LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 22, 406-420 (1991)

Operant Modulation of Low-Level Attributes of Rule-

Governed Behavior by Nonverbal Contingencies

FRODE SVARTDAL

University of Tromsii, Tromsii, Norway

A low-level and nonsalient attribute of behavior (i.e., speed of pressing) was

subjected to differential nonverbal operant reinforcement when rules governed a
high-level attribute of that behavior (i.e., counting by means of key presses).
Unknown to the subjects, reinforcers depended on reduced (slow group) or in-
creased (fast group) speed of pressing rather than on the correct number of presses.
The reinforced attribute was modulated according to the arranged speed contin-
gencies independently of the instructed task and independently of subjects’ aware-
ness of the critical contingency. A control group receiving random reinforcers
demonstrated no systematic speed changes. Possible mechanisms related to be-
havior changes of this type were examined and discussed, and it was concluded
that the behavior changes observed in this situation could be attributed to operant
conditioning. The results substantiate the assumption that nonverbal operant con-
tingencies may modulate low-level and nonsalient attributes of rule-governed be-
havior. B 1991 Academic Press. Inc.

The present study examines mechanisms that may be effective in gen-

erating behavior changes by arranged nonverbal operant contingencies
when verbal control is minimized. A number of studies on operant con-
ditioning of adult human behavior have found that interactions between
verbal control and arranged nonverbal contingencies result in responding
that does not mimic animal behavior in parallel conditioning situations
(e.g., Lowe, 1979; Schwartz, 1982; Wearden, 1988). These effects are
generally attributed to linguistic variables: Instructions, self-instructions,
and rules tend to override or distort arranged nonverbal contingencies,
resulting in a reduced sensitivity to those contingencies (e.g., Baron &
Galizio, 1983; Bentall & Lowe, 1987; Bentall, Lowe, & Beasty, 1985;
Galizio, 1979; Harzem, Lowe, & Bagshaw, 1978; Hayes, Brownstein,

I thank Magne A. Flaten for his comments on a previous version of this article. Requests
for reprints should be sent to Frode Svartdal, Department of Psychology, University of
Tromso, 9OtKl Tromso, Norway. E-mail address: frodes@mack.uit.no.

406
0023-9690191 $3.00
Copyright Q 1991 by Academic Press, Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
 MODULATION OF RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR 407

Zettle, Rosenfarb, & Korn, 1986; Hayes, Brownstein, Haas, & Greenway,
1986; Lippman & Meyer, 1967).
Reduced sensitivity to nonverbal contingencies should be expected in
situations where verbal stimuli easily interfere with arranged contingen-
cies. But when verbal control is minimized (Davey, 1989; Matthews,
Shimoff, Catania, & Sagvolden, 1977; Reber, 1976; Shimoff, Catania, &
Matthews, 1981; Wearden, 1988) or when behavior is inaccessible or too
complex to allow verbal control (e.g., Hefferline, Keenan, & Harford,
1958; Neuringer, 1986), nonverbal control may be facilitated. Further-
more, since verbal control of behavior requires attentional effort (e.g.,
Schneider & Fisk, 1983), verbal guidance of a behavioral property is likely
to prevent other concurrent behavioral properties from being salient to
the actor.
When describing their own behavior, actors generally prefer higher
levels of action identification (i.e., why the action is performed or what
its effects and implications are) to lower levels of action identification
(i.e., details of an action; how an action is done) (Vallacher & Wegner,
1987). If an action is guided by a higher level of identification, attention
to lower level attributes of that action is reduced (Vallacher & Wegner,
1987; Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps, 1984). It may be
assumed, therefore, that low-level properties of behavior-i.e., subtle
response dimensions related to topography, temporal properties, and
force, the so-called modality attributes of action (e.g., Rescher, 1970)-
are likely to be nonsalient to actors when higher-level properties are
verbally controlled. The control of low-level properties of behavior in
such situations must therefore involve nonverbal mechanisms, of which
operant contingency control may be an example. Since a significant pro-
portion of human behavioral variability is related to modality attributes
of behavior, e.g., behavioral style, paralinguistic behavior, and emotional
modulation of action (Rosenfeld, 1982; Scherer, 1982; Scherer & Ekman,
1982), an enhanced understanding of this control is of interest.
The purpose of the present study was to investigate mechanisms that
may be effective in generating low-level behavior changes by arranged
nonverbal operant contingencies when the role of verbal control of that
behavior is minimized. The setup was essentially similar to that used by
Svartdal (1989), but with some important extensions. In that experiment,
nonverbal operant contingencies modified a nonsalient and low-level at-
tribute of responding (i.e., speed of pressing) when rules guided a higher-
level attribute of that behavior (i.e., the number of presses emitted).
Subjects were instructed to count brief auditory stimuli (“clicks”) in stim-
ulus presentation periods and to indicate the number counted by pressing
a key the corresponding number of times in subsequent response periods.
“Correct” answers resulted in “feedbacks.” Unknown to the subjects,
those feedbacks (i.e., reinforcers) depended on the speed of pressing
408 FRODE SVARTDAL

rather than on the number of presses. Speed of pressing was modified by

response consequences when reinforcers depended on a tempo faster or
slower than the baseline speed.
The present experiment explored three specific mechanisms possibly
involved in the control of behavior in this situation:

(1) If the behavior changes under arranged nonverbal contingencies

are attributable to reinforcement, random presentations of reinforcers
should generate no systematic speed changes. To further assess the effects
of the arranged speed contingencies in this situation, a control group was
subjected to random reinforcement while two other groups were exposed
to a fast speed contingency (fast group) or to a slow speed contingency
(slow group). It was expected that the arranged contingencies would gen-
erate speed levels accordingly and that the speed level observed under
the random contingency would be located between those in the fast and
slow groups.
(2) Arranged nonverbal contingencies may generate behavior changes
by means of different mechanisms. In the Svartdal (1989) experiment,
the observed speed changes could alternatively be attributed to a bias in
counting (i.e., a general increase or decrease in the number of presses
emitted) rather than to changes in the speed of pressing per se. According
to the bias hypothesis, differences in counting could emerge as a function
of arranged speed contingencies and thus generate speed changes in an
indirect manner. According to the reinforcement of speed hypothesis,
however, speed of pressing should be changed in a direct manner and no
bias in counting should emerge.

(3) Asynchronies in the temporal relation between response cessation

and reinforcer presentation may be expected to affect conditioning (e.g.,
Killeen, 1981), in that long and variable delays between the required
response and reinforcer presentation produce poorer conditioning than
shorter delays. Data from the first experiment with 60 experimental trials
indicated that trials with relatively few clicks/trial were less effective in
producing reliable conditioning effects than were trials with relatively
many clicks/trial, possibly because the delays were longer in trials with
few clicks/trial. However, a definite conclusion is difficult to draw because
of the limited number of experimental trials run in that experiment, re-
sulting in relatively few exposures to trials with many and few clicks/trial.
In the present experiment, the number of experimental trials was increased
to 100, almost doubling the exposure to trials with extreme levels of
clicks/trial. Therefore, any eventual differential effects of varying re-
sponse-reinforcer asynchronies should be more readily observable.
 MODULATION OF RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR 409

METHOD
Subjects
Twenty-four undergraduates participated in the experiment. Each was
paid 100 NOK (equivalent to $14). The subjects were randomly assigned
to different experimental groups prior to arrival.

Apparatus and stimuli

The experiment took place in a sound-attenuated room containing a
table with stimulus-presentation and response-recording equipment. Two
transilluminated keys mounted on a 33 x 33 cm vertical console and a
loudspeaker were used to indicate stimulus presentation and response
periods, and to present feedback stimuli (i.e., reinforcers). The stimulus
presentation periods each had a duration of 6.1 s and were indicated by
a red left lamp on the console; the response periods had a duration of
6.4 s and were indicated by a green right lamp. Both stimulus presentation
and response periods were signalled by S-s 5000-I-Ix tones. Feedback
stimuli were a flashing orange right lamp + 5 x .07-s 1000~I-Ix tones. A
counter located in front of the subject displayed the number of feedbacks
obtained. Clicks of 1-ms duration and constant amplitude could also be
presented through the loudspeaker.
The table further contained a standard telegraph key used to record
responses. Variations in the rate of key pressing were monitored by a
tachometer. A contour-following integrator averaged the analog signals
from the tachometer. The experimenter was controlled by ASYST 2.0
software run on an IBM AT personal computer.

Procedure
The experimental session consisted of 130 trials, each with a 6.1-s stim-
ulus-presentation period and a subsequent 6.4-s response period. Each
trial was separated by a pause of 1 s. The first 30 trials were “blind,”
during which the subjects were instructed to count and respond as ac-
curately as possible with no “feedback.” Speed of pressing during baseline
Trials 1l-30 permitted individual calibration of baseline speed. Following
the baseline trials, all subjects had 100 experimental trials. Transition
between baseline and experimental trials was signalled by orange lamps
for 2 s and 3 x l-s lOOO-Hz tones.
The number of clicks generated during each stimulus-presentation pe-
riod was randomly determined and varied from trial to trial (mean =
10.85; range 4-17). Since the clicks were generated by a software random
number generator starting from the same seed at the outset of the ex-
perimental session, the sequence of random clicks was identical for all
subjects. Because the clicks were of short duration and occasionally oc-
410 FRODE SVARTDAL

curred at brief intervals (min. = 170 ms), counting was sometimes quite
difficult. No information about the actual number of clicks presented was
provided to the subjects.
The computer recorded values from an S-bit analog-to-digital converter
with intervals of 85 ms (i.e., 75 samples per response period), corre-
sponding to the analog output from the tachometer. Pressing typically
stabilized by 1.5 s into the response period. Because pressing also would
end early in some response periods due to few presented clicks, speed
data were selected from the 1.7-s interval, starting 1.7 s into each response
period. The mean speed of pressing (i.e., averaged interresponse times
(IRTs) in the selected time window) in baseline Trials 11-30 was used
for individual identification of the reinforcement criterion, which was
automatically calculated by the computer following Trial 30.
Feedback stimuli depended on the averaged IRTs computed from the
analog values recorded in the selected time window in the response period.
Modification of the selected behavioral unit by the arranged feedback
stimuli would be required in order for the behavioral unit to be called
an operant and the feedback stimuli reinforcers (e.g., Catania, 1973). The
IRT durations were updated by the tachometer based on the rate of
pressing during the response period. The tachometer was reset if no
presses occurred within a l-s interval following a response. The integrator
time constant was permanently set at 500 ms.
Three experimental conditions were arranged. In the fast condition,
reinforcers were presented at the end of the 6.4-s response period if the
mean speed of pressing during the selected time window was above the
level identified during the subject’s baseline trials. If reinforcers were
obtained on at least five successive trials, the reinforcement requirement
was increased, corresponding to a rate change of 4.8 responses/min for
the following trials. In the slow condition, reinforcers were presented
according to the same regime, except that the speed had to be below the
baseline criterion and that the reinforcement criterion was decreased after
any five consecutively reinforced trials. In the random condition, rein-
forcers occurred independently of speed and independently of counting
at a rate of about 50% of the experimental trials.
Instructions and verbal control. Before the experiment started, each
subject was briefly interviewed to assess whether she/he had any knowl-
edge of the experiment. This examination was kept very general to prevent
any communication of information to the subject about the nature of the
experiment. The subject was then seated in front of the console and
received the following instructions:

This is an experiment on how people count random events. When this lamp [ex-
perimenter indicates] is red. you will hear a number of clicks here [experimenter
indicates the loudspeaker]. You must count the number of clicks. Then a brief
 MODULATION OF RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR 411

pause follows. After the pause this lamp [experimenter indicates] will turn green.
Your task is now-while the green lamp is on-to press this key [experimenter
indicates] the same number of times as the number of clicks you just heard. After
a while the green lamp will be turned off, and following a short break the sequence
will be repeated.
The number of clicks will vary randomly during the experiment. Your task is
simply to count the number of clicks you hear when the red lamp is on, and then
press the corresponding number of times when the green lamp is on.
The clicks are quite faint and may at times occur with short intervals. This may
sometimes make counting rather difficult. Therefore your answer will most probably
not always be correct.
In the first part of the experiment your answers will be “blind”; you will not
get any message as to whether the answer was correct or not. Just try to answer
as accurately as possible. After a while you will hear a signal [later demonstrated]
meaning that from now on, you will get feedback if your answer was correct. If
your answer was correct, you will get a message [later demonstrated]; if you don’t
answer correctly, you will get no message.
Here [experimenter indicates] you can monitor the number of correct answers
you have achieved. You may obtain a maximum of 60 correct answers. Very few
people can accomplish this. Try as well as you can to obtain as many correct
answers as possible.
Do you have any questions?

Following the instructions, any questions were answered and a short dem-
onstration of the procedure was given. Then the experiment was started.
After the completion of the experiment, each subject was checked for
insight into the experimental manipulation by use of a questionnaire and
an interview. This check involved three separate criteria. First, if the
subject complied with the instructions, counting would by necessity have
been her/his primary preoccupation during the experimental session, mak-
ing it unlikely that other explicit strategies had been applied in the sit-
uation. Second, each subject was asked about strategies applied, both
with respect to counting and to responding. Finally, the subject was ex-
plicitly queried whether any strategy related to speed-that is, faster or
slower pressing, or rhythmicity-had been used. Based on these criteria,
a subject was classified as an “insight” subject if speed in any way was
reported or implied as relevant to responding.
After the completion of the session, the subject was given a general
description of the experiment. This explanation was kept very brief and
uninformative, as the subject was promised a more comprehensive ex-
planation later. Finally, the subject was asked not to tell others about
the nature of the experimental task.
Analysis of data. Speed data were sampled from the selected 1.7-s time
window (i.e., Samples 21-40) of every response period. Because the
general speed levels differed among subjects, individual data were trans-
formed by dividing each observed speed value by that value -t mean
baseline value, giving the formula d, = d,/(d, + baseline). Thus, a
412 FRODE SVARTDAL

transformed value of SO indicates no difference from baseline; values

higher than .50 indicate increased speed of pressing, and values lower
than SO indicate reduced speed of pressing.
Biases in counting during the 6.4-s response periods were computed as
the difference between the number of presented clicks/trial and the num-
ber of emitted responses/trial. Positive figures indicate too few presses;
negative figures indicate too many presses.
Since the delays between response completion and reinforcer presen-
tation generally would be short and relatively low in variability in trials
with many clicks/trial, adaptation to the arranged contingencies should
be more pronounced in these trials compared to trials with relatively few
clicks if delays of reinforcement affected conditioning in this situation.
Eventual differential effects of response-reinforcer asynchronies were
checked by comparing experimental trials with relatively many clicks/trial
to trials with relatively few clicks/trial.
Statistical analyses. The data were assessed by analyses of variance
(ANOVAs). Theoretically interesting differences were tested by contrast
analyses. In tests involving repeated measures, multivariate ANOVA
(MANOVA) was preferred because of its less stringent assumptions (e.g.,
O’Brien & Kaiser, 1985; Wilkinson, 1988). The rejection criterion for the
null hypothesis was set at (Y = .05.
RESULTS
One subject in the slow group (Subject 4) reported speed as relevant
for her response strategy and was consequently excluded from further
data analyses. None of the remaining subjects demonstrated or implied
any insight into the experimental manipulation.
Speed Changes
Individual adaptation to the arranged contingencies was defined in terms
of speed changes above baseline (fast group) and below baseline (slow
group) on the last four blocks of experimental trials (Trials 91-130). In
these trials, the mean number of clicks/trial was 10.98, which corre-
sponded reasonably well to the mean number of clicks/trial in baseline
trials (11.15). This ensured a basis for comparison, given that the number
of clicks/trial correlates positively with speed of pressing (Svartdal, 1989).
According to this criterion, all eight subjects in the fast group and five
of the remaining seven subjects in the slow group adapted to the arranged
contingencies. The reinforcement criterion changed from baseline level
(Trial 31) to final criterion level (Trial 130) in all subjects who were
exposed to a speed contingency (see Table 1).
Figure 1 shows the group mean speed changes over trials relative to
baseline. In none of the subjects exposed to a speed contingency did
abrupt changes in behavior appear that could be interpreted as “insight”
 MODULATION OF RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR 413

TABLE 1
Number of Criterion Changes, Last Trial vs Baseline, and Mean Speed Changes,
Transformed Values

Subj. ; Criterion Mean speed

cond. change change

1s - 4* ,521
2s - 2+ .488
3s ,498
4s (T Ig:) (.349)
5s - 6’ .43s
6S - 2* ,429
7s - 1* ,525
23s - 1* ,478
9F + 4* ,531
10 F + 3* 525
11 F + 3* 510
12 F + 7* 543
13 F + 4* 521
14 F + 3* 503
15 F + lo* ,584
16 F + 5’ 609
17 R - ,511
18 R - .522
19 R - ,503
20 R - ,531
21 R - ,507
22 R - ,554
23 R - ,478
24 R - 571

Note. Trials 91-130 relative to baseline; non-adapting subjects in italics; insight subject
in parentheses. S = Slow; F = Fast; R = Random.

learning. The gradual nature of the behavior changes suggests that a

conditioning process may have been operative. The random group showed
an initial increase in speed, but on the last five blocks of trials the random
group’s speed level was located between the speed levels of the fast and
slow groups.
An overall 3 (Groups) x 10 (Trial blocks) repeated measures ANOVA
showed a significant effect of Groups (F(2, 20) = 3.60, p < .05). A
MANOVA showed a significant effect of Trial blocks (F(9, 12) = 3.28,
p < .05), but no Groups x Trial blocks interaction (F(18, 26) = 1.02).
Planned comparisons showed that the slow and fast groups differed sig-
nificantly (F(1, 20) = 6.64, p < .02), and that there were nonsignificant
differences between the random and slow groups (F(1, 20) = 4.03, p <
.lO) and between the fast and random groups (F(l, 20) = .35).
414 FRODE SVARTDAL

A FAST
l luNoavl
0.45 - I-l_LAm~-l_l v SLOW
816212 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10

FIG. 1. Mean group speed changes relative to baseline (Fast, Slow, and Random groups).
Data are averaged over blocks of 10 trials, and one nonadapting subject in the Slow group
(Subject 7) is removed from the data.

The relatively weak conditioning effect in the slow group compared to

the fast group could partly be attributed to one non-adapting subject
(Subject 7). Removal of this subject from the data showed a gradual
decrease in slow group speed of responding comparable to the increase
in the fast group (see Fig. 1).
Latencies (response period onset to beginning of pressing) were short-
ened in all three groups over trials, indicating a training effect. Consistent
with the speed predictions, subjects in the fast group shortened latencies
over experimental trials somewhat more than subjects in the slow group
(fast group mean change from baseline = ( - 12.3 ms; slow group change
- 14 ms). The mean latency change in the random group was (- 109
is). An overall ANOVA did not, however, reach significance (F(2, 20)
= 1.77); neither did a planned comparison between the slow and fast
groups (t(20) = 1.75).
To further relate the effects of conditioning to the click level/trial, late
trials (mean Trial Number 105) on each click level were compared among
the groups. The mean speed of pressing on the last four trials on each
click level (except click level 16, which had only one trial) are shown in
Fig. 2b. The slow group pressed at a rate below baseline level, regardless
of click level. The fast group pressed at a rate above baseline level, while
the random group was located between the fast and slow groups on all
click levels above 9. Figure 2a shows the corresponding speed levels on
 MODULATION OF RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR 415

Early trials

J , , , , , , , , , , , iz
7 6 9 10 11 12 19 14 15 16 I?

cncklevel

Late trials

'I 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

clldcbal

FIG. 2. Mean group speed changes on different click levels/trial, first two experimental
trials/click level (a), and last four experimental trials/click level (b). See text for explanation.
416 FRODE SVARTDAL

the mean of the two first experimental trials on each click level (mean
Trial Number 47; click levels 16 and 17 were excluded in this figure, since
click level 16 had only one trial (Trial Number 70) and click level 17 had
only four trials (Trial Numbers 57, 60, 69, and 74). Contrast analyses of
the final speed data showed that the fast and slow, and the slow and
random groups were significantly different (F(1, 20) = 10.56, p < .005;
F(1, 20) = 5.29, p < .05, respectively). No significant difference appeared
in the comparison of the random and fast groups (F(1, 20) = .97).
To sum up, the speed data showed that (1) the arranged speed con-
tingencies generated adaptive behavior in 13 of 15 subjects, (2) the random
contingency produced a mean speed of responding that was located be-
tween the fast and slow groups, but was somewhat biased in the direction
of faster pressing, and (3) adaptation to the arranged contingencies was
not affected by the number of clicks/trial when the slow and fast groups
were compared on late trials.
Bias in Counting
The observed speed changes could alternatively be attributed to biases
in counting as a function of the arranged speed contingencies, i.e., to a
general increase (fast group) or decrease (slow group) in the number of
presses emitted. Bias in counting was measured by subtracting the number
of presses/trial from the number of clicks/trial. Thus, a positive figure
indicates too few presses; a negative indicates too many presses. The
mean of these differences on the last 40 experimental trials relative to
baseline Trials 11-30 was used as an index of counting bias.
The fast and slow groups differed marginally in the direction of the
bias prediction (fast group mean - .45; slow group mean = .32), but the
group difference was nonsignificant (t(13) = .84). The random contin-
gency generated no bias in counting (mean difference = - .04).
The slow and fast groups differed too little to account for the differences
in speed of responding. If it is assumed that the subjects on average
responded for 4 s during the response periods, the mean speed change
in the fast group (.541 or about + 39 responses/min) would imply a mean
counting bias of - 2.6 presses per trial. Conversely, the mean speed change
in the slow group (.482 or about - 12 responses/min, one nonadapting
subject removed from the data) implies a mean bias of + .78 per trial.
Both figures are far from the actual biases observed.
The mean absolute deviances in counting (i.e., number of clicks/trial-
responses/trial) in experimental Trials 91-130 was 1.43 in the slow group
and .08 in the fast group (t(13) = 1.40, p < .20). That in the random
group was .55. Thus, all groups tended to emit somewhat fewer presses
than were required, and this tendency was marginally stronger in the slow
group than in the fast group.
In sum, even though subjects in the slow group slightly reduced their
 MODULATION OF RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR 417

counts and subjects in the fast group slightly increased their counts relative
to baseline levels, biases in counting could not explain the observed dif-
ferences in speed of responding between those groups.
Response-Reinforcer Asynchronies
The delay hypothesis predicts that the speed differences between the
slow and fast groups will increase with increasing levels of clicks/trial,
i.e., with reduced response-reinforcer delays. Figure 2b indicates a dif-
ference between the slow and fast groups in the predicted direction. This
result was partially supported by a multivariate ANOVA, which showed
an interaction between groups (fast and slow) and click levels that ap-
proached significance (F(l0, 4) = 5.09, p < .lO).
It may be the case that reliable conditioning had already been estab-
lished in late trials and that differential effects of long versus short delays
would be more apparent in middle trials. Speed data from middle trials
(experimental Trials 10-59) did not, however, differ as a function of few
versus many clicks/trial between the fast and slow groups; but the overall
fast versus slow group speed difference was not as marked as in late trials
(F(1, 20) = 4.18, p < .lO). The present data therefore only render partial
support for the delay of reinforcement hypothesis.
DISCUSSION
The present study substantiates the idea that low-level and nonsalient
attributes of rule-governed behavior may be modulated by nonverbal
operant contingencies independently of the subject’s awareness of the
critical contingency. Thus, Svartdal’s (1989) main finding was confirmed.
Modification of the selected IRTs in the fast and slow groups by arranged
consequences demonstrates that this behavior can be called an operant
and the feedback stimuli reinforcers.
The experiment investigated factors that may generate such changes.
Bias in counting was discounted as a determining mechanism, even though
a marginal trend appeared in the data in the direction of support for the
bias hypothesis. The hypothesis that speed of pressing was altered through
a reinforcement process was found to be more probable, since reliable
correlations between the speed contingencies and speed of pressing were
observed. This hypothesis was further supported by the gradual rather
than abrupt behavior changes over trials and by the fact that behavioral
changes in the predicted directions occurred without the subjects’ ver-
balization of the contingency.
Several behavior-controlling mechanisms that do not relate to learning
per se may interact with the associative mechanisms assumed to generate
the systematic speed changes observed in this experiment. Counting biases
may be one such mechanism, but support for this mechanism was not
found. Subjects in the random group showed a gradual increase in speed
418 FRODE SVARTDAL

of pressing in the first part of the experimental trials, even though this
group was not subjected to a fast speed contingency. This effect may be
attributed to practice effects or to accidental reinforcement. It is inter-
esting to note, however, that this “superstitious” responding seemed to
deteriorate over time, even if a high speed level of pressing would have
resulted in a high rate of reinforcers throughout the experiment. This may
indicate that behavior, even if apparently adaptive, is not necessarily
stereotypic (cf. Schwartz, 1982; Page & Neuringer, 1985).
The weak effect of varying delays of reinforcement is perhaps not
surprising. Delays varied from 0 to 5 s, which may be within the optimal
range required for conditioning (e.g., Killeen, 1981; Mackintosh, 1974).
Reinforcer presentations “informed” the subjects that the required re-
sponse was “correct,” but this information was essentially noninformative
in relation to the instructed task. The relative difficulty of the counting
task probably prevented the subjects from suspecting that they had been
misinformed in cases where they observed discrepancies between the clicks
counted and the presses emitted. The interesting point in this context is,
however, that the arranged speed contingencies affected behavior in a
reliable manner. Obviously, the subjects were able to detect a signal
embedded in noise (Killeen, 1981) despite varying response-reinforcer
asynchronies, and they apparently did so in a manner that did not involve
conscious processing of response or contingency requirements.
The complexity of an arranged operant contingency must be assumed
to affect the probability that a subject is able to verbalize that contingency.
The nature of the response to be conditioned is a critical part of the
contingency, and it may be assumed that salient responses are easier to
detect and describe than are nonsalient ones. Therefore, the verbalization
of a response-reinforcer contingency may be easy if the consequences
follow a discrete and easily detectable response; when the response is
continuously variable and difficult to describe, however, the response-
reinforcer contingency may be much more difficult to verbalize. In the
present context, the response was nonsalient in two senses. First, the
response was made nonsalient by making another behavior attribute (i.e.,
instructed counting) salient. Second, the response was defined as an an-
alog, modulating attribute of behavior. Both factors should increase the
probability that the response and the response-reinforcer relation will be
obscured, and therefore reduce the probability that they will be con-
sciously processed by the subject.
This analysis has implications for the question of awareness in condi-
tioning. It is often believed that awareness about the arranged contingency
is crucial for classical as well as operant conditioning (Brewer, 1974;
Dawson & Schell, 1987; Wearden, 1988). Dawson and Schell (1987) con-
clude that “classical autonomic conditioning critically involves conscious
cognitive processes” (p. 34), and Wearden (1988) claims that “operant
 MODULATION OF RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR 419

contingencies may not (. . .) operate directly without some sort of cog-

nitive mediation, usually in the form of development of rules, self-in-
structions, or response strategies” (p. 220). This study supports a different
view, namely that conditioning may take place without the explicit in-
volvement of cognitive mediation. The present data (cf. also Berry &
Broadbent, 1988; Hefferline, Keenan, & Hat-ford, 1958; Reber, 1976;
Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor, 1980; Svartdal, 1989) imply, however,
that this conclusion may be confined to situations involving relatively
complex and nonsalient response and/or contingency requirements. In
other situations, i.e., where cognitive processing of contingency and re-
sponse requirements are more straightforward (e.g., Schwartz, 1982), ex-
plicit cognitive mediation of contingencies may be common.

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Received August 28, 1990

Revised January 21, 1991