AY 2004-2005

IRAQ ESTIMATE
WRITING ASSIGNMENT

LARRY KERR

MARK W. CLARK / GG-15

SEMINAR 13

FRANCIS A’HEARN, PRIMARY FACULTY ADVISOR

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces

National Defense University
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-5062
 MISSION

Mission Analysis: President Bush’s stated goal for the operation is for the U.S. forces, with

her coalition partners, to establish a “free, peaceful, and democratic” Iraq. The Iraqi elections

will be in January 2005. These elections are the first step in establishing a national assembly that

will produce and ratify a constitution by October 2005. The current Iraqi provisional

government continues to support the coalition efforts to establish peace and oversee a valid and

fair election process. Successful elections and ratification of a constitution will underscore that

"it was important to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that their interests are being taken into

account."1

The coalition needs to establish a secure environment to support elections and eventually

transition control to the Iraq militia and government. The military enemy is the insurgents in

country that are attempting to disrupt the election process and generally resist the establishment

of a new Iraq government. However, internal factions could also threaten stability and

accomplishment of the mission. This mission initiates immediately and will continue until the

transition is complete. As our forces capture or destroy the insurgent forces, the level of military

confrontation will decrease. Establishing the secure environment to support the election process

is high priority.

Mission Statement: In the near term, create and maintain a security situation in Iraq to

support the successful conduct of elections. Over the longer term, direct operations in such a

way as to facilitate an early turnover of all security and governance functions to Iraqi authorities.

Minimize coalition casualties while performing this mission.

SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION

Situational Analysis

2
 Geostrategic Context. Three distinct factions exist in the Iraq population of

approximately 25 million: Kurds, Shi’ites, and Sunnis.2 These factions have cultural and

religious differences. The oil resources of the country are split with predominance in the

Kurdish (north) and Sunni (south) regions.3 Oil production and revenues are the significant

economic factor. Technology and telecommunications infrastructures are improving with

rehabilitation of services (such as utilities, health centers, and education). A minority of the

Sunnis and a majority of the Shi’ites support violence against the coalition and want to see the

coalition forces leave immediately.4 No organized political party has significant popular support.

According to an ABC poll, 70% of the Iraqi people are opposed to political parties largely

because of the heritage of the Baath party.5 Each of the ethic factions will want to ensure their

interests are part of the new political dynamic. The Kurds will not want to relinquish gains in

areas of self-governance and policing. The Shi’ites will not want to revert to a subservient

position. The Sunnis, with their broad Arab support, will not want to accept Shi’ite or Kurd

dominance in governing power.6

Analysis of the Adversary. The primary adversaries are the Shi’a Mehdi Army of

Moqtada al-Sadr (Shi’ite) and the Al-Jam’iya al-Salafiya al-Mujahida (Sunni Resistance). Al-

Sadr has resorted to violence and operated “at the level of the poor, marginalized, and

dispossessed.”7 He has used Iraqi nationalism to spur support. Al-Sadr actively speaks against

Kurdish leadership. He has increased his power, both politically and militarily, since Najaf. His

forces rise from the people and are therefore difficult to estimate exact strength.

The Salafiya is a Sunni resistance organization, which embraces similar ideology as Al

Quada. It has been responsible for numerous ambushes of coalition forces. Salaf groups operate

3
globally and are active in Saudi Arabia. The Salaf ideology leaves no room for compromise with

western ideals.8

Other adversaries exist based on Islamic factions and nationalities but pose a lesser threat

since the coalition attacked them at the start of the campaign. Al Quada continues to operate in

the region but is not considered a major threat to this phase of the mission.

Friendly Situation. The coalition forces are approximately 150,000.9 In addition to the

deployed coalition, approximately 200,000 Iraqi military, 40,000 Iraqi police, 5,000 Iraqi border

police, and 20,000 Iraqi officers in the Facilities Protection Service are commissioned by the

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and ready to support military and law enforcement

efforts.10

Political order exists on three levels – local, national, and sovereign. However, these

levels are not well connected. A governing council was created to ensure Iraqi partnership in the

process. This council, now part of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), has provided Iraqi

leaders a platform to press for exposure.11

Restrictions. Military solutions involving extensive combat with the Sunni or Shi’ite

factions could create a public outcry over excessive force, civilian casualties, and collateral

damage. Small tactical victories are likely to create more insurgency.12 The mission continues to

be creation of a secure situation.

Assumptions. Coalition support will continue at present levels. Insurgency will not

change even while suppression activities continue. The Iraqi factions will continue to work

politically with the IIG to support elections in January.

Deductions. The coalition, along with the Iraqi security forces, is equipped to conduct

the operations. Although insurgency will attempt to disrupt the political process, the IIG will

4
succeed in conducting elections.

Courses of Action Analysis

COR-1. Increase military presence (coalition and Iraqi) before elections. Attack

insurgency strongholds. Capture or kill insurgent forces. This COA requires an additional

25,000 forces. Accelerate training of the Iraqi security forces to operate with the coalition

forces. Procure and supply additional armament for the effort. Coalition forces lead the attacks

in the cities. Capture and turn over insurgent forces to the Iraqi security force.

COR-2. Continue current posture. Accelerate and expand the training of the Iraqi

security forces. Greatly expand the role of the Iraqi security forces to assume military control

and provide law enforcement. Seek friendly Arab aid in training and monitoring of the election

process. Focus voter registration across the nation.

COR-3. Withdraw coalition forces from the cities. During the election phase, Iraqi

security forces will provide security and law enforcement. The United Nations (UN) will

provide observers of the election process to validate the process and the results. Coalition forces

withdraw to staging areas and respond only to insurgency as requested by either the Iraqi

security forces or the UN.

ANALYSIS OF ADVERSARY CAPABILITIES

COR-1. The most likely enemy course of action would be increased insurgency and

suicide attacks. With expanded coalition military forces, the insurgency will take up positions in

mosques and schools to ensure coalition response will increase collateral damage and civilian

casualties. Negative sentiment toward the United States and the coalition will result. Due to

extreme civil unrest and terrorist actions, reduced election participation will cause international

concern over the election validity.

5
 COR-2. This COR is no surprise to the enemy or the international community. The

current level of insurgency will not dramatically change. The coalition and Iraqi security forces

are already operating effectively in this approach. The insurgents will continue to attempt to

disrupt elections but will not prevail. The coalition is continually growing stronger with the

increase in training and distributed to support the election process.

COR-3. The insurgents will continue violence and attempt to overwhelm the lesser

prepared and trained Iraqi security forces. Response time for the coalition forces will be a factor.

Violence will lead to suppressed voter participation. International concern over the election

turnout will call to question the validity of the election.

COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION

Each of the three COAs is adequate, feasible, and acceptable. However, the international

community will question acceptability in most instances.

“There should be no illusions that the reconstruction of Iraq will be anything but difficult,
confusing, and dangerous for everyone involved. However, segmenting the strategy into distinct
phases and ensuring that Iraqis play a major role in determine the fate of their country will
reduce the chance that one brutal strongman will be substitute for another – reproducing
historical patterns and necessitating future interventions – and will also help increase the
likelihood that the United States is seen internationally, in the region, and in Iraq to be working
to promote Iraqi interests as opposed to assumed U.S. ones.” 13

COA-1. Attack and elimination of the insurgent forces will ensure the election process is

conducted and less violent. Collateral damage and civilian casualties will be high. The

international community and the Iraqi people will question means and motives. Iraqi nationalism

will intensify and call for complete withdraw of the coalition.

6
 COA-2. COA-2 does not change the international opinion. Strength of the coalition forces

remains the same. The Iraqi security forces receive more experience along side of coalition

forces. Public exposure of the Iraqi security forces is increased. Perceived Iraqi control of the

election will ensure international recognition and validation of the election results. Although

insurgency will continue, distribute coalition forces to ensure the election process and the

mission is successful.

COA-3. COA-3 has an advantage of reduced coalition casualties but does not support a

controlled and stable environment for the elections. When insurgency occurs, the delay in

response by coalition forces will result in higher Iraqi security force casualties. This action will

also make it appear that the Iraqi security forces are not ready to assume control. Increased

violence and the reduced turnout rate for the elections will cause the internationals community to

invalidate the results.

DECISION

The coalition forces will continue with the current posture (COR-2). Expand the role of the

Iraqi security force and ensure the public exposure of their actions. Coalition public affairs will

manage the publicity efforts. Iraqi forces will be under the direction supervision of qualified

Iraqi personnel. The Department of State will request support from the friendly Arab nations to

provide funding and training of the Iraqi security force. International observers will monitor the

election process. The coalition will need to support the voter registration process to obtain a

65% registration goal. Iraqi forces, with full coalition support, will maintain constant pressure

on the insurgent forces and protect the major polling places.

7
Endnotes

8
1
Government CustomWire, “US, Russian leaders discuss UN resolution on Iraq,” May 28, 2004
2
Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iraq War. Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut. Page
494
3
Chatham House. “Iraq in Transition: Vortex or Catalyst?” Briefing Paper, Sept 2004, page 3
4
Cordesman Anthony H. “Iraq: What is to be done.” Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C.
May 5, 2004. Page 1
5
Ibid. Page 5.
6
Chatham House. Page 2
7
Ibid. Page 4.
8
Ibid. Page 11.
9
Inside the Pentagon. “DoD can’t sustain current stability operations,” page 1
10
Jabar, Faleh A. “Post conflict Iraq. A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy” Special Report 120, United
States Institute for Peace, May 2004. Page 6
11
Ibid. Page 1
12
Cordesman, CSIS. Page 6
13
Djerejian, Edward P. and Wisner, Frank G. (co-chairs) “Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq. Council
on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. Jan 23, 2003. Page 2.