G.R. No.

L-20387 January 31, 1968

JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts:

One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every
public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office “and
within the month of January of every other year thereafter”, as well as upon the termination of
his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, “a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar: . . .”

In relation to Morfe’s alleged accumulation of assets grossly disproportionate to his reported

incomes after his assumption to office, plaintiff Morfe alleged that the periodical submission of
such sworn statement of assets is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police
power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban
against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-
incrimination..

On the otherhand, the defendants Secretary of Justice and Executive Secretary contended that
it was a legitimate exercise of police power, and that Morfe, having accepted a public position,
voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the
time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust.

Lower court: Law is unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not the required periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities is
unconstitutional on the grounds of it being an unlawful invasion of right to privacy, and an insult
to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.

Held:

No. SC said that such provision of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is constitutional. It is
within the State’s police power, and is not violative of due process and liberty. It is also not a
violation of guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, and is not against the non-
incrimination clause. Furthermore, it is not an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity
of public officials.

The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to
further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust.

The State’s inherent police power enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
and welfare of society. However, if the police power extends to regulatory action affecting
persons in public or private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection
of due process which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such requirement is
observed.

If due process mandate is not disregarded, even a public official, to protect the security of
tenure which is analogous to property, can protect himself from an infringement of his liberty.
However, liberty, in the interest of public health, public order, or safety, of general welfare, in
other words through the proper exercise of the police power, may be regulated.

In here, the reasonableness of the law makes the prohibition valid and within the ambit of police
power.

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities
of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to
condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and
employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having
done so upon assuming office. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police
power.

A periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after assumption of office is
within the power of the government to impose, even if it will affect the public officer’s liberty, for
as long as due process is observed. In subjecting the public officer to such a further compulsory
revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of
income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for
the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise
would be a private sphere.

Other Notes:

Right to privacy or Right to be left alone

“It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which
infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship
such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding
assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of
position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting
him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement
of the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be
a private sphere.”

Unreasonable Search and Seizure

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom
from testimonial compulsion.

Right against self-incrimination

We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s conduct from
judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.

Insult to personal integrity and official dignity

 Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis
for declaring a statute invalid.

STONEHILL V. DIOKNO    G.R. No. L-19550    June 19, 1967

FACTS:
l Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the corporations they form were alleged to have committed
acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code.”
l Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal
properties “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
l The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into (2) major groups, namely:

(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

l Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of the constitution and the
Rules of court by:

(1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the
petitioner;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for
disposal in accordance with law.

l The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with law;
The defects of said warrants were cured by petitioners consent; and in any event, the effects
are admissible regardless of the irregularity.
 l The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However, by a
resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the
offices of the corporations.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant issued is valid.
HELD:
NO the search warrant is invalid.
l The SC ruled in favor of petitioners.
l The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It
provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met.
l The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
l In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments
thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.
l As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
l As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications —
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
l The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal.
l Thus, openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be
seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
l However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot assail the validity of the search warrant
issued against their corporation because petitioners are not the proper party.
l The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that
the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
 thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties.
BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF G.R. No. L-64261December 26, 1984

FACTS:
l The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched and its office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents,
books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized based on the strength
of the two [2] search warrants issued by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.
l Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because:
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court.
2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed.
3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J.
Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized although the warrants were directed against Jose
Burgos, Jr. Alone.
4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery, receptacles,
instruments, etc.
5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they conducted
surveillance of the premises could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause.
l Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches that they only impugned the
search warrant six months later.
ISSUE:
WON there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
HELD:
 NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the
search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he
has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
l The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents
which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of
law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would
justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as the basis for
the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for the respondent judge to have done
so.
Soliven v Makaisar
FACTS:

The case at bar is a petition raised by one of the petitioners, Beltran, who wants to call for an
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest.

The petitioner assailed that his constitutional right was violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses,
if any, to determine probable cause. Soliven vs. Makasiar

Beltran's interpretation of the words "determined personally" convinced him that the judge is
solely responsible to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when the warrant of arrest was issued. Soliven vs. Makasiar

HELD:

No.

The Court did not find any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the respondent judge. Soliven vs. Makasiar

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution

 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,

and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be

searched and the persons or things to be seized.

What the Constitution requires is that the issuing judge must satisfy himself first with the criteria

in finding probable cause. And to satisfy himself doesn't mean to he is required to personally

examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Constitution mandates that he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal

regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;

or

(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and

require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion

as to the existence of probable cause. Soliven vs. Makasiar

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

Placer vs Villanueva

G.R. Nos. 60349-62, December 29, 1983

Facts: Following receipt of  informations from petitioners that probable cause has been
established which necessitates the issuance of warrants of arrest, respondent judge issued an
order the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing
the corresponding warrants of arrest.  After said hearing, respondent issued the questioned
orders requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and
other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his
power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners

Petitioners contended that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the
existence of a probable cause in a preliminary examination/investigation, and that their findings
as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by
the court.
Issues: Whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the information as to the existence
of probable cause obligates respondent City Judge to issue a warrant of arrest.

Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest,
compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

Held: 1. No.  2. Yes.

The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate.  This is clear from the following provisions of
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:

“Warrant of arrest, when issued. – If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination
conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been
committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he
must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.”

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before
issuing a warrant or order of arrest.  If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause.  This
has been the rule since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas.  And this evidently is the
reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982
and July 13, 1982.  Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence
which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the informations filed in
his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable
cause.  For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required
affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where he
was satisfied that probable cause existed.

The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of his
witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case outright or to require
further proceedings.

SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015

FACTS:
          
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2)
criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents
in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March
2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-
Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the
“Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’
(Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present
certiorari case.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law

HELD:
NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, for ready reference.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to
specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of
his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports
Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is
for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have
been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-
affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-
affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No
grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27
March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.
Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial
and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of
a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining

whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation
is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission
of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state
prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner’s
involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence
presented and the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in

administrative proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of
evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a
preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial
evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or
‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we
borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is
accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause
in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where
rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which
cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as
substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial
basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in determining
probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the
counter-affidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the
Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because
the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to
formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully
complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen.
Estrada beyond what the Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave
abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
not applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to
mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of the
constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS.
The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were never intended to
comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with
finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial
evidence for a decision against the respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary
investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish
probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In
preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer
must be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same
time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the investigator and hearing
officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under the
control and supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice.
This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations.
To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and
essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary
investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for
reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the country. No
preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside of the
prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final
judgment would have to be released from prison because their conviction violated constitutional
due process.

Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping.
Homar v People
FACTS:

The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II  of RA 9165. The Information
states that on or about August 20, 2002, the petitioner was found to possess one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 grams of as shabu. The petitioner pleaded not guilty
during arraignment. PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution. he testified
that on August 20, 2002, at around 8:50 in the evening, while proceeding to the area onboard a
mobile hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a “No Jaywalking”

portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the
pedestrian crossing area. The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting
Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a
thorough search on the petitioner’s body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing
what he suspected as shabu. Tangcoy and Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the

incident. The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense.  He testified that he was going
home at around 6:30 p.m. after selling imitation sunglasses and other accessories at the
BERMA Shopping Center. After crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped and
frisked him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused him of being a holdupper, and
forced him to go with them. They also confiscated the kitchen knife, which he carried to cut
cords. He was likewise

investigated for alleged possession of shabu and detained for one day. He was

criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 77 for the
possession of the kitchen knife but he was eventually acquitted.  CA affirmed the decision.

Petitioner’s Contention:

The shabu, which was allegedly recovered from the petitioner, is

inadmissible as evidence because it was obtained as a result of his unlawful arrest and in
violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioner has not committed,
was not committing and was not attempting to commit any crime at the time of his arrest. In fact,
no report or criminal charge was filed against him for the alleged jaywalking.

ISSUE:

WON there was a valid warrantless arrest.

 HELD:

NO. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested
or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under
the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1)

The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting officer. The prosecution has the
burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from which the corpus delicti of the crime
-shabu- was obtained. For, without a valid warrantless arrest, the alleged confiscation of the
shabu resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner’s body is surely a violation of his
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a consequence, the alleged shabu
shall be inadmissible as evidence against him.

The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search

incident to a lawful arrest.The Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused in that
case was inadmissibleas evidence when the police officer who flagged him for traffic violation
had no intent to arrest him. Due to the lack of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was
unlawful.

TERRY V. OHIO 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

FACTS:

l One night, while Officer McFadden was patrolling on plain clothes, he observed two suspicious
looking men who keeps on looking back the windows of a store.
l The police officer suspect that this might be a “casing job or a stick up”. After 10 to 12 minutes of
observing them, the police officer finally approached the two men and one man who joined them
later.
l The officer asked for their identifications but when one of them mumbled something, police officer
McFadden grabbed herein petitioner Terry, spun him around so that they were facing the other
two, with Terry between McFadden and the others, and patted down the outside of his clothing.
l The patting was done outside a store named Zucker. During the frisking, the officer felt a pistol.
Therefore, the officer ordered them to go inside the store and to face the wall with their hands
raised. Did and there patted their outside clothing for concealed weapons.
l The officer confiscated 2 guns from Terry and Chilton but no weapons for Katz, the 3 rd guy who
joined them lately.
l Later on, a police wagon came after the store owner called for help and took all three men to the
station, where Chilton and Terry were formally charged with carrying concealed weapons.
l Judge Bernard Friedman found the men guilty and ruled that, given the suspicious nature of their
behavior and McFadden’s concern for his safety, the decision to frisk was permissible.
l The appeals court affirmed the decision.
l Terry appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967.

ISSUE:

WON the search and seizure were validly done in accordance with the 4th amendment.

HELD:

YES. The search is valid.

Under the Fourth Amendment, it provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. . . ."

The Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because it is the duty of an officer to investigate suspicious behavior and prevent
crime.

The Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent
man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to
the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior."

The Court found that the searches were undertaken were limited in scope and designed to
protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.

Moreover, this case does not provide blanket authority to intrude on an individual’s right to be
left alone, nor does it allow such intrusion based on a police offers inarticulate hunch that a
crime is about to occur or is in progress. However, it does radically expand police authority to
investigate crimes where there is a reasonable basis for suspicion.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and set a precedent that allows police officers to
interrogate and frisk suspicious individuals without probable cause for an arrest, providing that
the officer can articulate a reasonable basis for the stop and frisk. 
Tambasen vs People
FACTS: On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search warrant
from the MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession at his
house at the North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand
Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive Documents,"
which articles were "used or intended to be used" for illegal purposes]. On the same day, the
application was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of Search Warrant No. 365, which
allowed the seizure of the items specified in the application (Rollo, p. 15). At around 6:30 P.M.
of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner and seized among others,
2 envelopes containing cash in the total amount of Php 14,000.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for the return of the seized articles. MTCC issued an order
directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search warrant. The following day, Sgt. Natuel
submitted a report to the court. Not considering the report as a "return in contemplation of law,"
petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt. Natuel be required to submit a complete and
verified inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel manifested that although he was
the applicant for the issuance of the search warrant, he was not present when it was served. On
October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and seizure
be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. MTCC ruled in favor of the
petitioner, however the Solicitor General alleged that assuming that the seizure of the money
had been invalid, petitioner was not entitled to its return citing the rulings stating that pending
the determination of the legality of the seizure of the articles, they should remain in custodia
legis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SW was valid.

HELD: On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The
caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for
illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-
Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null
and void (People v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 101 [1992]). Moreover, by their seizure of
articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their
authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a
search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The presumption juris
tantum of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the
constitutionally protected rights of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759)
As the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit
of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors."

Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the
CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her
premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.

Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s
leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the
documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s
office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-
Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and
that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently
describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause
has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s
witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD:

NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are;
what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.

It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search
warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general
 MATA V. BAYONA G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984

FACTS:

l Petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306 "AN ACT GRANTING THE

PHILIPPINE JAI-ALAI AND AMUSEMENT CORPORATION A FRANCHISE TO OPERATE,
CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A FRONTON FOR BASQUE PELOTA AND SIMILAR GAMES
OF SKILL IN THE GREATER MANILA AREA".
l The information against herein petitioner alleged that he offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai
Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the
Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."
l During the hearing of the case, the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the warrant is missing from the records of the case.
l This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the
articles seized
l The court dismissed his motion stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INPand the court made a certification that
the documents were not attached immediately and that there’s nowhere in the rules which
specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.
l Petitioner’s MR was also denied
l Hence, this petition praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be invalid
and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or
in any proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant is valid.

HELD:

NO. The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.
 Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to
the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

Furthermore, While the SC held that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized
cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, it was held that the illegality of the search warrant
does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.

Petition granted.
PEOPLE V. SUCRO      G.R. No. 93239    March 18, 1991

FACTS:

l Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by their Station Commander to
monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi
that Sucro was selling marijuana
l As planned Roy Fulgencio monitored the activities of the accused under the house of Regalado
and near the chapel where the accused was selling marijuana to a group of persons around 5
pm.
l Pat reported this to their station commander and instructed him to continue his monitoring.
l At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later
Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.
l At that point, after Macabante bought from the accused, they pursue Macabante and told them he
bought it from herein accused-appellant.
l The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and
Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside
the chapel and another teabag from Macabante,
l Accused appealed that the marijuana teabags were seized without serving upon him a search
warrant.
l The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, is a violation of his rights granted under
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
l He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest
warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the activities of the
accused two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.

ISSUE:

WON the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently
WON the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

HELD:

YES. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where
an arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:

Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (Emphasis supplied)

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.

From the records of the case, Fulgencio saw Sucro three times dealing drugs inside the chapel
where he is 2 meters away monitoring his nefarious activities then after the 3 rd deal, the police
intercepted the buyer Macabante and when confronted by the police, Macabante readily
admitted that he bought the marijuana from Sucro. Therefore, Sucro had just committed an
illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team
which monitored accused-appellants nefarious activity.
The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that
Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the former's joining the police force.
Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three days before the incident.

As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years
and that after Fulgencio joined the police force, he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs in
their locality. Hence, it is possible that because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report
his childhood friend and merely advised him not to engage in such activity. However, because
of reliable information was given by some informants that selling was going on every day, he
was constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.

On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that
their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed.

The general rule is that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute rule... Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest
under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the RCP which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant.

Since the arrest was considered valid, the evidence presented is admissible in evidence.

Hence, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed committed the offense
charged. The trial court's decision must be upheld.
People vs Ruben Burgos
G.R. No. L-68955
September 4, 1986
Concur: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts:

The lower court laid down its decision to the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal
possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion. That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and
thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines, the accused possessed without the
necessary license, permit or authority issued by the proper government agencies, one (1)
homemade revolver, caliber .38 with Serial No. 8.69221. The firearm was issued to and used by
the accused at his area in Davao del Sur on operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the
New People's Army (NPA), a subversive organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and violent means. 
Issues:

a)Whether or not the arrest of the appellant-accused without any valid warrant is legal and for
the search of firearm in his house without valid warrant is lawful?

b)Whether he violated Presidential Decree No. 9 in relation to General Orders Nos. 6 & 7?

Held:

Rule 113, Section 6 of the Rules of Court

The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling under
one of the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6
of the Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows: 

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit
an offense in his presence; 

b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed it; 

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. 

The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the
authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a
reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial
warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and
applicable jurisprudence on the matter." 

In proving ownership of the firearm

The constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights
winch provides that, “no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right.” The accused-appellant was not accorded his
constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. The lower court
correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog, to help the accused when he
subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have no
palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial investigation
when the extrajudicial statement was being taken. The judgment of conviction rendered by the
trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on
grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime with which he has been charged.
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE     G.R. No. 87059  June 22, 1992

FACTS:
l Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-
looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila.
l A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place.
l Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan narrated that they saw two men "looking from side
to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape
because the other lawmen had surrounded them.
l The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was
found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber.
l His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants
pocket. The weapons were taken from them.
l Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the
Intelligence Division.
l One other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the
subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in
Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers.
l He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the
revolver.
l Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it
and claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest.
l It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence
because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither
could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was
itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant.
l The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house
was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.

ISSUE:

WON the arrest was lawful

HELD:

NO. The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a
person be arrested after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused was merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There
was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at
least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.

The Court takes note that there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other
than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination
could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was
actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of
the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all
appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed
nor was be actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the
arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause
that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of
a warrant.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in
fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.

The truth is that they did not know then what offense if at all, had been committed and neither
were they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later after
Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his
house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein.

As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen
discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed
that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.

Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone
the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the
robbery of Danganan's house.
Hence, accused-appellant is acquitted.

PEOPLE V MUSA

FACTS:

On 14 December 1989, the accused sold 2 wrappers containing marijuana leaves to Sgt.
Amado Ani in a buy-bust operation in Zamboanga City.

The said buy-bust operation was planned since a civilian informer told that Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana and therefore, a test-buy was conducted the day prior to the said
buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust operation, after Sgt. Ani handed the money to Musa,
Musa entered his house to get the wrappings. Upon his return and with the inspection of the
wrappings, Musa was arrested, but the marked money used as payment cannot be found with
him, prompting the NARCOM agents to go inside his house. There, they could not find the
marked money, but they found more marijuana leaves hidden in a plastic bag inside the kitchen.

The leaves were confirmed as marijuana by the forensic chemist of the PC crime laboratory,
who later on served as a witness, along with T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, the team leader of the buy-
bust operation and Sgt. Ani.

The defense gave a different version of what happened on 14 December 1989 wherein he and
his wife, Ahara Musa, served as witnesses. They said that the NARCOM agents, dressed in
civilian clothes, got inside their house since the door was open, and upon entering, declared
that they were NARCOM agents and searched the house, despite demands of the couple for a
search warrant. The agents found a red bag whose contents were unknown to the Musas.

Musa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court.

On appeal, Musa contests that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He also
questioned the credibility of the witnesses, as well as the admissibility of the seized plastic bag
as evidence since it violates his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures provided in Art. III, Sec. 2.
 ISSUES:

1.     WON Musa is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt

2.     WON the seized plastic bag containing marijuana is admissible as evidence.

HELD/RATIO:

1.   Yes. The testimony given by T/Sgt. Belarga only strengthened the testimony of Sgt. Ani
since it was the testimony of the latter that served as direct evidence, being enough to prove the
consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug, and that their testimonies were not conflicting
as well.

2.     No. Although the warrantless search done falls under Sec. 12 of Rule 126 and that the
search may include premises or surroundings under the accused’s immediate control, it does
not fall under the “Plain View” doctrine. The agents found the plastic bag inside the kitchen, and
upon asking about the contents of the bag, the accused did not answer, making the agents
open the bag and find marijuana leaves. Even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain
view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the
object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object.

UMIL V. RAMOS      G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

FACTS:

l Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to be
one of the five NPA sparrows who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being
treated in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds.
l Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name is
Rolando Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).
l Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security
reasons.
l Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2
CAPCOM mobile patrols.
l In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military
on the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army
member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:

YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5
Rule 113, Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a
member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized
and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing
offense.

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest,
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.

Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant,
at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural
had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then.

Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as
agents or representatives of the organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like
rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called
"common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the
repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing an organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers
of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by
actual facts mentioned in this case.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-
named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man
can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made
any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for
disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the
hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts
constituting the alleged violation of the law and to prosecute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to
arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113
are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of
guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without
warrant.

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be
held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26
and/or for other administrative sanctions.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE
People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987)

FACTS: Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio
a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate in the
killing.

The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and
accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested.

Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated
therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had
ordered the “arrest” of the victim, Carancio, and that the group “sentenced him (the victim) to die
by stabbing.”

Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a
letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter,
accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit  and testify in his
favor instead.
Later the accused were convicted of murder.

ISSUE: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged
unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy?

HELD: No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful
search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy.
Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who
produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is
nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his
declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas
tated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

[GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]

FACTS: 
        Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu
against Leonardo Laconico after demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This demand was heard by
Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear
the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an
entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with
violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

ISSUE:
       Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA
4200 such that its use to overheard a private conversation would constitute an unlawful
interception of communication between two parties using a telephone line.

HELD:
      No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone or
dictagraph, or other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. this section refers to instruments
whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are of common usage and their purpose is precisely for
tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. The telephone extension in this
case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

      Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly  in favor of the
accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case,  on whether or not an extension telephone is
included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension telephone.

      A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to
discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities  or representatives of
organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to
intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listeneing , in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use
of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other similar nature

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents
G.R. No. 93833     September 28, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to his dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in
addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner. 
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize
wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

RULING:
No.  Section 1 of the Republic Act 4200 states that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The law is clear and unambiguous. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision. The instant petition is hereby
DENIED. Cost against petitioner.
Vivares v STC
Facts:

Julia and Julienne , both minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school
students at STC. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach
party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital
pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by
Angela on her Facebook profile. Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Upon discovery, Escudero
reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto
Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter,
following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a
manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook. On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne,
Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office Sr.
Purisima, STC’s high school principal and. They claimed that during the meeting, they were
castigated and informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are
barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012. A week before
graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition
for Injunction and Damages before the RTC and command the respondent not to implement the
said sanction which the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students
to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration. Despite the
issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in
the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted
motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ of habeas data.
Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return,
together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ. In
time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying
down the following grounds for the denial of the petition. the RTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the petition for habeas data. Hence the petition. adrianantazo.wordpress.com

Issues:

1.) Whether a writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu?

2.) Whether the Respondents violated the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the
minors involved in this case.
Held:

1.) NO, The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea
that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or
entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data. To “engage” in something is
different from undertaking a business endeavor. To “engage” means “to do or take part in
something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business.
What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the
element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal
Endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not
prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity. to agree with the argument of the
petitioners, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private
persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process
decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an instrument designed to protect a right which is
easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications
technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not
capable of protecting. adrianantazo.wordpress.com

2.) No, the respondents failed to established that the uploading or showing the photos to Tigol
constitute a violation of their privacy. the showing of the said photo to Tigol disproves their
allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to
corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without
their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their
statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
adrianantazo.wordpress.com

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students,
who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private
posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were
the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. That
the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
“Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook
friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content
or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the
latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person
is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was
tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

31
JUL
FACTS

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to
privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or
security.

RULING

NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that
her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents
sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the
criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs
the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore,
the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
Pollo vs David
G. R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011

Facts: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV
and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the
“Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na” program of the CSC.

On January 3. 2007, CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received an unsigned

complaint letter which was marked “Confidential” and was sent through a courier service (LBC)
from certain Allan San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The letter contain allegations
that the petitioner have been helping many who have pending cases in the CSC and the letter
sender pleas that the CSC should investigate this anomaly to maintain the clean and good
behaviour of their office.

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically
“to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal
divisions.”

After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue,
Quezon City. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal
Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo
and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text
messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time,
informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the
CSC Chair.
Issue: Legality of the search conducted in the petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his
personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression of his
constitutional right to privacy.

Ruling: Yes.

In sum, we conclude that the “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement
make the…probable-cause requirement impracticable,” x x x for legitimate, work-related
noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of
reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the
efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the
privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-
related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by
the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:

“Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must
consider ‘whether the…action was justified at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine
whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,’” x x x

Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be “justified at its inception”

when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a
noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be
permissible in its scope when “the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of
the search and not excessively intrusive in light of …the nature of the [misconduct].” x x x39
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its
inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its
actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by O’Connor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in
the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the
test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-
discussed American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in
its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an
investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the
warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a
certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was “lawyering” for parties having pending cases
with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as
it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in
the practice of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a
highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would
undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-
judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial
and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative
tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general
public would not have any trust and confidence in it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the
complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in
the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was
justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating
evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be
destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose
the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of
the wok-related investigation.

Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an
open and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who
happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In
addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and
the concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.

All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned
to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the
managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational
effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees.
Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.

Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other
argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to
certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under
the aforecited authorities.
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996
Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
Ponente: J. Mendoza

Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:
(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Salcedo-Ortanez v CA
Facts:

Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial
court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any
other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they
are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and
fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is
notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial.
The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is
erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and
not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists,
cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals
Held:

1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes
such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible
in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording
of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from
an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.