100 Largest Losses in The Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019

INSIGHTS MARCH 2020 26TH EDITION
100 Largest Losses in

the Hydrocarbon Industry
1974-2019
INSIGHTS MARCH 2020 26TH EDITION
100 Largest Losses

in the Hydrocarbon
Industry, 1974-2019
CONTENTS
01 Foreword
02 Introduction
05 What Can We Learn From the Last

Two Years?
13 30 Years on: Is History Repeating Itself?
19 Does Age Really Matter?
25 Organizational Resilience:
Turning Uncertainty into Opportunity
29 Graphics
35 100 Largest Losses Descriptions
36 Refineries
50 Petrochemicals
60 Gas Processing
64 Terminals & Distribution
68 Upstream
Foreword
It is my pleasure and privilege to write this foreword
for the 26th edition of Marsh JLT Specialty’s 100 Largest
Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry report. SHAKEEL H KADRI
Executive director and CEO,
I have found this publication to be very useful for leaders in the process industries Center for Chemical Process Safety
to help them comprehend past incidents and lessons learned, as well as assist in American Institute of Chemical
the development of their improvement plans. At the Center for Chemical Process Engineers (AIChE)
Safety (CCPS®), whose mission is to help prevent/minimize significant process
safety incidents, we also take great interest in lessons and root causes identified in
this document. CCPS was founded in 1985 in response to the Bhopal gas tragedy in
Bhopal, India — its vision to protect people, property, and the environment through
the collective wisdom of its corporate members and their stakeholders.
The recent period (2018-2019) covered in this document provides valuable information
to start a dialogue on “Does Age Really Matter?” in our process safety improvement
journey. Three of the new additions to the 100 largest losses occurred at oil refineries
that were constructed more than 50 years ago. The largest loss in 2019 occurred at
a refinery that was triggered by a failure of a thinned pipe elbow installed almost 50
years earlier. The component met the metallurgy requirement that was permitted at the
time of installation; however, the component did not meet the intent of the American
Society for Testing and Materials recommendations made 20 years later. With plants
older than 30 years, the industry needs to look more closely at the risks associated with
implementation of an effective asset/mechanical integrity programs; keeping facilities
fit-for-service to meet the intent of newer critical safety standards, and keeping
effective knowledge transfer. The best-in-class companies apply a formal engineering
standards retrofitting program to ensure fitness to service requirement.
The exodus of an aging workforce has created a huge issue around how industry will
meet its critical need of process safety knowledge transfer. This issue needs a holistic
improvement approach, including enhanced education of process safety in engineering
education, effective assimilation of process safety knowledge for early career industry
professionals, and ongoing reinforcement of process safety training in the workforce.
In recent years, many organizations have accelerated their effort to improve this area
and progress is being made. My organization — AIChE/CCPS — in collaboration with
its stakeholders, has put a great deal of effort into helping improve this critical need.
This is a long-term issue that will require a collective effort by all stakeholders to
progress effectively.
This report provides an excellent opportunity to look back at our history, at key issues
these incidents have identified, and see if we are making progress. I urge all of you to
review this document, and hope you will be able to extract learnings that you can apply
to your organization to improve your process safety performance.
Shakeel H Kadri
Marsh JLT Specialty• 1

Introduction
Welcome to the 26th edition of Marsh JLT Specialty’s
100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry report.
The last two The publication summarizes the 100 largest property
damage losses from the hydrocarbon extraction,
years have transport, and processing industry between 1974
been turbulent; and 2019.
eight property It allows us to look back at our industry’s history, identify key issues and trends from
damage losses large losses, and understand whether the industry is making progress.
from 2018-19 The report considers lessons that can be learnt from the past two years (page 05),
were among the and whether history is repeating itself 30 years on (page 13). The correlation between
a plant’s age and its impact on losses is then explored (page 19), before looking at how
50-largest energy organizational resilience can help turn uncertainty into opportunity (page 25).
losses of all time. The report’s information comes from Marsh JLT Specialty’s energy-loss database,
which includes information gathered from our deep involvement in the hydrocarbon
industry, and also from public records. The information covers more than 40 years,
and includes almost 10,000 individual loss records (see “Methodology” for more
information). Graphics drawing on this database can be found on pages 29-33 and
through the report.
The last two years have been turbulent; eight property damage losses from 2018-19
were among the 50-largest energy losses of all time. Four recent losses were among
the 20-largest losses ever.
Not since 1988-89 (when six of the largest ever energy losses occurred — including
Piper Alpha), has a two-year period seen such a high concentration of large losses.
Declining risk standards in some areas over the past 12 years may be a factor. For
example, our risk engineer surveys found that “engineering standards” at refineries
declined over this period, and that both gas processing plants and terminals/
distribution underwent an overall deterioration in risk quality over the past 12 years.
We also found that plants older than 30 years are far more likely to experience losses,
suggesting the industry needs to look more closely at the risks of older refineries and
petrochemical plants.
The cause of loss tends to vary depending on the age of a plant, found Liberty Specialty
Markets, a contributor to this report. In the first 10 years of a plant’s operation, most
losses are caused by operations-related failures.
As plant operations experience develops, the number of losses reduces, until age takes
its toll and there is a steep rise in both loss frequency and magnitude in plants more
than 30-years-old. In plants older than 30 years, mechanical-integrity-related failures
account for 65% of losses.
2 •100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019

Past Mistakes Methodology
The most commonly cited energy industry risk recommendations made by Marsh JLT
Specialty over the past few years (“systems of work,” “inspection,” and “fireproofing”)
were prevalent issues among the largest issues in 1988-99 — reinforcing the view that
Although every effort has been made to
the industry may not have learnt from past mistakes.
find out as much information as possible
about each of the losses referenced in this
During the Piper Alpha incident in 1988, the largest industry property damage loss of
report, there are some losses for which we
all time, there were shortcomings in all three areas of the root cause “systems of work”
still have too little information, preventing
(which includes permitting, management of change, and shift handover).
us from determining the contributing
factors. We have not included losses that
Similarly, the largest losses in 1988-1989 and 2018-19 both suffered from the escalating occurred during projects’ construction
factors “emergency response plans” (ERPs) and “fire protection.” For example, the lack phase, and marine transportation losses
of adequate ERPs caused the initial incident to escalate at Piper Alpha; at Campos Basin are excluded except those involving
it took over a month to control the resulting fire, compounding the cost of the incident. marine vessels moored at plant docks.
The loss values are reported in two ways:

In 2018-19, in all four of the largest losses, the sites were not well prepared for the
incidents that occurred. And in 2019 the US$600 million explosion at Limbe, Cameroon,
1. Adjusted property damage loss, based
began as a fire near a distillation unit on the refinery, which escalated to a much larger
on the value of loss at the end of 2019.
explosion. More robust fixed-fire protection at site may have reduced or prevented this
escalation. 2. Actual property damage loss, based on
the value of the loss when it occurred.
Four key factors arguably prevent lessons from being learnt from losses:
Losses have been ordered according to
the adjusted property damage loss values.
Distance
Parties unconsciously feel less affected by events a long way away. Loss amounts include property damage,
debris removal, and clean-up costs. The
costs of business interruption, extra
Culture expense, employee injuries/fatalities,
Preventing lessons from being implemented effectively. and liability claims are excluded from this
analysis. The direct on-premises clean-
up costs due to asbestos abatement,
Tunnel vision polychlorinated biphenyl removal, or
Not realizing wider relevance of lessons. released hydrocarbons and chemicals
following a fire, explosion, or other loss
event have traditionally been considered
Time part of the property damage loss.
Lessons are learnt, but then forgotten or solutions are insufficiently robust.
Given the 30 years that have elapsed between the two-worst periods in terms of the
20-largest losses, time would seem to be a particularly significant factor.
We hope this publication reminds energy-industry professionals of the range of losses

that can occur, the range of potential root causes, the fallibility of prevention measures,
and the scale of potential consequences. Only by reminding ourselves of these things,
can we begin to make the progress and improvements that the whole industry wants
to see.

CHAPTER 1
What Can We
Learn From the
Last Two Years?

What Can We Learn
From the Last Two Years?
Four of the Following a loss of more than US$1,000 million in 2017 —
which ranks as one of the largest downstream property
new losses damage losses of all time — the past two years has been
were among another turbulent period for the energy industry, with an
the 20-largest unusually high number of large losses.
losses ever. Of these new losses, a remarkable eight were among the 50-largest industry losses
of all time, and four of these were among the 20-largest losses ever. Several more
occurred that were just below the 100-largest losses threshold (which now stands at
US$175 million).
New additions to the 100-largest losses (100LL) from the past two years cost an
unusually large total of US$4.5 billion in property damage, which takes the total of the
100LL to US$43.2 billion (based on December 31, 2019, pricing).
The past two years have seen several major losses from refineries and petrochemical assets,
particularly those built in the 1960s or earlier. Although not as prevalent in the 100LL,
terminals/distribution and gas processing plants have also experienced large losses.
In this publication the large property damage losses have been grouped by type
of facility into five categories of similar technology, to facilitate data comparisons:
FIGURE
Refineries accounts for half of all new additions to
1 the 100LL.
SOURCE: MARSH
REFINERIES TERMINAL & DISTRIBUTION

Accounts for 50% of new Accounts for 0% of new
additions and 39% overall. additions and 5% overall.
PETROCHEMICALS UPSTREAM
Accounts for 25% of new Accounts for 0% of new
additions and 26% overall. additions and 24% overall.
GAS PROCESSING
Accounts for 25% of new
additions and 6% overall.

Refineries
Four of the new additions to the 100LL occurred at oil refineries, and three of these
occurred at sites more than 50 years old (the link between age of asset and large losses
is explored more closely in “Does Age Really Matter?” on page 17).
High oil refinery
The two largest refinery losses both happened in the US (Philadelphia US$750 million,
and Wisconsin US$650 million), where there has been a well-publicized regulatory
utilization has
shift over the past two years including the rescinding of most of the Chemical Disaster
Rule. This shift could be construed as representing a lighter regulatory touch from the
continued over
Environmental Protection Agency, which has removed the following safeguards: the past two
• The requirement that chemical companies must determine the root causes of spills years and may
or explosions.
have contributed
• The requirement that an independent third party investigates spills, explosions,
and other disasters. to the high
• Training requirements for supervisors of plant operations. number of recent
• The requirement for the plant owner or operators to keep safety information up to date. losses.
• The requirement that plant owners release chemical hazard information to the public
upon request.
The largest new refinery loss occurred at Philadelphia and was triggered by a thinned
pipe elbow installed almost 50 years earlier; it has been reported that this was found
to contain a metallurgy permitted when it was originally installed, but not under
recommendations made 20 years later by the American Society for Testing and US$
Materials. Similar losses could occur in future if aging assets are not supported by
evolving engineering standards that are enforced by adequate regulation.
750M
Downstream margins are positively affected by drops in oil prices and this can result The size of the largest refinery
in refineries being pushed to operate at greater capacity (see figure 2), potentially loss during 2018-19, occurring in
contributing to the frequency of large losses. At the end of 2017, US refinery utilization Philadelphia and triggered by a
stood at its highest level since 2005. This high utilization has continued over the past thinned pipe elbow installed almost
two years and may have contributed to the high number of recent losses. 50 years earlier.
FIGURE
Average US refinery utilization remained elevated
2 in recent years while the price of crude oil remained
relatively low.
SOURCE: MACRO TRENDS* AND US ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION**
94 120 Average Utilization

110
Crude Price
92
100
US Refinery Utilization (%)
90 90
Crude Price (US$)
80
88
70
86 60
50
84
40
82 30
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
*www.macrotrends.net **https://www.eia.gov

Petrochemical Plants
There have been a number of high-profile losses in the petrochemical sector
in the past two years. Several of these occurred in the US, including the
US$500 million loss in Houston (November 2019), and the US$100 million
A US$800 loss in Crosby (April 2019), which, like the Philadelphia refinery loss, was
initiated by the failure of a piping component.
million loss in
There was also an US$800 million loss resulting from an explosion in Jiangsu,
Jiangsu, China, China, which is the largest petrochemical property damage loss since
was the largest Pasadena 1989. Following this, there has been a reported drive in China to
increase regulation in order to raise minimum standards at petrochemical
petrochemical sites. This includes:
property • A stipulation that local governments eliminate all hazards around

production, storage, transportation, and waste disposal.
damage loss • Tighter zoning regulations that prevent chemical plants from being built
since Pasadena near residential areas.
1989. • New rules on the transportation and disposal of hazardous materials.
The recent large losses in both petrochemical and refining underline the
challenges governments, globally, face when trying to strike the right level of
regulation within an industry: Regulation will often need to allow for the fact
that retrofitting facilities may sometimes be prohibitive in terms of cost, or
impractical due to lack of available space.
What Does Risk Ranking Data Show?

To help companies understand and improve their risk profiles and reduce the
occurrence and magnitude of losses, Marsh’s risk engineers survey key energy assets.
As part of these surveys, Marsh ranks the quality of hardware, software (management
systems), and emergency response areas at sites, each of which are made up of a
number of sub-topics.
A look back over the past 12 years of ranking data shows that certain aspects
examined in these surveys have deteriorated, which may have contributed to the
trend of recent losses.
Of note is the scores given for “engineering standards” at refineries, which have
declined over this period.

FIGURE US$
3 Average engineering standards at refineries declined
during 2008-19. 100M
SOURCE: MARSH
The onshore oil and gas sector has

recently experienced more property
damage losses per annum in excess
of US$100 million.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Poor Basic Average Good Excellent
2008-2011 2012-2015 2016-2019
Deterioration in refining engineering standards (each circle represents the average score for the
respective four-year period).
Sub Topic Best In-Class Performance

Engineering Company has its own published or adopted standards
standards used in excess of major contractor standards, and these are
regularly revised/updated. Company has representation on
international standards committees. Regular symposia held
by company.
Specific loss Company has its own process safety management system
prevention standards and work processes, which are regularly updated and
address the specific hazards of the plant. Regular symposia
held by company.
Natural perils All aspects are considered and documented, for example:
protection
• Flooding • Wind
• Rainfall/storms • Earthquake
• Electrical storms • Tidal waves

Process hazard Company has an active PHA program with a minimum scope
analysis (PHA) and frequency in line with international standards. PHA
review is embedded in change-management process.
Safety case High-quality submission that exceeds government
standards and is third-party verified.
In essence, external standards represent a minimum expectation, and the highest-

scoring sites demonstrate commitment, rather than just compliance, through the
development and application of their own standards.
For both gas processing plants and terminals/distribution, Marsh risk-ranking data
indicates there has been an overall deterioration in risk quality across all measured
areas (hardware, software, and emergency response) over the past 12 years.

FIGURE
4 Overall risk quality in terminals/distribution

deteriorated during 2008-19.
SOURCE: MARSH
For both gas Hardware
processing plants
and terminals/ 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
distribution, Poor Basic Average Good Excellent
Software
Marsh’s data
indicates there
has been a 0
Poor
0.5 1
Basic
1.5 2
Average
2.5 3
Good
3.5 4
Excellent
deterioration in Emergency Control
risk quality.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
2008-2011 2012-015 2016-2019
Deterioration in global risk ranking for terminals/distribution (each circle represents the average
score for the respective four-year period).
FIGURE
5 Overall risk quality in gas processing plants deteriorated

during 2008-19.
SOURCE: MARSH
Hardware
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

Software
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

Emergency Control
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

2008-2011 2012-2015 2016-2019

Deterioration in global risk ranking for gas processing plants (each circle represents the mean score
for the respective four-year period).

These two categories make up a relatively small portion of the 100LL, due to their
relatively lower concentration of value than refineries/petrochemical plants. However, US$
there have still been large property damage losses in these sectors over recent years.
For example, a fire at a tank farm in the US, in March 2019, resulted in the destruction
125M
of at least 12 of the 15 tanks on-site, and property damage amounting to roughly
US$125 million.
The size of the property damage
loss resulting from a fire at a tank
Although it is not possible to accurately forecast the number and scale of future farm in the US, in March 2019 —
losses, these findings raise the question of whether we will continue to see increased resulting in the destruction of at
frequency of losses unless swift action is taken. least 12 of the 15 tanks on-site.
Lessons Learnt
The past two years have seen several major losses from refineries and petrochemical
assets, particularly those of at least 50 years in age. One contributing factor might be
the observed reduction in global “engineering standards” at refineries over the past
12 years, which, in the case of the US, has been coupled with a shift towards lighter
regulation. Reduced regulation will always disproportionally affect higher-risk sites
that simply comply with requirements, rather than the most mature sites with a strong
commitment to process safety. Another factor in the loss history might be the recent oil
price and consequent continued higher utilization of refineries.
Although not as prevalent in the 100LL, terminals/distribution and gas processing

plants have also experienced large losses. This is perhaps not surprising, given the
overall deterioration in risk quality observed over the past decade. This degradation
may also prove to be a leading indicator of increased losses in the near future.
The very best sites, with the most mature process safety cultures, have consistently
shown it is possible to run a facility without losses across the duration of their lifespan,
and across a range of external regulatory standards and oil prices. It is vital the industry
heeds the warnings, understands the lessons, and embeds the learnings contained
within the 100LL. Otherwise the worst years may not be behind us.

CHAPTER 2
30 Years on:
Is History
Repeating Itself?
30 Years on: Is History
Repeating Itself?
The past two years have contributed more incidents
(four) to the top-20 largest losses than any other
two-year window for 30 years. Not since 1988-89
(when six of the largest losses occurred), has there
been such a high concentration of large losses.
FIGURE
6 An unusually high number of large losses occurred in

1988-89 and 2018-19.
US$ SOURCE: MARSH
2,088M
6
Number of Losses in 20 Largest Losses
The Piper Alpha explosion in the North 4

Sea, UK, 1988 — the largest industry
property damage loss of all time.
4
1 1 1 1 1
1988-89 1998-99 2000-01 2004-05 2008-09 2010-11 2014-15 2016-18 2018-19
Time Period
Thirty years on, it is worth reflecting on the major contributing factors for these very
large losses, and how they compare with recent events.
FIGURE
7
Thirty years Large
large losses,severe
losses
on, it is worth
and howthan
from 2018-19
reflecting
those 30
they compare
were
on the major
withyears
less numerous
contributing
recentearlier.
events.
factors for and
these very
SOURCE: MARSH
1988-1989 2018-2019
Loss Value Location Loss Value Location
(US$m)* (US$m)*
2,088 Piper Alpha, North Sea, UK 800 Jiangsu, China
1,615 Pasadena, Texas, US 750 Philadelphia, US
957 Gulf of Mexico, US 650 Wisconsin, US
811 Campos Basin, Brazil 600 Limbe, Cameroon
737 Nevada, US
708 Louisiana, US
*On basis of December 31, 2019.

Largest Losses in 1988-1989
It is instructive to differentiate between root causes and escalating factors, which can
be considered as the two sides of a bow-tie diagram: Root causes, if eliminated, would
have avoided the event altogether; escalating factors would have prevented the event
from growing to such magnitude.
There were
ROOT CAUSES
Systems of work
shortcomings
This includes permitting, management of change, and shift handover. There were
shortcomings in each of these three areas for the Piper Alpha incident (where there
in permitting,
was a release of condensate and subsequent explosion following the reinstatement
of a pump that had been out for maintenance, due to gaps in control of permits and
management
information transfer during handover. The incident was exacerbated by the original of change, and
platform being designed for oil rather than gas processing). There were key issues
associated with permitting for maintenance work at the Pasadena petrochemical shift handover for
plant (an accidental release of polyethylene resulting from inadequate isolation during
routine maintenance), and the Gulf of Mexico incident (release of hydrocarbon during the Piper Alpha
the installation of a pig trap on an export gas pipeline), and also with management of
change for Campos Basin (explosion during the conversion of a platform well from oil
incident.
to gas production).
Inspection
This includes internal corrosion on the FCC unit at Louisiana, resulting in a loss of
primary containment of propane, which caused a large vapor cloud explosion.
ESCAL ATING FAC TORS

Emergency response plan (ERPs)
The lack of adequate ERPs caused the initial incidents to escalate at Piper Alpha (the
platform evacuation plan relied largely on the use of a helipad, which was inaccessible
due to the smoke from the fire, and nearby multi-function support vessel struggled,
having never been tested in such extreme conditions); while at Campos Basin it took
over a month to control the resulting fire, compounding the cost of the incident.
Fire protection
At Piper Alpha the fire-water system was in manual prior to the incident, due to divers
being in the water, and this contributed to the incident. At Louisiana the refinery
immediately lost all utilities, including fire water and the four diesel fire pumps, greatly
limiting the firefighting effort for several hours. At Pasadena there was no dedicated
fire-water system, instead the process water system was relied upon, which lost
pressure following the explosion. The fire-water pumps failed when the resulting fires
damaged electrical cables and, of the three standby diesel pumps, one was under
maintenance and another ran out of fuel.

Largest Losses in 2018-2019
For the most recent incidents, the loss data is less readily available and in some cases
investigations are still ongoing; however, comparisons can still be drawn with the
events 30 years ago.
ROOT CAUSES
Inspection
At Philadelphia, it is thought that the rupture of a thinned pipe elbow installed around
1973 was the initiating event, which caused the major loss of primary containment,
resulting in a large fire and subsequent explosions.1 At Wisconsin it is believed that the
root cause was an FCCU spent catalyst slide valve, which was intended to be “provided
with erosion protection suitable for the design life at the design conditions,” but had
actually eroded and was unable to maintain the catalyst level required to prevent air
from mixing with hydrocarbons during transient operation.
Engineering standards
The ruptured Philadelphia pipe was reported to contain levels of copper and nickel that
US$ were permitted when it was originally installed, but not under recommendations made
800M 20 years later by the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM International).2
Although standards had moved on, the equipment at the plant reportedly had not.
The explosion in Jiangsu, China — the ESCAL ATING FAC TORS

largest petrochemical property Fire protection
damage loss since Pasadena 1989. The incident at Limbe began as a fire near a distillation unit on the refinery, which
escalated to a much larger explosion. More robust fixed-fire protection at site may
have reduced or prevented this escalation.
Emergency response plans

In all four incidents, the sites were not well prepared for the incidents that occurred.
Carefully considered and documented emergency plans, which are tested through
drills on a regular basis, can help to greatly reduce the eventual impact of an event
from the point at which it is initiated.
The most commonly cited risk recommendation topics by Marsh over the past few
years (see chart below), reinforce the view that the same issues are still observed today
as they were in 1988-1989.
FIGURE
8 Systems of work was the most frequently cited topic.

SOURCE: MARSH
Topics Frequency of Citation (%)

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
S.System of Work
Chemical Safety and Hazard
1 U.S.
Investigation Board, Fire and Explosions S. Inspection
at Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refinery H. Fireproofing
Hydrofluoric Acid Alkylation Unit.
S. Ergonomics & Operability

2 Ibid. ER. Maintenance/Testing Operability
ER. Fire Detection & Alarm/Testing Operability
ER. Fire Water System
ER. Emergency Plans
H. Engineering Standards
ER. Fixed Fire Protection

Barriers to Learning from Losses
Four key factors prevent lessons from being learnt from losses, and allow history to
repeat itself:
Distance
Regulation following a major incident is often enforced locally rather Siloed thinking
than globally, and consequently only, or at least mostly, affects local
awareness. At the same time, parties can be affected by closeness can cause
bias — feeling unconsciously less affected by events a long way away.
companies to
Culture imagine that
This can prevent lessons from being implemented effectively. Fear of
litigation/blame prevents open reporting of incidents and learnings an incident
within organizations, while difficulty challenging upwards in certain
cultures can prevent improvements being implemented. happening in a
Tunnel vision
different type
Some companies do not realize wider relevance of lessons. Siloed
thinking can cause companies to imagine that an incident happening
of facility does
in a different type of facility from their own does not provide not provide
applicable learnings.
applicable
Time
Lessons have been learnt, but have since been forgotten or solutions
learnings.
implemented are insufficiently robust. Given the 30 years that have
elapsed between the two-worst periods in terms of the 20-largest
losses, this would seem to be particularly significant. The lapse of
time can result in the following:
• Loss of experienced people.
• Loss of corporate memory — efficacy of safeguards put in place

following large losses eroded over time.
• Lack of understanding how risk can change with the age of

plant, including:
ɣ Creeping or subtle change that is not recognized.
ɣ Inherited problems if site changed ownership.
• Complacency — “Has worked fine for 20 years” — it can be

challenging to maintain focus in the workforce over several decades.
The industry must ensure that in 30 years’ time, we are not reflecting that the lessons
have still not been learnt. This will only be achieved with a continued focus on process
safety, and a commitment to learn from losses at all levels of an organization.

CHAPTER 3
Does Age
Really Matter?
IAN ROBB
Global head of risk engineering,
Liberty Specialty Markets

Does Age Really Matter?
With plants older than 30 years far more likely to
experience losses, the industry needs to look more closely
IAN ROBB at the risks of older refineries and petrochemical plants.
Global head of risk engineering,
Liberty Specialty Markets The onshore oil and gas sector has recently experienced a rise in the number of
Ian Robb is the global head of risk property damage losses per annum in excess of US$100 million. The period 2016-2019
engineering for Liberty Specialty was particularly poor, with property damage losses well in excess of US$300 million
Markets, and based in London. occurring at refineries in North America and Europe, all of which were originally built in
He is a chartered chemical the 1960s or earlier.
engineer, responsible for global
risk engineering activities in
support of Liberty’s underwriting
and claims teams within the energy,
FIGURE
property, heavy industry, and
construction product lines. 9 The number and total cost of property damage losses
have both risen in recent years.
Property damage loss data and SOURCE: LIBERTY SPECIALTY MARKETS
trends discussed in this article have
been extracted from the Liberty
Specialty Markets oil & gas loss
3,500 8
database, which has captured and
analyzed the cause of loss for the 3,000 7
Ground-up Property Damage Loss (US$m)
onshore oil and gas sector since

6
2000. Excluding natural catastrophe 2,500
events, the database has over 700 5

2,000
losses and serves as a valuable
Count
4
source of insight that supports 1,500
Liberty’s underwriting decisions. 3
1,000
2
1
500
1
0 0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Year
Cost of Losses Number of Losses
In the first 10 years of a plant’s operation, most losses are caused by operations-related
failures, such as not following operating or permit-to-work procedures (see figure
10). As plant operations experience develops, the number of losses reduces, until age
takes its toll and there is a steep rise in both loss frequency and magnitude in plants
more than 30-years-old, creating a skewed “bath-tub curve.”
In older plants, mechanical-integrity-related failures account for 65% of losses. Failure

of piping becomes increasingly more prevalent as plants age. (Overall, not accounting
for age of plant, piping failure accounts for 60% of mechanical integrity losses.)

FIGURE
10 Plants older than 30 years see most losses, with

maintenance and inspection failures the primary cause.
SOURCE: LIBERTY SPECIALTY MARKETS
7,000 140 As plants in

MENA and Asia-
Ground-up Property Damage Loss (US$m)
6,000 120
5,000 100
Pacific age, we
may see similarly
Count Total
4,000 80
shaped ‘bath-tub
3,000 60
2,000 40
1,000 20
curves’ develop.
0 0
< 10 Years 10-20 Years 20-30 Years >30 Years
Age of Plant
Operations Maintenance & Inspection Fire & Safety Design & Construction
Count Total
The largest number of losses have occurred in North America (see figure 11) followed
by Europe, Middle East/North Africa (MENA), and Asia-Pacific (excluding China).
FIGURE
11 North America experiences the largest number

of losses, which follow a “bath-tub” curve.
70
60
50
Number of Losses
40
30
20
10
0
< 10 Years 10-20 Years 20-30 Years >30 Years
Age of Plant
North America MENA Europe/FSU Asia-Pacific
The MENA and Asia-Pacific regions do not yet follow the traditional “bath-tub curve,”
primarily due to the younger age of their operating plants compared to Europe and
North America, which have similar shapes. As plants in the MENA and Asia-Pacific
regions age, we may see similarly shaped “bath-tub curves” develop.

The oil sector, principally refining (including Canadian Oil Sands), is the major industry
contributor to major losses (constituting 51% of all losses — see figure 12), with
the petrochemicals sector a distant second place (19%). This can at least partly be
attributed to the highly corrosive nature of crude feed-stocks and processes, which
presents challenges both to ensure that metallurgy is up to current standards and for
inspection departments.
The oil sector,
principally
FIGURE
refining, is the 12 Refining accounts for more than half of all losses during
2000-19.
major industry SOURCE: LIBERTY SPECIALTY MARKETS
contributor to
major losses.
9%
9% Refining
Petrochemicals
12% LOSSES BY 51% Chemicals

SEC TOR 2000 -19
Gas Processing
Terminals & Pipelines

19%
To draw any conclusions from a regional analysis, it is necessary to examine the size
of the refining fleets currently operating in those regions and their respective
age. Out of a current global operating refinery fleet of 652, there are 142 in North
America, and 137 in Europe/FSU, according to data from data provider Global Data
— so similar size fleets overall.
In terms of age distribution, it is harder to provide an exact correlation. However,

one measure to consider is the year in which each region achieved a benchmark of
50 operating refineries. For the US, this was 1930; Europe/FSU — 1955; Asia-Pacific
(excluding China) — 1976; and MENA — 1999.
There is a much higher incident rate for North America than for, say, the Asia-Pacific
region. Allowing for the difference in size of regional refinery fleets, it can be concluded
that North America has the oldest refineries globally, highest utilization rates, and
also the highest Nelson Complexity Index. These high-conversion refineries typically
process more corrosive crudes at more severe conditions and therefore operate in a
more challenging regime, often while also coupled with higher throughputs.

FIGURE
13 The incident rate is higher in North America than

other regions.
In order to
Region
North America
Refinery Loss Frequency
2.82 x 10 -2
prevent losses
Europe/FSU 2.03 x 10 -2 involving aging
Middle East/North Africa
Asia-Pacific
1.89 x 10 -2
1.42 x 10 -2
plant and
equipment
In summary, in order to prevent losses involving aging plant and equipment increasing, increasing,
implementation of an effective mechanical integrity program is vital. Ensuring best
practice metallurgy to current industry standards, inspection programs designed by implementation
qualified inspectors and corrosion engineers, along with accredited qualifications of
those conducting inspections are all essential requirements. of an effective
mechanical
integrity
program is vital.

CHAPTER 4
Organizational
Resilience: Turning
Uncertainty into
Opportunity

Organizational Resilience:
Turning Uncertainty into
Many energy Opportunity
companies’ With plants older than 30 years far more likely
business to experience losses, the industry needs to look
more closely at the risks of older refineries and
resilience petrochemical plants.
strategies
continue to lag. The past two years have seen a high number of large property damage losses across
the energy sector. Such losses can take a long time to recover from and can even
mark the end for a site. For example, the reported US$750 million loss in June 2019,
at a refinery in Philadelphia, resulted in the refinery closing shortly afterwards and the
operator ultimately filing for bankruptcy.
Business continuity and business interruption strategies are vital to mitigating an

event’s knock-on effects, costs, and ultimate severity. Yet many energy companies’
business resilience strategies — including their investment and implementation —
continue to lag. Some companies have mature emergency response functions, and
business interruption coverage, but have no formal procedures or plans relating to
crisis management, business resilience/continuity planning, or cyber resilience.
A 2018 Marsh study explored share and stock price volatility — over a 250 trading-day,
post-incident timeline — for a sample of listed companies that experienced high-
profile incidents in the past 10 years. All the companies received significant business
and financial media coverage. The findings showed that post-crisis, some companies
can benefit from a sustained 5% increase in share performance, while others lose
on average 12% of their value. The main reason for this difference? A holistically
implemented crisis management and incident response plan.
26 •100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974–2019

1974/2019
Implementing a risk and resilience program that anticipates, prepares for, responds
to, and adapts to internal and external events, regardless of the cause, requires the
following key attributes:
• Overall management commitment to and sponsorship of the organizational

resilience program.
• Strategic involvement of internal and external stakeholders in resilience and business

Post-crisis, some
continuity, including supply-chain resilience. companies can
• Proactive identification and control of risks.
benefit from a
• Flexible and agile supply chains, with sufficient alternative arrangements built in to
support fast changes to operating structures and processes.
sustained 5%
• Proactive management of internal and external communications, including media increase in share
response planning for post-crisis situations.
performance,
• Swift control of the situation — including taking ownership of the problem and the
solution, decisiveness, and being able to admit mistakes during crisis management. while others lose
• Transparent, honest, and frequent communication with stakeholders to build on average 12%
confidence.
of their value.
• Strong alignment between emergency response, crisis management, business
continuity, IT disaster recovery, IT, and operational technology cyber
response plans.
• Continuous improvement by embedding lessons learned.

CHAPTER 5
Graphics

FIGURE
The two largest-ever losses still date from the period 1988-89.
14 SOURCE: MARSH
2,500
2,000
Property Damage Loss (US$m, 2019 values)
1,500
1,000
500
0
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
FIGURE
Recent large losses occurred across the world.
15 SOURCE: MARSH
2,500
2,000
PHILADELPHIA, US VOHBURG, GERMANY
FIRE & EXPLOSION FIRE & EXPLOSION
US$750m US$495m JIANGSU, CHINA
1,500
WISCONSIN, US FIRE & EXPLOSION
FIRE & EXPLOSION US$800m
US$650m
1,000
500
0
/ 0 74
/ 0 76
/ 0 78
/ 0 80
/ 0 82
/ 0 84
/ 0 86
/ 0 88
/ 0 90
/ 0 92
/ 0 94
/ 0 96
/ 0 98
/ 0 00
/ 0 02
/ 0 04
/ 0 06
/ 0 08
/ 0 10
/ 0 12
/ 0 14
/ 0 16
18
LIMBE, CAMEROON
01 /19
01 /19
01 /19
01 /19
01 /19
01 /19
01 /19
01 /19
01 /19
01 /19
01 /19
01 /19
01 /19
01 /20
01 /20
01 /20
01 /20
01 /20
01 /20
01 /20
01 /20
01 /20
20
6/
06
FIRE & EXPLOSION

/
01
HOUSTON, US
US$600m
FIRE & EXPLOSION ARZEW, ALGERIA*
US$500m FIRE & EXPLOSION KOMO, PAPUA NEW GUINEA
US$400m EARTHQUAKE
*Loss value may reduce from initial estimate
US$335m
as further information becomes available.

FIGURE
Refining accounts for more than a third of 100LL during 1974-2019.
16 SOURCE: MARSH
5
6
Refining
Petrochemicals
24 NUMBER OF 39
INCIDENTS IN Upstream
100LL BY SECTOR Gas Processing
Terminal & Distributions
26
FIGURE
Upstream accounts for an inordinate number of very high-value losses during 1974-2019.
17 SOURCE: MARSH
1,320
3,175
Refining
14,780
VALUE OF Petrochemicals
INCIDENTS IN Upstream
13,187
100LL BY SECTOR
Gas Processing
(US$M)
Terminal & Distributions
10,702

FIGURE
Most 100LL occurred in North America or Europe.
18 SOURCE: MARSH
PHILADELPHIA, US
FIRE & EXPLOSION
WISCONSIN, US
US$750m
FIRE & EXPLOSION
US$650m NORTH SEA, NORWAY
COLLISION
US$967m
LOUISIANA, US
EXPLOSION, VCE
US$708m NORTH SEA, UK
FIRE & EXPLOSION
US$2,088m
TEXAS, US
FIRE & EXPLOSION
US$1,615m
TOULOUSE, FRANCE
NEVADA, US
EXPLOSION
EXPLOSION
US$779m
US$737m
GULF OF MEXICO, US
FIRE & EXPLOSION
US$957m
SKIKDA, ALGERIA
EXPLOSION
US$736m
LIMBE, CAMEROON
BAY OF CAMPECHE, MEXICO FIRE & EXPLOSION
FIRE US$600m
US$737m
GULF OF MEXICO, US CAMPOS BASIN, BRAZIL

FIRE BLOWOUT
US$685m US$811m
CAMPOS BASIN, BRAZIL

EXPLOSION
US$905m

REFINERIES TERMINAL & DISTRIBUTION GAS PROCESSING
PETROCHEMICALS UPSTREAM
MINA AL-AHMADI, KUWAIT

FIRE & EXPLOSION
US$766m
JIANGSU, CHINA
FIRE & EXPLOSION
ABU DHABI, UAE
US$800m
FIRE & EXPLOSION
US$1,000m+
SENDAI, JAPAN
FIRE & EXPLOSION
US$691m
VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA
EXPLOSION
US$865m
Each figure included in this chart denotes the property damage

loss, adjusted to 2019 values.

CHAPTER 6
100 Largest Losses
Descriptions
36 Refineries
50 Petrochemicals
60 Gas Processing
64 Terminals & Distribution
68 Upstream

Refineries
There have been a number of large refinery losses over
the past two years. Four losses were large enough to
Three quarters of qualify for the 100LL (for which the threshold is US$175
million), and several more were in excess of US$100
recent property million. This is a continuing trend since the early 2000s
damage refinery and refinery losses now make up 39% of the 100LL.
losses in excess The worldwide group of oil refineries is, with some notable exceptions, a group of aging
of US$100 million assets, and 75% of recent property damage losses in excess of US$100 million occurred
at sites built in the 1960s or earlier. Older assets have often been subject to both
occurred at sites expansion projects to increase capacity, and retrospective installation of high-value,
high-conversion assets; together these have resulted in higher concentration
built in the 1960s of value at sites.
or earlier. Refineries process crude oil and therefore have a far more dynamic and broad
feedstock range than the other asset classes. Many sites also push their crude oil
processing envelopes to maximize operating margin: Relatively low crude oil prices
Fire & Explosion in recent years have contributed to positive refining margins, in turn resulting in high
global refinery utilization.
Explosion The combination of aging assets, increased concentration of value, and diverse
feedstocks are likely to have contributed to the increasing frequency and magnitude
of losses in this sector.
Fire
Mechanical Failure FIGURE

Large refinery losses have become more frequent
19 since 2000.
Natural Catastrophe SOURCE: MARSH
1,200
1,000
800
Loss (US$m)
600
400
200
0
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
Year

ADJUSTED ACTUAL PROPERTY
PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS UAE | 01/11/2017
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
1,000+ / 1,000 M M
A release of hot light hydrocarbon during the completion of a maintenance activity
resulted in a major fire. The fire occurred on a residual fluid catalytic cracking (RFCC)
unit that had recently been commissioned as part of a major expansion, doubling the
overall refinery capacity. The fire resulted in the closure of the expanded area of the
refinery while extensive rebuilding activity was delivered.
MINA AL-AHMADI, KUWAIT | 06/25/2000
766 / 412 M M
The explosion occurred when employees were attempting to isolate a leak on
a condensate line between an off-site NGL plant and the refinery gas plant.
Three crude units were damaged and two reformers were destroyed. The fire was
extinguished approximately nine hours after the initial explosion. Five people were
killed and 50 others were injured. The investigation into the loss indicated a lack of
inspection and maintenance of the condensate line, which was not owned by the
refinery. Lack of clear understanding of the ownership of the line is thought to have
delayed the isolation of the line.
PHILADELPHIA, US | 06/21/2019
750 / 750 M M
A major loss of primary containment on the hydrofluoric acid alkylation unit at the
refinery resulted in a large fire and subsequent explosions. It is thought that the rupture
of a thinned pipe elbow installed around 1973 caused the process fluid release. The
refinery closed shortly after the incident and the operator filed for bankruptcy.
NORCO, LOUISIANA, US | 05/05/1988
708 / 288 M M
Operations were normal in a 90,000 bbl/d fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) unit, when
internal corrosion caused the failure of the outside radius of an eight-inch diameter
carbon steel elbow, located 50 feet above grade in the depropanizer column overhead
piping system. An estimated 20,000lb of C3 hydrocarbons escaped through the
resulting hole, forming a large vapor cloud during the 30 seconds between failure
and ignition. Both the depropanizer column (operating at 270 psi and 130 ºF) and the
depropanizer accumulator depressurized through the opening. Ignition of the vapor
cloud was probably caused by the FCC charge heater.
The initial blast destroyed the FCC control building and toppled the 26-foot diameter
main fractionator from its 15-foot high concrete pedestal. The column separated from
its 10-foot high skirt before falling. Analysis of bolt stretching of towers in the blast path
indicated over pressures as high as 10 psi.
The refinery immediately lost all utilities, including fire water and the four diesel fire
pumps, greatly limiting the fire-fighting effort for several hours. Steam pressure
dropped abruptly due to severed lines. Twenty major line or vessel failures occurred
in the FCC and elsewhere throughout the 215,000 bbl/d refinery. Blast damage
throughout the plant was extensive, but was most severe in the FCC unit. About 5,200
property claims were received for off-site damage at distances of up to six miles. The
FCC unit was eventually demolished and a new unit was constructed.
*Based on December 31, 2019, values.

ADJUSTED ACTUAL PROPERTY A preliminary report stated that the failed elbow was located downstream of an
PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS injection point, where ammoniated water was added to reduce depropanizer
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
condensation or fouling. The elbow was a designated inspection point in the overhead
piping system for taking ultrasonic thickness measurements during turnarounds.
These inspections had constantly shown the expected corrosion rates of 0.05 mils per
year. Measurements taken at the failed elbow and in the downstream piping after the
explosion revealed unexpected, high localized corrosion rates.
SENDAI, JAPAN | 03/11/2011
691 / 590 M M
A major explosion occurred at a 145,000 bpd refinery in the north-eastern city of
Sendai, hours after the largest earthquake in the country’s history was followed by
a tsunami. The fire at the refinery originated from an oil product shipping facility.
Workers at the refinery were being evacuated, and there was no capacity to extinguish
the fire. Fire in the storage and shipping facilities resulted in damage to a 35,500 bpd
fluid catalytic cracker (FCC) at the refinery.
WISCONSIN, US | 04/26/2018
650 / 650 M M
An explosion and subsequent fire at the refinery resulted in injuries to 36 people,
and the evacuation of a large portion of the nearby town of Superior, Wisconsin. The
incident occurred when the site fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU), was taken offline
for planned maintenance.
It is believed that the FCCU spent catalyst slide valve had eroded and was
unable to maintain the catalyst level required to prevent air from mixing with
hydrocarbons during the transient operation. As a result, air flowed backwards
from the regenerator into the reactor, and then into other downstream equipment
— triggering a large explosion.
The explosion blew debris across the plant and one piece punctured a nearby large
above-ground storage tank — resulting in the release of around 15,000 barrels of hot
asphalt that subsequently ignited and caused a large fire.
LIMBE, CAMEROON | 05/31/2019
600 / 600 M M
A fire and subsequent explosion near the distillation unit on the refinery resulted in the
whole site’s shutdown, which is expected to last up to 12 months.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS ROMEOVILLE, ILLINOIS, US | 07/23/1984
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
515 / 191 M M
Just prior to the rupture of a 55-foot-tall, 8.5-foot-diameter monoethanolamine
absorber column, a refinery operator noted a six-inch-long horizontal crack at a
circumferential weld that was leaking propane. As the operator attempted to close the
inlet valve, the crack spread to about 24 inches. The area was being evacuated and the
plant fire brigade was arriving when the column failed. Propane at 200 psig and 100ºF
propelled most of the 20 ton vessel 3,500 feet, where it struck and toppled a 138,000-
volt power transmission tower.
The weld separation occurred along a lower girth weld joint made during repairs to the
column 10 years earlier. The vessel was constructed of one-inch-thick ASTM SA 516
Gr 70 steel plates rolled and welded with full penetration submerged arc joints, but
without post-weld heat treatment.
The explosion resulted in severe fires in the unsaturated gas plant, as well as fires in the
fluid catalytic cracker (FCC) and the alkylation units. After about 30 minutes, a boiling
liquid expanding vapor explosion occurred in a large process vessel in the alkylation
unit. A piece of the vessel travelled 500 feet, shearing off pipelines before striking a
tank in the water treatment unit. Another fragment landed in a unifining unit over 600
feet away, causing a major fire.
The first explosion, believed to be from a vapor cloud, broke windows up to six
miles from the plant. The explosion also caused extensive structural damage to
refinery service buildings and disrupted all electric power at the refinery, rendering a
2,500-US-gallons-per-minute (US gpm) electric fire pump inoperable. One explosion
sheared off a hydrant barrel, resulting in reduced fire water pressure from the two
2,500-US-gpm diesel-engine-driven fire pumps, which were operating at the time.
The refinery’s blast resistant control center, approximately 400 feet northeast of the
absorber, sustained little structural damage.
An estimated 30 paid and volunteer public fire departments, together with equipment
from refineries and chemical plants within a 20 mile radius, responded promptly. Many
of the pumpers took suction from the adjoining canal and from a quarry. The pumpers
and a 12,000-US-gpm pump on a fireboat eventually provided water at pressures
sufficient for fire fighting.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS LA MEDE, FRANCE | 11/09/1992
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
504 / 225 M M
A vapor cloud explosion occurred in the gas plant associated with the 29,700 bbl/d
fluid catalytic cracker (FCC) unit on a 136,000 bbl/d refinery.
The initial vapor cloud explosion and several subsequent lesser explosions could be
heard in Marseilles, approximately 18 miles away. An estimated 11,000 pounds of light
hydrocarbons were involved in the initial explosion.
A gas detection system in the FCC unit sounded an alarm indicating a major gas leak.
While the unit operator was contacting the security service to warn of this situation, the
initial explosion occurred. The initial gas release is believed to have resulted from a pipe
rupture in the gas plant, which was used to recover butane and propane produced in
the FCC unit.
The explosions and subsequent fires devastated about two hectares of the refinery,
which covers about 250 hectares. The gas plant, FCC unit, and associated control
building were destroyed by the incident. Two new process units, which were
under construction and scheduled to come into operation in 1993, were seriously
damaged. Roofs were damaged in the nearby town of Chateauneuf les Martigues
and windows were broken within a radius of 3,000 feet. Some windows were
broken up to six miles away.
The refinery fire brigade and over 250 firemen from three neighboring industrial sites
and four nearby towns were used for more than six hours to bring the incident under
control. Approximately 37,000 US gallons of foam concentrate were used during the
fire-fighting effort. Some fires were intentionally left burning after the incident was
under control to allow safe depressurizing of the process units, since the flare system
was partially damaged by the explosions.
VOHBURG, GERMANY | 09/01/2018
495 / 495 M M
A hydrocarbon release occurred from a reactor vessel on a naphtha hydrotreater unit.
The vessel operated at around 25 bar and 140 degrees C. The release of hot naphtha
and hydrogen created a vapor cloud that ignited, leading to an explosion and fire. It is
understood that the explosion caused further releases from other parts of the plant,
including a nearby diesel hydrotreater, which contributed to the fire.
Eight on-site employees were injured, but there were no fatalities. Residents of a nearby
town were evacuated as a precaution. Several hundred firefighters were reportedly
deployed to control the fire.
Some refinery process units were extensively damaged as a result of the explosion
and fire, as well as multiple office and maintenance buildings within the refinery site.
Windows in a village at least 3km away were broken. The initial release of hydrocarbon
was understood to have occurred as a result of a 1.5-meter crack that opened up in the
reactor vessel. The root cause of the vessel failure is not yet fully understood.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS BIG SPRING, TEXAS, US | 02/18/2008
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
483 / 380 M M
An explosion at this 70,000 bbl/d oil refinery caused damage to the fluid catalytic
cracker (FCC) utilities, storage tanks, and asphalt unit. An employee was hospitalized
for burns, while another person was injured when her car was struck by debris from the
explosion on the nearby highway. There were four injuries in total. Only 40 people were
on-site because the explosion occurred on a public holiday (there would typically have
been about four times as many people on duty). The fire was brought under control the
same day by the site fire brigade, supported by local fire departments.
The release is believed to have occurred during a start-up on the propylene splitter unit,
as a result of the catastrophic failure of a pump. Some processing resumed about two
months later and the FCC was re-commissioned eight months after the incident.
FORT MCKAY, ALBERTA, CANADA | 01/06/2011
451 / 385 M M
An explosion occurred on an oil sands upgrader site north of Fort McMurray, Alberta.
Five workers were injured in the blast, including one who received third-degree burns.
A subsequent fire occurred at the top of one of the site’s four coke drums and burned
for nearly four hours. As a result, two of the coke drums were disabled. Workers
returned to work to normal shifts the following morning. Most damage was sustained
above the cutting deck and derrick infrastructure of the coke drum.
At the time of the incident the plant was operating on bypass conditions due to process
upsets. An internal investigation team determined that the fire resulted from the
opening of the top unheading valve on an active low-pressure coke drum. This allowed
hot hydrocarbons to be released within the coker cutting deck building and was
followed by ignition leading to the explosion and fire.
Exceptionally cold weather following the incident hampered efforts to gain access
to the coker unit’s cutting deck, due to the deluge protection in this area. Additional
damage as a result of the fire fighting in freezing conditions also occurred.
LEMONT, ILLINOIS, US | 08/14/2001
422 / 233 M M
The 160,000 bbl/d capacity refinery was shut down due to a pool fire as a result of
a pipework release on the crude distillation unit. Three days later the crude column
suffered a structural failure due to an internal fire caused by air ingress from the
previously ruptured pipework reacting with pyrophoric material and oil in the column.
The crude distillation unit was shut down for 12 months. The cause of the initial pool fire
was due to incorrect piping material specification in one elbow, which failed.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS ST CROIX, VIRGIN ISLANDS | 09/18/1989
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
399 / 167 M M
Hurricane Hugo struck the refinery, causing extensive damage to 14 of the 500,000-
600,000 bbl storage tanks in the tank-farm area, the administration building, and the
company housing. The damage to process units, which were idled in preparation for
the hurricane, was limited to the asbestos insulation on process columns and piping.
A maximum wind speed of 192 mph was reported for the hurricane before the wind
speed measuring device at the St. Croix airport was damaged.
Because of the damaged asbestos insulation, approximately 1,500 company employees

and contractors worked every day for 15 weeks, to remove the asbestos debris from the
refinery at a substantial extra expense.
KORFEZ, GULF OF IZMIT, TURKEY | 08/17/1999
385 / 200 M M
An earthquake measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale caused a collapse of a 312-feet-high
concrete chimney on one of the crude units, setting off fires at the 226,000 bbl/d
refinery. Fires also broke out on on-site storage tanks. The process teams successfully
isolated and tackled the crude unit fire. Fires on the tank farm were allowed to burn
themselves out after storage tanks were pumped out as much as possible. Due to
broken water mains, fire-fighting efforts were limited to attempts by aircraft to drop
chemicals on the fires. The US and many other countries sent foam supplies, personnel,
and equipment to fight the fires. Damage to the refinery included a total loss of six
storage tanks, while another four storage tanks were deformed, and 50% damage
to other floating roof tanks. Damage to process units included the fire on the crude
distillation unit, and damage to a reformer and several connecting pipelines.
FALCON STATE, VENEZUELA | 08/25/2012
382 / 330 M M
A powerful explosion occurred in an area of pressured propane and butane storage at
the refinery. At least 48 people were killed and more than 80 injured. The explosion hit
an area of storage tanks, damaging nine tanks. It was reported that there had been a
significant number of leaks at the refinery in the previous year.
PASCAGOULA, MISSISSIPPI, US | 09/01/1998
371 / 190 M M
The entire refinery was shut down for three months after being struck by Hurricane
Georges. The hurricane left the entire plant submerged under more than four feet of
salt water from the Gulf of Mexico. Although the hurricane was only a Category 2 storm,
its slow movement subjected the refinery to 17 hours of high wind and rain. The storm
surge overtopped the dikes built to protect the refinery. Approximately 2,100 motors,
1,900 pumps, 8,000 instrument components, 280 turbines, and 200 miscellaneous
machinery items required replacement or extensive rebuilding. Newer control
buildings and electrical substations sustained little or no damage, as they had been
built with their ground floors elevated approximately five feet above grade.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS SODEGAURA, JAPAN | 10/16/1992
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
361 / 161 M M
An explosion and subsequent fire resulted in significant property damage at the
146,500 bbl/d refinery. The explosion occurred following a heat exchanger failure in
the hydrodesulfurization unit for light oil. The channel cover and lock ring of a breech
lock closure type heat exchanger were hurled into an adjacent factory, which was
located approximately 650 feet from the plant. The channel cover and lock ring were
each five feet in diameter, and weighed 4,000lb and 2,000lb, respectively.
The hydrodesulfurization unit was being restarted following catalyst exchange work,
when plant personnel noticed hydrocarbon being released from the heat exchanger.
Plant personnel were working to complete the additional tightening work required on
the heat exchanger bolts, due to thermal expansion, when the explosion occurred. The
subsequent fire was brought under control in two hours, 45 minutes, by fire fighters
using 15 fire trucks.
TEXAS CITY, TEXAS, US | 03/23/2005
298 / 200 M M
Fifteen people were killed and 105 injured following an explosion at the 460,000 bbl/d
refinery. The explosion occurred in the isomerization unit, which was being restarted
following its annual major maintenance turnaround. Loss of control of the restart of the
isomerization unit resulted in one of the unit’s splitter columns becoming full of light
hydrocarbon. Eventually, hot liquid was released from the column through relief valves
to a 30-meter-high blowdown stack on the unit. The release generated a large vapor
cloud in the unit’s vicinity. Some temporary buildings supporting planned turnaround
activity on another unit were located near to the blowdown stack; many of the fatalities
were attending a meeting in these buildings when the vapor cloud found a source of
ignition and exploded.
SANNAZZARO DE BURGONDI, ITALY | 01/12/2016
298 / 250 M M
A major fire broke out on a refinery processing unit designed to convert heavy oil
residues into refined products, resulting in serious damage to the plant.
WICKLAND, ARUBA | 04/09/2001
288 / 159 M M
An oil spill occurred due to a failure of a block valve to seat properly during maintenance
on a pump strainer in the visbreaker unit. The oil auto-ignited and the ensuing fire
spread and destroyed the visbreaker and damaged adjacent equipment. Subsequent
explosions and heat restricted fire-fighting access; insufficient fire-brigade personnel,
and damage to the firewater distribution system, further hindered extinguishing the
fire. The fire was spread by the firewater application, and finally extinguished with help
from the local fire department.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS LA PLATA DISTRICT, ENSENADA, ARGENTINA | 04/02/2013
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
280 / 225 M M
A fire broke out in the 188,000 bpd refinery, caused by flash-floods during heavy
rain. The rain overwhelmed the storm drainage system on the refinery, resulting in
hydrocarbons being washed out of the drains and around the site. An explosion was
reported in the crude distillation unit (CDU). There were two fires in the CDU, one in
the coking plant, and two in the topping distillation plant. The government agency said
the incident was caused by hydrocarbons exploding in one of the coke manufacturing
furnaces, which had been shut but were still hot enough to ignite the hydrocarbon.
It took eight hours to extinguish the fire and ten hours before the incident was under
control. The oil company said there were no fatalities or injuries.
TEXAS, US | 09/12/2008
280 / 220 M M
The 365,000 bbl/d refinery sustained severe damage as Hurricane Ike passed through
the Houston area, with related flooding due to storm surge as far away as Louisiana.
Hurricane Ike had an unusually large storm surge, which inundated the refinery.
FORT MCMURRAY, ALBERTA, CANADA | 01/04/2005
279 / 187 M M
A fire broke out at the oil sands refinery in upgrader 2, an area of the plant that converts
bitumen into crude oil products. Around 250 people were evacuated from the plant and
no injuries were reported. The fire burned for nine hours before being extinguished.
Witnesses reported two explosions minutes apart that sent a fireball six stories high
into the air. The plant also suffered ice damage from water used to fight the fire, as
temperatures in the area fell below -35 °C. A ruptured recycle line was the most likely
cause of the fire.
PASCAGOULA, MISSISSIPPI, US | 08/16/2007
272 / 200 M M
A fire broke out in a crude unit number 2 of a 325,000 bbl/d refinery and burned for
over six hours. No injuries were reported. Company officials said a major portion
of the refinery was able to continue operating. The refinery’s number 1 crude unit
remained operational.
229 / 137 M M
The incident occurred at an oil sands facility, with minor explosions occurring in the
froth treatment plant. Damage appeared mainly limited to electrical cables in the
solvent recovery area. The fire’s cause appears to have been a hydrocarbon leak in
piping. The plant’s emergency response team was assisted by the local fire brigade,
with the fire extinguished in two hours. Only one minor injury was reported. The
incident occurred eight days after the new facility began operating.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS PORT OF MOHAMMEDIA, MOROCCO | 11/22/2002
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
226 / 130 M M
Following torrential rain, rising floodwater brought waste oil floating on the surface
into contact with hot equipment on the refinery — causing explosions and a fire.
A second blaze broke out and several storage tanks reportedly caught fire and
exploded. Damage to the refinery was extensive and two people were killed, with a
further three reported missing. Later reports said the fire had affected two or three
production units. The processing units affected were the crude unit, the 20,000
bbl/d vacuum distillation unit, the 24,000 bbl/d catalytic reformer unit, and the
24,000 bbl/d distillate hydrotreater. At the time it was stated that units unaffected by
the fire would restart within 15 days, although other units would be inoperative for a
further eight to twelve months.
TEXAS CITY, TEXAS, US | 05/30/1978
224 / 55 M M
A failure led to the release of light hydrocarbons that dispersed and found an ignition
source. An intense fire followed in the tank farm. After less than five minutes, a 5,000
bbl storage sphere failed, resulting in a large fireball and rocketing pieces of the sphere
throughout the plant. Within 20 minutes, five 1,000 bbl horizontal vessels, four 1,000
bbl vertical vessels, and one additional 5,000 bbl sphere failed, either as a result of
missile damage or a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion. Pieces of the tanks
traveled in all directions, falling into various operating units and tank farms, starting
more fires. Fragments also hit the firewater storage tank and electric fire pumps,
leaving only the two diesel fire pumps operational.
RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA, US | 25/03/1999
218 / 113 M M
The explosion was caused by the failure of a valve bonnet in a high-pressure section of
a 60,000 bbl/d hydrocracker. A vapor cloud formed from the release, ignited, and was
followed by a large fire fed by escaping hydrocarbons at high pressure. The explosion
resulted in the collapse of a large section of pipe rack and destruction of a large fin-fan
cooler mounted above the rack. Many pumps were destroyed and a separator was
badly damaged. Around 300 fire fighters and 33 fire trucks worked for two-and-a-
half-hours to control the fire. Foam concentrate consumed totaled 3,200 US gal. The
hydrocracker was out of service for 12 months.
CARSON, CALIFORNIA, US | 04/23/2001
217 / 120 M M
A piping leak resulted in a fire in this refinery coker unit. Smoke rose to over 3,000 feet,
and the coker was shut down for about two months.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA, US | 04/10/1989
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
215 / 90 M M
A two-inch diameter line carrying hydrogen gas at 3,000 psi failed at a weld, resulting
in a high-pressure hydrogen fire. The fire resulted in flame impingement on the calcium
silicate insulation of the skirt for a 100-feet-high reactor in a hydrocracker unit. The
reactor’s steel skirt, which was between 10 and 12 feet in diameter and had a wall
thickness of 7 inches, subsequently failed. The falling reactor damaged air coolers and
other process equipment, greatly increasing the size of the loss.
At the time of the loss, the Hydrocracker unit was being shut down for maintenance and
the reactor was in a hydrogen purge cycle. The initial hydrogen leak is believed to have
resulted from the failure of an elbow to reducer weld in the two inch diameter hydrogen
preheat exchanger by-pass line.
RYAZAN, RUSSIA | 08/07/1994
212 / 100 M M
The event occurred on a crude unit at the 360,000 bbl/d refinery. A furnace was
under maintenance when a worker performed a hot cut and material was released.
Inadequate flushing and blinding, and a work scope that did not meet normal industry
practices, appear the likely causes.
205 / 75 M M
Erosion failure in a 10-inch diameter slurry recycle oil line, in an 82,000 bbl/d fluid bed
coking unit, released liquids close to their auto-ignition temperature. A vapor cloud
covering a large area ignited almost immediately, resulting in a ground fire covering
a large area that led to the failure of six or seven additional lines. The fire eventually
extended over a 150-feet diameter area, with damage in the unit structure up to a
height of more than 100 feet.
Metallurgical examination revealed that a 1.8-inch-long piece of carbon steel pipe had
inadvertently been inserted into the slurry recycle line, made of 5% chrome, during an
earlier metals inspection.
The reactor fractionator, light gas-oil stripper, 15,000hp air blower, pumps, and pipe
racks were severely damaged or destroyed.
About 2,700 barrels of hydrocarbon liquids were released from process equipment
during the fire. Much of this was by gravity flow from ruptured lines although pumps,
which could not be shut down, contributed much of the flow. A 900 psig steam line
that supplied the turbine drivers of the compressors, ruptured, hampering fire-
fighting efforts.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS MAZEIKIU, LITHUANIA | 10/12/2006
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
204 / 143 M M
The fire on the vacuum distillation unit (VDU) weakened the main vacuum distillation
column supports, allowing it to collapse onto the heat exchange train. The VDU was
shut down completely, and the refinery was left running at a much reduced capacity.
An investigation found the fire was caused by a leak from a branch on the column,
which was fabricated from incorrect material.
PRIOLO GARGALLO, SICILY, ITALY | 10/13/2008
191 / 150 M M
An explosion and fire in a 562MW-capacity integrated gasification combined
cycle electricity generating plant at a refinery caused a fire in the gasification unit.
No one was injured by the explosion and fire, but the loss resulted in the refinery’s
temporary closure.
SOHAR, OMAN | 03/11/2013
187 / 150 M M
The refinery suffered a fire in a wet-gas scrubber while conducting a planned shutdown
and maintenance of the plant equipment, including the polypropylene plant. Personnel
were evacuated from the site and there were no injuries.
PULAU BUKOM, SINGAPORE | 09/28/2011
176 / 150 M M
A fire broke out on the refinery, reportedly started in a pump-house used for blending
refined products as it was being prepared for maintenance. Site fire fighters were
supported by state fire authority forces. Non-essential staff were evacuated from the
site and neighboring units were shut down as a precaution. Further fire eruptions and
explosions were reported the next morning. The company commenced steps to shut
down the whole refinery. The fire was reported as extinguished late in the evening
of the second day — about 34 hours after the fire was first reported. The refinery’s
production units were progressively restarted, with all units back in production by the
end of 2011.
Manufacturing site on Pulau

Bukom Island.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS ABIDJAN, IVORY COAST | 01/03/2017
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
175 / 175 M M
A hydrogen leak on a reactor ignited causing a fire in the hydrocracking distillation unit
87, causing extensive damage to the main reactor. No fatalities were declared.
WILMINGTON, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, US | 10/08/1992
175 / 78 M M
An explosion originating in the hydrogen processing unit occurred in the 75,000
bbl/d refinery. The explosion and subsequent fires caused extensive damage to the
hydrocracker, hydrodesulphurisation, and hydrogen processing units. The fires were
fueled by hydrocarbons released from the damaged process column and equipment.
The explosion damaged nearby buildings and shattered windows several miles away.
It was recorded as a “sonic boom” at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena,
approximately 20 miles from the refinery.
The explosion resulted from the rupture of the outside radius of a six-inch diameter
carbon-steel 90° elbow, and the release of a hydrocarbon-hydrogen mixture to the
atmosphere. The vapor cloud ignited within seconds of the rupture. There were no out-
of-range or warning indications, until after the failure of the pipe elbow. An inspection
afterwards found the line at nearly full design thickness a short distance away the
failure; on these facts, it was concluded that the line failure was the result of the
thinning of the carbon steel elbow due to long term erosion/corrosion.
The fire-fighting effort was coordinated by the refinery emergency response team,
with the Los Angeles City and Los Angeles County fire departments using the joint
incident command system. The refinery emergency response team placed booms in
the Dominguez Channel storm drain, to stop oily water run-off generated by the fire-
fighting effort from reaching the Los Angeles Harbour. The fire was finally extinguished
after three days.
The refinery’s gasoline production was reduced to 35,000 bbl/d (approximately 70%
of rated capacity), until repairs to the damaged process units were completed.

Petrochemicals
Property damage losses at petrochemical plants
account for 26% of the 100LL. The major explosion
There has been a at the fertilizer and pesticides plant at the Chenjiagang
Chemical Industry Park in China, in 2019, is the
fairly infrequent largest petrochemical property damage loss since
occurrence of Pasadena 1989.
losses in the There are no significant trends identifiable, and there has been a steady, fairly
sector since the infrequent occurrence of losses in the sector since the early 2000s.
early 2000s. That said, a number of factors contribute to petrochemical plants loss history. They
often contain a concentration of high-value equipment and machinery, typically
operate at high temperatures and pressures, and require the careful control of violent
chemical reactions. On the other hand, materials processed at petrochemical plants
have normally been pre-processed (for example, supplied by oil refineries), meaning
Fire & Explosion that most contaminants in the feedstocks will have been removed prior to receipt,
making them less susceptible to several corrosion mechanisms.
Explosion
Fire FIGURE
Pasadena in 1989 remains by far the largest
20 petrochemical property damage loss.
Mechanical Failure SOURCE: MARSH
1,800
Natural Catastrophe
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
Loss (US$m)
800
600
400
200
0
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2019
2007
2010
2013
2016
Year

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS PASADENA, TEXAS, US | 10/23/1989
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
1,615 / 675 M M
A large flow of ethylene and isobutane was released from one of the high density
polyethylene (HDPE) units at a chemical complex. The vapor cloud drifted north toward
the center of the HDPE process area before ignition. This is believed to have occurred
approximately 60 seconds after the release. The explosion had the strength of a 3.5
magnitude (Richter scale) earthquake.
The explosion destroyed two HDPE units, which included a total of eight particle
form, loop reactor trains. The explosion’s heat caused boiling liquid expanding
vapor explosions of nearby pressurized storage tanks. Other process units at the
chemical complex sustained only minor damage and resumed normal production
within a few weeks.
The initial release of ethylene and isobutane occurred through an eight-inch diameter
ball valve a settling leg of one of the loop reactors. The function of these pneumatic
valves is to isolate the settling leg and other downstream equipment from the reactor
for maintenance. The company maintenance procedures for opening a settling leg
included closing the ball valve, inserting a lock-out device into this closed valve,
closing the block valves to the air hoses for the valve operator, and disconnecting
these air hoses.
Company personnel confirmed that these maintenance procedures were performed

two days before the loss, but maintenance work had not commenced due to changes
in priorities. The work on the settling leg was started on Monday, October 23.
After the explosion, investigations indicated that the lock-out device had been removed
from the valve and the air hoses had been reconnected to the valve operator on
settling leg. The valve was found in the open position and the settling leg was open
to atmosphere at the bottom of the leg, where a swedge/reducer spool leading to the
product take-off valve should have been connected.
CHENJIAGANG CHEMICAL INDUSTRY PARK, CHINA | 03/21/2019
800 / 800 M M
A major explosion occurred at the chemical plant, which is located within an industrial
park area and understood to produce fertilizers and pesticides.
The force of the blast started numerous fires in the local town and knocked down
several buildings. Considerable damage was caused to nearby factories and offices;
the roof of another chemical factory, around 3km from the explosion, reportedly fell in.
Windows were reportedly blown out up to 6km away from the explosion, and houses and
other buildings were damaged in the nearby village-level administrative divisions. It is
understood the explosion was strong enough that it registered on earthquake sensors
and could be seen by satellites. The blast created a crater resulting in a magnitude 2.2
seismic shock, with over 900 firefighters required to get the fire under control.
It is understood that nearly 80 people were killed and around 640 people injured as a
result of the incident.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS TOULOUSE, FRANCE | 09/21/2001
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
779 / 430 M M
A large explosion occurred in an ammonium nitrate storage warehouse of a fertilizer
plant, just outside Toulouse, which contained approximately 300 tons of off-
specification ammonium nitrate crystals. The explosion had the strength of a 3.2
magnitude (Richter Scale) earthquake, left most of the plant in ruins and damaged
surrounding areas. Thirty people were killed in the blast and approximately 3,000
people were injured.
HENDERSON, NEVADA, US | 05/04/1988
737 / 300 M M
An explosion at a plant that manufactured ammonium perchlorate (AP) for rocket fuel
flattened the local industrial park, left a crater 125 meters across, and cracked walls
15 miles away. Two people were killed. The cause is thought to be a fire in a batch
dryer. The initial explosion was equivalent to 108 ton of TNT, with a second explosion
four minutes later equivalent to 235 ton of TNT. Approximately half the buildings in the
nearby town of Henderson were destroyed. A natural gas pipeline running under the
plant was ruptured in the event and burned for a week.
PAMPA, TEXAS, US | 11/14/1987
549 / 215 M M
An explosion occurred in an air-line in a reactor, used for the liquid phase oxidation of
butane, as it was being started. The explosion ruptured the external portion of the
air-line to the reactor, allowing the reactor’s contents to vaporize and form a cloud.
The vapor cloud drifted and ignited about 25 to 30 seconds after the initial release.
The vapor cloud explosion caused extensive property damage in the immediate area,
and significant damage throughout the site. Windows were broken seven miles away.
The immediate cause was believed to be insufficient purging of the reactor when it had
previously been down.
HOUSTON, TEXAS, US | 11/27/2019
500 / 500 M M
An explosion occurred that shattered windows and ripped doors of nearby homes.
A second blast followed 13 hours later, and it took several days to extinguish the resulting
fires. Three out of the 30 workers on site at the time of the initial explosion were injured.
Around 60,000 people within a four-mile radius of the chemical plant were asked to
evacuate due to concerns over air quality. Elevated levels of butadiene were registered
as well as other volatile organic compounds, exposure to which can cause irritation,
shortness of breath, headaches, and nausea.
The explosion’s cause has not been determined yet, but is said to have occurred in the
south processing unit at a tank with finished butadiene.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS PORT NEAL, IOWA, US | 12/13/1994
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
430 / 203 M M
An explosion occurred in the plant’s ammonium nitrate process area. As a result,
the seven-story main process building was destroyed and a 30-foot diameter crater
was created.
Metal fragments from the explosion punctured one of the plant’s two 15,000 ton
refrigerated ammonia storage tanks. The punctured tank released an estimated 5,700
tons of ammonia, causing the evacuation of approximately 2,500 people from the
surrounding area. Metal fragments also punctured a nitric acid tank, resulting in the
release of approximately 100 tons of this acid. The explosion tore metal siding from
adjacent buildings, damaged three third-party electric generating stations, broke
windows of buildings 16 miles away in Sioux City and was felt more than 30 miles away.
BELPRE, OHIO, US | 05/27/1994
386 / 182 M M
An abnormal chemical reaction occurred during the batch production of a
thermoplastic rubber product, resulting in an explosion. The reactor, process controls,
accessories, control room, and building for this production unit were completely
destroyed as a result.
The fire spread to involve part of the tank farm, resulting in the destruction of five
atmospheric storage tanks. Around midday the first of four 1,000,000-US-gallon and
one 500,000-US-gallon styrene storage tanks exploded. A fire-fighting attack using
cooling water and foam hose streams was used to prevent the fire from involving other
nearby storage tanks, two of which contained butadiene. The fire was extinguished
after approximately nine hours.
NIIGATA, JAPAN | 03/20/2007
326 / 240 M M
An accident occurred at a methylcellulose manufacturing facility. An explosion
occurred, followed by a fire, which was extinguished about seven hours later.
Seventeen people working at the site were injured; three critically, five seriously,
and nine with minor injuries. There was one minor injury off site. Ignition of the
methylcellulose powder is thought to have been due to static electricity, resulting in a
powder dust explosion. All methylcellulose operations were suspended for two months
before sequentially restarting.
PORI, FINLAND | 01/11/2017
325 / 325 M M
A fire occurred at a titanium dioxide manufacturing facility, resulting in significant
damage to the plant and the halting of production of the pigment. It is understood
that a fire in the electrostatic precipitator quickly spread to the pipe network and
manufacturing halls.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS FLIXBOROUGH, UK | 06/01/1974
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
315 / 58 M M
The chemical facility was severely damaged by a large vapor cloud explosion. Twenty
eight workers were killed, and a further 36 suffered injuries. The number of fatalities
would have been higher had it not been a weekend, as the main office block was not
occupied. Offsite consequences resulted in 53 reported injuries. Properties in the
surrounding area were damaged to varying degrees. Before the loss, a reactor had
been removed and a bypass assembly installed to enable production to continue.
On June 1, the 20-inch bypass system ruptured, possibly caused by a fire on a nearby
eight-inch pipe. This resulted in the release of 30 tons of hot cyclohexane, which formed
a flammable cloud that found a source of ignition. Eighteen fatalities occurred in the
control room as a result of windows shattering and the roof collapsing. Ensuing fires
burnt for more than three days.
ANTWERP, BELGIUM | 10/02/1975
298 / 60 M M
An explosion and fire caused extensive damage at a low-density polyethylene plant.
The cause was a leak of ethylene at high pressure, due to fatigue failure of a vent
connection on the suction of a compressor. Six people were killed, and 13 injured.
MUNCHMUSTER, GERMANY | 12/10/2005
298 / 200 M M
A release of hexane created a vapor cloud that was ignited on an electric motor, causing
an explosion. This resulted in damage to a process unit and 20 injuries. The plant was
eventually replaced.
LUDWIGSHAFEN, GERMANY | 10/17/2017
290 / 290 M M
Maintenance work was taking place on a transfer line between the plant’s processing
areas and a jetty facility located on the river nearby, relatively near the jetty. It is
understood that at some point during the maintenance work, a cut was made in a line
that was live, instead of the planned line. This led to a release of hydrocarbon, causing
a gas cloud to form. The cloud ignited, leading to an explosion and fire, which led to
releases from at least one other pipeline nearby. It is understood that both ethylene
and propylene were released as a result of the incident.
The fire following the explosion took around 10 hours to extinguish. Residents of the
local town and a nearby city were told to remain inside for at least 24 hours following
the incident. Most the site’s different process units were shut down immediately
following the incident as a precaution. Five people were killed in the incident,
understood to include two plant operators, two fire fighters from the site, and a crew
member of a ship docked at the jetty area. At least 10 other people were injured.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS PORT ARTHUR, TEXAS, US | 04/29/2006
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
285 / 200 M M
A shelter-in-place was ordered when a fire broke out following an explosion in the
propylene refrigeration section of an ethylene unit. The fire, which burned for
three days, forced the facility’s shutdown for six months but caused no deaths or
serious injuries.
CEDAR BAYOU, TEXAS, US | 10/20/1994
276 / 130 M M
The Texas floods along the San Jacinto river shut down the site, involving 650,000 t/y
ethylene; 200,000 t/y LLDPE; 280,000 t/y LDPE plants; and general utilities. The loss
of utilities affected downstream clients. Flood water breached dikes around the main
substation and inundated control rooms and offices.
STERLINGTON, LOUISIANA, US | 05/01/1991
274 / 120 M M
Workers were preparing to check a compressor in the Nitroparaffin unit when they
noticed a small fire and sounded the plant’s fire alarm. Approximately 30 seconds later,
an explosion occurred that was followed by a series of smaller explosions. The initial
explosion’s effects were reported as far as eight miles away. It completely damaged an
area of the plant about the size of a city block. Subsequent fires were reported to have
burned for more than seven hours.
Although the incident did not damage the two ammonia units on-site, the entire plant
was temporarily shut down for precautionary measures.
DEER PARK, TEXAS, US | 06/22/1997
267 / 135 M M
An explosion and large fire occurred at a petrochemical plant. The explosion was felt
and heard over 10 miles away, and the ensuing fire burned for approximately ten hours.
The explosion and fire resulted in extensive damage to the facility, and several workers
received minor injuries. Nearby property was damaged, nearby transport routes were
closed for several hours, and residents were advised to remain indoors. The incident
originated at the cracked gas compressor system in the Olefins unit and was caused by
the structural failure of a 36-inch pneumatically-assisted, non-return valve located on a
high-pressure light hydrocarbon gas line. The escaping gas formed a vapor cloud and
eventually found a source of ignition, resulting in the unconfined vapor cloud explosion.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS ILLIOPOLIS, ILLINOIS, US | 04/23/2004
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
234 / 150 M M
Five people were killed and two seriously injured following an explosion at a plastics
plant producing 200 million barrels per year of speciality grade PVC. The explosion
was felt eight kilometers away. The highway was shut and local residents evacuated.
The explosion occurred in a reactor where vinyl chloride and vinyl acetate were being
mixed. Up to 75% of the plant was destroyed in the explosion.
PAJARITOS, COATZACOALCOS, MEXICO | 03/11/1991
221 / 97 M M
A gas leak involving the pipe rack that runs to the terminal in the petrochemical
complex led to an explosion. An initial explosion occurred near the complex chemical
plant, causing additional damage to the pipe rack and resulting in a major gas leak.
A powerful second explosion occurred that could be felt more than 15 miles from the
complex. This explosion and the subsequent fire completely destroyed the chemical
plant, caused significant damage to the pipe rack, and also caused moderate damage
to other complex buildings and adjacent third-party facilities. The fire was extinguished
after approximately three hours.
Because of the incident, the chemical plant at this complex was completely shut down
for seven months, to allow for the rebuild of the plant and pipe rack.
SEADRIFT, TEXAS, US | 03/12/1991
206 / 90 M M
An explosion occurred in the plant’s ethylene oxide process unit. As a result of the
explosion, the ethylene oxide refining column was completely destroyed, the ethylene
glycol unit was substantially damaged, and the co-generation unit was partially
damaged. A pipe rack near the storage area for liquid ethylene oxide was damaged
when a large piece of shrapnel from the explosion hit the rack, rupturing lines that
contained methane and other hydrocarbon products. The fire that resulted from the
released products was the only significant one to occur during the incident.
As a result of the explosion, all utilities at the plant were lost for about a week.
Additionally, a significant number of fixed-fire protection systems were damaged by the
explosion or inadvertently actuated due to a loss of plant air. These systems were shut
off and isolated, or placed back in service, as appropriate. A manual fire-fighting effort
was used to extinguish the fire in the pipe rack once the lines in the rack were isolated.
The polyethylene production was restarted in early April 1991, using imported
ethylene. The olefins production unit was restarted in late April 1991.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS ZWIJNDRECHT, ANTWERP, BELGIUM | 07/03/1987
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
199 / 78 M M
An explosion occurred in the final purification column of an ethylene oxide
manufacturing plant, resulting in 14 people being injured. The explosion initiated
several secondary fires on the original units and other units nearby, but all were
under control within 30 minutes. The root cause was a rapid over-pressurization of
the column as a result of decomposition of material within it, although the ignition
source was not identified.
PRIOLO, ITALY | 05/19/1985
197 / 74 M M
A faulty temperature probe on a 600,000-ton-per-year ethylene plant initiated an
isolation of the hydrogenation reactor located within the cold section. While the
operators were attempting to regain normal control, the pressure relief system
operated. About the same time, fire was noted near grade level at the base of the
deethaniser column. The source of fuel was believed to have been a flange at the
deethaniser column reboiler or in the relief system pipe work.
Leaking hydrocarbon, mostly propylene at 375 psig, was possibly ignited by hot
steam piping. The intense fire rapidly engulfed the adjoining ethylene and propylene
distillation columns and spread 180 feet to the storage area. Eventually one vertical
pressurized propane storage tank exploded, its top section travelling 1,500 feet and
missing a gas holder by 30 feet. Two other propylene tanks toppled; one onto a pipe
rack and the other against an ethylene tank. All were protected by deluge waterspray
systems that were said to be ineffective under the intense fire exposure. Five of the
eight ethylene and propylene tanks collapsed or exploded. The fire also spread to the
API separator and to three floating roof tanks. Pipe racks, motor control centers, and
pumps were severely damaged or destroyed.
Minutes after the fire brigade responded, the ethylene column released its
9,300-US-gallon inventory, destroying one of the plant’s two foam trucks. Assisted
by outside fire-fighting agencies, the plant’s fire brigade brought the fire under control
over 40 hours and extinguished it four days after the initial ignition.
UERDINGEN, GERMANY | 02/14/1989
191 / 80 M M
A runaway reaction triggered an explosion and fire, which destroyed the plant and a
neighboring building. The wrong components were added to chemical mixture.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS ANTWERP, BELGIUM | 03/07/1989
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
190 / 79 M M
A hairline crack in a welded seam of piping to the level indicator system on an aldehyde
column, resulted in a minor ethylene oxide leak on the gas processing plant. The crack
was caused by low cycle fatigue, and led to ethylene oxide escaping near the level
indicator and forming polyethylene glycols (PEG) in the mineral wool insulation.
It is believed that both the leak and accumulation of PEG occurred over a period of time.
During repairs to the level indicator, the metal sheathing of the insulation was removed
and air contacted the insulation soaked with PEG. Auto-oxidation of the PEG resulted
and the insulating material was ignited. The piping to the level indicator system was
heated to such a degree that auto-decomposition of the ethylene oxide within the
piping occurred. This auto-decomposition propagated into the aldehyde column,
which subsequently exploded.
The force of the explosion destroyed the distillation section of the plant. The large
resulting fire, and debris flying to other process sections, caused extensive damage
throughout the plant.
LITVINOV, CZECH REPUBLIC | 08/13/2015
175 / 155 M
**
M
** A short interruption in the supply of cooling water to a separation column, downstream
of a steam cracker, resulted in the need to open relief valves from the column to flare.
Subsequent manual choking back of the relief line to flare resulted in the pressure
relief valves opening. These valves vibrated excessively, resulting in the failure of
the bolted flanges and release of the propylene-rich column overhead line into the
atmosphere. The resultant explosion led to the failure of utility lines to the cracker
requiring a crash shutdown. The lack of process steam due to the interruption to the
utility supply resulted in the failure of furnace tubes and the release of quench oil. There
was subsequently a pool fire from the released quench oil under the cracker, resulting
in damage to four of the ten cracker furnaces.
**Loss estimate based on a settlement

reached in 2019.

Gas Processing
Six property damage losses associated with gas
processing feature among the 100LL — two of which
Excellent global occurred in the past two years.
experience The properties of LNG mean that the risk of internal corrosion is virtually eliminated.
with the design, And excellent global experience with the design, construction, and operation of LNG
facilities results in relatively few very large losses. The potential remains, however, for
construction, high-consequence losses at facilities of this type due to their complexity and value —
as underlined by the property damage caused by both the recent fire/explosion at the
and operation facility in Arzew, Algeria, and the earthquake in Papua New Guinea.
of LNG facilities
results in
relatively few
very large losses. FIGURE
In 2018-19 two gas processing losses entered the 100LL.
21 SOURCE: MARSH
Fire & Explosion 1,000

900
800
700
Explosion
Loss (US$m)
600
500
400
Natural Catastrophe 300
200
100
0
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
Year

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS LONGFORD, VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA | 09/25/1998
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
865 / 443 M M
Gas supplies to Australia’s Victoria State were virtually shut down following an
explosion and fire at this gas processing plant. The cause of the accident was attributed
to the rupture of a heat exchanger following a process upset that was set in motion
by the unintended, sudden shutdown of hot oil pumps. The loss of hot oil supply
resulted in some vessels being chilled by cold oil. When the hot oil was reintroduced
to a heat exchanger the vessel ruptured due to a brittle fracture. An initial release of
approximately 22,000lb of hydrocarbon vapor exploded, and an estimated 26,000lb
burned as a jet fire. The fire burned for two and half days. The incident highlighted
how a combination of ineffective management procedures, staffing oversights,
communication problems, inadequate hazard assessment, and training shortfalls
combined to result in a major plant upset with tragic loss of life.
SKIKDA, ALGERIA | 01/19/2004
736 / 470 M M
Twenty seven people were killed, seventy two injured and seven reported missing
following an explosion at this LNG plant. The explosion destroyed three out of six
liquefaction trains, damaged a nearby power plant and led to the shutdown of a
335,000 bbl/d refinery. There was also some damage to the neighbouring industrial
facilities. A faulty boiler was initially blamed for the incident. Investigations however
indicated that a large release of hydrocarbon from a cold-box exchanger was ignited
upon ingestion into the boiler. Train 6 of the LNG Complex re-started in May 2004 and
Trains 5 and 10 in September 2004. Trains 20, 30 and 40 were destroyed in the incident
representing 50% of the capacity of the LNG complex.
BINTULU, SARAWAK, MALAYSIA | 12/25/1997
563 / 285 M M
An explosion and fire occurred at a gas-to-liquids (GTL) plant, with the fire brought
under control the next day. The plant was one of only two commercially successful
GTL plants in the world at the time, with a capacity to produce 12,500 bbl/d of
middle distillates and waxes from natural gas feedstocks. The explosion occurred in
the air separation unit (ASU), which supplied oxygen for the production of synthesis
gas feedstock.
The investigation into the incident pointed to an initial combustion event in the ASU
as the most probable cause. This combustion event is thought to have initiated
explosive burning of the aluminum heat exchanger elements in the presence of liquid
oxygen, such that the elements ruptured explosively. Twelve people were injured,
none seriously, and the plant was shut down for several months for repairs.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS ARZEW, ALGERIA | 07/01/2019
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
400 / 400 M M
** A fire broke out at Algeria’s main liquefied natural gas (LNG) complex in Arzew’s
petrochemical hub. The fire was preceded by two explosions that were reported to
shake industrial and residential buildings kilometers away. Many people initially took
the blasts for an earthquake, because of their intensity. Four people were reportedly
injured in the incident.
KOMO, PAPUA NEW GUINEA | 02/26/2018
335 / 335 M M
The earthquake struck with an intensity of M7.5 (MM IX), with aftershocks over the
following weeks. The event caused building and infrastructure damage, and sinkholes
and landslides. Over 160 people were killed from the local communities and many
injured. The damage affected the local airport at Komo, which was significantly
damaged, the gas conditioning plant — which was safely shut down with some damage
but no loss of containment — and the pipeline system, where there was no loss of
containment but a need to remediate the pipeline “right of way” along most of its
onshore length. (Note: The value quote here is believed to be the reserve across all
elements of the loss — airport, gas plant, and pipeline.)
CACTUS, REFORMA, CHIAPAS, MEXICO | 07/26/1996
276 / 137 M M
A vapor cloud explosion centered in the Cryogenic Unit No.2 and two subsequent
explosions in the Cryogenic Unit No.1 occurred at this gas processing complex.
The Cryogenic Unit No.2 and LPG product pumps in the Cryogenic Unit No.1 were
extensively damaged, the control rooms for both units were destroyed, and the
remainder of the Cryogenic Unit No.1 experienced minor damage.
Plant personnel noticed that one of the two LPG product pumps in the Cryogenic Unit
No.1 had a seal leak, and decided to have the faulty seal replaced. In preparation for
the maintenance work on the LPG product pump, the motor operated valve (MOV) in
the suction line and the isolation valve in the discharge line of the pump were manually
closed. A spectacle blind was then inserted into the pump flange on the suction side
of the pump. After the seal was replaced, plant personnel removed the blind and were
in the process of tightening the flange bolts when LPG product began to leak from this
flange. A vapor cloud formed and drifted into the Cryogenic Unit No.2. It ignited and
resulted in the initial explosion. Following the explosions, it was determined that the
MOV in the suction line of the pump was in the open position, which allowed the LPG
product to reach the pump flange.
The fire brigades successfully extinguished the fire following the explosions after
approximately three hours, and protected the adjacent LPG spheres. Although the
explosions damaged the electric power in the plant and rendered the electric motor-
driven fire water pumps non-operational, fire water was provided by two diesel engine
driven fire water pumps.
Because of this incident, the 2.13 billion ft3/y gas processing capacity at this complex
was shut down, disrupting a third of Mexico’s total gas processing capacity.
* Based on December 31, 2019, values.
**Loss value may reduce from initial estimate

as further information becomes available.

Terminals & Distribution
Only five losses associated with terminal and distribution
operations feature among the 100LL — the most recent
Few sites occurring in 2002.
have enough The physical layout of most terminals and distribution assets, coupled with the value of
concentration the plant and its equipment, means that few sites have enough concentration of value
to result in the very largest property damage accidents if the worst were to occur.
of value to
Of special note is the fire at the ITC tank farm in the US in March 2019. A leak of naphtha
result in the very ignited and led to a full-surface tank fire at the facility. This then spread to other tanks
(the typical tank-to-tank separation was approximately 0.4 tank diameters), resulting
largest property in the destruction of at least 12 of the 15 tanks onsite. The property damage of roughly
damage US$125 million, however, was insufficient to include it in the 100LL.
accidents.
FIGURE
Terminals and distribution losses have not featured in
Fire & Explosion 22 the 100LL since 2002.
SOURCE: MARSH
Explosion
350
Fire 300
250
Loss (US$m)
200
Mechanical Failure
150
100
Natural Catastrophe
50
0
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS ANDES, ECUADOR | 03/05/1987
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
306 / 120 M M
Twenty-five miles of Trans-Andean pipeline disappeared in the event, which also
damaged natural gas and gasoline pipelines. All 285 producing wells were shut down,
and oil exports were suspended and swap arrangement made with Venezuelan
suppliers. The first earthquake registered 6.0 on the Richter scale, the second 6.8,
and there were ten earthquakes in total. Repairs took several months.
BANTRY BAY, IRELAND | 01/08/1979
265 / 70 M M
An 11-year-old 121,000-deadweight-tons tanker had unloaded its first parcel of Arabian
heavy crude at a deep-water port. No transfer operations between the ship and the
jetty were in process when a small fire was noticed on deck. About 10 minutes later fire
spread along the ship and was observed on the sea at both sides of the ship. After 30
minutes, a huge explosion occurred. It is theorized that the disaster was initiated by the
buckling of the ship’s structure at, or around, deck level. This was immediately followed
by explosions in the ballast tanks and the breaking of the ship’s back. These events
were produced by the conjunction of two separate factors: 1) a seriously weakened hull
due to inadequate maintenance, and 2) excessive stress due to incorrect ballasting at
the time of the disaster.
A fragment of the ship weighing 1,000lb was found at the base of a large crude oil tank,
1,800 feet from the ship. In addition to the total loss of the ship, 50 people lost their
lives, and 1,130 feet of the concrete and steel jetty were damaged or destroyed.
RAUDHATAIN, KUWAIT | 01/31/2002
261 / 150 M M
Four people were killed in an explosion and fire at the oil gathering center, gas booster
station, and power substation. The explosion occurred after a leak from a buried oil
pipeline in the gathering station spread to a power substation, sparking the blaze. The
flash explosion and resulting blaze hit the gathering center and adjacent gas booster
station. Nineteen people were injured in the incident, suffering mainly first- and
second-degree burns. The fire was extinguished two days after the event.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS MARCUS HOOK, PENNSYLVANIA, US | 01/31/1975
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
249 / 50 M M
The United States flag tanker “Edgar M. Queeny” rammed the Greek tanker
“Corinthos,” while the latter was discharging 400,000 bbl of crude oil at a refinery
jetty at Marcus Hook on the Delaware River. A huge initial explosion, and subsequent
explosions and fires, occurred on the Greek ship as a result. Twenty-five crew members
were killed on board the vessel, in addition to a crewman from the flag tanker.
The Corinthos sank shortly afterwards and was later removed for scrapping.
ABQAIQ, SAUDI ARABIA | 05/11/1977
239 / 55 M M
A 30-inch diameter crude oil pipeline failed and destroyed three spheroids, pumping
units, and other equipment. Ignition was caused by motor vehicles.

Upstream
Since 2016 there have been no additions to the 100LL
from the upstream sector, which accounts for 24% of the
The Piper Alpha 100LL. The Piper Alpha loss in 1988 remains the largest
recorded property damage loss.
loss in 1988
remains the This report only covers property damage and does not include the additional costs of
well control or third-party liability (total third-party liability claims for the Macondo
largest recorded loss in the Gulf of Mexico, in 2010, were more than 20 times the value of the associated
property damage loss).
property
damage loss. The evolution of the upstream industry with increased fracking has continued. These
assets are generally of relatively small size and well dispersed, so individual losses
associated with fracking have not yet been sufficiently large to feature in the 100LL.
Fire & Explosion
FIGURE
The Piper Alpha loss in 1988 remains by far the largest
23
Explosion
upstream property damage loss.
SOURCE: MARSH
Fire
Mechanical Failure 2,500
2,000
Hurricane/Storm
Loss (US$m)
1,500
Blowout
1,000
Collision 500
0
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
Year

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS PIPER ALPHA, NORTH SEA, UK | 07/06/1988
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
2,088 / 850 M M
A release and ignition of gas condensate from a section of piping in the gas
compression module of the platform set off a chain of fires and explosions, resulting
in the facility’s almost total destruction. The condensate was released from the site of
a pressure-relief valve that had been removed for maintenance, when this section of
piping was inadvertently pressurized. The severity of the accident was due largely to
the contribution of oil and gas from ruptured pipelines connected to the platform, and
the disabling of nearly all emergency systems as a result of the initial explosion. The
compression module had been retrofitted to the platform adjacent to the control room,
and the control room was rendered useless by the initial explosion.
In addition, the firewater pumps had been placed in manual operation mode due to
divers being in the water before the accident.
There were 226 people on the platform at the time of the accident; only 61 survived.
Contributing to the loss of life was the location of the quarters directly over the site of
the initial release and resulting explosion and fire.
EKOFISK, NORTH SEA, NORWAY | 06/04/2009
967 / 750 M M
A well-intervention vessel lost power and collided with an unmanned platform forming
part of this 230,000 bbl/d complex. Heavy damage was caused to the vessel and
platform, including damage to the platform structure, linking access bridge and well
equipment. Some 23,000 bbl/d of oil production was reportedly affected. The force
of the collision caused the bow of the vessel to compress by about two meters, with
the platform pushed partly out of position, loosening several support legs from the
main load-bearing structure. One of the water injection risers on the platform was bent
extensively and several wellheads were moved, with a catalogue of further damage
from the collision also identified.
BAKER, GULF OF MEXICO, US | 03/19/1989
957 / 400 M M
Contract personnel were installing a pig trap on an 18-inch-diameter export gas
pipeline on the platform. As a cold cut was made into the pipeline, hydrocarbons
sprayed from the cut and ignited. The explosion and fire burned the main structure and
caused subsequent explosions when six other pipelines ruptured due to the intense
heat. The accident resulted in the platform’s destruction and seven fatalities. Two years
were required to replace the platform.
RONCADOR FIELD, CAMPOS BASIN, BRAZIL | 03/15/2001
905 / 500 M M
The world’s largest offshore production facility was rocked by a series of explosions
caused by a gas release. The explosions knocked out a support pillar of the semi-
submersible platform, allowing seawater to enter the vessel. Workers pumped in
nitrogen and compressed air and tried to pump out almost 3,000 tons of seawater to
keep the rig afloat, but were unsuccessful. On March 20, the rig sank to the sea floor.
Eleven workers were killed.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS ENCHOVA, CAMPOS BASIN, BRAZIL | 04/24/1988
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
811 / 330 M M
During the conversion of one of the platform wells from oil to gas production, a high-
pressure gas pocket was encountered that forced the drill pipe out of the well. The
blow-out preventer failed to shut in the well and sparks — caused by the drill pipe that
was ejected from the well hitting one of the platform legs — ignited the escaping gas.
The fire lasted for 31 days. Most of the topside structure was destroyed and the facility
was later declared a total loss. Redesign of the production module was completed in
45 days in an effort to shorten loss of production as much as possible. Full production
was restored 18 months after the loss.
BAY OF CAMPECHE, MEXICO | 01/04/2015
737 / 640 M M
A complex of six platforms located in 30 meters of water in the Gulf of Mexico was
subject to a major fire. The fire originated on the lower decks of the production
platform and resulted in major damage to that platform, radiation and fire damage to
an adjacent compression platform, the loss of bridge links and pipelines, and radiation
damage to other bridge links. The root-cause investigation required by the government
identified corrosion of a small bore pipeline as behind the initial failure.
GULF OF MEXICO, US | 04/21/2010
685 / 560 M M
A semi-submersible drilling rig working in the Mississippi Canyon block 252,
approximately 48 miles off the coast of Louisiana, suffered a major explosion and fire
following a well integrity failure. The rig had a crew of 126: 11 people were immediately
identified as missing and subsequently confirmed as fatalities, with a further 17 injured.
The rig sank within 36 hours of the initial explosion in a water depth of approximately
5,000 ft. The exploration well had reached a depth of 18,360ft (total depth), and was
undergoing cementing works, prior to the well control event, with a view to temporarily
abandoning the well.
Hydrocarbons continued to flow through the damaged blowout preventer (BOP) for
87 days before a successful static kill was performed. The release caused a spill of
national significance and resulted in an unprecedented sub-sea and surface spill
control response. The well was declared finally killed five months after the original
event by successful interception by a relief well.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS MUMBAI HIGH NORTH FIELD, INDIA | 07/27/2005
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
552 / 370 M M
Twenty two people were killed when a fire completely destroyed an oil platform. It
is believed that a multi-purpose support vessel, which was evacuating a worker to a
medical center, hit the platform’s riser, causing an explosion. The vessel also caught fire
and sank but two nearby platforms were saved when connecting bridges collapsed.
The 150 people on board managed to transfer to a nearby water injection platform,
and another 348 people were evacuated from the oil platform. However, the rescue
operation was hampered by bad weather. A cantilever jack-up rig, linked by a bridge
to the process platform, was also involved in the fire. Seventy three people were
evacuated from the rig but during the evacuation an employee died. Six divers in a
saturation chamber on the vessel were rescued 36 hours later.
JUBILEE FIELD, GHANA | 11/02/2016
536 / 450 M M
The main turret bearing on a floating production storage and offloading vessel
seized and subsequently failed, resulting in the vessel being unable to weathervane.
Production was resumed with a revised operating regime employing tugs to maintain
a constant heading. Subsequently, the vessel was converted to employ a permanent
spread moored configuration, fixing the heading of the vessel and installing an
associated deep-water offloading buoy.
NORTH SEA, UK | 02/04/2011
527 / 450 M M
Heavy storm conditions in the North Sea caused four of this floating production storage
and offloading’s (FPSO) 10 anchor chains to break, resulting in the vessel moving off
its position. It is estimated that the FPSO was subject to 53 knot winds and nine-meter
waves. Normally a complex piping system runs from the wells on the seabed up to the
FPSO, but this infrastructure was damaged in the incident.
Following the vessel moving off its position all the wells were immediately shut in.
Subsequent surveys showed that no oil had been lost. Seventy-four non-essential crew
were evacuated to near-by platforms, and 43 essential crew remained on-board. Two
members of crew received minor injuries.
The facility was projected to be producing an average of 18,400 bbl/d of oil before
the loss.
TREASURE SAGA, NORTH SEA, NORWAY | 01/20/1989
526 / 220 M M
A semi-submersible rig had a gas kick at 15,527 feet during an attempt to clear the drill
pipe of cement previously pumped in to control the well, and the well then suffered a
blow-out. The well was stabilized after 11 months by pumping heavy mud down a relief
well. The well was later sealed.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS FATEH L3, DUBAI, UAE | 07/01/1975
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
393 / 79 M M
The Fateh Field L-3 development well had reached 4,180ft when a “kick” occurred. The
kick control effort was terminated and the rig abandoned when gas broke around the
20-inch shoe and bubbled up under the platform. Eight days after the blowout, the gas
ignited, and after two weeks the rig and platform disappeared beneath the waters.
GULF OF MEXICO, US | 07/10/2005
373 / 250 M M
Hurricane Dennis passed through the area where the platform was located, causing it
to partially sink. A seawater valve in a ballast tank had been wrongly installed, resulting
in excess water in the tanks. The platform had already been evacuated and there was
no leakage of oil, fuel, or other hazardous substances.
The loss resulted in the project commencing production three years behind schedule.
The company retrieved and rebuilt all the sea-bed production equipment after a series
of tests revealed metallurgical failure in components of the field sub-sea systems.
MONTARA, TIMOR SEA, AUSTRALIA | 08/21/2009
322 / 250 M M
Oil, condensate, and hydrogen sulphide leaked from a wellhead on a platform being
serviced by a jack-up rig in the Timor Sea. Sixty nine workers on the rig were evacuated.
Oil and gas started to spill after a plug blocking one of the project’s 1,200-meter-deep
wells came free. The next day a 12km-long and 30-meter-wide spill was reported.
Attempts were made to plug the well over the next two months. It was estimated the
well leaked 400 bbl/d of oil and gas.
On November 1, it was reported that drillers had successfully intercepted the well
and were beginning to put heavy mud into the shaft. However, a fire broke out on the
drilling platform as it attempted to plug a deeper leak. The fire was extinguished two
days later. A total of 4,140 tons of oil was estimated to have been lost. This incident
affected both the platform and the drilling rig.
CAMARUPIM FIELD, BRAZIL | 11/03/2015
304 / 250 M M
An explosion on a floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel off the
coast of Brazil resulted in nine fatalities and multiple injuries. The accident happened as
the vessel was anchored in the Atlantic Ocean 120km from the coast of Espirito Santos,
Brazil. The FPSO is a converted very large crude oil tanker, designed to produce up to
10 million cubic meters of natural gas. It is understood that a condensate leak during
a fluid transfer operation released a cloud of flammable vapor into the engine room,
resulting in an explosion in the machinery space. Most fatalities were believed to be
part of the emergency response team. The FPSO took on water, but the explosion did
not result in a breach of the hull of the vessel.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS TEMSAH, EGYPT | 08/10/2004
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
296 / 190 M M
A fire broke out during drilling operations at an offshore gas production platform
following a well-control incident. The fire on the production platform was initially
under control but then spread to a nearby jack-up drilling rig, owned by a major drilling
contractor, which suffered major damage and collapsed. All 79 people on board
the drilling rig were safely evacuated. The production platform, with 150 persons
onboard, had been evacuated before the fire spread. The drilling rig sank and was not
salvageable. The platform was damaged beyond repair and its destruction was ordered
by the state.
CARIBBEAN SEA, VENEZUELA | 05/13/2010
288 / 235 M M
A natural gas drilling rig sank in the Caribbean Sea, but all 95 workers were evacuated
safely and there was no reported leakage. The sinking was caused by a sudden surge of
water entering one of the submarine rafts that the platform legs floated on. Automatic
sub-sea safety valves sealed the wells and no leakage of oil occurred.
AUK FIELD, NORTH SEA, UK | 08/01/1975
272 / 55 M M
Platform was struck by the vessel “Stad Sea.”
ATLANTIC OCEAN, OFF ANGOLA | 07/01/2013
271 / 235 M M
A jack-up sank after the sea bed collapsed under one of the three legs. The rig sank
while being positioned for drilling operations in approximately 40 meters of water. One
hundred and three workers were on-board the rig when it suddenly tilted, causing the
rig to take on water and capsize. One crew member was missing and six others received
minor injuries.
NORTH SEA, NORWAY | 11/05/2006
264 / 185 M M
Offshore gas alarms were triggered on the floating production unit and, upon
investigation, it was established that a leak was emanating from one of the production
risers. Upon further investigation, five other risers were found to be similarly affected.
Remedial work was subsequently carried out.
LAMA, LAKE MARACAIBO, VENEZUELA | 03/25/1993
218 / 100 M M
An apparent failure of a propane intercooler liquid level control during unsupervised
maintenance led to an explosion and fire. The control room on the main platform was
destroyed and adjacent platforms were affected by the blast wave. Eleven fatalities
resulted from the incident.

PROPERTY DAMAGE DAMAGE LOSS SEA OF JAPAN, OFFSHORE JAPAN | 08/26/1986
LOSS (US$)* (US$)
197 / 75 M M
A semi-submersible barge ran aground near Uslan, Japan, during a typhoon.
GULF OF MEXICO, MEXICO | 04/12/2011
187 / 160 M M
Six hundred and thirty-eight workers were evacuated from the flotel after it began to
lean to one side when water entered a pontoon. The flotel was located about 80km
offshore Campeche, Mexico. No injuries were reported, although a total loss of the
flotel reportedly resulted.

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100 Largest Losses in The Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019

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INSIGHTS MARCH 2020 26TH EDITION

100 Largest Losses in

100 Largest Losses

05 What Can We Learn From the Last

13 30 Years on: Is History Repeating Itself?

19 Does Age Really Matter?

35 100 Largest Losses Descriptions

Marsh JLT Specialty• 1

2 •100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019

The loss values are reported in two ways:

We hope this publication reminds energy-industry professionals of the range of losses

Marsh JLT Specialty• 3

Marsh JLT Specialty• 5

REFINERIES TERMINAL & DISTRIBUTION

6 •100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019

94 120 Average Utilization

Marsh JLT Specialty• 7

petrochemical sites. This includes:

property • A stipulation that local governments eliminate all hazards around

1989. • New rules on the transportation and disposal of hazardous materials.

What Does Risk Ranking Data Show?

8 •100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019

The onshore oil and gas sector has

2008-2011 2012-2015 2016-2019

Sub Topic Best In-Class Performance

• Electrical storms • Tidal waves

In essence, external standards represent a minimum expectation, and the highest-

Marsh JLT Specialty• 9

4 Overall risk quality in terminals/distribution

For both gas Hardware

distribution, Poor Basic Average Good Excellent

deterioration in Emergency Control

2008-2011 2012-015 2016-2019

5 Overall risk quality in gas processing plants deteriorated

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

2008-2011 2012-2015 2016-2019

10 •100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019

Although not as prevalent in the 100LL, terminals/distribution and gas processing

Marsh JLT Specialty• 11

6 An unusually high number of large losses occurred in

The Piper Alpha explosion in the North 4

1988-89 1998-99 2000-01 2004-05 2008-09 2010-11 2014-15 2016-18 2018-19

*On basis of December 31, 2019.

14 •100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019

ESCAL ATING FAC TORS

Marsh JLT Specialty• 15

The explosion in Jiangsu, China — the ESCAL ATING FAC TORS

Emergency response plans

8 Systems of work was the most frequently cited topic.

Topics Frequency of Citation (%)

ER. Fire Detection & Alarm/Testing Operability

ER. Fire Water System

ER. Emergency Plans

ER. Fixed Fire Protection

16 •100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019

• Loss of experienced people.

• Loss of corporate memory — efficacy of safeguards put in place

• Lack of understanding how risk can change with the age of

ɣ Creeping or subtle change that is not recognized.

ɣ Inherited problems if site changed ownership.

• Complacency — “Has worked fine for 20 years” — it can be