G.R. No.

100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO

OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES, respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed
into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction.
The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR
Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of
the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers
Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private
respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated).
In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within
which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice,
the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give
way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a
letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking
the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23
July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls
and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well
as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the
demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of
1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in
favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's
supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that
violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest."6

A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also
averred, among other things, that:
 1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-
Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a
moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to

therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business
entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990
that the complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk
of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and
authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to
operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already
issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance.8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the
motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise
manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations
of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political
rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business."9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the
contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected
to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).10

In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a
fine of P500.00 on each of them.

On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental
motion to dismiss, in this wise:

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the
gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should
be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.13

The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper
tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial
body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
 The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and
to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents
with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their
health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized
the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's
inhumanity to man.

In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this recourse.

The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated,
however, in our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order,
directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls
were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his
comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment,18 through Hon. Samuel
Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private
respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991,
requiring such comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No.
163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21

The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
 (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance

respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty

obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the
intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This
view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human
Rights,24 the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed
that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory
power itself. The Court explained:

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to
be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take
over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in
a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this
controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define
it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a
symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977,
one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The
participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They
are the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or
the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom
of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused
to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be
elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and
social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services.25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer
fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by
the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part
of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.28

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an
individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the
term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally
considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional
Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent
commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under
the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of
the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an
advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the
Philippines,"29 observes:

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights
most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became
unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary
action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest
upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for
years, without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this
representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances became useless,
since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media
were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security
of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters
of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
 confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty
International and the International Commission of Jurists.

Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following
discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the
importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights have been
determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the
Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent
legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.

So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can
be most effective.

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are
very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single
right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw
the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the
language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture,
the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are
considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as
constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend
here.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic
rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to
the proper courts and authorities.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and,
therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases
which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary
investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the
specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the international
standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and
civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular
aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are
really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights
stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights.
Those are the rights that we envision here?

MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. They are integral parts of that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of
Rights covered by human rights?

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would
like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights,
the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had
defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life
consistent with human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that
the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by
the previous speaker.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act
effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and
the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5)
salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.

xxx xxx xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in
order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible,
without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional
area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the
reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal
Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and
political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of
human right with other human rights specified in other convention which I do not
remember. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of

1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights of which we are signatory.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant
mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other convention
which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our
concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the
rights contained in the convention.

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee,

before the period of amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the
Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of
including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the
Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to
expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the
question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be
considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political
rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political
detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as
crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So,
it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights
of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the
definite areas.

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer
linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-
called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I
was referring to an international instrument.

MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article
therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we
understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
 MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between
civil and social rights.

MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor
to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to
those that the Gentlemen has specified.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I
cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers
will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and
oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate — torture,
salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons who
are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big
shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.

I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially
for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get
it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we
open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will
not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis supplied)

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense,
to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of
the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the
laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term
may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed
in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.32
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in
the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office,
the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government.34

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that
the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more
severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the
"(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures,
(3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other
crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for
the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making
a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should
fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation."35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents
on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins
the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway.
The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed
paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place,
even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that
the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can
fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by
the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and
rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or
hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance
with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for
contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance
before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it
does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court,
speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to
issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the
Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary
 injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction
to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge
of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the
Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation
or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."
(footnotes omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government.37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the
vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there
lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly,
the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become
moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard,
and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy
to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act
already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its
resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to
also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the
P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason
and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R.
No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my
dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can
issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving
an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations
involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima
facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said
private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and
which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at
street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not
enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is
transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit
the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not
ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings.

# Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R.
No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my
dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can
issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving
an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations
involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima
facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said
private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and
which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at
street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not
enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is
transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit
the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not
ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings.

#Footnotes

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance
of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon
City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges —
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents,
books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation
cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants,
to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme
Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-
Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter,
decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void,
and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured
by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that
said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked
by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been
held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to

the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were
the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when
its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of
the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein. 1äw phï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution 13 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments
thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for
the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody
of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in
times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by
providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification,
the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the
things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not
be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other
laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted
the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may
have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which
itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be
repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal
Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
 . . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led
by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise,
then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high
regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held
in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the
cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even
Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable
against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which
its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to
privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by
the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate
denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise
is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the
Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the
incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and
that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police
officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our
decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given
crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause,
and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or
make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the
party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they
do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably —
finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the
pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry
S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the
records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include
personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control,
for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal
courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought
to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits
attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases
relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree
thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave
the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the
writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of
the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1
of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is
declared, abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared
null and void the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and
effect seized in the said residences is made permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that
they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects
seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by
the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants served
at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the
matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search
warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and
seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case
should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for
future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably
outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of
the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in
any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic
illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal
standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and
remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or
the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality
of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this
Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the
documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person," gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The
three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in
all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The
searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)
(narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d.
650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant
was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not
belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized
from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that
under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or
his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his
automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man
relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be
it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his
 desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate
the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private
papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other
cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual
contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked.
No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee
or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs.
U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93
(November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold
interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been
sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to
emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched
(Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436
Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made
improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were
stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned
the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all,
of the premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and
suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it
considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded,
however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which,
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is
largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability
Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd.
9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable
to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17
(1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the
corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved
for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his
home during the course of an illegal search:
 The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful.
The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained
should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles
seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald
vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter,
advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against
criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was
articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite
States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in
the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule
protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was
enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a
mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that
the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in the
property seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the
case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had seized
most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from
objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records
merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books and records
or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296
F. 2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano,
police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the
defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself)
used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that there also
was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and
seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano
vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces
tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no
standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and
because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding
that

Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
 escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965,
U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which
attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. *
Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm which, according
to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out to be
private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed
corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records were seized in
the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even
though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for
the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs.
Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer
vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law
was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in committing
a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell
M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell
M. Birrell. (p. 198)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to

suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)

If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers
v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct.
93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal
from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present
petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND
EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises
raided is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether
these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents
were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held
by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from
their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn
statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that
amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of
the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively)
by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search
warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or
grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things
are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts
which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said
documents.

And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal
standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal
prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do
not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

G.R. Nos. 83380-81 November 15, 1989

MAKATI HABERDASHERY, INC., JORGE LEDESMA and CECILIO G. INOCENCIO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CEFERINA J. DIOSANA (Labor Arbiter,
Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region), SANDIGAN NG
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SANDIGAN)-TUCP and its members, JACINTO GARCIANO,
ALFREDO C. BASCO, VICTORIO Y. LAURETO, ESTER NARVAEZ, EUGENIO L. ROBLES,
BELEN N. VISTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESTRABO, VEVENCIO TIRO, CASIMIRO ZAPATA, GLORIA
ESTRABO, LEONORA MENDOZA, MACARIA G. DIMPAS, MERILYN A. VIRAY, LILY OPINA,
JANET SANGDANG, JOSEFINA ALCOCEBA and MARIA ANGELES, respondents.

Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for petitioners.

Pablo S. Bernardo for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

This petition for certiorari involving two separate cases filed by private respondents against herein
petitioners assails the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CASE
No. 7-2603-84 entitled "Sandigan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino (SANDIGAN)-TUCP etc., et al. v. Makati
Haberdashery and/or Toppers Makati, et al." and NLRC CASE No. 2-428-85 entitled "Sandigan Ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (SANDIGAN)-TUCP etc., et al. v. Toppers Makati, et al.", affirming the
decision of the Labor Arbiter who jointly heard and decided aforesaid cases, finding: (a) petitioners
guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering them to reinstate the dismissed workers and (b) the existence
of employer-employee relationship and granting respondent workers by reason thereof their various
monetary claims.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Individual complainants, private respondents herein, have been working for petitioner Makati
Haberdashery, Inc. as tailors, seamstress, sewers, basters (manlililip) and "plantsadoras". They are
paid on a piece-rate basis except Maria Angeles and Leonila Serafina who are paid on a monthly
basis. In addition to their piece-rate, they are given a daily allowance of three (P 3.00) pesos provided
they report for work before 9:30 a.m. everyday.

Private respondents are required to work from or before 9:30 a.m. up to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. from Monday
to Saturday and during peak periods even on Sundays and holidays.

On July 20, 1984, the Sandigan ng Manggagawang Pilipino, a labor organization of the respondent
workers, filed a complaint docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 7-2603-84 for (a) underpayment of the
basic wage; (b) underpayment of living allowance; (c) non-payment of overtime work; (d) non-payment
of holiday pay; (e) non-payment of service incentive pay; (f) 13th month pay; and (g) benefits provided
for under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.1

During the pendency of NLRC NCR Case No. 7-2603-84, private respondent Dioscoro Pelobello left
with Salvador Rivera, a salesman of petitioner Haberdashery, an open package which was discovered
to contain a "jusi" barong tagalog. When confronted, Pelobello replied that the same was ordered by
respondent Casimiro Zapata for his customer. Zapata allegedly admitted that he copied the design of
petitioner Haberdashery. But in the afternoon, when again questioned about said barong, Pelobello
and Zapata denied ownership of the same. Consequently a memorandum was issued to each of them
to explain on or before February 4, 1985 why no action should be taken against them for accepting a
job order which is prejudicial and in direct competition with the business of the company. 2 Both
respondents allegedly did not submit their explanation and did not report for work. 3 Hence, they were
dismissed by petitioners on February 4, 1985. They countered by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal
docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 2-428-85 on February 5, 1985. 4

On June 10, 1986, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in NLRC NCR Case No. 2-428-85 finding
respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering them to reinstate Dioscoro
Pelobello and Casimiro Zapata to their respective or similar positions without loss of
seniority rights, with full backwages from July 4, 1985 up to actual reinstatement. The
charge of unfair labor practice is dismissed for lack of merit.

In NLRC NCR Case No. 7-26030-84, the complainants' claims for underpayment re
violation of the minimum wage law is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.

Respondents are hereby found to have violated the decrees on the cost of living
allowance, service incentive leave pay and the 13th Month Pay. In view thereof, the
economic analyst of the Commission is directed to compute the monetary awards due
each complainant based on the available records of the respondents retroactive as of
three years prior to the filing of the instant case.
 SO ORDERED. 5

From the foregoing decision, petitioners appealed to the NLRC. The latter on March 30, 1988 affirmed
said decision but limited the backwages awarded the Dioscoro Pelobello and Casimiro Zapata to only
one (1) year. 6

After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the
following issues:

THE SUBJECT DECISIONS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE

RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN PETITIONER HABERDASHERY AND RESPONDENTS
WORKERS.

II

THE SUBJECT DECISIONS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENTS WORKERS

ARE ENTITLED TO MONETARY CLAIMS DESPITE THE FINDING THAT THEY ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO MINIMUM WAGE.

III

THE SUBJECT DECISIONS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENTS PELOBELLO

AND ZAPATA WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. 7

The first issue which is the pivotal issue in this case is resolved in favor of private respondents. We
have repeatedly held in countless decisions that the test of employer-employee relationship is four-
fold: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct. It is the so called "control test" that is
the most important element. 8 This simply means the determination of whether the employer controls
or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to
the means and method by which the same is to be accomplished. 9

The facts at bar indubitably reveal that the most important requisite of control is present. As gleaned
from the operations of petitioner, when a customer enters into a contract with the haberdashery or its
proprietor, the latter directs an employee who may be a tailor, pattern maker, sewer or "plantsadora"
to take the customer's measurements, and to sew the pants, coat or shirt as specified by the customer.
Supervision is actively manifested in all these aspects — the manner and quality of cutting, sewing
and ironing.

Furthermore, the presence of control is immediately evident in this memorandum issued by Assistant
Manager Cecilio B. Inocencio, Jr. dated May 30, 1981 addressed to Topper's Makati Tailors which
reads in part:

4. Effective immediately, new procedures shall be followed:

A. To follow instruction and orders from the undersigned Roger Valderama, Ruben
Delos Reyes and Ofel Bautista. Other than this person (sic) must ask permission to
the above mentioned before giving orders or instructions to the tailors.
 B. Before accepting the job orders tailors must check the materials, job orders, due
dates and other things to maximize the efficiency of our production. The materials
should be checked (sic) if it is matched (sic) with the sample, together with the number
of the job order.

C. Effective immediately all job orders must be finished one day before the due date.
This can be done by proper scheduling of job order and if you will cooperate with your
supervisors. If you have many due dates for certain day, advise Ruben or Ofel at once
so that they can make necessary adjustment on due dates.

D. Alteration-Before accepting alteration person attending on customs (sic) must ask

first or must advise the tailors regarding the due dates so that we can eliminate what
we call 'Bitin'.

E. If there is any problem regarding supervisors or co-tailor inside our shop, consult
with me at once settle the problem. Fighting inside the shop is strictly prohibited. Any
tailor violating this memorandum will be subject to disciplinary action.

For strict compliance. 10

From this memorandum alone, it is evident that petitioner has reserved the right to control its
employees not only as to the result but also the means and methods by which the same are to be
accomplished. That private respondents are regular employees is further proven by the fact that they
have to report for work regularly from 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. and are paid an additional
allowance of P 3.00 daily if they report for work before 9:30 a.m. and which is forfeited when they
arrive at or after 9:30 a.m. 11

Since private respondents are regular employees, necessarily the argument that they are independent
contractors must fail. As established in the preceding paragraphs, private respondents did not exercise
independence in their own methods, but on the contrary were subject to the control of petitioners from
the beginning of their tasks to their completion. Unlike independent contractors who generally rely on
their own resources, the equipment, tools, accessories, and paraphernalia used by private
respondents are supplied and owned by petitioners. Private respondents are totally dependent on
petitioners in all these aspects.

Coming now to the second issue, there is no dispute that private respondents are entitled to the
Minimum Wage as mandated by Section 2(g) of Letter of Instruction No. 829, Rules Implementing
Presidential Decree No. 1614 and reiterated in Section 3(f), Rules Implementing Presidential Decree
1713 which explicitly states that, "All employees paid by the result shall receive not less than the
applicable new minimum wage rates for eight (8) hours work a day, except where a payment by result
rate has been established by the Secretary of Labor. ..." 12 No such rate has been established in this
case.

But all these notwithstanding, the question as to whether or not there is in fact an underpayment of
minimum wages to private respondents has already been resolved in the decision of the Labor Arbiter
where he stated: "Hence, for lack of sufficient evidence to support the claims of the complainants for
alleged violation of the minimum wage, their claims for underpayment re violation of the Minimum
Wage Law under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 must perforce fall." 13

The records show that private respondents did not appeal the above ruling of the Labor Arbiter to the
NLRC; neither did they file any petition raising that issue in the Supreme Court. Accordingly, insofar
as this case is concerned, that issue has been laid to rest. As to private respondents, the judgment
may be said to have attained finality. For it is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "an appellee
who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court-, any affirmative relief other than
the ones granted in the decision of the court below. " 14

As a consequence of their status as regular employees of the petitioners, they can claim cost of living
allowance. This is apparent from the provision defining the employees entitled to said allowance, thus:
"... All workers in the private sector, regardless of their position, designation or status, and irrespective
of the method by which their wages are paid. " 15

Private respondents are also entitled to claim their 13th Month Pay under Section 3(e) of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851 which provides:

Section 3. Employers covered. — The Decree shall apply to all employers except to:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis,
and those who are paid a fixed amount for performing a specific work, irrespective of
the time consumed in the performance thereof, except where the workers are paid on
piece-rate basis in which case the employer shall be covered by this issuance insofar
as such workers are concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, while private respondents are entitled to Minimum Wage, COLA and 13th Month
Pay, they are not entitled to service incentive leave pay because as piece-rate workers being paid at
a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of time consumed in the performance thereof, they fall
under one of the exceptions stated in Section 1(d), Rule V, Implementing Regulations, Book III, Labor
Code. For the same reason private respondents cannot also claim holiday pay (Section 1(e), Rule IV,
Implementing Regulations, Book III, Labor Code).

With respect to the last issue, it is apparent that public respondents have misread the evidence, for it
does show that a violation of the employer's rules has been committed and the evidence of such
transgression, the copied barong tagalog, was in the possession of Pelobello who pointed to Zapata
as the owner. When required by their employer to explain in a memorandum issued to each of them,
they not only failed to do so but instead went on AWOL (absence without official leave), waited for the
period to explain to expire and for petitioner to dismiss them. They thereafter filed an action for illegal
dismissal on the far-fetched ground that they were dismissed because of union activities. Assuming
that such acts do not constitute abandonment of their jobs as insisted by private respondents, their
blatant disregard of their employer's memorandum is undoubtedly an open defiance to the lawful
orders of the latter, a justifiable ground for termination of employment by the employer expressly
provided for in Article 283(a) of the Labor Code as well as a clear indication of guilt for the commission
of acts inimical to the interests of the employer, another justifiable ground for dismissal under the same
Article of the Labor Code, paragraph (c). Well established in our jurisprudence is the right of an
employer to dismiss an employee whose continuance in the service is inimical to the employer's
interest. 16

In fact the Labor Arbiter himself to whom the explanation of private respondents was submitted gave
no credence to their version and found their excuses that said barong tagalog was the one they got
from the embroiderer for the Assistant Manager who was investigating them, unbelievable.

Under the circumstances, it is evident that there is no illegal dismissal of said employees. Thus, We
have ruled that:
 No employer may rationally be expected to continue in employment a person whose
lack of morals, respect and loyalty to his employer, regard for his employer's rules, and
appreciation of the dignity and responsibility of his office, has so plainly and completely
been bared.

That there should be concern, sympathy, and solicitude for the rights and welfare of
the working class, is meet and proper. That in controversies between a laborer and his
master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of
agreements and writings should be resolved in the former's favor, is not an
unreasonable or unfair rule. But that disregard of the employer's own rights and
interests can be justified by that concern and solicitude is unjust and unacceptable.
(Stanford Microsystems, Inc. v. NLRC, 157 SCRA 414-415 [1988] ).

The law is protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer. 17 More importantly, while the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the
protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will automatically
be decided in favor of labor. 18

Finally, it has been established that the right to dismiss or otherwise impose discriplinary sanctions
upon an employee for just and valid cause, pertains in the first place to the employer, as well as the
authority to determine the existence of said cause in accordance with the norms of due process. 19

There is no evidence that the employer violated said norms. On the contrary, private respondents who
vigorously insist on the existence of employer-employee relationship, because of the supervision and
control of their employer over them, were the very ones who exhibited their lack of respect and regard
for their employer's rules.

Under the foregoing facts, it is evident that petitioner Haberdashery had valid grounds to terminate the
services of private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated March 30, 1988 and
that of the Labor Arbiter dated June 10, 1986 are hereby modified. The complaint filed by Pelobello
and Zapata for illegal dismissal docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 2-428-85 is dismissed for lack of
factual and legal bases. Award of service incentive leave pay to private respondents is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773.
These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent,
to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of
December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both
Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June
20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October
25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to
fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for
the provisional arrest of private respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining
the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory
on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed
with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private
respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is
a high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-
95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition
for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that
he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold
himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If
accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied
by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing
in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting
in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first
time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may
be granted bail.

In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through
then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision
on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1,
6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail
in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is
available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding
duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4)
the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that
the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second
half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of
war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle,
Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the
former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of
international law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all
the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the
members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set forth
in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified.
Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due
process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling
in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such
as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure
to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting
that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to
treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal
law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the
Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative
duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even
if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is
not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but
one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose
of trial or punishment.14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section
20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused,
pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty,
and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention"
may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should
be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence
of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings,
the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility
of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive
from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing
that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations
under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure
to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of
extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so,
where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions,
to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply
for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which
is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion
in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new
standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not,
the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice