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UNIT-I

INTERPRETATION OF STATUES

• INTRODUCTION-
The word statute is derived from an old French word “estatus”,
“statum” which means a law, regulation, rule, Act or ordinance.
Simply means a law enacted by the legislature.

• DEFINITION
Maxwell defines statutes as the ‘will’ of the legislature.
• PROCESS OF MAKING STATUTE
Either the central legislature or the State Legislature makes a law.
Initially it is a bill, when the bill finally becomes a law, it is called a
statute.

• PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

1. It is very often observed that lawyers and courts become busy in


unfolding the meaning of ambiguous words and expressions and
resolving inconsistencies.

2. Difficulties arise by various reasons such as words used are not


scientific symbols with precise or definite meaning. E.g- atom
3. Intention of the legislator – The conventional way is to seek the
intention of its maker.

4. The function of the court is only to expound the law and not to
legislate. After the enacting process, the legislature becomes
“functus officio” (office has come to an end) so the legislature
cannot interpret itself.

5. The process of construction or interpretation combines both


literal and purposive approach. A statute may be best interpreted
in such a way.

6. In the task of interpreting and applying a statute, judges have to


be conscious that in the end, the statute is the master and not the
servant of the judgement. Interpretation can be done with
permissible limits.

• The intention of the legislature can be said to have two


aspects :
a. Meaning- First aspect is meaning which tells what the words
means
b. Purpose & object – second aspect includes purpose and object of
enacting the statutes

• Courts / Judges cannot destroy a statute.

• EARLIER PRACTICE

• In U.O.I v Filip Tiago De Gama


The SC explained the object or purpose of Interpretation as “ the
paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the
legislature intended. The statute is neither a literary text nor a divine
revelation. Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and
unchanged. If there is obvious anomaly in the application of law, the
court could shape the law to remove the anomaly (fair and unfair
features of law-which needs a change).

• In Keshavji Rajivji v. CIT (1990)


As long as there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, resort to
any interpretative process to unfold the legislative intent becomes
impermissible. The need for interpretation arises when the words
used in the statute are ambivalent and does not manifest the intention
of the legislature.
• In Motor owners Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Modi Co. Ltd
The SC held “where language is ambiguous or capable of
more than one meaning , court must sympathetically and
imaginatively discover the true purpose and object of the
provision by filling gaps, clearing doubts and mitigating
(reducing) hardships, harshness and or unfair consequences.

• Ita scriptum est is a latin maxim which means Letter of the


law must prevail
If the statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation then
the court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true
intention of the legislature. Eg :Dowry Prohibition Act.
HEYDON’S RULE/ PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION/ MISCHEIF
RULE

• In some cases, difficulties arise in interpreting the construction


of sentences, phrases or their true meaning. Such construction
may give double meaning and absurdity to the Act.
• The Mischief Rule, go deep to see the intention of the
legislation and object of the statute and the mischief sought to
be remedied by the legislature.
• For this purpose, courts may –
a) Take help of counsels
b) Refer all materials connected with statutes
c) Press release
d) Agitation, comments of legal experts
e) Journals
f) Debates on the floor of Parliament,
g) Law Commission Reports etc.
Therefore, the background history of that statute shall be considered to
know its object and intention of the legislature.
• The rule emanated and facts of the Heydon’s case-
A college had certain properties on its name. The management had given
certain lands to W and his son and after them to S & G. This is called
“Doubling of Estates”. The England Parliament passed an enactment –
‘The Statute – 31 Henry VIII’ to prevent this doubling of estate and
misappropriation of properties. The property was taken away by the
crown and previous leases were cancelled (Heydon & G) challenged it in
the court. The court took the guidance of Mischief Rule of construction
and upheld the statute and the act of the crown.
Purpose: The object of the Parliament was to protect the properties of
ecclesiastical(church) and religious properties.
Statute 31 Henry VIII provided the remedy to protect the object of the
statute. According to it, leases creating doubling of estates or mischief
was held to be void and which would be against the true meaning of the
Act and remedy provided by the Parliament. The Court upheld the validity
of cancellation of leases.

• Goriss v. Scott
The defendants were carriers who engaged the plaintiff to transport his
sheep. Heavy storm occurred and sheep were washed away. The Carriage
Act provides that “It is the duty of the owners of the carriers to make pens
separately for his sheep and consignee sheep”
The Court applied “Mischief Rule” of interpretation and observed the
object of the statute was to prevent infection spreading from owner’s
animals to those of another”
Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiff could not seek t remedy for a
different mischief. The mischief sought to be remedied in the Carriers Act
was to prevent the consignee’s animals from spreading disease by the
diseased animal of the carriers whereas here the consignee’s animals were
swept because of heavy rain and storm which is an Act of God.
• Smith v. Hughes
In this particular case section 1(1) of The Street Offences Act, 1959 was
in question.
Facts: A prostitute makes a signal to the passer-by from the first floor of
her house. When she was produced before the court, her contention was
that she was not standing on the road and making a signal or calling a
customer, and this Act is only applicable to them, not to the prostitutes
who stand on the first and second floor and who do not molest the passer
by.
Court applied the mischief rule of interpretation. The mischief sought to
be remedied was “prostitutes not making signal and molest the passer-by”
and not the place from where they call.
• In Carew & Co. v. UOI
Held: “When two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer
that which advances the remedy and suppress the mischief as the
legislature envisioned.”

• U P Bhoodan Yagna Amiti v. Brij Kishore


Held: Having regard to the object of the U P Bhoodan Yagna Act,
1953 to implement Bhoodan Movement, the expression “Landless
Pension” in Section 14 includes landless labourers and does not
include landless businessmen residing in a city.
• While construing an Act, mischief rule enables considering of
four matters:
a) What was the law before making of the Act?
b) What was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide
remedy?
c) What is the remedy that the Act has provided?
d) What is the reason of the remedy?

COMMENCEMENT OF A STATUTE

Section 5 of the General Clauses Act provides “when any central


Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day,
then it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives
the assent of the President/Governor, unless the contrary is
expressed”.

All the provisions of a statute, generally come into force on the


same day and not at different times but sometimes some
provisions come into force on one day and the rest of the
provisions may come into force on some other day as per the
intention of the legislature and on different dates in different states
and this day will be considered as the day of commencement of a
statute.

Example : Indian Constitution.


Some Articles came into effect on 26thNovember 1949 but the
entire constitution came into force on January 26th, 1950.

The rules, bye laws made under the provision of a Principal


Act/Parent Act will not come into effect or commences until that
Principal Act commences.
A Statute has to be published in the official gazette, be it made by
the Central legislature or the State legislature.

OPERATION OF A STATUTE

There are two types of operation of a Statute :


1. Prospective operation and
2. Retrospective operation

Retrospective operation :
a. Express
b. By necessary implication
1.Nandumal Girdharlal v State of U.P
“It is the legislature which has the plenary (absolute) powers to
legislate prospectively or retrospectively”.

2.ShibnathvPorter
The court held that the first general principle is that the law
existing at the commencement of an action or proceedings must
decide the rights of the parties and not the law that existed at the
date of the judgement or order but where the statute gives its
provisions retrospective operation in express terms it would be a
matter for consideration how far the retrospective operation
extended and whether pending actions were intended to be
affected by it”.

3.Where a vested right, on the date of amendment or whether


substantive or procedural law has accrued to or has been acquired
by a party, the amending enactment cannot take away such right
unless it is expressly or by necessary intendment made
retrospective.

4.General Rule is that No law should have retrospective operation


-
Examples: a. If I have lost a case and go for appeal and in the
meantime some amendment comes to the enactment which gives
retrospective effect then it might effect adversely to me.

5.Nova constitution futuris is formam imponere debet non


praeteriies means if a person is already vested with the right it
cannot be altered and therefore the statute has to be construed
prospectively.

6.In Nathydevi vs Radhadevi Gupta


The Supreme Court observed that “Even if there exists an
ambiguity in the language or the same is capable of two
interpretations, the interpretation which serves the object of the
Act must be given effect to. In such a case the doctrine of
purposive construction should be adopted”.

7.In Mithileshkumari V Prem Bihari Khare


The Supreme Court laid down the principle that if there is a statue
taking away a vested right retrospectively, it is commonly
presumed to be unjust and oppressive unless expressly or
impliedly retrospective effect is given in the statute.

Presumption against construing an Act as having


retrospective operation.

The golden rule of construction is that in the absence of anything


in the enactment to show that it has a retrospective operation, it
cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law
applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was
passed.
One leading example section 46(2) of Government of India Act,
1935 which enacted that “Burma shall cease to be part of India”
was construed not to effect the continuance of pending action in
Indian court which related to the properties situated in Burma.

Circumstances under which retrospective operation justified

Although it is a good general rule that law should not be


retrospective but in cases in which the laws are meant for the
benefit of the community and individuals, they may have an effect
from a date antecedent to their commencement.

Pending actions- Presumption against retrospectivity

There is a strong presumption against applying a new Act to a


pending action when the language of the Act does no say so.
The Punjab High court held that “Rules of procedure cannot act
respectively if they interfere with vested rights”.
Example : Right to compensation on acquisition of land by the
government for public use.

Procedural enactments – Presumption of Retrospectivity

The law of procedure defines the modes and conditions by which


litigant seeks his remedy in a court of law. This law of procedure
comprises all steps which party must take in order to get the aid of
court for enforcement of his rights.
Example :Right to appeal, to interrogate the other party

If an Act of the Parliament alters the mode of procedure, he can


only proceed according to the altered mode. If, therefore a new
Act affects procedure only, then it applies to all actions pending
as well as future in contrast to statutes either Civil or Cr.P.C.

It is a general principle that statutes are not to operate


retrospectively so as to defeat vested rights but such operation may
be given by express enactment or by implication from the
language used.

Law of Limitation - Presumption of Retrospectivity

The right of suit comes to an end after the expiry of the period of
limitation and once this right had become barred under an earlier
Limitation Act, it cannot be revived by a later limitation Act even
if it provides a larger period of limitation than that provided by the
earlier Act. No one has a vested right in procedure.

The law of limitation is ordinarily prospective, unless the contrary


appears by express words or by necessary implication, a statute
extending the period of limitation is presumed not to operate
retrospectively so as to review a decree which has become
unenforceable by operation of the law of the limitation.

Court’s duty is to enforce the bar though it may be harsh


Though it is sometimes harsh and seems to be inequitable, because
the legislature has cast a duty upon them to see that the suits and
application of file in time. They have no option but to give a
prospective operation to the provisions of the limitation Act
according to the strict grammatical meaning of the words.

When a question of limitation is raised it ought to be decided in


accordance with the law of limitation in force at the time of
institution of the suit and not that in force at the time of the cause
of action unless there is any express provision to the contrary.

Statutes of limitation- when can be given retrospective effect


When the later Act provides a shorter period of limitation than
that provided by the earlier Act, right of suit which is substituting
according to the earlier Act on the date will not be taken to be
extinguished.

Penal statutes - Retrospectivity

Retrospective operation of penal laws is not permissible as Article


20(1) of the constitution provides that except in cases where such
law is beneficial to the accused.

A person cannot be convicted for an act which was not an offence


under the law, in force at the time the act was committed.

No person shall be subject to a penalty greater than that which


might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the
commission of the offence.

Example : Ratan Lal v/s State of Punjab


Boy.... 16 years ..........house trespass....... attempt of molesting a
girl of 7 years. 6 months rigorous imprisonment and also fine.
Probation of Offenders, Act 1958 came into force which provided
that a person below 21 years cannot be imprisoned.
Judgement : Reducing /the punishment cannot set aside.

Taxing statutes - Presumtion against retrospectivity


There is a strong presumption against a taxing or fiscal statute having
retrospective operation. In imposing a burden on the subject, the court
must be very careful in interpreting a fiscal statute. Fiscal legislation
imposing a liability is generally by the normal presumption that it is not
retrospective.

Strict construction of Taxing statutes having a retrospective effect

As held by the Supreme Court, a provision in a taxing statute which is


retrospective and has the effect of opening up liabilities which had
become barred by lapse of time will be subject to the rule of strict
construction. In interpreting a fiscal statute the Supreme Court further
observed in another case that the court cannot proceed to make good
deficiency is if there be any, but the court must interpret the statute as it
stands and in case of a doubt in a manner favourable to the taxpayer.

Retrospective effect of a fiscal statute - not unconstitutional

As held by the High Court of Kerala, Legislature cannot give retrospective


operation to tax in respect of an area over which it had no territorial
jurisdiction during the period of the retrospective operation.

Retrospective effect of fiscal statute given by a validating Act of


Parliament is not unconstitutional if it is within the competence of the
legislature to do so.
Declaratory and Explanatory Acts usually retrospective

Declaratory Acts unless otherwise provided are usually retrospective.


Example : The Income Tax (Amendment) Act of 1985, the Supreme Court
clearly gave an explanation of House Property which is an example of
Declaratory Act is usually retrospective in nature.

Remedial Statutes - Presumption in favour of Retrospectivity

Statutes passed to protect Public Interest are to be so construed as to give


them a retrospective effect when the intention of passing and Act is to
protect the public against the some evil or abuse. It is sometimes allowed
to operate retrospectively even though by such operation it deprives some
person or persons some vested rights. These remedial statutes are not
necessarily to be always retrospective, it depends on the very intention of
the legislature, the very object of the statute itself. Whether it is necessary
to give the statue a retrospective operation or not, is favoured by the
courts.

Statutes – Territorial and Extra Territorial operation ---IPC/Civil


Laws

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CODIFYING STATUTE

INTRODUCTION
Codification is the act of putting a body of laws, related to each other as
to avoid inconsistency and overlapping of code. Codifying means
consolidating entire law on particular subject, into code. It organises and
systemizes the statute. Codification has to be done for a legislative
enactment.

• A codifying statute states in detail the whole of the law upon a


particular subject, the draftsman attempting to include in his code
both the pre-existing statutory provision and also the common law
(uncodified law) rules.

• Codification is the latest device to bring about harmony, simplicity,


accessibility, uniformity and symmetry in the legal principles.

• The purpose of codifying statute is to present in orderly and


authoritative statement of leading rules of law on a given subject.

Example: Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is a codified statute with respect


to intestate succession among Hindus.

• Paton / Codification is possible in two types of countries:

1. First, a country with well-developed systems where the possibility of


further development is remote
2. Secondly, a country with underdeveloped systems which cannot
grapple with the new economic problems

CONSOLIDATING STATUTE
To consolidate means to combine into single whole. With regard to
legislation, it means, where law is scattered in different Acts to combine
all such Acts into one Act by repealing all former statutes.

• Consolidating statute is one which consolidates the law on a


particular subject at one place, it collects all statutory enactments
on a specific subject and gives them the shape of one statute with
minor amendments if necessary.

• The purpose of consolidating statute is to present the whole body


of statutory law on a subject in complete form, repairing the former
one.

• Consolidating Act may be an amending Act. This additional purpose


is usually indicated in the preamble or in the long title by use of
words “An Act to consolidate and amend”.

• EXAMPLE: (1) Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 – An Act


to consolidate the law on Arbitration in India – Arbitration Act
1940, Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act,1937, Foreign
Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act,1961.
(2) Cr. P.C

MANDATORY/ IMPERATIVE/ OBLIGATORY STATUTE

• A mandatory statute is one which compels performance of certain


things or compels that a certain thing must be done in a certain
manner or form.
• A mandatory provision in a statute is one which must be observed,
as distinguished from a directory provision, which leaves it optional
with the department or officer to which it is addressed to obey it or
not, as it thinks fit.

• When a duty is created by a statute and there is no option but to do


it in the manner prescribed by the statute, it is imperative in nature.

• Examples:
Taxing Statutes
Environment Protection Act, Rules.

DIRECTORY STATUE OR PERMISSIVE STATUTE

• A directory statute merely directs or permits a thing to be done


without compelling its performance and it is sufficient if it be
obeyed or fulfilled substantially.

• A complete non-compliance of a directory provision has been


held in many cases as not affecting the validity of the Act.
Therefore, directory requirements fall under two heads:

1. Those, which should be substantially complied with to make the


Act valid.
2. Those, which even if not at all complied will have no effect on the
validity of the Act.

• In some cases, the conditions or forms prescribed by the statute have


been regarded as essential to the Act or thing regulated by it and
their omission has been held fatal to its validity.
• In others, such prescriptions have been considered as merely
directory, the neglect of them involving nothing more than liability
to a penalty, if any, were imposed, for breach of the enactment.

• Therefore, where a statute prescribes certain formalities to be


completed, but which are not essential and may be regarded
disregarded without invalidating the thing to be done are called
directory.

• Examples: Labour Laws, Water Facility, Toilet Facility etc.

DECLARATORY ACT

A declaratory statute is to remove doubts as to the meaning of existing


law and to correct a construction considered erroneous by the legislature.
This may happen, for instance, where the courts have been interpreting a
particular expression as connoting a specific meaning which the
legislature feels is a wrong notion of the expression. In such a case, the
legislature may pass a declaratory statute declaring the correct meaning
of that expression thereby setting at rest, the controversy about the correct
meaning of the expression.

ENABLING STATUTE

• A statute which makes it lawful to do something which would not


otherwise be lawful, is called an enabling statute.
• It is one which enlarges the common law where it is narrow. By an
enabling Act, the legislature enables something to be done.
• It empowers at the same time by necessary implication to do the
indispensable things for carrying out the object of the legislation.
• One of the principles of the law with regard to the effect of an
enabling Act is that, if the legislature enables something to be done,
it gives power at the same time by necessary implication to do
everything which is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out
the purpose in view.
• Example: The acquisition of land for public benefit is an enabling
statute. Whenever legislature gives power to the public body to do
anything of a public character, the legislature must also give to the
public body all rights without which the power would be wholly
unavailable.

TAXING STATUTES

Introduction-

• Article 265 of the Constitution of the India provides “No tax should
be levied or collected except by authority of law”

• Article 366(28) of the Constitution of India defines Taxation and


reads, “Taxation includes the imposition of any tax whether general
or local or special and tax shall be construed accordingly”.

• According to Adam Smith, a Scottish Philosopher, there are four


famous maxims on taxation:
1.Canon of equality: The subjects of every state ought to contribute
towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible in proportion
to their respective abilities, that is, in proportion to the revenue which they
are respectively enjoying under the protection of the state.
2.Canon of certainty: The tax which an individual is bound to pay, ought
to be certain and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of
payment, the quantity to be paid, must be be clear and plain to the
contributor and to every other person.

3.Canon of convenience: Every tax ought to be so levied at the time or


in the manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the
contributor to pay it.

4. Canon of economy: Every tax ought to be as little as possible over and


above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.

• Allocation:
Article 265 of the constitution of India states that no tax shall be
levied or collected except by authority of law. The Union and the
State Legislatures are empowered under the Constitution of India to
make laws for levying and collection of taxes within the ambit of
their legislature, jurisdiction as per the article 245 (1), 246(1) and
246(3) of the constitution of India.

• What is a Taxing Statute?


A taxing statute is one which provides for the procedure of collection,
calculation of percentage of tax to be levied and matters connected
therewith.

• There are three components of a taxing statute-


1. Subject of the tax
2. Person liable to pay the tax
3. The rate at which the tax is levied.

Subject Person
Rate
• Characteristics of taxes:

1. Taxes to be imposed by the government only.


2. Tax is a compulsory contribution of the taxpayer.
3. In the payment of a tax the element of sacrifice is involved.
4. Payment of a tax is the personal obligation of a taxpayer.
5. The aim of tax imposition is the welfare of the community as a whole
6. A tax is a legal collection.
7. An element of force of state is there but tax is not imposed to realise
the cost of benefit
8. Taxes paid may be assessed on income or capital but they are actually
paid out of income.
9. A tax may be imposed upon property or occupation or commodities but
there are actually paid by the individuals.
10.The purpose of the tax levy is raising public revenue.
11.Tax revenue is issued by the state for public purpose or common
benefit of all.
12.Tax does not involve quid-pro-quo (a favour/ advantage granted in
favour of something) between the taxpayer and the public authority.

• Taxing statutes may be classified as:


a. Direct taxes
Examples: Wealth tax, Gift tax, Income tax
b. Indirect taxes
Examples: Customs duty, Excise duty

• Objectives of Taxing Statute:

1. The imposition of taxes that is to collect revenue for the government.


2. Prevention of concentration of wealth- Article 39(c) of the
constitution of India provides that “the operation of the economic system
does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to
the common detriment”
3. To secure economic stability A taxing statute may be used to secure
economic stability and to remove economic fluctuations.

4. Secure adjustment in allocation of resources: To meet the


expenditure for certain functions revenue is to be raised through taxing
statutes. For example: defence, judiciary, railways, roads social and
cultural welfare etc.

5. To accelerate economic growth: For the purpose of promoting a


country's economic development, taxation may be used to achieve capital
formation.

6. Instrument of social control: Taxing statutes are recognised


instruments of social control and not merely a source of raising revenue.

• Methods of recovery
If a person does not voluntarily pay tax then every taxing statute has a
charging section and provisions laying down the procedure to assess the
tax and penalties and method of collection and contains provisions to
prevent pilferage of revenue.

• Interpretation of taxing statutes:


First, taxing statutes are to be construed strictly.
Secondly, the subject not to be made liable for payment of enhanced
court fee unless such a step is warranted by the clear provisions of the
statute and
Thirdly where there is doubt in the matter, interpretation favourable to
the subject should be preferred.
Strict construction of taxing statutes

1. The general rule is that a taxing statute should be construed strictly


that means, a person should not be taxed unless the words of the statute
unambiguously impose the tax on him.

2.If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law,
he must be taxed however great the hardship may appear to the
judicial mind to be.

3. The demand for payment of tax has to be in conformity with the


provisions of the statute. There is a charging section in the
statutes. Therefore, no one can be taxed by implication, before
taking any person it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of
the charging section of the taxing statute by clear words used in the
section.

4. No equitable construction is allowed in a taxing statute

❖ In AV Fernandes vs State of Kerala AIR 1957


The court observed that if the revenue department satisfies the court that
the case falls strictly within the provisions of the law, the subject can be
taxed. If on the other hand the case is not covered within the four corners
of the provision of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference.

❖ In Shrimati Saroj Agarwal vs CIT


The court clearly held in the matter of imposing tax, the power of
legislation cannot be taken over by the courts to supply the lecture on
our fiscal statutes, are to be strictly construed and the courts cannot
supplement the statute rules or regulations to impose any tax, fee or levy.

❖ In Diwan Brothers vs Central Bank of India, Bombay AIR 1976


It was held that the courts have to interpret the provisions of a fiscal statute
strictly so as to give benefit of doubt to the litigant.
• Is there beneficial construction of taxing statute?
❖ When construing the fiscal statute, the court has to lean in its
interpretation in favour of the subject rather than in favour of the
state. If provision in a fiscal statute, intended for the benefit of the
taxpayer, must be construed liberally in favour of the taxpayer with
a view to ensuring the benefit to him and not in a narrow and
pedantic manner with an eye to deprive him of the benefit.

❖ When the taxing statute admits of two reasonable constructions


the construction most favourable to the citizens should be adopted

❖ In CIT vs Bai Kakinaboo


It was held that if any of the subjects are clever enough to avoid taxation
by legal means they are at liberty to do so. There is nothing wrong in
condusing one's affairs within the law as not to attract taxation.
Evasion is an act of escaping by means of a trick or to escape from the
liability. Evasion of tax is illegal non-payment of tax which is due and
deliberate suppression or falsification of the truth of facts relating to one’s
true tax liability.

• Whether retrospective effect of a taxing statute is valid?

❖ In Mewar textile mills limited vs Union of India


It was observed that once a competent legislature has passed a fiscal law
with retrospective effect the tax levied thereby must be held to be by
authority of law and it would be perfectly constitutional and not invalid
because of its being retrospectivity.

❖ In Tikamdas Nathirmal vs state of Madhya Pradesh


It has been held that no retrospective effect should be given to a fiscal
statute unless there is a clear provision or unless the effect is necessary by
implication of the provision.
• Other Case laws

❖ In Rajasthan Roller Flour Mills Association vs State of


Rajasthan
The question of law which arose before the court was whether the
expression ‘wheat’ in section 14 of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 would
also include flour, maida, suji?
The SC held that though they are derived from wheat, they cannot be
declared as ‘declared goods’ and is not taxable.

❖ In Martand Douly & Farm vs Union of India


The milk products like cheese, dhai, butter, cream were exempted from
sales tax but these products when sold in sealed containers were not
exempted. There was no reason as why sale of these products in loose
qualities were exempted and the sale of same product in sealed containers
were made taxable.
The court applied the strict literal construction rejecting the contention
that the terms seal in the language meant the fixture of the seal of the seller
in which his name for sale description is exhibited.

❖ D.H. Bros Pvt. Limited vs Commissioner of Sales Tax


The appellant is a registered dealer under U.P. Sales Tax Act and engaged
in the sale of machinery including sugarcane crusher. He sought
exemption from sales tax contending that sugarcane crusher would be
included in item agricultural implements.
The Supreme Court rejected the contention saying that agricultural
implements are intended for ‘agricultural process’ where as sugarcane
crusher are used for preparing gur in a ‘manufacturing process’ and
therefore sugarcane crushers could not be included in agricultural
implements.

❖ In Azamjha vs Expenditure Tax Officer, Hyderabad


It was held by the SC that section 2(g) of the Expenditure Tax Act, 1957
provides definition of ‘dependent’ the portion of the language reads
dependent means where assessee is an individual, his or her spouse or
minor child and includes any person wholly or mainly dependent on the
assessee for support and maintenance. It was held that words wholly and
mainly dependent on assessee did not refer to spouse or minor child and
that spouse and minor child would be dependent even if they had their
separate income.

❖ Dunlop India Limited vs Union of India


The question was whether commodity known as ‘VP latex’ comes within
the meaning of rubber. The Supreme Court held that while using a word
in a taxing statute, the legislature always to keep in mind the popular
meaning of that word as understood in trade and commerce circles. There
is no doubt that VP latex is rubber in natural and popular sense of the term.
It has no ambiguity and the legislature while using the term had this
meaning in mind.

❖ In Philip John Plaskett Thomas vs CIT


Section 16(3) of the Income Tax Act. 1922 was strictly construed by the
Supreme Court. This section permits inclusion of such income of wife into
total income of husband where income arises to wife from assets
transferred by husband otherwise than for adequate consideration. It was
held that for application of this provision, husband and wife relation must
exist at the time when income accrued to wife and also at the time when
the transfer of assets is made. Income accruing to wife from assets
transferred to her prior to marriage cannot be taken into account for
computing total income.
BENEFICIAL STATUTE OR WELFARE OR SOCIAL ECONOMIC OR
REMEDIAL STATUTE

• Statute which purports to confer a benefit on individuals or


a class of persons, or which tend to protect persons against
oppressive act is called a Beneficial legislation or statute
• Beneficial statutes may be in the form of remedial, welfare
or socio-economic statutes
• The Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the
Constitution are the beneficial legislation to the citizens and
as per the DPSP, the Indian Government enacted several
statutes for the benefit of the people.
Some of them are as follows -
❖ The Employees’ State Insurance Act
❖ The Employees’ Provident Fund Schemes, 1952
❖ The Employees’ Pension Scheme
❖ The Payment of Gratuity Act
❖ The Payment of Bonus Act
❖ Family Pension Scheme
❖ The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education
Act, 2009
❖ The Equal Remuneration Act
❖ The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005

• The beneficial construction depends upon the latin maxim


“saluspopuliest suprema lex” that is the welfare of the people
is the supreme for the law. The legislature in the end should
render benefits to the weaker sections.
• The courts while interpreting the beneficial or welfare
statutes, should follow these principles/guidelines-
1. The principle established in construction of a statute is that
there is no room for taking a narrow view but the court is
entitled to be generous towards the person on whom the benefit
has been conferred. It is the duty of the court to interpret a
provision especially the beneficial provision liberally so as to give
a wide meaning rather than a restrictive meaning which would
negate the very object of the rule.
2.In construing the provision of beneficial enactment, the court
should adopt that construction which advances, fulfils and
furthers the object of the Act rather than the one which would
defeat the same and the render the protection illusory.
3. Beneficial piece of legislation has to be construed in its correct
perspective so as to fructify legislative intent underlying its
enactment.
4. Beneficial construction provision must be meaningfully
construed so as to advance the object of the Act without causing
any lacuna or defect appearing in the same.
5. Construction should observe purpose of the enactment and
should not defeat it. Construction should be such that no part of
the enactment is rendered otiose.
6. When beneficial legislation is construed wider interpretation
must be given for the advantage of the section of people, the target
group of the enactment.
7. The courts have a duty to construe the provisions of a statute
to advance the cause of justice and facilitate the day-to-day
working of the statute to serve the public interest and achieve the
object of social betterment.
8. While construing the beneficial legislation the courts must look
them as they are constitutionally valid or not.
9. Court should adopt a construction which advances the policy
of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than one which
curtail the benefit.
10. The court should make a purposeful interpretation so as to
effectuate the intention of the legislature and not a purposeless
one in order to defeat the intention of the legislators.
11. Where an earlier statue imposes rigorous punishment for an
offence and the ex-post facto statue (subsequent) mitigates such
rigour of earlier law and reduces the sentence, the earlier law must
be deemed to have been repealed by the subsequent statute by
applying rule of beneficial construction
12. According to beneficial construction where an Act does not
expressly confirm a right to the workmen but does not indicate
any negative intention either, the Act must be construed in the
interest of the work man.
13. The language of the beneficial statute must be construed so as
to suppress the mischief and advance its object.
14. Benefits cannot be allowed in contravention of statutory
provision. The language of a provision should neither be twisted
nor should the words be assigned any strained or unnatural
meaning just because certain benefits are to be granted.

Case laws
1. B. Shah vs Presiding Officer
The question before the court was the interpretation of
section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 under which an
expectant mother employee could take a maximum of 12
weeks of maternity leave.

2. In Spring Meadows Hospital V Ahluwalia, the Supreme


Court held that, if the parents have hired the services of a
hospital for the benefit of their child, they and the child can
maintain independent actions against the hospital for
deficient services.

3. In Unichoyi V State of Kerala


The Supreme Court held that the state government has to fix
Minimum Wages in an industry. The Act did not define what
is minimum wage, the Act also did not provide for taking into
consideration the paying capacity of an employer. It was
challenged before the court that it was violative of Article 19
(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. The court held that the Act
is valid and the Act been beneficial legislation must be
construed in favour of workers.
4. In Manohar Lal V. State of Punjab
Section 7 of Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1949 was in
question which provides that the shops and establishments
within the purview of this Act shall remain closed on one
day in a week. This provision was held not to be violative of
article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution because this restriction
was reasonable on fundamental right as it was necessary for
ensuring health and efficiency of workers.

5. In Jivabhai V Jagan
In this particular case, sub-section 2(A) was inserted to
section 34 of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
Amending Act, 1952 was under challenge. Eviction of tenant
by landlord was made more difficult by inserting sub-section
2(A). The Supreme Court held that the amending Act is a
beneficial piece of legislation and is meant to protect the
rights of tenants in case of any ambiguity in newly inserted
subsection 2(A), it shall be used in favour of the tenant.

REPEAL

• Meaning- Repeal is to recall/ revoke /cancel/ abolish /abrogate


• In Ramakrishna v/s Janpadsabha subject to constitutional
restriction, the general rule is that the power of the legislative body
to repeal a law is coextensive with its power to enact such a law.
It is the Constitution of India, which gives such power to the
legislature to repeal and only an amendment in the constitution can
take away such power.
• Nobody has a vested right in a statute.
• No Statute can make itself secure against repeal.
• Parliament can never enact a statute saying that it can never be
repealed.
• The object of repeal is to remove the dead matter or strike out
unnecessary acts and to remove confusion from the minds of public.
• When the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the same
subject matter the court would undoubtedly have to look into the
new provisions of the new Act only for the purpose of determining
whether the new Act indicates a different intention.

Kinds of repeal
Parliament has power to make law and repeal any existing law. It can
be Perpetual or Temporary statue and repeal is of two kinds:
Express repeal and Implied repeal

• Express repeal, the Parliament or the legislature may come out with
a distinct repairing enactment to declare that an earlier Act has been
abolished. The words which are generally used are as follows-
“Is hereby repealed
Shall cease to have effect
Shall be ineffective
Shall be invalid…….
• Implied repeal, the Parliament/Legislature may make an enactment
which is so inconsistent with the earlier Act that no harmony
between the two is possible or it covers the entire subject-matter of
the earlier statute. This is called implied repeal of the earlier Act.

ESSENTIALS OF RPEAL
• There must be a subsequent repairing.

• Such subsequent Act must seek to repeal an earlier Act.

• There must be specific words in the subsequent Act showing


intendment to affect repeal of an earlier Act.

In Implied repeal:
a. The subsequent Act is so inconsistent with the existing Act that one
of the two can remain in force.
b. an Act covers the whole subject of the earlier Act and is intended to
be a substitute of the earlier Act.

General principles of Implied Repeal:


1. Only prior legislation is repealed by implication. The later laws
abrogate the prior one. The subsequent Act directly contradict the
provisions of earlier.
2. Implied repeal may not operate on entire statute. It may repeal
some provisions of earlier Act.
3. Implied repeal of earlier law can be inferred only when the subject
matter of both the statues is same. However, still contradict to
each other in such a way that no harmony can be established
between the two.
4. A prior Special law is not repealed by the later General law
(Generalia specialibus non-derogate) Special Law cannot be
abrogated by a subsequent general law.
In Paradip Port Trust vs Their workman, 1977 The court held
that section 36 (4) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 provides that a
party cannot be represented by a legal practitioner before
Tribunal/Labour Court except with the consent of other party and
with leave of Labour Court/ Tribunal or National Tribunal.

In another example-
The Advocates Act, 1961 entitles all advocates to practice in all
courts and before any tribunal. It is an example General Act.
5. A prior General Law may be affected/abrogated by a
subsequent Particular or Specific Act (General specialibus
derogate) Special things derogate from general things.
Eg: The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1937 is a Special Act
which qualifies the rights of the Muslim women to obtain divorce
from their husband. It is not permissible to travel beyond this Act
and to decide the rights of the parties in the light of the earlier
general law which is to be deemed as modified by the present Act.

• Special Law v General Law


In Rupia Naik vs State of Mysore
Court held that if both general and special law exist side by side and both
of them apply to a particular person and both are inconsistent with each
other, then special rules will prevail being a special law as against the
general rules. However, if the general rule applies more appropriately to
a person and is not inconsistent with any other special rule in such case,
general rule will apply.
• In case of conflict between two Special Laws, the later Act should
prevail over the earlier Act. The normal rule followed by the courts
in such case is that unless it is absolutely clear that the operation of
earlier Act is curtailed by the later Act the prior Act is to continue
though the later Act covers the same field.

In Unnoda Prasad V Kristo Tacoma


The effect of two Acts, Bengal Tenancy Act, 1859 and Limitation Act,
1859 on the law of limitation was considered by the Privy Council. It was
held that the rule of Limitation under the Bengal Tenancy Act was not
affected by the rule of limitation under the latter Act. The first Act was a
Special Act regulating the relation between the landlords and tenants, the
second Act though prescribing the general procedure was considered as a
special Act in some sense since this is also related only to a particular
procedure that is limitation of action and not with substantial right
between the landlords and tenants. From this point of view, it was held
that the second Act did not in any way affect the first Act.

• Affirmative enactment is not repealed by a subsequent affirmative


Act the rule was stated in Foster’s case which is as follows-
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Shiv Shankar
It was observed that where the new affirmative words are such as by their
use it is found necessarily to import a contradiction but that is to say where
one can see that it must have been intended that the two should be in
conflict so that two could not stand together the second repeals the first.
• Implied repeal can be inferred if later law imposes different
punishment for same offence:
If the later statute again describes an offence created by an earlier statute
and imposes a different punishment or varies the procedure the earlier
statute is repealed by implication.

In State of Madhya Pradesh V Veereswara Rao


It has been observed that section 26 of General Clauses Act provides that
where an Act of omission constitutes an offence under two or more
elements then the offender shall be liable to be punished under either or
any of those enactments but shall not be punished twice for the same
offence. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India directs that no person
shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.

• Effects of repeal
The following are some of the general effects of repeal or consequences
of repeal:
1. Later Act abrogates prior one
2. Repealed Act ceases to exist and does not remain in force with effect
from the date of repeal
3. Except in relation to the past and closed transactions, statues after
repeal are completely obliterated (destroyed) as if it had never been
enacted. As such, all rights and causes of action under repealed
statute are destroyed.
4. When an Act is repealed, all laws passed under it stand repealed
unless there is a saving provision.
5. No proceedings can be commenced or continued under an Act after
it’s repeal
6. A Law can be retrospectively amended to validate the transaction
made under it even after its repeal.
7. The statute is completely obliterated/destroyed and all rights under
repealed institute are destroyed.

• Effect of expiry of temporary statutes


1. After expiry, the law comes to an end and no more remains in force
it becomes inoperative and loses its effect.
2. After expiry of a temporary Act no proceedings can be taken upon
it unless contrary is provided in the statute itself. If life of temporary
Act expires, consequences of the same also gets extinguished with
the date of expiry
3. If the prosecution has not ended before the date of expiry of the Act
and the legal proceedings remains pending under expired statute
such proceedings cannot be continued against a person since they
terminate as soon as statute expires
4. When a temporary Act completes its contemplated life and expires
by efflux of time, any appointment, notification order, schemes,
forms, bye-law, rule, made or issued under that Act also comes to
an end.
5. Even if there is no saving clause in the temporary Act, it does not
become a dead letter after its expiry for all purposes.
6. If offences under the expired Act could be tried only by special court
constituted under the temporary Act the offences could not be tried
after expiry of the Act. If the special courts are abolished although
they could have been continued to function for trial of offences
committed before the expiry of the Act.
7. Offences which are punishable under the ordinary laws but were
being tried by special courts being connected with the offences
under the expired Act, could still be tried by ordinary course without
the necessity of a de novo trial.
8. An appeal under a temporary statute pending at the time of the
expiry of the statute will in the absence of a saving clause
automatically terminate.
9. A person who has been prosecuted and sentenced during the
continuance of a temporary Act for violating its provisions cannot
be released before he serves out his sentence even if the temporary
Act expires before the expiry of the full period of the sentence.

-------------------------------------X-----------------------------------

INTERPRETATION OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAWS

Substantive Law
• Substantive law is the statute or written law that defines rights and
duties such as crime and punishments in the criminal law, civil
rights and responsibilities in civil law, it is codified in legislative
statutes or can be enacted through the initiative process.

• Substantive law refers to all categories of public and private law


including the laws of contracts, real property law, torts and criminal
law. For example, criminal law defines certain behaviour as illegal
and lists the elements which are required to be proved to convict a
person of a crime.

Procedural law or Adjective law

• Procedure is the mode or form of conducting judicial proceedings.


In other words the expression, ‘procedure’ means the manner and
form of enforcing the law. Procedural or adjective law is the law
regulating procedure of the law as to
pleading, practice, evidence, etc.

• Procedural law is the ‘machinery’ for enforcing the rights and duties
of substantive law. Procedural law comprises the rules by which a
court hears and determines what happens in civil or criminal
proceedings as well as the method and means by which substantive
law is made and administered.

• Procedural law comprises the set of rules that govern the


proceedings of the court in criminal law suits as well as
civil in administrative proceedings.

Strict interpretation of Substantive law


• It is a sound rule of construction that the substantive law should be
construed strictly so as to give effect and protection to the
substantive rights unless the statute otherwise intends.

Prospective effect of the Substantial law


• The general rule of construction of substantive law is, unless an
enactment expressly provides for retrospective operation it has to be
construed as prospective. Unless there are words in the statute
sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect
existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective.

• The rule of prospective effect of substantive law is having its roots


in the legal
principle ‘nova constitutis your futuris forman imponere debet,
non preteritis’ which means ‘a new law ought to be prospective not
retrospective in its operation’.

• Retrospective operation of substantive enactment is not taken to be


intended unless that intention is manifested by express words or a
necessary implication. Therefore, substantive rights conferred by a
provision cannot be taken away by amendment of the provisions
with retrospective effect.

• There is a presumption under the law against


the retrospectivity of the Act. For example, in penal statutes, there
is no retrospective operation and penal statutes always
have prospective operation only. Where the distinction is made
between the existing and vested right, it is held that the rule against
retrospective effect is applied only to save vested rights.

Interpreting Procedural laws

• Procedural law is actuated with some policy to curb some public evil
or to effectuate some public benefit.
• It is a sound rule of construction that procedural enactments should
be construed liberally and in such a manner as to render the
enforcement of substantive rights effectively.

• Interpreting any procedural law when more than one interpretation


is possible, the one which curtails the procedure
without alluding the justice is to be adopted. The procedural law is
always subservient to and is an aid to justice. An interpretation
which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be
followed.

❖ In Roopdhaar Pujari vs Gangadhar Bhadra


The Supreme Court has observed that the procedural law cannot be
interpreted with too much rigidity and indulging in hair
splitting. Technical objections which tend to defeat and deny substantial
and effective justice should be discouraged except where the mandate of
the law is inevitably necessitates it.

The procedure provided in a statute for enforcement of substantial rights


conferred thereby should be construed as far as possible liberally so as to
give effect to and not to nullify those rights.

❖ In M.V. Wali Press vs Fernandez Lopez


It has been observed that rules of procedure are not by themselves ends
but the means to achieve the ends of justice. The rules of procedure are
tolls forged to achieve justice and or not hurdled to obstruct the pathway
to justice.
• Both the Law of Limitation and the Civil Procedure Code
are procedural laws. Accordingly, the same meaning should be
given to same expression used in these two laws. If the Code
of Civil Procedure has understood an ex-parte decree in one
particular definite sense, there is no reason why the court
should take the view that the Limitation Act has understood it
in a different sense.

❖ In Dashrath vs Mysore City Municipal Corporation, Mysore


and others
It has been observed that when plain reading of the language used in the
section by the draftsman leads to absurdity or it really frustrates the object
of the provision, it is open to the court to modify the language used in the
context of the provisions of the Act.

Retrospective effect to procedural law


• In contrast to statutes dealing with substantive rights, statutes
dealing with the matters of procedure are presumed to be
retrospective unless a construction is textually inadmissible.

• When an amended Act affects the matters of procedure, it


applies to all actions pending as well as future because the
change in procedure does not alter the substantial right of the
citizens.

• No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He


has only the right of prosecution or defence in the matter
prescribed for the time being by or for the court in which case
is pending and if by an Act of Parliament, the mode of
procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed
according to the altered mode.

• Nobody has a vested right in procedural law that is to say when


change is made in a procedural law it takes retrospective effect.
❖ In Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs National Insurance Company
Limited
The Supreme Court held that when, by the enforcement of the
amendment, the validity of a judicial order validly passed is
affected, it cannot be given retrospective effect. If proceeding has
reached to appellate stage and if party has already obtained a certain
right under the old procedure, for instance a decree, it would be
very unfair to disturb the right and direct the suitor to begin afresh
by following the amended procedure.

❖ In Mohammed Tahir vs Mohammed Wahab, the court held that


any technical defect in procedure should be ignored in the issue of
public concern. Violation of any procedural provision cannot
automatically make the enquiry or order void. Rules of procedure
have to be interpreted in a manner that may substantiate the cause of
justice as well as to avoid delay.

INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES

• As we all know a penal statute is one which imposes a


penalty or other punishment for an offence. It provides a
penalty for some offence of a public nature.

• Penalty is defined to be one which imposes a forfeiture of


property, Fine, Imprisonment, Fine or Imprisonment and
Fine and Imprisonment, even death sentence for doing a
thing prohibited or for disobedience of the law by the
offender.
• In India the prominent and major penal statutes are the
Indian Penal Code, 1860, Cr.P.C, 1973, the Evidence Act of
1872 and besides these Acts there are many Acts which
prescribe penalty or punishment for certain criminal acts
namely the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1955, the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988, the Environmental Protection Act, 1986,
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1987
etc.

• In Sakaria Cotton Mills Ltd V State of Bombay


It has been observed that in a penal statute it is the duty of
the courts to interpret words of ambiguous meaning in a
broad and liberal sense so that they will not become traps for
honest, unlearned (in law) and unwary men.

• In Tolaram Relumal V. State of Bombay


It has been observed that if two possible and reasonable
constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the court
must lean towards the provision which exempts the subject
from penalty rather than one which imposes penalty.

• Guiding principles of strict construction of penal statutes


and the rules initiated by courts in different cases:
1. In criminal cases strict construction is the general rule of
construction.
2. If the prohibiting words in their known meaning cover only
some cases of persons or some well-defined activity, their essence
cannot be extended to cover other persons or other activity on
consideration of policy or object the legislation.
3. It is beyond the provisions of courts to create basically new
offences these are properly the province of the legislature.
4. If there is no ambiguity, and the act or omission committed by
the accused falls clearly within the mischief mentioned in the
statute, then it is to be interpreted like any other law. Therefore,
full effect will be given to the statute.
5. Unless penalties are in clear terms, they are not enforceable.
When the legislature imposes penalty the words imposing it must
be clear and distinct.
6. Penal statute generally have a prospective operation. No penal
statute should be given a retrospective operation. When a new
penal Act is passed or amended with penalties what otherwise is
not an offence, it must be construed as to make it a strike at future
acts or omissions unless the legislature has clearly said so.
7. Where certain procedural requirements have been laid down by
a statue to be completed in a statute dealing with punishments, the
court is duly bound to see that all these requirements have been
complied with before sentencing the accused.
8. If there is a reasonable interpretation by which a penalty can be
avoided that interpretation has got to be accepted.
• Strict construction of penal statutes as laid down by
Maxwell
1.Express language
The first requirement is that the offence in the statute must be
manifestly defined with accurate terms and without any
ambiguous meaning and act or omission may be treated as an
offence and it depends upon the definition given by the concern
penal statute.
2. Explanation of an offence
The legislature must explain the elements of an offence. It must
mention clearly the essential conditions in which the act of a
person can be treated as an offence.
3. Punishment
Imposing punishment is essential ingredient of the penal statutes.
For the graver offences, punishment should be severe such as
imprisonment rigorous or simple and for the lighter offences
penalty by way of cash. For certain offences either imprisonment
or penalty or both may be prescribed.
4. Jurisdiction and Procedure
The criminal Act must be tried by the competent court in
prescribed procedure.

• Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two


or more enactments then the offenders shall be liable to be
prosecuted and punished under either or any of those
enactment but shall not be liable to be punished twice for
the same offence.

• If there is variation in the procedure as when a right of appeal


is given, when none existed before, there is an implied repeal
of the earlier statute.
• Strict construction of penal statutes by giving wide
interpretation. Though all penal statutes are to be construed
strictly, it is not an inflexible rule of construction.
Example-The interpretation of the word ‘breaking’ in connection
with burglary, the court held that you cannot give strict
construction. lifting up the flap of a cellar, raising the latch,
coming down from the chimney, gaining admittance into the
house by inducing the householder by a trick, all these amounts
to house burglary.
• In cases where the question of public health and safety is
concerned, it is usual with the courts to give statute a wide
construction. For example regulations regarding traffic and
parking, the rules regarding the prevention of food
adulteration.

Case laws-
• Fisher vs Ben
Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959 provide for
punishment to any person who sells or offers for sale a knife
of a particular description. A shopkeeper had displayed a
knife in a shop window with price tickets. Applying strict
construction, it was held that offer for sale did not include
exposure for sale and therefore no contravention was
committed by the shopkeeper.

• Lee vs Knapp
The Road Traffic Act, 1967 requires that the driver of a
motor vehicle involved/concerned in an accident, must stop
and if required to give his name, address, etc. to the
authorities concerned. The word ‘stop’ does not mean a
momentary pause and in that context, it meant the driver of
motor vehicle should stop the vehicle and remain there for a
reasonable time.

• Appasaheb vs State of Maharashtra


The Supreme Court held that a demand for money on
account of some financial stringency or for meeting some
urgent domestic expenses, such as purchase of manure,
cannot be termed as demand for dowry as the said word is
normally understood.

• In State of Punjab vs Ram Singh


A heavy drunk constable/Gunman was seen roaming in the
market with the service revolver while he was on duty. When
was sent to doctor for medical examination, abused medical
officer on duty which shows delinquency/moral turpitude
due to his drinking habit. He was dismissed from duty for his
misconduct.
The Supreme Court upheld that his conduct would institute
gravest misconduct warranting dismissal from service. The
question here was the word ‘misconduct’ was not given a precise
definition, but the court applied strict construction.

• M.V. Joshi vs M.U.Shimpi


The appellant was convicted under section 16 of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for selling
adulterated butter. The contention was that, the butter within
the meaning of the rules made under the Act was the butter
made from milk whereas he had sold butter made from curd.
The Supreme Court while rejecting the contention held that strict
construction means that the conduct of the accused for this
convention must fall within the plain meaning and a strict
construction was applied.
Mens Rea-
The doctrine of Mens Rea is expressed in the familiar Latin
maxim “actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’, the act itself
does not constitutes offence unless done with dirty mind.
Intent and the act must both confirm to constitute the crime
application.
Mens Rea in statutory offences may be explained with the
leading cases:
1.R vs Prince,
2.Queen vs Tolson,
3.Rex vs Wheat
(in this case the accused who was an uneducated man, handed
over his case to a solicitor for obtaining divorce from his first
wife. He was informed in good faith that he had been granted
divorce and then he got married again. His first wife charged him
for bigamy as his marriage was not actually dissolved before
remarrying. He pleaded that he did not know the procedure of law
but the court held guilty and convicted him because the
reasonable belief about the dissolution of marriage would not be
defence to the charge of bigamy and a divorce would have been
obtained from a court of law before remarriage).

• Dudley V Stephen it was observed that a man who in order


to escape from death from hunger on high seas kills another
man for the purpose of eating his flesh is guilty of murder
although at the time of act, he is in such circumstances that
he believes that is the only chance of preserving his life.

Mens Rea in Indian Law


• Mens Rea is not mentioned anywhere in I.P.C. Though mens
rea is an essential ingredient of an offence, it is not essential
in respect of certain offences. For example waging war,
sedition, kidnapping and abduction counterfeit of coins etc.
• In Shrinivasmal vs Emperor
The accused was the salt distributor. His servant infringed the rule
without his master's knowledge. The accused was acquitted on the
ground that he had no guilty intention since the act was committed
without his knowledge.

• In Rahul Hariprasad Ram vs State


A servant of petrol dealer supplied motor spirit without
coupons and also received advance coupons without
supplying motor spirit which was an offence under the
relevant order. The supreme court held that there were no
grounds for conviction of the master but convicted for non-
endorsement on the coupons by servant which was
mandatory and an absolute rule.

• Sankran Sukumaran vs Krishnan Saraswati


The Supreme court observed that mens rea is an essential
ingredient of the offence under section 494. Where the second
marriage has been entered in a bonafide believing that the first
marriage was not subsisting, no offence under section 494 is
committed.

• In Staff of Maharashtra vs M.S.George


The Supreme court considered the application of the
principle of mens rea in statutory offence. George carried
gold as a passenger from Zurich to Manila in plane and found
at Bombay airport as the bringing of gold into India was
prohibited except with permission of RBI. Supreme Court
found that the accused guilty for contravention of the
provisions of section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act, 1947.

• Nathu Lal vs State of M.P


The appellant had a stock of wheat for purpose of sale
without licence, contened that he has applied for licence and
was in the belief that it would be issued to him. He had also
deposited the requisite licence fee,he was purchasing for
grains from time to time and sending returns to the licensing
authority showing the grains purchased by him. He was
prosecuted for committing an offence under section 9 of the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955 for contravening an order
made under section 3 of the same. In this case, the court held
that the storage of food grains was under a bona fide believe
that he could legally do so and he did not intentionally
contravene the provisions of the Act, he was acquitted.

• In R.S.Joshi vs Ajit Mills ltd.


The Supreme court observed that a person may be liable for the
penal consequences for the act done by him whether he has
done it with guilty mind or not, it is a matter of common
knowledge that for proper enforcement of statutory provisions
the rule of strict liability is created an d the acts falling in this
category are punished even in the absence of guilty mind.
• In Malhan vs Kora Bibi Kutti the accused was a financier.
He seized the vehicle for which he had refinanced and did
not receive the installment. The person from whom the
vehicle was seized, complaint to police alleging that accused
has stolen his vehicle. The Supreme court held that the
element of mens rea is totally wanting in this case and the
accused was left without any conviction under section 379
of I.P.C.

Vicarious Liability
• In R vs Prayag Singh
A riot took place on the land of the Pragya Singh. During the
course, Pirkhan was killed. Prayag Singh was punished under
section 154 I.P.C and was fined with rupees thousand.

• In Kazi Zamuddin Ahmed vs R


The owner of an estate where riot took place was convicted
in the section 154 of I.P.C for his agent’s fault.

Example- The Environment Protection Act, 1986; The Water


Prevention and Control of Pollution Act,1974; The Air
Prevention and Control of Pollution Act,1981 impose the strict
liability upon the occupiers or principals in case of polluting the
atmosphere. If an occupier instruction for employees is to
discharge untreated affluence into the surrounding canal land in
atmosphere then the polluter or the occupier is held liable.
Another example- As per Factories Act, 1948, the owner of the
factory is held liable for accident due to the negligence in duty of
any person authorised to perform on his behalf.
UNIT- II

Internal Aids to IOS

Meaning - Aid means ‘to support’, ‘help’ or ‘to assist’.

The following are the Internal aids to interpret a statute.

1.Preamble
2.Short title and Long Title
3.Definitions
4.Marginal notes
5.Heading
6.Explanations
7.Proviso
8.Illustrations
9.Exceptions
10.Punctuations
11.Schedule
12.Non-obstante clause
13. Sections and Sub-Sections

1. PREAMBLE
It is a statement given in the beginning of the statute. Preamble means ‘which goes
before’ or ‘an introduction’. Preamble is said to be the key of the statue to open the
minds of the makers. It is a part of the Act and is an admissible aid to interpretation.
Although it is not an enacting part but it is expected to express the scope, object and
purpose of the Act comprehensively.

In Sussex Peerage Claim case (1844)


It was held that “Preamble is a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act and
the mischief which they intended to redress”.
In Salkeld vs Johnson
The court held that “Preamble is a part of the Act. The primary object,
purpose and intent of the legislation can be gathered from the preamble”.

The Supreme Court of India has brought out some principles in regard to use of
Preamble as internal aid to construction. It says that “when the language of the Act
is clear, the preamble must be disregarded but where object or meaning of the
enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to explain it. In view of this,
one cannot start with preamble for constructing the provisions of the Act but one can
always refer to the preamble to explain the ambiguous language of the Act”.

In Anju Mudaliyar vs Venkatachalam


It was held that preamble can be used to know the aims and objects of the legislation.

In Keshavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461


The apex court held that “Preamble of the Constitution, like the preamble of any
statute, furnishes the key to open the mind of the makers of the Constitution because
the Constituent Assembly took great pains in formulating it so that it may reflect the
essential features and basic objectives of the Constitution. The majority judgement
in this case strongly relied upon the preamble in reaching the conclusion that the
power of amendment conferred by Article 368 was limited and did not enable the
Parliament to alter the basic structure of framework of the Constitution”.

Limitations of Preamble as Internal Aid to interpretation as presumed by the


court in different cases:

1. Preamble cannot be pressed into service as long as the words are clear and precise
and are susceptible to only one meaning.
2. Preamble can be resorted only when the language of the provision is reasonably
capable of alternative construction.
3.Preamble can neither restrict nor extend the meaning and scope of the words used
in the enacting part of the statute.
4. Preamble can only indicate in a general way the content and colour of element
but cannot override the enacting provision in the Act.
5. In case of conflict between preamble and the section, the preamble would succumb
and section shall prevail.
6. If the provisions contained in a statute do not accord with the preamble then those
provisions cannot be invalidated on this ground.
7. Preamble cannot be used to control or qualify the clear and precise language of
enactment.
8. Preamble cannot be used to impose any prohibition or limitation.

2. TITLE

Title is an important part of a statute. It is given on the top of the statute book. There
are two kinds of titles namely Short Title and Long Title.

A. SHORT TITLE

Short Title means an inscription or a heading. Every Act contains a Title and at the
end of the title of every statute, the year in which it is enacted is mentioned. The
Parliament or State legislature in every year gives serial number to the Acts. The
serial number of the Act also becomes the part of the title. It is a part of the statue
which has no role to play while interpreting a provision of the Act neither can it
extend nor can it limit the clear meaning of a particular provision. It is an aid to
determine the scope and view of the Act however, it does not become a conclusive
aid.

Examples
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act Number 60 of 1860)
The Specific Relief Act, 1963 (Act Number 67 of 1963)
The Transfer Property Act, 1882 (Act number 4 of 1882)

B. LONG TITLE
The Long Title of an Act is mentioned in the statute book in small letters below
its short title and preamble.

Example:
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974)
An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to Criminal Procedure

Preamble: Be it enacted by Parliament --------


As may be seen in the above example, the long title gives a general description of
the object, policy and purpose of the given Act. Therefore, the long title may be
legitimately pressed into service for effective guidance in resolving the ambiguity of
the statute.

All modern Acts have both long and short titles. Long Title is set out at the head of
the statute giving fairly full description of the general purpose of the Act.

In R vs Bates and Russell (1952)


The court stated the principle that where something is doubtful or ambiguous, the
long title may be looked at to resolve the doubt or ambiguity, the passage under
construction must be taken to mean what it says so that if its meaning is clear, the
meaning is not to be narrowed or restricted by reference to the long title.

In Poppatlal Shah vs State of Madras (AIR 1953)


The Supreme Court observed that it is the settled rule of construction that to ascertain
the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are taken together and each
word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of general purpose and object
of the Act itself. The title and preamble whatever their value might be as aids to the
construction of the statute would undoubtedly throw light on the intent and design
of the legislature and indicate the purpose of legislation itself.

3. INTERPRETATION CLAUSES / DEFINITION SECTIONS

• Definition being nothing but making another, understand by words, what idea
the term defined stands for.

• Definition is now usual in statutes, inserted in an interpretation clause or


definition clause. It is a statement of the meaning intended by the legal
experts, to be applied to certain words when used in the Act.

• Definition given in the Act must be substituted for the word defined where
ever it occurs in the Act. When a word or phrase is defined as having a
particular meaning in an enactment it is that meaning alone which must be
given to it in interpreting a section of the Act unless there be anything
repugnant to the context.
• Every Statue contains interpretation clause after introductory section, it is
appended at the beginning of an Act defining terms and phrases frequently
appearing in the Act. The object of the definition clauses is to avoid the
necessity of frequent repetitions in describing all the subject matter to which
the world or expression so defined is intended to apply. If some words were
defined in other Acts and are used in this statute with the same meaning, the
definition section of this Act may borrow definition from the earlier Act.

• Where a term is defined in the enactment, the court has to look into the
definition and not to its dictionary meaning/ordinary meaning.

• The definition section is intended to provide a certain meaning to the terms


and expressions used elsewhere in the Act so that they may not be understood
in any other sense than what they have been intended to mean for the purpose
of this Act.

Two forms of interpretation clause /definition clause:

1. Where the word defined is declared to ‘mean’ so and so, the definition is
explanatory and prima facie restrictive.

2. The other where the word defined is declared to ‘include’ so and so, the
definition is extensive. The word used in an inclusive definition cannot be
restricted in any sense.

In Commissioner of Trade Tax vs M/s Kajaria Ceramics Limited


The Supreme Court held that generally, when the definition of a word begins with
‘means’ it is indicated of the fact that the meaning of the word has been restricted,
that is to say it would not mean anything but what has been indicated in the definition
itself.

In State of Bombay vs Hospital Mazdoor Sabha


In dealing with the definition of ‘industry’ in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
Justice Gajendragadkar observed it is obvious that the words used in inclusive
definition denote extension and cannot be treated as restrictive in any sense. Where
we are dealing with an inclusive definition, it would be inappropriate to put a
restrictive interpretation upon the terms of wider denotation.

In the State of Madhya Pradesh vs Seth and Hilton Private Limited


The Supreme Court while interpreting the word ‘court’ in Section14(2) of the
Arbitration Act,1940 held that its meaning given in Section(2)(c) of the Act that
means a court which would entertain a suit on the subject matter cannot be accepted,
in the light of the context and the court in the present Act means a court which
appoints the arbitrator.

In Lucknow Development Authority vs M.K. Gupta


The question before the supreme court was whether ‘housing construction’ was a
‘service’ within the meaning of Section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act,1986 The
Supreme Court ruled that housing construction is a service within the provision even
though the provision gives inclusive definition of the word service. This
interpretation was accepted as correct by the Parliament which amended the
provision in 1993 and expressly included housing contract construction within the
word service.

In Ichhapore Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd vs ONGC


The Supreme Court held that the definition of the word ‘mineral’ under the Mines
Act, 1952 has been incorporated in the petroleum and minerals pipelines at
acquisition of right of user in Land Act, 1962 by reference and that the context
scheme and object of the Act clearly points out that ‘water’ is a mineral within the
meaning of the Act.

4. MARGINAL NOTES:

• Marginal notes are side notes often printed at the side of a section in an Act
and express the effect of the sections. There are divergent opinions regarding
the use of marginal notes for construing the section. In the olden times, help
used to be taken sometimes from the marginal notes when the clear meaning
of enactment was in doubt. Marginal notes were used to understand the
intention of the legislature and queries in the section can be removed by
marginal note.

• According to Lord Reid, “marginal notes cannot be used as construction tool,


side note is a poor guide to the scope of a section as it can do no more than to
indicate the main object with which the section deals”
• Supreme Court is of the opinion that marginal notes appended to a section
cannot be used to interpret the section as the marginal note cannot control the
meaning of the body of the section if the language employed there is clear.

In Shakuntala vs Mahesh
The Supreme Court held that where the section is unambiguous, the marginal notes
are not to be used as an aid to interpretation.

In S.P Gupta and Others v Union of India


The Supreme court has observed that if the relevant provision in the body of the
statute firmly points towards a construction which would conflict with the marginal
note, the marginal note has to yield (surrender).

In Bengal Immunity Company V State of Bihar AIR 1955


The Supreme Court by a majority held that the marginal notes to Article 286 of the
Constitution was a part of a Constitution and therefore it could be relied on to furnish
a clue to the purpose and meaning of that Article. The marginal note to Article 286
of the Constitution unlike the marginal notes in the Acts in the British Parliament, is
part of the Constitution passed by the Constituent Assembly.

• Marginal notes may be used to consider the general purposes of the section
and the mischief at which it is aimed. Marginal notes are very rarely used for
interpretation as they are not considered a part of enactment. Only those
marginal notes can be used for controlling the provision which has been
inserted with the assent of legislature.

5. HEADING

• Titles prefixed to a section or a set of sections are called Headings. Headings


are prefixed to section or a group of sections in the statute.

• Examples –

1. The heading of Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 is bail


in case of non-bailable offence
2. Section 79 to 98 of the Evidence Act, 1872 are presented under the heading
‘Presumptions as to documents’

3. The heading of Chapter 7 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, is Offences


against the State

• If the plain meaning of an enactment is clear, help from headings cannot be


taken by the courts. However, if more than one conclusion is possible while
interpreting a particular provision, the courts may seek guidance from the
headings to arrive at the true meaning and ambiguity in the meaning of a
provision can be removed with the aid of the heading but where the meaning
of an enactment is clear and unambiguous, heading has no role to play in its
interpretation.

• According to Maxwell, the headings prefixed to sections or set of sections in


some modern statutes are regarded as preambles to those sections. They
cannot control the plain words of the statute but they may explain the
ambiguous words.

In N. C. Dhondial vs Union of India AIR 2004


It was held that heading can be relied upon to clear the doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation of the provisions and to discern (detect) the legislative intent.

6. PUNCTUATIONS

• Punctuation is the system of using certain conventional marks as periods in


writing or printing.
• Punctuation marks mean the marks such as comma, full stop, colon, semi-
colon, and question mark.
• They have a great importance in the language, if the punctuation marks are
ignored, the language becomes either meaningless.
• If the placement of punctuation mark is changed, the very meaning of the same
set of words might get reversed. For example- “hang, not leave him”, gives
out meaning opposite to the expression ‘hang not, leave him”, just because of
peculiar placement of a comma.
• In England before 1857, there was no marking of punctuation in the
manuscript copy of any Act which received the royal assent. Therefore, the
courts in England cannot have any regard to punctuation for construing the
older Acts. In modern times too, not much importance is given to punctuation.
Maxwell observed that punctuation has two consequences:

1. A provision in a statute may be read as though the punctuation which appears on


the face of the Act were omitted.

2. Where it is necessary to give to a provision a particular construction which is at


variance with the way in which the section is punctuated, it may be read as though
there were in fact punctuation. Where none appears on the fact of Act.

However, some of the jurists have opined that punctuation marks are of no use as
internal aids to construction.

In Maharani of Burdwan vs Krishna Kamini Dasi ILR 14 Cal 365


Lord Hobhouse held that it is an error to rely on punctuation marks in construction
of the Acts of legislature.

In Hanlon vs Law Secretary


The House of Lords argued that when the literate people like Parliamentary
draftsmen, punctuate as they write, then why should not other literate people like
judges look to punctuation to interpret the meaning of legislation. Therefore, not to
take account of punctuation, disregard this reality, if the statute in question is found
to be carefully punctuated, punctuation though a minor element may be resorted to
for the purpose of construction.

• In India, the punctuation marks are to be carefully seen while constructing a


provision since they can provide a good assistance in inferring the intention
of the legislature.

In Ashwini Kumar Ghose vs Arbinda Bose AIR 1952 SC 369 Justice Mukherjee
observed that punctuation is after all a minor element in construction of a statute,
and very little attention is paid to it by English courts”.

• When a statute carefully punctuated and there is no doubt about its meaning,
weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation.

• Punctuation may have its uses in some cases but it cannot certainly be
regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain
meaning of a text.
In Dadaji vs Sukhdeo babu
The Supreme Court held that the punctuation marks by themselves do not control
the meaning of a statute where its meaning is otherwise obvious.

In Angika Panwar vs Government of Delhi


The comma placed after the words “administration of justice” in Entry 11A of the
concurrent list in the seventh schedule of the constitution was in question. The Delhi
High Court held that punctuation mark cannot be allowed to control the plain
meaning of the text.

In R.S.Pillai vs Peratchi
It was held that when the provision itself is clear, the commas that may occur in the
section have to be ignored.

In Samma Alana Abdullah vs State of Gujarat


The Supreme Court construed the words ‘any secret official code or password, or
any sketch, plan, model etc. It was observed that there is a comma present after
password due to which the succeeding words are separated and detached from the
preceding words. Hence the term ‘secret’ only qualified the expression “official code
or password” but has no application for succeeding expression “any sketch, plan,
model etc”.

7. EXPLANATION

• An explanation in a statute is sometimes added to a section to elucidate what


is enacted, and not to add or subtract anything to or from it. It is a part and
parcel of the enactment and explanation should be read with a view to
harmonize and clear the ambiguity in the main provisions of the section.
• Explanation is a statement, fact, circumstance that explains the section. The
explanation of a word may include both definition and illustration.
• An explanation does not enlarge the scope of an original section, that it is
supposed to explain. The purpose of an explanation is however, not to limit
the scope of the main provision. Construction of the explanation must depend
upon its terms and no theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to
be inferred from the language used.

• The objects of the explanation to any statutory provision are:


1. To explain the meaning and intent of the Act.

2. When there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the
same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to
subserve.

3. An explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or


any part thereof but where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose
of explanation in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the
Act, it can help or assist the court in interpreting the true purport and
intendment of enactment.

4. It cannot however, take away a statutory right with which any person under
the statute has been clothed.

• Example: Section 2(d) of the Code of Cr.P.C says that-


‘Compliant means any allegations made orally or in writing to a magistrate with a
view to him taking action under this code that some person whether known or
unknown has committed an offence but does not include a police report’.
Explanation- A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after
investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a
complaint, and a police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be
the complainant.

In the above example, as per main provision, a police report is not included within
the meaning of the term complaint. But through the explanation, it is certified that a
police report relating to commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to
be a complaint.

• In construing an ‘explanation’, it is to be kept in mind that it has to be read


with the particular substantive provisions of the Act to which it relates,
otherwise the purpose for which the explanation has been appended is likely
to be defeated. Explanation is appended to a section either to record an
extended or restricted meaning to the expression or phrases occurring in the
main provision.

In Bihta Co-operative Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. vs State


of Bihar AIR 1967 SC 389
It has been held that in case of conflict between the main provision and the
explanation attached to it, the general duty of the court is to try to harmonise the two.

In M.K. Salpekar (Dr.) vs Sunil Kumar Shamsunder Chaudhari AIR 1988 SC


1841
The court observed that where a provision is related to two kinds of accommodation
for example, residential and non-residential and the explanation attached to it refers
to only residential accommodation, it cannot control non-residential accommodation
and therefore cannot be looked into in matters connected with the latter.

8. ILLUSTRATION
• An illustration is defined as a pictorial or other representation placed in a book
or other publication to elucidate the text.

• Illustrations to a section of an Act are examples of the application of the


principle of the sections to concrete cases.

• Illustrations are considered as examples. They are added to the section for the
purpose of explaining the situations and usage by the sections.

• Illustrations being the show of mind of the legislature are good guide to find
out the intention of the framers. But an enactment otherwise clear cannot be
given an extended or restricted meaning on the basis of illustrations appended
therein.

• Illustrations may be used as a guide to the understanding of the provisions of


the law embodied in the particular section of that Act.

• However, illustrations are considered to be good and valid internal aids as


they help to elucidate the principle of the section.

• A very large number of early Indian Acts have illustration but no Act of recent
day appends illustration to the recent enactments as they are clear and direct
where it is easy to understand the intent of the legislature.

• Example: Section 51 of the I.P.C provides punishment for attempting to


commit offences, punishable with imprisonment for life or other punishment:
Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by the code with
imprisonment.

Illustration 1
A makes an attempt to steal jewels by breaking open a box and finds after
opening the box that there is no jewel in it. He has done an act towards the
commission of theft and therefore is guilty under this section.

Illustration 2
‘A’ makes an attempt to pick the pocket of Z by thursting his hand into Z’s
pocket and fails in the attempt in consequence of Z having nothing in his
pocket. A is guilty under this section.

• Illustrations in enactment provided by the legislature are valuable in


understanding the real scope of the text thereof. They are part of the statute.
Illustrations however, make no law, they only exhibit the law in full action.

In Mahesh Chandra Sharma vs Rajkumari Sharma


It was held that illustration to the section is a part of the section and help to elucidate
the principle of the section.

9. SCHEDULE

• Schedule means a list summary or additional or appendant. As per Section


3(52) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 “schedule means schedule to the Act
or Regulation in which the word occurs”. Schedule is an appendix to an Act
of legislature or to legal instrument containing a statement of details or taking
the form of a detailed list or relevant matter.

• There is no rule that every statue should contain schedule some Act contain
schedule or more than 1 schedule, some Acts do not contain any schedule.

• Schedule in an Act of Parliament is a mere question of drafting. It reflects the


intention of the legislature. It works as an ‘explanation’ to the entire Act. It
can be used for construing provisions in the body of the Act. A Schedule is
added to the end to avoid burdening the section in the statute with matters of
excessive details and they form a part of the statute.

• Normally, a schedule cannot override the provision of an Act to which it


relates. If the enacting part and the schedule cannot be made to correspond,
the latter must yield to the former.

• Example
The Constitution of India contains 12 schedules

First Schedule contains the list of States and Union Territories

Second Schedule contains the provisions relating to the President and the
Governors of the State and the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court.

10. PROVISO

• Meaning - proviso is a clause inserted in a legal or formal document making


some condition, stipulation, exception or limitation and upon the observance
of which, the operation or validity of the instrument depends.

• The word proviso is used frequently to denote the clause, the first words of
which are “provided that” inserted in deeds and instrument generally and
containing a condition of stipulation on the performance or non- performance
of which, as the case may be the effect of a proceeding clause or of the deed
depends.

• Example
Section 171E of the Indian Penal Code provides:
Punishment for bribery: Whoever commits the offence of bribery shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to one year or with fine or with both.

Provided that bribery by ‘treating’ shall be punished with fine only.


Explanation “Treating” means that form of bribery where the gratification
consists in food, drink, entertainment, or provision.

In Sundaram Pillai vs Pattabiraman (1985) the court observed, a proviso may


serve the following purposes:

1. It may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment
by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make
the enactment workable.
2. It may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the
enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment
itself.
3. It may be used nearly to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the
sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision.

Note- A proviso is subordinate to the main section

11. EXCEPTION
• An exception means an omission or leaving out. It exempts something which
would otherwise fall within the purview of the general words of the statute.
An exception exempts something absolutely from the operation of an
enactment and intend to take it out from the main enactment, a portion, which
but for it, would fall within the main enactment.

• Exception being a later passage in an enactment prevails over the substantive


portion it follows. An exception may be referred to for the purpose of
controlling the enacting portion and if an exception is repugnant to the
operative part of the section then it must be ignored. Exceptions must be
construed strictly and strongly against the party trying to take the benefit.

• Example:
Section 136 of Indian Penal Code provides
Harbouring deserter: Whoever except as hereinafter excepted knowing or
having reason to believe that an officer, soldier, sailor or a man in the Army,
Navy, Air force of the Government of India has deserted, harbours such
officer soldier, sailor or airman shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to 2 years or with fine or with both.
Exception: This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour is given
by a wife to her husband.

In Collector of Customs vs M/s Modi Rubber Ltd.


It has been held that whenever there is a provision in the nature of an exception to
the principal clause thereof, it must be construed with regard to that principal clause.

In Shankarlal vs Gangabisam
It has been observed that exception is used to bring out the true nature and scope of
the operative section which the legislature has intended. It cannot be subject different
from that which it is an exception.

12. NON-OBSTRUCTION CLAUSE OR SAVING CLAUSE

• Saving clause is ordinarily a restriction in a repealing Act and saves rights in


pending proceedings, penalties etc. from the annihilation (total restriction)
which would result from unrestricted repeal.

• Generally saving clauses are inserted in the repealing Acts which save the
rights, procedures, penalties, investigation pending proceedings etc. before
the courts, Quasi-judicial and administrative authorities.

• The legislature enacts the statutes and also makes amendments to them from
time to time. In certain occasions, it repeals the waste and not much useful
Acts. During the transitional period, that is between the new Act and repealed
Act, several persons rights may be adversely affected and there may be several
proceedings before the court. To protect such people and proceedings, the
legislature, insert saving clause in the new Act. It means that the rights of the
persons and proceedings proceeded under repealed Act when it was in force
cannot be affected by the new Act even in future. Saving clause is used to
preserve from destruction certain rights, remedies or privileges already
existing in the Act.
• Saving clause being a later pass up in an enactment prevails over the
substantive portion it follows.
• Saving clause does not extend the terms of the section.
• Saving clauses are generally inserted when a statute is repealed and re-
enacted. The effect is that, the repealed statute remains in force as regards the
rights the party previously had, but it does not create new rights in his favour.
• Saving clause is generally introduced into the repealing Act in order to
safeguard rights which, but for such saving, would be lost.
• Saving clause which is repugnant to the body of the Act is void
• Saving clause may often be added by way of abundant caution.

In Trilok Chand Gopal Das vs State


The provincial government of Punjab enacted the East Punjab Safety Act, 1947 and
it was extended to Ajmer. The Chief Commissioner, Ajmer under the Act issued a
notification. Subsequently the Act was repealed by the East Punjab Act, 1947. The
Petitioner contended that the notification was void under the repealing Act. But the
High court has held that the notification issued under the Act 1947 would be
functioning as it was saved by saving clause inserted in the repealing Act.

In Agricultural Processed Food Products vs Union of India


The court has interpreted the saving clause 15 in the Export Control Order, 1988 to
preserve the right which existed prior to the issuance of the order and not to confer
any new or additional right which did not then, exist.

External Aids to Interpretation

• External Aids are also known as Extrinsic or Extraneous sources or aids in


construing the statute.

• Materials which are not included in the statute but are sought in interpreting
the statute are known as External Aids to Interpretation of Statute. They are
also popularly called as surrounding circumstances.

• The External or Extrinsic source may be implied in the construction of


statutes, if the words and language employed is not free from ambiguity and
which cannot be cleared even by resort to Intrinsic Aids.
• External Aids to interpretation are the secondary source to interpretation but
the primary source is always Internal aids to interpretation.

The following are the External Aids to interpretation:

1. Dictionaries
2. Reference to the statutes in pari-materia
3. Contemporanea Expositio
4. Legislative Debates
5. Reports of Law Commission and Inquiry Commission
6. Statement of objects and reasons of Legislature
7. Historical facts/ Parliamentary history
8. Foreign decisions
9. Textbooks
10. Government circulars and publications
11. Subsequent Social, Political and Economic Developments and Scientific
Inventions
12. Assistance of an earlier statutes
13. Assistance of Later Statutes
14. Translations
15. Travaux Preparatiores

1. Dictionaries

• Whether Dictionary meaning of words is acceptable for construction of


statutes. Ordinary dictionaries are not safe guides to the construction of
statutory terms.

• Lord Macnaughten said “that on such a point, the opinions of the judges like
Kindersley, V.C.Turner, Sir Georre Jesselare probably a safer guide than any
definitions or illustrations found in any dictionaries’.
uy
• On the other hand when words are to be understood in their ordinary sense,
any good dictionary such as Oxford or Webster dictionary may afford some
guide to the use of a term in a statute.

In Re Ripon case
The definition of the word ‘park’ in the Oxford English dictionary was adopted by
the Court.
In Mac Vittie vs Bolton Corporation.
The definition of the word ‘rubbish’ given in the Oxford English dictionary was
adopted by the court.

Supreme Court has also adopted dictionary meaning of many words in the
interpretation of statutes and some examples from the decided cases are given
below:

1. In construing what is an ‘undertaking’ appearing in the definition of Industry


in the ‘Industrial Dispute Act,1947 the Supreme Court has referred to the
Webster's dictionary in which the term has been defined as anything
undertaken or any business, work or project which one engages in or attempts
in an enterprise.

2. In Ishwar Singh Bindra V State of U.P


In construing the phrase ‘medicines and substances, appearing in section
3(b)(1) of the Drugs Act,1940, the Supreme Court has referred to the shorter
Oxford English dictionary for the appropriate meaning of medicine which
according to the dictionary is medica meant specially, the one taken internally
and the meaning of substance is any particular kind of corporal matter- species
of matter of definite chemical composition or texture.

3. Similarly the words ‘goods’,‘grove’, ‘arable’,‘establish’,‘narcotic’,‘import


and export’, ‘accessories’ etc have been taken into their ordinary meaning by
the Supreme court as given in the dictionaries.

4. In Amrendra Pratap Singh v Tej Bahadur Prajapati


The Supreme Court observed that the dictionaries can be taken as a guide for
finding out meanings of such words as are not defined in the statute. However,
dictionaries are not the final words on interpretation. The words take colour
from context and setting in which they have been used.

5. Wealth tax commissioner A.P v Courts of Wards Paigha


It is important to know that while it is for the courts in discharge of their duties
to assess themselves by any literary help they can find including of course standard
authors and reference to well-known and authoritative dictionary but in selecting one
out of the various meanings regard must always be had to the context in which the
word has been used in the statute.
It was further held by Supreme Court that, it is necessary to dispel the inferences
drawn from dictionary and reports of cases from England and Ireland but the safest
way as always, is the statute itself which is being considered. The dictionary meaning
should normally yield to the meaning which is in consonance with the purpose and
object of the Act.

6. In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore v Venkateshwara


Hatcheries Private limited

The Supreme Court observed that when the word ‘produce’ is not defined in the
Income Tax Act, 1961, it is permissible to consult the dictionary to find out the
meaning of same word as it is understood in common parlance but if in dictionary
there are more than one meaning of that word, in such circumstances the word has
to be construed in the context of the provision of the Act in reference to content and
objects of the same Act.

2. Statutes in Pari-materia

Introduction-
• Simply means reference to other statutes or reference to statutes in pari-
materia.

• Pari means ‘same’ and ‘materia’ means material or subject matter. Two
statutes are said to be in pari-materia when they deal with same subject or
thing. Where two statutes dealing with same subject matter, may be looked as
a guide to construction of other.

• The statutes in pari-materia can be lawfully referred to determine the meaning


of an ambiguous word. In other words, in order to resolve any ambiguity, help
can be taken from other statutes provided that they are in pari-materia, that is
dealing with the same subject-matter. But where the two statutes are identical
but connected with a different purpose then they are not to be held in pari-
materia.
In Madhusudan v Shrimati Chandrika
It has been observed that the word ‘fraud’ is not defined in the Hindu Marriage
Act,1955. It cannot be held to hear the same meaning of fraud as defined in Section
17 of the Indian Contract Act,1872 as the two are not statutes in pari-materia.

In State of Assam versus Deva Prasad Baruva AIR 1969 SC 831


It was held that section 19 of the Assam Agricultural Income-Tax Act,1939 is in
pari-materia with section 22 of the Income-Tax Act,1922 as such the judicial
decisions controlling section 22 of the Income -Tax Act were utilised for
construction of Section 19 of the Assam Agricultural Income -Tax Act.

In Sirsilk Ltd v Textile Committee AIR 1989 SC 317


The Supreme Court has observed, The Industries Development and Regulation
Act,1951 and the Textile Committee Act,1963 may possibly be considered to be
statutes in pari-materia. The former Act treats rayon as well as nylon as textiles made
of artificial fibres. This Act is earlier in point of time if a subsequent statute by the
same legislature can be pressed in aid for the purpose of interpreting previous
legislation or assistance of an earlier statute.

Example:

The Indian Parliament enacted the Indian Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.
Amendments were made to the Act from time to time, after the establishment of the
World Trade Organisation the Indian government signed the GATT multilateral
agreement. According to the International Agreement new Act, The Indian
Trademarks Act,1999 came in place of the Indian Trade and Merchandise Marks
Act,1958. Several definitions are similar in both the Acts. For example, the term
‘Associated Trademark’ is defined in Section 2(1) (b) of The Trade and Merchandise
Marks Act, 1958 defined Associated Trademarks means the marks deemed to be or
required to be registered as associated trademarks under this Act.

Similarly, Section 2(1)(3) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 also defines Associated
trademark as trademarks deemed to be or required to be registered as associated
trademarks under this Act.
The definition of associated trademark given in both the Acts is same. The Supreme
Court and High Court already interpreted this definition under the Act of 1958 and
delivered judgements, making the new rulings as the workings and concept of the
definition has not been changed in the new Act ,1999.

In Vijaynath v Guramma
It was held that a subsequent enactment/legislation cannot be used to interpret an
earlier enactment.

Whereas, in another leading case, it has been clearly established that the
subsequent legislation may be looked at where the earlier Act is ambiguous.

3. Contemporanea exposition

I ntroduction

• The word ‘contemporanea’ or ‘contemporaneous’ means ‘of the same time or


period’ and ‘exposition’ means explanation.

• In controlling old statutes, it has been usual, to pay great regard to the
construction put upon them by the judges who lived at or soon after the time
when they were made because they were best able to get the intention of the
makers of that time.

• The contemporaneous exposition makes effect of usage and practice.

Conditions
Usage to be useful in the purpose of construing the statute has to fulfil following two
conditions:

1. Antiquity
2. Reasonableness

In Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company limited vs Grama Panchayat


Pimpri, Waghere, AIR1976 SC 2463
The word ‘houses’ used under section 89 of Bombay Village Panchayats Act,1933
was construed by the Supreme Court by application of the rule of Contemporanea
exposition. The Supreme Court relied upon the rules made in 1934 in which the word
‘building’ was employed in place of ‘houses’. Where, it was held that the word
‘houses’ used in the Act was not limited to dwelling houses but also includes all
buildings whether used for residence or for commercial purposes.

4. Legislative Debates / Proceedings in Legislature

Introduction-
A minister while introducing the bill gives a statement in the legislature. Later
section-wise discussion takes place. Legislature give their opinion through their
statements, some members propose amendments, a detailed debate takes place in
legislature and the bill will be passed by the majority court and becomes a statute.

• If judges were allowed to apply their minds to be influenced in the controlling


of a statute by debates in the legislature or on reports of selected committees
or other bodies the build statute law would be reduced to confusion and
instead, their being one principle of construction of statutes, it would be
reduced to no principle at all.

In Rex v West riding of Yorkshire County Council


It was held that we have to deal with the construction of the Act as printed and
published that is the final word of the legislature as a whole and the antecedent
debates and subsequent statements of opinion or belief are not admissible.

Travancore Cochin v Bombay Company Ltd.


The Supreme Court held that in regard to the Articles of The Constitution, the
speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of debate
while drafting The Constitution of India, cannot be admitted as the extrinsic aid to
the construction of The Constitution of India.

In A. K. Gopalan vs State of Madras


The Supreme Court observed that the debates in Parliament on a bill are not
admissible for the construction of an Act which is ultimately enacted because a
speech made in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicator of the
subjective intent of the speaker but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental process
lying behind the majority of votes which carried the bill nor is it reasonable to
assume that the minds of all those legislators were in Accord.

In A K Gopalan vs State of Punjab


The supreme court referred to the speeches of two legislators made in the Constituent
Assembly not with a view to interpret the provisions of the Article in question which
the court did on its own terms but only to know what is the transcendental character
given to the fundamental rights by two of the important architects of the
Constitution.

In Indira Sawhney vs Union of India


The question of interpretation of backward class of citizens used in Article of the
Constitution was invoked. It was held that since this expression has not been defined
in the Constitution, it is permissible to refer to the speech of Dr BR Ambedkar to
understand the background and objective behind its use even though the debates and
speeches could not have a binding effect on the court.

In Keshavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala


It has been observed that if the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of
meaning nothing but that is logically relevant should as a matter of theory be
excluded the rigidity of English course in interpreting language nearly by reading it
disregard the fact that enactments are as it were organisms which exists in their
environment. It is of course difficult to say that judge who profess to exclude from
their consideration or expensive sources are confined psychologically as they
purport to be legally by judge who is himself limited to reading the provision of the
Constitution without the awareness of the history of their adoption and would be
taking a mechanical view of the task of construction.

In Sushila Rani vs Commissioner of Income-Tax


The Supreme Court had considered the statement of the Finance Minister while
explaining object of the awards Samadhan Scheme, 1998

In P V Narasimha Rao vs State CBI


It has been observed that it would be seen that as per the decisions of the Supreme
Court the statement of the minister who had moved the bill in Parliament can be
looked at to a certain mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation, object and
purpose for which the legislation is enacted. The statement of the minister is not
taken into account for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the enactment.
5. Statement of objects and reasons of Legislation
Introduction-

• It is usual with the minister or promoter of a bill in the legislature to attach a


statement of objects and reasons when he introduces a bill in the legislature.
It is not a part of the bill. However, it explains the objects and reasons which
necessitates the passing of that particular statute in the legislature. It is only
the expression of the objects and reasons to propound objective which it stands
for so that the members of the house may be convinced of the necessity of
introducing that particular bill. The matter is then discussed by the legislature
and many other aspects of the bill to be considered before it takes the final
shape. When the bill takes the final shape of the modification and additions
incorporated therein, the original statement of objects and reasons may be
altogether irrelevant or relevant to a little extent only.

• The statement of objects and reasons might be admissible not for controlling
the Act but for ascertaining the conditions which prevailed when the
legislation was enacted.

In State of Haryana v Chaman Malthe


Statement of objects and reasons is not a part of the statute and where the operative
part of the statute is clear beyond doubt, it cannot be used to determine the intention
of the legislature.

In Ashwini Kumar Ghose vs Arvind Bose


The Supreme Court held that the objects and reasons do not form part of the bill and
not voted upon by the members. The bill may have undergone radical changes during
its passage through both the houses and there is no guarantee that the reasons which
led to its introduction and objects thereby sought to be achieved, have remained the
same throughout till the bill emerges from the house as an Act of the legislature.

In State Bank Staff Union v Union of India


It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that the statement of objects and reasons of a
statute is to be looked into as an extrinsic aid to find out the legislative intent only
when the meaning of the statue by its ordinary language is absent or ambiguous.

In S.S. Bola & others v B.D Sardana & others


It is the cardinal rule of interpretation that if the words used in a statute are clear and
unambiguous then the statute itself declares the intention of the legislature and in
such a case, it would not be permissible for a court to interpret the statute by
examining the statement of objects and reasons for the statute in question. The
statement of objects and reasons may be referred to for the limited purpose of
ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponsor of the
bill to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of the evil which sought to
remedy.

6. Law Commission Report

Introduction-
The legislatures are not expert body which can study a piece of legislation
thoroughly in all its aspects and formulate proposals for its amendments. Hence a
Law Commission was established for purposes of formulating proposals, for reform
from time to time. A standing Law commission was established in India headed by
T. B. Macaulay under the Charter Act of 1833. from then onwards, the Law
commission started working before 1950 and also after our constitution was framed.

In G. Shekar v Geeta
The Supreme Court held that report of the law commission of India may be looked
into for the purpose of construction of Statute but the same would not prevail over
clear and unambiguous provision contained therein.

In Raj Kishore v Union of India


The Supreme Court held that section 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973
provides that proceedings under this section does not amount to an enquiry. In
arriving at this inference, the Supreme Court made reference to 41st Law
Commission report.

However, it is relevant to note that in some cases the Supreme Court of India did not
rely on Law Commission Report.

In Maharani Kusum Kumari v Kusum Kumari Jadeja


The Supreme Court refused to rely on the report of Law commission as an external
aid to construction.

7. Parliamentary History or Historical Settings or Historical Facts or


Historical Background or History of Legislation or Surrounding
Circumstances
Introduction

The state of affairs existing at the time when a law was enacted are called
historical facts. The court is entitled to look into such historical facts as may be
necessary to understand the subject matter of the statute or to consider the
surrounding circumstances or the course of events influencing the introduction
of the bill. The court may take into account such facts or events of the time which
may help it to consider whether the statute was intended to alter the law, to leave
it exactly where it stood before.

• Judges need not limit themselves to the bare reading of the statute. They are
entitled to take into account the historical facts and surrounding
circumstances that existed at the time of passing of the statute.
EXAMPLES

• The rule laid down in Heydon’s case that to a certain extent explains the
historical circumstances which led to the passing of the Act.

• The agitation against the judgement given in Shah Bano Begum’s case led to
the enactment of a new law ‘Dissolution of Muslim Women Marriage
Act,1986’ which entitled for maintenance of Muslim women.

• The English practice is that, ‘the intent of the Parliament which empowers
the Act is not to be gathered from the parliamentary history of the statute’.
English courts do not go outside the statue, at the history of the Act and it
has no impact on the statute.

• In the United States, the rule as to exclusion of Parliamentary history in


interpretation of Statute is not as thick as in English practice. Debates in
Congress are taken to be reliable guides to the meaning of the language of
enactment not only that the Reports of a Committee including the bill as
introduced changes made in the bill in the course of its passage and the
statement made by the committee chairman or incharge of it stand upon a
different footing than that of English practice.

• In India the historical evolution of a provision in the Statute is sometimes


considered to be a useful guide to its construction. Justice Mukherjee
observed that ‘for the purpose of appreciating the scope and object of a
statute and for explaining its language which may be susceptible of different
meaning, the historical circumstances or historical facts may be considered’.

In Express Newspaper Pvt Ltd vs Union of India

The Supreme Court held that ‘history of legislation and other like external sources
may be looked into by the courts in case of ambiguity’

Sub-committee of Judicial Accountability v Union of India


The Supreme Court while interpreting the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968 held that
consideration of the entire background of statutes as aid to interpretation is
permissible.

Limitations

These are some limitations to the interpretation on the basis of historical facts:

1.The court may take into account the historical facts and surrounding
circumstances prevailing at the time of enacting a statute but the inferences drawn
from it cannot be used to defeat the clear language employed in the enactment
itself.

2. In case of conflict, the plain language shall survive and influences drawn from
historical facts and surrounding circumstances shall fail.

8. Foreign decisions

Introduction
It is sometimes desirable for a court which is called upon to interpret a statute to
acquaint itself with the history of the circumstances under which it was passed and
even to compare it with any similar statues passed in other countries and to examine
decisions of British and even of other foreign courts based upon similar statutes.
However, while doing, it should be borne in mind namely if statute in terms
reasonably plain and clear assistance is not sorted.

• Recourse to foreign decisions by Indian courts before and after


independence

Recourse to foreign decisions particularly English decisions by the Indian courts was
a common practice in the pre-independence and post-independence period because
of the historical and political connection with England. The practice is being still
followed even during the post constitution period, the reason is that our legal system
is built on the British system and the pattern is still the same. Mr. M.C. Setalvad in
his ‘Common law in India’ states very often the general rule in Indian court was
based on an English principle and in such cases the Indian courts frequently sought
the assistance of English decisions to support the conclusions they reached. They
could not do otherwise for not only the general rules were contained in the code but
some of the illustrations given to clarify the general rules were based on English
decisions.

• In the administration of the law of Contracts, the courts in India have generally
been guided by the rules of the English common law applicable to contracts
where no statutory provisions to the contrary is in force.

In Dr S. Dutt v State of U.P


The Supreme Court of India followed the meanings given to certain expressions that
is with intent to ‘deceive or defraud’ in the Larceny Act, 1861 and the Companies
Act, 1962 and expression ‘with intent to defraud’ in the Forgery Act in England.

In Travancore Electric Industries v Harindra Nath


The High Court of Kerala referred English case laws and principle laid down in
Halsbury’s Laws of England volume 25, 3rd edition, page 490 has been followed.
The court further held that where no statutory provisions governing the master and
servant relationship exists the English common law rule is invariably applied to
Indian cases.

Textile Machinery Corporation Ltd. v Commissioner of Income Tax


It was held that it is not uncommon for our courts to refer to the decisions of English
courts on statutes which are in pari-materia and the legitimate use of such foreign
decisions is permitted by practice in Indian courts. But in referring to search for in
decisions a cautious approach is necessary.

• The Supreme Court has laid down the principal in several cases to the effect
that assistance of foreign decisions may be sought, subject to the qualification
that the prime importance is always to be given to the words employed in the
Indian statue and also to the circumstances in which it is enacted and the
conditions where it is to be applied and it is not to be forgotten that there is
always an element of risk of taking ready and hasty assistance from such
decisions.

In Additional Commissioner of Gujarat v Surat Silk Manufacturers


Association
The words ‘Charitable Purpose’ in section 2(15) of Income Tax Act, 1961 was to be
interpreted before the Supreme Court of India. It was observed that English decision
on the interpretation of the same expression in English in Income Tax Act is not
binding on the courts, these words in Indian statue to be interpreted according to the
language used according to circumstances and background of the Indian life.

Conditions
The use of foreign decisions is permissible. However, there are certain conditions in
this regard:

1.The foreign judgement sought to be referred, must be of those countries which


follow same system of jurisprudence.

2.Prime importance is to be given to the language of Indian statue, circumstances


and setting in which it was enacted and Indian conditions where it is to be applied.

3. There should be similarity in political thought of India and that country, the
decision of the court of which is being relied.

In Union of India v Naveen Jindal


It was held that all the interpretation of the Constitution of India should be primarily
based on materials available in India. However, relevant rules of other countries can
be looked into for guidance only.

9. Textbooks

Where the language of a statute is not precise and words employed there in are
capable of bearing more than one meaning in such circumstance textbooks may be
referred to resolve the ambiguity.

Manu, Yagnavalkya, Vijnaneshwara, Jimutavahana and Kautilya have been


frequently quoted by courts with approval. Mulla has been referred time and again.

Reference to textbook shall not bind the court in any manner. It shall be the
discretion of the court either to accept or to reject the meaning given in the textbook.
A commentary in a textbook is not binding on the court but when it is to be found in
the learned treatise on a relevant law it can and does have persuasive value in so
much as it demonstrates that the view of the jury and that of the court coincide.

In Ramlal v State of Rajasthan


The question that came under consideration was whether camel milk was also
included under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules,1955. The Supreme Court
referred a number of books and encyclopaedias and held that the camel milk was
included in the said rules as it contains vitamin contents, fatty acid and total protein
of the same order as in cow's milk and it can be profitably used for human purposes.

In Keshavananda Bharati v State of Kerala


A large number of textbooks were quoted by both the contesting parties in support
of their respective rival contentions but most of the judges of Supreme Court
deciding the case were of the opinion that in view of many opinions and counter
opinion, it was not desirable to follow the opinions and that the safest force of the
court was to interpret keeping in mind always whole context of the issues.

10. Government Circulars, Publications, Reports of Commissions and


Committees

• Courts have considered the official circulars and notifications, orders and
statements as external aids in construction of statutes unless they do not go
against the spirit of the statute under which they are issued.

In Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P v M/s Kajaria Ceramics Ltd.


It has been held that the circular can be read as a contemporaneous understanding
and exposition of the intention and the purport of the notification. Courts have
treated contemporary official statements as contemporary exposition and use them
as aid to interpret even recent statutes.

• Government publications may consist either of the reports of the committees


or commissions or explanatory notes regarding the working of the Act issued
by the government for the assistance of their officials.

In Madanlal Dohediya v Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd.


A committee was appointed to bring about changes in Company Law. Based on the
report of the Committee, Amendment Act number 65 of 1960 was passed. The
Supreme Court made a reference to this report in this case.
In Shriram chits and Investments Private Ltd. v Union of India
The validity of Chit Fund Act, 1982 was in question. The Supreme Court referred to
the report of Banking Committee prepared in 1972, the report of Select Committee
of Parliament, the report of Study Group on non-banking Financial Intermediaries
constituted by the Banking Commission and the Raj Committee report. The Supreme
Court upheld the reasonableness and validity of Chit Fund Act, 1982 by taking into
consideration of all these reports.

In Shamrao Suryavanshi v Prahladbiroba Suryavanshi


The question before the Supreme Court was interpretation of section 53a of the
Transfer of Property Act while interpreting the section, the court referred to the
recommendations contained in the report of the special committee set up by the
Government of India and upheld the validity of section 53a of the Transfer of
Property Act.

In R.S. Nayak vs A.R. Antulay


The Supreme Court held that Committee report of Joint Parliamentary Committee
and the report of the Commission constituted for collecting the information leading
to the legislation are permissible external aids to the construction of the Act.

NCERT v Jayalakshmi Rice and Oil Mills


It has been observed that the report of Special Samiti appointed by the Government
of India to examine the provisions of the bill which later became the Partnership Act
could not be utilised for interpreting the provisions of the Act.
Unit-5

Bentham’s Principles of Morals and Legislation


• Jeremy Bentham’s Principles of Morals and Legislation is a presentation of
an ethical (moral) theory that actions are right in so far as they produce
pleasure or prevent pain, and is an explanation of a political theory that the
purpose of civil or criminal laws is to maximize the amount of pleasure or
happiness which may be enjoyed by society.

• Bentham argues that if utility is defined as the ability to produce happiness,


then the rightness of an action is determined by its utility. Bentham also argues
that if happiness is viewed as the only thing which is intrinsically (basically)
good, then the principle of utility is the only right principle of human action.

• Bentham advocates a doctrine of psychological hedonism (pleasure seeking),


that all human actions are motivated by the desire to enjoy pleasure or prevent
pain, and that the enjoyment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain is the only
rational aim of human action. He also advocates a doctrine of ethical
hedonism, that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by
whether the action tends to promote happiness or unhappiness. If an action
conforms to the principle of utility (i.e. if the action tends to promote
happiness or prevent unhappiness), then the action is morally right, or at least
is not morally wrong. If an action does not conform to the principle of utility
(i.e. if the action tends to prevent happiness or promote unhappiness), then the
action is morally wrong, or at least is not morally right.
• Bentham maintains that the principle of utility is the only sufficient ground
for deciding whether an action is morally right or wrong. The principle of
sympathy and antipathy (i.e. the feeling of instinctive approval or
disapproval for the expected consequences of an action) is not a sufficient
ground for judging the moral rightness or wrongness of an action.

• Bentham argues that the principle of utility is a morally right principle of


action for every situation. He says that the principle of utility may also be
described as the greatest happiness principle, in that it asserts that the only
morally right and proper goal of action is to achieve the greatest happiness
of all individuals whose interest is affected by the action.
• Bentham rejects the notion that the law of reason is a sufficient principle of
morality. For Bentham, such concepts as common sense, the rule of right, the
law of reason, and the law of nature are only theoretical or speculative
principles and cannot be practically applied to every moral situation.

• Bentham describes hedonistic calculus by which the moral rightness or


wrongness of an action may be calculated according to the amount of pleasure
or pain which is produced by the action. Bentham explains that the quantity
of a pleasure or pain may depend on the intensity, duration, certainty or
uncertainty, propinquity (closeness), fecundity (productivity), and purity of
the pleasure or pain. The fecundity of a pleasure or pain may be determined
by the likelihood that the pleasure or pain will be followed by pleasures or
pains of the same kind. The purity of a pleasure or pain may be determined by
the likelihood that the pleasure or pain will not be followed by pleasures or
pains of the opposite kind.

• According to Bentham, actions which are morally right tend to produce the
greatest possible amount of pleasure and the least possible amount of pain,
while actions which are morally wrong tend to produce either a lesser amount
of pleasure or a greater amount of pain than other actions which could be
performed. The total amount of pleasure or pain which is produced by an
action may depend on the total amount of pleasure or pain which is
experienced by all individuals whose interest is affected by the action.

• Bentham provides that the pains may be caused by various kinds of sensations,
classification of the various kinds of pleasures and pains. Pleasures,
emotions, memories, expectations, and associations. Simple pleasures and
pains may be combined to form complex pleasures and pains.

• Bentham explains the sense of pleasure. Pleasure may be caused by the


thoughts relief of pain, and pain may be caused by the cessation caused by the
satisfaction of desire and pain may be caused by the frustration of desire.
Sensitivity to pleasure or pain may vary among individuals, and that each
individual may respond differently to the same pleasure or pain.

• Bentham also provides a classification of motives for action. However, many


of his arguments for the theory that motives are morally neutral are not only
misdirected but morally repugnant. For example, he argues that there is no
difference between the aim to avoid punishment by telling the truth and the
aim to avoid punishment by telling a lie, because the aim in either case is to
avoid punishment. He argues that there is no difference between the aim to
preserve oneself from danger by helping another person and the aim to
preserve oneself from danger by not helping another person, because the aim
in either case is to preserve oneself from danger. He argues that there is no
difference between the aim to gain a person’s favour by being kind to that
person and the aim to gain a person’s favour by being cruel to the enemy of
that person, because the aim in either case is to gain the person’s favour.

• According to Bentham, pleasure is intrinsically good, and pain is


intrinsically evil. The motives which individuals may have for their actions
are only good or evil if they have good or evil consequences. Motives may
not be intrinsically good or evil, and their consequences may vary according
to each situation and according to each individual’s sensitivity to pleasure or
pain.

• Bentham tries to justify the oppression of women by men by arguing that


women may be more sensitive to smaller pleasures and pains and that
women may thus have less "firmness of mind." Bentham also argues
unsuccessfully that women are more likely to conform (obey) their actions to
the principle of sympathy and antipathy, and that they are less likely to
conform their actions to the principle of utility.

• Bentham asserts that if good intentions are produced by a motive, then the
motive may be described as good. If bad intentions are produced by a motive,
then the motive may be described as bad. Good actions produce pleasure,
while bad actions produce pain.

• Bentham defines ethics as the art of producing the greatest possible amount
of happiness for oneself and for others. Ethics is both the art of fulfilling one’s
duty to oneself and the art of fulfilling one’s duty to others. While private
ethics is concerned with the personal happiness of an individual, public ethics
and the art of legislation are concerned with the happiness of all individuals.
If an act of legislation conforms to the principle of utility, then it tends to
increase the total happiness of all individuals.

• Bentham enumerates five classes of illegal offenses against society: 1)


private offenses against individuals, 2) semi-public offenses against groups of
individuals, 3) self-regarding offenses against the rights of the individual, 4)
public offenses against the community, and 5) offenses by acts of falsehood
or by breaches of trust. Bentham argues that private offenses against
individuals may include those against: 1) person, 2) property, 3) reputation,
4) condition (by breach of duty), 5) person and property, and 6) person and
reputation. Semi-public offenses may include wrongful acts which endanger
the well-being and security of a particular class or group of individuals. Public
offenses may include wrongful acts which endanger public security, justice,
general happiness, social harmony, economic prosperity, or national
sovereignty.

• Bentham argues that the punishment of illegal offenses against society


should be proportional to the amount of harm which is caused by these
offenses. Punishment of offenses is not justified if it is disadvantageous or
needless. The amount of punishment for an offence should be sufficient to
deter further offences but should not be unjust or arbitrary.

• Bentham also contends that any form of punishment for violating civil or
criminal laws should conform to the principle of utility. Any punishment
which is inflicted upon an offending individual should have a sufficient
ground for the infliction of pain upon that individual

• The purpose of punishing illegal offenses against society is not only to


prevent similar or greater offenses but to offer satisfaction to those who have
been injured and to discipline and reform the offender.

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