Atp Case Digest

LAW ON AGENCY, TRUSTS AND PARTNERHSIP (SUMMER 2016)
SECTION 1
JOSE BORDADOR and LYDIA BORDADOR, petitioners, vs. BRIGIDA D. LUZ, During the trial of the civil cae, petitioners claimed that Deganos acted as agent of Luz when
ERNESTO M. LUZ and NARCISO DEGANOS, respondents. received the subject items of jewelry, and because he failed to pay for the same, Luz, as
G.R. No. 130148. December 15, 1997 principal, and her spouse are solidarily liable with him
FACTS: Trial court ruled that only Deganos was liable to Bordador for the amount and damages
Petitioners were engaged in the business of purchase and sale of jewelry and respondent claimed. It held that while Luz did have transactions with petitioners in the past, the items
Brigida Luz, also known as Aida Luz, was their regular customer. involved were already paid for and all that Luz owed Bordador was the sum or P21, 483
representing interest on the principal account which she had previously paid for.
On several occasions, respondent Deganos, brother of Luz, received several pieces of gold
and jewelry from petitioners amounting to P382, 816. These items and their prices were CA affirmed TC‘s decision
indicated in seventeen receipts covering the same. 11 of the receipts stated that they were
received for a certain Aquino, a niece of Deganos, and the remaining 6 receipts indicated that
they were received for Luz. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Luz are liable to petitioners for the latter‘s claim for money and damages in the sum of
Deganos was supposed to sell the items at a profit and thereafter remit the proceeds and P725,463.98, plus interests and attorney‘s fees, despite the fact that the evidence does not
return the unsold items to Bordador. Deganos remitted only the sum of P53, 207. He neither show that they signed any of the subject receipts or authorized Deganos to receive the items
paid the balance of the sales proceeds, nor did he return any unsold item to petitioners. of jewelry on their behalf
The total of his unpaid account to Bordador, including interest, reached the sum of P725,
463.98. Petitioners eventually filed a complaint in the barangay court against Deganos to
recover said amount. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
No
In the barangay proceedings, Luz, who was not impleaded in the cases, appeared as a witness Evidence does not support the theory of Bordador that Deganos was an agent of Luz and that
for Deganos and ultimately, she and her husband, together with Deganos signed a the latter should consequently be held solidarily liable with Deganos in his obligation to
compromise agreement with petitioners. petitioners.
In that compromise agreement, Deganos obligated himself to pay petitioners, on installment The basis for agency is representation. Here, there is no showing that Luz consented to the
basis , the balance of his account plus interest thereon. However, he failed to comply with his acts of Deganos or authorized him to act on her behalf, much less with respect to the
aforestated undertakings. particular transactions involved.
Petitioners instituted a complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages, with an It was grossly and inexcusably negligent of petitioner to entrust to Deganos, not once or
application for preliminary attachment against Deganos and Luz. twice but on at least six occasions as evidenced by 6 receipts, several pieces of jewelry of
substantial value without requiring a written authorization from his alleged principal.
Deganos and Luz was also charged with estafa
A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the
authority of the agent.
Records show that neither an express nor an implied agency was proven to have existed
between Deganos and Luz. Evidently, Bordador who were negligent in their transactions
with Deganos cannot seek relief from the effects of their negligence by conjuring a supposed
agency relation between the two respondents where no evidence supports such claim.
The trial court also found that it was petitioner Lydia Bordador who indicated in the receipts
that the items were received by Deganos for Evelyn Aquino and Brigida D. Luz. [7]Said court
was persuaded that Brigida D. Luz was behind Deganos, but because there was no
memorandum to this effect, the agreement between the parties was unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds. Absent the required memorandum or any written document connecting the
respondent Luz spouses with the subject receipts, or authorizing Deganos to act on their
behalf, the alleged agreement between petitioners and Brigida D. Luz was unenforceable.
EUROTECH INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Petitioner, - versus –EDWIN

CUIZON and ERWIN CUIZON, Respondents ISSUES & ARGUMENTS :
G.R. No. 167552 April 23, 2007
Whether or not the act of Edwin Cuizon as sales manager in signing the Deed of Assignment
FACTS: binds his principal Impact Systems.
From January to April 1995, petitioner sold to Impact Systems various products allegedly
amounting to P91,338.00 pesos. Subsequently, respondents sought to buy from petitioner one Yes, the act of Edwin in signing the Deed of Assignment binds Impact Systems
unit of sludge pump valued at P250,000.00 with respondents making a down payment of
P50,000.00. When the sludge pump arrived from the United Kingdom, petitioner refused to The Supreme Court held that in a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some
deliver the same to respondents without their having fully settled their indebtedness to service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another with the latter's consent.
petitioner. Thus, on 28 June 1995, respondent EDWIN and Alberto de Jesus, general Its purpose is to extend the personality of the principal or the party for whom another acts
manager of petitioner, executed a Deed of Assignment of receivables in favor of petitioner. and from whom he or she derives the authority to act. It is said that the basis of agency is
Impact systems is owed by ERWIN Cuizon. representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the
scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally
Despite the existence of the Deed of Assignment, respondents proceeded to collect from executed by the principal.
Toledo Power Company the amount of P365,135.29. Alarmed by this development,
petitioner made several demands upon respondents to pay their obligations. As a result, In this case at hand, the parties do not dispute the existence of the agency relationship
respondents were able to make partial payments to petitioner. On 7 October 1996, petitioner's between respondents ERWIN as principal and EDWIN as agent.
counsel sent respondents a final demand letter wherein it was stated that as of 11 June 1996,
respondents' total obligations stood at P295,000.00 excluding interests and attorney's fees.
Because of respondents' failure to abide by said final demand letter, petitioner instituted a HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
complaint for sum of money, damages, with application for preliminary attachment against
herein respondents Respondent Edwin Cuizon acted within his authority as an agent, who did not acquire any
right nor incur any liability arising from the Deed of Assignment, it follows that he is not a
By way of special and affirmative defenses, respondent EDWIN alleged that he is not a real real party in interest who should be impleaded in this case. A real party in interest is one who
party in interest in this case. According to him, he was acting as mere agent of his principal, stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
which was the Impact Systems, in his transaction with petitioner and the latter was very of the suit.In this respect, we sustain his exclusion as a defendant in the suit before the court a
much aware of this fact. quo.
MANOTOK BROTHERS, INC., petitioner, -versus- MANOTOK BROTHERS, INC.,

petitioner
G.R. No. 94753. April 7, 1993. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:
FACTS: The Court ruled that when there is a close, proximate and causal connection between the
agent's efforts and labor and the principal's sale of his property, the agent is entitled to a
The petitioner herein then defendant-appellant is the owner of a certain parcel of land and commission.
building which were formerly leased by the City of Manila and used by the Claro M. Recto
High School, at M.F. Jhocson Street, Sampaloc Manila. They agree with the respondent Court that the City of Manila ultimately became the
purchaser of petitioner's property mainly through the efforts of private respondent. Without
By means of a letter 5 dated July 5, 1966, petitioner authorized herein private respondent discounting the fact that when Municipal Ordinance No. 6603 was signed by the City Mayor
Salvador Saligumba to negotiate with the City of Manila the sale of the aforementioned on May 17, 1968, private respondent's authority had already expired, it is to be noted that the
property for not less than P425,000.00. In the same writing, petitioner agreed to pay private ordinance was approved on April 26, 1968 when private respondent's authorization was still
respondent a five percent (5%) commission in the event the sale is finally consummated and in force. Moreover, the approval by the City Mayor came only three days after the expiration
paid. of private respondent's authority. It is also worth emphasizing that from the records, the only
party given a written authority by petitioner to negotiate the sale from July 5, 1966 to May
Petitioner, on March 4, 1967, executed another letter 6 extending the authority of private 14, 1968 was private respondent.
respondent for 120 days. Thereafter, another extension was granted to him for 120 more
days, as evidenced by another letter 7 dated June 26, 1967.
Finally, through another letter 8 dated November 16, 1967, the corporation with Rufino
Manotok, its President, as signatory, authorized private respondent to finalize and
consummate the sale of the property to the City of Manila for not less than P410,000.00.
With this letter came another extension of 180 days.
ISSUES& ARGUMENTS:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the five percent agent's commission.
MANUEL B. TAN, GREGG M. TECSON and ALEXANDER SALDAA, petitioners,

vs. EDUARDO R. GULLAS and NORMA S. GULLAS,respondents.
G.R. No. 143978. December 3, 2002
FACTS:
Respondents, were the registered owners of a parcel of land, they executed a special power
of attorney authorizing petitioners Tan, a licensed real estate broker, and his associates
Tecson and Saldaña, to negotiate for the sale of the land, at a commission of 3% of the gross HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:
price. Tan contacted the Sisters of Mary of Banneaux, Inc. (hereafter, Sisters of Mary), a
religious organization interested in acquiring a property. The Sisters, who had already seen The records show that petitioner Tan is a licensed real estate broker, andother petitioners his
and inspected the land, found the same suitable for their purpose and expressed their desire to associates. A Broker is one who is engaged for others
buy it. However, they requested that the selling price be reduced. Respondents agreed to sell On a commission, negotiating contracts relative property with the custody of which he has no
the property to the Sisters of Mary. Petitioners went to see respondents who refused to pay concern; the negotiator between other parties , never acting in his own name but in the name
thebroker‘s fee and alleged that another group of agents was responsible for the sale of land of those who employed him.
to theSisters of Mary. Petitioners filed a complaint against the defendants for recovery of
their broker‘sfee. They alleged that they were the efficient procuring cause in bringing about
the sale of the,but that their efforts in consummating the sale were frustrated by the There was no dispute as to the role that petitioners played in transaction. An agent receives a
respondents who, in evidentbad faith, malice and in order to evade payment of broker‘s fee, commission upon the successful conclusion of a sale. On the other hand a broker earns his
dealt directly with the buyerwhom petitioners introduced to them. pay merely by bringing the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is eventually made.
Therefore petitioners as brokers should be entitled to the commission whether or not the sale
of property subject matter of the contract was concluded through their efforts.
ISSUES& ARGUMENTS:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the brokerage commission.

Whether or not an agent distinguished from a broker.
EDUARDO V. LINTONJUA, JR. and ANTONIO K. LITONJUA, Petitioners, -versus-

ETERNIT CORPORATION (now ETERTON MULTI-RESOURCES
CORPORATION), ETEROUTREMER, S.A. and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:
COMPANY, Respondents. The general principles of agency governthe relation between the corporation and its officers
G.R. No. 144805 June 8, 2006 or agents, subject to thearticles of incorporation, by-laws, or relevant provisions of
law.Agency may be oral unless the law requires a specific form. However, to createor convey
FACTS: real rights over immovable property, a special power of attorney isnecessary. Thus, when a
The Eternit Corporation (EC) manufactures roofing materials and pipeproducts. Ninety sale of a piece of land or any portion thereof is throughan agent, the authority of the latter
(90%) percent of the shares of stocks of EC were owned byEteroutremer S.A. Corporation shall be in writing, otherwise, the sale shallbe void.In this case, the petitioners failed to
(ESAC), a corporation registered under the laws of Belgium. Glanville was the General adduce in evidence any resolution of theBoard of Directors of EC empowering Marquez,
Manager and President of EC, while Delsauxwas the Regional Director for Asia of ESAC. In Glanville or Delsaux as its agent,to sell, let alone offer for sale, for and in its behalf, the eight
1986, because of the political situation in the Philippines the management of ESAC wanted parcels of landowned by it.Moreover, the evidence of petitioners shows that Adams and
to stop itsoperations and to dispose the land in Mandaluyong City. They engaged theservices Glanville acted onthe authority of Delsaux, who, in turn, acted on the authority of ESAC,
of realtor/broker Lauro G. Marquez.Marquez thereafter offered the land to Eduardo B. through itsCommittee for Asia, and the Belgian/Swiss component of the management
Litonjua, Jr. forP27,000,000.00. Litonjua counter offered P20,000,000.00 cash. Marquez of ESAC. The offer of Delsaux emanated only from the "Belgian/Swiss decision," and not
apprisedGlanville & Delsaux of the offer. Delsaux sent a telex stating that, based on the entire management or Board of Directors of ESAC. While it is true thatpetitioners
the"Belgian/Swiss decision," the final offer was "US$1,000,000.00 andP2,500,000.00. The accepted the counter-offer of ESAC, EC was not a party to the transaction between them;
Litonjua brothers deposited US$1,000,000.00 with the Security Bank & Trust Company, and hence, EC was not bound by such acceptance. Decision of the lower court is affirmed
drafted an Escrow Agreement to expeditethe sale.Meanwhile, with the assumption of
Corazon C. Aquino as President, the politicalsituation improved. Marquez received a letter
from Delsaux that the ESACRegional Office decided not to proceed with the sale. When Respondents maintain that Glanville, Delsaux and Marquez had no authority from the
informed of this, theLitonjuas, filed a complaint for specific performance and payment for stockholders of EC and its Board of Directors to offer the properties for sale to the
damageson account of the aborted sale. Both the trial court and appellate court petitioners. Petitioners assert that there was no need for a written authority from the Board of
rendered judgment in favor of defendants and dismissed the complaint. The lower court Directors of EC for Marquez to validly act as broker. As broker, Marquez was not an
declared that since the authority of the agents/realtors was not in writing, the sale is void and ordinary agent because his only job as a broker was to look for a buyer and to bring together
not merely unenforceable. the parties to the transaction. He was not authorized to sell the properties; hence, petitioners
argue, Article 1874 of the New Civil Code does not apply. A corporation is a juridical person
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS: separate and distinct from its stockholders and is not affected by the personal rights,
obligations and transactions of the latter. It may act only through its board of directors or,
Whether or not the appellate court committed grave error of law in holding thatMarquez when authorized by its board resolution, through its officers or agents.
needed a written authority from respondent ETERNIT before the salecan be perfected.
weeks of waiting, the petitioners wrote respondent Fernandez on January 5, 1995, demanding
that their transaction be finalized by January 30, 1996.
SECTION 2
ANTONIO K. LITONJUA and AURELIO K. LITONJUA, JR., petitioners, vs. MARY
ANN GRACE FERNANDEZ, HEIRS OF PAZ TICZON ELEOSIDA, represented by ISSUES& ARGUMENTS:
GREGORIO T. ELEOSIDA, HEIRS OF DOMINGO B. TICZON, represented by
MARY MEDIATRIX T. FERNANDEZ, CRISTETA TICZON, EVANGELINE JILL Whether or not there was perfected contract of sale between the parties
R. TICZON, ERLINDA T. BENITEZ, DOMINIC TICZON, JOSEFINA LUISA Whether or not the contract falls under the coverage of Statute of Frauds
PIAMONTE, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents. Whether or not the defendants declared in default are benefited by the assailed decision of
G.R. No. 148116. April 14, 2004 the court of appeals.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:

FACTS:
In City of Cebu v. Heirs of Rubi, it is held that the exchange of written correspondence
Sometime in September 1995, Mrs. Lourdes Alimario and Agapito Fisico who worked as between the parties may constitute sufficient writing to evidence the agreement for purposes
brokers, offered to sell to the petitioners, Antonio K. Litonjua and Aurelio K. Litonjua, Jr., of complying with the statute of frauds.
the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 36754 and 36766. The petitioners were shown a
locator plan and copies of the titles showing that the owners of the properties were In this case, we agree with the findings of the appellate court that there was no perfected
represented by Mary Mediatrix Fernandez and Gregorio T. Eleosida, respectively. The contract of sale between the respondents-owners, as sellers, and the petitioners, as buyers.
brokers told the petitioners that they were authorized by respondent Fernandez to offer the There is no documentary evidence on record that the respondents-owners specifically
property for sale. The petitioners, thereafter, made two ocular inspections of the property, in authorized respondent Fernandez to sell their properties to another, including the
the course of which they saw some people gathering coconuts. petitioners. Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that a special power of attorney is
In the afternoon of November 27, 1995, the petitioners met with respondent Fernandez necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted
and the two brokers at the petitioners office in Mandaluyong City.The petitioners and or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration or to create or convey real
respondent Fernandez agreed that the petitioners would buy the property consisting of 36,742 rights over immovable property, or for any other act of strict dominion. Any sale of real
square meters, for the price of P150 per square meter, or the total sum of P5,098,500. They property by one purporting to be the agent of the registered owner without any authority
also agreed that the owners would shoulder the capital gains tax, transfer tax and the therefor in writing from the said owner is null and void. The declarations of the agent alone
expenses for the documentation of the sale. The petitioners and respondent Fernandez also are generally insufficient to establish the fact or extent of her authority In this case, the only
agreed to meet on December 8, 1995 to finalize the sale. It was also agreed upon that on the evidence adduced by the petitioners to prove that respondent Fernandez was authorized by
said date, respondent Fernandez would present a special power of attorney executed by the the respondents-owners is the testimony of petitioner Antonio Litonjua that respondent
owners of the property, authorizing her to sell the property for and in their behalf, and to Fernandez openly represented herself to be the representative of the respondents-owners, and
execute a deed of absolute sale thereon. The petitioners would also remit the purchase price that she promised to present to the petitioners on December 8, 1996 a written authority to sell
to the owners, through respondent Fernandez. However, only Agapito Fisico attended the the properties.
meeting. He informed the petitioners that respondent Fernandez was encountering some
problems with the tenants and was trying to work out a settlement with them. After a few
The settled rule is that persons dealing with an assumed agent are bound at their peril, and if
they would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact of agency but also the
nature and extent of authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon
them to prove it. In this case, respondent Fernandez specifically denied that she was
authorized by the respondents-owners to sell the properties, both in her answer to the
complaint and when she testified. The Letter dated January 16, 1996 relied upon by the
petitioners was signed by respondent Fernandez alone, without any authority from the
respondents-owners. There is no evidence on record that the respondents-owners ratified all
the actuations of respondent Fernandez in connection with her dealings with the
petitioners. As such, said letter is not binding on the respondents as owners of the subject
properties.
15) Any other act of dominion
DOMINION INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, The payment of claims is not an act of administration which requires a special power of
RODOLFO S. GUEVARRA, and FERNANDO AUSTRIA, respondents. attorney before Guevarra could settle the insurance claims of the insured.
G. R. No. 129919. February 6, 2002
Also Guevarra was instructed that the payment for the insured must come from the revolving
FACTS:
fund or collection in his possession, Gueverra should not have paid the insured through his
own capacity. Under 1918 of civil code an agent who acted in contravention of the
Rodolfo Guevarra (Guevarra) filed a civil case for sum of money against Dominion
principal‘s instruction the principal will not be liable for the expenses incurred by the agent.
Insurance Corp. (Dominion) for the amount advanced by Guevarra in his capacity as
manager of defendant to satisfy certain claims filed by defendant‘s client.
YES. Even if the law on agency prohibits Gueverra from obtaining reimbursement his right
to recover may be justified under the article 1236 of the civil code.Thus Guevarra must be
The pre-trial was always postponed, and during one of the pre-trial conference dominion
reimbursed but only to the extent that Dominion has benefited without interest or demand for
failed to arrive therefore the court declared them to be in default. Dominion filed several
damages.
Motions to Lift Order of Default but was always denied by the court. The RTC rendered its
decision making Dominion liable to repay Guevarra for the sum advanced and other damages
and fees. Dominion appealed but CA affirmed the decision of RTC and denied the appeal of
Dominion.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:
Whether or not Guevarra acted within his authority as agent of petitioner.

Whether or not Guevarra must be reimbursed for the amount advanced.
HOLDINGS &RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO. Even though the contact entered into by Guevarra and Dominion was with the word
―special‖ the contents of the document was actually a general agency. A general power
permits the agent to do all acts for which the law does not require a special power and the
contents in the document did not require a special power of attorney.
Art 1878 of the civil code provides instances when a special power of attorney is required.:
1) To make such payment as are not usually considered as acts of administration.
On October 29, 1966, Estanislao Olaguer executed a General Power of Attorney in favor of
Jose A. Olaguer, authorizing the latter to exercise general control and supervision over all of
ESTATE OF LINO OLAGUER, Represented by Linda O. Olaguer, and his business and properties, and among others, to sell or mortgage any of his properties.
LINDA O. MONTAYRE, Petitioners, vs.
EMILIANO M. ONGJOCO,Respondent. On December 29, 1966, Estanislao Olaguer sold to Jose A. Olaguer for 15,000 the 10 parcels
G.R. No. 173312 August 26, 2008 of land he bought from Olivia P. Olaguer and Eduardo Olaguer.
FACTS: On March 16, 1968, Estanislao Olaguer sold to Jose A. Olaguer for 1 Peso and other valuable
consideration 2 parcels of land which have a total area of 2.5 hectares.
Lino Olaguer died on October 3, 1957 so Special Proceedings No. 528 for probate of will On June 5, 1968, Estanislao Olaguer sold another 2 lots to Jose A. Olaguer for 1 Peso and
was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Albay. Defendant Olivia P. Olaguer was other valuable consideration.
appointed as administrator pursuant to the will. Later, defendant Eduardo Olaguer was
appointed as co-administrator. On May 13, 1971, Jose A. Olaguer in his capacity as Attorney in-Fact of Estanislao Olaguer
In the order of the probate court dated April 4, 1961, some properties of the estate were sold to his son Virgilio Olaguer for 1 Peso and other valuable consideration.
authorized to be sold to pay obligations of the estate.
Relying upon the order, but without prior notice or permission from the Probate Court, On July 15, 1974, Jose A. Olaguer sold to his son Virgilio Olaguer Lot No. 4521 and Lot No.
defendants Olivia P. Olaguer and Eduardo Olaguer on November 1, 1965 sold to Estanislao 4522 for 1,000 Pesos.
Olaguer 10 parcels of land. The sale to was approved by the Probate Court on November 12,
1965. On September 16, 1978 Virgilio Olaguer executed a General Power of Attorney in favor of
Jose A. Olaguer authorizing the latter to exercise general control and supervision over all of
On July 7, 1966, defendant Olivia P. Olaguer executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor his business and properties and among others, to sell or mortgage the same.
of defendant Jose A. Olaguer, authorizing the latter to "sell, mortgage, assign, transfer, Olivia P. Olaguer and Eduardo Olaguer were removed as administrators of the estate and on
endorse and deliver" of 6 properties. February 12, 1980, plaintiff Ma. Linda Olaguer Montayre was appointed administrator by the
Probate Court.
On July 7, 1966, Estanislao Olaguer executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Jose
A. Olaguer authorizing the latter to "sell, mortgage, assign, transfer, endorse and deliver" the The decedent Lino Olaguer have had three marriages. He was first married to Margarita
9 properties. Ofemaria who died April 6, 1925. His second wife was Gloria Buenaventura who died on
July 2, 1937. The third wife was the defendant Olivia P. Olaguer.
By virtue of this Special Power of Attorney, on March 1, 1967, Jose A. Olaguer as Attorney-
in-Fact of Estanislao Olaguer mortgaged Lots 7589, 7593 and 7396 to defendant PNB as Jose Olaguer acting upon the general power of attorney sold 8 parcels of land to Emilio
security for a loan of 10,000 Pesos. The mortgage was foreclosed by the PNB on June 13, Ongjoco.
1973 and the properties mortgage were sold at public auction to PNB. On December 10,
1990, the PNB transferred the properties to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Exec. On 28 January 1980, the Estate of Lino Olaguer filed an action for the Annulment of Sales of
Order No. 407 dated June 14, 1990 for agrarian reform purposes. Real Property and/or Cancellation of Titles in the then Court of First Instance of Albay. The
plaintiffs therein alleged that the sales of the following properties belonging to the Estate of
Lino Olaguer to Estanislao Olaguer were absolutely simulated or fictitious, the plaintiffs
likewise prayed that the resulting Transfer Certificates of Title issued to Jose Olaguer,
Virgilio Olaguer, Cipriano Duran and the PNB be annulled.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:

Whether General Power of Attorney was sufficient to effect the sale of the subject properties.
Yes, the general power of attorney was sufficient
The Supreme Court held that while the law requires a special power of attorney, the general
power of attorney was sufficient in this case, as Jose A. Olaguer was expressly empowered to
sell any of Virgilio's properties; and to sign, execute, acknowledge and deliver any agreement
therefor. Even if a document is designated as a general power of attorney, the requirement of
a special power of attorney is met if there is a clear mandate from the principal specifically
authorizing the performance of the act. The special power of attorney can be included in the
general power when the act or transaction for which the special power is required is specified
therein.
On its face, the written power of attorney contained the signature of Virgilio Olaguer and was
duly notarized. As such, the same is considered a public document and it has in its favor the
presumption of authenticity and due execution, which can only be contradicted by clear and
convincing evidence.
LUZ PINEDA, MARILOU MONTENEGRO, VIRGINIA ALARCON, DINA ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:
LORENA AYO, CELIA CALUMBAG and LUCIA LONTOK, petitioners vs.HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, Whether or not Insular Life should still be liable to the complainants when they relied on the
LIMITED, respondents. G.R. No. 105562 September 27, 1993 special powers of attorney, which Capt. Nuval presented as documents, when they released
the checks to the latter.
FACTS:
Whether or not Insular Life should be liable to the complainants when they released the
Morocco. The families of the victims then wanted to claim the benefits of the insurance.
check in favor of Ayo and Lontok, even if no bond was posted as required.
Hence, under the advice of Nuval, the president of PMSI, they executed a special power of
attorney authorizing Capt. Nuval to, "follow up, ask, demand, collect and receive" for their
benefit the indemnities.
Insular drew against its account 6 checks, four for P200,00.00 each, one for P50,000.00 and
another for P40,00.00, payable to the order the families. The checks were given to PMSI.
Yes to both. Petition granted
Nuval, the PMSI president, pocketed the amounts in his bank account.
The special powers of attorney "do not contain in unequivocal and clear terms authority to
When the families went to insular to get the benefits, their request was denied
Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt from respondent company insurance proceeds arising
because Insular claimed that the checks were already given to PMSI.
from the death of the seaman-insured.
The families filed a petition with the Insurance Commission. They won and Insular was
Insular Life knew that a power of attorney in favor of Capt. Nuval for the collection and
ordered to pay them 500 a day until the amount was furnished to them. The insurance
receipt of such proceeds was a deviation from its practice with respect to group policies.
Commission held that the special powers of attorney executed by complainants do not
They gave the proceeds to the policyholder instead of the beneficiaries themselves. Even the
contain in unequivocal and clear terms authority to Nuval to obtain and receive from
Insularrep admitted that he gave the checks to the policyholder.
respondent company insurance proceeds arising from the death of the seaman-insured; also,
Insular Life recognized Capt. Nuval as the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners. However, it
that Insular Life did not convincingly refuted the claim of Mrs. Alarcon that neither she nor
acted imprudently and negligently in the premises by relying without question on the
her husband executed a special power of authority in favor of Capt. Nuval and that it did not
special power of attorney.
observe Sec 180(3), when it released the benefits due to the minor children of Ayo and
Strong vs. Repide- third persons deal with agents at their peril and are bound to inquire as to
Lontok, when the said complainants did notpost a bond as required-
the extent of the power of the agent with whom they contract.
Insular Life appealed to the CA. CA modified the decision of the Insurance Commission,
Harry E. Keller Electric Co. vs. Rodriguez- The person dealing with an agent must also act
eliminating the award to the minor children.
with ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence. Obviously, if he knows or has good reason
Hence, this petition by the beneficiary families.
to believe that the agent is exceeding his authority, he cannot claim protection… the party
dealing with him may not shut his eyes to the real state of the case, but should either refuse to
deal with the agent at all, or should ascertain from the principal the true condition of affairs.
Insular delivered the checks to a party not the agent of the beneficiaries.
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment.
In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is judicial order to the
contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000,
the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may
determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property
or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.
―If the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, a
bond has to be posted by the parents concerned to guarantee the performance of the
obligations of a general guardian.‖
On group insurance :
Group insurance is essentially a single insurance contract that provides coverage for many
individuals, particularly for the employees of one employer.
There is a master agreement issued to an employer. The employer acts as the collector of the
dues and premiums. Disbursement of insurance payments by the employer is also one of his
duties.
They require an employee to pay a portion of the premium, which the employer deducts from
wages while the remainder is paid by the employer. This is known as a contributory plan as
compared to a non-contributory plan where the premiumsare solely paid by the employer.
Although the employer may be the policyholder, the insurance is actually for the benefit of
the employee. In a non-contributory plan, the payment by the employer of the entire premium
is a part of the total compensation paid for the services of the employee.
The primary aim of group insurance is to provide the employer with a means of procuring
insurance protection for his employees at a low cost and thereby retain their loyalty and
efficiency.
GUTIERREZ HERMANOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ENGRACIO ORENSE, defendant-appellant. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:
G.R. No. L-9188 December 4, 1914
Whether or not Orense is bound by Duran‘s act of selling the former‘s property.
FACTS:
On and before Februaru 14, 1907, Engracio Orense had been the owner of a parcel of land in
Guinobatan, Albay.
On February 14, 1907, Jose Duran, a nephew of Orense, sold the property for P1,500 to
Gutierrez Hermanos, with Orense‘s knowledge and consent, executed before a notary a Yes. It was proven during trial that he gave his consent to the sale. Such act of Orense
public instrument. The said public instrument contained a provision giving Duran the right to impliedly conferred to Duran the power of agency. The principal must therefore fulfill all the
repurchase it for the same price within a period of four years from the date of the said obligations contracted by the agent, who acted within the scope of his jurisdiction.
instrument.
Orense continued occupying the land by virtue of a contract of lease.
After the lapse of four years, Gutierrez asked Orense to deliver the property to the company
and to pay rentals for the use of the property.
Orense refused to do so. He claimed that the sale was void because it was done without his
authority and that he did not authorize his nephew to enter into such contract.
During trial, Orense was presented as witness of the defense. He states that the sale was done
with his knowledge and consent. Because of such testimony, it was ascertained that he did
give his nephew, Duran, authority to convey the land. Duran was acquitted of criminal
charges and the company demanded that Orense execute the proper deed of conveyance of
the property.
Whether or not the petitioners validly acquired the subject property.
ALEJANDRIA PINEDA and SPOUSES ADEODATO DUQUE, JR., and

EVANGELINE MARY JANE DUQUE,petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI
SPOUSES NELSON BAÑEZ and MERCEDES BAÑEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 127094 February 6, 2002 The court deny the petition. The issue raised is factual. In an appeal via certiorari, we may
not review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.11
FACTS:
Nevertheless, it appears that the Bañez spouses were the original owners of the parcel of land
Appellees Nelson Bañez and Mercedes Bañez are the original owners of a parcel of land and improvements located at 32 Sarangaya St., White Plains, Quezon City. On January 11,
together with its improvements located at 32 Sarangaya St., White Plains, Quezon City while 1983, the Bañez spouses and petitioner Pineda executed an agreement to exchange real
Ms. Alejandria Pineda is the owner of a house located at 5224 Buchanan St., Los Angeles, properties. However, the exchange did not materialize.
California.
Petitioner Pineda‘s "sale" of the property to petitioners Duque was not authorized by the real
On January 11, 1983, the appellees and Alejandria Pineda, together with the latter‘s spouse owners of the land, respondent Bañez. The Civil Code provides that in a sale of a parcel of
Alfredo Caldona, executed an ‗Agreement to Exchange Real Properties‘ (Exh. "A", p. 16, land or any interest therein made through an agent, a special power of attorney is
Folder of Exhibits). In the agreement, the parties agreed to: 1) exchange their respective essential.12 This authority must be in writing, otherwise the sale shall be void. 13 In his
properties; 2) Pineda to pay an earnest money in the total amount of $12,000.00 on or before testimony, petitioner Adeodato Duque confirmed that at the time he "purchased"
the first week of February 1983; and 3) to consummate the exchange of properties not later respondents‘ property from Pineda, the latter had no Special Power of Authority to sell the
than June 1983. It appears that the parties undertook to clear the mortgages over their property.14
respective properties. At the time of the execution of the exchange agreement, the White
Plains property was mortgaged with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) while A special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of
the California property had a total mortgage obligation of $84,000.00 (Exh. "A-2", p. 18, an immovable is transmitted or acquired for a valuable consideration. 15 Without an authority
Ibid). in writing, petitioner Pineda could not validly sell the subject property to petitioners Duque.
Hence, any "sale" in favor of petitioners Duque is void.16
In the meantime, the appellees were allowed to occupy or lease to a tenant Pineda‘s
California property (Exh. "A-1", p. 17, Ibid) and Pineda was authorized to occupy appellees‘ Further, Article 1318 of the Civil Code lists the requisites of a valid and perfected contract,
White Plains property (Complaint; p. 8. Records). Pursuant to the exchange agreement, namely: "(1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter
Alejandria Pineda paid the appellees the total amount of $12,000.00 broken down as follows: of the contract; (3) cause of the obligation which is established."17 Pineda was not authorized
1) $5,000.00, on January 1983; 2) $4,000.00 on April 1983; 3) $3,000.00 on January 1985 to enter into a contract to sell the property. As the consent of the real owner of the property
(Exh. "C" & "D", pp. 28; 36 Ibid). was not obtained, no contract was perfected.18
Consequently, petitioner Duque failed to validly acquire the subject property.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Sally Yoshizaki vs. Joy Trading Center of Aurora, Inc.
GR 174978 July 31, 2013
FACTS: ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Respondent Jpy Training Center of Aurora, Inc. (Joy Training) is a non-stock, non-profit Whether or not there was a contract of agency to sell the real properties between Joy Trading
religious educ~ti(mal institution. It was the registered owner of a parcel of lhnd and the and spouses Johnson
building thereon (real properties) located in San Luis Exten.sicm~ Purok No. 1, Barangay
Buhangin, Baler, Aurora. The parcel of land was designated as Lot No. 125-L and was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-25334. HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI
On November 10, 1998, the spouses Richard and Linda Johnson sold the real properties, a The court find the petition unmeritorious.
Wrangler jeep, and other personal properties in favor of the spouses Sally and Yoshio
Yoshizaki. On the same date, a Deed of Absolute Sale5 and a Deed of Sale of Motor There is no contract of agency between Joy Trading and the spouses Johnson to sell the
Vehicle6 were executed in favor of the spouses Yoshizaki. The spouses Johnson were parcel of land with its improvements.
members of Joy Training‘s board of trustees at the time of sale.
Article 1868 of the Civil Code defines a contract of agency as a contract whereby a person
On December 7, 1998, TCT No. T-25334 was cancelled and TCT No. T-260527 was issued binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of
in the name of the spouses Yoshizaki. On December 8, 1998, Joy Training, represented by its another with the consent or authority of the latter. It may be express or implied from the acts
Acting Chairperson Reuben V. Rubio, filed an action for the Cancellation of Sales and of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency,
Damages with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
Preliminary Injunction against the spouses Yoshizaki and the spouses Johnson before the
Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora (RTC). 8 On January 4, 1999, Joy Training filed a
Motion to Amend Complaint with the attached Amended Complaint. The amended complaint
impleaded Cecilia A. Abordo, officer-in-charge of the Register of Deeds of Baler, Aurora, as
additional defendant. The RTC granted the motion on the same date.
to consider the same as a total loss, and to claim from the insurer the face value of the car
insurance policy and apply the same to the payment of their remaining account and give them
SECTION 3 the surplus thereof, if any. But instead of heeding the request of the Cuadys, B.A. Finance
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Corporation prevailed upon the former to just have the car repaired. Not long thereafter,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, MANUEL CUADY and however, the car bogged down. The Cuadys wrote B.A. Finance Corporation requesting the
LILIA CUADY, respondents.G.R. No. 82040 August 27, 1991 latter to pursue their prior instruction of enforcing the total loss provision in the insurance
coverage. When B.A. Finance Corporation did not respond favorably to their request, the
FACTS: Cuadys stopped paying their monthly installments on the promissory note .
On July 15, 1977, private respondents Manuel Cuady and Lilia Cuady obtained from
Supercars, Inc. a credit of P39,574.80, which amount covered the cost of one unit of Ford ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Escort 1300, four-door sedan. Said obligation was evidenced by a promissory note executed
by private respondents in favor of Supercars, Inc., obligating themselves to pay the latter or Whether or not B.A. Finance Corporation has waived its right to collect the unpaid balance
order the sum of P39,574.80, inclusive of interest at 14% per annum, payable on monthly of the Cuady spouses on the promissory note for failure of the former to enforce the total loss
installments of P1,098.00 starting August 16, 1977, and on the 16th day of the next 35 provision in the insurance coverage of the motor vehicle subject of the chattel mortgage.
months from September 16, 1977 until full payment thereof. There was also stipulated a
penalty of P10.00 for every month of late installment payment. To secure the faithful and
prompt compliance of the obligation under the said promissory note, the Cuady spouses HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI
constituted a chattel mortage on the aforementioned motor vehicle. On July 25, 1977,
Supercars, Inc. assigned the promissory note, together with the chattel mortgage, to B.A. The petition is devoid of merit.
Finance Corporation. The Cuadys paid a total of P36,730.15 to the B.A. Finance
Corporation, thus leaving an unpaid balance of P2,344.65 as of July 18, 1980. In addition B.A. Finance Corporation was deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of Supercars,
thereto, the Cuadys owe B.A. Finance Corporation P460.00 representing penalties or Inc. when the latter assigned the promissory note, together with the chattel mortgage
surcharges for tardy monthly installments (Rollo, pp. 27-29). constituted on the motor vehicle in question in favor of the former. Consequently, B.A.
Finance Corporation is bound by the terms and conditions of the chattel mortgage executed
Parenthetically, the B.A. Finance Corporation, as the assignee of the mortgage lien obtained between the Cuadys and Supercars, Inc. Under the deed of chattel mortgage, B.A. Finance
the renewal of the insurance coverage over the aforementioned motor vehicle for the year Corporation was constituted attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to file, follow-up,
1980 with Zenith Insurance Corporation, when the Cuadys failed to renew said insurance prosecute, compromise or settle insurance claims; to sign execute and deliver the
coverage themselves. Under the terms and conditions of the said insurance coverage, any loss corresponding papers, receipts and documents to the Insurance Company as may be
under the policy shall be payable to the B.A. Finance Corporation (Memorandum for Private necessary to prove the claim, and to collect from the latter the proceeds of insurance to the
Respondents, pp. 3-4). extent of its interests, in the event that the mortgaged car suffers any loss or damage (Rollo,
p. 89). In granting B.A. Finance Corporation the aforementioned powers and prerogatives,
On April 18, 1980, the aforementioned motor vehicle figured in an accident and was badly the Cuady spouses created in the former's favor an agency. Thus, under Article 1884 of the
damaged. The unfortunate happening was reported to the B.A. Finance Corporation and to Civil Code of the Philippines, B.A. Finance Corporation is bound by its acceptance to carry
the insurer, Zenith Insurance Corporation. The Cuadys asked the B.A. Finance Corporation
out the agency, and is liable for damages which, through its non-performance, the Cuadys, entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the
the principal in the case at bar, may suffer. principal's ratification.
NICHOLAS Y. CERVANTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE

PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 125138. March 2, 1999
FACTS:
On March 27, 1989, private respondent PAL issued to herein petitioner Nicholas Cervantes a
round trip ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila, which is valid until
March 27, 1990. On March 23, 1990, petitioner used it. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles, he
immediately booked a flight to Manila, which was confirmed on April 2. Upon learning that
the plane would make a stop-over in San Francisco, and because he would be there on April
2, petitioner made arrangements to board in San Francisco. On April 2, he was not allowed to
board due to the expiration of his ticket. He filed a complaint for damages. It was not given
due course by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket extended the period of
validity of petitioner's ticket.
HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI
From the facts, it can be gleaned that the petitioner was fully aware that there was a need to
send a letter to the legal counsel of PAL for the extension of the period of validity of his
ticket. Under Article 1898 11 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope
of his authority do not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or
impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent was
acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the
agent. If the said third person is aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not
Annulment of Quitclaim and Recovery of Sum of Money and Damages was filed before the
RTC. Cecilio was declared in default, but this was reversed by the CA.
CORNELIA M. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, vs.

CECILIO F. HERNANDEZ, Respondent.
March 9, 2011
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
FACTS:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding the validity of the receipt and quitclaim document.
On 11 November 1993, the owners of the Hernandez property, which includes petitioner
Cornelia Hernandez, executed a letter indicating: (1) respondent Cecilio Hernandez as the
representative of the owners of the land; and (2) the compensation he gets in doing such job. HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI
Such property was subject of an expropriation case for a DPWH project. During the course of
the expropriation proceedings, an Order was issued by the RTC, Cecilio was appointed as The petition is granted. It is Voidable Contracts.
one of the commissioners in the expropriation case. On 18 October 1996, Cornelia, and her
other co-owners who were also signatories of the 11 November 1993 letter, executed an A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence,
irrevocable Special Power of Attorney (SPA) appointing Cecilio Hernandez as their "true and or fraud is voidable. In determining whether consent is vitiated by any of the circumstances
lawful attorney" with respect to the expropriation of the subject property. There was no mentioned, courts are given a wide latitude in weighing the facts or circumstances in a given
mention of the compensation scheme for Cecilio, the attorney-in-fact. case and in deciding in their favor what they believe to have actually occurred,considering
the age, physical infirmity, intelligence, relationship, and the conduct of the parties at the
The just compensation for the condemned properties was fixed subsequently, with Cornelias time of the making of the contract and subsequent thereto. Here, the service contract of 11
share amounting to P7,321,500.00the amount apro-indivisoowner is to receive. At this point, November 1993 (appointing Cecilio as representative), as well as the quitclaim and receipt,
Cecilios SPA was revoked by Cornelia. On 7 February 2000, however, Cornelia received are voidablethe first due to mistake, the second due to fraud.
from Cecilio a check amounting to P1,123,000.00. The check was accompanied by a Receipt
and Quitclaimdocument in favor of Cecilio.In essence it states that: (1) the amount received First, the service contract gave Cecilio compensation based on "1998 skyrocketing" prices
will be the share of Cornelia in the just compensation paid by the government in the that essentially will give Cecilio 83.07% of the just compensation due Cornelia as the co-
expropriated property; (2) in consideration of the payment, it will release and forever owner of the land. No evidence on record would show that Cornelia agreed, by way of the 11
discharge Cecilio from any action, damages, claims or demands; and (3) Cornelia will not November 1993 letter, to give Cecilio 83.07% of the proceeds of the sale of her land. Second,
institute any action and will not pursue her complaint or opposition to the release to Cecilio quitclaims are also contracts and can be voided if there was fraud or intimidation that leads to
or his heirs or assigns. lack of consent.The facts show that a simple accounting of the proceeds of the just
compensation will be enough to satisfy the curiosity of Cornelia.However, Cecilio did not
In a Letterdated 22 June 2000after she learned of her true share in the expropriation disclose the truth and instead of coming up with the request of his aunt, he made a contract
proceedingsCornelia demanded the accounting of the proceeds.The letter was left intended to bar Cornelia from recovering any further sum of money from the sale of her
unanswered.She then decided to have the courts settle the issue.A Complaint for the property.
Moreover, when Cecilio accepted the position as commissioner, he created a barrier that
prevented his performance of his duties under the SPA. Cecilio could not have been a hearing
officer and a defendant at the same time.Indeed, Cecilio foisted fraud on both the Court and
the Hernandezes when, after his appointment as commissioner, he accepted the appointment
by the Hernandez to "represent" and "sue for" them.
The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the disputed
lots have already been sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it is alleged that a
simulated deed of sale involving said lots was effected by Ignacio Rubio in
CORAZON L. ESCUETA, assisted by her husband EDGAR ESCUETA, IGNACIO E. her favor; and that the simulated deed of sale by Rubio to Escueta has raised
RUBIO, THE HEIRS OF LUZ R. BALOLOY, namely, ALEJANDRINO R. doubts and clouds over respondents title.
BALOLOY and BAYANI R. BALOLOY,
Petitioners, vs. RUFINA LIM, Respondent
G.R. No. 137162 January 24, 2007
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
FACTS: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in denying the petition for relief from judgement
filed by the baloloys.
Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to,
real property, with preliminary injunction and issuance of a hold-departure Whether or not the Ignacio E. Rubio is not bound by the contract of sale between Virgina
order] from the Philippines against Ignacio E. Rubio. Respondent amended Laygo-Lim and Rufina Lim.
her complaint to include specific performance and damages.
Whether or not the contract entered into between Rufina Lim and Virginia Laygo-Lim is a
In her amended complaint, respondent averred inter alia that she bought the contract to sell and not a contract of sale.
hereditary shares (consisting of 10 lots) of Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz
Baloloy, namely: Alejandrino, Bayani, and other co-heirs; that said vendors Whether or not Rufina Lim failed to faithfully comply with her obligations under the contract
executed a contract of sale dated April 10, 1990 in her favor; that Ignacio to sell thereby warranting the cancellation thereof.
Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy received [a down payment] or earnest
money in the amount of P102,169.86 and P450,000, respectively; that it was Whether or not Corazon L. Escueta acted in utmost good faith in entering into the contract of
agreed in the contract of sale that the vendors would secure certificates of title sale with Ignacio E. Rubio.
covering their respective hereditary shares; that the balance of the purchase
price would be paid to each heir upon presentation of their individual Whether or not the contract of sale executed between Ignacio E. Rubio and Corazon L.
certificate[s] of [title]; that Ignacio Rubio refused to receive the other half of Escueta is valid.
the down payment which is P[100,000]; that Ignacio Rubio refused and still
refuses to deliver to [respondent] the certificates of title covering his share on Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners counterclaims.
the two lots; that with respect to the heirs of Luz Baloloy, they also refused
and still refuse to perform the delivery of the two certificates of title covering
their share in the disputed lots; that respondent was and is ready and willing to
pay Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy upon presentation of their
individual certificates of title, free from whatever lien and encumbrance;
The Court of Appeals did not consider the circumstances surrounding petitioners failure to
appear at the pre-trial and to file the petition for relief on time.
The sale by Virginia to respondent is not binding. Petitioner Rubio did not
authorize Virginia to transact business in his behalf pertaining to the property. The Special
Power of Attorney was constituted in favor of Llamas, and the latter was not empowered to
designate a substitute attorney-in-fact. Llamas even disowned her signature appearing on the
Joint Special Power of Attorney, which constituted Virginia as her true and lawful attorney-
in-fact in selling Rubios properties.
The contract between respondent and Virginia is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. The
real character of the contract is not the title given, but the intention of the parties. They
intended to reserve ownership of the property to petitioners pending full payment of the
purchase price. Together with taxes and other fees due on the properties, these are conditions
precedent for the perfection of the sale. Even assuming that the contract is ambiguous, the
same must be resolved against respondent, the party who caused the same.
The respondent failed to faithfully fulfill her part of the obligation. Thus, Rubio had the right
to sell his properties to Escueta who exercised due diligence in ascertaining ownership of the
properties sold to her. Besides, a purchaser need not inquire beyond what appears in
a Torrens title.
The petition lacks merit. The contract of sale between petitioners and respondent is valid.
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

JOSE EVANGELISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
TAN ONG SZE VDA. DE TAN TOCO, appellant. HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI
G.R. No. L-32977 November 17, 1930
No. The appellant‘s contention that the amount of P200 and P500 should be considered as
FACTS: payments made to Atty. Antero Soriano for professional services rendered by him personally
to the interest of the widow of Tan Toco is untenable. In view of the fact that the amount
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment wherein the appellant herein Tan Ong involved in the cases have been appealed to this court, run into hundreds of thousand pesos,
Sze Vda. De Tan Toco sought to recover the value of a strip of land belonging to said and considering that said lawyer had won several of those cases for his clients, the sum of P
appellant taken by the petitioner herein to widen a public street. After the case was remanded 10,000 to date paid to him for professional services is wholly inadequate and even if
to the court of origin and the judgment rendered therein had become final and executor, Atty. indirectly that the assignment of appellant‘s rights and interests made to the late Atty.
Evangelista in his own behalf and counsel for the administration of Jose Ma. Arroyo‘s Soriano was made in consideration of the professional services rendered by the latter to the
interest estate filed a claim in the same case for professional services rendered by him. At widow and her co-heirs.
the hearing on the said claim various claimants appeared claiming the amount judgment.
Article 1459 the following persons cannot take by purchase, even at a public or judicial
After the hearing al the adverse claims on the amount of the judgment were recorded in favor action, either in person or through the mediation of another: xxxx 5. Justices, judges,
of Atty. Evangelista, in his own behalf and as counsel for the administration of the deceased members of the department of public prosecution, clerks of superior and inferior courts and
Arroyo and directed the Municipality of Iloilo to file an action of interpleading against the other officers of such courts, the property and rights in litigation before the court within
adverse claimants, the PNB, Antero Soriano, Mauricio Cruz & Co., Jose Evangelista and whose jurisdiction or territory they perform their respective duties. This prohibition shall
Jose Arroyo. Thereafter, the municipal treasurer of Iloilo paid the late Antero Soriano the include the acquisition of such property by assignment. The prohibition contained in this
amount of 6,000 in part payment of the judgment assigned to him by Tan Boon Tiong, acting paragraph shall include lawyers and solicitors with respect to any property or rights involved
as attorney-in-fact of Tan Ong Sze Vda. De Tan Toco. The amount of 6,000 was also in any litigation in which they make take part by virtue of their profession and office. In this
delivered to Atty. Evangelista as counsel for the late Jose Ma. Arroyo. With these two case it does not appear that Atty. Soriano was counsel for the appellant in civil case, which
payments of 6,000 each, the judgment for 42,966.44 againts municipality of Iloilo was the appellant instituted against the Municipality of Iloilo for the recovery of the value of a
reduced tp 30, 966.40 which was adjudicated by said court to Mauricio Cruz & Co. strip of land expropriated by said municipality for the widening of a certain public street.
The only lawyers who appear to have represented her in the case were Atty. Arroyo and Atty.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Evangelista, who filed claim for their professional fees. There was no relation of attorney and
client then between Antero Soriano and the appellant, in this case where the judgment was
Whether or not the assignment of credits, rights and interest belonging to Tan Ong Sze made rendered and therefore the assignment of her credit, rights and interest to Atty. Soriano did
by Tan Boon Tiong, as attorney-in-fact of Tan Ong Sze Vda. De Tan Toco to Atty. Antero not violate prohibition.
Soriano by virtue of the judgment rendered in civil case in consideration of professional
service rendered is in contravention of the prohibition contained in Article 1459 paragraph 5
of the civil code.
right sought to be enforced. Petitioners are not parties to the contract of sale between their
principals and NHA. They are mere agents of the owners of the land subject of the sale. As
WILLIAM UY and RODEL ROXAS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

ROBERT BALAO and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,respondents. agents, they only render some service or do something in representation or on behalf of their
G.R. No. 120465. September 9, 1999 principals. The rendering of such service did not make them parties to the contracts of sale
executed in behalf of the latter. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as
FACTS: against each other, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or defendant, in an action
upon that contract must, generally, either be parties to said contract. Petitioners have not
Petitioners William Uy and Rodel Roxas are agents authorized to sell 8 parcels of land. shown that they are assignees of their principals to the subject contracts. While they alleged
Petitioners offered to sell the land to NHA for a housing project. On February 14, 1989, that they made advances and that they suffered loss of commissions, they have not
NHA passed a resolution approving the acquisition of said lands, and pursuant to this the established any agreement granting them "the right to receive payment and out of the
parties executed Deeds of Absolute Sale. However, only 5 out of 8 lands were paid for by proceeds to reimburse [themselves] for advances and commissions before turning the balance
NHA because of a report from DENR that the remaining area is located at an active landslide over to the principals."
area and are therefore not conducive for housing. On November 22, 1991, NHA issued a
resolution canceling the sale of the remaining lands and offered P1.225 million to the The cancellation was not a rescission under Article 1191. Rather, the cancellation was based
landowners as daños perjuicios. On March 9, 1992, petitioners filed a complaint for damages on the negation of the cause arising from the realization that the lands, which were the object
against NHA and its general manager Robert Balao. The RTC declared the cancellation to be of the sale, were not suitable for housing. Cause is the essential reason which moves the
justified, but awarded the amount offered by NHA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the contracting parties to enter into it. In other words, the cause is the immediate, direct and
decision, but deleted the award. proximate reason which justifies the creation of an obligation through the will of the
contracting parties. Cause, which is the essential reason for the contract, should be
distinguished from motive, which is the particular reason of a contracting party which does
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS not affect the other party. Ordinarily, a party's motives for entering into the contract do not
affect the contract. However, when the motive predetermines the cause, the motive may be
Whether or not the petitioners are real parties in interest. regarded as the cause. In this case, it is clear, and petitioners do not dispute, that NHA would
not have entered into the contract were the lands not suitable for housing. In other words, the
Whether or not the cancellation is justified. quality of the land was an implied condition for the NHA to enter into the contract. On the
part of the NHA, therefore, the motive was the cause for its being a party to the sale. We hold
that the NHA was justified in canceling the contract. The realization of the mistake as regards
HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI the quality of the land resulted in the negation of the motive/cause thus rendering the contract
inexistent.
Petitioners claim that they lodged the complaint not in behalf of their principals but in their
own name as agents directly damaged by the termination of the contract. Petitioners in this
case purportedly brought the action for damages in their own name and in their own behalf.
An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by the substantive law, has the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONAL

MERCHANDISING CORPORATION and DOMESTIC INSURANCE COMPANY
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Defendants-Appellants.
G.R. Nos. L-33819 and L-33897. October 23, 1982
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant National Power Corporation (NPC) and defendant- appellant National HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI
Merchandising Corporation (NAMERCO), the Philippine representative of New York-based
International Commodities Corporation, executed a contract of sale of sulfur with a Yes, NaMerCo exceeded their authority.
stipulation for liquidated damages in case of breach.
The Supreme Court held that before the contract of sale was signed Namerco was already
Defendant-appellant Domestic Insurance Company executed a performance bond in favor of aware that its principal was having difficulties in booking shipping space.
NPC to guarantee the seller's obligation. In entering into the contract, Namerco, however, did
not disclose to NPC that Namerco's principal, in a cabled instruction, stated that the sale was It is being enforced against the agent because article 1897 implies that the agent who acts in
subject to availability of a steamer, and contrary to its principal's instruction, Namerco agreed excess of his authority is personally liable to the party with whom he contracted.
that non-availability of a steamer was not a justification for non-payment of liquidated Moreover, the rule is complemented by article 1898 of the Civil Code which provides that "if
damages. the agent contracts in the name of the principal, exceeding the scope of his authority, and the
principal does not ratify the contract, it shall be void if the party with whom the agent
The New York supplier was not able to deliver the sulfur due to its inability to secure contracted is aware of the limits of the powers granted by the principal".
shipping space. Consequently, the Government Corporate Counsel rescinded the contract of Namerco never disclosed to the Napocor the cabled or written instructions of its principal.
sale due to the supplier's non-performance of its obligations, and demanded payment of For that reason and because Namerco exceeded the limits of its authority, it virtually acted in
liquidated damages from both Namerco and the surety. Thereafter, NPC sued for recovery of its own name and not as agent and it is, therefore, bound by the contract of sale which,
the stipulated liquidated damages. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment however, is not enforceable against its principal.
ordering defendants-appellants to pay solidarity to the NPC reduced liquidated damages with
interest.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether or not National Merchandising Corporation had exceeded their authority

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and the ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN B. DANS, represented
by CANDIDA G. DANS, and the DBP MORTGAGE REDEMPTION INSURANCE
POOL, respondents.G.R. No. L-109937 March 21, 1994
FACTS: No. DBP MRI Pool is not liable. Though the power to approve the insurance is lodged to the
pool, the DBP MRI Pool did not approve the application of the deceased. There was no
Juan B. Dans, 76 years of age, together with his family, applied for a loan worth Php 500, perfected contract between the insurance pool and Mr. Dans.
000 at the Development Bank of the Philipppines on May 1987. The loan was approved by DBP was wearing two legal hats: as a lender and insurance agent. As an insurance
the bank dated August 4, 1987 but in the reduced amount of Php 300, 000. Mr. Dans was agent, DBP made believed that the family already fulfilled the requirements for the said
advised by DBP to obtain a mortgage redemption insurance at DBP MRI pool. DBP insurance although DBP had a full knowledge that the application would never be approved.
deducted the amount to be paid for MRI Premium that is worth Php 1476.00. The insurance DBP acted beyond the scope of its authority for accepting applications for MRI. If the third
of Mr. Dans, less the DBP service fee of 10%, was credited by DBP to the savings account of person who contracted is unaware of the authority conferred by the principal on the agent and
DBP MRI-Pool. Accordingly, the DBP MRI Pool was advised of the credit. he has been deceived, the latter is liable for damages. The limits of the agency carries with it
On September 3, 1987, Mr. Dans died of cardiac arrest. DBP MRI notified DBP the implication that a deception was perpetrated—Articles 19-21 come into play.
was not eligible for the coverage of insurance for he was beyond the maximum age of 60.
The wife, Candida, filed a complaint to the Regional Trial Court Branch I Basilan against However, DBP is not entitled to compensate the family of the deceased with the
DBP and DBP MRI pool for ‗Collection of Sum of Money with Damages‘. Prior to that, entire value of the insurance policy. Speculative damages are too remote to be included in the
DBP offered the administratrix (Mrs. Dans) a refund of the MRI payment but she refused for cost of damages. Mr. Dans is entitled only to moral damages. Such damages do not need a
insisting that the family of the deceased must receive the amount equivalent of the loan. DBP proof of pecuniary loss for assessment. The court granted only moral damages (Php 50, 000)
also offered and ex gratia for settlement worth Php 30, 000. Mrs. Dans refused to take the plus attorney fees‘s (Php 10, 000) and the reimbursement of the MRI fees with legal interest
offer. The decision of the RTC rendered in favor of the family of the deceased and against from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
DBP. However, DBP appealed to the court.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether or not the DBP MRI Pool should be held liable on the ground that the contract was
already perfected.
NORA S. EUGENIO and ALFREDO Y. EUGENIO, petitioners,

vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.G.R. No. 103737 December 15, 1994
FACTS: Court of Appeals decision is annulled and set-aside. Pepsi is ordered to pay
Eugenio.Assuming in this case that Pepsi never received the amounts reflected in the TPR's,
Nora Eugenio was a dealer of Pepsi. She had one store in Marikina but had a regular charge Pepsi still failed to prove that Estrada (its duly authorized agent) did not receive the amounts.
account in Q.C. And Muntinlupa. Her husband Alfredo used to be a route manager for Pepsi In so far as Eugenio is concerned, their obligation is extinguished when they paid Estrada
in its Q.C. Plant. Pepsi filed a complaint for a sum of money against Eugenio spouses. since using Pepsi's official receipt. The substantive law is that payment shall be made to the person
according to them the spouses (1) had an outstanding balance since it purchased and received in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person
on credit various products from both its Q.C. and Muntinlupa plant and (2) had an unpaid authorized to receive it. *TPR: Trade Provisional Receipts are bound and given in booklets to
obligation for the loaned ―empties‖ from Pepsi. They contend that the total outstanding the company sales representatives, under proper acknowledgement by them and with a record
account was P94,651.xx. Eugenio's in their defense presented four Trade Provisional of the distribution thereof. After every transaction, when a collection is made the customer is
Receipts (TPR) allegedly issued to and received by them from Pepsi's Route Manager given by the sales representative a copy of the TPR, that is, the triplicate copy or customer's
(Malate Warehouse) Jovencio Estrada showing that they paid a total sum of P80,500.xx. copy, properly filled up to reflect the completed transactions. All unused TPR's,as well as the
They also claim that the signature of Nora Eugenio in a Sales Invoice (85366) for the amount collections made, are turned over by the sales representative to the appropriate company
of P5,631.xx which was included in the computation of their debt was falsified. Therefore, officer.
without these errors, petitioner contend that (1) they do not have any outstanding debt, and
(2) it is Pepsi who owes them P3,546.02. RTC found in favor of Pepsi. CA affirmed the
decision.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether or not the amounts in the Trade Provisional Receipts should be credited in favor of
the spouses.
BACALTOS COAL MINES and GERMAN A. BACALTOS, petitioners, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 114091 June 29, 1995
FACTS: HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI
In an authorization petitioner Bacaltos authorized Savellon to use the coal operating contract No. The broadest scope of Savellon‘s authority is limited to the use of the coal operating
of Bacaltos Coal Mine of which he is the proprietor. For any legitimate purpose that it may contract and the clause cannot contemplate any other power not included in the enumeration
serve and particularly: to acquire purchase orders, to engage in trading, to collect all or which are unrelated either to the power to use the coal operating contract or to those
receivables due or in arrears, to extend to any person or company by substitution the same already enumerated. In short, while the clause allows some room for flexibility, it can
extent of authority that is granted to Rene Savellon, in connection with the preceeding comprehend only additional prerogatives falling within the primary power and within the
paragraphs to execute and sign documents, contracts and other pertinent papers. same class as those enumerated. There is no evidence at all that Bacaltos Coal Mines as a
coal mining company owns and operates vessels and even if it owned any such vessels, that it
In 1988, a Trip Charter Party was executed between Bacaltos Coal Mines represented by was allowed to charter or lease them also, the authorization is not a general power of
Savellon and San Miguel. The agreement was that for Php 650,000 to be paid within seven attorney. It is a special power of attorney for it refers to a clear mandate specially
days after theexecution of the contract, it lets demises the vessel to charterer SMC. For three authorizing the performance of a specific power and of express acts subsumed therein.
round trips to Davao. The vessel was able to make only one trip, so SMC filed an action for
specific performance.
Petitioners alleged that Savellon was not their Chief Operating Officer and that the powers
granted to him are only those clearly expressed in the authorization which do not include the
power to enter into any contract with SMC.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether or not Savellon was duly authorized by the petitioners to enter into the Trip Charter
Party.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., petitioner, vs. PEDRO L.

LINSANGAN, respondent. G.R. No. 151319 November 22, 2004
Florencia Baluyot offered Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan a lot called Garden State at the Holy NO. The acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless
Cross Memorial Park owned by petitioner (MMPCI). According to Baluyot, a former owner he ratifies them, expressly or impliedly. Only the principal can ratify; the agent cannot ratify
of a memorial lot under Contract No. 25012 was no longer interested in acquiring the lot and his own unauthorized acts. Moreover, the principal must have knowledge of the acts he is to
had opted to sell his rights subject to reimbursement of the amounts he already paid. The ratify. No ratification can be implied in the instant case. Atty. Linsangan failed to show that
contract was for P95,000.00. Baluyot reassured Atty. Linsangan that once reimbursement is MMPCI had knowledge of the arrangement. As far as MMPCI is concerned, the contract
made to the former buyer, the contract would be transferred to him. Atty. Linsangan agreed price was P132,250.00, as stated in the Offer to Purchase signed by Atty. Linsangan and
and gave Baluyot P35,295.00 representing the amount to be reimbursed to the original buyer MMPCI's authorized officer. Likewise, this Court does not find favor in the Court of
and to complete the down payment to MMPCI. Baluyot issued handwritten and typewritten Appeals' findings that "the authority of defendant Baluyot may not have been expressly
receipts for these payments. Baluyot verbally advised Atty. Linsangan that Contract No. conferred upon her; however, the same may have been derived impliedly by habit or custom
28660 was cancelled for reasons the latter could not explain, and presented to him another which may have been an accepted practice in their company in a long period of time." A
proposal for the purchase of an equivalent property. He refused the new proposal and insisted perusal of the records of the case fails to show any indication that there was such a habit or
that Baluyot and MMPCI honor their undertaking. For the alleged failure of MMPCI and custom in MMPCI that allows its agents to enter into agreements for lower prices of its
Baluyot to conform to their agreement, Atty. Linsangan filed a Complaint for Breach of interment spaces, nor to assume a portion of the purchase price of the interment spaces sold
Contract and Damages against the former. For its part, MMPCI alleged that Contract No. at such lower price. No evidence was ever presented to this effect.
28660 was cancelled conformably with the terms of the contract because of non-payment of
arrearages. MMPCI stated that Baluyot was not an agent but an independent contractor, and
as such was not authorized to represent MMPCI or to use its name except as to the extent
expressly stated in the Agency Manager Agreement.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether or not a contract of agency exists between Baluyot and MMPCI.

SPOUSES RAUL and AMALIA

PANLILIO, PETITIONERS vs.
Citibank, Respondent
G.R. No. 156335 Nov 28, 2007
Spouses Raul and Amalia Panlilio‘s initial intention was to invest money in a Citibank Having bound themselves under the contract of agency, petitioners as principals in an
product which had a high interest but since it was not available, they put their Php 1,000,000 agency relationship are solely obliged to observe the solemnity of the transaction entered into
in a savings account instead. More than a month later , petitioners placed another amount of by the agent on their behalf, absent any proof that the latter acted beyond its authority.
Php 2,134635.87 in the Citibank‘s long term commercial paper (LTCP) , a debt instrument Concomitant to this obligation id that the principal also assumes the risks that may arise from
that paid a high interest issued by the corporation Camella and Palmera Homes (C&P the transaction . Indeed, as in the instant case bank regulations prohibit banks from
Homes). Months after signing with the debt instrument and after receiving interests, guaranteeing profits or the principal in an investment management account.
petitioners contested the investment contract and demanded that the respondent bank to
return their investment money. This happened when newspaper reports came out that C&P
Homes stock had plunged in value.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether or not the investment contract creates a trusteeship or agency.

Whether or not the respondent is under the obligation to return the investment money of the
petitioners.
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC.
and ELDRED JARDINICO, respondents.
G.R. No. 79688 February 1, 1996 mix – up when he constructed the improvements . It was in fact due to the negligence and
wrongful delivery of CTTEI which included its principal the herein petitioner. It further
ruled that the award of rental was without basis.
FACTS:
Pending the resolution of the case at the Court of Appeals Jardinico and Kee entered into a
Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development Corporation, herein petitioner a
deed of sale, wherein Lot 9 was sold to Kee. In the said deed a provision stating that
parcel of land at Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. The property was designated as Lot
regardless of the outcome of the decision, such shall not be pursued by the parties and shall
9, Phase II. In 1975, herein respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the said subject lot from the
be considered dismissed and without effect. The appellate court was not informed of this
former purchaser. Eldred later discovered that the property he purchased had improvements
deal.
introduced therein by respondent Wilson Kee.
Wilson Kee on the other hand bought on installments Lot 8 of the same subdivision from
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:
C.T. Torres Enterprises Inc. which is the exclusive real estate agent of the petitioner. Under
the contract Kee was allowed to take possession of the property even before full payment of
the price. CTTEI through an employee, Zenaida Octaviano accompanied Kee‘s wife Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property
Donabelle to inspect Lot No. 8 Octaviano however mistakenly pointed towards Lot 9. Hence erroneously delivered by the owner’s agent, a builder in good faith.
spouses Kee had their residence, an auto repair shop a store and other improvements
constructed on the wrong lot.
Upon discovery of the blunder both Kee and Jardinico tried to reach an amicable settlement
but they failed. Jardinico demanded that the improvements be removed but as Kee refused, Yes. Article 527 of the Civil Code provides the presumption that petitioner has the burden of
Jardinico filed a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee at the Municipal Trial proving that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Kee may be made liable for the violation of the
Court in Cities of Bacolod City. Kee filed a third – party complaint against herein petitioner contract with CTTEI but this may not be used as a basis of bad faith and as a sufficient
and CTTEI. ground to negate the presumption of good faith. Jardinico is presently only allowed to file a
complaint for unlawful detainer. Good faith is based on the belief of the builder that the land
The MTCC found that the error was attributable to CTTEI also since at present the contract he is building on is his and his ignorance of any flaw or defect in his title. Since at the time
with Kee has rescinded for Kee‘s failure to pay installments. Kee no longer had any right when Kee constructed his improvements on Lot 8, he was not aware that it was actually Lot 9
over the subject property and must pay rentals for its use. The Regional Trial Court of that was delivered to him. Petitioner further contends that Kee was negligent as a provision in
Bacolod City ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent. It the contract of sale on installment stated that the vendee must have.
argued that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Even if assuming that he was in good faith, he
was no longer so and must pay rentals from the time that he was given notice to vacate the
lot. The Court of Appeals ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith as he was unaware of the
of the considerable amount of discrepancies and irregularities. As a consequence,
THE MANILA REMNANT CO., INC., Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and OSCAR VENTANILLA, JR. and CARMEN GLORIA Artemio Valencia was removed as President by the Board of Directors of Manila
DIAZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 82978. November 22, 1990 Remnant. Therefore, Valencia stopped transmitting Ventanilla's monthly
installments. A.U. Valencia and Co. sued Manila Remnant to impugn the abrogation
FACTS: of their agency agreement. The court ordered all lot buyers to deposit their monthly
amortizations with the court. But A.U. Valencia and Co. wrote the Ventanillas that it
Petitioner Manila Remnant Co., Inc. is the owns parcels of land situated in Quezon was still authorized by the court to collect the monthly amortizations and requested
City and constituting the Capital Homes Subdivision Nos. I and II. Manila Remnant them to continue remitting their amortizations with the assurance that said
and A.U. Valencia & Co. Inc. entered into a contract entitled "Confirmation of Land payments would be deposited later in court.
Development and Sales Contract" to formalize a prior verbal agreement whereby
A.U. Valencia and Co., Inc. was to develop the aforesaid subdivision for a Thereafter, the trial court issued an order prohibiting A.U. Valencia and Co. from
consideration of 15.5% commision. At that time the President of both A.U. Valencia collecting the monthly installments. Valencia complied with the court's order of
and Co. Inc. and Manila Remnant Co., Inc. was Artemio U. Valencia. Manila submitting the list of all his clients but said list excluded the name of the Ventanillas.
Remnant thru A.U. Valencia and Co. executed two "contracts to sell" covering Lots 1 Manila Remnant caused the publication in the Times Journal of a notice cancelling
and 2 of Block 17 in favor of Oscar C. Ventanilla and Carmen Gloria Diaz. Ten days the contracts to sell of some lot buyers. To prevent the effective cancellation of their
after the signing of the contracts with the Ventanillas, Artemio U. Valencia, without contracts, Artemio Valencia filed a complaint for specific performance with damages
the knowledge of the Ventanilla couple, sold Lots 1 and 2 of Block 17 again, to Carlos against Manila Remnant
Crisostomo, one of his sales agents without any consideration. Artemio Valencia then
transmitted the fictitious Crisostomo contracts to Manila Remnant while he kept in The Ventanillas, believing that they had already remitted enough money went
his files the contracts to sell in favor of the Ventanillas. All the amounts paid by the directly to Manila Remnant and offered to pay the entire outstanding balance of the
Ventanillas were deposited in Valencia's bank account. Upon orders of Artemio purchase price. Unfortunately, they discovered from Gloria Caballes that their names
Valencia, the monthly payments of the Ventanillas were remitted to Manila Remnant did not appear in the records of A.U. Valencia and Co. as lot buyers. Also, Manila
as payments of Crisostomo for which the former issued receipts in favor of Remnant refused the offer of the Ventanillas to pay for the remainder of the contract
Crisostomo. price. The Ventanillas then commenced an action for specific performance,
annulment of deeds and damages against Manila Remnant, A.U. Valencia and Co.
General Manager Karl Landahl, wrote Artemio Valencia informing him that Manila and Carlos Crisostomo.
Remnant was terminating its existing collection agreement with his firm on account
have ratified the same. More in point, we find that by the principle of estoppel,
Manila Remnant is deemed to have allowed its agent to act as though it had plenary
The trial court found that Manila Remnant could have not been dragged into this powers.
suit without the fraudulent manipulations of Valencia. Subsequently, Manila
Remnant and A.U. Valencia and Co. elevated the lower court's decision to the Court Article 1911 of the Civil Code provides: "Even when the agent has exceeded
his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the
of Appeals through separate appeals. On October 13, 1987, the Appellate Court latter to act as though he had full powers." In such a situation, both the principal
affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Reconsideration sought by petitioner and the agent may be considered as joint feasors whose liability is joint and solidary.
In essence, therefore, the basis for Manila Remnant's solidary liability is estoppel
Manila Remnant was denied, hence the instant petition.
which, in turn, is rooted in the principal's neglectfulness in failing to properly
supervise and control the affairs of its agent and to adopt the needed measures to
prevent further misrepresentation. As a consequence, Manila Remnant is considered
estopped from pleading the truth that it had no direct hand in the deception
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:
employed by its agent. That the principal might not have had actual knowledge of the
agent's misdeed is of no moment.
Whether or not petitioner Manila Remnant should be held
solidarily liable together with A.U. Valencia and Co. and Carlos
Crisostomo for the payment of moral, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in favor of the Ventanillas.
YES. In the case at bar, the Valencia realty firm had clearly overstepped the bounds
of its authority as agent — and for that matter, even the law — when it undertook the
double sale of the disputed lots. Such being the case, the principal, Manila Remnant,
would have been in the clear pursuant to Article 1897 of the Civil Code which states
that "(t)he agent who acts as such is not personally liable to that party with whom he
contracts, unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority
without giving such party sufficient notice of his powers." However, the unique
relationship existing between the principal and the agent at the time of the dual sale
must be underscored. Bear in mind that the president then of both firms was
Artemio U. Valencia, the individual directly responsible for the sale scam. Hence,
despite the fact that the double sale was beyond the power of the agent, Manila
Remnant as principal was chargeable with the knowledge or constructive notice of
that fact and not having done anything to correct such an irregularity was deemed to
ALBALADEJO Y CIA., S. en C., plaintiff-appellant, vs.

The PHILIPPINE REFINING CO., as successor to The Visayan Refining
Co., defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-20726 December 20, 1923
FACTS: ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:
It appears that Albaladejo y Cia is a limited partnership, organized in conformity with the Whether or not the defendant is liable for the expenses incurred by the plaintiff in keeping its
laws of these islands, and having its principal place of business at Legaspi, in the Province of organization intact during the period now under consideration.
Albay and during the transactions which gave origin to this litigation said firm was engaged
in the buying and selling of the products of the country, especially copra and in the conduct
of a general mercantile business in Legaspi and in other places where it maintained agencies HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI:
or sub – agencies for the prosecution of its commercial enterprises. The Visayan Refining
Co. is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines Islands; and prior to July 9, It is noted in the letter dated July 10, 1920 that Mr. Day suggested that if the various
1920 it was engaged in operating its extensive plant at Opon, Cebu for the manufacture of purchasing agents of the Visayan Refining Co. would keep their organization intact, the
coconut oil. company would endeavor to see that they should not lose by the transaction in the long run.
These words afford no sufficient basis for the conclusion, which the trial judge deduced
On Aug 28, 1918 the plaintiff made a contract with the Visayan Refining Co. Pursuant to this there from, that the defendant is bound to compensate the plaintiff for the expenses incurred
agreement the plaintiff during the year therein contemplated, bought copra extensively for in maintaining its organization. The correspondence sufficiently shows on its face that there
the Visayan Refining Co. At the end of said year both parties found themselves satisfied with was no intention on the part of the company to lay a basis for contractual liability of any sort;
the existing arrangement, and they therefore continued by tacit consent to govern their future and the plaintiff must have understood the letters in that light. The parties could undoubtedly
relations by the same agreement. In this situation affairs remained until July 9, 1920, when have contracted about it, but there was clearly no intention to enter into contractual relation;
the Visayan Refining Co. closed down its factory at Opon and withdrew from the copra and the law will not raise a contract by implication against the intention of the parties. The
market. inducement held forth was that, when purchasing should be resumed, the plaintiff would be
compensated by the profits then to be earned for any expense that would be incurred in
When the contract above referred to was originally made, Albaladejo y Cia apparently had keeping its organization intact. It is needless to say that there is no proof showing that the
only one commercial establishment that at Legaspi but the large requirements of the Visayan officials of the defendant acted in bad faith in holding out this hope.
Refining Co. for copra appeared so far to justify the extension of the plaintiff‘s business that
during the course of the next two or three years it established some twenty agencies or sub In the appellant's brief the contention is advanced that the contract between the plaintiff and
agencies in various ports and places of the Province of Albay and neighboring provinces. the Visayan Refining Co. created the relation of principal and agent between the parties, and
the reliance is placed upon article 1729 of the Civil Code which requires the principal to
indemnify the agent for damages incurred in carrying out the agency. Attentive perusal of the
contract is, however, convincing to the effect that the relation between the parties was not
that of principal and agent in so far as relates to the purchase of copra by the plaintiff. It is
true that the Visayan Refining Co. made the plaintiff one of its instruments for the collection
of copra; but it is clear that in making its purchases from the producers the plaintiff was
buying upon its own account and that when it turned over the copra to the Visayan Refining
Co., pursuant to that agreement, a second sale was effected. In paragraph three of the contract
it is declared that during the continuance of this contract the Visayan Refining Co. would not
appoint any other agent for the purchase of copra in Legaspi; and this gives rise indirectly to
the inference that the plaintiff was considered its buying agent. But the use of this term in one
clause of the contract cannot dominate the real nature of the agreement as revealed in other
clauses, no less than in the caption of the agreement itself. In some of the trade letters also
the various instrumentalities used by the Visayan Refining Co. for the collection of copra are
spoken of as agents. But this designation was evidently used for convenience; and it is very
clear that in its activities as a buyer the plaintiff was acting upon its own account and not as
agents, in the legal sense, of the Visayan Refining Co. The title to all of the copra purchased
by the plaintiff undoubtedly remained in it until it was delivered by way of subsequent sale to
said company.
SECTION 5
CMS LOGGING, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and D.R. AGUINALDO
CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. L-41420 July 10, 1992
FACTS: HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI:

Petitioner CMS is a forest concessionaire engaged in the logging business, while private The principal may revoke a contract of agency at will, and such revocation may be express,
respondent DRACOR is engaged in the business of exporting and selling logs and lumber. or implied, and may be availed of even if the period fixed in the contract of agency as not yet
On August 28, 1957, CMS and DRACOR entered into a contract of agency whereby the expired. As the principal has this absolute right to revoke the agency, the agent can not object
thereto; neither may he claim damages arising from such revocation, unless it is shown that
former appointed the latter as its exclusive export and sales agent for all logs that the former
such was done in order to evade the payment of agent's commission. During the existence of
may produce, for a period of five (5) years. the contract of agency, DRACOR admitted that CMS sold its logs directly to several
CMS was able to sell through DRACOR a total of 77,264,672 board feet of logs in Japan, Japanese firms. This act constituted an implied revocation of the contract of agency under
Article 1924 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 1924 The agency is revoked if the
from September 20, 1957 to April 4, 1962. Six months prior the end of their agreement, CMS
principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third
found out that DRACOR was using Shingko Trading to sell their logs and earned persons. DRACOR is not entitled to commission since it was revoked by CMS when they
commission for it. CMS claimed that it was a violation of their agreement since DRACOR transacted directly with the Japanese firms
already received 5% commission and is no longer entitled to the additional commission to
Shinko. After the discovery, CMS directly transacted with Japanese firms without the aid if
DRACOR. CMS sued DRACOR for the commission Shingko received while DRACOR
counterclaimed for the commission of the sales made by CMS with the Japanese firms.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:
Whether or not D.R. Aguinaldo Corporation is entitled to its commissions from the sales
made by CMS to japans firms.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by LT. GEN. JOSE M. CALIMLIM,

in his capacity as former Chief of the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP), and former Commanding General, Presidential Security Group
(PSG), and MAJ. DAVID B. DICIANO, in his capacity as an Officer of ISAFP and
former member of the PSG, petitioners, vs. HON. VICTORINO EVANGELISTA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 223, Quezon City, and
DANTE LEGASPI, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Paul Gutierrez, respondents.
G.R. No. 156015. August 11, 2005
HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI:

FACTS:
Petitioners claim that the special power of attorney of Gutierrez to represent Legaspi has
The Complaint alleged that private respondent Legaspi is the owner of a land located in already been revoked by the latter. Private respondent Gutierrez, however, contends that the
Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan. In November 1999, petitioner Calimlim, representing the unilateral revocation is invalid as his agency is coupled with interest.
Republic of the Philippines, and as then head of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces We agree with private respondent.
of the Philippines and the Presidential Security Group, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with one Ciriaco Reyes. The MOA granted Reyes a permit to hunt for Art. 1868 of the Civil Code provides that by the contract of agency, an agent binds
treasure in a land in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Petitioner Diciano signed the MOA as a himself to render some service or do something in representation or on behalf of another,
witness.[2] It was further alleged that thereafter, Reyes, together with petitioners, started, known as the principal, with the consent or authority of the latter.[13]
digging, tunneling and blasting works on the said land of Legaspi. The complaint also alleged A contract of agency is generally revocable as it is a personal contract of representation
that petitioner Calimlim assigned about 80 military personnel to guard the area and encamp based on trust and confidence reposed by the principal on his agent. As the power of the
thereon to intimidate Legaspi and other occupants of the area from going near the subject agent to act depends on the will and license of the principal he represents, the power of the
land. agent ceases when the will or permission is withdrawn by the principal. Thus, generally, the
agency may be revoked by the principal at will
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:
Whether or not the contract of agency between Legaspi and private respondent
Gutierrez has been effectively revoked by Legaspi.
ARTURO P. VALENZUELA and HOSPITALITA N. VALENZUELA, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO M. ARAGON, ROBERT
E. PARNELL, CARLOS K. CATOLICO and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 83122 October 19, 1990
Arturo Valenzuela is a General Agent of Philippine American General No. The principal cause of the termination of Valenzuela as General Agent of Philamgen
Insurance (Philamgen) since 1965. He was authorized to solicit and sell in arosefrom his refusal to share his Delta commission. The apparent
behalf of Philamgen all kinds of non-life insurance, and in consideration of bad faith o f t h e
services rendered was entitled to receive the full agent's commission of privaterespondents in terminati ng the General Agenc y Agreement of
32.5% from Philamgen under the scheduled commission rates. From p e t i t i o n e r s . T h e a g e n c y involving petitioner and private respondent is one
1973 to1975, Valenzuela solicited marine insurance from one of his "coupled with an interest," and, therefore,should not be freely revocable at the unilateral will
clients, the Delta Motors in the a m o u n t o f P 4 . 4 M i l l i o n f r o m of the latter. With the termination of the General Agency Agreement, Valenzuela
which he was entitled to a commission of 32%. would no longer be entitled to commission on therenewal of insurance policies
H o w e v e r , Valenzuela did not receive his full commission which of clients sourced from his agency.
amounted to P1.6 Million from the
Despite the termination of the agency, Philamgen continued to hold Valenzuela jointly
P4.4M i l l i o n i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e o f t h e D e l t a M o t o r s . I n 1 9
andseverally liable with the insured for unpaid premiums. Valenzuela had an
7 7 , P h i l a m g e n s t a r t e d t o b e c o m e interested in and expressed its interest in thecontinuation of the agency when it was unceremoniously terminated not only
intent to share in the commission due Valenzuela on a fifty-fifty basis. because of the commissions he should continue to receive from the insurance business he has
Because of the refusal of Valenzuela, Philamgen terminated the General solicited and procured but also for the fact that by the very acts of the respondents, he was
Agency Agreement of Valenzuela. made liable to Philamgen in the event the insured fail to pay the premiums due. They are
estopped by their own positive averments and claims for damages. Therefore, the
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS respondents cannot state that the agency relationship between Valenzuela and
Philamgen is not coupled with interest. There is an exception to the principle that an
Whether or not Philamgen could continue to hold Valenzuela jointly and agency is revocable at will and that is when the agency has been given not only for the
severally liable with the insured for unpaid premiums. interest of the principal but for the interest of third persons or for the mutual interest of the
principal and the agent. In these cases, It is evident that the agency ceases to be freely
revocable by the sole will of the principal. The factor rendering Philamgen and the
private respondents liable in damages is that the termination by them of the
General Agency Agreement was tainted with bad faith. If aprincipal acts in bad
faith and with abuse of right in terminating the agency, then he is liable in damages.
Valenzuela is not liable to Philamgen for the unpaid

and uncollected premiums. UnderSection 77 of the Insurance Code, the remedy for the
non-payment of premiums is to putan end to and render the insurance policy not binding
Sec. 77. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy

orc o n t r a c t o f i n s u r a n c e i s v a l i d a n d b i n d i n g u n l e s s
and until the premiumsthereof have been paid except in the case of
a l i f e o r i n d u s t r i a l l i f e p o l i c y whenever the grace period provision applies
Albert M. Ching and Romeo J. Bautista, Petitioners vs.
Felix M. Bantolo et al,. Respondents
G.R. No. 177086 December 5, 2012
Respondents Felix M. Bantolo , Antonio O. Adriano and Eulogio Sta Cruz Jr. are owners of Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners recovery of the actual damages in the
several parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City. On April 3, 2000, respondents executed in amount of Php 500,000 be made contingent upon the obtention of a loan through the subject
favor of petitioners Albert Ching (Ching) and Romeo J. Bautista a Special Power of Attorney SPA, which the respondents in the first place refused to honor and revoked in bad faith .
(SPA) authorizing petitioners to obtain a loan using respondents‘ properties as collateral
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the petitioners are not entitled to one-half of the
On July 18, 2000, the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) approved the loan application of respondents properties despite the finding of the RTC that the consideration therefor was that
petitioner Ching in the amount of P25 million for a term of five years subject to certain the petitioners shall pay for the loan to be obtained utilizing the respondents properties and
conditions. the finding of the RTC that petitioner Ching, to his grave prejudice failed to utilize the
proceeds of the loan for the latter‘s business plan as well as to recover his share in the
On July 31, 2000, petitioner Ching thru a letter12 informed respondents of the approval of expenses, which petitioner Ching advanced in procuring the loan.
the loan.
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the expenses incurred and to be incurred by the
Sometime in the first week of August 2000, petitioners learned about the revocation of the petitioners in applying for a loan through the SPA should be borne by the petitioners despite
SPA. Consequently, petitioners sent a letter15 to respondents demanding that the latter the existence of an agreement to the contrary between the petitioners and respondents the
comply with the agreement by annulling the revocation of the SPA existence of which agreement was duly found by the RTC.
On September 8, 2000, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that respondents are not liable to pay exemplary
City a Complaint17 for Annulment of Revocation of SPA, Enforcement of SPA and/or damages for revoking the SPA in bad faith on the ratiocination that the respondents sis not
interest in the properties covered by said SPA and Damages against respondents. Petitioners act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner because the
later amended18 the Complaint, docketed as Q00-41851, to include an alternative prayer to respondents were purportedly unsatisfied with the amount of the loan approved.
have them declared as the owners of one-half of the properties covered by the SPA
HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI:
The petition is partly meritorious. There is no question that the SPA executed by respondents pointed out by the CA, majority of the receipts were incurred abroad and in connection with
in favor of petitioners is a contract of agency coupled with interest. This is because their petitioner Ching‘s business dealings.
bilateral contract depends upon the agency. Hence, it ―cannot be revoked at the sole will of
the principal.‖ The only issue therefore is the extent of the liability of respondents and the Petitioners are not entitled to exemplary damages. Neither are petitioners entitled to
damages to be awarded to petitioners. exemplary damages. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed ―by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
Petitioner Ching is entitled to actual damages in the amount of P500,000.00 without any temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.‖ They are, however, not recoverable as a
condition matter of right. They are awarded only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
In exchange for his possession of the titles, petitioner Ching advanced the amount of
P500,000.00 to respondents. Considering that the loan application with PVB did not push
through, respondents are liable to return the said amount to petitioner Ching.
Petitioners are not entitled to one-half of the subject properties.
It is far from human experience that a person will give half of his property to another person
whom he barely knows. It is clear from the records of the case that the [respondents] do not
know [petitioner] Ching. It was [petitioner] Bautista who introduced him to [respondent]
Bantolo. The [respondents] agreed to give an SPA to Ching, because they were informed that
the latter could help them secure a loan with their pieces of property as collateral. No one in
his right mind would definitely agree to give half of his property to another. It is certain that
they agreed that they would share in the proceeds of the loan but not in the property. Hence,
[petitioners] are not entitled to one-half of the property.
Petitioners are not entitled to reimbursement of all the expenses incurred in obtaining a loan.
For this reason, we find that petitioners are not entitled to the reimbursement of the expenses
they have incurred in applying for the loan. Besides, petitioners failed to show that the
receipts submitted as evidence were incurred in relation to the loan application. As aptly
AMPARO G. PEREZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellees, vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Binalbagan Branch, ET AL., defendants
and appellants. G.R. No. L-21813 July 30, 1966
On August 29, 1939, Vicente Perez mortgaged Lot No. 286-E of the Kabankalan Cadastre,
with Transfer certificate of Title No. 29530, to the appellant Philippine National Bank,
Bacolod Branch, in order to secure payment of a loan of P2,500, plus interest, payable in
yearly installments. On October 7, 1942, Vicente Perez, mortgagor, died intestate, survived
by his widow and children (appellees herein). At that time, there was an outstanding balance
of P1,917.00, and corresponding interest, on the mortgage indebtedness.
On October 18, 1956, the widow of Perez instituted Special Proceedings No. 512 of the
Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros for the settlement of the estate of Vicente Perez.
The widow was appointed Administratrix and notice to creditors was duly published. The HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI:
Bank did not file a claim. The project of partition was submitted on July 18, 1956; it was
approved and the properties distributed accordingly. Special Proceedings No. 512 was then
closed.
It appears also that, as early as March of 1947, the widow of the late Vicente Perez inquired
by letter from the Bank the status of her husband's account; and she was informed that there
was an outstanding balance thereon of P2,758.84 earning a daily interest of P0.4488. She was
furnished a copy of the mortgage and, on April 2, 1947, a copy of the Tax Declaration.
On January 2, 1963, the Bank, pursuant to authority granted it in the mortgage deed, caused
the mortgaged properties to be extra judicially foreclosed. The Provincial Sheriff accordingly
sold Lot No. 286-E at auction, and it was purchased by the Bank. In the ordinary course after
the lapse of the year of redemption, Certificate of Title No. T-29530 in the name of Vicente
Perez was cancelled, and Certificate T-32066, dated May 11, 1962, was issued in the name of
the Bank. The widow and heirs were not notified.

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LAW ON AGENCY, TRUSTS AND PARTNERHSIP (SUMMER 2016)

EUROTECH INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Petitioner, - versus –EDWIN

MANOTOK BROTHERS, INC., petitioner, -versus- MANOTOK BROTHERS, INC.,

MANUEL B. TAN, GREGG M. TECSON and ALEXANDER SALDAA, petitioners,

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the brokerage commission.

EDUARDO V. LINTONJUA, JR. and ANTONIO K. LITONJUA, Petitioners, -versus-

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:

Whether or not Guevarra acted within his authority as agent of petitioner.

HOLDINGS &RATIO DECIDENDI:

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:

HOLDINGS &RATIO DECIDENDI:

Yes, the general power of attorney was sufficient

Orense continued occupying the land by virtue of a contract of lease.

ALEJANDRIA PINEDA and SPOUSES ADEODATO DUQUE, JR., and

Consequently, petitioner Duque failed to validly acquire the subject property.

FACTS: ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

NICHOLAS Y. CERVANTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI

CORNELIA M. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, vs.

The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

WILLIAM UY and RODEL ROXAS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONAL

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Whether or not National Merchandising Corporation had exceeded their authority

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

NORA S. EUGENIO and ALFREDO Y. EUGENIO, petitioners,

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

BACALTOS COAL MINES and GERMAN A. BACALTOS, petitioners, vs.

FACTS: HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., petitioner, vs. PEDRO L.

FACTS: HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Whether or not a contract of agency exists between Baluyot and MMPCI.

SPOUSES RAUL and AMALIA

FACTS: HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Whether or not the investment contract creates a trusteeship or agency.

PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI

ALBALADEJO Y CIA., S. en C., plaintiff-appellant, vs.

FACTS: ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:

FACTS: HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI:

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by LT. GEN. JOSE M. CALIMLIM,

HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI:

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:

FACTS: HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI

Valenzuela is not liable to Philamgen for the unpaid

Sec. 77. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy

FACTS: ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:

HOLDINGS & RATIO DECIDENDI:

Petitioners are not entitled to one-half of the subject properties.

FACTS: ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:

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