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Intermediate Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis of the

Probability and Severity of Recidivism

Article  in  Sociological Inquiry · January 2007

DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-682X.2001.tb01107.x

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Intermediate Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis of the
Probability and Severity of Recidivism

Jeffery T. Ulmer, Pennsylvania State University

Social scientists have a longstanding concern with the relationship between crimi-
nal sanctions and offenders’ future behavior. This paper uses data from a sample of 528
adult felony offenders to compare the relative probability of rearrest, the severity of
rearrest, and the likelihood of probation revocation for offenders with a sentence of
incarceration, work release, house arrest, and traditional probation-or a combination of
these sentences. Consistent with previous research, prior record, gender, offense type,
and education were significantly related to the probability and severity of rearrest.
Furthermore, no matter which other sanction it was paired with, house arrest was asso-
ciated with reduced chances of rearrest and lower rearrest severity. The influence of one
of these sanction combinations was gender-specific: incarceration followed by house ar-
rest was associated with reduced odds of rearrest for women but not for men. However,
house arrest was associated with the considerably increased likelihood of probation re-
vocation. In addition, these effects remain after controlling for potential selection bias
stemming from the sentencing decision. This paper concludes by discussing the
theoretical and correctional implications of these findings and directions for future
research.

Social scientists have a longstanding concern with the relationship between

criminal sanctions and offenders’ future behavior (Braithwaite 1989; Sherman
1993). Criminal sanctions are sometimes intended to prevent the sanctioned
offender’s future criminal behavior through specific deterrence or incapacitation.
Sanctions are also sometimes intended to provide the offender with contexts and
opportunities for rehabilitation, which might foster conventional skills, attitudes
and self-concepts, and foster ties to conventional institutions and individuals. On
the other hand, some kinds of criminal sanctions-incarceration in particular-
have been known to isolate the offender from conventional society, close off op-
portunities for conventional relationships and employment, and/or foster
entrenched interaction with criminal peers and increased commitment to crimi-
nal attitudes, values, and activities (Sampson and Laub 1993; Hagan and Palloni
1990; Braithwaite 1989).
Various versions of labeling theory have held that under certain conditions
and for certain kinds of offenders, punitive and segregative formal criminal sanc-
tions that are intended to deter crime can instead entrench offenders in criminal
careers (Tannenbaum 1938; Lemert 1951; Becker 1963; Goffman 1963; Stebbins

Sociological Inquily. Vol. 71, No. 2, Spring 2001, 164-93

02001 by the University of Texas Press, PO.Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819
 PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF RECIDIVISM 165

1971; Schur 1980; Hagan and Palloni 1990). For example, sanctions such as
imprisonment are said to stigmatize offenders, close off opportunities for
conventional activities and social ties, open up opportunities for participation in
deviant subcultures, socialization,and activities, and foster deviant self-definitions
(Ulmer 1994).
The 1990s has seen a recent theoretical convergence between labeling
theories, life-course oriented social control theories (Sampson and Laub 1993,
1997), and theories of differential social control (Matsueda 1992; Matsueda and
Heimer 1997). In particular, Sampson and Laub (1997, pp. 147-50) argue that
punitive, segregative sanctions like imprisonment “knife off” conventional social
bonds and opportunities, with repercussions for criminal behavior throughout the
life course. They also argue that criminal sanctions which entail structured ways
to preserve, mobilize, or foster the growth of social bonds to conventional adult
institutions such as work and family are far more likely to prevent future crimi-
nal offending in the short and long term. Furthermore, Braithwaite’s (1989) rein-
tegrative theory of criminal sanctioning synthesizes insights from labeling,
social control, opportunity, and differential association theories. Braithwaite
(1989) differentiates between reintegrative and stigmatizing sanctions. While
reintegrative sanctions can prevent future offending by restoring or preserving
conventional social bonds, opportunities, and socialization processes, stigmatiz-
ing sanctions can lead to continued or increased criminal offending by having the
reverse effects. This reintegrative theory of sanctioning has received some solid
empirical support (e.g., Makkai and Braithwaite 1991; Heimer and Staffen
1995). Also, Sherman (1993) argues that perceived procedural justice conditions
the effect of sanctions on future crime. Sanctions perceived by the offender to be
unjust tend to result in defiance, while those perceived as just tend to result in
shaming and reintegration.
Since the late 1980s, intermediate sanctions (sometimes also known as
alternative sanctions, alternative punishments, or community corrections), such
as house arrest with electronic monitoring, work release programs, and super-
vised labor in the community (usually known as “road crew” or “work crew”)
have become increasingly common. The primary policy motivation for such
programs is often thought to be a financial one-the conservation of scarce
corrections resources (Feeley and Simon 1992). However, these programs are
also sometimes touted as being potentially more effective at preventing recidi-
vism than traditional probation or incarceration (e.g., Morris and Tonry 1990;
Byrne 1990).
Byrne’s (1990) assessment of the possibilities and limitations of
intermediate sanctions provides an implicit linkage between the theoretical
directions outlined above and recent developments in corrections. Byrne (1990)
argues that intermediate sanctions will prevent recidivism to the extent that they
166 JEFFERY T. ULMER

preserve or strengthen conventional social bonds and help enmesh offenders in

networks of informal conventional social control. Such sanctions will fail to
prevent recidivism if they ignore these reintegrative, rehabilitative goals and
focus only on formal surveillance and control (Byme 1990; see also Petersilia
and Turner 1990).
The goal of this paper is to compare the probability and severity of contin-
ued criminal activity between adult felony offenders sentenced to intermediate
sanction options (i.e., house arrest, road crew, work release) and those sentenced
to more traditional sanctions (i.e., incarceration, traditional probation). I first
discuss empirical research on relationships between criminal sanctions and
continuity in criminal behavior, with particular attention to issues surrounding
recent intermediate sanction alternatives such as house arrest, work release, or
“road crew.” I analyze data from a sample of 528 adult felony offenders to
compare the relative probability of rearrest, the severity of rearrest, and the
likelihood of probation revocation between offenders under the different types of
sanctions, both singly and in combination. I conclude with a discussion of the
findings’ implications for the possibilities and limitations of intermediate
sanctions, and this study’s contribution to theories of criminal sanctions and
continuity in criminal behavior.
Intermediate Sanctions
Traditionally, imprisonment has been the backbone of adult criminal
sanctioning in America (Cole and Smith 1998), and has traditionally been used
to attempt to fulfill each of the four major (and sometimes contradictory) goals
of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Many
contemporary criminologists agree, however, that while imprisonment is
effective in terms of punishment and incapacitation of serious offenders, it is less
effective in providing a context for rehabilitation (Andrews, Zinger, Hoge,
Bonta, Gendreau, and Cullen 1990), and a great deal of social science evidence
suggests strong skepticism about imprisonment’s value as a general or specific
deterrent to crime (Blumstein 1993; Skolnick 1995; Gottfredson and Gottfredson
1994). One of the major criticisms of incarceration is that it can, at least for
some offenders, provide a context in which more criminal socialization and role
modeling can occur, provide access to networks of other criminals and criminal
opportunities, and can cut the offender off from conventional relationships,
opportunities, and influences (see Sampson and Laub 1997; Hagan 1992;
Skolnick 1995). On the other hand, traditional probation has been criticized for
not providing enough structure, supervision, services, and control of offenders
(see review by Petersilia 1995).
Dissatisfaction with both traditional imprisonment and traditional probation
has led to a search for innovation and flexibility in sentencing options. Intermediate
 PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF RECIDIVISM 167

sanctions can be seen as part of a larger social movement in criminal justice

called the “new penology:’ which Feeley and Simon (1992, pp. 452, 459)
describe this way:
It considers the criminal justice system, and it pursues systematic rationality and efficiency. It
seeks to sort and classify, to separate the less from the more dangerous, and to deploy control
strategies rationally . . .At one extreme the prison provides maximum security at a high cost
for those who pose the greatest risks, and at the other probation provides low-cost surveillance
for low risk offenders. In between stretches a growing range of intermediate supervisory and
surveillance techniques.
Intermediate sanctions encompass exactly the kinds of “intermediate super-
visory and surveillance techniques” to which Feeley and Simon refer, and are
sometimes coupled with an emphasis on facilitating rehabilitative strategies such
as various kinds of counseling, opportunities for education and vocational
improvement, and substance abuse treatment. Intermediate sanctions allow the
offender to remain in the community, but under more structure and supervision
than traditional probation. Further, some intermediate sanction programs attempt
to facilitate offenders’ pursuit of opportunities for rehabilitative programs,
education, community service, and conventional employment. Unlike imprison-
ment, intermediate sanctions can potentially provide a context that fosters con-
ventional opportunities, commitments, activities and relationships. Unlike
traditional probation, however, intermediate sanctions also include closer moni-
toring and supervision of offenders. Among the most prominent intermediate
sanctions are house arrest (often with electronic monitoring), work release, and
public workhervice programs (often known by terms such as “road crews” or
“work crews”) (Petersilia 1995; Turner and Petersilia 1998).
Another often-cited goal of intermediate sanctions is to alleviate pressure
on the scarce correctional resources of counties and states (Jones 1990).
Intermediate sanctions are theoretically supposed to be targeted toward offenders
who would otherwise be imprisoned, and not toward those who would be more
appropriate for traditional probation (Morris and Tonry 1990). Thus, community
corrections programs are meant to provide a lower-cost alternative to imprison-
ment as a criminal sanction for those offenders deemed appropriate candidates.
On the other hand, some argue that such correctional resource savings are illu-
sory, and that intermediate sanctions can, under certain circumstances, actually
increase correctional systems’ human and financial resource burdens. Austin and
Krisberg’s (1982) well-known critique charges that intermediate sanctions can
sometimes result in “net widening” (offenders receive intermediate sanctions
who otherwise would have gotten probation), “net strengthening”(when offenders
who would otherwise have gotten probation are subjected to more surveillance
and control than they would have under traditional probation), and net shifting
(offenders are simply transferred from one regime of correctional control to
168 JEFFERY T. ULMER

another with no real benefit or cost saving). Of particular concern for this study
is the issue of “net strengthening.” If offenders are under the heightened surveil-
lance and control of intermediate sanctions like house arrest, there may be a
greater likelihood that any program rule violations or criminal behavior will be
caught, and thus a greater likelihood that offenders will be incarcerated for such
violations.
On the other hand, Jones (1990) argues that net widening and strengthening
are not inevitable by-products of intermediate sanctions. Furthermore, Blomberg
(1 995) argues that intermediate sanction programs become embedded in
complex organizational, correctional, community, and policy contexts, and this
can result in mixed or indeterminate outcomes for offenders and the programs
themselves. Blomberg (1995) calls for more empirical research on such poten-
tially mixed outcomes:
But what do we really know empirically about this particular penal reform movement [inter-
mediate sanctions]. Empirically speaking, little is known about the precise origins, operational
features, and potentially mixed outcomes of this particular reform [intermediate sanctions].

Studies of recidivism in general have found that the likelihood of recidivism

(measured in a variety of ways) is conditioned by offenders’ prior record age,
gender, race/ethnicity, education, prior record, peer and personal associations,
level and quality of employment, and type and severity of the convicted offense.
Specifically, this literature shows that women, older offenders, less serious of-
fenders, those with less serious or no prior criminal records, those who are mar-
ried, those with conventional social bonds, and those with more education tend
toward less recidivism, while men, serious drug and property offenders, the less
educated, the unmarried and unattached, and those with extensive prior records,
the un- or underemployed, and those with criminal associates are more likely to
recidivate (see comprehensive reviews by Baumer 1997; DeJong 1997;
Gendreau, Little, and Goggin 1996; Andrews et al. 1990; see also Homey,
Osgood, and Marshall 1995; Visher, Lattimore, and Linster 1991; Rhodes 1986;
Land, McCall, and Parker 1994).
Studies of the relationship between sanctions or correctional programs
and recidivism have generally found little or mixed evidence for specific
deterrence resulting from punitive sanctions, but some empirical support for
appropriately targeted and funded rehabilitative programs as a means to reduce
recidivism (see Andrews et al. 1990; Gendreau et al. 1996; Musheno, Palumbo,
Maynard-Moody, Levine 1989).’ In addition, there is convincing evidence that
the effect of sanctions in general and rehabilitative programs in particular on
recidivism varies according to the social resources, disadvantages, and conven-
tional social bonds of offenders (see DeJong 1997; Albonetti and Hepburn
1997; Horney et al. 1995).
 PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF RECIDIVISM 169

Multivariate analyses are surprisingly rare that directly compare the proba-
bilities of recidivism between intermediate sanctions vs. traditional sentences
using varied samples of offenders (e.g., samples that include a variety of
convicted offenses, as well as variation in offender characteristics such as gender
or age). Those that do exist provide mixed results. On one hand, some studies
fmd no significant difference in recidivism between offenders sentenced to
intermediate sanctions and offenders sentenced to incarceration or traditional
probation (Turner and Petersilia 1998; Smith and Akers 1993; Couhvright,
Berg, and Mutchnick 1997). On the other hand, Petersilia and Turner (1993)
found that in intermediate sanctions programs where offenders received both
supervision and rehabilitative treatment, recidivism was reduced by 20% to 30%
(see also Petersilia 1995). Geerken and Hayes (1993) found that offenders in
intermediate sanctions programs in Louisiana exhibited moderately lower overall
recidivism rates compared to those released from prison, while Glaser and Watts
(1992) found that drug offenders on house arrest in Los Angeles exhibited
significantly less probation revocations and rearrests than drug offenders on
traditional probation. In Washington state, Berliner, Schram, Miller, Milloy
(1995) found that while recidivism rates for sex offenders receiving intermediate
sanctions were not significantly different from sex offenders sentenced to incar-
ceration, other kinds of offenders receiving intermediate sanctions did exhibit
significantly less recidivism than their counterparts who were sentenced to
incarceration.
Furthermore, Albonetti and Hepburn (1 997) compared the likelihood and
timing of probation revocation between offenders on traditional probation vs.
intensive probation (i.e., probation with more intensive probation officer super-
vision, more frequent drug/alcohol screenings, and more extensive drug/alcohol
treatment) among a sample of probationers in Phoenix. They found that those in
intensive probation were actually more likely to have their probation revoked,
lending support to the notion that intermediate sanctions can result in net
strengthening. Their explanation was that more intense supervision and
drug/alcohol testing meant that violations were more likely to be detected, and
did not necessarily mean that those on intensive probation actually committed
more violating behaviors than those on traditional probation. They also found
that probation revocation was more likely among males, those with more ex-
tensive and serious prior criminal histories, and those with low education.
Further, they found that the effects of offender’s gender, ethnicity, age, and su-
pervision level on probation revocation depended on offender’s education and
prior criminal history.
In sum, while prior research literature gives only modest and mixed
guidance on the comparative effect of intermediate sanctions on recidivism, most
prior studies agree that offenders’ gender, prior criminal record, type/severity of
170 JEFFERY T. ULMER

convicted offense, age, education, racelethnicity, and type of correctional

supervision or sentence are important factors for which to control when looking
at the relationship between sanctions and rearrest or probation revocation.
Further, some evidence supports the proposition that sanctions combining super-
vision on one hand (Petersilia 1995) and rehabilitative opportunities on the other
(Andrews et al. 1990) may discourage recidivism. However, there is also
evidence that the level of surveillance and control increases the likelihood of
probation or program revocation (Albonetti and Hepburn 1997), thus supporting
the notion of intermediate sanctions as a mechanism of net strengthening.There
is clearly a need for more research on such questions (see reviews by Blomberg
1995; Byrne 1990; Smith and Akers 1993, p. 290; Spelman 1995), and this study
attempts to help address that need.
Data and Methods
I collected data from a stratified random sample of offenders from a county
in Indiana containing a medium-sized metropolitan area. Several features of this
county are important to note. First, it had consistently enjoyed crime rates that
were lower than state or national averages throughout most of the 1990s. Also,
jobs were plentiful and economic growth was pronounced. The county’s
unemployment rate had been consistently lower than the rest of the state’s, which
in turn was lower than the national average. Further, the county contained several
institutions of higher education, including a state-subsidized system of
vocational/technical colleges. Finally, the county was home to a community
corrections program (which administered house arrest, road crew, and work
release programs) that was well-funded and staffed, and was in fact considered
one of the states’ “flagship” community corrections programs. Thus, this county
context could not be called highly criminogenic. On the other hand, this county
provides a unique opportunity to test the relationship between different kinds of
sanctions and recidivism under contextual conditions that might discourage
recidivism regardless of what sanction an offender gets. Further, regarding inter-
mediate sanctions, one could say that this context provides the rather unique
opportunity to assess their relationship to recidivism under unusually favorable
conditions. If such sanctions do not show favorable results here, this certainly
would not speak well for their potential for preventing recidivism in more
criminogenic contexts.
The offenders in the sample represent four categories of individuals: 1) of-
fenders sentenced to county intermediate sanction programs (i.e., house arrest or
work release); 2) offenders sentenced to traditional probation; 3) offenders sen-
tenced to county jail; and 4) offenders from the county sentenced to state prison.
This study is therefore able to compare offenders receiving various types of sen-
tences, both singly and in combination with one another. I also collected quali-
 PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF RECIDIVISM 171

tative data from semi-structured interviews with each of the county judges who
handled criminal cases, the county district attorney and members of his stafT,
four members of the public defender’s office, the chief of adult probation, and
community corrections staff, as well as a varied subsample of offenders.
Although not the focus of this paper, these interview data inform and contexb-
alize the interpretation of the quantitative findings.
To select the sample, I obtained lists from county community corrections,
probation, jail, and department of corrections (DOC) agencies of adult felony
offenders released from house arrest or work release, supervised probation,
county jail, or state prison between 1991 and 1995. I then selected a stratified
random sample from these sampling frames. I was particularly interested in
obtaining adequate variation in convicted offenses, and obtaining adequate
numbers of women and black offenders for meaningful comparisons (the
county’s population was less than 9% black, and blacks were not highly overrep-
resented in the county’s offender population). Therefore, I grouped each
sampling frame according to offenders’ statutory felony severity level (A, B, C,
or D), gender, and race/ethnicity, randomly selected offenders within these
categories, and oversampled women and blacks. The sample consists of 528
offenders. Once these samples were selected, we collected and cross-checked
data from three sources: 1) county community corrections case files; 2) the
county courthouse’s computerized case database; 3) the state department of
corrections’ offender tracking data.
While the offenders in the sample were released between 1991 and August
of 1995, we tracked their rearrests and probation revocations until August of
1997. Offenders sentenced to jail andor prison were tracked from the time of
their release from incarceration.2 Offenders sentenced to house arrest, work
release, or traditional probation were tracked from the time of sentencing, since
their sentences allowed “on-street” time and thus immediate opportunity to be
rearrested. Thus, all offenders in the sample have a minimum of two years of
follow-up time within which to be rearrested or revoked. To address the disparate
lengths of on-street, non-incarcerated follow-up time for offenders in the sample,
I control for the number of months of “street time” (time since sentence or
incarceration release) in the later analyses.
A number of recent recidivism studies (DeJong 1997; Baumer 1997;
Albonetti and Hepburn 1997) have focused on the timing of various measures of
recidivism (e.g., self-reported reoffending, rearrest, probation revocation) using
time series or hazard models. The issue of the timing of recidivism, while
important, is conceptually distinct from the goal of this paper. My goal here is
simply to compare the relationships between different types and combinations of
sentence options and the overall probability and severity of rearrest and the
probability of revocation.
172 JEFFERY T. ULMER

Appendix A presents the variables used in the analysis and their coding.
Most of the variables and their coding are straightforward and self-explanatory.
However, three features of the data require further comment. First, data on two
key variables-marital status and education-were sometimes missing in the
three record sources above, and we were legally prohibited from accessing
probation department presentence report^.^ Rather than excluding these
important variables from the analyses completely, I utilized two common and
conservative techniques for dealing with missing data (Little and Schenker
1995). For education, I assigned the mean value of education (1 1.4 years) to
missing cases. For marital status, I created a dummy variable to indicate whether
marital status was missing or not, and included this variable in the models
presented below. This retains cases with missing marital status information
while also allowing a check on whether these missing cases are systematically
different from non-missing cases regarding the dependent variables (as seen in
the models below, they are not).
Second, since data on prior record and rearrests came from county comput-
erized courthouse records (supplemented by community corrections, adult
probation, and department of corrections records as appropriate), if for some
reason an arrest did not result in charges filed, (i.e., if the charge was dropped
prior to filing in court), then the data would not reflect such cases. In addition,
obviously neither the prior record nor rearrest data capture criminal behavior that
did not result in an arrest. The overall effect of these limitations, I believe, is that
the prior record and rearrest measures are conservativethat is, any errors or
omissions in these data almost surely underestimate the true amount of prior
criminal behavior and/or recidivism for the research subjects. On the other hand
it is arguably better from a data validity standpoint to underestimate these crucial
variables than overestimate them-conservative data are better than fictional
data. Thus, the prior record and rearrest data should be understood as represent-
ing clearly known and recorded prior convictions and rearrests.
Third, the prior criminal convictions scale (hereafter, prior record) reflects
both the number and severity of prior criminal convictions. As Appendix A
describes, different severities of offenses result in differing amounts of points on
the prior record scale. For example, a prior “A” felony would count four points
on the scale, while a prior misdemeanor would count only half a point4 In this
way, the prior record scale weights more severe prior convictions more heavily
than less severe ones. Finally, the rearrest severity scale ranges from zero to
eight, and simply corresponds to the statutory letter grading of misdemeanors
and felonies. For example a rearrest for a “C” misdemeanor counts “1” on the
scale, while a rearrest for an “A” felony counts “7.”
The analysis consists of multivariate models of rearrest, rearrest severity,
and the probability of probation revocation. Logistic regression is used for the
 PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF RECIDIVISM 173

dichotomous dependent variables (rearrest, probation revocation) (Aldrich and

Nelson 1984). Although rearrest severity is an ordinal scale, I treat it as a
continuous dependent variable and use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
to analyze the effects of the various predictors on it (a common practice, see
Agresti and Finlay 1986).
Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables in the analyses.
Appendix B shows a correlation matrix for the independent and dependent
variables used in the analyses. Several things are notable about Table 1 and
Appendix B. First, the sample exhibits adequate variation in key non-sentencing
variables that may affect rearrest and its severity as well as probation revocation,
such as offense type and seriousness, prior record, and sex. Also, there is ade-
quate variation within the sentence categories in terms of these key non-
sentencing variables (i.e., the sentence categories are not homogeneous with
regard to prior record, offense type or severity, or sex). Second, the categories for
the basic sentence types are not mutually exclusive. Third, the numbers of cases
in the basic sentence categories do not exactly match the numbers sampled from
the sampling frames for community corrections, probation, and Department of
Corrections. The latter two conditions occur because, as Table 1 shows, very few
offenders receive only one type of sanction. Many of the offenders in the “incar-
ceration” category, for example, also might have received a term of work release
or house arrest, and nearly every offender in the sample received some period of
probation. Similarly, several people sampled from the other sampling frames also
turned out to have received other, additional sanctions. Listwise deletion of miss-
ing data on variables other than marital status and education resulted in omitting
twelve offenders in the models below (resulting in an N of 516). Finally, al-
though there are enough cases in the offense categories for multivariate analyses,
it should be noted that two categories contain relatively fewer offenders
(autokaffic felonies and miscellaneous offenses).
Rearrest and Rearrest Severity
Table 2 shows two logistic regression models of the likelihood of rearrest.
In each (and also those in Tables 3 and 4), a variable called “time since sen-
tencing” controls for the number of months from the time offenders were
sentenced---or released from incarceration-to the time the collection of these
data was concluded (August of 1997).
In Table 2, prior record, sex, the type of conviction offense, and education
each significantly condition the likelihood of rearrest, and the effects of each of
these non-sentence related variables are very similar if not identical between
Models 1 and 2. The strongest predictor of rearrest in both models is prior
 Table 1
Descriptive Statistics

Mean (standard
Variable N (Percent) deviation)

Offender age - 30.5 (9.3)

Sex -
Male 384 (73%)
Female 144 (27%)
Race/ethnicity -
White 464 (88%)
African-American 49 ( 9%)
Hispanic 12( 2%)
Other 3 (0.6%)
Marital status
Single (never married) 160 (30%)
Married 88 (17%)
Divorcedseparated 99 (19%)
Missing 181 (34%)
Education - 11.8 (2.4)
-
Offense category combinations
Property 145 (27.5%)
Violent 82 (15.5%)
Drugs 73 (14%)
Other sex offenses 39 ( 7.4%)
Autoltraffic felonies 142 (26%)
Other 42 ( 8Yo)
Offense severity level 1.6 (.72)
A (4) 2 ( 0.4%)
B (3) 67 (12.6%)
c (2) 158 (30%)
D (1) 301 (57%)
Drugialcohol treatment ordered -
Yes 246 (47yo)
No 283 (53%)
Prior record scale 1.7 (1.85)
0 125 (24%)
1 183 (35%)
2 95 (18%)
3 35 ( 6.6%)
4 33 ( 6.3%)
5 22 ( 4.2%)
6 10( 1.9%)
(continued)
 Table 1 (continued)

Mean (standard
Variable N (Percent) deviation)

7 7 ( 1%)
8 or greater 7 ( 1YO)
Missing 11( 2%)
Basic sentence categories -
Incarceration 274 (52%)
Work release 75 (14%)
House arrest 295 (56%)
Traditional probation 500 (95%)
Sentence category combinations
Incarceration only 26( 5%)
Work release and probation 35( 7%)
Work release and house arrest 40 ( S o / )
Incarceration and house arrest 82 (16%)
Incarceration and probation 88 (17%)
House arrest and probation 171 (32%)
Traditional probation only 86 (15?'0)
Probation revoked (includes only
probation cases)
No 331 (66%)
Yes 169 (34%)
Rearrest -
No 295 (56%)
Yes 233 (44%)
Rearrest severity scale 1.7 (2.22)
None (0) 295 (56%)
D misdemeanor ( 1 ) 3 ( 0.5%)
C misdemeanor (2) 77 (14.7%)
B misdemeanor (3) 9 ( 1.7%)
A misdemeanor (4) 30 ( 5.8%)
D felony (5) 70 (13Yo)
C felony (6) 36 ( 6.8%)
B felony (7) 3 ( 0.5%)
A felony (8) 1 ( 0.2%)
Missing 4 ( 0.7%)
 Table 2
Logistic Regression Models for Rearrest Odds (Probability)

Model 1 Model 2

Age .99 (-) .99 (-)

Sex (female = 1) .58 (.37) * .55 (.35) *
Racea
Black .98 (SO) .94 (.49)
Hispanic .95 (.49) .94 (.49)
Marital statusa
Married .72 (.42) .72 (.42)
Divorcedseparated 1.11 (S3) 1.10 (S2)
Missing 1.26 (.56) 1.16 (S4)
Education .82 (-) * .81 (-) *
Offense level .88 (-) .88(-)
Prior record 1.31 (-) ** 1.32 (-) **
Offense type combinations”
Violent 1.90 (.66) 1.90 (.66)
Property 2.68 (.73) ** 2.81 (.74) **
Drugs 1.12 (S3) 1.08 (S2)
Other sex offenses .79 (.44) .85 (.46)
Autoltraffic offenses 1.93 (.66) 2.04 (.67) *
Drug/alcohol treatment ordered 1.51 (.60) * 1.45 (S9)
Basic sentencesa
Incarceration .75 (.43)
Work release 1.35 (S7)
House arrest .58 (-37) **
Sentence combinationsa
Incarceration only .68 (.41)
Work release and probation .77 (4)
Work release and house arrest .45 (.31) *
Incarceration and house arrest .43 (.30) *
Incarceration and probation .58 (.37)
House arrest and probation .41 (.29) **
Time since sentencindrelease 1.01 (-) 1.01 (-)
Chi-square 74.7 (s < .OOOl) 77.8 (p < .0001)
Gamma (predicted vs. observed) .42 .44
N 516 516

a White is the reference for race/ethnicity. Single is the reference for marital
status. “Other” offenses are the reference for offense category combinations.
Probation is the reference for basic sentence categories and sentence com-
binations.
* Statistically significant at .05 or less.
** Statistically significant at .01 or less.
 PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF RECIDIVISM 177

criminal record. Since the prior record scale is a continuous variable, its effect
on the odds of rearrest is cumulative-that is, each increase in the prior record
scale is associated with a 32% increase in the odds of rearrest (in Model 2). For
example, from both Model 1 and 2, offenders with a prior record score of “4”
would have about 2.86 times greater odds of being rearrested than an offender
with a prior record score of “0.”5 Thus, the more numerous and serious are
offenders’prior criminal records, the greater the likelihood of their rearrest. This
finding is no surprise, and coincides with the large majority of prior studies of
criminal careers and recidivism.
Offenders’ sex is also a strong predictor of rearrest. Females’ rearrest odds
are almost half those of males in both models, and also females have only a 35%
(Model 2) to 37% (Model 1) probability of rearrest compared to a roughly 60%
probability for males.6 This finding is also in line with previous criminological
literature, which finds that females are far less involved in crime, especially
serious crime, than males (Steffensmeier and Allan 1996), and less likely to
recidivate than males (e.g., Baumer 1997). The type of offense for which
offenders were convicted also influences the likelihood of rearrest in both
models. In particular, those convicted of property crimes have odds of rearrest
that are well over two-and-a-half times greater than other offenses, and have
about a 74% probability of rearrest. Those convicted of autohaffic felonies (i.e.,
repeat drunk driving or “habitual traffic violators”) are also significantly more
likely to be rearrested in Model 2. The lowest (but not statistically significant)
probabilities of rearrest (48%) are associated with non-rape sex offenses (i.e.,
child molesting, incest) followed by drug offenses (55%). Education is also
associated with moderately decreased odds of rearrest in both models. Each year
of education yields a roughly . I 8 decrease in rearrest odds.
Of the basic sentence categories in Model I, only house arrest is associated
with significantly reduced odds of rearrest compared to the reference category,
traditional probation. Those offenders for whom the court orders mandatory drug
or alcohol treatment are also moderately more likely to be rearrested in Model 1.
This finding may seem counterintuitive at first-a purpose of drug or alcohol
treatment, after all, is to prevent alcohol or drug related problems such as
criminal behavior in the future. In fact, a great deal of social science research
and criminal justice experience indicates that drugs and alcohol are in fact
strongly related to criminal activity (Blumstein 1993; Horney et al. 1995; Parker
1998). When a judge orders drug or alcohol treatment as a condition of proba-
tion, this indicates that an offender already has a drug or alcohol problem serious
enough to warrant treatment, and he/she who may already be at a modest
disadvantage in terms of recidivism. .
Model 2 depicts the effects of the various sentence combinations on
rearrest. First, each of the combinations result in decreased likelihood of rearrest
178 JEFFERY T.ULMER

relative to the reference group-offenders receiving only traditional probation.

In other words, traditional probation is associated with the highest likelihood of
rearrest. However, only the coefficients for house arrest/probation, work
release/house arrest, and incarcerationhouse arrest are statistically significant.
The sentence combination with the least likelihood of rearrest is house
arrest/probation. Those sentenced to a combination of house arrest followed by
(or concurrent with) probation have rearrest odds of .41 compared to the refer-
ence category (traditional probation only), and the lowest probability of rearrest
(29%). Next to house arrestlprobation, the sentence combinations of work
release/house arrest and incarcerationhouse arrest are roughly equal in their in-
fluence on the likelihood of rearrest (as I discuss below, however, the significant
effect of incarcerationhouse arrest is gender-specific and applies only to
women). The rearrest odds for both of these sentence combinations are less than
half of those for traditional probation and both are associated with a roughly
30% probability of rearrest. In sum, each sentence combination that includes
house arrest is associated with significantly decreased likelihood of rearrest.
Table 3 presents two OLS models of rearrest severity that include the same
basic sentence categories and sentence combinations as Table 2.
Again, the effects of the non-sentencing variables are very similar between
the two models. The coefficients for prior record, sex, offense type and education
are all significant. The strongest effect is for prior record (Beta = .23), followed
by offense type (Beta for property offenses is roughly .20, and .18 for auto/traf-
fic offenses), sex (Beta = - 12), and education (Beta = -.lo). Thus, those with
more extensive prior records, those convicted of property or auto/traffic offenses,
males, and those with less education tend to be rearrested for more serious of-
fenses. In Model 1, the only basic sentence category with a significant effect on
rearrest severity is house arrest-if those with a house arrest component to their
sentences are rearrested, it tends to be for less severe offenses compared to those
under traditional probation.
House arrestiprobation is the only sentence combination in Model 2 signif-
icantly related to rearrest severity (Beta = -.13). When they are arrested, of-
fenders sentenced to house arrest followed by (or concurrent with) probation
tend to be rearrested for less serious offenses. While all of the other sentence
combinations except work release/probation are also associated with decreased
rearrest severity compared to probation only (the comparison group), none of
these effects are statistically significant.
Probation Revocation
It is important to analyze the relative likelihood of probation revocation for
different sentencing options for two reasons. On one hand, it is a commonly
used measure of offender behavior that violates correctional program rules
 Table 3
OLS Models for Severity of Rearrest

Age .003 (.01) .003 (.01)

Sex (female = 1) -.57 (-.ll) ** -.60 (-.12) **
Racea
Black . l l (.01) .I0 (.01)
Hispanic .27 (.02) .25 (.02)
Marital status"
Married -.32 (-.02) -.02 (- .06)
Divorcedseparated .06 (.01) .06 (.01)
Missing .07 (.02) .02 (.01)
Education -.20 (-.lo) * -.21 (-.lo) *
Offense level -.18 (-.06) -.I7 (-.05)
Prior record .28 (.23) ** .28 (.23) **
Offense type combinationsa
Violent .72 (.12) .73 (.11)
Property 1.01 (.20) ** 1.04 (.21) **
Drugs .27 (.04) .24 (.04)
Other sex offenses .07 (.01) .10 (.01)
AutoJtraffic offenses .87 (.17) * .89 (.18) *
Drug/alcohol treatment ordered .33 (.07) .32 (.07)
Basic sentencesa
Incarceration -.18 (-.04)
Work release .42 (.07)
House arrest -.42 (-.lo) *
Sentence combinations"
Incarceration only -.05 (-.Ol)
Work release and probation .09 (.01)
Work release and house arrest - .40 (- .05)
Incarceration and house arrest - .54 (- .09)
Incarceration and probation -.39 (-.07)
House arrest and probation -.63 (-.13) *
Time since sentencinghelease .003 (.01) .004 (.01)
F 4.2 (p < .0001) 5.0@ < .0001)
R-squared .15 .16
N 516 516

"White is the reference for race/ethnicity. Single is the reference for marital
status. "Other" offenses are the reference for offense category combina-
tions. Probation is the reference for basic sentence categories and sentence
combinations.
* Statistically significant at .05 or less.
** Statistically significant at .01 or less.
180 JEFFREY T. ULMER

(Visher et al. 1991), though it may or may not reflect criminal behavior. On the
other hand, probation revocation is also a measure of criminal justice agencies’
surveillance and control activities (Albonetti and Hepburn 1997). In particular,
if intermediate sanctions such as work release or house arrest are associated
with comparatively high levels of revocation (and thus potential incarceration),
this may indicate the kind of “net strengthening” effect noted by Austin and
Krisberg (1 982).
The model in Table 4 examines the net effects on revocation of the sen-
tencing categories (incarceration, work release, community corrections) that can
be combined with probation. The reference category is traditional probation only.
This model includes only the 489 offenders who received probation as a part of
their sentence (minus 12 deleted for missing data). In terms of the non-
sentencing factors, age, sex, offense severity level, and offense type are all
significantly related to probation revocation. A decreased likelihood of probation
revocation is found among females, older offenders, and offenders convicted of
crimes with a more severe statutory grading. On the other hand, property
offenders are almost two-and-a-half times more likely to have their probation
revoked, and revocation is also moderately more likely for offenders who are
ordered into mandatory drug or alcohol treatment by the court. In contrast to the
analyses of rearrest and rearrest severity, prior record is not significantly associ-
ated with revocation.
Neither incarceration nor work release is significantly associated with the
likelihood of revocation, but house arrest is associated with considerably greater
revocation odds. Those offenders whose probation follows or runs concurrent
with a house arrest sentence have 2.25 times greater odds of probation revo-
cation, and a 69% probability of revocation. This finding can be explained by the
greater level of surveillance to which offenders in house arrest are subject,
compared to other offenders on probation. Given this more intensive level of
surveillance, it is likely that when community corrections offenders do violate
their conditions of probation, their violations are more likely to be detected and
dealt with compared to offenders under less surveillance-a pattern corroborated
in my qualitative data from interviews with house arrest staff and field observa-
tions. This is supported by the findings of Albonetti and Hepburn (1997), who
show that probationers under more intensive supervision are much more likely to
be caught for violations and have their probation revoked.
The analyses above control for a variety of factors that might influence
recidivism apart from the types or combinations of sanctions offenders receive,
and the correlations in Appendix B shows that the sentence types are far from
homogeneous in terms of the characteristics of the offenders who receive them.
Even so, it is important to rule out the possibility that the relationships between
the recidivism variables and the various sentence options described above are
 Table 4
Logistic Regression Models for Probation Revocation (Probation Cases Only)
Odds (Probability)
-

Age .97 (-) *

Sex (female = 1) .59 (.37) *
Race"
Black 1.22 (S5)
Hispanic .31 (.24)
Marital statusa
Married 1.02 (.50)
Divorcedseparated 1.53 (.60)
Missing .60 (.38)
Education .93 (-)
Offense level .66 (-) *
Prior record 1.05 (-)
Offense type combinations"
Violent 1.28 (.56)
Property 2.40 (.71) *
Drugs .51 (.34)
Other sex offenses .39 (.28)
Autoltrafic offenses 1.48 (.60)
Drug/alcohol treatment ordered 1.62 (.62) *
Basic sentencesa
Incarceration 1.39 (.58)
Work release 1.04 (.5 1)
House arrest 2.25 (.69) **
Time since sentencinghelease .99 (-)
Chi-square 84.2 (p < .OOOl)
Gamma (predicted vs. observed) .49
N 489

"White is the reference for race/ethnicity. Single is the reference for marital
status. "Other" offenses are the reference for offense category combina-
tions. Probation is the reference for basic sentence categories and sentence
combinations.
* Statistically significant at .05 or less.
** Statistically significant at .01 or less.
182 JEFFERY T.ULMER

spurious due to selection bias. In other words, perhaps only those offenders least
likely to be rearrested are sentenced to house arrest in the first place. This would
render spurious the finding that those whose sentence includes a house arrest
component are least likely to be rearrested and tend to be rearrested for less
serious offenses. This possibility is unlikely for two reasons.
First, qualitative interview data from county judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and house arrest staff indicate that offenders seen as less problematic
are sentenced to traditional probation, rather than house arrest, work release, or
especially incarceration. Instead, house arrest was reserved for either those
offenders whose offense severity or prior record precluded traditional probation,
or those offenders seen as unable to handle the comparative lack of structure and
supervision of traditional probation. Work release and incarceration, in turn,were
reserved for offenders who committed even more serious offenses, had more ex-
tensive prior records, and/or posed greater risks. Based on these descriptions of
the local sentencing decisions, one would expect results opposite those in Tables
2 and 3. If the results were due to selection bias from the sentencing decision, it
would favor offenders receiving only traditional probation (the reference cate-
gory in Tables 2 and 3), and not tKe other types and combinations of sentences.
Second, Table 5 shows the results of analyses that replicate the full models
in Tables 2-4, but also control for selection bias stemming from the sentencing
decision, using the two-step procedure commonly used to control for selection
bias (Berk 1983; Peterson and Hagan 1984).
Appendix C shows a logistic regression model of the likelihood of receiv-
ing house arrest, and one of the likelihood of being incarcerated. These models
were used to generate predicted values for the "hazard" of receiving one or the
other type of sentence. These predicted hazards, in turn, were included as pre-
dictors in models of rearrest, rearrest severity, and probation revocation that
replicated those in Tables 2 4 , but that controlled for the probability of receiving
a house arrest sentence, or being incarcerated, respectively. The results were
nearly identical between the recidivism models controlling for the probability of
receiving house arrest and the ones controlling for the probability of being in-
carcerated. Thus, Table 5 shows results for the sanction variables (other controls
included but not shown) when the probability or hazard of receiving a house ar-
rest sentence is controlled.
As the models in Table 5 show, the effects of the sentencing combinations
on rearrest and rearrest severity are almost identical to those in Tables 2 and 3.
In addition, the only sentence type significantly related to probation revocation is
house arrest, which-as in Table &more than doubles the odds of revocation.
Thus, the effects of house arrest-alone and in combination with other
sentences-on rearrest, rearrest severity, and probation revocation are apparently
robust with respect to selection bias stemming from sentencing decisions.
 PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF RECIDIVISM 183

Table 5
Effects of Sentences on Rearrest, Rearrest Severity, and Probation Revocation:
Net of Non-Sentencing Control Variables, and Controlling for Sentencing
Selection Bias

Rearrest Severity Revocation

Odds (Probability) b (Beta) Odds (Probability)

Sentence combinations”
Incarceration only .68 (.40) -.05 (-.Ol)
Work release and probation .76 (.43) .09 ( .01)
Work release and house arrest .43 (.30) * -.40 (- .05)
Incarceration and house arrest .45 (.3 1) * -.54 (-.09)
Incarceration and probation .58 (.37) -.39 (-.07)
House arrest and probation .41 (.29) ** -.63 (-.13) *
Basic sentence typesa
Incarceration 1.37 (.58)
Work release 1.01 (.50)
House arrest 2.28 (.70) **
Selection bias correction factor 999.0 (-) .05 (.003) 188.1 (-)
Chi-squared 78.0 (p < .0001) 85.0 (p < .OOOl)
Gamma (predicted vs. observed) .44 .50
N 516 489
F 5.5 (p < .0001)
R-squared .16

“White is the reference for race/ethnicity. Single is the reference for marital status.
“Other” offenses are the reference for offense category combinations. Probation is
the reference for basic sentence categories and sentence combinations.
bThe logit coefficients for the selection bias correction factor in the models above are:
Rearrest model, 10.8; Revocation model, 5.2.
* Statistically significant at .05 or less.
** Statistically significant at .01 or less.

Finally, I tested interaction terms for each possible combination of race and
combined sanction type and gender and combined sanction type (e.g., race *
house arrest/probation, gender * incarceratiodprobation, etc.) on rearrest,
rearrest severity, and probation revocation. Only one of these kinds of interaction
effects was significant-gender * incarceration with house arrest (logit = -2.14,
odds = .12, p < .01). That is, the significant effect of incarceration followed by
184 JEFFERY T. ULMER

house arrest on the odds of rearrest found in Table 2 pertains only to women.
Women receiving a period of incarceration followed by house arrest are signifi-
cantly less likely to be rearrested, but not men (full results available on request).
Conclusions
To summarize, a stratified random sample of 528 adult felony offenders
from a medium-sized Indiana county was selected from offenders released from
house arrest, work release, supervised adult probation, and the Department of
Corrections between 1991 and 1995. The offenders in the sample varied in their
demographic characteristics, offense types and severity levels, prior criminal
records, sentences and other characteristics.
First, prior record, sex, offense type and education were consistently and
significantly related to the probability and severity of rearrest-findings gener-
ally consistent with previous research. Prior record was the strongest predictor of
rearrest and its severity-ffenders with more extensive prior records were more
likely to be rearrested, and tended to be rearrested for more severe offenses.
Women, on the other hand, were less likely to be rearrested, and if they were, it
tended to be for less serious offenses. Property offenders and autokaffic offend-
ers also tended to have a higher likelihood of rearrest, and tended to be rearrested
for more severe offenses. In addition, more educated offenders were less likely
to be rearrested, and when they were, it tended to be for less serious offenses.
The sentence combination associated with the least likelihood of rearrest
was house arredprobation. The combinations of work releasehouse arrest and
incarcerationlhouse arrest were also significantly associated with decreased
chances of rearrest compared to traditional probation. Of the sentence combina-
tions, only house arrest/probation was significantly related to rearrest. When
those sentenced to house arrestiprobation were rearrested, it tended to be for less
serious offenses. In fact, no matter which other sentence option it was paired
with, house arrest was associated with reduced chances of rearrest and less
rearrest severity. Furthermore, whenever any other sentence option was paired
with house arrest, that sentence combination was associated with reduced
chances and severity of rearrest (with the community corrections/probation
combination having the least odds and severity of rearrest). When sentences such
as incarceration, work release, and traditional probation were not paired with
house arrest in these data, those sentences exhibited no significant relationship to
rearrest or its severity. However, house arrest also considerably increased the
likelihood of probation revocation.
Some important cautions in interpreting these findings are in order. Rearrest
and its severity and probation revocation are not only measures of offender
behavior, but also of the activities of police, house arrest surveillance officers,
and probation officers. This is especially crucial to keep in mind for the probation
 PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF RECIDIVISM 185

revocation analyses. The results for the analysis of house arrest violations and
probation revocations may reflect both the behavior of offenders and the amount
of attention and watchfulness accorded offenders under different types of correc-
tional supervision. These are factors that are impossible to fully disentangle in
these data. Relatedly, it is also important to remember that rearrests and proba-
tion revocations may represent very different offender behaviors. While rearrests
represent police definitions of criminal behavior, violations and revocations may
or may not involve criminal behavior. Instead, violations and revocations may in-
volve non-criminal behavior that violates program rules. Thus, the different re-
cidivism variables reflect potentially different levels of seriousness of behavior.
What is it about house arrest in this county that might explain the lower
odds and severity of rearrest? House arrest is the program in this county that puts
the offender in touch with the most opportunities and resources for rehabilitative
services (such as substance abuse counseling and workshops, sex offender coun-
seling, anger management classes, and other services) and also directly channels
offenders into work or education. To be eligible for and remain on house arrest,
an offender must be employed, actively seeking employment, or going to school.
Education is a particularly attractive option in this county’s program, since it can
fulfill the program’s employment requirement, and since there are a number of
local low-cost or publicly subsidized educational opportunities (e.g., county sub-
sidized G.E.D. programs, a local community college, a large state university).
None of the other types of sentences or programs (including work release) pro-
vides these resources and opportunities to such an extent.
Given these characteristics of this county’s house arrest program vis-a-vis
the other sentence options, the findings here support the contentions of Byrne
(1990), Andrews et al. (1990), and MacKenzie, Brame, McDowall, and Souryal
(1995) that intermediate sanctions of any type may potentially reduce recidivism,
but only to the extent that they include a rehabilitative emphasis. Furthermore,
these findings also support the theoretical arguments of Braithwaite (1989),
Sampson and Laub (1993, 1997), and Matsueda and Heimer (1 997) that crimi-
nal sanctions which entail structured ways to preserve, mobilize, or foster the
growth of social bonds to conventional adult roles and institutions such as work
and family are far more likely to prevent future criminal offending.
The different sanctions examined here have different rules about what con-
stitutes infractions and violations, and different levels of surveillance and formal
control. Like Albonetti and Hepburn’s (1997) findings regarding intensive pro-
bation, the data here suggest a process of “net strengthening” (Austin and
Krisberg 1982). Offenders under the heightened surveillance and control of
house arrest may or may not be more likely to violate rules. If offenders are
under the heightened surveillance and control of intermediate sanctions like
house arrest, there may be a greater likelihood that any program rule violations
186 JEFFERY T. ULMER

or criminal behavior will be caught. And, of course, offenders who violate pro-
gram rules almost always face the possibility of incarceration or reincarceration.
Thus, I found the kind of mixed outcomes for intermediate sanctions predicted
by Blomberg (1995). House arrest was associated with reduced chances of rear-
rest and its severity, but also much greater chances of probation revocation. One
very important direction of future research might be to determine whether house
arrest’s savings in correctional resources gained through preventing rearrests is
outweighed by greater levels of probation revocation, and potential subsequent
in~arceration.~ Some key empirical questions to answer are, what happens to
house arrest offenders whose probation is revoked-are they reincarcerated or
kept in the house arrest program but sanctioned some other way (e.g., given a pe-
riod on road crew, given an increased house arrest term, etc.), and how does this
vary according to the behavior in question, prior record, offenders’ social sta-
tuses, organizational program characteristics, or other factors?
We have a good deal more to learn about the comparative and conditionalout-
comes of traditional sanctions on one hand, and intermediate sanctions on the
other. The general recidivism literature contains several studies that examine both
the probability and timing of recidivism using sophisticated event history models,
but these studies typically do not include or compare a variety of intermediate
sanctions with more traditional sentences. The literature on recidivism and inter-
mediate sanctions seldom investigates the timing of recidivism, and some studies
do not even contain multivariate models of the probability of recidivism. Further,
both literatures often rely on offender samples that lack variation in key character-
istics. For example, many focus only on limited types of offenses, some offender
samples lack variation in criminal history, and many are limited only to males.
Future research needs to put all of these pieces together by investigating the prob-
ability and timing of a variety of recidivism measures, comparing a wide variety
of newer and more traditional sentence types, and using samples of offenders that
vary in their offenses, prior records, sex, race and ethnicity, and social resources.
As mentioned earlier, with its plentiful jobs, education opportunities, and its
comparatively well-funded, supported, and organized intermediate sanction pro-
grams like house arrest, this particular county would seem to have a social struc-
tural context which favors the success of community corrections. Thus, a crucial
direction for future research would be further examine the relationships between
intermediate sanctions, traditional sentencing options, and the probability and
timing of recidivism, to do so across a variety of jurisdictions with different con-
textual characteristics, and across intermediate sanction programs with different
organizational characteristics.
Further, research should not only continue to quantitatively analyzerecidivism
outcomes or series of outcomes, but should also qualitatively explore the processes
by which intermediate sanctions-like house arrest for example-may or may not
 PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF RECIDIVISM 187

prevent recidivism (see also Blomberg 1995). Future research should focus on the
situational and interactionalprocesses by which differentkinds of sanctions affect-
the theoretical mechanisms discussed by Braithwaite (1989), Sampson and Laub
(1993,1997) and Matsueda and Heimer (19 9 7 F t h e balance of criminal and con-
ventional opportunities, the nurturing vs. or “knifing off” of conventional commit-
ments and social bonds, and criminal vs. conventional self-definitions.

APPENDIX A
Variables and Their Coding

Variable Coding

Time since Months since sentencing for non-

sentencing or incarcerated offenders, months
incarcerationrelease since release for incarcerated
offenders
Offender’sage Age at time of sentence, in years
Offender’s sex 0 = male; 1 = female
Offender’s race Dummy variables for white, black,
Hispanic (1 = Yes)
Offender’smarital status Dummy variables for single, married,
divorcedseparated,
and missing (1 = Yes)
Offender’seducation Years of education completed
Offense categories Block of dummy variables for:
property (theft, auto theft, burglary,
forgery, arson)
violent (robbery, battery/assault,
rape, involuntary manslaughter,
criminal recklessness, criminal
confinement)
drugs (drug possession, drug
trafficking)
other sex offenses (sex offenses
other than rape, e.g., incest, child
molesting)
auto/traffic (repeat driving
while intoxicated, habitual
traffic offender)
Other (miscellaneousoffenses)
Convicted offense severity level 1 = D felony (least severe)
2 = C felony
3 = B felony
4 = A felony (most severe)
(continued)
188 JEFFREY T. ULMER

APPENDIX A (continued)
Variable Coding

Incarceration sentence 0 = no; 1 = yes

Work release sentence 0 = no; 1 = yes
Drug treatment Dummy variable for whether
drug/alcohol treatment is ordered
as condition of probation (yes = 1)
Community corrections length Length, in months
House arrest sentence 0 = no, 1 = yes
Prior criminal convictions scale Total score, based on the following
(weighted for seventy) point system:
0 = no prior convictions
each prior misdemeanor = .5 point
each prior D felony = 1 point
each prior C felony = 2 points
each prior B felony = 3 points
each prior A felony = 4 points
Probation revocation 0 = no; 1 = yes;
Rearrest (any rearrests following 0 = no; 1 = yes
convictionwithin study time frame)
Rearrest severity scale
(based on first rearrest) 0 = none
1 = C misdemeanor
2 = B misdemeanor
3 = A misdemeanor
4 = D felony
5 = C felony
6 = B felony
7 = A felony
 APPENDIX B
Correlation Matrix

.35** .OI -.04 -.II* -.II*' .01 .lo* -.W* .03 -.01 -.W* .23** .11** .04 -.IS** -.12** .07 .04 .OL .05 -.11' .02
.30" .01 -.01 -.13'* -.W' .02 .06 -.lo*' .04 .01 -.lo' 26'. .09* .04 -.IS'* -.II*' .11** .05 .04 .08 -.08' .01
- .M -.13** -.06 -.01 .08 -.14* -.03 .02 -.05 -.W* .13** .13** .01 -.13** -.13*' .06 .IS* .01 .07 .2l" .14**
- -.W -.05 -.05 .03 .I0 -.02 .02 -.01 -.01 -.06 -.01 -.03 -.04 .04 .02 .01 .02 -.W -.18** -.07
- .OL .17** .20'* .04 .01 .01 -.05 -.07 .01 -.24*' -.02 .02 .16*' .18** .01 .05 -.01 -.05 -.09*
- .01 .01 .04 .03 -.05 -.04 -.12** -.08 .07 -.IS** .21'* -.16** .01 .02 -.21** -.07 .03 .12**
- -.91** -.33*' -.02 -.05 -.04 -.03 .02 -.M .01 .II" .02 -.06 .03 .M .01 .12** -.12**
- -.35** -.05 -.03 -.04 .08* .09* -.01 .03 -.02 .11** -.07 .07 .09* -.01 .03 -.06
- .04 .02 -.01 -.20*' -.W -.M -.01 .II" -.11" .19* -.08 -.20*' -.06 -.27*' .IF*
- .01 -.OS .03 -.05 .01 .01 .07 -.05 -.01 .05 -.04 .02 .02 .I0
- -.05 -.02 .02-.01 .21** -,OS -.02 -.W* .02 .lo* .07 -.lI* .02
- -.01 -.02 -.03 .04 .01 -.04 .05 .03 -.03 .01 .03 -.02
- -.W* -.03 .04 .01 -.04 -40" -.01 .27** -.02 -.05 -.07
- .08* .Ol -.08 -.13* .06 -.01 .lo* .03 .08 -.04
- -.26** -.25*' -.17** -.37** -.20*' -.M -.04 -.05 -.04
- -.17*' -.12** -.2S** .01 .08 -.Ol -.I2** -.04
- -.11** -.24** .08* .lo* -.02 .05 .07
- -.17** .01 .12** -.07 -.04 -.IS**
- .17** -.lo* .11** .14** .II*
- .16** .13" .16** 29"
- .39" -.22** -.21"
- -.02 .09*
- .23**

Coefficient significant at .05 or less.

** Coefficientsignificant at .01 or less.
Variables:
(1) Reamst (9) Marital status missing (1 7) Drug offenses
(2) Reamst severity (10) Education (18) Sex offenses
(3) probation revocatim (11) Black (19) Autohrathc felonies
(4) Time s h e sentencing/release (12) Hispanic (20) Drug/alcohol treatment ordered
( 5 ) Age (13) Offense level (21) Incarceration sentence
(6) *x (14) Prior record scale (22) Work release sentence
(7) Married (1 5 ) property offenses (23) H o w arrest sentence
(8) Divorcdseparated (16) Violent offenses (24) Probation
190 JEFFERY T. ULMER

APPENDIX C

Logistic Regression Models of Probability of Receiving House Arrest and Incarceration Sentences
Odds (Probability)
House Arrest Incarceration

Age .98 (.49) * 1.01 (.50)

Sex (female = 1) 1.10 (.52) .43 (.30) **
Racea
Black .54 (.35) 2.50 (.71) **
Hispanic .74 (.42) 1.20 (.55)
Marital statusa
Married 1.15 (S3) 1.16 (.53)
Divorcedkeparated .84 (.46) 1.10 (S2)
Missing .33 (.25) * .53 (.35) *
Education 1.06 (.5 1) .94 (.48)
Offense level .85 (.46) 2.23 (.69) **
Prior record 1.06 (.51) 1.13 (.53) *
Offense type combinationsa
Violent .75 (.43) 1.81 1.64)
Property .97 (.49) 1.09 (.52)
Drugs 1.27 (.56) 2.46 (.71) *
Other sex offenses .84 (.46) 2.81 (.74) *
Auto/traffic offenses 2.7 (.73) ** 1.63 (.62)
Chi-square 76.2 (p < ,0001) 99.9 (p < .0001)
Gamma (predicted vs. observed) .42 .48
N 516 516

aWhite is the reference for race/ethnicity. Single is the reference for marital status. “Other” offenses
are the reference for offense category combinations.
* Statistically significant at .05 or less.
** Statistically significant at .01 or less.

ENDNOTES

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1998 annual meetings of the American
Society of Criminology, Washington, D.C. This research was funded by the Indiana Department of
Corrections, but the author is solely responsible for this article’s arguments. I thank David Kuebler,
Kristi Aufderheide, Amy Crook, Amy Earlywine, Janet Ahlfield, and Danielle Hsu for their efforts on
this research project.
‘These findings coincide with MacKenzie et a1.k (1995) research, which found that boot camps
exhibited decreased recidivism rates only to the extent that they included a rehabilitative or educa-
tional focus.
20f course, offenders could commit new criminal offenses while in jail or prison. I do not in-
clude such offenses. Incarcerated offenders are under much greater supervision surveillance than
those under other sanctions, and have much less opportunity to commit new criminal offenses than
 PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF RECIDIVISM 191

those in the community. Thus, the time “at risk” for incarcerated offenders and those not incarcerated
is not strictly comparable.
3By state law, anyone who wants to view an offender’s presentence report must have that of-
fender’s written permission, and securing such permission from 528 offenders was impractical.
4This weighted prior record scale is very similar to those used by many states’ sentencing
guideline systems, such as Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Washington (Kramer, Lubitz, and
Kempinen 1989).
5The cumulative effect on the odds for a given value of a continuous independent variable is
calculated by raising the odds ratio for that variable to a power equal to the value of interest. For ex-
ample, the cumulative odds of rearrest for a hypothetical offender with a prior record score of “4”
would be 1.34 = 2.86.
6The formula for converting odds ratios to probabilities is: odds / (odds + 1) (Lichter 1989).
’1 am grateful to Tom Bernard for suggesting this point.

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