To the Point

QUAD
Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue (Quad)

The second meeting of the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue of Foreign Ministers took
place in Tokyo.

In a departure from the earlier secrecy, they made public a large part of their
deliberations, including the decision to make the FM meeting an annual event, building
infrastructure, connectivity and a supply chain initiative in the region.
Nations that have been directly impacted by China’s militarisation- Vietnam, South Korea, New zealand even Philippines
or Indonesia → Quad Plus
Evolution of Quad:
Genesis - In 2004, India, Japan, Australia and the US formed the Tsunami Core Group for disaster relief.
April, 2007 - Joint naval exercises near Tokyo by India, Japan and the United States.
May 2007 - In Manila, on the sidelines of Asian Regional Forum members met in the inaugural meeting of the
Quadrilateral
August 2007 – Shinzo Abe delivers “Confluence of Two Seas” speech in Indian Parliament.
September 2007 - Further naval exercises were held in the Bay of Bengal, including Australia.
October2007 - Security agreement between Japan and India, ratified during a visit by Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh to Tokyo, to promote sea lane safety and defense collaboration; Japan had previously
established such an agreement only with Australia.
January 2008 – Before visiting China, the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, declared that "India is not
part of any so-called contain China effort," when asked about the Quadrilateral.
February 2008 – Kevin Rudd, unilaterally announced Australia's departure from the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue without consulting members of the Quad.

Quad 1.0 effectively dies

Why Quad 1.0 failed?

Reluctance of the members

Australia
In 2008, Australia announced withdrawal from the Quad , without consulting
India, Japan or the US.
The reason were mainly economic:
1. China was the second-largest destination for Australian exports, about
15 percent.
2. By 2017, China became Australia’s top export destination, at 35 percent,
buying a large share of its core exports (iron ore and coal). This trend has
continued through 2019, pushing Australia into a dangerous economic
dependency with China.
3. Australia’s imports from China have been rising faster than from
elsewhere, further integrating the Australian economy with that of
China.
Additionally, Australian universities are heavily reliant on China for a
growing number of international fee-paying students.
 Japan

Japan’s pacifism due to Article 9 of its Constitution (which outlaws war) as well the pacifist public sentiment
constrained its defence partnerships.

Yasuo Fukuda (an advocate for better relations with China) took over as prime minister following Abe’s resignation
in 2007. Fakuda abandoned the developing values-oriented foreign policy concept of the Arc of Freedom and
Prosperity, seen as “too provocative” for Beijing .

Pacifism is opposition to war, militarism or

violence. The word pacifism was coined by the
French peace campaigner Émile Arnaud (1864–
1921)
India

1. Strategic and geo-political

2. Asymmetry in economic and military strength
3. Domestic political reasons

Wuhan summit → New Delhi decided to reject Australia’s request to participate in Malabar military exercises
along with the United States and Japan.

Annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore- PM Modi :“India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy
or as a club of limited members.”

In June , 2018 - PM Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Qingdao,→
agreed to work collaboratively in Afghanistan and to engage Pakistan to reduce regional tensions. Qingdao
Declaration : “economic globalisation is confronted with the expansion of unilateral protectionist policies.”

“weakest link” in the Quad.

The wisdom of endangering relations with China at the cost of seeking a US-dominated partnership.
Emergence of Quad 2.0
2017 – During ASEAN Summits all four former members rejoined in
negotiations to revive the quadrilateral alliance in the backdrop of
China's increased prominence in the South China Sea
2017-2019 - The Quadrilateral met five times to discuss "free and open
Indo-Pacific amid China’s aggressive postures in the region.“

Real push
March 2020 - Officials from the Quadrilateral met to discuss the COVID-19
pandemic. They were joined by New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam
for the first time→ Quad Plus .
October 2020 – Quad foreign ministers held a meeting in Tokyo, Japan .
Australia allowed to join the Malabar Exercise along with India, Japan
and USA.
Reasons behind shaping up of Quad 2.0
Australia
China is Australia’s largest trading partner in terms of both exports and imports. China’s share in Australia’s
exports reached a record A$117 billion, or 38 per cent, in 2019, more than any other country.

Australia suggested the start of an inquiry into the origins and the initial handling of the coronavirus.
Beijing criticised it for “anti-China propaganda” and called for boycotting Australia as a tourist and higher
education destination and banning Australian products like wine and beef; imposing an 80 per cent tariff
on barley imports coming from Australia.

Australia raised the issue of Uighur Muslims and human rights situation.

After China imposed the National Security Law in Hong Kong, Australia suspended its extradition treaty
with Hong Kong and said the law undermines Hong Kong’s autonomy and suppresses opposition to
Mainland China. Australia also decided to extend visas for Hong Kong residents.
China is also said to have launched cyberattacks onto the
networks of Australia’s parliament and the three main
political parties just before the 2019 parliamentary
elections.

Relations with China have also created threats to societal

cohesion in Australia through operations allegedly
carried out through Chinese students, Chinese-Australian
organisations and Australian politicians of Chinese
descent, leading to debates on “yellow peril alarmism”.

Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper signalled a

strategic departure in its defence posturing by defining the
“most ambitious plan” to regenerate the Royal Australian
Navy and called out China’s coercive behaviour in East
Asia’s maritime commons. It has concerns over the
possibility of Beijing developing and acquiring ports,
infrastructure facilities and bases across the region,
including in Fiji, Vanuatu and on the Manus Island in
Papua New Guinea.
China has been carrying out a large-scale militarisation of the South
China Sea and deploying ‘grey zone’ tactics—actions that fall in the grey
area between outright war and peace, such as building artificial islands,
and sending coast guard and survey vessels to contested waters.

Concerns over US foreign policy unpredictability and the commitment to

the contested region are worrisome for Japan as a less-than-committed
US would allow the military balance in the important waterway to tip in
China’s favour. By being an “anchor” of continued US engagement in the
region, the Quad holds significant value for Tokyo.

Increased tensions in East China Sea and fear of encirclement by China

has driven Japan back to the Quad. A developed Quad would not only
check China’s expansionism but also US uncertainties about the region,
quelling Japan’s concerns about it.
USA
China’s rising economic, diplomatic and military profile in Asia, challenged the US’s “hub and spoke” system
of regional alliances and threatened to make way for China-led regional formations. This energised interest
in democratic values-based diplomacy, with former US President George W. Bush proposing the creation of a
new Asian Pacific Democracy Partnership.

In 2011, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed on the need for the US to shift resources and
priorities away from the Middle East to the increasingly important emerging geography of the Asia Pacific,
which she described as stretching from the “Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas” and
spanning two linked oceans.

The US’s interest in the Middle East are no longer at risk given that
it has achieved energy self-sufficiency, ISIS has been territorially
defeated there, and US ally Israel remains the preeminent military
The hub-and-spokes alliance model –
power in the region through which US may manage Iran.
comprising the US, Japan, South
Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and
Trump’s National Defence Strategy 2018 and the National Security
Thailand – has been a pillar of
Strategy 2017 identify revisionist China as presenting the greatest
stability in the Asia-Pacific
strategic threat to the US.
throughout the Cold War
India

Concerns in New Delhi about Beijing’s increased presence in South Asia and the IOR.
China has been attempting to thwart India’s great power aspirations by
complicating its domestic security environment.

It has continued to shield Pakistan in its use of terror proxies against India, and has
sustained insurgent groups in India’s northeast.

Beijing has also continued to cordon off New Delhi from key international
institutions such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
–

This BRI segment is economically not

feasible and Pakistan’s won’t be able to
pay for these projects, [US$62-billion
Project] → CPEC serves a geostrategic
purpose of establishing Chinese presence
in the IOR against India → Gwadar port
in Pakistan’s Balochistan province holds
little economic viability, but is more
useful for Chinese navy to establish a
submarine presence in the region.

This would give Beijing the option of

overcoming its ‘Malacca Dilemma’
String of Pearls - President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
The way “containment of China ” brings New Delhi and Washington closer . Similarly, China and
Pakistan have strategic interest in “ containment of India”.

Srilanka → China’s acquisition of a majority stake in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, with a 99-year
operational leasing right.Although the Chinese navy does not have a basing agreement with
Colombo to station its forces at Hambantota, the port’s weak commercial viability continues to
raise questions about China’s intentions.
Myanmar → ‘Debt trap’ concerns have also been raised over Kyaukphyu, a deep seaport in
Myanmar’s troubled Rakhine state, in which Chinese have a majority stake.
Maldives → A staggering debt of over US$3.4 billion of China. Maldives not only ‘negotiated’ a
skewed free trade deal and several exorbitantly-priced infrastructure projects to Beijing’s
advantage, it also leased the Feydhoo Finolhu Island to Chinese developers, raising suspicions in
the India.
 ‘tit for tat’ The ‘Necklace of Diamonds’—is the
alleged Indian answer to the ‘String of Pearls’ ( Nha
Trang port in Vietnam, and the Indian presence in
Mauritius.)
Dual policy on terrorism - Post Pulwama terrorist attack by Pakistan-backed Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in
February 2019, China used its diplomatic prowess to absolve Islamabad of any responsibility.

China also shielded JeM chief Masood Azhar from being listed as a UNSC-designated global terrorist for
nearly a decade before capitulating to international pressure against heightened terror concerns in South
Asia in the aftermath of the 2019 Sri Lanka Easter bombings.

China’s “dual policy on terrorism”—shielding terrorists that harm India over Kashmir and justifying
Xinjiang internment camps as a counter-radicalisation move—China has used the Kashmir conflict and its
alliance with Pakistan as an impediment to India’s great power aspirations by augmenting its internal
security concerns.
Aksai Chin – Considered by India as the integral part, is under control of
China.
China has also widely internationalised the Kashmir issue following the
abolition of Jammu and Kashmir’s special constitutional status.
Beijing has also been offering clandestine support to militant insurgent
groups operating in India’s North East, such as the United National
Liberation Front of Western South East Asia and People’s Liberation Army
(of Manipur).
2017 Doklam face-off - India successfully forced China to abandon the
construction of a controversial highway through the Doklam plateau. India
was undeterred by Beijing’s use of psychological warfare tactics. However,
LAC clashes reveal more aggressive China which can be aptly managed
through a robust Quad.
Changing perception about alliances in Indian foreign policy making circles –
Post 2014 and especially under Dr. Jaishankar, there are efforts to let go dogmatic Non-Alignment
paradigm and rather go for multiple “issue-based” partnerships.
The emergence of the concept of Indo-Pacific –
In 2017 , the strategic concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’, which replaced the traditional
‘Asia Pacific’, now accommodated the revitalised Quad. The Indo-Pacific found
institutional space across the Quad countries—
➢ A 2016 Defence White Paper identified geopolitical shifts in the Indo-Pacific as
central to Australia’s security,
➢ The US renamed its Pacific Command to Indo Pacific Command
(USINDOPACOM),
➢ Japan identified challenges and opportunities in the Free and Open Indo
Pacific (FOIP),
➢ India set up a dedicated Indo-Pacific desk at its foreign ministry.
Quad is the next logical step
There has been an improvement in India’s defence ties with the other Quad
countries, with the US, Japan and Australia being the only strategic partners
with whom it has established a 2+2 foreign and defence dialogue mechanism.
India and USA have also signed the General Security of Military Information
Agreement; the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement; and the
Communications, Compatibility and Security Arrangement; and are finalising
the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation
Agreement.
India is also making progress on signing the Acquisition and Cross Servicing
Agreement with Japan.
In November 2019, the Quad countries conducted their second military exercise
in the counter-terrorism table- top exercise organised by India’s National
Investigation Agency.
China’s criticism of Quad
China defines Quad as
• “Indo-Pacific NATO”;
• “Asian NATO”
• a “headline-grabbing idea” that would “dissipate like sea foam”.
• Beijing’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi :
o An “exclusive clique”, “an anti-China frontline” and even a “mini-NATO” led by the U.S.’s
“Cold War mentality”.
o “The U.S., which has signed military alliance treaties with Japan and Australia, now wants
to rope India in to boost not only the alliance and to gang up on China. However, such a
goal is not easy to realise. India has been buttering its bread on both sides of major
power games ever since the Cold War.”
“If the U.S. wants to count India in its ‘Asian NATO’, it would need to persuade India to give up its
Russia-made weapons and substantially invest to change the standards of Indian firearms to the
standards of the U.S.,”.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in the 2020 foreign minister’s meet called on the entire Quad
to “collaborate to protect” the region from China. What he seemed to propose was not just a
coalition of democracies committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific but even a full-fledged
military alliance of countries facing tensions with China.
Challenges to the concept of Quad:
• China factor – Beijing, a regional hegemon, cannot be ignored.

• The geo-political construct of ‘Indo-Pacific’ is questionable – Rather it is combination of

two Asian systems — an Indian Ocean system and an East Asian system . If British empire
never managed to combine the Indo and the Pacific into a unitary system , efforts by a U.S.
in global retreat and relative decline is least expected artificially manufacture such concept.

• Ambiguity in the motive behind joining Quad: Members still defining their priorities, each
seeks to address their bilateral issue with China (bargaining Chip) through Quad. Doubts
remain about the Quad’s strategic objective and its capability as a robust partnership
.Australia’s trade relationship with China , India’s aversion to alliances; Japan’s pacifism;
and the US’ ‘America First’ policy.

• Quad is led by foreign ministry of the member states and not the defence ministry.
• Lack of institutionalisation – No joint statement, No military exercise.

• Non inclusive of ASEAN

• Uncertainty because of US Elections – Joe Biden is expected to be comparatively more

accommodative than Trump.

• Strategic autonomy - Japan and Australia are already in alliance treaties with the U.S., New Delhi
has thus far charted its course on strategic autonomy. Joining Quad is being seen as a compromise
on strategic autonomy of India. India’s traditional reluctance to join any security alliance.
One way of clearing that confusion is to ask four
questions(C. Raja Mohan)

1.Nature of alliances –
Though seen negatively in India, alliances figure
prominently in India’s ancient strategic wisdom
embodied in the Mahabharata, the Panchatantra and
the Arthashastra. It is extensively used in
Contemporary Indian domestic politics.

The question is what form of alliance and how will be

the distribution of power within the members of an
alliance and against whom?
2.Does India forge alliances?
Contrary to conventional wisdom, India has experimented with alliances of different kinds.
First World War - some nationalists aligned with Imperial Germany to set up the first Indian
government-in-exile in Kabul.
Second World War - Subhas Chandra Bose joined forces with Imperial Japan to set up a provisional
government in Port Blair, Andaman Islands.
Nehru –
When Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim — turned to Delhi for protection amidst Maoist China’s advance
into Tibet during 1949-50, Nehru signed security treaties with them.
Nehru, who actively opposed US alliances in Asia, turned to the US for military support to cope
with the Chinese aggression in 1962.
Delhi desperately sought, but did not get, security guarantees from the US, UK and Soviet Russia
after China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964.
Indira Gandhi signed a security cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in 1971 to cope with
the crisis in East Pakistan. India also signed a similar treaty of friendship with the newly-liberated
Bangladesh in 1972.
So India participates in alliances but the question is when, under what conditions and on what
terms.
3.Is the US offering India an alliance against China?

The current political discourse in Washington is hostile to alliance-

making.

Formal commitments do not always translate into reality during

times of war. For example:US-Pakistan bilateral security
agreement of 1954 – For Pakistan it was aimed at India. For the US,
it was about countering communist aggression.As a result the US
did not prevent Pakistan’s division by India in 1971.

Thus , Washington is not offering a military alliance. Nor is Delhi

asking for one.They are interested in building issue-based
coalitions in pursuit of shared interests.
4.Instrumental nature of alliances - Agreements for security cooperation are made
in a specific context and against a particular threat. When those circumstances
change, security treaties loose relevance. Example –
a. India’s security treaties with Nepal which was designed to protect Nepal
against the Chinese threat.
b. India’s 1971 treaty with Moscow waned within a decade, as Delhi sought to
improve relations with Beijing and Washington. Russia was willing to support
India against the China challenge in the 1970s. But today, Beijing is Moscow’s
strongest international partner.
c. Approach of Mao
Mao aligned with the Soviet Union after the establishment of the People’s
Republic in 1949 and fought the Korean War against the US during 1950-53.

He broke from Russia in the early 1960s and moved closer to the US in the
1970s.

He also welcomed Washington’s alliance with Tokyo as a useful means to prevent the
return of Japanese nationalism and militarism.
So, what should India do?
Unlike Communist China, a democratic India can’t be brutally transactional about its external
partnerships. But Delhi could certainly learn from Beijing in not letting the theological debates
about alliances cloud its judgements about the extraordinary economic and security challenges
India confronts today.

The infructuous obsession with non-alignment diverts Delhi’s policy attention away from the
urgent task of rapidly expanding India’s national capabilities in partnership with like-minded
partners.

An India that puts its interests above the doctrine will find coalitions like the Quad critical for its
international prospects.

India should not be seen as joining a forum under the dominant leadership of USA, in a region
which may be considered as its extended backyard
Moving forward, India should not be fixated to Quad as a means of deepening cooperation with like-minded
security partners in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad is not a sine qua non for regional security. Include other like
minded countries / ASEAN members – Dhruva Jaishankar

Going forward, the Quad should actively contemplate expanding the coverage of issues like 5G technology,
quality infrastructure, resilient supply chains, connectivity, cyber-security, rare-earths etc. It would also
need to reach out to other like-minded countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, UK, France, Germany, etc. to
provide greater inclusivity and credibility to the evolving institution. – Ashok Sajjanhar

“India has maintained various circles of engagement such as the Quad, ASEAN, BRICS, BIMSTEC and now SCO
which give Indian foreign policy a degree of flexibility and room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis major powers . In this
period of multiple transitions this may be the best course to follow, but it is the Quad which may eventually
emerge as the critical instrument to manage the China challenge.” – Shyam Saran

“The rise of China across the Indian and Pacific Oceans challenges the security umbrella established at the
end of Second World War and strengthened after the end of the Cold War. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific
as a new geographic space — bringing together the Indian and the Pacific Oceans — represents the new
strategic reality of the twenty-first century.” – Darshana Baruah