G.R. No.

153675             April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine

Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge
Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing
Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to
vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were
issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting
an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong
Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a
jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which,
in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same
day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520,
praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of
the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch
10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for
bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then
raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail.
This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail,
thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted
subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear
and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and
processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will
be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure
order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require
that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the
accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the
corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent
judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s
liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court
has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch
42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings.
It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows
that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is
not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application
"only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art.
VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to
bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even
in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who,
in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in
the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law,
on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and
the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to
states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials
after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations
of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle,
Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were
proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of
Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, 3 the principles
set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the
rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court
in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international
treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this
Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance
the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the
necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had
committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most
serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is
the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of
every individual is not impaired.

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable
the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an
extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment
may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It
is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. 12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but
one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of
a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty
on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the
machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of
justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest
"shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty
which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter,
the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points
out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the
purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a
fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he
or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right
to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed
that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not
a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted
bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 180906             October 7, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not
separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in
its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed
before this Court.

This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by
the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners,
versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents."

This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before this
Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents)
and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners
also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access
Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the
Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in
their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their
Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing,
abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section
14 of the 1987 Constitution.5

While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007.
Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to
Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be
considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ
commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific
matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed
for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec.
187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8

On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and
further resolved, viz:

WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of
Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition
to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing
on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.9

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents),
the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:

ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.

 The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby
REQUIRED:

1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official
and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already
on file herein;

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.

3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any
treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of
medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until
August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff
or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn
compliance with this directive.

SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed
and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San
Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw
some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11

On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past
noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him.
They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed
soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his
house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then
forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.12

Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti"
de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in
Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of
the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo
Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the
faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the
van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the
team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one
of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.14

The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of
them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The
van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different
room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo
on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was
brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked
him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns.
He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had
helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute
them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he
saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials
was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather
shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas
corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was
not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also
manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17

On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They
doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol,
punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the
torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room.
Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him.18

The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the
chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his
hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near
a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and
an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to
Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing
him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the
entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled.
They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see
Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where
Reynaldo was detained.20

For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds
were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk.21

Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed
all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his
bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been detained in that bartolina, including
his brother Reynaldo and himself.23

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house
with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and
mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as
the "DTU."24

At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples
and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs
were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined
respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the
results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies
returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario
alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named
Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them.25

One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men
wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or
two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by
Hilario's men.26

From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were
detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in
Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the
compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from
respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He
asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he
were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen.
Palparan was an evil man.27

Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:

Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"

Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang
lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at
sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon.
Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28

Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the
morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents'
house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the
presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were
afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights
rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.29

When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four "masters"
who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was
in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be
healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each,
and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned
that they would not be given another chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.32

One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named
"Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take
one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each
time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.33

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that
while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan.
While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other
military men and civilians.34

After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was
fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a
30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.35

The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he
learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He
was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She
told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She
confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with
her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.36

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen
Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came
to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and
Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was
beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they
escaped, their families would all be killed.37

On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they
were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006,
respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had
already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September
2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a
military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in
his affidavit.38

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the
24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8,
2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar"
and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in
the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.39

Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and
Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan
where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who
was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog,"
Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of
the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41

From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the
sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay,
the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June
2007.42

In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to
bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:

Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang
kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang
nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong
binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.

Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak
at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy
ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.

Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan,
ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi
siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at
ibinaon ito.

Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick
up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at
napakamasangsang ang amoy.

May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila
sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.

xxx xxx xxx

 Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen.
Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog
na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang
haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa
amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.

Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin.
Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung
tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa
gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.43

On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald
(Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their
family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no
longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and
represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44

Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm
adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved
Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text
messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned
some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.

There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived
in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have
electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong
and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of
the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their
sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.45

Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters they
witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the
faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the
18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely
beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol,
Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.

At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from
Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a
mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in
San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo,
Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle.
Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of
their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp
Tecson."46

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino
specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of
human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct
medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded
with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their
account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after
respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He
testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25,
2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any
involvement therein, viz:

13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held
incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in
the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito
Palparan, as Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as
the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of
Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding
that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In
a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence
establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that
the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter.48

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National
Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers'
alleged abduction. He also claimed that:

7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he
undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations.
The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction
to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed
the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to
submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have
issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of
action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:

(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in
the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;

(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;

(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern
or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;

(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and

(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that
he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive,
he did the following:

3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued
directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance
and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.
 3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters
and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching
Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info:
COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of
this Affidavit.

3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit
relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.

3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ
of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeño pending
before the Supreme Court.

3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding
circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military
personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar
of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.50

Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R.
No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño and Merino, which averred among
others, viz:

10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention
area, I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the
area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino being held
captive;

11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;

12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police,
Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their
good office;

13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba,
Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino
were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have
been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeño and Merino.51

It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan
(Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured
in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted.52

Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of
this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.53 The
24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54

On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen.
Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by
CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de
la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy
Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the
alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez
testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the
Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned
about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58

Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and
conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in
the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six
persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other
witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six
persons.62

Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was
in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office
of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons.65

Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to
come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure.
Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed
on May 29, 2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation
report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006.67 He then gave his report to
the Office of the Chief of Personnel.68

As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein
substantially quoted:

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken
from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by
unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims
filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz,
Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he
was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church
located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he
was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him
because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of
the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said
victims.

b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that
he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at
Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his
neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @
KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of
the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he
was one of those working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that
he just came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by
Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and
claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.

c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a
resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato
Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder
brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February
2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the
incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him
was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA
BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him in support of
their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers.

d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident
of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being
his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he
claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he
was being informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers
were being abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they
implicated him was because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of
summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He
claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that
incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.

e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident
of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na
Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio
mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @
KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his
residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any
participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors
reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship
to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.

f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a
resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a
CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well
the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20)
years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder
brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused,
he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he
learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy.
Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly
innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in
order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.

IV. DISCUSSION

5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the
alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006
at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement
theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this
investigation.

Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of
Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that
they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other
accused claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also
mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as
members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist
group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so
far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
 V. CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the
above named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for
any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the
charge.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2)
civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.

8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69

In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail
the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY
SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT
RAYMOND MANALO.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS

(HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN
CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM
IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE
CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL
MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR
RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A
LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY
14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken
to its beginning.

The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-
day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on
July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social
spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.

On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and
enforced disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to
protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to
the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem
of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private
individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate
or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law."76

The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837, de
Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the
practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejón,
drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,79 which granted judges the power to protect all persons in
the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in
1847, viz:

The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights
granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and
Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific
case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the
violation.80

Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the judge
determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors,
to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in
question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial
power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by
protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire
nation.82

The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response
to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court,
one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of
human dignity, her own painful history conceived."84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public
authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of
personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial
decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the
protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.85

In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against
human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-
encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.86 Other countries
like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to
some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the
above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra
leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas
corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law
tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.89

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be
adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the
swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of
appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law
traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy
to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to
the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.91

The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to
subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the
further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order"92 to
stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic
rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies
including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and
equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as
an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced
disappearance. The Court granted their motion.

With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals states, viz:

The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible
uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein
respondent Raymond Manalo.94

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to
determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege
shall be denied. (emphases supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.95

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were
abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and
were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of
the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is
dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured
through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi
ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng
sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila
nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit
ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell
phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100

We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and
testimony, viz:

...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein
respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who
barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army
boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de
la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was
sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the
van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their
assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU
auxiliaries.

We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either
members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned
out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.

The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The
investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU
auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into
the participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly
exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...

Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the
petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer
tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a
safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen.
Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire
situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command
bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the
abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause.

In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman;
Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing
evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's
involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive
the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the
decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)

However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were
brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in
subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from
Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then
Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished
house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p.
205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the
petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was presented to
the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario
 warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human
rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being
Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan
required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions
when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.

It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners
was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among
others, was similarly established.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also do,
for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming.101

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other
independent and credible pieces of evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of
respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the
pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of
the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort
Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division
Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility.

In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission
considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by
agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989.
The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made
by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they
took when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained.107 She was also examined by a
medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her
cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108

With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it
logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the
veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their
statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or
landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the
hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.

We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the
enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped
from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free,
they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear
that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large
and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis
supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed,
which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.111

Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often associated with liberty;"
it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment."
Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that
their rights "to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under
the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to
give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987
Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching
in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the
State on the exercise of that liberty"114 such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted
to a deprivation of liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and surveillance."116

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and
a violation of their right to security.

Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents
assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge...

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person - houses,
papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home
and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.117 The purpose of this
provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers
of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when
attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is
an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual,
whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the
Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against
unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the
serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be
for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive121 - upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this
life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he
established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and
property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence."122 In a broad sense, the right
to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded
not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the
nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."123

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis
supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an
individual international human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom
from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied)

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life,
liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently.
The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength
of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to
security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter
part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the
provision.127

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article
III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded
without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and
painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in
criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or
security of a person.129

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will
such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily
and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of
bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as
afore-discussed.

Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the
commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all
the more be protected from these degradations.

An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully
detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of
person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts
as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:

...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could
reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the
circumstances in question.

xxx xxx xxx

 ... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3
to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)

The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the protection
of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:

...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental
freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the
meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).
These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.132

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights
to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134 viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its
own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or
his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.135

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the
United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to
security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right
to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be
a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case
involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed
from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:

The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one
could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux
préparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the
other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to
life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in
separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security
of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of
the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties
have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a
matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just
because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to
take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would
allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its
jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.139 (emphasis supplied)

The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience
who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a
catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving
discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v.
Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias
v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered
because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt on the
chairman of an opposition alliance.

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting the
State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to
liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of
Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had
been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation
regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security
of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural
rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the
individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to
account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to
take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt
effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not
been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is
a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.

First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and security.

While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be
killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted
to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.

This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be
stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily
freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when
respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were still
deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa
amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.148

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape,
this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the
military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such
as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among others.

Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens
because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their
movements or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction,
they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to
their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ
of Amparo.

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military
elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they
also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony
and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry
Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the
Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the
first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did
not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.

In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31,
2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the
event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially
include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification
of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on
this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide
results of the investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued
by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of
the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.

Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.

In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to
their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise
violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.

Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.

First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.

Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas.

Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to
include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until
August 12, 2007.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents
partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search
warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath
or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized;
(3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.152 In the
case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by
respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be
produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of
the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of
petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.

Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a
search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is
a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from
the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule
27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:

Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a)
order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of
the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control...

In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued
a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material
Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search
and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that
"cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..."

Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the investigations
conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the
persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher
headquarters."

With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical
personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo.
They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military
officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death.

On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in
ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help
ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and
action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to
create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns
and prisoners behind secret walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104768               July 21, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed
1 

petitioner’s Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano,
while the second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs
sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
for further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power
"(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and
the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order."
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board")
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active
service or retired.
2

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista,
Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at ₱700,000.00.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were
confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT.
EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth
Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate
money in the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually
goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and
when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode
in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen
Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported
by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.

Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized in her house
on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is
also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had
no visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to
cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the
affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, the existence
and ownership of these money would have never been known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Board’s
consultant. Although the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that
respondent has an unexplained wealth of ₱104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth in the amount of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA
3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise
known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." 3

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No. 1379")  against
4 

Ramas.

Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint
naming the Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant.
The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano ("Dimaano") as co-defendant.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the
other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist
at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas
"acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income
from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and
influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the
deposed President Ferdinand Marcos." 5

The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe
that respondents have violated RA No. 1379. The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of
6 

respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended
Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at ₱700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate
income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other items
confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of
Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.

After termination of the pre-trial, the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.
7 

On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for trial and the
absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order "to charge the delinquent
properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x." 8
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioner’s presentation of evidence
on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner would file the amended
complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague
and not related to the existing complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been
pending in court, petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.

After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.

On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to trial because
of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to
amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano
alone unlawfully acquired the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.

The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because of its many
postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact the case had
long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if
any.

During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence. Giving petitioner
one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan
reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any
action that private respondents might take under the circumstances.

However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no further evidence
to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which to file an
appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to
take drastic action.

Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino. The Court held in Migrino that the
9 

PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a
showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos.

On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs.
The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over
the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is also
referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to which petitioner
filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.

On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

 (1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino which involve the same issues.
10  11 

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas
and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE

CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY,
COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT
RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS
WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE
COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.

B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT,
SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not
applicable to this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or
waived by respondents with the filing of their respective answers with counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before the latter was
allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS
SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED
FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE
EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE. 12

The Court’s Ruling

First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and
13 

Republic v. Migrino. 14

The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a
forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.

We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired. The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary recommendations to
15 

appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken based on its findings. The PCGG gave this task to the AFP
16 

Board pursuant to the PCGG’s power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in
order to accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to
wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to
time.

x x x.

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel
who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s
immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their
powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President
17 

assigns their cases to the PCGG. 18

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas’ case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas’ case
should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner
argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas’ position enabled him to receive orders
directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.

We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1
and its amendments.

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is used in EO Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed
this issue in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the term
‘subordinate.’ The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes ‘all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs.
Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any
interest or participation.’

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

‘[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of
the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil.
53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].’
[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former President
Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close
relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

xxx

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the
administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis
supplied)

Ramas’ position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General does not suffice
19 

to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has
to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner
that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close
association is manifested either by Ramas’ complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos’ acquiescence in Ramas’ own accumulation of ill-
gotten wealth if any.

This, the PCGG failed to do.

Petitioner’s attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in
Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant
to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG
was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a
subordinate of the former President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the
Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA
3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise
known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." 20

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to petitioner’s case. EO No. 1 created
the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific
and limited purpose.

Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas
allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner
merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these properties were disproportionate
to his salary and other legitimate income without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association
with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that
Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not
categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by
virtue of his close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that
such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating
the same and the objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019
and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a; (Emphasis supplied)
21 

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was
accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1 clearly 22 
premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was
not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO
23 

Nos. 1, 2, 14, 14-A:

24  25  26

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive
Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act
No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through his
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority and influence,
connections or relationships; and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as
contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing
categories, require a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute
in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in
the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors,
their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling
under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25
February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture
petition rests with the Solicitor General. The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the
27 

Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained
wealth amassed after 25 February 1986. 28

After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie
finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with the
Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents since there is no
prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the
Amended Complaint state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have
recommended Ramas’ case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary
unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent
for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without
prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency
of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.

Petitioner’s argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by
submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.

Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The
PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGG’s powers are specific and
limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
29 

Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute their cases by
filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was
decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October
1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. Thus,
30 

we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an
action.
31

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if
warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan. The right of the State to forfeit
32 

unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel. 33

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of
petitioner’s evidence.

We disagree.

Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame
for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years before the
Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its
evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient
time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements
and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion
for Leave to Amend the Complaint. The motion sought "to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of
34 

petitioner’s evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x
x x."

The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioner’s evidence since petitioner did not state
when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the
presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its
evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its
evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case has been ready
for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the government to produce on
scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply
them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been
held to task in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in
view of the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already in
progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate action could have
been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic. 35

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation on the unexplained
wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379. The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to
36 

conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the presentation of
evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the
preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May
1990 to continue with the presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar as the status
of the case is concerned x x x." Still on the date set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990,
37 

petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint. The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending for
38 

years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.

Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete the presentation of
its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence.
The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioner’s delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a
Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case
since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private respondents. This alone
would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against private
respondents.

Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of
petitioner’s evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as
illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioner’s case since
these properties comprise most of petitioner’s evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much
evidence to support its case against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant captioned "Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaano’s cousins witnessed
the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the
search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56
ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of ₱2,870,000 and US$50,000,
jewelry, and land titles.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure "on March 3,
1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution." Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was
39 

operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were
"taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people." Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government
40 

effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February
1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had
already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies
and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private
respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No.
3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution." The 41 

resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except
treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary
government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the
adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration")
remained in effect during the interregnum.

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule
that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the
interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by
the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno: 42

A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political
system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and
State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new
order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself."

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the "people power
revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the
unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a people to cast out
their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a
general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so
obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of
the state" and from there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of
government without regard to the existing constitution."

xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it
was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had
earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the
organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by
the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet
officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had
ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void
all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of
the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private
property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure
clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was
no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered
companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, petitioner Baseco,
43 

while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the
sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights.
The Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of
sequestration orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety of
sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the
authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the
Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve
the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous
regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." And as
also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the "authority to issue
sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the sequestration orders
would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include specific language recognizing
the validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the present
amendment.

For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salonga’s lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which
all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is doing is traditionally
legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture
developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the
results and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts,
another word for niceties or exceptions.

Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection? The answer is
clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection, for
exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes malos, grande y
malos remedios. That is not an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me
elaborate and give three reasons:

First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional
normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We
cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full
functioning of what is at the heart of constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of
Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when
we begin to backslide even before we get there.

Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report asks for
extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may
even extend this longer.

Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report is asking for is
that we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.

Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have
a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of
consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.

Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is very disturbing.
When it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another
staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument
makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and
seizure clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause.
You can keep it in your private safe."

Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The
hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically
the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something positively revolving about either argument.
The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will
survive and grow strong, only if it would become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is
beyond monetary estimation.

For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the committee
report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First,
it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument — that what the PCGG has been doing has been completely
within the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of
Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of
Rights.

The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what another Christian
replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law
for my nation’s safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our nation’s sake. And we should
delete Section 8.

Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting sequestration orders from
the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
44 

Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not
stand the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.

Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent a
constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration
orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy,
under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s
good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires
each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the
45 

duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence."

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
46 

international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.

47 

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another
matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in
the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same
way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and
orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The Provisional
48 

Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers
entrusted to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government
officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government.
The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary
government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant,
issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with
respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioner’s
witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside from the weapons,
were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.

Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know
the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?

A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why they also brought the
other items not included in the search warrant was because the money and other jewelries were contained in attaché
cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attaché
cases and the steel safes were containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out that they
contained money.

xxx

Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized this money instead
of weapons?

A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also the money
because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that because they might be
suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor. 49

Cross-examination

Atty. Banaag

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the Municipal Trial Court
of Batangas, Branch 1?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and
five (5) boxes of ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx

AJ AMORES

Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.

Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or contraband which could
be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the communications equipment
and money. However, I did not include that in the application for search warrant considering that we have not
established concrete evidence about that. So when…

Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor. 50

xxx

Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many ammunition?

A. Forty, sir.

Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscal’s office who charged Elizabeth
Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know what happened to that case?

A. I think it was dismissed, sir.

Q. In the fiscal’s office?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the name of
Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?

A. I think that was the reason, sir.

Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did
you seize the jewelries?

A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the jewelries and other
items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not really know their
reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken because they might get lost if they will just leave
this behind.

xxx

Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search warrant?

A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be contained in attaché
cases.  These attaché cases were suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the course
1âwphi1
of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader also decided to take this considering that they
believed that if they will just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.

Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like Transfer Certificates
of Title of lands?

A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened. 51

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe
these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize
these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the
52 

raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they
53 

must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the
lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and
withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18
November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for
such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139465           January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.

MELO, J.:

The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-à-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government.
His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield
him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the
government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful
guardian of the fundamental writ.

The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:

On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded
on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the
state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the
Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries;
and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.

On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate,
by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its
concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the
documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
requested state resident in the Requesting State).

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No.
0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the
Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District
of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent
appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):

A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum
Penalty — 5 years on each count);

B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each
count);

D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty — less
than one year).

(p. 14, Rollo.)

On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel
began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof.
The panel found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request
and that there are some other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated
July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as
well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request
after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on
the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.

Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the
United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.

In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by
private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:

1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the
United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition
documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article
7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary
requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and
admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069.

Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to
preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements
 under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.

It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished
by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose
any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents.

2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents
obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States
had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand
jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr.
Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In
this particular extradition request the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Department's denial of your request is
consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The
Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.

3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition
request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that
"[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith".
Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of
accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)

Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private
respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or
oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to
set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the
extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with
an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).

The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said
regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.

After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf,
moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.

On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to
maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further
proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner;
from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the
extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of
this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the
counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are,
likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or
before said date.
 SO ORDERED.

(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)

Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:

I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED

OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR
A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN
EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF
THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;

II.

PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE
EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;

III.

THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND

IV.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT,

AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.

(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)

On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a
temporary restraining order (TRO) providing:

NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondent
Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead
are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued
by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.

GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th
day of August 1999.

(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)

The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective
memoranda.

From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of
these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the
pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic
due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial
court, moot and academic (the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative
resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing
petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court.
Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage
of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of
the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a
breach, is there any conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty?

The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the
case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684,
particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the
trial court.

To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed
only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also
called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree
relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:

The Extradition Request

The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
and shall be accompanied by:

1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of
the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal
force;

2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity
of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time
and place of the commission of these acts;

3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or description of
the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and

4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.

(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides

. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of
this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents
to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take
charge of the case.

The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of
the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?

In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must
ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
 1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location of the
person sought;

2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;

3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which extradition
is requested;

4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense;

5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of
punishment for the offense;

6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article,
as applicable.

(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his arrest
and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;

8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and

9. A copy of the charging document.

(Paragraph 3, ibid.)

The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents received in
support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident
in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department
of Foreign Affairs).

In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority
of the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense
which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation."

The Extradition Petition

Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are
sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D.
No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or
city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).

The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable,
issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in
the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the
accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the
prospective extraditee.

The Extradition Hearing

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special
proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the
provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the
proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the
case may, upon application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons
therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision
is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The
provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the
aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).

The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application
of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court
also determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3,
RP-US Extradition Treaty). 1âwphi1.nêt

With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the
nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?

A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition
petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the
latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3],
Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military
offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1],
Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.

However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the
Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of
Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly
evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of
Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply
forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign
Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the
completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid
down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although
the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over
them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this
stage where private respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting
papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to
present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the
filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.

The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the
other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a
manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to
evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.

Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly
reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the
request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the
field of law, could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How
then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is
not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such
stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency
of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents
the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August
31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be
characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an
administrative body's quasi-judicial power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts
based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon,
Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power,
which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This
power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or
entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records,
reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).

The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is
indispensable to prosecution.

In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an
investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to
investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise
of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose
for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if
the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment.

The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The
body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the
prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and
the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not
final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the
court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.

It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by
certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the
deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional
arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that
in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of
the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days
if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after
which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this
respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee
may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty),
for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his
possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the
pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).

Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is
not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.

Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency
conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical
assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective
extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence,
therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had
occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that
are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral
arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the
proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135;
Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).

In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to
administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a
licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if
found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the
revocation of one's license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.

Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was
filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result
in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the
nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court,
citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the
proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case,
such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute
that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does
not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.

The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is
this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based
on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over
property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and
beyond recompense.

By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign
country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is
akin to a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result — the arrest and imprisonment of
the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary
investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and
to the deprivation of his liberty.

Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the
extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is
not authority for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The
characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law.
It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.

As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the
general public good, which regards and preserved these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due
process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed
non-compliance with treaty commitments.

The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective
citizens.

The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language
and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the
spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and
resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from
earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due
process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress
and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer
to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the
course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).

Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law
in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of
the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent
tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).

True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and
civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the
proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they
may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz,
Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).

In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the
complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant.

These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:

1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative
charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters
showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and
the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;

2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from
enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the
summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary
appointee; and

3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?

Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that
the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.

American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition
Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, §2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or
extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition
Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to
effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime
(31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand
must be in proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face
of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense
charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that
prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The
extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and
documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrument charging the person demanded
with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to
said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the
government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate
copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments
accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is
directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410,
citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).

In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the
Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular
officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).

In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from
the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles,
which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty),
federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:

1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the
provincial arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S.
Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is
transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.

2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of Justice.
Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been
made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal
representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2
thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures
admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.

3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18
U.S.C. §3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in
support of the extradition request (Ibid.)

4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country.
The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the
hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and
(c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he committed the
offenses charged (Ibid.)

5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a
"complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of
the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is
noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the
character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or
innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]

6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations
in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this
certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate
decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. §3186).

7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the requesting
government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present whatever information
he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an
individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity — the
Department of State — which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning,
and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability.
In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request,
and having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department
of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs,
in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of
evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for
extradition.

Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be
extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's
primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process.

We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:

The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest
worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in
particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.

(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)

The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right — that of liberty —
secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the
altar of expediency.

(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)

In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the
end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the
means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need,
subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration
to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as
against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).

There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be
effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always
incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a
disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."

Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in
the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state
may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close
evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly
jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of
the requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful
examination of the extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the
requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the
extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction
to effect the extradition.

In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the
requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition
papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly
authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the
lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation,
which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a
proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with?

Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity
and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the
other, it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant
of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential
Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even
during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing
law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.

Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved
aside.

Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which
reads:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to
information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general
right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the
right of access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may
be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise
that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government
(Ibid.).

Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under
the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public
concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with public interest
and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected
by the matters requested, invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly
affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.

The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the
conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and
any citizen has "standing".

When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct bearing on his life,
and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in
a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be
contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.

In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the U.S.
Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to
matters of foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional
provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition of a
Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the
proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own
government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the
extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have
already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be
forthcoming.

We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's
entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties
of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really
a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?

First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to
the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.

The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the
parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a
treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war
as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the
doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action is
needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p.
12).

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute
of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law
in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to
be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be
upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
[1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been
made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal
law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the
principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In
states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these
two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the
two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by
Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and
during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition
procedures also manifests this silence.

Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure
as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.

We disagree.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due
process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the
Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures
on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective
extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he
does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).

Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys.
The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make
available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court
concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil
of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.

A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in
jurisprudence for an application by analogy.

Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both
procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a
provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20,
Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this
imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of
the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available
during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since
Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which
provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting
foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceeding is
an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of
(Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1
[1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer
vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the
law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not
tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the
Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the
Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential
Decree No. 1069?

Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA
661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary
proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in
Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and
Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be
charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although
summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due
process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:

. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be
removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an
employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the
employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural
requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on
due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or
malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses
against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . .

(at p. 671)

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the
respondent.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment,
but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of
petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily
comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality,"
may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell &
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due
process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would
not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of
liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he
must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner
is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684
having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Puno, J., please see dissent.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J., please see my dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., I join the dissents of Puno and Panganiban, JJ.
Quisumbing, J., with concurring opinion.
Pardo, J., I join J. Puno & J. Panganiban.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., I join the dissent of Justices Puno & Panganiban.
Ynares-Santiago, J., please see separate concurring opinion.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

The only real issue before the Court, I would take it, is whether or not private respondent can validly ask for copies of
pertinent documents while the application for extradition against him is still undergoing process by the Executive
Department.

There is, I agree with the majority, a right of access to such extradition documents conformably with the provisions of
Article III, Section 7, of the Philippine Constitution. The constitutional right to free access to information of public
1 

concern is circumscribed only by the fact that the desired information is not among the species exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guaranty and that the exercise of the right conforms with such reasonable conditions
as may be prescribed by law.

There is no hornbook rule to determine whether or not an information is of public concern. The term "public concern"
eludes exactitude, and it can easily embrace a broad spectrum of matters which the public may want to know either
because the subject thereof can affect their lives or simply because it arouses concern. 2

I am not convinced that there is something so viciously wrong with, as to deny, the request of private respondent to be
furnished with copies of the extradition documents.

I add. The constitutional right to due process secures to everyone an opportunity to be heard, presupposing
foreknowledge of what he may be up against, and to submit any evidence that he may wish to proffer in an effort to
clear himself. This right is two-pronged — substantive and procedural due process — founded, in the first instance, on
Constitutional or statutory provisions, and in the second instance, on accepted rules of procedure. Substantive due
3 

process looks into the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the law that figures to interfere with the right of a person to his
life, liberty and property. Procedural due process — the more litigated of the two — focuses on the rules that are
established in order to ensure meaningful adjudication in the enforcement and implementation of the law. Like "public
concern," the term due process does not admit of any restrictive definition. Justice Frankfurter has viewed this flexible
concept, aptly I believe, as being ". . . compounded by history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout
confidence in the democratic faith." The framers of our own Constitution, it would seem, have deliberately intended, to
4 

make it malleable to the ever-changing milieu of society. Hitherto, it is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application that makes it appropriate to accept an enlarged concept of the term as and when
there is a possibility that the right of an individual to life, liberty and property might be diffused. Verily, whenever there is
5 

an imminent threat to the life, liberty or property of any person in any proceeding conducted by or under the auspices of
the State, his right to due process of law, when demanded, must not be ignored.

A danger to the liberty of the extraditee, the private respondent, is real. Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America provides that in
case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person prior to the presentation of the
request for extradition. I see implicit in this provision that even after the request for extradition is made and before a
petition for extradition is filed with the courts, the possibility of an arrest being made on the basis of a mere evaluation
by the Executive on the request for extradition by the foreign State cannot totally be discounted.

The conclusion reached by the majority, I hasten to add, does not mean that the Executive Department should be
impeded in its evaluation of the extradition request. The right of the extraditee to be furnished, upon request, with a
copy of the relevant documents and to file his comment thereon is not necessarily anathema to the proceedings duly
mandated by the treaty to be made.

I vote to deny the petition.

KAPUNAN, J., separate concurring opinion;

I vote to dismiss the petition, both on technical and substantial grounds.

The petition in the case at bar raises one and only issue, which is the validity of the Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) issued by respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion on August 9, 1999 in Civil Case No. 99-94684. The TRO directed
respondents in said case to:

. . . maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further
proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner;
from filing the corresponding Petition with the Regional Trial Court; and from performing any act directed to the
extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty days from the service on respondents of
this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court. (Emphasis ours.)
1 

The petition itself categorically states that "(t)he issue sought to be presented and litigated here is solely-the validity of
the TRO." 2

Notably, there is no allegation in the petition that respondent Judge is without jurisdiction to hear the case below or that
he has exceeded his jurisdiction in hearing the same. Nor is there any other act, ruling, order, or decision, apart from
the TRO already mentioned, of respondent Judge that is being challenged in the petition before us.

Since, as alleged in the petition, a copy of the TRO was served on respondents below on August 10, 1999, the TRO
ceased to be effective on August 30, 1999; consequently, the instant petition has become moot and academic. This
Court does not exercise jurisdiction over cases which are moot and academic or those not ripe for judicial
consideration. 3

Assuming that the present case has not become moot and academic, still, it should be dismissed for lack of merit.

The substantive issues raised in this case are: (a) whether a person whose extradition is sought by a foreign state has
due process rights under Section 2, Article III of the 1997 Constitution before the Department of Justice as the request
for extradition is being evaluated, or whether due process rights maybe invoked only upon the filing of a petition for
extradition before a regional trial court; and (b) whether or not private respondent has a right of access to extradition
documents under Section 7, Article III of the 1997 Constitution.

Petitioner contends that due process rights such as the right to be informed of the basis of the request for extradition
and to have an opportunity to controvert are not provided in the extradition treaty or in P.D. 1069 and therefore does not
exist in this stage of the proceedings. Further, he argues that the documents sought to be furnished to private
respondent only involve private concerns, and not matters of public concern to which the people have a constitutional
right to access.

While the evaluation process conducted by the Department of Justice is not exactly a preliminary investigation of
criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person
sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his
family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away
from him — a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have
access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them.
While the extradition treaty and P.D. 1069 do not provide for a preliminary investigation, neither does either prohibit it.
The right to due process is a universal basic right which is deemed written into our laws and treaties with foreign
countries.

Like a preliminary investigation, the evaluation by the Department of Justice of the extradition request and its
accompanying documents is to establish probable cause and to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution.

In this connection, it should be stressed that the evaluation procedure of the extradition request and its accompanying
documents by the Department of Justice cannot be characterized as a mere "ex-parte technical assessment of the
sufficiency" thereof. The function and responsibilities of the Department of Justice in evaluating the extradition papers
involve the exercise of judgment. They involve a determination whether the request for extradition conforms fully to the
requirements of the extradition treaty and whether the offense is extraditable. These include, among others, whether
the offense for which extradition is requested is a political or military offense (Article 3); whether the documents and
other informations required under Article 7(2) have been provided (Article 7); and whether the extraditable offense is
punishable under the laws of both contracting parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year (Article
2). Consequently, to arrive at a correct judgment, the parties involved are entitled to be heard if the requirements of due
process and equal protection are to be observed.

With respect to petitioner's claim that private respondent has no right to demand access to the documents relating to
the request for extradition, suffice it to say, that any document used in a proceeding that would jeopardize a person's
constitutional rights is matter of public concern. As Martin Luther King said, "injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere," so any violation of one's rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is everybody's concern because they, one
way or another, directly or indirectly, affect the rights of life and liberty of all the citizens as a whole.

Due process rights in a preliminary investigation is now an established principle. The respondent has a right of access
to all of the evidence. He has the right to submit controverting evidence. The prosecuting official who conducts the
preliminary investigation is required to be neutral, objective, and impartial in resolving the issue of probable cause. I see
no reason why the same rights may not be accorded a person sought to be extradited at the stage where the
Department of Justice evaluates whether a petition for extradition would be filed before a regional trial court. If denied
such rights, not only denial of due process rights but of equal protection may be raised.

It is suggested that after a petition for extradition is filed with a regional trial court, the person sought to be extradited
may exercise all due process rights. He may then have access to all the records on the basis of which the request for
extradition has been made. He may controvert that evidence and raise all defenses he may consider appropriate. That,
it is urged, meets the due process requirement.

But why must he wait until the petition for extradition is filed? As succinctly expressed, if the right to notice and hearing
is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be
prevented. Like the filing of an information in a criminal case, the mere filing of a petition for extradition causes
4 

immediate impairment of the liberty of the person sought to be extradited and a substantial curtailment of other rights.
His arrest may be immediately ordered by the regional trial court. He would be compelled to face an open and public
trial. He will be constrained to seek the assistance of counsel and incur other expenses of litigation. The public eye
would be directed at him with all the concomitant intrusions to his right to privacy. Where the liberty of a person is at
risk, and extradition strikes at the very core of liberty, invocation of due process rights can never be too early.

QUISUMBING, J., concurring opinion;

As I concur in the result reached by the ponencia of Justice Melo, may I just add my modest observations.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. Stated otherwise, the constitutionally
mandated duties of our government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding
obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of
the land.

For this primordial reason, I vote to DENY the petition.

Moreover, considering that the Extradition Treaty between the USA and Philippines appears mute on the specific issue
before us, the Court — in the exercise of its judicial power to find and state what the law is — has this rare opportunity
of setting a precedent that enhances respect for human rights and strengthens due process of law.

As both majority and dissenting colleagues in the Court will recognize, American authorities follow two tracks in
extradition proceedings: (1) the interstate practice where, pursuant to statute, the state Executive upon demand
furnishes the would be extraditee or counsel copies of pertinent documents as well as the request for extradition; and
(2) the international practice where the Executive department need not initially grant notice and hearing at all. Rules of
reciprocity and comity, however, should not bar us from applying internationally now what appears the more reasonable
and humane procedure, that is, the interstate practice among Americans themselves. For in this case the American
people should be among the most interested parties.

Truly, what private respondent is asking our Executive department (notice, copies of documents, and the opportunity to
protect himself at the earliest time against probable peril) does not, in my view, violate our Extradition Treaty with the
USA. His request if granted augurs well for transparency in interstate or intergovernmental relations rather than secrecy
which smacks of medieval diplomacy and the inquisition discredited long ago.

That private respondent is a Filipino citizen is not decisive of the issue here, although it is obviously pertinent. Even if
he were a resident alien (other than American perhaps), he is, in my view, entitled to our full protection against the
hazards of extradition (or deportation, similarly) from the very start. More so because, looking at the facts adduced at
the hearing and on the record of this case, the charges against him involve or are co-mingled with, if not rooted in,
certain offenses of a political nature or motivation such as the ones involving alleged financial contributions to a major
American political party. If so, long established is the principle that extradition could not be utilized for political offenses
or politically motivated charges.

There may, of course, be other charges against private respondent in the USA. But then they are, in my view, already
tainted there with political color due to the highly charged partisan campaign atmosphere now prevailing. That private
respondent's cases will be exploited as political fodder there is not far-fetched, hence the need here for cautious but
comprehensive deliberation on the matter at bar. For, above all, it is not only a Treaty provision we are construing; it is
about constitutional and human rights we are most concerned.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring opinion;

I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Jose A.R. Melo with its conceptive analysis of a citizen's right to be given what is
due to him. I join in his exposition of this Court's constitutional duty to strike the correct balance between overwhelming
Government power and the protection of individual rights where only one person is involved.

However, I am constrained to write this short concurrence if only to pose the question of why there should be any
debate at all on a plea for protection of one's liberty which, if granted, will not result in any meaningful impediment of
thwarting any state policy and objectives.

I see no reason why respondent Mark Jimenez, or other citizens not as controversial or talked about, should first be
exposed to the indignity, expense, and anxiety of a public denunciation in court before he may be informed of what the
contracting states in an extradition treaty have against him. There is no question that everything which respondent
Jimenez now requests will be given to him during trial. Mr. Jimenez is only petitioning that, at this stage, he should be
informed why he may be deported from his own country.
I see no ill effects which would arise if the extradition request and supporting documents are shown to him now, instead
of later.

Petitioner Secretary of Justice states that his action on the extradition request and its supporting documents will merely
determine whether or not the Philippines is complying with its treaty obligations. He adds that, therefore, the
constitutional rights of an accused in all criminal prosecutions are not available to the private respondent.

The July 13, 1999 reply-letter from petitioner states the reasons why he is denying respondent Jimenez's requests. In
short, the reasons are:

1. In evaluating the documents, the Department merely determines whether the procedures and requirements
under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutional
rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are, therefore, not available.

2. The United States Government has requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure
of certain grand jury information.

3. The petitioner cannot hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. For extradition
to be an effective tool of criminal law enforcement, requests for surrender of accused or convicted persons must
be processed expeditiously.

I respectfully submit that any apprehensions in the Court arising from a denial of the petition — "breach of an
international obligation, rupture of states relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment, and a plethora of
other equally undesirable consequences" — are more illusory than real. Our country is not denying the extradition of a
person who must be extradited. Not one provision of the extradition treaty is violated. I cannot imagine the United
States taking issue over what, to it, would be a minor concession, perhaps a slight delay, accorded in the name of
human rights. On the other hand, the issue is fundamental in the Philippines. A citizen is invoking the protection, in the
context of a treaty obligation, of rights expressly guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution.

Until proved to be a valid subject for extradition, a person is presumed innocent or not covered by the sanctions of
either criminal law or international treaty. At any stage where a still prospective extraditee only seeks to know so that he
can prepare and prove that he should not be extradited, there should be no conflict over the extension to him of
constitutional protections guaranteed to aliens and citizens alike.

Petitioner cites as a reason for the denial of respondent's requests, Article 7 of the Treaty. Article 7 enumerates the
required documents and establishes the procedures under which the documents shall be submitted and admitted as
evidence. There is no specific provision on how that Secretary of Foreign Affairs should conduct his evaluation. The
Secretary of Justice is not even in the picture at this stage. Under petitioner's theory, silence in the treaty over a
citizen's rights during the evaluation stage is interpreted as deliberate exclusion by the contracting states of the right to
know. Silence is interpreted as the exclusion of the right to a preliminary examination or preliminary investigation
provided by the laws of either one of the two states.

The right to be informed of charges which may lead to court proceedings and result in a deprivation of liberty is
ordinarily routine. It is readily available to one against whom the state's coercive power has already been focused. I fail
to see how silence can be interpreted as exclusion. The treaty is silent because at this stage, the preliminary procedure
is still an internal matter. And when a law or treaty is silent, it means a right or privilege may be granted. It is not the
other way around.

The second reason alleging the need for secrecy and confidentiality is even less convincing. The explanation of
petitioner is self-contradictory. On one hand, petitioner asserts that the United States Government requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of certain information. On the other hand, petitioner declares
that the United States has already secured orders from concerned District Courts authorizing the disclosure of the
same grand jury information to the Philippine Government and its law enforcement personnel.

Official permission has been given. The United States has no cause to complain about the disclosure of information
furnished to the Philippines.
Moreover, how can grand jury information and documents be considered confidential if they are going to be introduced
as evidence in adversely proceedings before a trial court? The only issue is whether or not Mr. Jimenez should be
extradited. His innocence or guilt of any crime will be determined in an American court. It is there where prosecution
strategies will be essential. If the Contracting States believed in a total non-divulging of information prior to court
hearings, they would have so provided in the extradition treaty. A positive provision making certain rights unavailable
cannot be implied from silence.

I cannot believe that the United States and the Philippines with identical constitutional provisions on due process and
basic rights should sustain such a myopic view in a situation where the grant of a right would not result in any serious
setbacks to criminal law enforcement.

It is obvious that any prospective extraditee wants to know if his identity as the person indicated has been established.
Considering the penchant of Asians to adopt American names when in America, the issue of whether or not the
prospective extraditee truly is the person charged in the United States becomes a valid question. It is not only identity of
the person which is involved. The crimes must also be unmistakably identified and their essential elements clearly
stated.

There are other preliminary matters in which respondent is interested. I see nothing in our laws or in the Treaty which
prohibits the prospective extraditee from knowing until after the start of trial whether or not the extradition treaty applies
to him.

Paraphrasing Hasmin vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216; Trocio vs. Manta, 118 SCRA 241 (1941); and Salonga vs. Hon. Paño,
134 SCRA 438 (1985), the purpose of a preliminary evaluation is to secure an innocent person against hasty, faulty
and, therefore, oppressive proceedings; to protect him from an open and extensively publicized accusation of crimes; to
spare him the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial; and also to protect the state from useless and expensive
trails. Even if the purpose is only to determine whether or not the respondent is a proper subject for extradition, he is
nonetheless entitled to the guarantees of fairness and freedom accorded to those charged with ordinary crimes in the
Philippines.

The third reason given by petitioner is the avoidance of delay. Petitioner views the request to be informed as part of
undesirable delaying tactics. This is most unfortunate. Any request for extradition must be viewed objectively and
impartially without any predisposition to granting it and, therefore, hastening the extradition process.

In the first place, any assistance which the evaluating official may get from the participation of respondent may well
point out deficiencies and insufficiencies in the extradition documents. It would incur greater delays if these are
discovered only during court trial. On the other hand, if, from respondent's participation, the evaluating official discovers
a case of mistaken identity, insufficient pleadings, inadequate complaints, or any ruinous shortcoming, there would be
no delays during trial. An unnecessary trial with all its complications would be avoided.

The right to be informed is related to the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The constitutional guarantee extends to
the speedy disposition of cases before all quasi-judicial and administrative bodies (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16).
Speedy disposition, however, does not mean the deliberate exclusion of the defendant or respondent from the
proceedings. As this Court rules in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970), "the right to a speedy trial, means
one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent
person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt (in this case,
his being extradited) determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose."

The right to be informed and the right to a preliminary hearing are not merely for respondent. They also serve the
interests of the State.
1âwphi1.nêt

In closing, I maintain that the paramount consideration of guaranteeing the constitutional rights of individual respondent
override the concerns of petitioner. There should be no hurried or indifferent effort to routinely comply with all requests
for extradition. I understand that this is truer in the United States than in other countries. Proposed extraditees are given
every legal protection available from the American justice system before they are extradited. We serve under a
government of limited powers and inalienable rights. Hence, this concurrence.
 

PUNO, J., dissenting opinion;

If the case at bar was strictly a criminal case which involves alone the right of an accused to due process, I would have
co-signed the ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Jose A.R. Melo, without taking half a pause. But the
case at bar does not involve the guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at
stake is our government's international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried
for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction. The issues are of first impression and the majority opinion
dangerously takes us to unknown shoals in constitutional and international laws, hence this dissenting opinion.

Extradition is a well-defined concept and is more a problem in international law. It is the "process by which persons
charged with or convicted of crime against the law of a State and found in a foreign State are returned by the latter to
the former for trial or punishment. It applies to those who are merely charged with an offense but have not been brought
to trial; to those who have been tried and convicted and have subsequently escaped from custody; and those who have
been convicted in absentia. It does not apply to persons merely suspected of having committed an offense but against
who no charge has been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as a witness or for obtaining or enforcing a civil
judgment." The definition covers the private respondent who is charged with two (2) counts of conspiracy to commit
1 

offense or to defraud the United States, four (4) counts of attempt to evade or defeat tax, two (2) counts of fraud by
wire, radio or television, six (6) counts of false statements or entries and thirty-three (33) counts of election
contributions in the name of another. There is an outstanding warrant of arrest against the private respondent issued by
the US District Court, Southern District of Florida.

A brief review of the history of extradition law will illumine our labor. Possibly the most authoritative commentator on
extradition today, M. Cherif Bassiouni, divides the history of extradition into four (4) periods: "(1) ancient times to
seventeenth century — a period revealing almost exclusive concern for political and religious offenders; (2) the
eighteenth century and half of the nineteenth century — a period of treaty-making chiefly concerned with military
offenders characterizing the condition of Europe during that period; (3) from 1833 to 1948 — a period of collective
concern in suppressing common criminality; and (4) post-1948 developments which ushered in a greater concern for
protecting the human rights of persons and revealed an awareness of the need to have international due process of law
regulate international relations."
2

It is also rewarding to have a good grip on the changing slopes in the landscape of extradition during these different
periods. Extradition was first practiced by the Egyptians, Chinese, Chaldeans and Assyro-Babylonians but their basis
for allowing extradition was unclear. Sometimes, it was granted due to pacts; at other times, due to plain good
will. The classical commentators on international law thus focused their early views on the nature of the duty to
3 

surrender an extraditee — whether the duty is legal or moral in character. Grotius and de Vattel led the school of
thought that international law imposed a legal duty called civitas maxima to extradite criminals. In sharp contrast,
4 

Puffendorf and Billot led the school of thought that the so-called duty was but an "imperfect obligation which could
become enforceable only by a contract or agreement between states. 5

Modern nations tilted towards the view of Puffendorf and Billot that under international law there is no duty to extradite
in the absence of treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral. Thus, the US Supreme Court in US v. Rauscher, held: ". . . . it
6 

is only in modern times that the nations of the earth have imposed upon themselves the obligation of delivering up
these fugitives from justice to the states where their crimes were committed, for trial and punishment. This has been
done generally by treaties . . . Prior to these treaties, and apart from them there was no well-defined obligation on one
country to deliver up such fugitives to another; and though such delivery was often made it was upon the principle of
comity . . ."

Then came the long and still ongoing debate on what should be the subject of international law. The 20th century saw
the dramatic rise and fall of different types and hues of authoritarianism — the fascism of Italy's Mussolini and
Germany's Hitler, the militarism of Japan's Hirohito and the communism of Russia's Stalin, etc. The sinking of these
isms led to the elevation of the rights of the individual against the state. Indeed, some species of human rights have
already been accorded universal recognition. Today, the drive to internationalize rights of women and children is also
7 

on high gear. The higher rating given to human rights in the hierarchy of values necessarily led to the re-examination of
8 

rightful place of the individual in international law. Given the harshest eye is the moss-covered doctrine
that international law deals only with States and that individuals are not its subject. For its undesirable corrally is the
sub-doctrine that an individual's right in international law is a near cipher. Translated in extradition law, the view that
once commanded a consensus is that since a fugitive is a mere object and not a subject of international law, he is
bereft of rights. An extraditee, so it was held, is a mere "object transported from one state to the other as an exercise of
the sovereign will of the two states involved." The re-examination consigned this pernicious doctrine to the museum of
9 

ideas. The new thinkers of international law then gave a significant shape to the role and rights of the individual in
10 

state-concluded treaties and other international agreements. So it was declared by then US Ambassador Philip C.
Jessup in audible italics: "A very large part of international affairs and, thus, of the process of international
accommodation, concerns the relations between legal persons known as states. This is necessarily so. But it is no
longer novel for the particular interest of the human being to break through the mass of interstate relationship." The
11 

clarion call to re-engineer a new world order whose dominant interest would transcend the parochial confines of
national states was not unheeded. Among the world class scholars who joined the search for the elusive ideological
underpinnings of a new world order were Yale Professor Myres McDougal and Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano. In their
seminal work. Law and Minimum World Public Order, they suggested that the object of the new world should be "to
obtain in particular situations and in the aggregate flow of situations the outcome of a higher degree of conformity with
the security goals of preservation, deterrence, restoration, rehabilitation and reconstruction of all societies comprising
the world community." Needless to stress, all these prescient theses accelerated the move to recognize certain rights
12 

of the individual in international law.

We have yet to see the final and irrevocable place of individual rights, especially the rights of an extraditee, in the realm
of international law. In careful language, Bassiouni observes that today, "institutionalized conflicts between states are
still rationalized in terms of sovereignty, national interest, and national security, while human interests continue to
have limited, though growing impact on the decision-making processes which translate national values and goals into
specific national and international policy."
13

I belabor the international law aspect of extradition as the majority opinion hardly gives it a sideglance. It is my humble
submission that the first consideration that should guide us in the case at bar is that a bilateral treaty — the RP-US
Extradition Treaty — is the subject matter of the litigation. In our constitutional scheme, the making of a treaty belongs
to the executive and legislative departments of our government. Between these two departments, the executive has a
greater say in the making of a treaty. Under Section 21, Article VII of our Constitution, the President has the sole
power to negotiate treaties and international agreements although to be effective, they must be concurred in by at least
two thirds of all the members of the Senate. Section 20 of the same Article empowers the President to contract or
guarantee foreign loans with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. Section 16 of the same Article gives the
President the power to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. In addition, the President has the power to deport undesirable aliens. The concentration
of these powers in the person of the President is not without a compelling consideration. The conduct of foreign
relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the nation especially in
times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the best available
information and can decide with decisiveness. Beyond debate, the President is the single most powerful official in our
land for Section 1 of Article VII provides that "the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines,"
whereas Section 1 of Article VI states that "the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives . . . except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum," while Section 1 of Article VIII provides that "judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." Thus, we can see that executive power is
vested in the President alone whereas legislative and judicial powers are shared and scattered. It is also the President
who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign countries for our
diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited
access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the
14 

President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay,
validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an
international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of
other problems with equally undesirable consequences.

These are some of the dominant policy considerations in international law that the Court must balance against the
claim of the private respondent that he has a right to be given the extradition documents against him and to comment
thereon even while they are still at the evaluation stage by the petitioner Secretary of Justice, an alter ego of the
President. The delicate questions of what constitutional rights and to what degree they can be claimed by an extraditee
do not admit of easy answers and have resulted in discrete approaches the world over. On one end of the pole is the
15 
more liberal European approach. The European Court of Human Rights embraces the view that an extraditee is entitled
to the benefit of all relevant provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. It has held that ". . . in so far as a measure of the extradition has consequences adversely
affecting the enjoyment of a convention right, it may, assuming that the consequences are not too remote, attract the
obligations of a Contracting State under the relevant convention guarantee." At the other end of the pole is the more
16 

cautious approach of the various Courts of Appeal in the United States. These courts have been more conservative in
light of the principle of separation of powers and their faith in the presumptive validity of executive decisions. By and
large, they adhere to the rule of non-inquiry under which the extraditing court refuses to examine the requesting
country's criminal justice system or consider allegations that the extraditee will be mistreated or denied a fair trial in that
country.17

The case at bar, I respectfully submit, does not involve an irreconcilable conflict between the RP-US Extradition Treaty
and our Constitution where we have to choose one over the other. Rather, it calls for a harmonization between said
treaty and our Constitution. To achieve this desirable objective, the Court should consider whether the constitutional
rights invoked by the private respondent have truly been violated and even assuming so, whether he will be denied
fundamental fairness. It is only when their violation will destroy the respondent's right to fundamental fairness that his
constitutional claims should be given primacy.

Given this balancing approach, it is my humble submission that considering all the facts and facets of the case, the
private respondent has not proved entitlement to the right he is claiming. The majority holds that the Constitution, the
RP-US extradition and P.D. No. 1069 do not prohibit respondent's claims, hence, it should be allowed. This is too
simplistic an approach. Rights do not necessarily arise from a vacuum. Silence of the law can even mean an implied
denial of a right. Also, constitutional litigations do not always involve a clear cut choice between right and wrong.
Sometimes, they involve a difficult choice between right against right. In these situations, there is need to balance the
contending rights and primacy is given to the right that will serve the interest of the nation at that particular time. In such
instances, the less compelling right is subjected to soft restraint but without smothering its essence. Proceeding from
this premise of relativism of rights, I venture the view that even assuming arguendo respondent's weak claim, still, the
degree of denial of private respondent's rights to due process and to information is too slight to warrant the interposition
of judicial power. As admitted in the ponencia itself, an extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is, thus, futile to
determine what it is. What is certain is that it is not a criminal proceeding where there is an accused who claim the
entire array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Let it be stressed that in an extradition proceeding, there is no
accused and the guilt or innocence of the extraditee will not be passed upon by our executive officials nor by the
extradition judge. Hence, constitutional rights that are only relevant do determine the guilt or innocence of an accused
cannot be invoked by an extraditee. Indeed, an extradition proceeding is summary in nature which is untrue of criminal
proceedings. Even the rules of evidence are different in an extradition proceeding. Admission of evidence is less
18 

stringent, again because the guilt of the extraditee is not under litigation. It is not only the quality but even the quantum
19 

of evidence in extradition proceeding is different. In a criminal case, an accused can only be convicted by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In an extradition proceeding, an extraditee can be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existed
20 

of a prima facie case." If more need be said, the nature of an extradition decision is different from a judicial decision
21 

whose finality cannot be changed by executive fiat. Our courts may hold an individual extraditable but the ultimate
22 

decision to extradite the individual lies in the hands of the Executive. Section 3, Article 3 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty specifically provides that "extradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State
determined that the request was politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation." In the United States, the Secretary of State exercises this ultimate power and is
conceded considerable discretion. He balances the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign
relations. In sum, he is not straitjacketed by strict legal considerations like an ordinary court.
23 

The type of issue litigated in extradition proceedings which does not touch on the guilt or innocence of the extraditee,
the limited nature of the extradition proceeding, the availability of adequate remedies in favor of the extraditee, and
the traditional leeway given to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs have compelled courts to put a high
threshold before considering claims of individuals that enforcement of an extradition treaty will violate their
constitutional rights. Exemplifying such approach is the Supreme Court of Canada which has adopted a highly
deferential standard that emphasizes international comity and the executive's experience in international matters. It 24 

continues to deny Canada's charter protection to extraditees unless the violation can be considered shocking to the
conscience.
In the case, at bar and with due respect, the ponencia inflates with too much significance the threat to liberty of the
private respondent to prop us its thesis that his constitutional rights to due process and access to information must
immediately be vindicated. Allegedly, respondent Jimenez stands in danger of provisional arrest, hence, the need for
him to be immediately furnished copies of documents accompanying the request for his extradition. Respondent's fear
of provisional arrest is not real. It is a self-imagined fear for the realities on the ground show that the United States
authorities have not manifested any desire to request for his arrest. On the contrary, they filed the extradition request
through the regular channel and, even with the pendency of the case at bar, they have not moved for respondent's
arrest on the ground of probable delay in the proceedings. To be sure, the issue of whether respondent Jimenez will be
provisionally arrested is now moot. Under Section 1 of Article 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, in relation to Section
20(a) of PD No. 1069, the general principle is enunciated that a request for provisional arrest must be made pending
receipt of the request for extradition. By filing the request for extradition, the US authorities have implicitly decided not
to move for respondent's provisional arrest. But more important, a request for respondent's arrest does not mean he
will be the victim of an arbitrary arrest. He will be given due process before he can be arrested. Article 9 of the treaty
provides:

PROVISIONAL ARREST

1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending
presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the
diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United States Department
of Justice.

2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:

a) a description of the person sought;

b) the location of the person sought, if known;

c) a brief statements of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and location of the offense;

d) a description of the laws violated;

e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or judgment of

conviction against the person sought; and

f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow.

3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its application and the reasons for
any denial.

4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the expiration of sixty (60) days
from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the executive authority of the Requested State has not received
the formal request for extradition and the supporting documents required in Article 7.

In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:

Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest. — (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty
or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending
receipt of the request for extradition made in accordance with Section 4 of this Decree.

(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila,
either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or telegraph.

(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his behalf shall upon receipt of
the request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused from the presiding judge of
the Court of First Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the warrant for
 the provisional arrest of the accused. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation through the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting state of the result of its request.

(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not received the
request for extradition and the documents mentioned in Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released
from custody.

The due process protection of the private-respondent against arbitrary arrest is written in cyrillic letters in these two (2)
related provisions. It is self-evident under these provisions that a request for provisional arrest does not mean it will be
granted ipso facto. The request must comply with certain requirements. It must be based on an "urgent" factor. This is
subject to verification and evaluation by our executive authorities. The request can be denied if not based on a real
exigency of if the supporting documents are insufficient. The protection of the respondent against arbitrary provisional
arrest does not stop on the administrative level. For even if the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation agrees
with the request for the provisional arrest of the respondent, still he has to apply for a judicial warrant from the
"presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of the province of city having jurisdiction of the place. . . . ." It
is a judge who will issue a warrant for the provisional arrest of the respondent. The judge has comply with Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution which provides that "no . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the . . . persons or things to be seized." The message that leaps to the eye is
that compliance with this requirements precludes any arbitrary arrest.

In light of all these considerations, I respectfully submit that denying respondent's constitutional claim to be furnished all
documents relating to the request for his extradition by the US authorities during their evaluation stage will not subvert
his right to fundamental fairness. It should be stressed that this is not a case where the respondent will not be given an
opportunity to know the basis of the request for his extradition. In truth, and contrary to the impression of the
majority, P.D. No. 1069 fixes the specific time when he will be given the papers constituting the basis for his extradition.
The time is when he is summoned by the extradition court and required to answer the petition for extradition. Thus,
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:

Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices. — (1) Immediately upon receipt

of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear
and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. He may issue a warrant for the immediate
arrest of the accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge
that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon
receipt of the answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the
hearing thereof.

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each
upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case.

Upon receipt of the summons and the petition, respondent is free to foist all defense available to him. Such an
opportunity does not deny him fairness which is the essence of due process of law.

Thus, with due respect, I submit that the ponencia failed to accord due importance to the international law aspect of an
extradition treaty as it unduly stressed its constitutional law dimension. This goes against the familiar learning that in
balancing the clashing interests involved in extradition treaty, national interest is more equal than the others. While
lately, humanitarian considerations are being factored in the equation, still the concept of extradition as a national act is
the guiding idea. Requesting and granting extradition remains a power and prerogative of the national government of a
State. The process still involves relations between international personalities. Needless to state, a more deferential
25 

treatment should be given to national interest than to individual interest. Our national interest in extraditing persons who
have committed crimes in a foreign country are succinctly expressed in the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1069, viz:

WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity
with all nations;
 WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed but also of any
other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps the foundation of social life and is an
outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the interest of civilized communities that crimes should not go
unpunished. . . . .

The increasing incidence of international and transnational crimes, the development of new technologies of death, and
the speed and scale of improvement of communication are factors which have virtually annihilated time and
distance. They make more compelling the vindication of national interest to insure that the punishment of criminals
should not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. This overriding national interest must be upheld as
against respondent's weak constitutional claims which in no way amount to denial of fundamental fairness.

At bottom, this case involves the respect that courts should accord to the Executive that concluded the RP-US
Extradition Treaty in the conduct of our foreign affairs. As early as 1800, the legendary John Marshall, then a
congressman, has opined that the power to extradite pursuant to a treaty rests in the executive branch as part of its
power to conduct foreign affairs. Courts have validated this forward-looking opinion in a catena of unbroken cases.
26 

They defer to the judgment of the Executive on the necessities of our foreign affairs and on its view of the requirements
of international comity. The deferential attitude is dictated by the robust reality that of the three great branches of our
government, it is the Executive that is most qualified to guide the ship of the state on the known and unknown
continents of foreign relations. It is also compelled by considerations of the principle of separation of powers for the
Constitution has clearly allocated the power to conduct our foreign affairs to the Executive. I respectfully submit that the
majority decision has weakened the Executive by allowing nothing less than an unconstitutional headbutt on the power
of the Executive to conduct our foreign affairs. The majority should be cautions in involving this Court in the conduct of
the nation's foreign relations where the inviolable rule dictated by necessity is that the nation should speak with one
voice. We should not overlook the reality that courts by their nature, are ill-equipped to fully comprehend the foreign
policy dimension of a treaty, some of which are hidden in shadows and silhouettes.

I vote to grant the petition.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting opinion;

With due respect, I dissent.

The main issue before us is whether Private Respondent Mark B. Jimenez is entitled to the due process rights of notice
and hearing during the preliminary or evaluation stage of the extradition proceeding against him.

Two Staged in Extradition

There are essentially two stages in extradition proceedings: (1) the preliminary or evaluation stage, whereby the
executive authority of the requested state ascertains whether the extradition request is supported by the documents
and information required under the Extradition Treaty; and (2) the extradition hearing, whereby the petition for
extradition is heard before a court of justice, which determines whether the accused should be extradited.

The instant petition refers only to the first stage. Private respondent claims that he has a right to be notified and to be
heard at this early stage. However, even the ponencia admits that neither the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor PD 1069
(the Philippine Extradition Law) expressly requires the Philippine government, upon receipt of the request for
extradition, to give copies thereof and its supporting documents to the prospective extraditee, much less to give him an
opportunity to be heard prior to the filing of the petition in court.

Notably, international extradition proceedings in the United States do not include the grant by the executive authority of
notice and hearing to the prospective extraditee at this initial stage. It is the judge or magistrate who is authorized to
issue a warrant of arrest and to hold a hearing to consider the evidence submitted in support of the extradition request.
In contrast, in interstate rendition, the governor must, upon demand, furnish the fugitive or his attorney copies of the
request and its accompanying documents, pursuant to statutory provisions. In the Philippines, there is no similar
1 

statutory provision.

Evaluation Stage Essentially Ministerial

The evaluation stage simply involves the ascertainment by the foreign affairs secretary of whether the extradition
request is accompanied by the documents stated in paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the Treaty, relating to the identity
and the probable location of the fugitive; the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case; provisions of
the law describing the essential elements of the offense charged and the punishment therefor; its prescriptive period;
such evidence as would provide probable cause for the arrest and the committal for trial of the fugitive; and copies of
the warrant or order of arrest and charging document. The foreign affairs secretary also sees to it that these
accompanying documents have been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippines in the
United States, and that they are in English language or have English translations. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Treaty, he
also determines whether the request is politically motivated, and whether the offense charged is a military offense not
punishable under non-military penal legislation. 2

Upon a finding of the secretary of foreign affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient
and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the justice secretary, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case. The lawyer designated shall then file a
written petition with the proper regional trial court, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under
consideration.3

When the Right to Notice and Hearing Becomes Available

According to private Respondent Jimenez, his right to due process during the preliminary stage emanates from our
Constitution, particularly Section 1, Article III thereof, which provides:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

He claims that this right arises immediately, because of the possibility that he may be provisionally arrested pursuant to
Article 9 of the RP-US Treaty, which reads:

In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending
presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the
diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United States Department
of Justice.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Justice Melo's ponencia supports private respondent's contention. It states that there are two occasions wherein the
prospective extraditee may be deprived of liberty: (1) in case of a provisional arrest pending the submission of the
extradition request and (2) his temporary arrest during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. The second
4 

instance is not in issue here, because no petition has yet been filed in court.

However, the above-quoted Article 9 on provisional arrest is not automatically operative at all times, and in enforcement
does not depend solely on the discretion of the requested state. From the wordings of the provision itself, there are at
least three requisites: (1) there must be an urgency, and (2) there is a corresponding request (3) which must be made
prior to the presentation of the request for extradition.

In the instant case, there appears to be no urgency characterizing the nature of the extradition of private respondent.
Petitioner does not claim any such urgency. There is no request from the United States for the provisional arrest of
Mark Jimenez either. And the secretary of justice states during the Oral Argument that he had no intention of applying
for the provisional arrest of private respondent. Finally, the formal request for extradition has already been made;
5 

therefore, provisional arrest is not likely, as it should really come before the extradition request.
6

Mark Jimenez Not in Jeopardy of Arrest

Under the outlined facts of this case, there is no open door for the application of Article 9, contrary to the apprehension
of private respondent. In other words, there is no actual danger that Jimenez will be provisionally arrested or deprived
of his liberty. There is as yet no threat that his rights would be trampled upon, pending the filing in court of the petition
for his extradition. Hence, there is no substantial gain to be achieved in requiring the foreign affairs (or justice) secretary
to notify and hear him during the preliminary stage, which basically involves only the exercise of the ministerial power
of checking the sufficiency of the documents attached to the extradition request.

It must be borne in mind that during the preliminary stage, the foreign affairs secretary's determination of whether the
offense charged is extraditable or politically motivated is merely preliminary. The same issue will be resolved by the
trial court. Moreover, it is also the power and the duty of the court, not the executive authority, to determine whether
7 

there is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the extraditee committed the crimes charged. The 8 

sufficiency of the evidence of criminality is to be determined based on the laws of the requested state. Private
9 

Respondent Jimenez will, therefore, definitely have his full opportunity before the court, in case an extradition petition
will indeed be filed, to be heard on all issues including the sufficiency of the documents supporting the extradition
request.10

Private respondent insists that the United States may still request his provisional arrest at any time. That is purely
speculative. It is elementary that this Court does not declare judgments or grant reliefs based on speculations, surmises
or conjectures.

In any event, even granting that the arrest of Jimenez is sought at any time despite the assurance of the justice
secretary that no such measure will be undertaken, our local laws and rules of procedure respecting the issuance of a
warrant of arrest will govern, there being no specific provision under the Extradition Treaty by which such warrant
should issue. Therefore, Jimenez will be entitled to all the rights accorded by the Constitution and the laws to any
person whose arrest is being sought. 1âwphi1.nêt

The right of one state to demand from another the return of an alleged fugitive from justice and the correlative duty to
surrender the fugitive to the demanding country exist only when created by a treaty between the two countries.
International law does not require the voluntary surrender of a fugitive to a foreign government, absent any treaty
stipulation requiring it. When such a treaty does exist, as between the Philippines and the United States, it must be
11 

presumed that the contracting states perform their obligations under it with uberrimae fidei, treaty obligations being
essentially characterized internationally by comity and mutual respect.

The Need for Respondent Jimenez to Face Charges in the US

One final point. Private respondent also claims that from the time the secretary of foreign affairs gave due course to the
request for his extradition, incalculable prejudice has been brought upon him. And because of the moral injury caused,
he should be given the opportunity at the earliest possible time to stop his extradition. I believe that any moral injury
suffered by private respondent had not been caused by the mere processing of the extradition request. And it will not
cease merely by granting him the opportunity to be heard by the executive authority. The concrete charges that he has
allegedly committed certain offenses already exist. These charges have been filed in the United States and are part of
public and official records there. Assuming the existence of moral injury, the only means by which he can restore his
good reputation is to prove before the proper judicial authorities in the US that the charges against him are unfounded.
Such restoration cannot be accomplished by simply contending that the documents supporting the request for his
extradition are insufficient.

Conclusion

In the context of the factual milieu of private respondent, there is really no threat of any deprivation of his liberty at the
present stage of the extradition process. Hence, the constitutional right to due process — particularly the right to be
heard — finds no application. To grant private respondent's request for copies of the extradition documents and for an
opportunity to comment thereon will constitute "over-due process" and unnecessarily delay the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the Petition.