1. Anonymous Letter Complaint Against Atty. Morales and Pollo vs.

Chairperson
Constantino-David

A. Morales Case vs. Pollo Case

Similarities Differences

1. Both cases originated from an 1. In the Morales case, the accusation

anonymous complaint letter was more of the lawyer’s
regarding their misconduct as misconduct as an officer of court,
lawyers in using office supplies and
2. The accusations are all related to equipment for personal use; while
the use of their personal computers in the Pollo case, the allegation is
intended for office work while with regard to the lawyer’s abuse
they are in their official duties as of his authority and position in
public officials CSC for helping public officials
3. Both cases contend violation of who have pending cases with CSC.
Article 3 Section 2 of the 2. The hard drives of both lawyers
Constitution and that the were seized although in the Pollo
information obtained against their case, even though he was made
will, are fruits of a poisonous tree aware of that there is an ongoing
search and seizure of the hard
drives of all employees, the
consent given was against his will
when all the contents of the hard
drive were copied as back up;
whereas in the Morales case, no
consent was given when the
documents stored in the hard drive
were printed out .

B. In the Morales case, the Court held that the documents obtained from his hard drive is
inadmissible evidence because it violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure as provided in Article 3 Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution. Atty.
Morales did not consent to the search conducted by the NBI more so its confiscation of
his computer, hence, the NBI violated his fundamental constitutional rights. For a valid
consent or waiver for search and seizure, it must show (1) that the right exists; (2) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish such right. The Court
found no probable cause for a valid warrantless search because this does not fall in any of
its categories. The exclusionary rule in paragraph 2 of Section 3 states that any evidence
obtained in violation of such rights is inadmissible, therefore the Court dismissed Atty.
Morales’ case. Additionally, the misconduct committed by Atty. Morales is only for his
 usage of office supplies and equipment for his own personal business and does not
endanger public safety and order.
While in the Pollo case, the Court held that there is no violation of the constitutional
rights to privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures when Chairperson David
ordered to back up all the files stored in the hard drives found in their Region 4 office,
which included the computer of Atty. Pollo. In Article 3 Section 2 of the Constitution, it
states that the constitutional guarantee against reasonable search and seizure in relation to
the right to privacy is not a prohibition of all acts of search and seizure but only to
unreasonable ones, that is, if there is a probable cause determined by the court. One of the
policies implemented by the CSC, which all employees of the said agency are made
aware of, is that employees may be subjected to monitoring of the use of computer
resources anytime. This means that random spot checks or inspections may be done to
ensure that all employees are using computer resources only for a legitimate business
purpose, hence, employees have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store,
send or receive on the office computers. The Court held that the CSC Chair’s order to
search and and copy the contents of the hard drive of Atty. Pollo was reasonable because
there is a probable cause identified, his lawyering for public officials with pending cases
with the CSC using the latter’s computer.

C. In my opinion, the SC’s ruling for both cases were tenable. Both cases are different in
nature when it comes to the offenses committed. Additionally, CSC has a different policy
when it comes to auditing their employees unlike with the judiciary. I think courts should
follow suit with CSC’s implementation of spot-checking its employees’ usage of any
office facilities and equipment to ensure that they are not committing any grave
misconduct while in their official duties.

2. Morfe vs. Mutuc

A. The law being questioned in this case is the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of
1960 (RA 3019) with its specific provision that every public officer, either within
thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the
month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his
position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses
and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year.”

B. The law was enacted to deter public officials from committing acts of dishonesty and
improve the tone of morality in public service. Its state policy provides that "in line
with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public
 officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which
may lead thereto."

C. I. Morfe alleged that the periodical submission of sworn statements of his assets and
liabilities is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as
an unlawful invasion of his constitutional right to privacy. The Court held that the
right to privacy, in relation to communication and correspondence, is inviolable except
upon a lawful order of the Court or when public safety and order. It is recognized
independently from liberty which needs constitutional protection. The challenged
provision does not call for a disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a
person to privacy, especially to public officials. A public officer is not deprived of
constitutional protection and in mandating him to reveal his assets and liabilities, there
is no unconstitutional intrusion in relation to his private sphere because as a public
figure, is subject to scrutiny in order to obtain public trust and confidence.

II. Morfe also alleged that by requiring public officials to submit these assets and
liabilities, it becomes an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public
officials on the grounds that there is an unwarranted and derogatory assumption that
they are “corrupt at heart” unless they prove otherwise. The Court held that the
intention of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is to curtail and minimize
corruption of public officials and maintain a standard of honesty in their observance of
public service, which is a regulatory within the State’s police power, and is not
violative of due process and liberty. It is also not a violation of guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure because when a government official assumes his
public position, it is presumed that he voluntarily obliges himself to give information
about his personal affair not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the
time he continues to discharge public trust.

III. Morfe alleges that the provision also violates his right against self-incrimination.
By invoking the non-incrimination clause of the Bill of Rights, which provides that
“no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself,” a person has immunity
from any attempt to coerce or intimidate him to furnish evidence enough to convict
himself. The Court held that there are no constitutional provisions designed to protect
man’s conduct from judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice. The legislative
has the power or competence, not the wisdom, to declare a statute unconstitutional.
Moreso, it is not the obligation of courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the
bounds of propriety and common sense. It was also held from previous decisions that
if the law which exacts such incriminating information as invalid, although there is no
evidence of guilt that might lead to a charge of crime against the informant, then all
 police regulations which involve such information given may be questioned on the
same ground.

3. Primicias vs. Fugoso and Navarro vs. Villegas

A. The Court used the clear and present danger test for both the Primicias and Navarro
cases. The rule is that the danger created must not only be clear and present but also
traceable to the ideas expressed. The term “clear” points to a causal connection
between the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned.
“Present” refers to the time element used to be identified with imminent and
immediate danger. Additionally, the danger referred to must not only be probable but
very likely inevitable.

B. In the Primicias case the Court used the clear and present danger test. This was applied
when the Mayor of the City of Manila sought to defend his refusal to allow the
Nacionalista Party to hold a meeting in Plaza Miranda. The Court held that the
Mayor’s contention that fear of serious injury cannot alone justify the suppression of
free speech and assembly. To justify such, there must be reasonable grounds to fear
that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced, that the danger apprehended is
imminent, that the evil to be prevented is a serious one; and that there must be the
probability of serious injury to the state.
While in the Navarro case, a clear and present danger test was also used by the Court
when the Mayor of Manila had also refused to issue a permit to enable certain student
groups to hold a public rally, for fear of public disorder as a result of the speeches to
be delivered. The Court held that the growing of out of the nature of a well-ordered
civil societies that the exercise of the rights of freedom of speech and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is not absolute for it
may be regulated and that it is not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
equal rights nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.