Cover

1.Executive

2
Table

3
2. Introduction of Bank

2.1 History of Bank

Early 1900's: The Creation of the Federal Reserve System

 In 1907, a severe financial panic jolted Wall Street and forced several banks into failure. This
panic, however, did not trigger a broad financial collapse. Yet the simultaneous occurrence of general
prosperity with a crisis in the nation's financial centers persuaded many Americans that their banking
structure was sadly out of date and in need of major reform.
 In 1908, the Congress created the National Monetary Commission. This Commission, led by
Nelson W. Aldrich and composed of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, was
charged with making a comprehensive study of the necessary and desirable changes to the banking
system of the United States. The resulting plan called for a National Reserve Association, which
would be dominated by the banking industry. This plan was treated with great skepticism and received
very little public support.
 In 1912, the House Banking and Currency Committee held hearings to examine the control of the
banking and financial resources of the nation. The Committee concluded that America's banking and
financial system were in the hands of a "money trust." The Committee's report defined a "money trust"
as "an established and well defined identity and community of interest between a few leaders of
finance . . .which has resulted in a vast and growing concentration of control of money and credit in
the hands of a comparatively few men." The public's awareness of a monopoly on the banking system
was crucial in leading to America's financial reform.
 Another key event leading to America's financial reform was the election of Woodrow Wilson as
President in 1912. Wilson and his Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, forcefully opposed "any
plan which concentrates control in the hands of the banks."
 On December 26, 1912, the Glass-Willis proposal was submitted to President-elect Wilson.
Instead of suggesting the creation of a central bank, the proposal called for the creation of twenty or
more privately controlled regional reserve banks, which would hold a portion of member banks'
reserves, perform other central banking functions and issue currency against commercial assets and
gold. Wilson approved of this idea, but also insisted upon the creation of a central board to control and
coordinate the work of the regional reserve banks.

The Federal Reserve Act of 1913

The Federal Reserve Act presented by Congressman Carter Glass and Senator Robert L. Owen
incorporated modifications by Woodrow Wilson and allowed for a regional Federal Reserve
System, operating under a supervisory board in Washington, D.C. Congress approved the Act,
and President Wilson signed it into law on December 23, 1913. The Act, "Provided for the
establishment of Federal Reserve Banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of
rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the
United States, and for other purposes. The Act provided for a Reserve Bank Organization
Committee that would designate no less than eight but no more than twelve cities to be Federal
Reserve cities, and would then divide the nation into districts, each district to contain one Federal
Reserve City.

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3. Structure of Federal Reserve Bank of New York

3.1 Functions
Supervision Group
The Supervision Group supervises and regulates financial institutions in the Second District. It
applies its unique insight to influence and execute Federal Reserve System supervision in order to
promote a safe, sound and stable banking and financial system. Staff in the Group assesses the
safety and soundness of domestic banking institutions and operations of foreign banking
organizations in the District through periodic onsite evaluations and offsite financial analysis and

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surveillance. The Group also analyzes issues and developments to identify emerging supervisory
risks and develop domestic and international supervisory policy.

Chief Operating Officer

The Office of the Chief Operating Officer for Supervision provides strategic oversight and direction for
the Group’s Operations. These responsibilities also include management of Supervision’s internal
communications and employee engagement initiatives.

Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (LISCC) Programs

Under the local direction of senior vice president William Brodows, the Large Institution Supervision
Coordinating Committee (LISCC) Programs Function is responsible for developing and executing
horizontal programs and strategies covering capital, liquidity, governance and controls, recovery and
resolution, and monitoring and analysis. The function also executes firm-specific work in conjunction
with the LISCC DST Portfolio teams. The supervised firms include 12 globally systemic financial
institutions (nine located in NY) comprising U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate Holding
Companies.

LISCC Dedicated Supervisory Teams (DST)

The Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (LISCC) Dedicated Supervisory Teams
(DST) function is responsible for executing continuous risk-focused supervisory programs for nine
complex financial institutions in the Second Federal Reserve District, which include U.S. Bank Holding
and Intermediate Holding Companies currently subject to the Federal Reserve System’s oversight. This
responsibility encompasses an understanding of and assessment of each firm's risk profile, governance
structure, and strategy with the expressed goal of identifying institutional-specific and horizontal/systemic
areas of concern.

Large and Foreign Banking Organizations

The Large and Foreign Banking Organizations (LFBO) function is responsible for the supervision of
those foreign financial institutions operating in the Second District that are subject to enhanced
supervision due to their size and or complexity of operations. The portfolio is distributed based on factors
of geography and type of business.

Regional, Community and Foreign Institutions

The Regional, Community and Foreign Institutions and Consumer Compliance function (RCFI)
supervises Second District state-chartered regional and community banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System, along with regional and community bank holding companies, regardless of the lead
bank’s charter. A regional bank has total assets between $10 billion and $50 billion in banking activity
while a community bank has total assets less than $10 billion. The function also supervises foreign
banking organizations (FBOs) under $50 billion in banking assets as well as foreign representative offices
in the District, which cannot engage in depository, lending or other banking activities.

Financial Market Infrastructure

The Financial Market Infrastructure function is responsible for supervising the payments clearance and
settlement activities of bank holding companies and designated financial market utilities. This function is
concerned primarily with the systemic risks associated with the transactional operations that support the
financial system, identifies when vulnerabilities exist, and determines how to address them.

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Supervisory Policy and Strategy
The Supervisory Policy and Strategy function helps to formulate policy responses to supervisory matters
across the Supervision Group and the Bank.

Group Operations
Group Operations provides operational and administrative services, across multiple disciplines, in support
of the execution of core supervisory activities.

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 4. Departments and their roles

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is one of 12 regional Reserve Banks which, together with the
Board of Governors in Washington, D.C., make up the Federal Reserve System. The Fed, as the system is
commonly called, is an independent governmental entity created by Congress in 1913 to serve as the
central bank of the United States. It is responsible for:
 formulating and executing monetary policy,
 supervising and regulating depository institutions,
 providing an elastic currency,
 assisting the federal government's financing operations, and
 serving as the banker for the U.S. government.
In addition, the Federal Reserve System has important roles in operating the nation's payments systems,
protecting consumers' rights in their dealings with banks and promoting community development and
reinvestment.
The New York Fed oversees the Second Federal Reserve District, which includes New York state, the 12
northern counties of New Jersey, Fairfield County in Connecticut, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands. Though it serves a geographically small area compared with those of other Federal Reserve
Banks, the New York Fed is the largest Reserve Bank in terms of assets and volume of activity.
The New York Fed employs about 2,700 officers and staff at the head office and the regional office in
East Rutherford, New Jersey.
In addition to responsibilities the New York Fed shares in common with the other Reserve Banks, the
New York Fed has several unique responsibilities, including conducting open market operations,
intervening in foreign exchange markets, and storing monetary gold for foreign central banks,
governments and international agencies. Foremost among its functions is the implementation
of monetary policy, one of the three missions of the New York Fed. The other two are supervision and
regulation, and international operations

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5. Policy rate last 5 years

5.1 Interpretation

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6. Governors Last Five Tenures

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7. CV of
Current
Governor NAME OF GOVERNORS START OF TENURE END OF TENURE

E. Gerald Corrigan January 1, 1985 July 19, 1993

William J. McDonough July 19, 1993 June 10, 2003

Timothy Geithner November 17, 2003 January 26, 2009

William Dudley January 27, 2009 June 18, 2018

John Williams June 18, 2018 Incumbent

Curriculum Vitae August 2019

John C. Williams
President and Chief Executive Officer

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

33 Liberty Street

New York, NY 10045

Phone: (212) 720-6180

Education

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Ph.D. Economics, Stanford University, 1994

MSc. Economics, London School of Economics, 1989

A.B. Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 1984

Positions Held

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

President and Chief Executive Officer, 2018 – present

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

President and Chief Executive Officer, 2011 – 2018

Executive Vice President and Director of Research, 2009 – 2011

Senior Vice President and Advisor, 2004 – 2008

Senior Research Advisor, 2003 – 2004

Research Advisor, 2002 – 2003

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Senior Economist, 1998 – 2002

Economist, 1994 – 1997

Stanford University Graduate School of Business (on leave from FRBSF) Lecturer, 2008

Council of Economic Advisers (on leave from Board of Governors) Senior Economist, 1999-2000

Professional Activities
Managing Editor, International Journal of Central Banking, 2011 – 2016.

Research Associate, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, 2008 – present

. Associate Editor, American Economic Review, 2005 – 2008.

Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2001 – 2005.

Research Interests
Monetary policy under uncertainty and imperfect information; macroeconomics.

Fellowships and Awards

Bradley Foundation Fellowship

Phi Beta Kappa

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Published Research Articles
“Monetary Policy Frameworks and the Effective Lower Bound on Interest Rates,” (with Thomas M.
Mertens), American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 109, May 2019, 427-32.

“Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest: International Trends and Determinants,” (with Kathryn Holston
and Thomas Laubach), Journal of International Economics, 108, May 2017, S59-S75.

“A Wedge in the Dual Mandate: Monetary Policy and Long-Term Unemployment,” (with Glenn D.
Rudebusch), Journal of Macroeconomics, 47A, March 2016, 5-18.

“Measuring the Effect of the Zero Lower Bound on Medium- and Longer-Term Interest Rates,” (with
Eric T. Swanson), American Economic Review, 104 (10), October 2014, 3154-3185.

“Measuring the Effect of the Zero Lower Bound on Yields and Exchange Rates in the U.K. and
Germany,” (with Eric T. Swanson), Journal of International Economics, 92 (S1), 2014, 2-21.

“A Defense of Moderation in Monetary Policy,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 38, December 2013, 137-
150.

“Monetary Policy Mistakes and the Evolution of Inflation Expectations,” (with Athanasios Orphanides),
in Michael D. Bordo and Athanasios Orphanides (ed.), The Great Inflation: The Rebirth of Modern
Central Banking, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013, 255-297.

“Have We Underestimated the Probability of Hitting the Zero Lower Bound?” (with Hess Chung, Jean-
Philippe Laforte, and David Reifschneider), Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44, 2012, 47-82.

“Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy,” (with John B. Taylor), in Benjamin Friedman and
Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, Volume 3B, North-Holland, 2011, 829-860.

“Welfare-Maximizing Monetary Policy under Parameter Uncertainty,” (with Rochelle M. Edge and
Thomas Laubach), Journal of Applied Econometrics, 25(1), January/February 2010, 129-143.

“Heeding Daedalus: Optimal Inflation and the Zero Lower Bound,” Brookings Paper on Economic
Activity, Fall 2009, 2010, 1-37.

“Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control Policy,” (with Athanasios Orphanides), in Carl
Walsh and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (ed.), Central Banking, Analysis 3 and Economic Policies: Monetary
Policy Under Uncertainty and Learning, Central Bank of Chile, 2009, 115-144.

“Forecasting Recessions: The Puzzle of the Enduring Power of the Yield Curve,” (with Glenn D.
Rudebusch), Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 27(4), October 2009, 492-503.

“A Black Swan in the Money Market,” (with John B. Taylor), American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 1(1), January 2009, 58-83.

“Learning, Expectations Formation, and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control Monetary Policy,” (with
Athanasios Orphanides), Journal of Monetary Economics, 55, October 2008, S80-S96.

“Revealing the Secrets of the Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections,”
(with Glenn D. Rudebusch), in John Y. Campbell (ed.) Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, University of
Chicago Press, 2008, 247-284.

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“Learning and Shifts in Long-Run Productivity Growth,” (with Rochelle M. Edge and Thomas Laubach),
Journal of Monetary Economics, November 2007, 2421–2438.

“Robust Monetary Policy with Imperfect Knowledge,” (with Athanasios Orphanides), Journal of
Monetary Economics, August 2007, 1406-1435.

“Inflation Targeting under Imperfect Knowledge,” (with Athanasios Orphanides), in Frederic Mishkin
and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (ed.) Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, Central Bank of Chile, 2007.
Reprinted in FRBSF Economic Review, 2007.

“Monetary Policy in a Low Inflation Economy with Learning,” in Monetary Policy in an Environment of
Low Inflation; Proceedings of the Bank of Korea International Conference 2006, Seoul, Korea: The Bank
of Korea, 2006, 199-228.Reprinted in FRBSF Economic Review, 2010.

“Monetary Policy with Imperfect Knowledge,” (with Athanasios Orphanides), Journal of the European
Economic Association, 4 (2-3), April/May 2006, April-May 2006, 366– 375.

“Monetary Policy under Uncertainty in Micro-founded Macroeconomic Models,” (with Andrew T.

Levin, Alexei Onatski, and Noah Williams), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005, 20, Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2006, 229-287.

“Robust Estimation and Monetary Policy with Unobserved Structural Change,” in Jon Faust, Athanasios
Orphanides, and David Reifschneider (ed.) Models and Monetary Policy: Research in the Tradition of
Dale Henderson, Richard Porter, and Peter Tinsley, Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 2005. Reprinted in FRBSF Economic Review, 2005.

“The Decline of Activist Stabilization Policy: Natural Rate Misperceptions, Learning, and Expectations,”
(with Athanasios Orphanides), Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, November 2005, 1927-1950.

“Using a Long-Term Interest Rate as the Monetary Policy Instrument,” (with Bruce McGough and Glenn
D. Rudebusch), Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, July 2005, 855-879.

“Inflation Scares and Monetary Policy,” (with Athanasios Orphanides), Review of Economic Dynamics,
8, April 2005, 498-527.

“Investment, Capacity, and Uncertainty: A Putty-Clay Approach,” (with Simon Gilchrist), Review of
Economic Dynamics, 8, January 2005, 1-27.

“Imperfect Knowledge, Inflation Expectations, and Monetary Policy,” (with Athanasios Orphanides), in
Ben S. Bernanke and Michael Woodford (ed.) The Inflation-Targeting Debate, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2004, 201-234.

“Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest,” (with Thomas Laubach), Review of Economics and Statistics,
85(4), November 2003, 1063–1070.

“Robust Monetary Policy with Competing Reference Models,” (with Andrew T. Levin), Journal of
Monetary Economics, 50, July 2003, 945–975.

“The Performance of Forecast-Based Monetary Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty,” (with Andrew T.
Levin and Volker Wieland), American Economic Review, 93(3), June 2003, 622-645.

“Simple Rules for Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, 2003,
1-12.

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“Robust Monetary Policy Rules with Unknown Natural Rates,” (with Athanasios Orphanides),
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2, 2002, 63-145.

“Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low Inflation Era,” (with David Reifschneider), Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 32(4), November 2000, 936- 966.

“Putty-Clay and Investment: A Business Cycle Analysis,” (with Simon Gilchrist), Journal of Political
Economy, 108(5), October 2000, 928-960.

“Too Much of a Good Thing? The Economics of Investment in R&D,” (with Charles Jones), Journal of
Economic Growth, 5, March 2000, 65-85. 5

“Robustness of Simple Monetary Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty,” (with Andrew Levin and
Volker Wieland), in John Taylor (ed.) Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago Press, 1999.

“Aggregate Disturbances, Monetary Policy, and the Macroeconomy: The FRB/US Perspective,” (with
David Reifschneider and Robert Tetlow), Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 1999, 1-19.

“Measuring the Social Rate of Return to R&D,” (with Charles Jones), Quarterly Journal of Economics,
November 1998, 1119-1135.

“The Evolution of Macro Models at the Federal Reserve Board,” (with Flint Brayton, Andrew Levin, and
Ralph Tryon), Carnegie-Rochseter Conference Series on Public Policy, 47, December 1997, 43-81.

“The Role of Expectations in the FRB/US Macroeconomic Model,” (with Flint Brayton, Eileen
Mauskopf, David Reifschneider, and Peter Tinsley), Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1997, 227-245.

“Expectations, Learning and the Costs of Disinflation: Experiments using the FRB/US Model,” (with A.
Bomfim, R. Tetlow, and P. von zur Muehlen), Monetary Policy and the Inflation Process, Basel,
Switzerland: Bank of International Settlements, 1997.

Discussions and Comments

“Discussion of ‘Prospects for Inflation in a High Pressure Economy: Is the Phillips Curve Dead or Is It
Just Hibernating?’ by Peter Hooper, Frederic S. Mishkin, and Amir Sufi, U.S. Monetary Policy Forum,
New York, NY, Feb 22, 2019. https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2019/wil190222

“Discussion of “Language after Liftoff: Fed Communication Away from the Zero Lower Bound’,” by
Michael Feroli, David Greenlaw, Peter Hooper, Frederic S. Mishkin, and Amir Sufi, U.S. Monetary
Policy Forum,New York, NY, February 26, 2016. http://www.frbsf.org/our-district/press/presidents-
speeches/williamsspeeches/2016/february/language-after-liftoff-fed-communication-away-from-the-
zerolower-bound/

“Discussion of Discussion of “Housing, Monetary Policy, and the Recovery,” by Michael Feroli, Ethan S.
Harris, Amir Sufi, and Kenneth D. West, U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York, NY, February 24,
2012. https://www.frbsf.org/ourdistrict/press/presidents-speeches/williams-
speeches/2012/february/williams-housingmonetary-policy-recovery/

“Monetary Policy and Housing Booms,” International Journal of Central Banking, 7(1), March 2011,
345-354. 6

“Wrap-up Discussion,” in: Renee Fry, Callum Jones, and Christopher Kent (ed.) Inflation in an Era of
Relative Price Shocks, Sydney, Australia: Reserve Bank of Australia, May 2010, 342-346.

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“The Zero Lower Bound: Lessons from the Past Decade,” NBER International Seminar on
Macroeconomics, 6, 2010, 367-375.

“Discussion of ‘Free Flows, Limited Diversification: Openness and the Fall and Rise of Stock Market
Correlations, 1890-2001’ by Quinn and Voth,” NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics, 6,
2010, 48-52.

“Discussion of ‘A Snapshot on Inflation Targeting in its Adolescence’ by Kenneth Kuttner,” in

Christopher Kent and Simon Guttmann (ed.) The Future of Inflation Targeting, Sydney, Australia:
Reserve Bank of Australia, November 2004, 43-46.

“Discussion of ‘Disagreement about Inflation Expectations’ by N. Gregory Mankiw, Ricardo Reis, and
Justin Wolfers,” in Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff (ed.) NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, 18,
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004, 257-268

Other Publications
“The Future Fortunes of R-star: Are They Really Rising?,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Letter, 2018-13, May 21, 2018.

“Supporting Strong, Steady, and Sustainable Growth,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2018-10, April 9, 2018.

“Expect the Expected: Staying Calm When the Data Meet the Forecasts,” Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Economic Letter, 2018-03, February 5, 2018.

“Monetary Policy and the Economic Outlook: A Fine Balancing Act.” Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Economic Letter, 2017-36, December 18, 2017.

“The Perennial Problem of Predicting Potential.” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2017-32, November 6, 2017.

“Interest Rates and the ‘New Normal’.” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2017-
29, October 10, 2017.

“Monetary Policy’s Role in Fostering Sustainable Growth,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Letter, 2017-22, August 7, 2017.

“The Global Growth Slump: Causes and Consequences, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Letter, 2017-19, July 3, 2017. 7

“Preparing for the Next Storm: Reassessing Frameworks and Strategies in a Low R-star World,” Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2017-13, May 8, 2017.

“DSGE models: A cup half full,” in: DSGE Models in the Conduct of Policy: Use as intended, VoxEU
Ebook, edited by: Refet Gürkaynak and Cédric Tille, April 28, 2017. http://voxeu.org/content/dsge-
models-conduct-policy-use-intended

“Three Questions on R-star,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2017-05,
February 21, 2017.

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“Looking Back, Looking Ahead, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2017-02,
January 23, 2017.

“Longview: The Economic Outlook, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2016-24,
August 22, 2016.

“Monetary Policy in a Low R-star World,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter,
2016-23, August 15, 2016.

“Economic Outlook: Springtime Is on My Mind,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2016-16, May 16, 2016.

“Data Dependence Awakens,” (with Benjamin Pyle), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2016-12, April 11, 2016.

“Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest Redux,” (with Thomas Laubach), Business Economics, 51(2),
April 2016, 57-67.

“Rules of Engagement,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2016-06, February 29,
2016.

“The Right Profile: Economic Drivers and the Outlook,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Letter, 2016-05, February 22, 2016.

“After the First Rate Hike,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2016-01, January
11, 2016.

“Dancing Days Are Here Again: The Long Road Back to Maximum Employment,” Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2015-36, December 7, 2015.

“Will Interest Rates Be Permanently Lower?” VoxEU, November 26, 2015.

http://www.voxeu.org/article/evidence-low-real-rates-will-persist

“The Economic Outlook: Live Long and Prosper,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2015-31, October 5, 2015. 8

“Measuring Monetary Policy’s Effect on House Prices,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Letter, 2015-28, August 31, 2015.

“The Recovery’s Final Frontier?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2015-23,
July 13, 2015.

“Macroprudential Policy in a Microprudential World,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2015-18, June 1, 2015.

“Looking Forward: The Path for Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2015-17, May 26, 2015.

“Monetary Policy and the Independence Dilemma,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2015-15, May 11, 2015.

“The Decline in the Natural Rate of Interest,” Business Economics, 50(2), April 2015, 57-60.

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“The Value of Lifelong Learning,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2014 Annual Report, April
2015. “The View from Here: Outlook and Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Letter, 2015-08, March 9, 2015.

“Inflation Targeting and the Global Financial Crisis: Successes and Challenges,” Fourteen Years of
Inflation Targeting in South Africa and the Challenge of a Changing Mandate, South African Reserve
Bank Conference Series 2014, Pretoria, South Africa: South African Reserve Bank, 2015, 95-111.

“Policy Rules in Practice,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 49, December 2014, 151-153.
“Navigating toward Normal: The Future for Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2014-31, October 20, 2014.

“Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: Happy Marriage or Untenable Union?” Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2014-17, June 9, 2014.

“The Economic Recovery and Monetary Policy: The Road Back to Ordinary,” Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco Economic Letter, 2014-16, June 2, 2014.

“The San Francisco Fed and the West: A Century of Reinvention,” (with Sam Zuckerman), Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2013 Annual Report, April 2014. 9

“Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: Putting Theory into Practice,” The Hutchins Center on Fiscal
& Monetary Policy, The Brookings Institution, January 16, 2014.

“Housing, Banking, and the Recovery: The Outlook,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2014-02, January 13, 2014.

“Rebalancing the Economy: A Tale of Two Countries,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Letter, 2013-33, November 12, 2013.

“Forward Policy Guidance at the Federal Reserve,” VoxEU, October 16, 2013.
http://www.voxeu.org/article/forward-policy-guidance-federal-reserve

“Will Unconventional Policy Be the New Normal?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2013-29, October 7, 2013.

“Bubbles Tomorrow, Yesterday, but Never Today?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2013-27, September 23, 2013. Reprinted in: Business Economics, 2013, 48 (4), 224-230.

“The Economic Recovery: Past, Present, and Future,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2013-18, July 1, 2013.

“Economic Outlook: Moving in the Right Direction,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2013-15, May 20, 2013

“Cash Is Dead! Long Live Cash!” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2012 Annual Report, April
2013, 7-15.

“The Economy and Fed Policy: Follow the Demand,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2013-05, February 25, 2013.

“Monetary Policy in Uncertain Times,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2013-
02, January 21, 2013.

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“The Federal Reserve’s Unconventional Policies,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2012-34, November 13, 2012.

“The Economic Outlook and Federal Reserve Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2012-30, October 1, 2012.

“The Outlook and Monetary Policy Challenges,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2012-22, July 23, 2012.

“Monetary Policy, Money, and Inflation,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter,
2012-21, July 9, 2012. 10

“Opening the Temple,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2011 Annual Report, April 2012, 7-14.

“The Slow Recovery: It's Not Just Housing,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter,
2012-11, April 9, 2012

“The Federal Reserve and the Economic Recovery,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2012-02, January 17, 2012.

“Unconventional Monetary Policy: Lessons from the Past Three Years,” Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Economic Letter, 2011-31, October 3, 2011.

“Economics Instruction and the Brave New World of Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Economic Letter, 2011-17, June 6, 2011.

“Maintaining Price Stability in a Global Economy,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2011-14, May 9, 2011.

“What Is the New Normal Unemployment Rate?” (with Justin Weidner), Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Economic Letter, 2011-5, February 14, 2011.

“Estimating the Macroeconomic Effects of the Fed's Asset Purchases,” (with Hess Chung, Jean-Philippe
Laforte, and David Reifschneider), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2011-3,
January 31, 2011.

“Two Cheers for Bagehot,” in Subir Gokarn (ed.), Challenges to Central Banking in the Context of
Financial Crisis, New Delhi, India: Academic Foundation, 2011, 333-347.

“The Shape of Things to Come,” (with Justin Weidner), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Letter, 2010-15, May 17, 2010.

“How Big Is the Output Gap?” (with Justin Weidner), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter, 2009-19, June 12, 2009.

“The Risk of Deflation,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2009-12, March 27,
2009.

“Inflation Persistence in an Era of Well-Anchored Inflation Expectations,” Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Economic Letter, Number 2006-27, October 13, 2006.

“The Natural Rate of Interest,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, Number 2003-
32, October 31, 2003. 11

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Unpublished Working Papers

“Tying Down the Anchor: Monetary Policy Rules and the Lower Bound on Interest Rates,” (with
Thomas M. Mertens), Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 887, August 2019.

“What to Expect from the Lower Bound on Interest Rates: Evidence from Derivatives Prices,” (with
Thomas M. Mertens), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2018-03, January 2018.

“Learning and the Role of Macro Factors in the Term Structure,” (with Thomas Laubach and Robert
Tetlow), mimeo, October 2007.

“The Responses of Wages and Prices to Technology Shocks.” (with Rochelle M. Edge and Thomas
Laubach), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 03-21, December 2003.

“Parameter Uncertainty and the Central Bank’s Objective Function,” (with Andrew T. Levin),
manuscript, May 2003.

“The Optimal Monetary Policy Response to Shifts in Growth,” (with Rochelle Edge and Thomas
Laubach), manuscript, May 2003.

“Transition Dynamics in Vintage Capital Models: Explaining the Postwar Catch-Up of Germany and
Japan,” (with Simon Gilchrist) Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-07, February 2001.

“What’s Happened to the Phillips Curve?,” (with Flint Brayton and John Roberts), Finance and
Economics Discussion Series 1999-49, September 1999.

“The Limits to ‘Growing an Economy’,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95- 30, 1995.

8. Organogram / Organizational Chart of Central Banks

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9. Economic Outlook of the country

9.1 GDP OF UNITED STATES

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States was worth 21427.70 billion US dollars in 2019,
according to official data from the World Bank and projections from Trading Economics. The GDP value
of the United States represents 17.65 percent of the world economy

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9.2. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

The US unemployment rate was unchanged at 6.7 percent in December 2020, compared with
market expectations of 6.8 percent and well above pre-pandemic levels of about 3.5 percent. The
latest reading pointed to stagnation in the labor market recovery, amid a lack of fiscal stimulus
and record COVID-19 infections that prompted many US states to impose restrictive measures to
respond to the outbreak

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9.3. INFLATION RATE

Annual inflation rate in the US increased to 1.4% in December of 2020, from 1.2 percent in November
and slightly higher than market forecasts of 1.3%. On a monthly basis, consumer prices increased 0.4%,
higher than 0.2% in November and in line with expectations, mainly driven by an 8.4% increase in the
gasoline index, which accounted for more than 60% of the overall rise. The other components of the
energy index were mixed, resulting in an increase of 4.0 percent for the month. The food index rose in
December, as both the food at home and the food away from home indexes increased 0.4%. The core
index which excludes food and energy rose 0.1% on the month and 1.4% on the year

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9.4. INTEREST RATE

The Federal Reserve reiterated it was committed to using its full range of tools to support the US
economy, as the uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook remained elevated, minutes of the
December 15-16 policy meeting showed. Also, policymakers sought to reassure market participants they
would get plenty of notice before the asset purchases were curtailed. Fed members agreed that the path of
the economy would depend significantly on the course of the virus and that the ongoing public health
crisis would continue to weigh on economic activity, employment, and inflation in the near term. In
addition, the central bank noted that, with the pandemic worsening across the country, the economic
recovery would likely slow in coming months

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9.5 GDP GROWTH RATE OF US

The US economy expanded by an annualized 33.4% in Q3 2020, slightly higher than 33.1% in the second
estimate. It is the biggest expansion ever, following a record 31.4% plunge in Q2, as the economy
rebounds from the coronavirus pandemic. The upward revision primarily reflected larger increases in
personal consumption expenditures and nonresidential fixed investment. However, GDP is still 3.5%
below its pre-pandemic level and although coronavirus vaccination already started, the pandemic is far
from controlled. The country is recording an average of around 200K new cases every day and states are
tightening restrictions. Also, Congress only approved a new $892 billion aid package late in December. It
includes $600 payments to most Americans, a $300-per-week unemployment benefit and $284 billion for
the Paycheck Protection Program but excludes aid for states and local governments

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10. List of Banks Regulated by Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Adirondack Bank
Adirondack Trust Company
Alden State Bank
Amboy Bank
Banco Popular De Puerto Rico
Banco Popular North America
Bank of Cattaraugus
Bank of Millbrook
Bank of New York Mellon
BPD Bank
Chemung Canal Trust Company
Community Bank of Bergen County, N.J.
Depository Trust Company
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
Empire State Bank
Five Star Bank
Goldman Sachs Bank USA
Gotham Bank of New York
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company
Mizuho Corporate Bank (USA)
Northern Trust Company of New York
Orange County Trust Company
Peapack-Gladstone Bank
Solvay Bank
Tioga State Bank
Warehouse Trust Company LLC

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12. Conclusion

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