ARTICLE 1409 • In the interest of the public, it is of the utmost
SYLVIA DE LEON v. CA, MACARIA DE LEON, and
JOSE VICENTE DE LEON
G.R. No. 80965, June 6,1990
• Under the disputed letter-agreement, the parties
contemplated not only to agree to a judicial separation
of property of the spouses but also to continue with the
divorce proceedings.
• If taken with apparently ambiguous provisions under the
document regarding the termination of relations, the
parties clearly contemplated not only the termination
of property relations but also the marital relations
entirely.
• While there could be inherent benefits to a termination
of conjugal property relationship between the spouse,
the lower court held that it not clearly perceive the
underlying benefit for the intervenor unless the
consideration is the termination of martial relationship
by divorce proceedings between her son and his wife
petitioner Sylvia.
• The Court then ruled that the cause or consideration for
the intervenor respondent Macaria in executing the letter-
agreement was the termination of marital relationship
between her son and Sylvia.
• Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social
institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulations. . . xxx
(Art. 52 of the Civil Code)
• From this, it can be ascertained that the intervenor’s
undertaking premised on the termination of marital
relationship is not only contrary to law but contrary to
Filipino morals and public policy.
• Hence, any agreement or obligations based on such
unlawful consideration and which contrary to public
policy is deemed null and void.
• Thus, petition is denied.
IGNACIO ARROYO v. ALFRED BERWIN
G.R. No. L-10551, Mar. 3, 1917
• The case involves an agreement to dismiss a criminal
proceeding, stipulating that the defendant would
recognize plaintiff as the owner of the land, where she
ordered the cane to be cut.
• It was stipulated that the defendant would not oppose the
application of registration to be filed provided the
plaintiff would ask the prosecutor to dismiss the
proceedings against defendant for the crime of theft.
• The plaintiff complied, but defendant refused the sign
the written agreement that she recognized plaintiff’s
ownership in the land.
• Thus, the plaintiff filed an action to compel the defendant
to sign the agreement.
• The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of the
illegality of the consideration of the contract.
ISSUE:
• W/N the agreement is valid
HELD:
• An agreement by the owner of the stolen goods to stifle
the prosecution of the person charged with theft, for a
pecuniary or other valuable consideration, is manifestly
contrary to public policy and the due administration of
justice.
importance that criminal should be prosecuted, and that
all criminal proceedings should be instituted and
maintained in the form and manner prescribed by
law.
• To permit an offender to escape the penalties prescribed
by law by the purchase of immunity from private
persons would result in a manifest perversion of justice.
• Hence, the order is affirmed.
E. RAZON, INC. and ENRIQUE RAZON v.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, PRIMITIVO
SOLIS, JR. and VICENTE SUAZO, Jr., respondents.
MARINA PORT SERVICES, INC., intervenor.
G.R. No. 75197, June 22, 1987
• The disputed Management Contract was executed
between petitioner E. Razon, Inc, and respondent PPA.
• At the time of execution of the contract, E. Razn was
controlled by Alfredo Romualdez, the brother-in-law of
deposed Pres. Marcos.
• Under Sec. 5 of RA 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, due to his relationship with the President,
Romualdez was prohibited from intervening, directly
or indirectly, in any transaction or business with the
government.
• Thus, the Management Contract, entered into by E.
Razon, Inc., ostensibly owned by petitioner Enriquez
Razon, but in fact controlled by Romualdez as 60%
equity owner therof, is null and void, being one
expressly prohibited by law.
• Furthermore, it is the direct result of a previous illegal
contract and, therefore, is itself null and void under
Art. 1422 of the Civil Code.
• The transfer of the shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc,
representing 60% equity to persons fronting Romualdez
was null and void.
• The invalidity springs not from vitiated consent nor
absolute want of monetary consideration but for having
an unlawful cause — that of obtaining a government
contract in violation of law.
• The general rule is that the causa of the contract must
not be confused with the motives of the parties.
• However, this case falls into the exception, where the
motive may be regarded as causa when it predetermines
the purpose of the contract.
• The motive of Romualdez was to contract with the
government which he was then prohibited by law from
doing, and the motive of Razon was to renew his
management contract.
• Thus, Razon would not have transferred the shares of
stock to Romualdez without the assurance that he would
be unduly favored with a renewal of the Management
Contract.
• By transferring 60% of the shares in his company to
Romualdez, Razon was able to secure an 8-year
contract with PPA and 6 years before cancellation
benefitted from the proceeds.
• The transfer of the control of E. Razon from Razon to
Romualdez, being null and void, served as a direct link
to petitioner’s obtaining the Management Contract.
• Being the direct consequence and result of a previous
illegal contract, the Management Contract itself is null
and void under Art. 1422.
• Petition is dismissed.
CONCHITA LIGUEZ v. CA, MARIA NGO VDA. DE
LOPEZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-11240, Dec. 18, 1957
• In making the donation, the late Salvador Lopez was
not moved exclusively by the desire to benefit appellant
Conchita Liguez but also to secure her cohabiting with
him, so he could gratify his sexual impulses.
• This is clear for his confession to the witnesses that he
was in love with appellant, but her parents would not
agree unless he donated the disputed land.
• Therefore, the donation was but one part of an onerous
transaction that must be viewed in its totality.
• The conveyance was predicated on an illicit causa.
• In this case, Lopez would not have conveyed the
property had he known that appellant would refuse to
cohabit with him.
• Thus, the cohabitation was an implied condition to the
donation, and being unlawful, necessarily tainted the
donation itself.
• However, it cannot be said that both parties had equal
guilty when considered as against deceased Lopez, a man
advanced in years and mature experience, and
appellant, then 16 years old, when the donation is made.
• There was no finding that she was fully aware of the
terms of the bargain entered into by Lopez and her
parents.
• Her acceptance in the deed of donation did not
necessarily imply knowledge of conditions and terms
not provided.
• The Court interpreted the rule that parties to an illegal
contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by law but
will both be left where it finds them, as barring the party
from pleading the illegality of the bargain as a cause of
action or defense.
• From the provisions of the Civil Code, the donation made
by the husband in contravention with the law is not void
in its entirety but only in so far as it prejudiced the
interest of his wife as the property was conjugal in
character and the right of husband to donate community
property is strictly limited by law.
• Hence, appellant Conchita Liguez is entitled to the
donated property as may be found, upon proper
liquidation, not to prejudice the share of the widow
Maria Ngo in the conjugal partnership with Lopez or the
legitimes of the forced heir of Lopez.
PEDRO BERCERO v. CAPITOL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 154765, Mar. 29, 2007
• Void are all contracts in which the cause or object does
not exist at the time of transaction.
• In this case, the lease contract between petitioner
Bercero and respondent CDC is void for having an
inexistent cause as respondent did not have the right to
lease the property to petitioner considering its lease
contract with R.C. Nicolas was still valid and subsisting,
albeit pending litigation.
• As it granted to R.C. Nicolas the right to use and enjoy
its property from 1983 to 1993, respondent could not
grant the same right to petitioner in 1988.
• When petitioner entered into the lease contract, CDC was
still obliged to maintain R.C. Nicolas’ peaceful and
adequate possession and enjoyment of its lease for the
10-year duration of the contract.
• Respondent’s unilateral rescission of its lease contract
with R.C. Nicolas, without the final outcome of the
ejectment case, is unlawful.
• A lease is a reciprocal contract and its continuance,
effectivity, or fulfillment cannot be made to depend
exclusively on the free and uncontrolled choice of just
one party to a lease contract.
• Hence, the lease contract entered between petitioner and
respondent, during the pendency of the lease contract
with R.C. Nicolas, is void.
AMPARO GONZALES and ALFREDO TRINIDAD v.
PRIMITIVO TRINIDAD and MARIA YNAREZ
G.R. No. L-45965, April 29, 1939
• Plaintiff executed in favor of petitioners a deed of sale of
an urban property, which was mortgaged to the Bureau
of Lands.
• The petitioner then assumed the encumbrance.
• The sale was simulated and the supposed vendors did
not receive the alleged price in order to save the
property from attachment by Dr. Papa to whom Lorenzo
had endorsed a note for P4,000 executed and signed by
Primitivo Trinidad.
• When Dr. Papa died, Carmen papa represented the credit
and had a subsequent agreement with Primitivo where
he would pay the note as soon as he had the money.
• Thus, the litigation and attachment Primitivo feared were
averted.
• The CA declared the deed of sale as null and void.
ISSUE:
• W/N the deed of sale is null and void
HELD:
• Art. 1305 and 1306 are not applicable to the contract
entered into by the parties because they refer to contracts
with illegal consideration and subject matter, whether
the facts constitute an offense or misdemeanor or
whether the consideration is only rendered illegal.
• The contract of sake was onerous as its cause or
consideration is the price of P10,000.
• Both the consideration and the subject of the contract, the
property, are lawful and not penalized by law.
• However, as the contract was in itself fictitious and
simulated price, the consideration being lacking, the
contract is null and void per se or non-existent.
• The object of the contracting parties or the motives of
the vendors in entering into the simulated contract
should not be confused with the consideration, which
was not present in the transaction.
• The motive, although illegal, neither determine nor take
the place of consideration.
• Hence, the Court denied the remedy sought.
MANUEL PEREZ v. ANTONIO HERRANZ
G.R. No. 2982, Mar. 8, 1907
• After negotiations, defendant Herrnanz executed a bill
of sale of the streamer Alfred to plaintiff Perez for the
sum of P58,000, Mexican currency, which was paid by
check by defendant.
• Of the P58,000, the defendant retained an interest of
P48,000, while the P10,000 was furnished by plaintiff.
• The title was put in the name of plaintiff alone as he was
a native inhabitant of the Philippines, who was
qualified under the statutes, while defendant was a
Spaniard.
• The reliance of the plaintiff is on the legality of his
arrangements, as one in contravention of the coastwise
trading laws of the US and Philippines.
• This is an action to recover possession of the streamer
Alfred.
ISSUE:
• W/N the agreement between plaintiff and defendant is
void/inexistent
HELD:
• The courts will not aid either party to enforce an illegal
contract bu will leave both of them where it finds them
— but where the plaintiff establish a cause of action,
without exposing the illegality, the vice does not affect
his right to recover.
• The plaintiff could establish prima facie his whole
ownership by the bill of sale and official registration, and
the defendant may overthrow this title by proof through
a subsequent agreement between him and plaintiff as
co-owners of the vessel without disclosing the illegal
motive.
• Less than 2 months after the purchase the vessel, the law
was changed, making the arrangement between plaintiff
and defendant legal, where a vessel owned wholly or in
part by a Spaniard was entitled upon compliance with
the statute to engage in the coastwise trade under a
special license.
• However, the proof do not indicate that the parties ever
took advantage of the enactment and applied for such
license, nor did they show the license did not comply
with the new law.
• The Court is not required to pass on this question of fact
nor on the effect of the statute unaided on the preexisting
ownership.
• The plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement as
a society for cuentas en participacion under the Code of
Commerce.
• The clause concludes words of transfer effective
between parties, even in a private document, which
conferred on the defendant actual ownership int he
vessel in proportion to his investment.
• The arrangement, after passage of Act No. 520, was in
conformity of the law and valid.
• Hence, the plaintiff and defendant as owners in common
of the vessel, and plaintiff may not in his action recover
its possession from defendant but is entitled to an
accounting and payment of the share of the earnings
due him.
• Thus, the plaintiff is declared the owner of 10/58 interest
and defendant as owner of 48/58 of the steamship Alfred.
BASILIA BOUGH and GUSTAVUS BOUGH v.
MATILDE CANTIVEROS and PRESBITERA
HANOPOL
G.R. No. 13300, Sept. 29, 1919
• Defendant Matilde is the owner of various parcels of
land with the value of P30,000 or more.
• She and her husband Jose Vasquez signed a martial
contract of separation.
• At this time, Matilde lived with plaintiffs Basilia and
Gustav Bough, with Basilia being the cousin of Matilde
and a protege.
• Through Gustav’s influence, he told Matilde that her
husband might contest the contract of separation of
conjugal property and induced her to sign a fictitious
contract of sale of all her property to Basilia.
• The contract was prepared in due form and
acknowledged before a notary public, with the amount of
consideration at P10,000 being last inserted with a pen.
• To reassure Matilda, the Boughs prepared and signed
another document, which is a donation to Matilda of all
the property in the fictitious contract, effective in case
of death of themselves and their children before the
death of Matilde.
• Plaintiffs Boughs then sought to have themselves be put
in possession of the property covered by the deed of
sale.
• The judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants,
declaring the deed of sale fictitious, null, and without
effect.
ISSUE:
• W/N the deed of sale is null and void
HELD:
• Contracting parties may not establish clauses and
conditions which conflict with laws, morals, or public
order.
• A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of
law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out.
• This is expressed in the maxims, “Ex dolo malo non
oritur actio,” and “In pari delicto potior est conditio
defendentis.”
• The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement;
it leaves them where it finds them.
• However, where the parties to an illegal contract are not
equally guilty, and where public policy is considered as
advanced by allowing the more excusable of the 2 to
sue relief against the transaction, relief is given.
• In this case, the grantor, reposing faith in the integrity
of the grantee, and relying on a suggested occurrence,
which did not even take place, was made the dupe of
the grantee and led to an agreement against public
policy.
• The party asking for relief, which she was induced to
enter by means of fraud, was thus in delicto, but not in
pari delicto with the other party.
• The deed was procured by misrepresentation and fraud
sufficient to vitiate the transaction.
• Justice will be done if the Court were to place the grantor
in the position before the transactions.
• Hence, the Court affirmed the judgment.
FLOCERFINA BARANDA, ALIPIO VILLARTA, and discontinuing her pension as a war window on the
SALVACION BARANDA v. EVANGELINA BARANDA, ground that she squandered her property.
ELISA BARANDA, and THE IAC • However, if that were her only purpose, why is is
G.R. No. 73275, May 20, 1987 necessary to commence litigation as mere resale of the
• The questioned sales were effected through 3 deeds properties would be sufficient and easily effected.
denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa, where Paulina Baranda • There would have been no difficulty in their acceding to
sold 5 parcels of land to her niece Evangeline and a 6th her request for a resale to protect her pension.
parcel to her other niece Elisa, for the total • Hence, decision is reversed.
consideration of P105,000.
• However, what made the transactions suspect was a
subsequent complaint filed by Paulina against her
nieces, alleging that the she signed the deeds of sales
without knowing their contents.
• The complaint was then withdraw as the parties entered
into an agreement where the defendants are obligated to
execute absolute deeds of sale in favor of plaintiff,
covering the subject properties.
• Unfortunately, only Elisa reconveyed the lot, and
Evangeline never complied with the agreement.
• Petitioner as legitimate heirs of the late Paulina filed a
complaint against Evangelina and Elisa for the
annulment of sale and reconveyances of the lots.
• The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the IAC
reversed the judgment, holding the deeds were valid and
binding.
ISSUE:
• W/N the deeds of sale are valid
HELD:
• The Court found especially intriguing was the source of
the purchase price of P105,000, which was paid by them
in cash to their aunt in the office of Atty. Galos, who
notarized the deeds of sale.
• According to Evangeline, the P100,000 was given to her
by a balikbayan boyfriend, which she used to pay her
P75,000 purchase price.
• She then lent her sister Elisa P15,000, who then raised
another P15,000 from her grandmother to complete her
P30,000 purchase price.
• However, at the time of these transaction, neither of them
were gainfully employed or had independent sources of
income as they are both fresh college graduates at 25
and 26 years old.
• The Court found the balikbayan a hazy figure without
even a name, let alone other personal circumstances to
give him bone and body.
• From the records, what can only be ascertained is that he
is an exceedingly trusting and generous person, who
was not even presented at the trial.
• Moreover, the grandmother was another generous if also
improbable figure.
• The Court found it hard to believe that this old woman
would agree to sell her own properties where she was
presumed to make a living and live off her
granddaughters who were also living with Paulina.
• The sisters made another incredible claim that they
carried they the P105,000 in cold cash to the office of
Atty. Galos, whey they could have delivered the money
in the house where they lived with Paulina.
• Paulina denied that she ever sold her lands to the sisters,
but the sisters explained that the complaint was merely
simulated to prevent the US government from
UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD
MINISTERS, as owner of the BROKENSHIRE
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL v. HON. JUDGE
ALEJANDRO SEBASTIAN, and MELENCTIO
DELENA and MAURO GEMENTIAZ, as co-executors of
the Testate of DAVID, Jacobson
G.R. No. L-34672, March 30, 1988
• David Jacobson was an American Citizen who had been
a resident of the Philippines for more than 30 years and
up to the time of his death in 1970.
• He left a will where he bequeathed to the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital 60% of his shares of stocks in the
Tagdangua Plantation Co.,
• Tagdangua Plantation Co. was incorporated under
Philippine law in 1948 and is the registered owner of a
tract of land with about 145 hectares acquired by virtue
of sales patent in 1953.
• In a special proceeding, the CFI disallowed the legacy
as it was in effect an alienation of private agricultural
land in favor of a transferee that is not qualified under
the 1935 Constitution.
• It was found that the Brokenshire Memorizal Hospital
was owned by petitioner United Church Board for
World Ministries (UCBWM), which was a non-stock
corporation organized in the US by virtue of charter.
• The basis of the ruling was Article XII, Sec. 1 and 5 of
the 1935 Constitution, which barred foreigners,
including Americans, from acquiring agricultural lands
in the country except only by hereditary succession.
• Hence, this petition, contending the constitutional
provisions were inapplicable because the object of the
legacy was not land but shares of stocks.
ISSUE:
• W/N the will left by David Jacobson void
HELD:
• Upon examination of the documents presented for the
case, it appeared that at the time the will was executed,
the land on which the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital
was situated was registered in the name of the Mindanao
District Conference, which was an affiliate of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines . (UCCP).
• The UCCP was a non-stock organization, organized
under Philippin law in 1949 with 100% Filipino
membership, which owned and operated the
Brokenshire Hospital at the time of Jacobson’s death.
• Later, the Brokenshire Hospital was incorporated as a
charitable institution, with Filipinos for its majority
members, and became the successor-in-interest of the
UCCP to the parcel of land on Dec. 16, 1970.
• To support these, the following proof were presented:
• the articles of incorporation of the UCCP and
Brokenshire Hospital and their certificates of
registration issued by the Securities Exchange
Commission)
• the licenses issued by the Board of Medical Science
for the operation of the Hospital to the UCCP (1968
to 1972) and to the Brokenshire Hospital (1973-
1974) and
• the certificate of title over the land in the name of the
Mindanao District Conference, commonly known as
the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital.
• The presented documents made it clear the the United
Church for Christ in the Philippines was the owner of the
Hospital at the time of execution of the will and of the
testator’s death in 1970 and no the United Church
Board for World Ministries.
• It was then the the UCCP passed the ownership to the
Brokenshire Hospital upon it incorporation in 1970
when it became the party-in-interest to claim the
property by virtue of Jacobson’s will.
• Furthermore, the United Church Board for World
Ministries no longer claims the property as can be
gleaned from its sur rejoinder to the rejoinder of the
Brokenshire Hospital, which expressly provided under
paragraph 6 that:
• “The United Church Board for World Minstries
does not intend to take, possess, or enjoy the
legacy of David Jacobson and has manifested
and mandated that all properties that may be
derived therefrom shall be used entirely and
exclusively for the work of the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital in accordance with the
wishes of David Jacobson.
• The Court ruled that even assuming the that United
Church Board for World Ministries was really the owner
of the Hospital at the time of effectivity of the will and
that the devise was unenforceable, the defect in the will
was rectified by the subsequent transfer of property to
the Brokenshire Hospital.
• If the land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a
citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of transferee is rendered valid.
• Hence, the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital is substituted
for the United Church Board for World Ministries as
petitioner in this case and is declared to be qualified to
accept the legacy of the late David Jacobson.
• Thus, the petition is granted.
EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA and
PACITA VALLAR v. VICTORIANO CUENCO
G.R. No. L-33048, April 16, 1982
• The case involves a parcel of coconut land which was
sold by a Filipino owner to a Chinese, who then sold it
to a naturalized Filipino.
• On 1936, petitioner Epifania sold the land to Chinese
Ong King Pio for P1,050, who took actual possession
and enjoyed the fruits.
• The Chinese then sold the litigated property to Victoriano
Cuenco who immediately took actual possession and
harvested the fruits.
• On 1962, Epifania usurped the property and sold 1/2 of
the land to Pacita Vallar, claiming that it was not her
intention to sell the land to the Chine as she did so
merely to evidence her indebtedness.
• Respondent then instituted a complaint for recovery for
possession of possession and ownership against
petitioners, who insisted that the sale to the Chinese was
inexistent and void ab initio.
• The RTC dismissed the complaint and declared the deeds
of sale as inexistent and void ab initio, which was
reversed the CA.
ISSUE:
• W/N the deeds of sale were void
HELD:
• The sale by Epifania to the Chinese was inexistent and
void ab initio as it was a contract executed against the
mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which as
expression of public policy to conserve lands for the
Filipinos.
• However, the property is now in the hands of a
naturalized Filipino, who is no longer a disqualified
vendee.
• Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was
constitutionally qualified to own the property.
• There would be no more public policy to be served in
allowing petitioner to recover the land as it is already in
the hands of a qualified person.
• While Ong King Po had no rights of ownership to
transmit, it is inescapable that petitioner Epifania had
slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962.
• By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should
be barred from asserting her claim to the property.
• Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier.
• It is negligence or omission to assert a right within
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party has abandoned or declined to assert it.
• Hence, respondent is the rightful owner of the property.
DONATO REYES YAP and MELITONA MARVILLAS
v. HON. EZEKIEL GRAGEDA and JOSE RICO
G.R. No. L-31606, Mar. 28, 1983
• Maximo Rico executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of petitioner Donato Yap, who was then a Chinese
National.
• After 15 years, petitioner was admitted as a Filipino
citizen and was issued a Certificate of Naturalization.
• He then ceded a major portion of the land in favor of
his son, Felix Yap, who was also a Filipino citizen.
• The CFI rendered the Contract of Sale as null and void
ab initio and without legal force and effect.
• Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
• W/N the Contract of Sale was null and void
HELD:
• The contract of sale was inexistent and void ab initio as
it was a contract executed against the mandatory
provision of the 1935 Constitution, which as expression
of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos.
• However, the property is now in the hands of a
naturalized Filipino, who is no longer a disqualified
vendee.
• Hence, judgment is reversed and set aside.
FILOMENA DE CASTRO v. JOAQUIN TENG QUEEN
TAN, TAN TENG BIO, DOLORES TAN HUA ING, and
TO HIAP
G.R. No. L-31956, April 30, 1984
• On 1938, Petitioner de Castro sold a residential lot to
Tan Tai, a Chinese, who upon his death, left
respondents.
• Before his death, one of his sons, respondent Joaquin,
became a naturalized Filipino, and 6 years after the
death, Tan Tai’s heir executed an extra-judicial
settlement of estate.
• On 1968, petitioner commenced a suit against the heirs of
Tan Tai for annulment of the sale for violation of the
1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.
• The CFI dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
• W/N the sale is void
HELD:
• Independent of the doctrine of in pari delicto, petitioner
cannot have the sale annulled.
• While the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the
land has become the property of respondent Joaquin, a
naturalized Filipino citizen, who is constitutionally
qualified to own the land.
• Laches also militates against petitioner as she sold the
land in 1938 and instituted the action to annul on 1968.
• Hence, the order is affirmed.
CELSO HALILI and ARTHUR HALILI v. CA, HELEN
GUZMAN, DAVID GUZMAN, and EMILIANO
CATANIAG
G.R. No. 113539, Mar. 12, 1998
• Simeon de Guzman was an American citizen, who died
in 1968 and left real properties in the Philippines — his
forced heirs being respondents as widow and son, who
are also American citizens.
• Helen later executed a deed of quitclaim where she
assigned, transferred, and conveyed to David all her
rights, titles, and interests in and over 6 parcels of lan
which the 2 of them inherited from Simeon.
• David then sold the land to respondent Emiliano.
• Petitioners, owners of the adjoining lot, filed a
complaint, questioning the constitutionality and validity
of the 2 conveyances and claiming ownership based on
their right or legal redemption under Art. 1621.
• The RTC dismissed the complaint, which was affirmed
by the CA.
ISSUE:
• W/N the sale to cataniag is valid
HELD:
• The deef of quitclaim by Helle collided with the
Constitution, Art. 12, Sec. 7.
• Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private
lands or to lands of public domain, except by way of
legal succession.
• However, if the land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfer it to a
citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of transferee is rendered valid.
• If the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural
but also urban land is to preserve the nation’s land for
future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose
would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful
the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became
Filipino citizens by naturalization.
• Accordingly, the disputed land is now owned by
Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, so the prior invalid transfer
cannot be assailed.
• The objective of the constitutional provision, to keep our
land in Filipino hands, has been served.
Hence, petition is denied.