ART. 1179.

Every obligation whose performance does not depend upon a future or uncertain event, or upon a
past event unknown to the parties, is demandable at once. Every obligation which contains a resolutory
condition shall also be demandable, without prejudice to the effects of the happening of the event. (1113)

A pure obligation is one which is not subject to any condition and no specific date is mentioned for its
fulfillment and is, therefore, immediately demandable.
 Effect: If the obligation is pure, it is immediately demandable. Other obligations which are also
demandable at once:
a. obligations with a resolutory condition
b. obligations with a resolutory term or period

A conditional obligation is one whose consequences are subject in one way or another to the fulfillment of a
condition.
 Condition is a future and uncertain event, upon the happening of which, the effectivity or
extinguishment of an obligation (or rights) subject to it depends, , it is, however, essential that both
requisites must concur. In other words, the event must not only be future, but it must also be uncertain.
 Past but unknown. — A condition may refer to a past event unknown to the parties. (infra.) If it refers
to a future event, both its very occurrence and the time of such occurrence must be uncertain;
otherwise, it is not a condition. A condition must not be impossible. (see Art. 1183.)

CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONS
Conditions are traditionally classified as follows:
(1) a. Suspensive — when the fulfillment of the condition results in the acquisition of rights arising out of the
obligation.
b. Resolutory — when the fulfillment of the condition results in the extinguishment of rights arising out of the
obligation.

(2) a. Potestative — when the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the will of a party to the obligation.
b. Casual — when the fulfillment of the condition depends upon chance and/or upon the will of a third person.
c. Mixed — when the fulfillment of the condition depends partly upon the will of a party to the obligation and
partly upon chance and/or the will of a third person.

(3) a. Possible — when the condition is capable of realization according to nature, law, public policy or good
customs.
b. Impossible — when the condition is not capable of realization according to nature, law, public policy or good
customs.

(4) a. Positive — when the condition involves the performance of an act.

b. Negative — when the condition involves the omission of an act.

(5) a. Divisible — when the condition is susceptible of partial realization.

b. Indivisible — when the condition is not susceptible of partial realization.

(6) a Conjunctive — when there are several conditions, all of which must be realized.
b. Alternative — when there are several conditions, but only one must be realized.

(7) a. Express — when the condition is stated expressly.

b. Implied — when the condition is tacit.

Differentiate Article 1180 vs 1182 – Trillana case v Taylor case

Art. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those
already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.

SUSPENSIVE AND RESOLUTORY CONDITIONS

A suspensive condition (condition precedent) is a future and uncertain event upon the happening or fulfillment
of which rights arising out of the obligation are acquired. Stated in another way, it signifies a future and
uncertain event upon the fulfillment of which the obligation becomes effective, what is acquired by the
obligee/creditor is a mere hope or expectancy.

A resolutory condition (condition subsequent), on the other hand, is a future and uncertain event upon the
happening or fulfillment of which rights which are already acquired by virtue of the obligation are extinguished
or lost. Hence, when the obligation is subject to a resolutory condition, the juridical relation which is established
as a result of the obligation is subject to the threat of extinction.
Art. 1182. When the fulfi llment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional
obligation shall be void. If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third person, the obligation shall take
effect in conformity with the provisions of this Code.

It must be (1)potestative and (2)suspensive by the sole will of the debtor for the obligation to be void
CASE: G.R. No. L-5003 June 27, 1953 –

Potestative, Casual and Mixed Conditions. — As regards the cause upon which its fulfillment depends, a
condition may be either potestative, casual or mixed.
 A purely potestative condition is one whose fulfillment depends exclusively upon the will of either one of
the parties to the obligation.
 A casual condition is one whose fulfillment depends exclusively upon chance and/or upon the will of a
third person.
 A mixed condition is one whose fulfillment depends jointly upon the will of either one of the parties to
the obligation and upon chance and/or the will of a third person.

What if potestative upon the will of the creditor alone? Even if the article is silent, this is allowed or valid since
the creditor is naturally and always will be interested in the fulfillment of the condition since it is only by such
fulfillment that the obligation can become effective.

What if it is potestative upon the sole will of the debtor? It will be an illusory obligation and considered void.
XPN: precept contained in the first sentence of Art. 1182 is applicable only to a suspensive condition. Hence, if
the condition is resolutory and, at the same time, potestative, the obligation, as well as the condition,
is valid even though the fulfillment of the condition is made to depend upon the sole will of the obligor
or debtor. This is logical because it is but natural that the debtor is interested in the fulfillment of the resolutory
condition since it is only by such fulfillment that he can reacquire the rights which have already been vested in
the obligee or creditor upon the constitution of the obligation.

Problem — Art. 1182 of the New Civil Code declares that when the fulfillment of the condition depends upon
the sole will of the debtor, and conditional obligation shall be void. Is this rule absolute in the sense that it is
applicable to all conditional obligations regardless of the nature of the condition as well as of the obligation?

Answer — The rule is not absolute. There are 2 well-known limitations.

They are as follows:
 The rule is applicable only to a suspensive condition. Hence, if the condition is resolutory and
potestative, the obligation is valid even if the fulfillment of the condition is made to depend
upon the sole will of the debtor. This is logical because it is but natural that the debtor is interested in
the fulfillment of the condition since it is only by such fulfillment that he can reacquire the rights which
have already been vested in the creditor upon the constitution of the obligation. In other words, the
position of the debtor when the condition is resolutory is exactly the same as the position of the creditor
when the condition is suspensive. (Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao, 43 Phil. 873.)
 The rule that even the obligation itself shall be void is applicable only to an obligation which depends for
its perfection upon the fulfillment of the potestative condition and not to a pre-existing obligation. Thus,
if the debtor binds himself to pay a previous indebtedness as soon as he decides to sell his
house, although the condition is void because of its potestative character, the obligation itself
is not affected since it refers to a pre-existing indebtedness. (Trillana vs. Quezon Colleges, 93
Phil. 383.)

Article 1183 It is possible when it is capable of realization not only according to its nature, but also according to the law,
good customs and public policy. It is impossible when it is not capable of realization either according to its nature or
according to law, good customs or public policy.

Case: G.R. No. 124208  January 28, 2008

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS v CA

Art. 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.

Constructive Fulfillment of Suspensive Conditions. — The above article enunciates the doctrine of constructive
fulfillment of suspensive conditions. In order that this doctrine can be applied, it is, however, necessary that the
obligor must have actually prevented the obligee from complying with the condition, and that such prevention
must have been voluntary or willful in character. (Intentionally done)

There are three (3) requisites for the application of this article:
(1) The condition is suspensive;
(2) The obligor actually prevents the fulfillment of the condition; and
(3) He acts voluntarily.
The law does not require that the obligor acts with malice or fraud as long as his purpose is to prevent the fulfillment of
the condition. He should not be allowed to profit from his own fault or bad faith to the prejudice of the obligee. In a
reciprocal obligation like a contract of sale, both parties are mutually obligors and also obligees. (see Art. 1167.)

G.R. No. 158361 IHC v Joaquin – 2nd requisite is absent here, hence 1186 is not the prevailing provision for
the liability

Article 1186 and Article 1234 of the Civil Code cannot be the source of IHC’s obligation to pay respondents IHC
argues that it should not be held liable because: (a) it was Joaquin who had recommended Barnes; and (b) IHC’s
negotiation with Barnes had been neither intentional nor willfully intended to prevent Joaquin from complying with
his obligations.

IHC’s argument is meritorious.

Article 1186 of the Civil Code reads:

Article 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.

This provision refers to the constructive fulfillment of a suspensive condition, 32 whose application calls for two
requisites, namely: (a) the intent of the obligor to prevent the fulfillment of the condition, and (b) the actual
prevention of the fulfillment. Mere intention of the debtor to prevent the happening of the condition, or to place
ineffective obstacles to its compliance, without actually preventing the fulfillment, is insufficient.

G.R. No. L-16109 October 2, 1922 It will be noted that the language conferring the right of cancellation upon the
defendants is broad enough to cover any case of the nonarrival of the machinery, due to whatever cause; and the
stress in the expression "for any reason" should evidently fall upon the word "any." It must follow of necessity that
the defendants had the right to cancel the contract in the contingency that occurred, unless some clear and
sufficient reason can be adduced for limiting the operation of the words conferring the right of cancellation. Upon
this point it is our opinion that the language used in the stipulation should be given effect in its ordinary sense,
without technicality or circumvention; and in this sense it is believed that the parties to the contract must have
understood it.

Art. 1188. The creditor may, before the fulfillment of the condition, bring the appropriate actions for the
preservation of his right. The debtor may recover what during the same time he has paid by mistake in case of
a suspensive condition.

Effect of Suspensive Conditions Before Fulfillment. — If the obligation depends upon a suspensive condition,
the demandability as well as the acquisition or effectivity of rights arising from the obligation is suspended
pending the happening or fulfillment of the fact or event which constitutes the condition. It is but logical;
therefore, that during the pendency of the condition, the obligee or creditor has only a mere hope or
expectancy. This hope or expectancy, however is protected by the law.

In the case of the obligor or debtor, it is also logical that during the pendency of the condition, his obligation to
comply with the prestation which constitutes the object of the obligation is held in suspense until the
fulfillment of the condition. Or more accurately, his obligation to comply with the prestation arises only if and
when the event which constitutes the condition is finally fulfilled. Consequently, if he has paid anything by
mistake during the pendency of the condition, he can recover what has been paid.

RETROACTIVITY OF EFFECT
The condition which is imposed is only an accidental, not an essential, element of the obligation.
Consequently, once the event which constitutes the condition is fulfilled thus resulting in the effectivity of the
obligation, its effects must logically retroact to the moment when the essential elements which gave birth to the
obligation have taken place and not to the moment when the accidental element was fulfilled.

Article 1189 Loss, Deterioration or Improvement

Art. 1189. When the conditions have been imposed with the intention of suspending the efficacy of an
obligation to give, the following rules shall be observed in case of the improvement, loss or deterioration of the
thing during the pendency of the condition:
(1) If the thing is lost without the fault of the debtor, the obligation shall be extinguished;
(2) If the thing is lost through the fault of the debtor, he shall be obliged to pay damages; it is understood that
the thing is lost when it perishes, or goes out of commerce, or disappears in such a way that its existence is
unknown or it cannot be recovered;
(3) When the thing deteriorates without the fault of the debtor, the impairment is to be borne by the creditor;
(4) If it deteriorates through the fault of the debtor, the creditor may choose between the rescission of the
obligation and its fulfillment, with indemnity for damages in either case;
(5) If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor;
(6) If it is improved at the expense of the debtor, he shall have no other right than that granted to the
usufructuary.

Loss of the thing due must be understood in its technical, not vulgar, sense. Thus, according to the Code, it
is understood that the thing is lost:
(1) when it perishes; or
(2) when it goes out of commerce; or
(3) when it disappears in such a way that its existence is unknown or it cannot be recovered.

If the thing is lost without any fault of the debtor, the obligation is extinguished. However, if it is lost through his
fault, the obligation is converted into one of indemnity for damages.

Deteriorations. — The rules contained in Nos. 3 and 4 of Art. 1189 are self-explanatory. If the thing
deteriorates without the fault of the debtor, the impairment is to be borne by the creditor. However, if it
deteriorates through the fault of the debtor, the creditor may choose between bringing an action for rescission
of the obligation with damages and bringing an action for specific performance with damages.

Improvements. — If the thing is improved by its nature or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit
of the creditor. Thus, in case of natural accessions, such as alluvion, avulsion, abandoned river beds, or
islands which are formed, the accession shall inure to the benefit of the creditor. However, if the thing is
improved at the expense of the debtor, he shall have no other right than that granted to a usufructuary.
Consequently, the debtor cannot ask reimbursement for the expenses incurred for useful improvements or for
improvements for mere pleasure; he can, however, ask reimbursement for necessary expenses. Although he
cannot ask the creditor to reimburse his expenses for useful improvements and improvements for mere
pleasure, he has the right to remove such improvements, provided it is possible to do so without damage to the
thing or property. He may also set off the improvements he may have made on the property against any
damage to the same.

Problem — Are the above rules also applicable if the condition is resolutory?
Answer — Yes. (Art. 1190, NCC.) However, in applying these rules, the “debtor” is the person obliged to return
the object of the obligation in case of fulfillment of the condition, while the “creditor” is the person to whom the
thing or object must be returned.

Article 1190 Effect of Resolutory Conditions Before Fulfillment

Although apparently this right above-mentioned is available only to the creditor in obligations with a suspensive
condition, justice demands that the rights must also be available to the debtor in obligations with a resolutory
condition during pendency of the said condition.

Effect of Resolutory Conditions After Fulfillment

If the resolutory condition is not fulfilled, such rights are consolidated; in other words, they become absolute in
character. If it is fulfilled, such rights are extinguished altogether; in other words, whatever may have been paid
or delivered by one or both of the parties upon the constitution of the obligation shall have to be returned upon
the fulfillment of the condition. There is, therefore, a return to the status quo.

Retroactivity of effect
Thus, in obligations to give, upon the fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the parties shall return to each other
what they have received. This rule is applicable whether the obligation is reciprocal or unilateral. There are no
exceptions or limitations similar to those provided for in suspensive conditions. The basis for the difference,
according to Manresa, lies in the fact that in obligations with a resolutory condition, the fulfillment of the
condition and its retroactivity have the effect of signifying the nonexistence of the obligation and what is
nonexistent must not give rise to any effect whatsoever. Consequently, the fiction of retroactivity must be
carried to its full consummation. Therefore, every vestige of the obligation must be effaced as much as
possible through the process of restitution.