Ontological arguments are arguments, for the conclusion that God exists, from

premises which are supposed to derive from some source other than observation of
the world—e.g., from reason alone. In other words, ontological arguments are
arguments from what are typically alleged to be none but analytic, a priori and
necessary premises to the conclusion that God exists.
It is the argument that proceeds from the idea of God to the reality of God.
Theologian and philosopher St Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) was the first to
have proposed an ontological argument in the second and third chapters of his
Proslogion. Anselm's argument was not presented in order to prove God's existence;
rather, Proslogion was a work of meditation in which he documented how the idea of
God became self-evident to him.
Anselm uses reductio ad absurdum in order to demonstrate the existence of God.

He begins by concentrating the monotheistic concept of God into the formula: “a

being greater than which nothing greater can be conceived.” It is important to notice
that the idea of the most perfect conceivable being is different from the idea of the
most perfect being that there is. Instead of describing God as the most perfect being
that there is, Anselm describes God as the being who is so perfect that no more
perfect can even be conceived.
Anselm distinguishes between, x, existing in the mind only and its existing in reality
as well. If the most perfect conceivable being existed only in the mind, we should
then have the contradiction that it is possible to conceive of a yet more perfect being,
namely, the same being existing in reality as well as in mind. Therefore, the most
perfect conceivable being must exist in reality as well as in the mind.
Further, Anselm goes on to explain God’s uniquely necessary existence. God is
defined in such a way that it is impossible to conceive of God’s not existing. The core
of this notion of necessary being is self-existence. Since God as infinitely perfect is
not limited in or by time, the twin possibilities of God having ever come to exist or
ever ceasing to exist are alike excluded and God’s non-existence is rendered
impossible.

Anselm refers to atheists as ‘fools’ since, even such a person, he says, possess the
idea of God as the greatest conceivable being; and when we unpack the implications
of this idea we see that such a being must actually exist.

Gaunilon, a French monk and a contemporary of Anselm, criticized Anselm’s view in

his work In Behalf of the Fool. He claims that Anselm’s reasoning would lead to
absurd conclusions if applied in other fields, and he sets up a supposedly parallel
ontological argument for the most perfect island. Guanilon spoke of the most perfect
of islands rather than of the most perfect conceivable island; but his argument could
be rephrased in terms of the latter idea. Given the idea of such an island, by using
Anselm’s principle, we can argue that unless it exists in reality, it cannot be the most
perfect conceivable island.
Anselm’s reply is based upon the second form of the argument. The element in the
idea of God which is lacking in the notion of the most perfect island is necessary
existence. An island is by definition a part of the contingent world. It is a dependent
reality which can, without contradiction, be thought not to exist; and therefore,
Anselm’s principle does not apply to it. It applies only to the most perfect
conceivable being, which is defined as having eternal and independent existence.

This debate re-emerged Descartes reformulated Anselm’s argument and thereby,

attracted widespread attention to it. Descartes brought the the fore the point upon
which most of the modern discussions of the ontological argument have centered,
namely, the assumption that existence is a property or predicate. He explicitly treats
existence as a characteristic, the possession or lack of which by a given x is properly
open to inquiry. The essence or defining nature of each kind of thing includes certain
predicates, and Descartes’ ontological argument claims that existence must be among
the defining predicates of God. Just as a triangle without its defining properties would
not be a triangle, and God without existence would not be God.

This Cartesian version of the ontological argument was later challenged at two levels
by Immanuel Kant.
At one level he accepted Descartes’ claim that the idea of existence belongs to
analytically to the concept of God, as the idea of having three angles belongs
analytically to that of a three-sided plane figure. In each case the predicate is
necessarily linked with the subject, But, Kant replied, it does not follow from this that
the subject, with its predicts, actually exists. What is analytically true is that if there is
a triangle, it must have three angles, and if there is an infinitely perfect being, that
being must have existence.
At a deeper level, however, Kant rejected the basic assumption that existence, like
triangularity, is a predicate that something can either have or lack, and that may in
some cases be analytically connected with a subject. He points out, similar to Hume,
that the idea of existence does not add anything to the concept of a particular thing or
kind of thing.
Thus, to say of x that it exists is not to say that in addition to its v various other
attributes of existing, but is to say that there is an x in the real world.

Essentially, the same point has more recently been made by Russell in his analysis of
the word “exists.” He has shown that although “exists” is grammatically a predicate,
logically it performs a different function.

The bearing of this upon the ontological argument is evident. If existence is, as
Anselm and Descartes assumed, an attribute or predicate that can be included in a
definition and that, as a desirable attribute, must be included in the definition of God,
then the ontological argument is valid. For it would be self-contradictory to say that
the most perfect conceivable being lacks the attribute of existence. But if existence,
although it appears grammatically in the role of the predicate, has the quite different
logical function of asserting that a description applied to something in reality, then
the ontological argument, considered as a proof of God’s existence, fails. For if
existence if not a predicate, it cannot be a defining predicate of God, and the question
whether anything in reality corresponds to the concept of the most perfect
conceivable being remains open inquiry. A definition of God described one’s concept
of God but cannot prove the actual existence of any such being.

The ontological argument has perennially fascinated the philosophical mind, and in
recent years there have been a number of new discussions of it.