G.R. No.

100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for
prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from
further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and
received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said
notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of
North EDSA.1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls
should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-
complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the
CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of
the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and
convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the
CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the
private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to
"desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." 6

A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement
whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-
Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the
demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this
Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue,
Quezon City; . . . and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain
business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a
permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September
1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be
understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in
this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime
been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then
unresolved).10

In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.

On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to
dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.13

The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating
civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and
violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and
children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children,
who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.

In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this recourse.

The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution16 of 18
June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR
No. 90-1580."17

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners
at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The
latter thus filed its own comment,18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the
comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such
comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the
exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21

The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —
 (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human
rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims
of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the
Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In
Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,24 the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed
that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that
resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does
not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the
extent of CHR's investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could
at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of
the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants,
representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the
world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or
Indonesia . . . .
 Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of
religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect
public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights,
such as the right to an education, employment, and social services. 25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because
they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.27

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate
and inalienable.28

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to
include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term
to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable
rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific
provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the
country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental
law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the
Philippines,"29 observes:

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed
in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September
1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and
were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the
Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since
group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term
licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and
security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of resignation and were
dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies
like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986
deliberations:

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights and
also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights
legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation.
Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task,
hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.

So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill
of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right.
So, where do we draw the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights
advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to
life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are
considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights,
and these are precisely what we want to defend here.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this
right against torture.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other violations
of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the
commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the
jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which cover
civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the
particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we
have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at
the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as
human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?

MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of
that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human
rights?

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past
regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a
matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with
human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so
as not to confuse the issue?

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of
political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.

xxx xxx xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed
Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the
concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference
was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on,
this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.

If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other convention
which I do not remember. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which
we are signatory.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in
that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of
human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of amendments,
could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not
for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to
what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was
no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil
or a social right. It is not a civil right?

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be
envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair
and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is
limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals,
and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept
of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an international
instrument.

MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those that
pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights.

MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-
the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has
specified.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

 SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much we
need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not
pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate —
torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons who are allegedly guilty are
people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be
independent.

I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little
individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political
violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive
any response. . . .30 (emphasis supplied)

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on
Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a
person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures,
and imprisonment for debt.32

Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration
of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.34

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for
instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the
religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of
priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily
making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that
"Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into
account its recommendation."35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well
as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that,
the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent
danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been
violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its
revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance
with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to
apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To
exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly
withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a
semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking
through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction
on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of
the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ,
for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and
interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency
of government.37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition
is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the
disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case
before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant
petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further
proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204
SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The
Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to
maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order
maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary
shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the
civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR
has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and
results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and
vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR
should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.
 # Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204
SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The
Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to
maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order
maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary
shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the
civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR
has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and
results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and
vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR
should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 204819               April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS
IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion
S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez &
Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio
Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria
C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor &
Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita
Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho &
Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho,
Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro,
Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M.
BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON
WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato
Marcos, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal
capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in
his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G.
NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M .
Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap,
Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno
and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J.
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General,
National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G.
MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO
collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of
the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and
the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal
capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A.
MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA
ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE
VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a
state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy,
the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The
government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and
the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact
laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring
concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an
inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet
reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital
and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in
every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media.
From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep
division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors
of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that
its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-
intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their
personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others, 13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in
their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as
a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella
Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
 (12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat)
;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities
as citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against
abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH
Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health
problems.36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners,
the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate
ensuring religious freedom.37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and
2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical
specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with
the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. 40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an
affront to their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the
"clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and
the right to free speech.42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects
medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment.43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to
render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer
be able to avail of the practitioners services.44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it
makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than
promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor.45
 • The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of
imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation"
of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the
right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." 47 It
ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment.

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly
to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is
granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare
facility willing to perform the service or procedure. 48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any
real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of
their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental
authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives. 50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution. 52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level
and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No.
9054.54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of
the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan,
and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and
Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator
Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal
reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the
effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent
issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013,
and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until
further orders of the Court.63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several
questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64
 The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner." 65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-
conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of
provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person
without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population problem
should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and
tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An
Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned
that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to
space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8,
1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of
over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of
spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under that policy, the country gave
priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments
made in the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or
"The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for
women, including family planning and sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry
number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92
million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH
Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family
planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more
effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning
methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes
certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's
health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of
life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of
the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and
Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a
physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and
provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and
universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following
principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural
impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom
of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic
process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and
positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress. 77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern
Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the
validity of the acts of the legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced
and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the
RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure. 80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought
that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the
principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. 81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b) the executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of
powers among the three branches of government.85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper
restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the
Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution
are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect
the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the
line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative
branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the
Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction
as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is
simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive
branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their
respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations
of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
(to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the
definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation. 95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz :
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. 96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to
be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been
charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by
its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not
merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the
act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is
a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has
no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the
intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate
ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail
the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. 106 These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights
of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not
only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental
Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions
on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge"
lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet
to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in
establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he
asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of
the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing. 115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury
to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with
the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time
and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked.
The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may
not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially
the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must
be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the
freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and
reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions
raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life
of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to
be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population
control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124 and that the concepts of
"responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable. 125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus
of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children
healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods.
These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however,
covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the
central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-
natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna
Carta for Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections
and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the
title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a
liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of
the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act."129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally
sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion. 130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that
prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take
effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the
fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that
contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life. 131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use
contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or
supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective
patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes. 133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of
abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient"
reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public. 134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law.
As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and
other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only
when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various
studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is
constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent
upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the
enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male
vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to
promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years,
however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to
one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's
well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." 141 As will
be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should
not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the
individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no
unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life
begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held
in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable
and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization
that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents. 145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon
resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon.
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally
with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at
all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision,
the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the
following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x. 150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum
alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it
processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it
multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is
no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and
the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46
chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as
night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because of
doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized
ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception." 152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the
moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to
Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be
very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So
we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise
during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are
abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization
has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is
proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and
should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are
abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient. 154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal
protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In
fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence.155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action
prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life
of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured
of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of
these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again
for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no,"
not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does
it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which
actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception,"
what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments.
There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your
Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable
zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops." 160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that
human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a
new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and female
gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the
contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the
sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid
cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process,
fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed....
The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is
restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible
Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is
sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and
that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human
embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this
objective scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of
any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. 165 According
to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected." 167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and
46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it
would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation
of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to
prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This
intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by
the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to
make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from
the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to
protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction
or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive
health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the
enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have
children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination,
coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter
of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act
No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines
an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law,
first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces
the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an
abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests.
It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it
recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected
the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and
afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or
destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion.
To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine
wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the
RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in
the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as
an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. 171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that
the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included
in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used
as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills,
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning
of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health product,
whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from
being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word
"primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section
4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the
way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be
considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized
ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients
because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this,
together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable
conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the
primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a
manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting
abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively
"open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular
purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the
risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never
use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of
combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction. 177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and
"sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that
women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that
contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting
and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health,
manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and
their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per
se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not
prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no
intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with
the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives
since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician.
With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made
available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and
Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729
which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without
consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing
fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the
primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five
hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or
device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a
prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that
the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage
of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and
implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current
levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of
this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in
effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible
means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive
drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves
the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food
and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the
RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick
as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe
and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not
Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient.
The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from
the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not
mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those
who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil.
Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the
willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely
opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms
true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life." 188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives
violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a
conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector
the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the
patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do
without violating his/her religious beliefs.190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although
it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information -
no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures.
They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in
Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools
referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize. 191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care
service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the
act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to
disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-
bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care services
to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of
a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH
Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it
mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-
discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to
justify the impairment of religious freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible
parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine
and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide,
support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it
natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the
public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with
the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that what the law only prohibits are those
acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee
informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the
constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. 200 In other words, by
seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's
sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry. 201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it
being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is
required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional
in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient
accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an
opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition.
It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to
accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State. 204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics
and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on
contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and
religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious,
cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the
religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they
conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the
present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to
ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom,
love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a
people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect
the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. 205 Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards
religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-
versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the
internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate
against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision
utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which
metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular
objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions.
It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use
of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 207 Under this part of
religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus
forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed.
1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the
religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as
his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose
and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government
the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices. 210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two
parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the
same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the
rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare." 213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has
been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution." 215 In the same case, it was
further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not
to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.
"The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion." 216 "What is
sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218 Underlying the compelling
state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny. 219 In
Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause,
American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to
be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is
whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as
well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German
went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly
recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not
surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or
another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set
the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority
cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case
that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present
danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and
German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this
jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest"
test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects
may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over
the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is
an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such
higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a
government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere
balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling
interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a
compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state
interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state.
This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest"
test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be
preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the
support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to
one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee
of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the
nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood."
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective natural
and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding
support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing
laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious
convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies,
plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is
likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their
children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however,
the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can
or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor
can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the
RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes
simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the
Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions
commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law
to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest
test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor,
there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.
As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience. 222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health
providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly
what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's
thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the
protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the
religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. 224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the
other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health
providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from
compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be
violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater
Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion
Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions. 226 The Inner
House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would
actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if
it would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health
care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with
their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of
religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service
providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary 228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either
an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health
procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot
allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act
and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the
religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates
of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction
whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe
that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to
think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and,
thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of
the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law,
the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in
upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read,
I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health
professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others,
who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot
be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the
religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1]
demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the
burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of
a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to
his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the
Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a
conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation
involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship
between medical doctors and their patients.231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors,
however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one
believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's
belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject
provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is
contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she
even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and
occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it
takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. 234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be
momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious
freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without
violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may
perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform
an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other
legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and
R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and
programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive,
culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the
major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be
accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and
the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
 (4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary
right and duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and
AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance
towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete,
and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training programs,
with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral character
and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per
day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete
facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48
percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such
number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers
cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be
made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother
should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to
unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested:
"the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency." 237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of
double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a
conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct
harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because
both their lives are equally valuable.238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is
against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this
case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a
reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether
they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable,
and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into
marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and
total development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article
XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;

The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a
solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common
future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had
suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent
or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures
shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should
require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family.
Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot
found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would
undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife,
possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a
marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution. 241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any
decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly
matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as
they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any
compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women,"
provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the
number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility
between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen
the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach
into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v.
Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection." 244 Marje adopted the ruling of
the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy
rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." 246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not
be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor
is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are
excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental
authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot
replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is
clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government." 247 In this
regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is
superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to
mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life,
would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino
tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of
marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not
the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental
authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the
consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information
about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of
her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of
the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the
protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental
guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put
at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently
needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of
parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the
first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of
this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom .
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they
believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical
data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births;
divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and
promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate
on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the
religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the
Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution
and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by
recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building. 253 Considering that
Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of
gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights;
responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and
Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional
changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than
supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction
with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14
violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health education
program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According
to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who
is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private
health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering
reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time
fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 255 Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone,
but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to Section
4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted
primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2)
public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of
health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and
who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local
health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider,"
should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated
to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad
enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold,
restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision
is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate,
faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand,
the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information
in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own
personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide
public health and safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor
because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than
promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the
poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the
RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis
of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly
constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of
the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.
"The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class
should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those
covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in
the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address
the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their
number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains,
the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who
intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if
they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide
priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under Section
14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not
amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public
educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to
render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires
medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to
slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover,
the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth
being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not
a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the
power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public
health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such
right altogether.264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other
similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and
non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no
penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy
the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of
such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden,
but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this
provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is
to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register
and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so.
It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions,
powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend standards of
identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization
and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors,
wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x
 "(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure
safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer
users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to
the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered with
the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be
extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious
illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive,
and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate
authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates
of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA
was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the
mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service"
and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines
that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government
units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining
to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties
and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and
offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge
such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects,
facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except
in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, 271 the hiring of
skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national
priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the
wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot
be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does
not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded
to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for
the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be
exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the
regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to
exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. 275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal
basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is
perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it
is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by
theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the
actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down
a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine
every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in
the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. 279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It
only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed
out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After
all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest
of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-
minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of
rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the
unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the
hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked
on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with
adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one,
Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an
ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the
fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down
below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of
the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking
body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the
province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to
enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court
must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled
jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is,
as enacted by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and
reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be
the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of
Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-
coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without
the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent
only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in
so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
 8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED,
insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

G.R. No. L-1800             January 27, 1948

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties, petitioner,

vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.

Ramon Diokno for petitioner.

City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondent.

FERIA, J.:

This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties
against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at
Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the
groun that the respondent refused to grant such permit. Due to urgency of the case, this Court, after mature deliberation, issued a writ
of mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of November 15, 1947, without prejudice to writing later an extended and reasoned decision.

The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic countries. But it a casettled principle growing
out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, not injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to
regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power" which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police
power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and
civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities, and cities authorizing their legislative bodies,
called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.

The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, which according to
section 2439 of the Administrative Code is the legislative body of the City. Section 2444 of the same Code grants the Municipal Board,
among others, the following legislative power, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays, disturbances,
and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets, avenues ... parks, cemeteries and other public places" and "for the abatement
of nuances in the same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants."

Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections 844 and 1119. Section of the Revised
Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." And
section 1119 provides the following:

"SEC. 1119 Free for use of public — The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the
public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as
provided by ordinance or regulation: Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or exercise during the celebration of
national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be
 permitted by means of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or portions thereof, where
such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any
streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every such ocassion,
determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession:
And provided, finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-
four hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession."

As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at
any street or public places, the provisions of saif section 1119 regarding the holding of any parade or procession in any street or public
paces may be applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any street or public places.

Said provision is susceptible to two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to
grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places
of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the
latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with the view to prevent
confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing
to minimize the risk of disorder.

After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second construction, that is construe the provisions
of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in
issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be
held.

Our conclusions find support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute
of New Hampshire P.L. Chap. 145, section 2, providing that "no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be
permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the select men of the town or from licensing committee," was
construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfetted discretion to refuse to grant the
license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes firming the
judgement of the State Supreme Court, held that " a statute requiring pewrsons using the public streets for a parade or procession to
procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or a freedom
of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of
licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience
and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, ... ."

We can not adopt the alternative construction or constru the ordinance under consideration as conferring upon the Mayor power to grant
or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for
holding of meetings, parades or processions, because such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or violative of the
constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Boards is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and the other public places,
and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern,
and to restrain, but can not be construed a synonimous with construed "suppressed" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41
Phil., 103), the Municipal Board can not grant the Mayor a power that it does not have. Besides, the powers and duties of the Mayor as the
Chief Executive of the City are executive and one of them is "to comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful
performance and execution of laws and ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised Administrative Code), the ligislative police power of
the Municipal Board to enact ordinances regulating reasonably the excercise of the fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the
streets and other public places, can not be delgated to the Mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him unregulated discretion or
without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality and oppression
prevented.

In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 Ill., 430, it was held by the Supreme Court of Illinois that, under Rev. ST. Ill. c. 24, article 5 section 1,
which empowers city councils to regulate the use of public streets, the council has no power to ordain that no processions shall be allowed
upon the streets until a permit shall be obtained from the superintendent of police, leaving the issuance of such permits to his discretion,
since the powers conferred on the council cannot be delegated by them.

The Supreme COurt of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.W., 1104, held the following:

"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke, 49 Md., 217, were also, in substance, the same, for the
ordinance in that case upon its face committed to the unrestrained will of a single public officer the power to determine the rights
of parties under it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or cintrol his action, and it was held void because "it lays
down no rules by which its impartial execution can be secured, or partiality and oppression prevented." and that "when we
remember that action or nonaction may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and
other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and difficult to be detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to
 suggest or to comment upon the injustice capable of being wrought under cover of such a power, for that becomes apparent to
every one who gives to the subject a moment's consideration. In fact, an ordinance which clothes a single individual with such
power hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it inoperative and void." ... In the exercise of
police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but can not suppress
them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion with
which the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or
to confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant."

In re Frazee, 63 Michigan 399, 30 N.W., 72, a city or ordinance providing that "no person or persons, or associations or organizations
shall march, parade, ride or drive, in ou upon or through the public streets of the City of Grand Rapids with musical instrument, banners,
flags, ... without first having obtained the consent of the mayor or common council of said city;" was held by the Supreme Court of
Michigan to be unreasonable and void. Said Supreme Court in the course of the decision held:

". . . We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it assumes to grant, so far as it is not plainly unconstitutional, as
only conferring such power over the subjects referred to as will enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in
accordance with the limitations and conditions required by the rights of the people themselves, as secured by the principles of
law, which cannot be less careful of private rights under the constitution than under the common law."

"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and disorder in cities than in smaller towns or in
rural places. This may justify reasonable precautionary measures, but nothing further; and no inference can extend beyond the
fair scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discretion to suppress lawful action altogther can be
granted at all. . . . ."

"It has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized countries, for people who are
assembled for common purposes to parade together, by day or reasonable hours at night, with banners and other paraphernalia,
and with music of various kinds. These processions for political, religious, and social demonstrations are resorted to for the
express purpose of keeping unity of feeling and enthusiasm, and frequently to produce some effect on the public mind by the
spectacle of union and numbers. They are a natural product and exponent of common aims, and valuable factors in furthering
them. ... When people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for purposes opposed to private or public security, they become
unlawful, and their members and abettors become punishable. . . ."

"It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or create
or manifestly threaten some tangible public or private mischief, that the law interferes."

"This by-law is unreasonable, because it suppresses what is in general perfectly lawful, and because it leaves the power of
permitting or restraining processions, and thier courses, to an unregulated official discretion, when the whole matter, if regualted
at all, must be permanent, legal provisions, operating generally and impartially."

In Rich vs. Napervill, 42 Ill., App. 222, the question was raised as to the validity of the city ordinance which made it unlawful for any
person, society or club, or association of any kind, to parade any of the streets, with flags, banners, or transparencies, drums, horns, or
other musical instruments, without the permission of the city council first had and obtained. The appellants were members of the Salvation
Army, and were prosecuted for a violation of the ordinance, and the court in holding the ordinance invalid said, "Ordinances to be valid
must be reasonable; they must not be oppressive; they must be fair and impartial; they must not be so framed as to allow their enforcement
to rest on official discretion ... Ever since the landing of the Pilgrims from the Mayflower the right to assemble and worship accordingto
the dictates of one's conscience, and the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for a lawful purpose, have been fostered and regarded
as among the fundamental rights of a free people. The spirit of our free institutions allows great latitude in public parades and
emonstrations whether religious or political ... If this ordinance is held valid, then may the city council shut off the parades of those whose
nations do not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion, and permit like parades of those whose nations do. When men in authority
are permitted in their discretion to exercise power so arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the spirit of of our free institutions violated. ...
Where the granting of the permit is left to the unregulated discretion of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than
partial and discriminating in its practical operation. The law abhors partiality and discrimination. ... (19 L.R.A., p. 861)

In the case of Trujillo vs. City of Walsenburg, 108 Col., 427; 118 P. [2d], 1081, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in construing the
provision of section 1 of Ordinance No. 273 of the City of Walsenburg, which provides: "That it shall be unlawful for any person or
persons or association to use the street of the City of Walsenburg, Colorado for any parade, procession or assemblage without first
obtaining a permit from the Chief of Police of the City of Walsenburg so to do," held the following:

"[1] The power of municipalities, under our state law, to regulate the use of public streets is conceded. "35 C.S.A., chapter 163,
section 10, subparagraph 7. "The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets ... may be regulated in the interest of
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be excercised in subordination to the general, be abridged or denied." Hague,
Mayor vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S., 496, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 964; 83 Law, ed., 1423.
 [2, 3] An excellent statement of the power of a municipality to impose regulations in the use of public streets is found in the
recent case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569; 61 S. Ct., 762, 765; 85 Law, ed. 1049; 133 A.L.R., 1936, in which the
following appears; "The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the
people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar
illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote
the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted excercise of some civil right which in other
circumstances would be entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he
thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an
announcement of his opinions. As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional excercise of
control by local government, the question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly
abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions
immemorially associated with resort to public places. Lovell vs. Criffin, 303 U.S., 444, 451;58 S. Ct., 666, 668, 82 Law. ed., 949
[953]; Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 515, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 963, 964; 83 Law. ed., 1423
[1436, 1437]; Scheneider vs. State of New Jersey [Town of Irvington]; 308 U.S., 147, 160; 60 S. Ct., 146, 150; 84 Law. ed., 155
[164]; Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U. S., 296, 306, 307; 60 S. Ct., 900, 904; 84 Law. ed., 1213 [1219, 1220]; 128 A.L.R.
1352."

[4] Our concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an ordinance which leaves to the uncontrolled official discretion of the chief
of police of the municipal corporation to say who shall, who shall not, be accorded the privilege of parading on its public streets.
No standard of regulation is even remotely suggested. Moreover, under the ordinance as drawn, the chief of police may for any
reason which he may entertain arbitrarily deny this privelege to any group. in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 85 Law.
ed., 1049, 1054, said:

"In the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the public streets in a lawful manner clearly is
apparent from the face of the ordinance before us, and we therefore hold it null and void."

The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 515, 516; 83 Law. ed., 1423,
declared that a municipal ordinance requiring the obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways,
public parks, or public buildings of the city and authorizing the director of public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances,
or disorderly assemblage, to refuse to issue a permit when after investigation of all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the application
he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a valid exercise of the police power. Said Court in the course of its opinion in
support of the conclusion said:

". . . Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to
the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied.

"We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note 1 void upon its face. It does not make comfort or
convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his
mere opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' It can thus, as the record discloses, be
made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking
will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute
for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right."

Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the Mayor shall have the power
to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the
petitioner, for the simple reason that said general power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board requiring
licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. It
is not a specific or substantive power independent from the corresponding municipal ordinances which the Mayor, as Chief Executive of
the City, is required to enforce under the same section 2434. Moreover "one of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power
conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority," except certain
powers of local government, specially of police regulation which are conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal corporation.
Taking this into consideration, and that the police power to regulate the use of streets and other public places has been delegated or rather
conferred by the Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City (section 2444 [u] of the Administrative Code) it is to be presumed that
the Legislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the Mayor in section 2434 (m) the same power, specially if we take into
account that its exercise may be in conflict with the exercise of the same power by the Municipal Board.
Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, and in fact has conferred, upon the Mayor the power to grant or
refuse licenses and permits of all classes, independent from ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board on the matter, and the provisions
of section 2444 (u) of the same Code and of section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, such grant of
unregulated and unlimited power to grant or refuse a permit for the use of streets and other public places for processions, parades, or
meetings, would be null and void, for the same reasons stated in the decisions in the cases above quoted, specially in Willis Cox vs. New
Hampshire, supra, wherein the question involved was also the validity of a similar statute of New Hamsphire. Because the same
constitutional limitations applicable to ordinances apply to statutes, and the same objections to a municipal ordinance which grants
unrestrained discretion upon a city officer are applicable to a law or statute that confers unlimited power to any officer either of the
municipal or state governments. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any
officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. As stated in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, supra, "The
discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to
transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an arbitrary authority making in its exercise a petty tyrant."

It is true that Mr. Justice Ostrand cited said provision of article 2434 (m) of the Administrative Code apparently in support of the decision
in the case of Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255- 261, but evidently the quotation of said provision was made by the writer of the
decision under a mistaken conception of its purview and is an obiter dictum, for it was not necessary for the decision rendered. The
popular meeting or assemblage intended to be held therein by the Communist Party of the Philippines was clearly an unlawful one, and
therefore the Mayor of the City of Manila had no power to grant the permit applied for. On the contrary, had the meeting been held, it was
his duty to have the promoters thereof prosecuted for violation of section 844, which is punishable as misdemeanor by section 1262 of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. For, according to the decision, "the doctrine and principles advocated and urged in the
Constitution and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by its members in
the public meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebelious conspiracies and disturb
and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty."

The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar
speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." As the request of the petition was for a permit
"to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given
for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. As stated in the portion of the decision in Hague vs. Committee on
Industrial Organization, supra, "It does not make comfort and convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It
enables the Director of Safety to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly
assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national
affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities." To this we may add the following, which we
make our own, said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.), 1105-1107:

"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It
is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that
the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . . .

"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order
at the cost of liberty. . . .

"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions essential effective democracy, unless the
evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be
inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a society. . . . The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to
the state. Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations
of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly." Whitney vs. California, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 71 Law., ed.,
pp. 1106-1107.)

In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no reasonable objection to the use of the Plaza
Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied for, the respondent is ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as requested. So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:

The subject-matter of the petition is not new in this jurisdiction. Under Act No. 2774, section 4, amending section 2434, paragraph (m) of
the Revised Administrative Code, the Mayor has discretion to grant or deny the petition to hold the meeting. (See Evangelista vs.
Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255.) And, in the case of U. S. vs. Apurado, 7 Phil., 422, 426, this Court said:

"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances
whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual
members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then
the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and snare and the attempt to exercise it
on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest
and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting
authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished
therefor."

The petitioner is a distinguished member of the bar and Floor Leader of the Nacionalista Party in the House of Representatives; he was the
chief campaigner of the said party in the last elections. As the petition comes from a responsible party, in contrast to Evangelista's
Communist Party which was considered subversive, I believe that the fear which caused the Mayor to deny it was not well founded and
his action was accordingly far from being a sound exercise of his discretion.

BRIONES, M., conforme:

En nombre del Partido Nacionalista y de los grupos oposicionistas aliados, Cipriano P. Primicias, director general de campaña de las
minorias coaligadas en las ultimas elecciones y "Floor Leader" de dichas minorias en la Camara de Representantes, solicito del Alcalde de
Manila en comunicacion de fecha 14 de Noviembre, 1947, permiso "para celebrar un mitin publico en la Plaza Miranda el Domingo, 16
de Noviembre, 1947, desde las 5:00 p.m. hasta la 1:00 a.m., a fin de pedir al gobierno el remedio de ciertos agravios." Tambien se pedia
en la comunicacion licencia para usar la plataforma ya levantada en dicha Plaza.

El Vice-Alcalde Cesar Miraflor actuo sobre la solicitud en aquel mismo dia dando permiso tanto para la celebracion del mitin como para
el uso de la plataforma, "en la inteligencia de que no se pronunciaran discursos subversivos, y ademas, de que usted (el solicitante) sera
responsable del mantenimiento de la paz y orden durante la celebracion del mitin."

Sin embargo, al dia siguiente, 15 de Noviembre, el Alcalde Valeriano E. Fugoso revoco el permiso concedido, expresandose los motivos
de la revocacion en su carta de tal fecha dirigida al Rep. Primicias.

"Sirvase dar por informado — dice el Alcalde Fugoso en su carta — que despues de haber leido los periodicos metropolitanos da
esta mañana en que aparece que vuestro mitin va a ser un 'rally' de indignacion en donde se denunciaran ante el pueblo los
supuestos fraudes electorales perpetrados en varias partes de Filipinas para anular la voluntad popular, por la presente se revoca
dicho permiso.

"Se cree — añade el Alcalde — que la paz y el orden en Manila sufriran daño en dicho 'rally' considerando que las pasiones
todavia no se han calmado y la tension sigue alta como resultado de la ultima contienda politica.

"Segun los mismos periodicos, delegados venidos de provincias y estudiantes de las universidades locales participaran en el
'rally,' lo cual, a mi juicio, no haria mas que causar disturbios, pues no se puede asegurar que concurriran alli solamente
elementos de la oposicion. Desde el momento en que se mezclen entre la multitud gentes de diferentes matices politicos, que es
lo que probablemente va a ocurrir, el orden queda en peligro una vez que al publico se le excite, como creo que sera excitado,
teniendo en cuenta los fines del mitin tal como han sido anunciados en los periodicos mencionados.

"Se dice que los resultados de las ultimas elecciones seran protestados. No hay base para este proceder toda vez que los
resultados todavia no han sido oficialmente anunciados.

"Por tanto — termina el Alcalde su orden revocatoria — la accion de esta oficina se toma en interes del orden publico y para
prevenir la perturbacion de la paz en Manila."
De ahi el presente recurso de mandamus para que se ordene al Alcalde recurrido a que expida inmediatamente el permiso solicitado. Se
pide tambien que ordenemos al Procurador General para que investigue la fase criminal del caso y formule la accion que justifiquen las
circunstancias.

Dada la premura del asunto, se llamo inmediatamente a vista arguyendo extensamente los abogados de ambas partes ante esta Corte en sus
informes orales.1

El recurso se funda, respecto de su aspecto civil, en el articulo III, seccion 1, inciso 8 de la Constitucion de Filipinas, el cual preceptua
"que no se aprobara ninguna ley que coarte la libertad de la palabra, o de la prensa, o el derecho del pueblo de reunirse pacificamente y
dirigir petiticiones al gobierno para remedio de sus agravios." Con respecto al posible aspecto criminal del caso se invoca el articulo 131
del Codigo Penal Revisado, el cual dispone que "la pena de prision correccional en su periodo minimo, se impondra al funcionario publico
o empleado que, sin fundamento legal, prohibiere o interrumpiere una reunion pacifica, o disolviere la misma."

La defensa del recurrido invoca a su favor los llamados poderes de policia que le asisten como guardian legal de las plazas, calles y demas
lugares publicos. Se alega que como Alcalde de la Ciudad de Manila tiene plena discrecion para conceder o denegar el uso de la Plaza
Miranda, que es una plaza publica, para la celebracion de un mitin o reunion, de conformidad con las exigencias del interes general tal
como el las interpreta. Especificamente se citan dos disposiciones, a saber: el articulo 2434 (b), inciso (m) del Codigo Administrativo
Revisado, y el articulo 1119, capitulo 118 de la Compilacion de las Ordenanzas Revisadas de la Ciudad de Manila, edicion de 1927. El
articulo aludido del Codigo Administrativo Revisado se lee como sigue:

xxx             xxx             xxx

"(m) To grant and refuse municipal license or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon
which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are being committed under the protection of such
licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other good reason
of general interest." La ordenanza municipal indicada reza lo siguiente:

La ordenanza municipal indicada reza lo siguiente:

"SEC. 1119. Free for use of public. — The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the
public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as
provided by the ordinance or regulation: Provided, That the holding of athletic games, sports, or exercises during the celebration
of national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be
permitted by means of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places, or portions thereof, where
such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any
streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor, who shall, on every occasion,
determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession: And
provided, finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four
hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession."

Parece conveniente poner en claro ciertos hechos. El mitin o "rally" de indignacion de que habla el Alcalde recurrido en su carta
revocando el permiso ya concedido no consta en la peticion del recurrente ni en ningun documenmento o manifestacion verbal atribuida al
mismo, sino solamente en las columnas informativas de la prensa metropolitana. El recurrente admite, sin embargo, que el objeto del
mitin era comunicar al pueblo la infinidad de telegramas y comunicaciones que como jefe de campaña de las oposiciones habia recibido
de varias partes del archipielago denunciando tremendas anomalias, escandalosos fraudes, actos vandalicos de terrorismo politico, etc.,
etc., ocurridos en las elecciones de 11 de Noviembre; llamar la atencion del Gobierno hacia tales anomalias y abusos; y pedir su pronta,
eficaz y honrada intervencion para evitar lo que todavia se podia evitar, y con relacion a los hechos consumados urgir la pronta
persecucion y castigo inmediato de los culpables y malhechores. De esto resulta evidente que el objeto del mitin era completamente
pacifico, absolutamente legal. No hay ni la menor insinuacion de que el recurrente y los partidos oposicionistas coaligados que representa
tuvieran el proposito de utilizar el mitin para derribar violentamente al presente gobierno, o provocar una rebelion o siquiera un motin. En
realidad, teniendo en cuenta las serias responsabilidades del recurrente como jefe de campaña electoral de las minorias aliadas y como
"Floor Leader" en el Congreso de dichas minorias, parecia que esta consideracion debia pesar decisivamente en favor de la presuncion de
que el mitin seria una asamblea pacifica, de ciudadanos conscientes, responsables y amantes de la ley y del orden. 2

Se ha llamado nuestra atencion a que en el articulo arriba citado y transcrito de las Ordenanzas Revisadas de Manila no figura el mitin
entre las materias reglamentadas, sino solo la procesion o parada por las calles. Esto demuestra, se sostiene, que cuando se trata de un
mitin en una plaza o lugar publico, la concesion del permiso es ineludible y el Alcalde no tiene ninguna facultad discrecional. Pareceme,
sin embargo, que no es necesario llegar a este extremo. Creo no debe haber inconveniente en admitir que el mitin esta incluido en la
reglamentacion, por razones de conveniencia publica. Verbigracia, es perfectamente licito denegar el permiso para celebrar un mitin en
una plaza publica en un dia y una hora determinados cuando ya previamente se ha concedido de buena fe el uso del mismo lugar a otro a
la misma hora. La prevencion de esta clase de conflictos es precisamente uno de los ingredientes que entran en la motivacion de la
facultad reguladora del Estado o del municipio con relacion al uso de calles, plazas y demas lugares publicos. Por ejemplo, es tambien
perfectamente licito condicionar el permiso atendiendo a su relacion con el movimiento general del trafico tanto de peatones como de
vehiculos. Estas consideraciones de comfort y conveniencia publica son por lo regular la base, el leit-motif de toda ley u ordenanza
encaminada a reglamentar el uso de parques, plazas y calles. Desde luego que la regla no excluye la consideracion a veces de la paz y del
buen orden, pero mas adelante veremos que este ultimo, para que sea atendible, requiere que exista una situacion de peligro verdadero,
positivo, real, claro, inminente y substancial. La simple conjetura, la mera aprension, el temor mas o menos exagerado de que el mitin,
asamblea o reunion pueda ser motivo de desorden o perturbacion de la paz no es motivo bastante para denegar el permiso, pues el derecho
constitucional de reunirse pacificamente, ya para que los ciudadanos discutan los asuntos publicos o se comuniquen entre si su
pensamiento sobre ellos, ya para ejecer el derecho de peticion recabando del gobierno el remedio a ciertos agravios, es infinitamente
superior a toda facultad reguladora en relacion con el uso de los parques, plazas y calles.

La cuestion, por tanto, que tenemos que resolver en el presente recurso es bien sencilla. ¿Tenia razon el Alcalde recurrido para denegar el
permiso solicitado por el recurrente, ora bajo los terminos de la ordenanza pertinente, ora bajo la carta organica de Manila, y sobre todo,
bajo el precepto categorico, terminante, expresado en el inciso 8, seccion 1, del Articulo III de la Constitucion? ¿No constituye la
denegacion del permiso una seria conculcacion de ciertos privilegios fundamentales garantizados por la Constitucion al ciudadano y al
pueblo?

Resulta evidente, de autos, que el recurrido denego el permiso bajo lo que el mismo llama "all-pervading power of the state to regulate,"
temiendo que el mitin solicitado iba a poner en peligro la paz y el orden publico en Manila. No se fundo la denegacion en razones de
"comfort" o conveniencia publica, vgr., para no estorbar el trafico, o para prevenir un conflicto con otro mitin ya previamente solicitado y
concedido, sino en una simple conjetura, en un mero temor o aprension — la aprension de que, dado el tremendo hervor de los animos
resultante de una lucha electoral harto reñida y apasionada, un discurso violento, una arenga incendiaria podria amotinar a la gente y
provocar serios desordenes. La cuestion en orden es la siguiente: ¿se puede anular o siquiera poner en suspenso el derecho
fundamentalisimo de reunion o asamblea pacifica, garantizado por la Constitucion, por razon de esta clase de conjetura, temor o
aprension? Es obvio que la contestacion tiene que ser decididamente negativa. Elevar tales motivos a la categoria de razon legal
equivaldria practicamente a sancionar o legitimar cualquier pretexto, a colocar los privilegios y garantias constitucionales a merced del
capricho y de la arbitrariedad. Si la vigencia de tales privilegios y garantias hubiera de depender de las suspicacias, temores, aprensiones,
o hasta humor del gobernante, uno podria facilmente imaginar los resultados desastrosos de semejante proposicion; un partido mayoritario
dirigido por caudillos y liders sin escrupulos y sin conciencia podria facilmente anular todas las libertades, atropellar todos los derechos
incluso los mas sagrados, ahogar todo movimiento legitimo de protesta o peticion, estrangular, en una palabra, a las minorias, las cuales
— como sabe todo estudiante de ciencia politica — en el juego y equilibrio de fuerzas que integran el sistema democratico son tan
indispensables como las mayorias. ¿Que es lo que todavia podria detener a un partido o a un hombre que estuviera en el poder y que no
quisiera oir nada desagradable de sus adversarios si se le dejara abiertas las puertas para que, invocando probables peligros o amagos de
peligro, pudiera de una sola plumada o de un solo gesto de repulsa anular o poner en suspenso los privilegios y garantias constitucionales?
¿No seria esto retornar a los dias de aquel famoso Rey que dijo: "El Estado soy yo," o de aquel notorio cabecilla politico de uno de los
Estados del Sur de America que asombro al resto de su pais con este nefasto pronunciamiento: "I am the only Constitution around here"?
Es inconcebible que la facultad de reglamentar o el llamado poder de policia deba interpretarse en el sentido de justificar y autorizar la
anulacion de un derecho, privilegio o garantia constitucional. Sin embargo, tal seria el resultado si en nombre de un concepto tan vago y
tan elastico como es el "interes general" se permitiera in terdecir la libertad de la palabra, de la cual los derechos de reunion y de peticion
son nada mas que complemento logico y necesario. Una mujer famosa de Francia 3 en la epoca del terror, momentos antes de subir al
cadalso y colocar su hermoso cuello bajo la cuchilla de la guillotina, hizo historica esta exclamacion: "¡Libertad, cuantos crimenes se
cometen en tu nombre!" Si se denegara el presente recurso legitimando la accion del recurrido y consiguientemente autorizando la
supresion de los mitines so pretexto de que la paz y el orden publico corren peligro con ellos, un desengañado de la democracia en nuestro
pais acaso exprese entonces su suprema desilusion parafraseando la historica exclamacion de la siguiente manera: "¡Interes general, paz,
orden publico, cuantos atentados se cometen en vuestro nombre contra la libertad!"

El consenso general de las autoridades en los paises constitucionalmente regidos como Filipinas, particularmente en Estados Unidos, es
que el privilegio del ciudadano de usar los parques, plazas y calles para el intercambio de impresiones y puntos de vista sobre cuestiones
nacionales si bien es absoluto es tambien relativo en el sentido de que se puede regular, pero jamas se puede denegar o coartar so pretexto
o a guisa de regulacion (Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 515-517). Este asunto, planteado y decidido en 1938,
ha venido a ser clasico en la jurisprudencia americana sobre casos del mismo tipo que el que nos ocupa. La formidable asociacion obrera
Committee for Industrial Organization conocida mas popularmente por la famosa abreviatura CIO, planteo una queja ante los tribunales
de New Jersey contra las autoridades de Jersey City, (a) atacando, por fundamentos constitucionales, la validez de una ordenanza
municipal que regulaba y restringia el derecho de reunion; y (b) tachando de inconstitucionales los metodos y medios en virtud de los
cuales ponian en vigor la ordenanza las referidas autoridades.

Los hechos del caso, brevemente expuestos, son, a saber: La CIO trataba de celebrar mitines y asambleas publicas en Jersey City a fin de
comunicar a los ciudadanos sus puntos de vista sobre la "National Labor Relations Act." Las autoridades de la ciudad, comenzando por el
Alcalde Hague el famoso cabecilla de la muy notoria maquina politica de New Jersey, rehusaron consistentemente conceder licencia para
dichos mitines bajo la especiosa alegacion de que los miembros de la organizacion obrera solicitante eran comunistas y del orden publico
corria peligro de grave perturbacion; es decir, casi, casi la misma alegacion que en el presente caso. La denegacion de la licencia se
fundaba en una ordenanza municipal que trataba de reglamentar el derecho constitucional de reunion y asamblea pacifica.
Los tribunales de New Jersey, declarando inconstitucionales la ordenanza en cuestion y los metodos por los cuales se trataba de poner en
vigor, sentenciaron a favor de la CIO permitiendole celebrar los mitines solicitados. Elevado el asunto en casacion e la Corte Suprema
Federal, esta confirmo la sentencia con solo una ligera modificacion. Entre otros pronunciamientos se dijo que: (a) donde quiera este
alojado el titulo sobre las calles, parques y plazas, desde tiempo inmemorial los mismos siempre se han considerado como un fideicomiso
para uso del publico, y desde tiempos remotos que la memoria no alcanza se han usado siempre para fines de reunion y de intercambio de
impresiones y puntos de vista entre los ciudadanos, asi como para la libre discusion de los asuntos publicos; (b) que el uso de las calles y
plazas publicas para tales fines ha sido siempre, desde la antiguedad, una parte importante y esencial de los privilegios, inmunidades,
derechos y libertades de los ciudadanos; (c) que el privilegio del ciudadano de los Estados Unidos de usar las calles, plazas y parques para
la comunicacion de impresiones y puntos de vista sobre cuestiones nacionales puede ser regulado en interes de todos; es en tal sentido
absoluto pero relativo, y debe ser ejercitado con sujecion al "comfort" y conveniencia generales y en consonancia con la paz y el buen
orden; pero no puede ser coartado o denegado so pretexto y forma de regulacion; (d) que el tribunal inferior estuvo acertado al declarar
invalida la ordenanza en su faz, pues no hace del "comfort" o conveniencia en el uso de calles y plazas la norma y patron de la accion
official; por el contrario, faculta al Director de Seguridad a rehusar el permiso en virtud de su simple opinion de que la denegacion es para
prevenir motines, trastornos o reuniones turbulentas y desordenadas; (e) que, de esta manera, y conforme lo demuestra el record, la
denegacion puede ser utilizada como instrumento para la supresion arbitraria de la libre expression de opiniones sobre asuntos nacionales,
pues la prohibicion de hablar producira indudablemente tal efecto: (f) y, por ultimo, que no puede echarse mano de la supresion official
del privilegio para ahorrarse el trabajo y el deber de mantener el orden en relacion con el ejercicio del derecho. En otras palabras,
traduciendo literalmente la fraseologia de la sentencia, aun a riesgo de incurrir en un anglicismo, "no puede hacerse de la supresion
official incontrolada del privilegio un sustituto del deber de mantener el orden en relacion con el ejercicio del derecho." He aqui ad
verbatim la doctrina:

"5. Regulation of parks and streets. — "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of the citizen of the United States to use the streets and
parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it
must not in the guise of regulation be abridged or denied. We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance . . . void
upon its face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the
Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances, or disorderly
assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on
national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official
suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the
right." (Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516.)

Durante la audiencia del presente asunto se hizo mencion del caso de Evangelista contra Earnshaw, 57 Jur. Fil., 255, como un precedente
en apoyo de la accion del Alcalde recurrido. Pero la similitud es solo en el hecho de que el entonces Alcalde D. Tomas Earnshaw tambien
revoco el permiso previamente concedido al partido comunista que representaba Crisanto Evangelista para celebrar mitines en Manila,
pero las circunstancias en ambos casos son enteramente diferentes. El Alcalde Earnshaw revoco el permiso despues de una minuciosa
investigacion en que se habian encontrado pruebas indubitables no solo de que en los estatutos y documentos del partido comunista se
preconizaba como uno de sus primordiales objetivos el derribar al gobierno americano en Filipinas — gobierno que ellos calificaban de
imperialista y capitalistico — sino que de hecho en mitines celebrados con anterioridad los comunistas habian pronunciado discursos clara
y positivamente sediciosos predicando una abierta rebelion e incitando un alzamiento para liberar, segun ellos, al proletariado filipino de
las garras del imperialismo capitalista. La accion, por tanto, del Alcalde Earnshaw se fundo no en una simple conjetura, en un mero temor
o aprension, sino en la existencia de un peligro inminente, claro, real, sustantivo — ingrediente unico y excepcionalisimo que permite una
salvedad suspensiva singularisima en el ejercicio de los privilegios constitucionales de que se trata.

¿Existe ese ingrediente en el caso que nos ocupa? Indudablemente que no. Ni siquiera se ha hecho la mas pequeña insinuacion de que las
minorias coaligadas en cuyo nombre se ha pedido la celebracion del mitin en cuestion tuvieran el proposito de derribar al gobierno por
metodos y procedimientos violentos. El mismo Fiscal Villamor, en su informe oral, admitio francamente la legalidad de la coalicion y de
sus fines. Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial de que esas minorias coaligadas lucharon en todas las provincias y municipios de
Filipinas presentando candidatos para todos los cargos — nacionales, provinciales y locales, y de que su candidatura senatorial triunfo en
21 provincias de las 50 que componen el mapa electoral, y en 5 ciudades con carta especial de las 8 que existen, incluyendose entre dichas
5 la de Manila, capital del archipielago.

Que la coalicion minoritaria no es una organizacion subversiva como la que fue proscripta en el caso de Evangelista contra Earnshaw,
sino que por el contrario propugna la balota, no la bala, como el instrumento normal y democratico para cambiar los gobiernos y las
administraciones, lo demuestra, ademas del hecho ya apuntado de que lucho en las ultimas elecciones prevaliendose de las armas
proveidas por la legalidad y sacando partido de los medios de que disponia frente a la natural superioridad del partido gobernante, lo
demuestra, repito, la circunstancia de que despues de hechas las votaciones y mientras se estaban contando los votos y cuando vio que,
segun ella, se habia escamoteado o se estaba escamoteando la voluntad popular en varias partes mediante engaños, abusos y anomalias de
diferentes clases, no busco la violencia ni recurrio a la accion directa para hallar remedio a sus agravios o vengarlos, sino que trato de
cobijarse bajo la Constitucion reuniendo al pueblo en asamblea magna al aire libre para comunicar y discutir sus quejas y recabar del
gobierno el correspondiente remedio. Y esto lo hizo la coalicion oficialmente, con todas las rubricas del protocolo, formulando la peticion
del mitin el hombre que mejor podia representarla y ofrecer garantias de legalidad y orden ante los poderes constituidos — el recurrente
en este caso, cuya solvencia moral y politica esta doblemente garantida por su condicion de lider de las minorias en el Congreso y jefe de
campaña de las mismas en las pasadas elecciones. ¿Que mejor prueba de legalidad y de propositos pacificos y ordenados?

Por tanto, las circunstancias han venido a situar al gobierno en una encrucijada: por un lado, el camino angosto de la represion, de una
politica de fuerza y de cordon ferreo policiaco; por otro lado, la amplia avenida de la libertad, una politica que consista en abrir espitas y
valvulas por donde pueda extravasarse no ya la protesta sino inclusive la indignacion del pueblo, previniendo de esta manera que los
vapores mal reprimidos hagan estallar la caldera, o que la desesperacion lo arrastre a conspirar en la sombra o a confiar su suerte a los
azares de una cruenta discordia civil. Creo que entre ambas politicas la eleccion no es dudosa.

Se alega que antes del 11 de Noviembre, dia de las elecciones, el Alcalde recurrido habia concedido a las minorias coaligadas permisos
para celebrar varios mitines politicos en diferentes sitios de Manila; que en dichos mitines se habian pronunciado discursos altamente
inflamatorios y calumniosos llamandose ladrones y chanchulleros a varios funcionarios del gobierno nacional y de la Ciudad de Manila,
entre ellos el Presidente de Filipinas, el Presidente del Senado y el mismo recurrido, suscitandose contra ellos la animadversion y el
desprecio del pueblo mediante la acusacion de que han estado malversando propiedades y fondos publicos con grave detrimento del
bienestar e interes generales; que, dado este antecedente, habia motivo razonable para creer que semejantes discursos se pronunciarian de
nuevo, minandose de tal manera la fe y la confianza del pueblo en su gobierno y exponiendose consiguientemente la paz y el orden a
serias perturbaciones, teniendo en cuenta la temperatura elevadisima de las pasiones, sobre todo de parte de los grupos perdidosos y
derrotados.

Estas alegaciones son evidentemente insostenibles. Darles valor equivaldria a instituir aqui un regimen de previa censura, el cual no solo
es extraño sino que es enteramente repulsivo e incompatible con nuestro sistema de gobierno. Nuestro sistema, mas que de prevencion, es
de represion y castigo sobre la base de los hechos consumados. En otras palabras, es un sistema que permite el amplio juego de la libertad,
exigiendo, sin embargo, estricta cuenta al que abusase de ella. Este es el espiritu que informa nuestras leyes que castigan criminalmente la
calumnia, la difamacion oral y escrita, y otros delitos semejantes. Y parafraseando lo dicho en el citado asunto de Hague vs. Committee
for Industrial Organization, la supresion incontrolada del privilegio constitucional no puede utilizarse como sustituto de la operacion de
dichas leyes.

Se temia — dice el recurrido en su contestacion — que la probable virulencia de los discursos y la fuerte tension de los animos pudiesen
alterar seriamente la paz y el orden publico. Pero — cabe preguntar — ¿de cuando aca la libertad, la democracia no ha sido un peligro, y
un peligro perpetuo? En realidad, de todas las formas de gobierno la democracia no solo es la mas dificil y compleja, sino que es la mas
peligrosa. Rizal tiene en uno de sus libros inmortales una hermosa imagen que es perfectamente aplicable a la democracia. Puede decirse
que esta es como la mar: serena, inmovil, sin siquiera ningun rizo que arrugue su superficie, cuando no lo agita ningun viento. Pero
cuando sopla el huracan — lease, Vientos de la Libertad — sus aguas se alborotan, sus olas se encrespan, y entonces resulta horrible,
espantosa, con la espantabilidad de las fuerzas elementales que se desencadenan liberrimamente.

¿Ha dejado, sin embargo, el hombre de cruzar los mares tan solo porque pueden encresparse y enfurecerse a veces? Pues bien; lo mismo
puede decirse de la democracia: hay que tomarla con todos sus inconvenientes, con todos sus peligros. Los que temen la libertad no
merecen vivirla. La democracia no es para pusilanimes. Menos cuando de la pusilanimidad se hace pretexto para imponer un regimen de
fuerza fundado en el miedo. Porque entonces el absolutismo se disfraza bajo la careta odiosa de la hipocresia. Ejemplo: los Zares de
Rusia. Y ya se sabe como terminaron.

El Magistrado Sr. Carson describio con mano maestra los peligros de la libertad y democracia y previno el temor a ellos con las luminosas
observaciones que se transcriben a continuacion, expuestas en la causa de Estados Unidos contra Apurado, 7 Fur. Fil., 440 (1907), a saber:

"Es de esperar que haya mas o menos desorden en una reunion publica del pueblo para protestar contra agravios ya sean reales o
imaginarios porque en esos casos los animos siempre estan excesivamente exaltados, y mientras mayor sea el agravio y mas
intenso el resentimiento, tanto menos perfecto sera por regla general el control disciplinario de los directores sobre sus secuaces
irresponsables. Pero si se permitiese al ministerio fiscal agarrarse de cada acto aislado de desorden cometido por individuos o
miembros de una multitud como pretexto para caracterizar la reunion como un levantamiento sedicioso y tumultuoso contra las
autoridades, entonces el derecho de asociacion, y de pedir reparacion de agravios seria completamente ilusorio, y el ejercicio de
ese derecho en la ocasion mas propia y en la forma mas pacifica expondria a todos los que tomaron parte en ella, al mas severo e
inmerecido castigo si los fines que perseguian no fueron del agrado de los representantes del ministerio fiscal. Si en tales
asociaciones ocurren casos de desorden debe averiguarse quienes son los culpables y castigarseles por este motivo, pero debe
procederse con la mayor discrecion al trazar la linea divisoria entre el desorden y la sedicion, y entre la reunion esencialmente
pacifica y un levantamiento tumultuoso."

En el curso de los informes se pregunto al Fiscal, defensor del recurrido, si con motivo de los discursos que se dicen calumniosos y
difamatorios pronunciados en los mitines de la oposicion antes de las elecciones ocurrio algun serio desorden: la contestacion fue
negativa. Como se dice mas arriba, en el mitin monstruo que despues se celebro en virtud de nuestra decision en el presente asunto
tampoco ocurrio nada. ¿Que demuestra esto? Que los temores eran exagerados, por no llamarlos fantasticos; que el pueblo de Manila, con
su cordura, tolerancia y amplitud de criterio, probo ser superior a las aprensiones, temores y suspicacias de sus gobernantes.

La democracia filipina no puede ni debe sufrir un retroceso en la celosa observancia de las garantias constitucionales sobre la libertad de
la palabra y los derechos concomitantes — el de reunion y peticion. Se trata de derechos demasiado sagrados, harto metidos en el corazon
y alma de nuestro pueblo para ser tratados negligentemente, con un simple encogimiento de hombros. Fueron esas libertades las que
inspiraron a nuestros antepasados en sus luchas contra la opresion y el despotismo. Fueron esas libertades la base del programa politico de
los laborantes precursores del '96. Fueron esas libertades las que cristalizaron en la carta organizacional de Bonifacio, generando luego el
famoso Grito de Balintawak. Fueron esas libertades las que despues informaron los documentos politicos de Mabini y la celebre
Constitucion de Malolos. Y luego, durante cerca de medio siglo de colaboracion filipino — americana, fueron esas mismas libertades la
esencia de nuestras instituciones, la espina dorsal del regimen constitucional y practicamente republicano aqui establecido. Nada mejor,
creo yo, para historiar el proceso de esas libertades que los atinados y elocuentes pronunciamientos del Magistrado Sr. Malcolm en la
causa de Estados Unidos contra Bustos, 37 Jur. Fil., 764 (1918). Es dificil mejorarlos; asi que opto por transcribirlos ad verbatim a
continuacion:

"Hojeando las paginas de la historia, no decimos nada nuevo al afirmar que la libertad de la palabra, tal y como la han defendido
siempre todos los paises democraticos, era desconocida en las Islas Filipinas antes de 1900. Por tanto, existia latente la principal
causa de la revolucion. Jose Rizal en su obra 'Filipinas Dentro de Cien Años' (paginas 62 y siguientes) describiendo 'las reformas
sine quibus non,' en que insistian los filipinos, dijo:

"El ministro, . . . que quiera que sus reformas sean reformas, debe principiar por declarar la prensa libre en Filipinas, y por crear
diputados filipinos.

"Los patriotas filipinos que estaban en España, por medio de las columnas de La Solidaridad y por otros medios, al exponer los
deseos del Pueblo Filipino, pidieron invariablemente la 'libertad de prensa, de cultos y de asociacion.' (Vease Mabini, 'La
Revolucion Filipina.') La Constitucion de Malolos, obra del Congreso Revolucionario, en su Bill de Derechos, garantizaba
celosamente la libertad de la palabra y de la prensa y los derechos de reunion y de peticion.

"Tan solo se mencionan los datos que anteceden para deducir la afirmacion de que una reforma tan sagrada para el pueblo de
estas Islas y a tan alto precio conseguida, debe ampararse ahora y llevarse adelante en la misma forma en que se protegeria y
defenderia el derecho a la libertad.

"Despues sigue el periodo de la mutua colaboracion americano-filipina. La Constitucion de los Estados Unidos y las de los
diversos Estados de la Union garantizan el derecho de la libertad y de la palabra y de la prensa y los derechos de reunion y de
peticion. Por lo tanto, no nos sorprende encontrar consignadas en la Carta Magna de la Libertad Filipina del Presidente
McKinley, sus Instrucciones a la Segunda Comision de Filipinas, de 7 de abril de 1900, que sientan el siguiente inviolable
principio:

"Que no se aprobara ninguna ley que coarte la libertad de la palabra o de la prensa o de los derechos del pueblo para reunirse
pacificamente y dirigir peticiones al Gobierno para remedio de sus agravios."

"El Bill de Filipinas, o sea la Ley del Congreso de 1.° de Julio de 1902, y la Ley Jones, o sea la Ley del Congreso de 29 de
Agosto de 1916, que por su naturaleza son leyes organicas de las Islas Filipinas, siguen otorgando esta garantia. Las palabras
entre comillas no son extrañas para los estudiantes de derecho constitucional, porque estan calcadas de la Primera Enmienda a la
Constitucion de los Estados Unidos que el pueblo americano pidio antes de otorgar su aprobacion a la Constitucion.

"Mencionamos los hechos expuestos tan solo para deducir la afirmacion, que no debe olvidarse por un solo instante, de que las
mencionadas garantias constituyen parte integrante de la Ley Organica — La Constitucion — de las Islas Filipinas.

"Estos parrafos que figuran insertos en el Bill de Derechos de Filipinas no son una huera palabreria. Las palabras que alli se
emplean llevan consigo toda la jurisprudencia que es de aplicacion a los grandes casos constitucionales de Inglaterra y America.
(Kepner vs. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1917], 214 U. S., 470.) Y ¿cuales son estos principios? Volumen tras
volumen no bastaria a dar una contestacion adecuada. Pero entre aquellos estan los siguientes:

"Los intereses de la sociedad y la conservacion de un buen gobierno requieren una discusion plena de los asuntos publicos.
Completa libertad de comentar los actos de los funcionarios publicos viene a ser un escalpelo cuando se trata de la libertad de la
palabra. La penetrante incision de la tinta libra a la burocracia del absceso. Los hombres que se dedican a la vida publica podran
ser victimas de una acusacion injusta y hostil; pero podra calmarse la herida con el balsamo que proporciona una conciencia
tranquila. El funcionario publico no debe ser demasiado quisquilloso con respecto a los comentarios de sus actos oficiales. Tan
solo en esta forma puede exaltarse la mente y la dignidad de los individuos. Desde luego que la critica no debe autorizar la
 difamacion. Con todo, como el individuo es menos que el Estado, debe esperarse que sobrelleve la critica en beneficio de la
comunidad. Elevandose a mayor altura que todos los funcionarios o clases de funcionarios, que el Jefe Ejecutivo, que la
Legislatura, que el Poder Judicial — que cualesquiera o sobre todas las dependencias del Gobierno — la opinion publica debe ser
el constante manantial de la libertad y de la democracia. (Veanse los casos perfectamente estudiados de Wason vs. Walter, L. R.
4 Q. B., 73, Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3 F. & F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1.)

Ahora que ya somos independientes es obvio que la republica no solo no ha de ser menos celosa que la antigua colonia en la tenencia y
conservacion de esas libertades, sino que, por el contrario, tiene que ser muchisimo mas activa y militante. Obrar de otra manera seria
como borrar de una plumada nuestras mas preciosas conquistas en las jornadas mas brillantes de nuestra historia. Seria como renegar de lo
mejor de nuestro pasado: Rizal; Marcelo H. del Pilar, Bonifacio, Mabini, Quezon, y otros padres inmortales de la patria. Seria, en una
palabra, como si de un golpe catastrofico se echara abajo la recia fabrica de la democracia filipina que tanta sangre y tantos sacrificios ha
costado a nuestro pueblo, y en su lugar se erigiera el tinglado de una dictadura de opera bufa, al amparo de caciquillos y despotillas que
pondrian en ridiculo el pais ante el mundo . . . Es evidente que no hemos llegado a estas alturas, en la trabajosa ascension hacia la cumbre
de nuestros destinos, para permitir que ocurra esa tragedia.

No nos compete determinar el grado de certeza de los fraudes e irregularidades electorales que la coalicion minoritaria trataba de airear en
el mitin en cuestion con vistas a recabar del gobierno y del pueblo el propio y correspondiente remedio. Pudieran ser reales o pudieran ser
imaginarios, en todo o en parte. Pero de una cosa estamos absolutamente seguros y es que la democracia no puede sobrevivir a menos que
este fundada sobre la base de un sufragio efectivo, sincero, libre, limpio y ordenado. El colegio electoral es el castillo, mejor todavia, el
baluarte de la democracia. Suprimid eso, y la democracia resulta una farsa.

Asi que todo lo que tienda a establecer un sufragio efectivo4 no solo no debe ser reprimido, sino que debe ser alentado. Y para esto, en
general para la salud de la republica, no hay mejor profilaxis, no hay mejor higiene que la critica libre, la censura desembarazada.
Solamente se pueden corregir los abusos permitiendo que se denuncien publicamente sin trabas sin miedo.5 Esta es la mejor manera de
asegurar el imperio de la ley por encima de la violencia.

HILADO, J., dissenting:

Because the constitutional right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances has been here invoked on behalf of petitioner, it has
been considered doubly necessary to expound at length the grounds of my dissent. We are all ardent advocates of this right, whenever and
wherever properly exercisable. But, in considering the legal problem here presented serenely and dispassionately, as I had to, I arrived at a
different conclusion from that of the majority.

(a) Right not absolute but subject to regulation. — It should be recognized that this right is not absolute and is subject to reasonable
regulations. (Philippine Constitutional Law by Malcolm and Laurel, 3d ed., p. 407; Commonwealth vs. Abrahams, 156 Mass., 57, 30 N.E.
79.)

Messers. Malcolm and Laurel say: "The right of peaceful assemblage is not an absolute one. Assemblies are subject to reasonable
regulations."

In the above cited case of Commonwealth vs. Abrahams, which is cited in support of the text on page 407 of the above cited work on
Philippine Constitutional Law by Malcolm and Laurel, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered and decided a case
involving a regulation by the Board of Park Commissioners forbidding all persons "to make orations, harangues, or loud outcries" in a
certain park, under penalty of $20, except upon prior consent of the board. The defendant requested permission to deliver an oration in the
park, which was refused by the board, and thereafter entered the park, and delivered an "oration or harangue" about ten or fifteen minutes
in length. In a criminal trial of said defendant for violating the rules promulgated by the Board of Park Commissioners, said rules were
held valid and reasonable, and not inconsistent with article 19 of the Bill of Rights (of the Massachusetts Constitution), providing that "the
people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good, give instructions to their
representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done
them, and of the grievances they suffer." In that case the defendant admitted that the people would not have the right to assemble for the
purposes specified in the public streets, and might not have such right in the public gardens or on the common, because such an assembly
would or might be inconsistent with the public use for which these places are held. And the Supreme Court of Massachusetts said:

". . . . The same reasons apply to any particular park. The parks of Boston are designed for the use of the public generally; and
whether the use of any park or a part of any park can be temporarily set aside for the use of any portion of the public, is for the
park commissioners to decide, in the exercise of a wise discretion."
In the above-quoted case it appears from the statement of facts preceding the opinion that within the limits of Franklin Park, there
involved, were large areas not devoted to any special purpose and not having any shrubbery that would be injured by the gathering thereon
of a large concourse of people; that defendant's speech contained nothing inflammatory or seditious, and was delivered in an ordinary
oratorical tone; that at the close of the oration the audience quietly dispersed; and that no injury of any kind was done to the park. Still, it
was held that the regulation under which the Board of Park Commissioners denied the permission to deliver said oration requested by the
defendant was valid and was not inconsistent with that provision of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights guaranteeing to the people the "right,
in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good, give instructions to their representatives, and to
request of the legislative body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the
grievances they suffer."

In the case at bar, the Mayor of Manila had the duty and the power, inter alia, "to grant and refuse municipal . . . permits of all classes . . .
for any (other) good reason of general interest" (Rev. Ad. Code, section 2434 [b]-[m]; italics ours); and "to comply with and enforce and
give the necessary orders for the faithful enforcement and execution of the laws and ordinances in effect within the jurisdiction of the
city." [Ibid., section 2434 (b)-(a)]; and among the general powers and duties of the Municipal Board, whose ordinances the said Mayor
was at once bound and empowered to comply with and enforce, were such as "regulate the use of streets, . . . parks, . . . and other public
places." [Ibid., section 2444 (u); italics ours.]

Another legal doctrine which should not be lost sight of is that, without abridging the right of assembly and petition, the government may
regulate the use of places — public places — wholly within its control, and that the state or municipality may require a permit for public
gatherings in public parks and that, while people have the right to assemble peaceably on the highways and to parade on streets,
nevertheless the state may regulate the use of the streets by requiring a permit (16 C. J. S., p. 642). In our government the state, through
the Charter of Manila, has conferred certain powers pertinent to the subject under consideration upon the City Mayor, and upon the
Municipal Board. Among these is the duty and power of said Mayor "to grant and refuse municipal . . . permits of all classes . . . for any
good reason of general interest" (italics ours), and the power and duty of the Municipal Board "to regulate the use . . . of street, . . . parks, .
. . and other public places . . ." (italics ours), already above discussed.

Plaza Miranda in a way is a public square or plaza, and in another sense, in view of its more frequent public use, is a public place devoted
to traffic between several streets which empty into it within the district of Quiapo. It is a fact of common knowledge and within the
judicial notice of this Court that said plaza is one of the public places constantly used by an usually great number of people during all
hours of the day and up to late hours of the night, both for vehicular and for pedestrian traffic. It is one of the centers of the city where a
heavy volume of traffic during those hours converges and from which it again proceeds in all directions; and the holding during those
hours of a meeting, assembly or rally of the size and nature of that contemplated by petitioner and those belonging to the Coalesced
Minority Parties when the permit in question was requested from the City Mayor, must have been expected to greatly inconvenience and
interfere with the right of the public in general to devote said plaza to the public uses for which it has been destined since time
immemorial.

The rule may perhaps be more aptly stated by saying that the right of peaceful assembly and petition is not absolute but subject to
regulation as regards the time, place, and manner of its exercise. As to time, it seems evident, for example, that the State, directly or
through the local government of the city or municipality, by way of regulation of the right of free speech, may validly prohibit the delivery
of speeches on public streets near private residences between midnight and dawn. As to place, we have the example of the instant case
involving Plaza Miranda or any other public place. And as to manner, it is a familiar rule that the freedom of speech does not authorize the
speaker to commit slander or defamation, and that laws and ordinances aimed at preventing such abuses are valid regulations of the right.
Among other cases which may be cited on the same point, we have that of Hague vs. Committee on Industrial Organization, 307 U. S.,
496, 83 Law. ed., 1423, cited in the majority opinion and from which the following passage is copied from the quotation therefrom in the
said opinion:

". . . The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions
may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged
or denied." (Italics ours.)

I construe this declaration of principles by the United States Supreme Court to imply that where the regulatory action is predicated upon
the "general comfort and convenience," and is "in consonance with peace and good order," as in the instant case, such action is regulation
and not "guise of regulation," and therefore does not abridge or deny the right.

(b) No constitutional right to use public places under government control, for exercise of right of assembly and petition, etc. —

Indeed, carefully analyzed, the action taken by the City Mayor was not even a regulation of the constitutional right of assembly and
petition, or free speech, claimed by petitioner, but rather of the use of a public place under the exclusive control of the city government for
the exercise of that right. This, I submit, is a distinction which must be clearly maintained throughout this discussion. No political party or
section of our people has any constitutional right to freely and without government control make use of such a public place as Plaza
Miranda, particularly if such use is a deviation from those for which said public places have been by their nature and purpose
immemorially dedicated. In other words, the City Mayor did not attempt to have anything to do with the holding of the "indignation rally"
or the delivery of speeches thereat on the date desired at any place over which said mayor had no control — his action was exclusively
confined to the regulation of the use of Plaza Miranda for such a purpose and at such a time. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a
unanimous court in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 85 Law. ed., 1049, 1054, said:

If a municipality has authority to control the uses of its public streets for parades or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it can not
be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place, and manner in relation to the other proper
uses of the streets. We find it impossible to say that the limited authority conferred by the licensing provisions of the statute in
question as thus construed by the state court contravened any constituional right. (emphasis ours).

That case was concerened with a prosecution of sixty-eigth "Jehovah's Witnesses" in a municipal court in the State of New Hampshire for
violation of a state statute prohibiting a "parade or procession" upon a public street without a special license. The appellants invoked the
constitutional right of free speech and press, as well as that of the assembly. The judgment of the municipal court was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire and that of the latter was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. Among other things, the
United States Supreme Court said that the appellants were not prosecuted for distributing leaflets, or for conveying information by
placards or otherwise, or for issuing invitations to a public meeting, or for holding a public meeting, of for maintaining or expressing
religious beliefs. Their right to do any of these things apart from engaging in a "parade or procession," upon a public street was not
involved in the case. The question of the validity of a statute addressed to any other sort of conduct than that complained of was declared
not to be before the court (85 Law. ed., 1052). By analogy, I may that in the instant case the constitutional rights of free speech, assmebly,
and petition are not before the court but merely the privilege of petitioner and the Coalesced Minorities to exercise any or all of said rights
by using Plaza Miranda, a public place under the complete control of the city government. In the same case of Cox vs. New
Hampshire, supra, Chief Justice Hughes, in his opinion, used the following eloquent language:.

"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in
order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent
with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control
of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of
highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it can not be disregarded by the
attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protectio. One would not be justified in
ignoring the familiar red lightbecause he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means
to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinion...." (85 Law. ed., 1052-1053.).

In other words, when the use of public streets or places is involved, public convenience, public safety and public order take precedence
over even particular civil rights. For if the citizen asserting the civil right were to override the right of the general public to the use of such
streets or places, just because it is guaranteed by the constitution, it would be hard to conceive how upon the same principle that citizen be
prevented from using the private property of his neighbor for the exercise of the asserted right. The constitution, in guaranteeing the right
of peaceful assembly and petition, the right of free speech, etc., does not guarantee their exercise upon public places, any more than upon
private premises, without government regulation in both cases, of the owners' consent in the second..

In Davis vs. Commonwealth, 167 U. S. 43, 42 Law. ed., 71, 72, the United States Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then of the latter tribunal, quoted from said decision
as follows:.

"...As representatives of the public it (legislature) may and does excercise control over the use which the public may make of
such places (public parks and streets), and it may and does delegate more or less of such control to the city or town immediately
concerned. For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an
infringement of the rights of the member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no
proprietary right interferes the legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the
dedication to public uses. So it may take the lesser step of limiting the public use to certain purposes. See Dill. Mun. Corp. secs.
393, 407, 651, 656, 666; Brooklyn Park Comrs. vs. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234, 243, 244 (6 Am. Rep. 70)....".

(c) Authorities cited.--.

I have examined the citations of authorities in the majority opinion. Most of the cases therin cited are, I think, inapplicable to the oune
under consideration, and those which may have some application, I believe reinforce this dissent. None of them was for mandamus to
compel the granting of a permit for holding a meeting, assembly or the like, upon a public place within the control of the general or local
government..
The fact that a law or municipal ordinance under which a person had been prosecuted for delivering a speech without the required permit,
for example, was declared unconstitutional or otherwise void for delegating an unfettered or arbitrary discretion upon the lisencing
authority, thus completely failing to confer the discretion, does not mean that such person has the right by mandamus to force said
authority to grant him the permit. If, in such case, the law or ordinance, conferring the discretion, is unconstitutional or void,
the mandamus suit becomes entirely idle. Such a suit would involve self-contradictory proposition, for the very idea of a permit is
something which may be granted or witheld. He who has the power to grant permission for the doing of an act necessarily has the
correlative power to deny the permission. A "permit" which under no conditions or circumstances and at no time can be refused needs a
different name..

Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, was concerned with a statute of the State of New Hampshire which was construed
by the Supreme Court of the same State as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse the license, and was held
valid both by said Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States..

In our case, section 2434 (b)-(m) of the Revised Administrative Code does not confer upon the Mayor of Manila an unfettered discretion
to grant or refuse the permit--his power to grant or to refuse the permit is controlled and limited by the all important requirement of the
same section that whatever his determination, it should be "for any good reason of general interest.".

In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 Ill., 430, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois held that the power of City councils under the state
law to regulate the use of the public streets could not be delegated by them, and therefore could not be delegated to the superintendent of
police. But in our case, the power of the City Mayor under the Revised Administrative Code has not been delegated by the Municipal
Board of Manila but has been directly conferred by the State through its legislature. .

In State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585, what was involved was a city ordinance committing to the unrestrained will of public
officer the power to determine the rights of parties under the ordinance without anything (to guide or control his action.) In our case, as
already stated, the city mayor received his power from the State through the Legislature which enacted the Revised Administrative Code,
and moreover, his action therein provided to be guided and controlled by the already mentioned requirement that whether he grants or
refuses a municipal premit of any class it shall be for some "good reason of general interest," and not as his unfettered will may dictate..

The case of In re Fradzee, 63 Mich., 399, involved a city ordinance declared unreasonable and void by the Supreme Court of Michigan,
the ordinance prohibiting certain uses of the public streets of the City of Grand Rapids "without having first obtained the consent of the
Mayor or Common Council of said City." The ordinance did not prescribe any guide, control or limitation for, of, and to, the exercise of
the power thus conferred upon the mayor or common council. The following passage from the quotation from the decision of the Supreme
Court of Michigan made in the majority opinion would seem to reinforce the stand taken in this dissent..

"...We must therefore construe this Charter and the powers it assumes to grant, so far as it is not plainly unconstitutional, as only
conferring such power over the subjects referred to as will enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in accordance
with the limitations and conditions required by the rights of the people themselves, as secured by the principles of law, which
cannot be less careful of private rights under a constitution than under the common law..

"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and disorder in the cities than in smaller towns or
in rural places. This may justify reasonable precautionary measures, but nothing further; and no inference can extend beyond the
fair scope of powers granted for such a purpose and no grant of absolute discretion to suppress lawful action altogether can be
granted at all...." (emphasis ours.)

The instant case is concerned with an "indignation rally" to be held at one of the busiest and most frequented public places in this big
cosmopolitan city, with a present population estimated to be 150 per cent larger than its prewar population, and the public officer who was
being called upon to act on the petition for permit was the chief executive of the city who was by reason of his office the officer most
directly responsible for the keeping and maintenance of peace and public order for the common good. And as stated elsewhere in this
dissent, his power in the premises was not without control, limitation or guide and, lastly, the action taken by him was not an absolute
suppression of the right claimed but was merely a postponement of the use of a public place for the excercise of that right when popular
passions should have calmed down and public excitement cooled off sufficiently to better insure the avoidance of public peace and order
being undermined..

Rich vs. Mapervill, 42 Ill. Ap., 222, had to do with another city ordinance. The court there held that when men in authority are permitted
in their discretion to excercise "power so arbitrary , liberty is subverted, and the spirit of our free institution violated." (Emphasis ours.)
This is not our case, as the power of the Manila Mayor now under consideration is not at all arbitrary. It was further held in that case that
where the granting of the permit is left to the unregulated discretion of a small body of city alderman, th ordinance can not be other than
partial and discriminating in its practical operation. The case at bar is radically different for, as already shown, the discretion of the City
Mayor here is not unregulated, for the phrase "any good reason of general interest" is certainly an effective regulatory condition precedent
to the exercise of the power one way or the other. And just as certainly the reasons alleged by the respondent Mayor for his action stated
in his letters dated November 15 and 17, 1947, addressed to petitioner and in his affidavit Annex 1, seem entirely well founded and well
taken, consideration being had of his grave responsibilities as the immediate keeper of peace and public order in the city. Elsewhere in this
dissent we quote from said documents textually..

On page 13 of the majority opinion there is aquotation of anothe passage from the case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, supra, which says:.

"As regualtion of the use of the streets for parades or processions is a traditional exercise of control by local government, the
question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly
and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with
resort to public places.".

The above rule means that if the control exerted does not deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly, such control is legally
valid. This is precisely our case, since the respondent Mayor neither denied not unwarrantedly abridged the right asserted by petitioner
and his companions. If the postponement of the granting of the permit should be taken as a denial of the right, then we would practically
be denying the discretion of the proper official for it would be tantamount to compelling him to grant the permit outright, which could
necessarily mean that he can never refuse the permit, for one who cannot even postpone the granting of such permit much less can
altogether refuse it. .

Hague vs, Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 83 Law. ed., 1423, apart from being clearly distinguishable from the
instant case as later demonstrated, contains the passage quoted on page 7 of this dissent, which decidedly supports it. The distinction
between that case and this is that there "the ordinance deals only with the exercise of the right of assembly for the purpose of
communicating views entertained by speakers, and is not a general measure to promote the public convenience in the use of the streets or
parks" (83 Law. ed., 1436); while in the instant case section 2434 (b)-(m) of the Revised Administrative Code is not solely aimed at
prhibition of any particular act for it likewise provides permission, and in both cases is expressly aimed at promoting the "general
interest." .

Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 95 Law, ed., 1049, is equally in solid support of this dissent as appears from No. 2 of the
syllabus therein:.

"A statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local
authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the
statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration
of time, place, and manner, of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an
opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse licenses, but are required
to exercise their discretion free from the improper or inappropriate consideration and from unfair discrimination." (Emphasis
ours.).

In empowering and directing the City Mayor to grant or refuse permits "for any...good reason of general interest," the Revised
Administrative Code plainly has in view only the common good and excludes all "improper or inappropriate considerations" and "unfair
discrimination" in the exercise of the granted discretion.

Lastly, as between Hague vs, Committee fro Industrial Organization, supra, and Cox vs. State of New Hampshire supra, the choice is
obvious with regard to their authoritative force, when it is considered that in the former out of the nine Justices of the United States
Supreme Court two did not take part and of the seven who dis only two, Justices Roberts and Black, subscribed the opinion from which
the majority here quote, while in the latter (Cox vs. State of New Hampshire) the decision was unanimous..

(d) Mandamus unavailable.--- .

Mc Quillin on Municipal Cororations, 2nd ed., Revised, Volume 6, p. 848, section 2714, expresses the rule obtaining in the United States
that the immunity from judicial control appertaining to the Office of the Governor of the State, or to the Presidency of the United States,
does not attach to the mayoralty of a city. But on page 878, section 2728, ha has the following to say on the unavailability of mandamus to
compel the granting of licenses and permits by municipal officers:.

"SEC. 2728. To compel the granting of licenses and permits.--If the issuance of the license or permit is discretionary with the
officer or municipal board, it is clear that it cannot be compelled by mandamus. The cases rarely, if ever, depart from this well
established rule, and in consequence in doubtful cases the judicial decisions uniformly disclose a denial of the remedy. As
already stated, the fundamental condition is that the petition must show a clear legal right to the writ and a plain neglect of duty
on the part of the public officer to perform the act sought to be enforced. For example, one who seeks to compel a city to issue to
him a permit for the erection of a buiding must show compliance with all valid requirements of the building ordinances and
regulations..
 "The granting of licenses or permits by municipal or other public authorities, as mentioned, is usually regarded as a discretionary
duty, and hence, ordinarily mandamus will not lie to compel them to grant a license or issue a permit to one claiming to be
entitled thereto, especially where it is not alleged and shown that the exercise of such discretion was arbitrary. All the court can
do is to see that the licensing authorities have proceeded according to law. Their decision will not be reviewed on its merits.
Where, however, refusal to grant a license or to issue a permit, as said above, is arbitrary or capricious mandamus will lie to
compel the appropriate official action...." .

To my mind, the following reasons, alleged by the respondent mayor, negative all element of arbitrariness in his official action:.

"...please be advised that upon reading the metropolitan newspapers this morning wherein it appears that your meeting will be an
indignation rally at which all the supposed election frauds allegedly perpetrated in many parts of the Philippines for the purpose
of overriding the popular will, will be bared before the people, this office hereby revokes the said permit..

"It is believed that public peace and order in Manila will be undermined at the proposed rally considering the passions have not
as yet subsided and tension remains high as an aftermath of the last political contest..

"According to the same newspapers, delegates from the provinces and students from local universities will particpate in the said
rally which, in my opinion, would only precipitate trouble since no guarantee can be given that only the opposition elements will
be there. The moment the crowd becomes mixed with people of different political colors which is most likely to happen, public
order is exposed to danger once the people are incited, as they will be incited, considering the purposes for which the meeting
will be held as reported in the newspapers above mentioned..

"...." (Mayor's letter dated November 15, 1947.).

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 7, 1947, requesting for a permit to hold a public meeting at
Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, on Saturday, November 22, 1947, for the purpose of denouncing the alleged fraudulent manner in which
the last elections have been conducted and the alleged nationwide flagrant violation of the Election Law, and of seeking redress
therefor. It is regretted that for the same reasons stated in my letter of November 15, 1947, your request can not be granted for the
present. This Office has adopted the policy of not permitting meetings of this nature which are likely to incite the people and
disrupt the peace until the results of the elections shall have been officially announced. After this announcement, requests similar
to yours will be granted..

"...." (Mayor's letter dated November 17, 1947.).

"That according to Congressman Primicias, the meeting will be an indignation rally for the purpose of denouncing the alleged
fraudulent manner the said elections were conducted and the nationwide falgrant violations of the Election Law;.

"2. That it is a fact that the returns of the last elections are still being recounted in the City of Manila in the Commission on
Elections, and pending the final announcement of the results thereof, passions, especially on the part of the losing groups, remain
bitter and high;.

"3. That allusions have been made in the metropolitan newspapers that in the case of defeat, there will be minority resignations in
Congress, rebellion and even revolution in the country;.

"4. That I am sure that the crowd that will attend said meeting will be a multitude of people of different and varied political
sentiments;.

"5. ....... .

"6. That judging from the tenor of the request for permit and taking into consideration the circumstances under which said
meeting will be held, it is safe to state that once the people are gathered thereat are incited, there will surely be trouble between
the opposing elements, commotion will follow, and then peace and order in Manila will be disrupted; and.

"7. That the denial of said request for permit has been made for no other reasons except to perform my duty as Mayor of Manila
to maintain and preserve peace and order in this City..

8. That I have assured Congressman Primicias that immediately after the election returns shall have been officially announced,
the Nacionalista Party or any party will be granted permit to hold meetings of indignation and to denounce alleged faruds."
(Annex 1, Answer.).
For these and other reasons which could be advanced in corroboration, I am of the considered opinion that the respondent Mayor had
under the law the requisite discretion to grant or refuse the permit requested, and therefore to revoke that which had previously been
granted, and that the reasons for such revocation alleged in his letters dated November 15 and 17, 1947, to petitioner and in his affidavit
Annex 1 were amply sufficient to justify his last action. And be it distinctly observed that this last action was not an absolute denial of the
permit, but a mere postponement of the time for holding the "rally" for good reasons "of general interest" in the words of section 2434 (b)-
(m) of the Revised Admninistrative Code..

TUASON, J., dissenting:.

I join in Mr. Hilado's dissent and wish to add a few remarks..

As Mr. Justice Hilado says, freedom of speech, of the press, and of peaceble assemblage, is only an incidental issue in this case. No one
will contest the proposition that the mayor or the Congress itself may stop the petitioner and his men from meeting peacebly and venting
their grievances in a private place. The main issue rather is the extent of the right of any group of people to use a public street or a public
plaza for a purpose other than that for which it is dedicated..

The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not prevent the government from regulating the use of places within its control. A law or
ordinance may forbid the delivery of addresses on the public parks, or on the streets as a valid exrcise of police power. (12 C. J., 954)
Rights of assembly and of petition are not absolute rights and are to be construed with regard to the general law. (16 C.J.S., 640) Indeed,
"the privileges of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for the communication of views on national questions...must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience." (Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 83
Law. ed., 1433) And so long as the municpal authorities act within the legitimate scope of their police power their discretion is not subject
to outside interference or judicial revsion or reversal (14 C. J., 931.).

The mayor did not act capriciously or arbitrarily in withholding or postponing the permit applied for by the petitioner. His reasons were
real, based on contemporary events of public knowledge, and his temporary refusal was reasonably calculated to avoid possible
disturbances as well as to adavance and protect the public in the proper use of the most congested streets and public plaza in an
overcrowded city. There was reason to fear disturbances, not from the petitioner and his men but from elements who had no connection
with the holding of the meeting but who, having gripes, might be easily excited to violence by inflammatory harangues when nerves were
on edge. The fact that no untoward incident occurred does not prove the judiciousness of this Court's resolution. The court is not dealing
with an isolated case; it is laying down a rule of transcendental importance and far-reaching consequences, in the administration of cities
and towns. If nothing happened, it is well to remember that, according to newspapers, 500 policemen were detailed to prevent possible
disorder at the gathering. It should also be borne in mind that vehicular traffic in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda had to be suspended and
vehicles had to be rerouted, during and after the meeting. All of which entailed enormous expense by the city and discomforts to the
general public..

No individual citizen or group of citizens certainly has a right to claim the use of a public plaza or public streets at such great expense and
sacrifice on the part of the city and of the rest of the community. Yet, by virtue of this Court's resolution any person or group of persons
invoking political, civil or religious freedom under the constitution is at liberty to stage a rally or parade or a religious procession, with the
mayor powerless to do anything beyond seeing to it that no two meetings or parades were held in the same place or close to each other. No
precedent in the United States, after whose institutions ours are modelled, approaches this Court's resolution in its disregard of the
government's authority to control public streets and to maintain peace and order. In an infant republic where the state of peace and order is
still far from normal, where the forces of law are far from adequate to cope with lawlessness; in a city where conditions of traffic are
among the worst if not the worst on earth, this Court sets down a principle that outstrips its prototype in "liberality", forgetting that
personal rights can only exist in a properly regulated society. As Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 61 S. Ct., 762,
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which
liberty itself would be lsot in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of the municipality to impose regulations in order to
assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties, but
rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend." To be logical, peddlers and merchants
should be given, as a matter of right, the freedom to use public streets and public squares to ply their trade, for the freedom of expression
and of assemblage is no more sacred than the freedom to make a living. Yet no one has dared make such a claim..

The cases cited in the resolution are not applicable. It will be seen that each of these cases involved the legality of a law and municipal
ordinance. And if in some of said cases a law or an ordinance was declared void, the grounds of invalidation were either discrimination or
lack of authority of the Legislature or the municipal council under the state constitution or under the law to adopt the contested measure..

As applied to Manila, there are both a law and an ordiance regulating the use of public places and the holding of meetings and parades in
such places. As long as this law and this ordinance are in force the mayor does not only have the power but it is his sworn duty to grant or
refuse a permit according to what he believes is in consonance with peace and order or is proper to promote the general comfort and
convenience of the inhabitants..

The Court says that section 2434 (m) of the Revised Administrative Code "is not a specific of substantive power independent from the
corresponding municipal ordinance which the Mayor, as Chief Executive of the City, is required to enforceunder the same section 2434."
The Court advances the opinion that because section 2444 confers upon the municipal board "the police power to regulates the use of
streets and othe public places," "It is to be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the Mayor in section
2434 (m), the same power, specially if we take into account that its exercise may be in conflict with the exercise of the same power by the
municipal board.".

Section 2434 (m) is written in the plainest language for any casual reader to understand, and it is presumed that it means what it says. This
provision certainly was not inserted in the city charter, which must have been drawn with painstaking care, for nothing. And I am aware of
no constitutional provision or constitutional maxim which prohibits the delegation by the Legislature of part of its police power affacting
local matters, directly upon the mayor instead of through the municipal board. Nor is there incompatibilty between section 2434 (m) and
section 2444 or the ordinance enacted under the latter. At any rate, section 2434 (m) is of special character while section 2444 is general,
so that, if there is any conflict between section 2434 (m) and the ordinance passed under section 2444, the former is to prevail..

This Court has already set at rest the validity, meaning any scope of section 2434 (m) in a unanimous decision with all the nine members
voting, when it sustained the mayor's refusal to grant a permit for a public meeting on a public plaza to be followed by a parade on public
streets. (Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255) The reference to section 2434 (m) in that decision was not an obiter dictum as the
majority say. The sole question presented there, as we gather from the facts disclosed, was the legality of the mayor's action, and the court
pointed to section 2434 (m) as the mayor's authority for his refusal. The fact that the mayor could have denied the petitioner's application
under the general power to prohibit a meeting for unlawful purposes did not make the disposition of the case on the strength of section
2434 (m) obiter dictum. An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered a dictum; and this rule
applies as to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the
consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement in the opinion as to a matter on which the decision is
predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is or might
have been on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the
court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. (1 C. J. S. 314-315.).

But the Court asserts that if the meaning of section 2434 (m) is what this Court said in Evangelista-Earnshaw case, then section is void. I
do not think that that provision is void--at least not yet. Until it is invalidated in the proper case and in the proper manner, the mayor's
authority in respect of the issuance of permits is to be measured by section 2434 (m) and by the municipal ordinance in so far as the
ordinance does not conflict with the law. The validity of that provision is not challenged and is nowhere in issue. It is highly improper,
contrary to the elementary rules of practice and procedure for this Court to say or declare that the provision is void. Moreover, Article
VIII, section 10, of the Constitution provides that "all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or a law shall be heard and decided
by the Supreme Court in banc, and no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of the court." Only seven voted in favor of the resolution...

1 El letrado Sr. D. Ramon Diokno, en representacion del recurrente, y el Fiscal Auxiliar de Manila D. Julio Villamor, en representacion
del recurrido..

2 Los hechos confirmaron plenamente esta presuncion; el mitin monstruo ques se celebro en la noche del 22 de Noviembre en virtud de
nuestra resolucion concediendo el presente recurso de mandamus-- el mas grande que se ghaya celebrado jamas en Manila, segun la
prensa, y al cual se calcula que assistieron unas 80,000 personas--fue completamente pacifico y ordenado, no registrandose el menor
incidente desagradable. Segun los periodicos, el mitin fue un magnifico acto de ciudadania militante y responsable, vindicatoria de la fe de
todos aquellos que jamas habian dudado de la sensatez y cultura del pueblo de Manila. .

3 Madame Roland..

4 En Mejico el lema, la consigna political es: "Sufragio efectivo, sin reelecion." Los que conocen Mejico aseguran que, merced a esta
consigna, la era de las convulsiones y guerras civiles en aquella republica ha pasado definitivamente a la historia. .

5 "No puedo pasar por alto una magistratura que contribuyo mucho a sostener el Gobierno de Roma; fue la de los censores. Hacian el
censo del pueblo, y, ademas, como la fuerza de la republica consistia en la disciplina, la austeridad de las costumbres y la observacion
constante de ciertos ritos, los censores corregian los abusos que la ley no habia previsto o que el magistrado ordinario no podia castigar.....

"El Gobierno de Roma fue admirable, porque desde su nacimiento, sea por el espiritu del pueblo, la fuerza del Senado o la autoridad de
ciertos magistrados, estaba constituido de tal modo, que todo abuso de poder pudo ser siempre corregido. .
"El Gobierno de Inglaterra es mas sabio, porque hay un cuerpo encargado de examinarlo continuamente y de examinarse a si mismo; sus
errores son de suerte que nunca se prolongan, y por el espiritu de atencion que despiertan en el pais, son a menudo utiles. .

"En una palabra: un Gobierno libre, siempre agitado, no podria mantenerse, si no es por sus propias leyes capaz de corregirse."
("Grandeza y decadencia de los romanos," por Montesquieu, pags. 74, 76 y 77.) .

G.R. No. L-7995             May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by
Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.

Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.

LABRADOR, J.:

I. The case and issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-
reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly
springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer.
Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence
and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free
the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic
dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed
to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in
case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an
exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage
in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the
business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of
aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin
the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation
or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the
police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has
only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the
form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power. —

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is
attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit
preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it?
What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly
and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive
with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent
and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to
almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest
and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the
needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the
extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that
Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The
most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

b. Limitations on police power. —

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens
alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)

c. The, equal protection clause. —

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause. —

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a
public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not
been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than
real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place,
that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the
State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in
the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other
hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the
exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable
abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the
wisdom of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation were
merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it
goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex because its subject
is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of
race, color or citizenship.

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is
unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an
infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big communities and
specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's
needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru
him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform
the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the communities
comprising the nation.

There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs,
food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around
his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle
and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-
sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait. —

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was
unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big
centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs
of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien
has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are
made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and
extremely useful.

c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the
alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly
through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of
almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles.
And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal foods
and products would easily become full and complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the
threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it
is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually impossible. The first
argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence
of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional
convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears
and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out
to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:

Assets Gross Sales

Per cent
Year and Retailers No.- Per cent
Pesos Distributio Pesos
Nationality Establishments Distribution
n
1941
:
Filipino .......... 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924 51.74
Chinese ........... 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21
Others ............ 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
1947
:
Filipino .......... 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333 57.03
Chinese ........... 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134 41.96
Others ........... 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01
1948 (Census)
:
Filipino .......... 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667 60.51
Chinese .......... 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227 38.20
Others .......... 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29
1949
:
Filipino .......... 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901 53.47
Chinese .......... 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875 45.36
 Others .......... 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17
1951
:
Filipino ......... 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052 53.07
Chinese .......... 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384 46.06
Others .......... 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Item Gross
Year and Retailer's
Assets Sales
Nationality
(Pesos) (Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 1,633

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 9,691

Others ............................................... 24,415 8,281

1947:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 2,516

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 14,934

Others .............................................. 24,749 13,919

1948: (Census)

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,111

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 24,398

Others .............................................. 24,916 23,686

1949:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,069

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 24,152

Others .............................................. 24,807 20,737

1951:

Filipino ............................................. 1,877 3,905

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 33,207

Others ............................................... 24,824 22,033

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census,
issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments already include mere
market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the
years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap
through their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in
retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The
same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers
were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino
retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the enactment of
the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien
dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the Convention
that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-
663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant or
comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines
that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that
had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed.,
p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection
with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:

But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and that if such a
situation should remain, political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is
not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence,
largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has
to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the
same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the
protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien
interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen, manufacturers and producers
believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is
Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved
on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears,
alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. We,
therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that
compose the Filipino community.

e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing
feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough
organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the
determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they
would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national
economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at
their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or
importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens
would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the
producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers,
find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.

We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave abuses have
characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook
or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in the retail
trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at
some time or other they have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and
enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming
public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their
continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential commodities,
such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for
price control convictions; that they have secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of
supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in
unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and
money into and out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful
authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of
graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and
by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the
above practices.

The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future. The present dominance of the alien
retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity.
We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized
and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe
no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life,
his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.

f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility,
prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized
representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of
police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection
of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is
attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally
lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard,
sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting
them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The
experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his
profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth.
He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the
country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed
be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of
commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of
which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the
existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the
alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate
distinction can be found between one and the other.

b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient
grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's
classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is
actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare
that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the
equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we
can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the
application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:

. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the
adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does
not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some
inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the
classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially
arbitrary."

c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been affirmatively decided in this
jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity
of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in
coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was
held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting
the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We
held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that
the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal
protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval
the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:

"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of
spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of
which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every
commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of
American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an
American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to
confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by
foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in
the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."

The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the
limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a
class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between
citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that
no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the
following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare, good
order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309
(Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be
the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be
sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire
social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S.
Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard
rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and
allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted
classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative
appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs.
Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the
business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of
police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P.
151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to have
different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of
pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of
Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the
decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even
the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the
issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power
over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was
no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of
Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources.
In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-
born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the
classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.

d. Authorities contra explained. —

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the distinction between aliens and
citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public interest
involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine
law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main
reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that
the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct
its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be derived from the operations of
the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins,
30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and
place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which
attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery,
47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore
no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic
consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's
economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations
on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can
do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the
distinction between the alien and the national, thus:

. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge of our laws,
customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology
from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first
to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed under
entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed
toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I
have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible
reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of
legislation. . . . .

VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the United
States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .

xxx     xxx     xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to
override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
 discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)

Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police power in a
constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire
whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it
imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .

xxx     xxx     xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it affects, must not be for
the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:

. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:

In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the operation of a
business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has
a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that
power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.

b. Petitioner's argument considered. —

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential to the
orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to
prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this
country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and
unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and
welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien,
thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a
deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is
the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in
question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control
and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into
effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have
infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from
having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who
owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in
our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the
mercy of other people.

In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of
their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a
power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it respects existing rights.
 The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and
liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own
race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives
that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative
authority.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. —

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of such
a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution
must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people,
their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing
their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from
approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced
that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to
engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the
Memorandum for the Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a
principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines
the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines."
The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?

The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the radical measures is,
therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the
nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public interest and national
survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through
adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made
prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their
lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon
conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not
have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and
purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into
the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the
necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold
views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and
we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which
are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase
because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there
may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the
supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it
conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional
provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
 No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or the public of the nature,
scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of
the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily
and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the
law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term
regulation.

Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating
liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)

Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title
to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to
minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the subject of regulating
the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in
connection with the thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no
absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or
only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)

The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not be an index to the entire
contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question
adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the
regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from
"regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have
made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under
which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the
purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and
study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the nature of the
law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a
great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of
the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes
no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp.
29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights
can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from
engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated
by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even
supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S.
vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs.
Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law
is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power
and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title,
and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to
be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the
aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time
comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does
not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law
should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an the Act passed by the Congress and duly
approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule does not preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act offends
against a provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the due process of law and the
equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does not infringe upon them, insofar as it affects associations, partnership or
corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have not been
engaged in the retail business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does not violate said clauses insofar as the Act applies to
associations and partnerships referred to in the Act and to aliens, who are and have heretofore been engaged in said business. When they
did engage in the retail business there was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it. They assumed and believed in good faith they
were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act allows aliens to continue in business until their death or voluntary retirement from the
business or forfeiture of their license; and corporations, associations or partnership, the capital of which is not wholly owned by the
citizens of the Philippines to continue in the business for a period of ten years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or
until the expiry of term of the existence of the association or partnership or corporation, whichever event comes first. The prohibition on
corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period of more
than ten years from the date of the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence, whichever event comes first, is
valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence of such corporations is subject to whatever the Congress may impose
reasonably upon them by subsequent legislation.1 But the prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and partnerships, the
capital of which is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the approval of the Act, even before the
end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is
transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a deprivation of their property
without due process of law. To my mind, the ten-year period from the date of the approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of
the existence of the association and partnership, whichever event comes first, and the six-month period granted to alien heirs of a deceased
alien, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of the law, because the effect of the prohibition is to
compel them to sell or dispose of their business. The price obtainable at such forced sale of the business would be inadequate to reimburse
and compensate the associates or partners of the associations or partnership, and the alien heirs of a deceased alien, engaged in the retail
business for the capital invested in it. The stock of merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business. The
goodwill that the association, partnership and the alien had built up during a long period of effort, patience and perseverance forms part of
such business. The constitutional provisions that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law 2 and that no
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws3 would have no meaning as applied to associations or partnership and alien heirs of
an alien engaged in the retail business if they were to be compelled to sell or dispose of their business within ten years from the date of the
approval of the Act and before the end of the term of the existence of the associations and partnership as agreed upon by the associations
and partners and within six months after the death of their predecessor-in-interest.
The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the ownership of private agricultural lands which
together with the lands of the public domain constitute the priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise
and prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such lands.4

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations and partnership referred to therein to
wind up their retail business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their existence
as agreed upon by the associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the aliens engaged in the retail business in his
lifetime his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, are invalid, for they violate the due process of law and the equal protection
of the laws clauses of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991

HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners,

vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

Jejomar C. Binay for himself and for his co-petitioner.

Manuel D. Tamase and Rafael C. Marquez for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati
is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

The pertinent facts are:

On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which reads:

A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY
THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO
 A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURY. (Rollo, Annnex "A" p. 39)

Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed
two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five
hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati. (Reno, Annex "13", p. 41)

Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 43).

Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary
findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the implementation
thereof. (Rollo, Annex "D", P. 44)

Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo, pp. 45 and 48, respectively) filed by petitioners Mayor Jejomar Binay, were
denied by respondent in its Decision No. 1159, in the following manner:

Your request for reconsideration is predicated on the following grounds, to wit:

1. Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council of Makati and the intended disbursements fall within the twin
principles of 'police power and parens patriae and

2. The Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), under a Certification, dated June 5, 1989, has already appropriated the amount
of P400,000.00 to implement the Id resolution, and the only function of COA on the matter is to allow the financial assistance in
question.

The first contention is believed untenable. Suffice it to state that:

a statute or ordinance must have a real substantial, or rational relation to the public safety, health, morals, or general
welfare to be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power. The mere assertion by the legislature that a statute
relates to the public health, safety, or welfare does not in itself bring the statute within the police power of a state for
there must always be an obvious and real connection between the actual provisions of a police regulations and its
avowed purpose, and the regulation adopted must be reasonably adapted to accomplish the end sought to be attained.
16 Am. Jur 2d, pp. 542-543; emphasis supplied).

Here, we see no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s.
1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati.

Anent the second contention, let it be stressed that Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered
thereby should be for a public purpose, i.e., that the disbursement of the amount of P500.00 as burial assistance to a bereaved
family of the Municipality of Makati, or a total of P400,000.00 appropriated under the Resolution, should be for the benefit of the
whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present
case. On this point government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes. (Cf. Section 4[2], P.D. 1445).
(pp. 50-51, Rollo)

Bent on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the Municipality of Makati, through its Council, passed Resolution No. 243, re-affirming
Resolution No. 60 (Rollo, Annex "H", p. 52).

However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to
file this special civil action of certiorari praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void.

The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is
founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is
securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository
of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere
fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair
intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring
powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable
for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as
are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation
and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers.
(Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures of
the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public
necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the
municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact
such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law,
and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve
public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of
property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to
promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."

Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute
of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it
depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the
enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social
system rests. (16 C.J.S., P. 896) However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must
follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).

In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained
under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." (Rollo, Annex
"G", p. 51).

Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the
inhabitants of Makati."

In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring
the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide
for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to
all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a
wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare
of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest
welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of
comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which
shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered
thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality
and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).

COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared
towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section
5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid." (Comment, p. 12)

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police
power in the promotion of the common good.

There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified.
Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of
the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage
of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our
government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of
a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies
the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however
must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate
dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is hereby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's
Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 178552, October 05, 2010 ]

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE SOUTH-SOUTH NETWORK (SSN) FOR
NON-STATE ARMED GROUP ENGAGEMENT, AND ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 178554]

KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER LABOG, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO V.
USTAREZ AND SECRETARY GENERAL ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, AND CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DAISY ARAGO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NORBERTO GONZALES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, HON. RAUL GONZALES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. RONALDO PUNO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP
CHIEF OF STAFF, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 178581]

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL ALLIANCE BINDING WOMEN FOR REFORMS, INTEGRITY,
EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP AND ACTION (GABRIELA), KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY),
SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE WORKERS, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG
KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH
ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, RENATO
CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN OSB, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA LICHAUCO, COL.
GERRY CUNANAN (RET.), CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA, DR. CAROLINA PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, RENATO REYES,
DANILO RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE LESUS, RITA BAUA, REY CLARO CASAMBRE, PETITIONERS, VS. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO
GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI),
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON,
THE PNP, INCLUDING ITS INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE ELEMENTS, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 178890]

KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, REPRESENTED HEREIN BY DR. EDELINA
DE LA PAZ, AND REPRESENTING THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS: HUSTISYA, REPRESENTED BY EVANGELINE
HERNANDEZ AND ALSO ON HER OWN BEHALF; DESAPARECIDOS, REPRESENTED BY MARY GUY PORTAJADA AND
ALSO ON HER OWN BEHALF, SAMAHAN NG MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT PARA SA AMNESTIYA
(SELDA), REPRESENTED BY DONATO CONTINENTE AND ALSO ON HIS OWN BEHALF, ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT
FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE (EMJP), REPRESENTED BY BISHOP ELMER M. BOLOCON, UCCP, AND PROMOTION OF
CHURCH PEOPLE'S RESPONSE, REPRESENTED BY FR. GILBERT SABADO, OCARM, PETITIONERS, VS. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARTY
EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO
GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI),
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON,
THE PNP, INCLUDING ITS INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE ELEMENTS, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 179157]

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), REPRESENTED BY ATTY. FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, COUNSELS
FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY (CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL AND FORMER SENATORS
SERGIO OSMEÑA III AND WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
AND THE MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 179461]

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST), GABRIELA-ST, KATIPUNAN NG MGA

SAMAHYANG MAGSASAKA-TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL
LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS, ANAKBAYAN-ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISA'T UGNAYAN NG
MGA MAGBUBUKID SA LAGUNA (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN SA TABING RILES (SMTR-ST),
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA SA REPORMANG
AGRARYO KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT
UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSÑOS
RURAL POOR ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS & EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIÑO LAJARA, TEODORO REYES,
FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, JANNETTE E. BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE CLARO, SALLY P.
ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE BELTRAN, PETITIONERS, VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMEN T SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINCANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES,
 NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY
(NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL
DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, INCLUDING ITS INTELLIGENCE AND
INVESTIGATIVE ELEMENTS, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and
Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,[1] signed into law on March 6, 2007.

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,[2] petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government
organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July
16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552.  On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-
Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective
officers[3] who are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
178554.

The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for
Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned
Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE),
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan,
Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance
for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers,[4] and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina
Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos,
Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.

On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa
Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church People's
Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective officers[5] who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.

On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL), [6] Senator Ma. Ana
Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmeña III, and Wigberto E. Tañada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
179157.

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern
Tagalog Region,[7] and individuals[8] followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.

Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council[9] composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions,
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary
Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary
Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members.  All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar
Calderon.

The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for
the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration,
Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and
the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.

The petitions fail.

Petitioners' resort to
certiorari is improper

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1.  Petition for certiorari.--When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz:  (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.[10]

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two
superfluous.

Petitioners lack locus standi

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[11]

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary[12] summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action,
and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the military;
whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

While Chavez v. PCGG[13] holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is
in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether
different genus of constitutional litigation.  Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be
elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.

Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.  None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.

KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been
subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark
windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build."  They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of
the [S]tate."[14]

Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to
show any connection between the purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante,
HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondents' alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its
armed wing, the National People's Army (NPA).  The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without
following the procedure under the law.[15]  The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court.  The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover,
a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded
as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.  As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of
particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge.  But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact
which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.[16] 
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice.  Petitioners' apprehension is insufficient to substantiate
their plea.  That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any
claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to
the CPP and NPA.  They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to
their organization and members.

While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of America [17] (US) and the European
Union[18] (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations.  The Court takes note of the
joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt
the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. [19]  Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed
before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under
RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have
conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.

Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casiño,
Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan,[20] urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by removing the
impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist
organizations. Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration [21] of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the government is
not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.

More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the questions being raised.[22]  Of recent
development is the filing of the first case for proscription under Section 17[23] of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice before the Basilan
Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.[24]  Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu
Sayyaf Group.

Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges
against them.

In Ladlad v. Velasco,[25] the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin
Beltran and Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casiño and Saturnino Ocampo
of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato
Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the Communist movement were
petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.[26]

The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners.  For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the
enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court.  For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to
charge a person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.

Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA 9372.  It cannot be
overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.  The
IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.

The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with
standing.[27]  The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights
and duties.  Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.

Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of "political surveillance," also lacks locus standi.
Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of "political surveillance," the Court finds that she has not shown even the
slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372.  Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Tañada and Senator
Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372.  Outside these
gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.

Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that
the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, "which must be settled early" and are of "far-reaching implications," without
mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be charged.  Mere invocation of human rights
advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi.  Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of
sustaining, direct injury as a result of the law's enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as
every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.

Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens.  A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is
an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress,[28] whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the
proceeding.[29]

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the
individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.

It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of
a direct and personal interest is key.

Petitioners fail to
present an actual
case or controversy

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] the Court ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties.  Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.[32]

Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC[33] cannot be more emphatic:

[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.  The
controversy must be justiciable--definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.  In other
words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other
hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or issue.  There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be
premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events.[34]  Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an application for a license to
operate a radio or television station has been denied or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely
wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.[35]
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections[36] for failure to cite any specific affirmative
action of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed resolution.  It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections,[37] to rule on
the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim
Code and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real litigants.   

The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.

The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge.  This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must
be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.[38]

Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,[39] allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal
statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await
and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."[40]  The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court to
assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. §2339B (a) (1), [41] proscribing the provision of material support to
organizations declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations.  They claimed that they intended to provide support for
the humanitarian and political activities of two such organizations.

Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged
prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable controversy.[42]

Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372
forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real
and existing one.

Petitioners' obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution.  From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is
not its function.[43]

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.  Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.[44]

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and
merely imagined.  Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.[45] 
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.

A facial invalidation of a
statute is allowed only in free speech cases,
wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism [46] under RA 9372 in that
terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case
since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.

Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free speech
cases.  They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan[47] and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[48]

The Court clarifies.

At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene" in Section 5[49] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad.  The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free-speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes." [50]  It added that, at any rate, the
challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.[51]

While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,[52] the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is
not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense [53] under
the Voter's Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.[54]

The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion[55] of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court
found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed to an
"as-applied" challenge.  He basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of
its validity.  The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the
main Estrada decision, reads:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a
vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression
is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his
own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.  Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and,
if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. 
In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases.  They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes.  As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."  In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again,
that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct."  For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."  As for
the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.  "A
plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others."

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases.  They cannot be made to do service when
what is involved is a criminal statute.  With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."  As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."  Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim
that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.  It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of
the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.  But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is
put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary.  The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the
impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line
analysis of detailed statutes,  . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and
only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.  In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are
alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.[56] (Underscoring
supplied.)

The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-
applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of
abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).

To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.  It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. [57] 
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. [58]

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits
and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. [59]

A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.[60]

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle[61] in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for
a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal
statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases  is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the
exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights.[63]

The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an `on-its-
face' invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed."[64]

[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.  The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered.  No prosecution would be possible.  A strong
criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of
the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised.  A facial
challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative.  It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who
are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the
State's ability to deal with crime.  If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State's power to
prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear
as applied to him.[65] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to
the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech,
inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. 
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as
applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation.  Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.  Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests.  In overbreadth analysis,
those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face,"
not merely "as applied for"; so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly.  The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect
of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit.  The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression."  An overbreadth ruling is designed
to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.[66] (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)

In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases, [67] observed that the US Supreme Court has
not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment, [68] and that claims of facial overbreadth have
been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.[69]  In Virginia v. Hicks,[70] it was
held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed
to speech or speech-related conduct.  Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression."[71]

Since a penal statute may only be

assailed for being vague as applied
to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of
"terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an
actual or imminent charge against them

While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as
applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its entirety." [72]  It stressed
that "statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant ."[73]

American jurisprudence[74] instructs that "vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of
the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity."

For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants' claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague,
developing a doctrine hailed as "among the most important guarantees of liberty under law."[75]

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes.  In at least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor
Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to
those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.

There is no merit in the

claim that RA 9372 regulates
speech so as to permit a facial
analysis of its validity

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the
offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special
penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful
demand" in the definition of terrorism[77] must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech
clause.

The argument does not persuade.  What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an
"unlawful demand."  Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of
the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners' notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the
crime.  Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt
criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction.  An analogy in
one U.S. case[78] illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take
down a sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating speech rather than conduct.

Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially
harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech.  This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the
expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion perceptible.

[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through speaking or writing.  But it has
never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the  conduct was, in
part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.  Such an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of
trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.[79] (italics and underscoring supplied)

Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct. [80]  Since speech is
not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.

IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as applied to the
therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds.  The Court in said
cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety.

In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness
grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a criminal
prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372.  Even a
limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible.  The Court reminds litigants that judicial
power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statute's future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as
an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro,  Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., on official leave.
Abad, J., certify that J. Abad who is on official business a concurring opinion.