The Theory of Names im Plato’s Cratylus by Richard Nonmson Plato’s Cratylus is about ¢iparva, but what No English word is equivalent to the Greek word ‘¢vépaza’, but. nearest to it comes ‘names’. We may therefore say roughly that the Cratylus is about names. But an évoye differs from a name in at least two ways, (1) In English names are primarily proper names like "Socrates’, and to eall ‘man’ a general name isa little peculiar, though it is done and the dictionary recognizes it; but in Greek ‘man’ is every bit as good an évoxa as ‘Socrates’. (2) “Ovoua’ is much closer to ‘word’ than ‘name’ is. This is partly because ‘é92a" embraces general nouns far more easily than ‘name" does, and largely because there is no equi- valent for ‘word’ in Greek. Approx ns lo our notion of a word exist in the word ‘éxs;" (but prose does not like this word), and in the phrase ‘aes }fZeug" (but that is a phrase, nota word, and the usey Agiews that Aristotle lists 1456b20 are not words), and in longer expressions including Plato’s ‘ti ‘Tis pues ens” (So. 262D); but equivalents do not exist. The function of the missing word ‘word’ is often performed by ‘dua’. Thus, when Epicurus says ‘sx dduars 2 dpyig wh; Oise. yevisfias' (Diogenes Laertins X 75-76), he means to be talking about words in general. He ot conscious of confin- himself to one kind of word, as we are when we talk about names, Owing to this tend of the word ‘sy9p2" towards the meaning ‘word’, é#pat2 are not equivalent to names, Also owing to this tendency, people ofien think it better to translateRICHARD ROBINSON by ‘words’ and to say that the Cratylus is about Yot ‘eva’ is ‘name’ rather than “word', and the Grecks did not realize nearly as much as we do the elion, belween the species name and ils ge word, A passage like lnlo's Sophist 261D-262C, where the word ‘vega’ is Inbor- fously used first in a gen «i then im a specific sense, expresses the rare struggle of a great man towards a distine- tion which, thanks lo hi ig now common property, Even Aristotle's definition of ‘cvesa" (De Int. 16019) docs not achieve the generality of our ‘word’, When oa Greek heard the word ‘dua’ he thought first of a proper name, then of general names, occasionally also of adjectives, rarely also of verbs (De Jat, 16619), still more rarely of preposilions or conjunctions, In his conception of an de there lay undistinguished at least five notions that are distinct now: the proper name; the name, the word, the noun, and the subject of predication. Ii is still less prudent to translate ‘éaza” by ‘language’ and suy that the Cratylus is about language. ‘This translation would be offen wrong and mever necessary. [It may be right ‘Socrates’ in Cratylus 424-5 in speaking of a plan eal language, but it is certainly not right to use the nguage’ in translating the passage. A language is ‘the whole body of words and of methods of combining them used by a nalion, people, or race; a “tongu (Shorter Ozjord English Dictionary), What, if anything, i the Greek equivalent? Language is near to 7w¥i, or voice, because it is (in its primary form al any rate) voice articulated as a symbol; and nent of language can be referred to as. ‘swvhy Sengipiicata 7h tiyvy' (Plato Prof. 322A), The word is common in the Cratylus, often in its first meaning of ‘voice’ (e.g. 423B-D), but often also in the meaning of ‘language or tongue’, as in “thy “Arne + 398D, and ‘Bhdwsie gwriy’ 4096, and ence of the jogue, Bul it never appears as a subject of vestigation in the Cratylus, still less as the topic of the al And Aristotle makes clear in his Inquiries concern- g Animals IVD that pert is never quite the same as language, because language never is simply what go) is primarily, mamely, voice produced in a pharynx.THE THE: AY OF NAMES IN PLATO'S CRATYLUS 222 There are three other Greek words that come near lo our dawns”. Aristotle (loc, cit.) culation of the-voice by the tongue, nd varies from man tow “Asidextog” comes close fo our ‘language’ in easily bringing up the idea of different dinlects or lang but it departs from And conversation is what is in the Cratylus. Another Greek word that comes close to our ‘language’ is ‘logos’. Whereas in his Inquiries concerning Animals Avis. totle finds the peculiarity of man’s g0vi to be 9 3 Palities he finds it to be 4y ol, 12, 125307-18). All beasts, he there says, can signal pleasure and pain by means of voice, but il good and bad and their species. Bywater uses. the word ‘linguage’ to translate aa ng Plato's dsfevig’y (Letter VIL, S40AL). And in the Crafylus it is possible thal ‘keyev’ is to be translated by ‘language™ at 425. Nevertheless, logos is not identical with language. “Two verbs cannot make a language’ means something different from ‘two verbs cannot make a logos’ (see Plato's So. 262B). A logos can be a statement, which a language cannot be, We can use the word ‘logos’ to say in Greek that language is man's most. valuable possession, but not to say that there are filly different languages in India, In any case, logos is not the topic of the Geatylus; and, when it comes under scrutiny at all this dialogue, it does so nol in its meaning of ‘language’ but in its meaning of ‘statement’ (385, 431), Another Greek word that comes close to our ‘language’ is " 2M. is indeed in some Greek authors very like our ‘language’. In the Crefylus, however, so far as 1 have observed, it always means an organ of the body, the tongue (4228, 423B, 4208, 4274, 427B). Ast cites no use of it in the I sense from any work by Plate. sither 44yos nor Zdlaeeg nor sux nor yMiere is the topic of the Cratylus, but évigota, it is usually better to say that the Crafytus is about names than to say that it is about language. We may pass the use of “Sprachphilosophie™224, AICHARD ROBINSON and such words in the title of books about the Cratylus; but we had better not say that “the ostensible subject of discussion is the origin of language’ (A. E, Taylor, Plato The Man and his Work, ed. 2, p. 77), or that ‘the main theme of the Cra- tylus is obviously the relation of language to thought and reality’ (Shorey, What Plato Said 267). What aspect of names does the Cratylus discuss? Their correciness or épfétrg, Correctness of names is announced as the topic in the third sentence, and continues to be the sole topic throughout, except that there is something like a short appendix on the theory that all things are always in flux, The Cratylus is definitely mot one of these dialogues where two apparently unrelated topics seem to share the speakers’ atten- tion, It is almost wholly occupied in examining the theory that ‘names are not merely random, but have a certain correct- mess’ (397A). Since the Cratylus is solely about the correctness of names, it is not about the origin of names, either wholly or in part. The passage just quoted from Taylor includes, therefore, a second mistake, the common mistake that the Crafylas dis cusses origins. The Cratylus discusses two contrary theses, slated al the beginning; and neither of them mentions origins de, mor represented any of his characters as the mistake of guessing how language hegan or supposing he knew how language began. Nobody in the dinlogue inquires how names began, or where they began, or when they began, or whether they began more than once, or whether there was a clean breakaway from animal sounds. Plate had as liltle interest in the o1 of names as in other kinds of genesis, (Cf Julius Deuschle, Die Platonische Sprochphilosophie, 1852, §. 44. This is one of the best books on Plato's Cratylus.) No argument is brought for or against nm that language began as a deliberate and self- conscious invention by some unusually clever man, who pro- posed it to his companions and had it accepted by them. Otto Apell, im the introduction to his translation of the jozue (pp. 2, 4), gives a false impression by using the words ‘Ursprung” and ‘entstanden’. ‘The false opinion, that Plato's Cratylus discusses the origin of names, is easy to fall into for two reasons. The origin of