G.R. No.

100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580,
entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990)
within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner
Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to
then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The
complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990
the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest."6

A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila
Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures
of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its
resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain business establishment
(should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly
specified by law and ordinance.8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved.
The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined
only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their
privilege to engage in business."9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private
respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).10

In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite
the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.

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On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors
who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.13

The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but
it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines . . . ." It added:

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and
trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare.
Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's
inhumanity to man.

In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this recourse.

The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also
issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority
given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own
comment,18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who
had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative
power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21

The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human
rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

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 (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make
CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country,
or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions
to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative
power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as
inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has
been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied
answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the
Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom,
and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to
form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services. 25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human
rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable. 28

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic,
cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in
creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in
fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the
sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of
Human Rights in the Philippines,"29 observes:

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International
Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule.
Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years,
without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances
became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term
licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure, except
members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to
extort confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

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Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights and also because civil and
political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the
Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.

So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil
and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and
public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as
constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which
can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to
take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial
agencies of the government. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights
as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens,
especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to
safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could
specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision
here?

MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke
the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to
decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the
issue?

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively:  1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6)
other crimes committed against the religious.

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The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective,
delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human
rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal
Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.

If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a
copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other convention which may not be specified here.
I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights
contained in the convention.

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to us which of
these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed
constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later
on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would
be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this
provision — freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving
disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations.  So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and
political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on
Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.

MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and
politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights.

MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to
education, housing, shelter, et cetera.

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on
Human Rights. . . .

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 . . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the
ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate — torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of
arrest, massacre — and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore,
this Human Rights Commission must be independent.

I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this
kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this to land, housing
and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis supplied)

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on
its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract,
etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may
also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32

Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.34

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that
would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of
political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6)
other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of
priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation
of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights
that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation."35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected
by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this
Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical
that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct
or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for
contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the
instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority
vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a
writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court
of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in
which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary
injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of
a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in
the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the
appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

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The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580)
has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about
to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in
CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No.
90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the
resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending
its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of
human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private
respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition
of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly,
the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a
tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not
ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.

# Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the
resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending
its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of
human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private
respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition
of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly,
the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a
tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not
ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.

7
G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO ORDONEZ, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing Zone"
(CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation, formerly Filoil
Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).

Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or
its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed
quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia.

Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoñez filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint
complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an investigation of the
complaint.

According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission on May 10, 1991 a verified complaint for violation of their human rights.
They alleged that on March 20, 1991, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer, accompanied by his subordinates and
members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the private respondents who tried to stop them by showing a copy of
a letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing. However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the ground by a
member of Damondamon's group who proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!"

On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the private respondents to cover the happenings in the area were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from
them by members of the Philippine National Police and some government officials and their civilian followers.

On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from
committing further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appeal before the Commission on May 27, 1991 at
9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A).

On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent
Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.

On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the
Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. The order reads as follows:

Considering the sworn statements of the farmers whose farmlands are being bulldozed and the wanton destruction of their irrigation canals which
prevent cultivation at the farmlands as well as the claim of ownership of the lands by some farmers-complainants, and their possession and
cultivation thereof spanning decades, including the failure of the officials concerned to comply with the Constitutional provision on the eviction
of rural "squatters", the Commission reiterates its Order of May 17, 1991, and further orders the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, their
Contractors and representatives to refrain and desist from bulldozing the farmlands of the complainants-farmers who have come to the
Commission for relief, during the pendency of this investigation and to refrain from further destruction of the irrigation canals in the area until
further orders of the Commission.

This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9 00 a.m. and the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways or his representative is
requested to appear. (p. 20, Rollo; emphasis supplied)

On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders.

On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the motion.

On September 11, 1991, the petitioner, through the Government Corporate Counsel, filed in this Court a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no clear, positive right to be protected by an injunction; that the CHR abused its
discretion in entertaining the private respondent's complaint because the issue raised therein had been decided by this Court, hence, it is barred by prior judgment.

On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned
injunction orders.

8
In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of this Court's restraining order, and for an order restraining petitioner EPZA from doing further
acts of destruction and harassment. The CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere
investigation" because it is mandated, among others, to:

a. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

b. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

c. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad,
and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

d. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 45, Rollo)

On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that he be excused from filing a Comment for the CHR on the ground that the
Comment filed by the latter "fully traversed and squarely met all the issues raised and discussed in the main Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition" (p. 83, Rollo).

Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from
continuing the acts complained of?

In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681, December 2, 1991, we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a
quasi-judicial body.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function  of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions
to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

xxx xxx xxx

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even
if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their
human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the
question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those
actions and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and
regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what were the
particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. (pp. 5 & 8.)

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law" (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28
January 1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No.
88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et al.. G.R. Nos. 97108-09, March 4, 1992).

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of
injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no
jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by
a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action
pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction dated May 17 and 28, 1991 issued by the respondent Commission on
Human Right are here by ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order which this Court issued on September 19, 1991, is hereby made
PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Devide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Feliciano and Bellosillo, JJ., are on leave.

9
 Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.,  concurring:

I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Hon. Isidro Carino, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G. R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991. In
addition, it is my considered view that the CHR has the unquestioned authority in appropriate cases to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection." (Section 18(c), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution)

If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to maintain the status quo pending its investigation of cases involving alleged human rights
violations, then it is, in effect, an ineffective instrument for the protection of human rights. I submit that the CHR, consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, may issue cease and desist orders particularly in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which it intends to investigate, and such cease
and desist orders may be judicially challenged like the orders of the other constitutional commissions, — which are not courts of law — under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, on grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings (investigation).

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent
of City Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL
CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought
from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or
government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a
particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the
Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the
present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set
forth.

1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had
decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call
for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from
their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions
were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to
initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the
week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3

Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who
had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4

2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and
given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced
(unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5

3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber
were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative
proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for
suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the
10
hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually
resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents
submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8

4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked
CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the
striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . .
docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so
numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."

5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while
they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them. 10

6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers
CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his
attendance therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the)
Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants'
counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b)
expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The
Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:

To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers
are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda
Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en
banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this
matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.

x x x           x x x          x x x

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted
on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14

8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as
aforestated, viz.:

a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario
Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still
timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima
facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue
decision on those charges." 17

9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their
counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter
affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative
charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to
the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint
Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).

It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cariño, has commenced the present action
of certiorari and prohibition.

The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has
also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or
hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:

1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their
superiors; and

11
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify
their mass action or strike.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon
and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared
that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or
even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on
Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the
truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly
and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power
on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said
rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request
the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be
required by its findings. 26

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
12
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec.
257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to
settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
"adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment." 32

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers
constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to
him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been
seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on
substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the
Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined
through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service
Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education
Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions
involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary
in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those
reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service
Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate
Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the
Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ, concur.

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