AN APPRAISAL OF AVAILABLE STATISTICS ON FREQUENCY OF

REPORTED OFFENCES AND WHETHER THE POLICE USE THESE

REPORTS TO PROFILE OFFICERS

AIG AUSTIN I. IWAR, RTD

2020

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 ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS IN THIS PAPER
ACP - Assistant Commissioner of Police
AG - Attorney General
AIG - Assistant Inspector General
ASP - Assistant Superintendent
CLEEN - Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (Now known
as CLEEN Foundation)
CP - Commissioner of Police
CRU - Complaints response Unit
CSO - Civil Society Organisation
CSP - Corporal Superintendent
DIG - Deputy Inspector General
DPO - Divisional Police Officer
DSP - Deputy Superintendent
FCID - Force Criminal Investigation Department
FCT - Federal Capital Territory
IGP - Inspector General of Police
NBS - National Bureau of Statistics
NGO - Non-governmental Organisations
NHRC - National Human Rights Commission
NPF - Nigeria Police Force
O/C - Officer in Charge
OPC - Oduduwa People’s Congress
PCB - Public Complaints Bureau
PCC - Public Complaints Commission

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PSC - Police Service Commission
SARS - Special Anti-Robbery Squad
SIECS - States Independent Electoral Commissions
SP - Superintendent
UN - United Nations

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 Table of Content
1. Introduction and Literature Review
Police Misconduct in Nigeria
Review of Relevant Literature
a. Demography
b. Race and Age
Police accountability
The Nigerian Context
a. History/Origins
b. State Policing and Community Policing
c. Police Brutality
d. Stop and Search
Research Question
2. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis
a. Population and sample
b. Data collection instrument
c. Reliability of data and limitation of study
3. Procedures of Handling Complaints and Investigating Police Misconduct
Complaints against police misconduct
Internal
a. Types of misconduct
b. Types of internal investigations
c. Non-criminal (Disciplinary) investigations
d. Criminal investigations
External Oversight
Police Service Commission (PSC)
National Human Rights Council (NHRC)
Public Complaints Commission (PCC)

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Summary
Analysis of available data on police misconduct
a. Received complaints
b. Internal investigations
c. Complaints Response Unit (CRU)
d. X-Squad
e. Public Complaints Bureau (PCB)
f. IGP Monitoring Unit
g. Provost Department
Case Disposition
External Oversight
Police Service Commission
a. Misconduct by Rank
b. Misconduct by Decision and Disposition
Public Complaints Commission and National Human Rights Commission
Summary
4. Factors affecting police officers’ misconduct and effectiveness of
accountability bodies
Introduction
a. Individual Factors
b. Environmental and Community Factors
c. Organisational and Systemic Factors
The Path to Procedural Justice
The Process: challenges and Constraints
The Aftermath: Consequences
Profiling
4. Conclusions and Recommendations
Recommendations
a. Training solutions

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 b. Legislative solutions
c. Administrative and systemic solutions
References

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 CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Police Misconduct in Nigeria
As enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Section
214) and the Police Act, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is charged with the
powers to enforce law and order, prevent crimes, and engender security within
the country. The operation of members of the Force revolve around daily
interaction with citizens whom they are sworn to protect and serve.

In the execution of the codified duties over the years, police officers have since
attained a reputation characterized by corruption and untrustworthy processes in
the pursuit of crime prevention and justice. Citizens have developed a mistrust
and dislike of the police. This is fuelled by daily reports on the media and
ubiquitous personal accounts of encounters with the police. These reports and
accounts often include stories of high-handed incontinence, extra-judicial killings,
brutality, corrupt practices, and abuse of power.

According to Aborisade (2017), officers of the Nigeria Police have been known to
commonly engage in unprofessional, corrupt, and criminal activities as early as it
was established in 1930. While some have, during their service to the country,
stood out in extraordinary ways while working in difficult and dangerous
conditions, officers of the Nigerian Police Force are generally regarded as
predators and criminals in uniforms rather than as protectors of life and property.

For instance, over 7,198 extra-judicial killings were conducted by the police
between 2008 and 2011 (Olusegun, 2017). On June 8, 2005, some police
officers in Abuja extra-judicially killed six persons suspected to be armed robbers
in Apo District. – a phenomenon popularly referred to as “Apo Six Killings” today
(Igbo, 2017).
In a June 2020 publication by Amnesty International titled, Nigeria: Time To End
Impunity, Torture And Other Violations By Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS),
members of the named notorious unit of the Nigeria Police Force are said to:

“…often look out for well-dressed young men, especially those in new cars.
Often, these young men are accosted at roadblocks or on the streets and
accused of being internet fraudsters, known as ‘Yahoo boys’ in local

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 parlance. The young men are taken to the station and are threatened with
being charged for robbery, unless they agree to pay large sums of money
for bail.”

Between 2015 and 2020, there have been at least one reported case in the news
every week of severe misconduct committed by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad
(SARS) of the Nigeria Police Force against members of the public. These
instances of severe misconduct often involve unlawful search, arbitrary arrests
and detention, extortion, torture and intimidation, unnecessary use of force, and
extra-judicial killings. These reported cases are also purported to represent only
a sliver of the actual frequency of occurrences.

A poll in 2019 by NOI found that 40 percent of Nigerians had been or knew
someone who directly experienced brutality in the hands of the police. Also, 77
percent agreed that the issue of police brutality is widespread. Another 2019 poll
set out to measure public perceptions of police misconduct discovered that 41
indicated the intimidation of citizens as evidence of misconduct while 12 percent
of respondents cited the killing of unarmed citizens as evidence. 57 percent of
Nigerians believed police misconduct to be an issue of concern, 83 percent of
which referred to bribery and extortion by police officers as the major problem.

Several moves made and actions taken over the years to curb the atrocious acts
of these police officers have met no substantial outcomes. It is common
knowledge among Nigerians that till date police officers still extort money from
motorists. It is also common knowledge that even though bail is touted to be free,
police officers request “bail money” from sureties in order to release detainees.

This problem is so endemic to the extent that it is a common reaction to be

pleasantly surprised when there is an absence of these misconducts when
dealing with the police in Nigeria. Legislation and executive policies have proved
abortive in the efforts to curb misconduct among officers and improve public
perception of the organization.

Police misconduct broadly refers to those offences and crimes committed by

police officers using their constitutional powers of arrest and crime prevention.
These misconducts are outlined and categorized in the Police Act, First Schedule
(Regulation 370), Offences Against Discipline.

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In this study, misconduct is understood to mean those activities which
contravene internal police regulations. In addition, disobedience of laws while
acting in the capacity of a police officer is also regarded as police misconduct.
Specifically, misconduct is based on in the administrative, disciplinary and legal
rules which are created to regulate police practice as well as societal operation.
Conversations around police brutality, corruption, and misconduct have been
going on for decades. This has led to multiple studies carried out in varying
aspects of the issue. These studies have always attempted to define the term
“police misconduct/corruption” to enable clarity of scope in understanding it.
Police organizations in different countries have specific definitions on what it
means. For example, in Nigeria, behaviours or conduct that contravene those
typically expected of police officers could be regarded as misconduct.
Among researchers, ‘police misconduct’ is often discussed alongside ‘police
deviance’ and ‘corruption’. The difference between these terms is rarely made
clear and can result to problems of definition (see Punch,2000; Newburn,1999).
However, the most favoured definition of the term has been that of Kleinig (1996:
166) which states that: “Police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing
to exercise their authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private
or departmental/divisional advantage”. Perhaps this is widely accepted because
it highlights both action and negligence of action for the purpose of personal or
organizational benefit against that of the citizenry or society which it is meant to
serve.
Additionally, the question as to whether the mandate of police organizations is
threatened by the co-option of a police service (Mungiu-Pippidi 2011) by leaders
or the rich and powerful in a country, was documented in Nigeria by Agbiboa
(2015). Similar occurrences have been observed to exist in other parts of Africa
(Mugari and Olutola 2017) and most parts of Central and Eastern Europe noted
by Kos (2008: 52) to be “serving the rulers of the day rather than enforcing the
rule of law”.
In attempting to gain a full understanding of the extent of police misconduct in
Nigeria by way of empirical data and social observation, this study will discuss
the wealth of literature available on policing and police misconduct around the
world while paying special focus to the Nigerian context.

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Review of Relevant Literature
Not surprisingly, there have been many studies in academic literature focusing
on police misconduct globally. Yet, these studies are commonly troubled by
challenges of methodology and data collection.
However, there have been few studies available on frequency of police
misconduct among officers of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). Even then,
majority of the research conducted on police misconduct in Nigeria have been
lacking in sufficient empirical data due to sensitivity of the subject and the
unwillingness by individuals and institutions to cooperate. This lends credence to
the opinion of Klockars et al. (1997) who posit that:

“…official data on corruption is best regarded as a measure of police

agency anti-corruption activity than the actual level of corruption.” (p. 4)

However, several studies on the subject of misconduct or corruption among

police officers have been done. These studies can be grouped into the following
categories: definition of police corruption, misconduct or deviance (Pyman et al
2011; Ivković 2005a; Newburn 2015); the question of police integrity or
legitimacy, discrimination based on race (Rowe 2004; Chaney and Robertson
2013; Lai and Zhao 2010), gender (Pickering 2001; Poteyeva and Sun 2009;
Dowler and and Arai 2008), and age (CLEEN 2011); as well as on police
accountability (CLEEN 2013; Baramspahič and Muk 2015) and reform (CLEEN
2018).
Police Integrity
The integrity of police organisations is inextricably tied to the quality of service
they render as well as the popular perception held of them by the public.
Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković (2004) defined police integrity as “the normative
inclination to resist the temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their
occupation” (p. 5). To expand this concept, perception of misconduct by police
officers will inevitably have negative effects on the legitimacy of the organisations
of which they are part since legitimacy can only be granted by the trust of those
whom they are sworn to protect (Gurevitch et al., 1971; Hickman et al., 2004a;
Lim et al., 2000; Meyer et al., 2013; Wu and Sun, 2010).

10
Consequently, integrity can be interpreted to be an end goal of sorts fostered by
a combination of an existing ethical foundation and a collage of newer
experiences.
The question of police integrity became of scholarly concern largely as a result of
incidents of police corruption became popular in American mass media 1960s
and 1970s (Sherman, 1978). There were accounts of police officers accepting
settlements from sex workers (Sherman, 1978), running unlawful gambling
“pads” (Knapp Commission, 1972), and stowing away cocaine from drug raids
(Sechrest and Burns, 1992). These are clear instances of the negative allure that
wielding power engenders. After all, absolute power, they say, corrupts
absolutely.
As such, it became pertinent to carry out studies on police integrity in efforts to
identify attitudes toward corrupt practices by way of organisational responses on
police accountability measures (Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković, 2004). The
interrogation of police integrity can aid a more seamless assessment of the
prevalence and persistence of corruption existent in a law enforcessment agency
just by appraising the integrity level of that organisation (Kutnjak Ivković, 2009;
Kutnjak Ivković and Kang, 2012).
Also, a large number of scholars argue that police misconduct is reflects on the
organisation more than it does the individual at one discrediting the “bad apple”
theory (Donner and Jennings, 2014; Klockars et al., 2000). In their book entitled
Challenging the Myth of a Few Bad Apples, Tator and Henry (2006) claim that
the bad-apple theory fosters an illusory belief that racial profiling and police
misconduct can easily be curbed by educating officers on cultural sensitivity and
making the recruitment process more radicalised. Tator and Henry argue, “this
leaves the structure of police unchanged as well as the core ideology of police
officers- their beliefs, values and norms” (p. 17).
For countries, like the US, that do not run national police services, tracking and
measuring organisational integrity can be a tricky affair because comparing
police integrity across such a country is subject to significant disparities.
Therefore, capturing a wholesome national “picture” of the issue becomes a
burdensome challenge. However, greater success has been achieved in studying
police integrity across the rest of the world due to the existence of national police
forces as well as national training institutions for police officers (Gottschalk, 2010;
Klockars et al., 1997; Kutnjak Ivković and Kang, 2012; Kutnjak Ivković and

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Khechymyan, 2013; Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman, 2015; Kutnjak Ivković and
Shelley, 2005; de Meijer et al., 2010; Prenzler, 2006, 2011).
Demography
Researchers have found demographics like race, gender, income level, and age
to be instrumental in the way police officers treat citizens. For instance, in a 2001
Public Opinion Survey in the US 38% of white people and 89 % of black people
viewed the criminal justice system as biased against black people (Tonry 2011).
This is as a result of the widespread nature of unfavourable encounters black
people experience with the police.
Gender
Studies into morality differences have shown that gender play significant roles in
ethical decision-making and the outcomes of interactions with police. Several
scholars agree that differences in degree do exist (Gilligan, 1982, 1983; Pollock,
1995, 1999; Spader, 2002) while some others argue that the differences are
characterised by exaggeration or simply non-existent (Baumrind, 1986; Walker,
1984).
As Wilson (1993) points out, while it is a possibility that gender differences exist
between male and female police officers, but it would be erroneous to say that
these differences are caused by biology, social conditioning, or both. Studies on
women joining police service submits that women are often made to pick
between their job as police officers and their gender identity (Martin, 1980).
Leger (1997) admits that although women in police have been the subject of
research for over two decades, they still experience discrimination from their
male colleagues in recruitment, assigning duties as well as promotion. Alemika
and Chukwuma (2003) observed that police women are not only discriminated
against in the recruitment process, they also suffer statutory discrimination on the
basis of marriage and placements. Unmarried police women are required to seek
permission to get married, a requirement which isn’t made of police men.
Alemika and Chukwuma also noted sexual harassment and intimidation against
women in the force. This could cost them their promotions and desired postings if
they refuse such demands by senior male police officers.
Race and Age

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Earlier studies by scholars suggest that differences along race and ethnic lines
exist with respect to perceptions of police work. Direct encounters with police
officers often play a significant role in the views held about police and policing
behaviour. Individual experience is more likely to change and shape attitudes
towards police (Wu, 2010; Wu and Sun, 2010; Wu et al., 2011). In the West,
white people likely to have more favourable views about police than racial
minorities, therefore police legitimacy among white groups is predictably higher
(Bobo and Tuan, 2006; Weitzer and Tuch, 2004; Wu et al., 2009).
The correlation between low perceptions of figures of authority and low approval
ratings of police organisations is often very clear (Brown and Benedict, 2002;
Garcia and Cao, 2005; Lai and Zhao, 2010; Wu et al., 2011). However, a study
by Radelet and Carter (1994) contradicts this pattern. They discovered that Black
and Latino persons often look to the police with more respect police due to daily
life challenges they face that often make reliance on police services almost
inevitable.
Furthermore, Worden (1996) observed that police officers tend to misuse force in
cases where suspects were male, black, and especially young. A look at the
Driving While Black phenomenon in Canada, it was documented by Foster
(1996) Blacks experience frequent stop and search scenarios solely on the
predication of race. Bowling and Phillips (2002) suggested that black men were
almost 10 times more likely to be pulled over and searched by police than their
white counterparts. Other non-black minorities have also been found to
encounter the same issues of racial profiling by the police. (Wortley and Tanner,
2003).
Young people, especially male, have been found to be profiled more times by the
police than any other demographic. A CLEEN (2011) study found co-operation
between young people and police in Lagos state to be very low. The reasons are
a combination of factors including the socioeconomic background of young
people which often builds negative perception of police, lack of training on how to
handle young people on the part of the police, as well as unfavourable direct
encounters by both parties.
Police Accountability
Some of the most exhaustive studies carried out regarding policing globally have
often had focus on two main aspects: accountability and reform. According to
Baramspahič and Muk a “well-structured internal control system may help in

13
detecting and preventing corruption and unlawful behaviour among police
officers. The goal of the control is to ensure that the police service operates in
line with its purpose, and that its work results in improved reputation of the police
and more efficient and responsible officers” (2015: 7).
There is wide-ranging consensus among researchers on the need to hold the
police accountable for how they perform their duties and how they interact with
citizens. There have also been overwhelming submissions to the argument that
without proper and efficient accountability systems put in place, the police is
vulnerable to being co-opted as an oppressive tool by government, or become
badly-behaved and unruly in exercising their powers for selfish reasons (Bent,
1974).
However, the sea of general consensus among scholars divides the moment the
conversation what police accountability should entail and how it can be achieved.
In fact, reaching a definition is a herculean task because police accountability
means different things in different contexts and is interpreted differently among
different people.
A large part of the early writings on police accountability arose as part of a
growing need to curb and control abuse of powers by the police. For example,
the focus was initially placed on procedures and approaches employed in daily
policing work (Goldstein, 1977). This method has remained dominant in studies
about police accountability because it zooms in on police use of power and if
they uphold societal interests in the process of protecting individual lives and
property. It has been suggested by Brogden and Shearing (1988) that
accountability is about ensuring that bestowing enormous powers on the police
remains legitimate, and simultaneously reassuring the public that police are
subject to laws and activities scrutinised.
But other researchers have contended that police accountability is beyond just
paying attention to how police agencies appraise their members for
accountability when they violate regulations (Trojanowicz, 1998). Since the police
are meant to enhance public safety by fighting and preventing crime, the police
should also be made to account for how they use their powers and resources in
the constant achievement of those goals.
Since the beginning of this century, more elements have been added in order to
expand the understanding of police accountability. These elements include risk
management, strategy communication, and gaining public trust by providing

14
assurance (Kettl, 2000). There is an almost unanimous agreement that policing is
a high-risk job. This is as a result of extent of power they’re allowed to have as
well as the high demand for the use of discretion in the execution of their duties.
This also means that there is a very high potential for abuse of power. Hence, the
overbearing need for police accountability systems to balance those risks of
power abuse with those of co-ordinated practice, standard operational
procedures and ensuring full compliance with laid down regulations (Ibid).
Communicating strategy relates establishing a clear direction on how police
operates in its various capacities in the state. This includes clarifying what is
expected of police officers in specific situations in accordance with regulations
and rule of law. This will eliminate confusion on the extent and limitation of police
powers during the course of securing life and property.
Building trust by means of 'providing assurance' to the community is argued by
Kettl (2000) to be an element of ensuring police accountability for the purpose of
transparency. He presents that when police authorities are held accountable for
their actions, citizens trust then that they obey the law and are not operating
under different set of rules. Hence, the foremost way of 'providing assurance' is
by tracking and measuring police conduct as well as performance. Perhaps it is
these needs that have propelled the adoption of two-tiered accountability
systems in the form of internal unit withing the police force as well as civilian
oversight bodies independent of the influence of the police authorities. That way,
levels of service delivery and public satisfaction with policing can be assessed
and addressed where and when necessary.
The Nigerian Context
This study primarily intends to bridge a gap and create a new path of empirical
research of policing in Nigeria. Until recently, lit studies have attempted to
simultaneously analyse statistical data on the prevalence of misconduct among
Nigerian police officers and the disciplinary outcomes of investigating them using
reports and field data from both internal units and external oversight bodies
charged with handling complaints in that regard. As observed with police
organisation around the world, the Nigeria Police force is suspicious of outsiders
and unwilling to disclose information or data regarding actions taken by their
members.
A chunk of the research that exist on policing in Nigeria is historical (Tamuno
1970, 1993, Rotimi 2001, Ahire 1991, Alemika 1993). There have been a few

15
researches conducted on policing in recent years mostly carried out by non-
governmental organisations/advocacy-oriented groups like CLEEN Foundation,
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch as well as academics in the field of
criminology. Their work asserts three basic issues: (i) NPF is unpopular and
inefficient; (ii) It is fundamentally a colonial institution that lacks meaningful
accountability and; (iii) It is disconnected from members of the public whom it’s
supposed to protect.
History and Origins
Perhaps the most researched aspect of policing in Nigeria is its historical origins
and how it affects contemporary policing. Tekena Tamuno and Phillip Ahire have
been regarded as two of the foremost scholars on the subject. Ahire (1991)
presents a radical explanation of the history of the Nigerian Police. His central
ideas argue that colonialism happened for the sole purpose of political and
economic oppression of the masses by the ruling elite; and that the members of
the NPF were designed and structured as a tool to realise the end. Ahire
classifies the 'phases' in the development of Nigerian policing into two distinct
parts: the militaristic (1860 to 1914); and the civil (1914 to 1960).
It is safe to say that works succeeding Tamuno (1970) were based on his earlier
assertions as is evident in Ahire (1991) and Onyeozili’s (1998) later explanation
as well as others. He explained that modern policing in Nigeria can be traced
back the 19th century when the Hausa Constabulary was created. It was made up
of 30 ex-slaves from Sierra Leone (Ahire, 1991; Alemika, 2010; Tamuno, 1970).
Tamuno (1970). The main purpose of the constabulary was to enforce of colonial
laws while mineral resources were forcefully extracted. Put simply, the Hausa
constabulary was created to protect the interests of colonists in Lagos colony; it
was never to serve the citizens (Onyeozili, 1998). They brought strangers to
police strangers since the 30 officers were Hausa-speaking ex-slaves from Sierra
Leone. They were totally unaware of the customs and traditional values of the
people they were meant to police. (Ahire, 1991; Onyeozili, 1998).
The occurrence, thereby, created a first impression of policing in the psyche of
citizens and this impression was riddled with distrust and unfamiliarity which
resulted in avoidance (see Ahire, 1993; Alemika, 2010; Oluwaniyi, 2011; Otu,
2012). Colonial policing saw to incessant suppression of the culture and beliefs
of the people to the benefit of colonialists (Ahire, 1991; Tankebe, 2008). It was
achieved through armed patrols, raids, arrests and detention of any person or

16
group who is perceived as having opposed the British interests (Onoge, 1993;
Tamuno, 1970). Since people saw the police establishment as something that is
fundamentally against their interests, avoiding the police and the people whose
purpose they served was seen as the only option. This further alienated the
people from the police (Alemika, 1993; Onoge, 1993). Scholars have reasoned
that these attitudes and sentiments have been passed down like cultural lore
from one generation of Nigerians to another generation, thereby keeping the
cycle of alienation from the police strong and alive (Ahire, 1991; Tamuno, 1970).
Sadly, after more than five decades of independence, many administrations have
failed to make the Police Force into an accountable and publicly-supported and
reliant institution. Instead, they have maintained a system not any different from
the colonial one; protect their personal interests and protecting mandates over
serving the public (Francis, 2012). It has also been argued by some researchers
distrusting the government has been ingrained into the daily consciousness of
Nigerians and naturally, the police are seen not only as representation of the
government but also its oppressive tool (Agbiboa, 2015; Akinlabi, 2015). And the
Nigeria Police Force has not helped in softening this perception. If anything, they
have corroborated it with their own actions.
State Policing and Community Policing
Conversations surrounding decentralisation or devolution of policing powers in
Nigeria have often been fraught with misrepresentations, misunderstanding, and
countless misses. However, literature exist of well-articulated research and
arguments for and against devolution of the Nigeria Police.
In the 30th instalment of CLEEN Foundation’s Monograph Series titled, Police
Reform in Nigeria: The Devolution Debate (2018) edited by Oliver Owen,
contributions from many known scholars in the field spans the length and breadth
of the conversation
In the Foreword by Alemika, he chronicles the history of debates for reform or
devolution of police powers in the country from 1999 to present day highlighting
key arguments and stating three levels of devolution he finds absolutely
necessary. He outlines them thus:
(a) devolving more administrative, operational and financial powers to field
managers and commanders within the centralized system, (b) deployment
of about 50% of junior officers to their states of origin, and (c)

17
 establishment of Security Board and Security Forum at the State and Local
Government Areas respectively (p.1).
He goes further to debunk the idea that the centralisation or decentralisation of a
police service is in any way linked to efficiency whereas, legitimacy and
accountability are the real harbinger of efficient policing. Also, Alemika
interpreted the comparison of Nigeria to the United States in arguments
regarding state policing as flawed and lacking fundamental knowledge of how
very different the citizenship system of both countries is and the roles they would
play in state-controlled law enforcement.
Owen’s article in the volume focused on the need for evidence-based decision
making with regard to police devolution in Nigeria. He points out that while
conversations and efforts to decentralise the police never really end, there are no
evidence or empirical data available to work with in determining what is likely to
work and what isn’t. Owen also raises the argument for local recruitment as a
model for better accountability as opposed to “stranger policing stranger” passed
down from colonial era policing. He argues that although ceding local recruit and
control to police units will likely be efficient, there are great chances of it these
units become partisan and therefore used for political oppression. In addition,
Owen submits that a large part of Nigeria’s policing problem is a result of
insufficient funding. This leads to a proliferation of seeking secondary funding
schemes, some of which are illicit. (p. 13-16)
There is at least one article each for the three positions in the volume taking the
form of positions for devolution, one against it, and one exploring the possibility
of hybridity. Hon. M. Adeniji Kazeem, the then Attorney General of Lagos State,
argues in favour of legal devolution. He approaches the conversation from the
perspective of the chief legal officer of a state with devolved policing powers. The
problems he addressed are at once practical especially in aspects where working
with a Federal law enforcement in their daily legal, and administrative operations
is required. One of which is regarding the issue of prosecutorial powers. (p. 22-
24)
Dr. Kole Shettima, presents a counter view. He highlights the damning
disadvantages of a devolved police system in the current Nigerian political
climate. He expresses concerns for the potentiality of powers concentrated in
Executives. Shettima contends that a proliferation of State Police departments
would also mean assigning more powers to lower levels of government lacking

18
the capacity and control to exercise them accountably. The result of which will be
a replication of the problems into the current police system is fraught with. He
cites the creation and failure State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECS)
as a telling example. In his conclusion, he strongly argues for social security in
the likes of healthcare, education, housing, and financial inclusion, etc. because
in the end, rise in crime rates is often inextricably linked to rising poverty. (p. 26-
29)
The case for a hybrid policing system was made by Dr. Otivie Igbuzor, a former
Commissioner of the Police Service Commission. He argues that while
devolution is necessary for more accountability and efficiency there should be a
federally-controlled ombudsman, such as Police Service Commission, that is
independent of the control of state executives. Such a system, he argues, will
ensure that standards of operation and discipline are upheld and harmonised
nationally. (p. 30-34)
In the final article on the volume, Criminology Analyst, Chukwuma Ume, zooms
in on some of the or hybrid formations that have existed since 1999. He
interrogates the power balance and issues that arose around well-known non-
state created outfits that enjoyed some level state-recognition. The OPC in the
South-West, Bakassi Boys in Abia State and other parts of South-East, and
Hisbah in Kano State. Ume reassesses these ‘experiments’ and draws a
conclusion resorting to a blanket approach to State Policing or devolution will not
do. Rather, any devolution should be beneficial, limited, and answerable to even
more principal oversight bodies. (p. 76-89)
Police Brutality
Perhaps police brutality, unnecessary use of force, and other flagrant abuse of
human rights is only second to bribery and extortion in the long list of illicit things
the Nigeria Police is infamous for and there have been ample writings exploring
the phenomenon. Onyeozili (2005) observes that one of the most prominent
complaints levelled against the Nigeria police and its officers is the casual and
brutal exercise of power.
In a pertinent exploration of the subject of brutality within the Nigeria police,
Alemika and Chukwuma (2003) posit that police brutality poses a hindrance to
great potentials of the Nigeria police. They argue that the police in Nigeria often
act with a disregard to the rule of law, often backed by corrupt unruly leaders and
unjust laws. They tend to act like they are above the laws of the land; they arrest,

19
detain, torture, extort, and kill citizens at will with little or no consequences for
their atrocious actions. They maintain that political opponents of the government
experience extreme and persistent spells of brutality, kidnappings, illegal
searches and privacy violations, intimidation, incarceration, and sometimes,
extra-judicial killings.
Torture implies the application of physical or psychological pain by the police
suspects in order to elicit information, statement, a desired action from a hesitant
suspect. While detention has to do with the confinement of a suspect under
police custody. Barnabas (2013) describes torture methods employed by the
Nigeria police on detainees in their custody:
Shooting on the hips, cigarette burns, insertion of broom sticks or pins into
the genitals of a male suspect and broken bottles into the vagina of female
suspects, beating with horse whip, electric cables and batons; electric
strokes; mock execution, removal of finger nails, denial of food and
medication. (p.73)
A similar account was presented in a Human Rights Watch report identifying
various forms of torture carried out by the police:
the flying of arms and legs of the body, suspension by hands and legs from
the ceiling, severe beatings and flogging with metal or wooden objects,
spraying of tear gas in the eyes, shooting in the foot or leg, raping female
detainees, and using pliers or electric shocks on the penis of small suspect
(2011).
Police torture is very rampant in Nigeria. It is common knowledge that police
stations across the country often have torture chambers where these acts
happen. A lot of these tortures, disguised as interrogations, have resulted in
several wrongful sentences and imprisonment of innocent people. In Nigeria,
arrest can be made with or without warrant; it is often contingent on how serious
an offence or issue at stake is (Ogbunweze, 2005). The right to liberty and free
movement is enshrined in Section 35 (1) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal
Republic of except on the reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed
a criminal offence or has shown the intention of doing so (Jegede, 1999).
However, what “reasonable suspicion” actually entails has been a thing of debate
for decades and this is even more concerning because arbitrary arrests happen

20
all the time in Nigeria. They carry out raids randomly on the streets, markets,
viewing centres, motor parks, etc. with no justifiable reasons.
Stop and Search
There have been concerns about the disproportionate or inappropriate use of
stops and searches regarding its value and whether officers are employing it
excessively or inappropriately. The manner in which officers undertake Stop and
Search can therefore have a major impact on those subject to the procedure, and
this in turn can influence community relations. The main criticism in respect of
Stop and Search has been with regard to the manner and attitude of the
searching officer(s), coupled with a lack of an explanation for the procedure. One
of the areas the Nigeria Police had lost the confidence of the public has been in
stops and searches. The campaign “#EndSARS” is a classic example of the
public distrust of the police in view of the seeming targeting of young persons by
SARS. If you are a young Nigerian, there is the possibility that you may be
stopped and harassed by police officers on patrol or on roadblocks. You get to
hear such commanding words as “park, park, park”, “what do you have in your
boot”, “what do you do for a living”, “unlock your phone”, “open your laptop”.
A stop and search scenario imply that whilst the police have the legal power to
stop and search, this must be done within the context of reasonable suspicion.
The issue is what determines reasonable suspicion? Do police officers on stop
and search rely on any intelligence and information before stopping and
searching? What is evident is that these activities have also been avenues for
extortion and other corrupt practices, including extra-judicial deaths committed by
police officers.
The reasons behind the continued antagonism between Nigeria police and
Nigerian citizens are obvious: internal corruption, brutality, unnecessary use of
force, bribery and extortion, negligence or inaction towards crime, and the
flagrant disregard for rule of law. In essence, the legitimacy of the Nigeria police
force remains questionable as a result of its unflattering reputation. However, the
integrity, and by extension, the legitimacy of the Nigeria police can be rekindled
and stabilised through creating and maintaining efficient accountability systems,
building strong cooperation with the civilian population, strongly encourage
obedience to rule of law and operational regulations, and finally, relinquishing
power where necessary. Through these steps, the Nigeria police will be on the
road to becoming one of some of the best police organisations around the world.

21
Research Questions
By drawing extensively from diverse and eloquent literature on policing around
the world and specifically in Nigeria we hope establish the fertile soil on which
our own study will grow. This study will juxtapose statistical data with theoretical
analysis achieve a better understanding of the incidence and prevalence of
misconducts committed by police officers in Nigeria. During the course of this
paper, we intend to seek answers to the following research questions:
i. What is the incidence and prevalence of misconducts committed by police
officers?
ii. How does the police authorities discipline these officers when cases are
reported?
iii. To what extent have disciplinary actions brought changes to police
conduct?
Answering the above questions will provide us with insights into the frequency of
police misconduct, patterns of behaviours, motivations for those behaviours, as
well as the extent of efficiency demonstrated by the accountability structures in
place.

22
 CHAPTER TWO
Methods of Data Collection and Analysis
Introduction
This study sets out to ascertain the prevalence of police misconduct in Nigeria
between 2019 and 2020 taking a qualitative and quantitative analytical approach.
Additionally, it seeks to understand how police authorities discipline officers who
are found guilty of complaints made, and the extent to which said disciplinary
actions have brought changes to police conduct. The last step of the study is to
find out if there is a profiling system for officer who are found guilty of these
misconducts. The methods adopted for data collection and analysis in the study
are described below.
Researchers have over the years used different methods to study police
misconduct in Nigeria. What has been missing in most of these works has been
the absence of comprehensive official data collected include g surveys, field
studies, police records, oversight agency records, and investigative reports of
various government departments delegated to look into police misconduct and
crime. Thus, previous research has failed to produce a systematic data on police
misconduct and crime.

The lack of comprehensive data has become problematic especially for

legislations, external oversight agencies and police management to develop
robust strategies to mitigate police misconduct. In addition, a comprehensive
data could help in the development and implementation of policies, strengthen
legislations, internal and external oversight mechanisms to deter police
misconduct, enhance police integrity and reduce the damage to police –
community relations.

From an academic point of view, the collection, analysis, and dissemination of

comprehensive police misconduct data could stimulate studies designed to
identify how police culture and socialization potentially contribute to the problem.
In order to achieve this, we need a comprehensive data on the types of
misconduct committed by police officers and how frequently they commit them.

Population and Sample

23
The study adopted a three-pronged research method involving harvesting
statistical data through charts, conducting interviews, and using questionnaires to
generate both quantitative and qualitative data. A major advantage of adopting
this research approach is that broadening the data collection method improves
reliability of data obtained. That way, there is a high chance of capturing
information that is missed by one method in the another.
Respondents to this study were drawn from five internal units of the police force
and three external oversight bodies. Each of the five internal unit is handled in
the same manner each external body is handled.
The different units and bodies contrast in complaint handling procedures, nature
of misconducts handled, and roles played in administering disciplinary measures.
The table below illustrate the units/organizations involved in the study and their
characteristics.
Data Collection Instruments
Two instruments were designed and used in the study to elicit quantitative and
qualitative data. These were questionnaire schedule and interview guides. The
questionnaires/in-depth interview guides were open ended to allow for generous
expression of opinions to clarify statements or reported attitudes and
perceptions. Desk officers in internal units and external bodies were questioned
on their general duties and experience with handling complaints of police
misconduct, as well as their perception of challenges faced in the process and
what they think might be possible solutions.
Reliability of Data and limitations of the study
Concerns have often been noted when it comes to analysis of available data on
police misconduct due to the general mistrust of internal police data on
complaints against its members as well as an obvious lack of a comprehensive
data storage most of the units and organisations approached.
This study approach is the first of its kind in the issue of police misconduct by the
Nigerian Police. As a result, we encountered several daunting challenges during
the course of data collection. The Nigerian Police does not analyse and make
data on complaints received and investigated readily available. Also, there are
concerns relating to bias on the part of the police units involved in handling such
matters.

24
While these are valid limitation with respect to the data that we were able to
collect, the diversity of the collated numbers and annual averages will provide us
with a close enough reality of the prevalence of misconduct in Nigeria.

The data gathered is also limited to cases in which officers have been arrested
and charged to administrative proceedings. Thus, the study could not lay its
hands on cases of police misconduct that did not come to the attention of the
police or oversight authorities.

25
 CHAPTER THREE
Procedures of Handling Complaints and Investigating Police
Misconduct
Complaints Against Police Misconduct
Complaints of misconduct by the police damage the reputation and integrity of
the Force and undermines its overall authority, power and legitimacy. There have
been structures set up to receive, investigate, and discipline misconduct by the
police. These structures include internal units and external oversight bodies as
will be outlined in subsequent paragraphs.
Internal
The Nigeria Police Force has five units responsible for conducting internal
investigations into complaints relating to different categories of misconduct
committed by police officers. These units have specific functions and scopes in
their operation as may be further explained below.

 Complaints Response Unit (CRU)

 Public Complaints Bureau (PCB)
 Provost Department
 Force Criminal Investigation Department (FCID)
 Monitoring Unit

Types of Misconduct
There are seventeen classifications of police misconduct as outlined by the
Police Act, First Schedule (Regulation 370), and Offences Against Discipline.
These misconducts range from allegations of acts or omission, either criminal or
non-criminal. These misconducts could be committed whilst off duty or on duty,
on the streets while on patrol or in the course of conducting investigations, or as
private individuals using police powers. Each category of offence is often broad
and may contain further specific acts of misconduct or misdemeanour and the
disciplinary actions that suit befit them.
Types of Internal Investigations
Investigations carried out internally into police misconduct are grouped into two
broad classifications: Non-Criminal (Disciplinary) Investigations; and Criminal
Investigations.

26
Non-Criminal (Disciplinary) Investigations
According to Section 9 of the Force Order 235 document, the Public Complaints
Bureau (PCB) of the Police force is the foremost unit charged with the
responsibility of receiving and processing complaints of police misconduct
internally. Most of the offences in the outlined offence category fall under
disciplinary offences and are treated as such. After legitimacy of the
allegation/complaint has been ascertained, the PCB forwards it to the appropriate
unit or department responsible for dealing with the specific misconduct for
investigation. If found wanting, disciplinary measures are meted out by the
Provost Department.
Criminal Investigations
If the PCB or any other investigating unit finds the offence committed by a police
officer to be criminal in nature, the case is forwarded to the X-Squad Unit of
Force Criminal Investigation Department for further investigation and
determination of guilt or innocence. Officers found guilty are treated in line with
the Police Act and charged to court.
However, some complaints made regarding police misconducts have been found
to straddle both the disciplinary and criminal offence categories as grouped in the
Force Order. The category of “Corrupt Practice” for example, can be both
Criminal and Non-Criminal and will be treated with contextual understanding of
specific cases.
External Oversight
Police Service Commission (PSC)
The Police Service Commission Act 2001 established the police service
commission, charging it with: “responsibility, among other things to appoint
persons to offices (other than the office of the inspector-general of police) in
Nigeria police force and to dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over any
person holding office in the Nigeria police force (other than the inspector-general
of police); and for related purpose.”

National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)

The National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria was established by the
National Human Rights Commission Act of 1995, as amended in 2010 with the

27
mandate to: “promote and protect all human rights.” Specifically, the Commission
has the mandate to handle all matters related to the protection of human rights in
Nigeria.

Public Complaints Commission (PCC)

The Public Complaints Commission is the machinery for the control of
administrative excesses (non- adherence to procedures or abuse of law). It is an
organ of the government set up to redress complaints lodged by aggrieved
citizens or residents in Nigeria against administrative injustice. The primary
function of the Public Complaints Commission is to provide impartial investigation
on behalf of the complainants who feel aggrieved by the action or inaction of the
government or local government or private companies.

Summary
The Police Service Commission is the primary government body tasked with
civilian oversight authority over the Nigeria Police Force. The Commission is
charged with the responsibility of reviewing decisions of the Nigeria Police,
receiving complaints from the public and engaging in practical measures to police
misconduct. The NHRC in accordance with its establishment Act of 1995 as
amended in 2010 has the responsibility of receiving and investigating complaints
relating to violations of human rights of Nigerian citizens. This includes but is not
limited to those committed by members of the Police Force. The Public
Complaints Commission on the other hand receives and redresses complaints
relating to non-adherence to procedures or abuse of law by government officials.
While the PCC receives complaints pertaining to police misconduct, Section 6 (d)
of its enabling Act prohibits it from investigating them or any other complaints
made against members of the Armed Forces in Nigeria. This implies that
although the Public Complaints Commission is restricted from directly
investigating the Police Force, it has the full powers to investigate and sanction
the Police service Commission which is the primary civilian oversight body of the
Police in Nigeria.
ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE DATA ON POLICE MISCONDUCT
This study is unable to produce a real-time account of how many complaints of
misconduct has been made against the police at any given time. Due to a lag in
handling the processes, the internal units and external agencies responsible will

28
likely continue to receive and process complaints of misconduct. As a result, this
report analyses only those public complaints lodged between January 2019 and
July 2020 for which the complaints have been handled and disposed prior to the
production of this paper.
Furthermore, due to the limited number of complaint dispositions submitted by
some units and concerns regarding the handling of certain cases, the ability of
this study to draw conclusions or provide more accurate analyses is rather
limited.
Nevertheless, while these data do not serve as accurate representation of
frequency of police misconduct in Nigeria, nor do they reflect all complaints that
have been lodged against the Force, this study will provide fair enough insights
into patterns and resulting effects of this phenomenon. It has attempted to
analyse available data, identifying shortfalls, areas of improvement and areas of
concern regarding the Police public complaint process, member conduct,
disciplinary actions and administrative shortcomings that seem worthy of note.
Received Complaints
Questionnaires distributed to Desk Officers responsible for receiving, processing,
and investigating complaints against police officers suggest that more than 60%
of all complaints are lodged by members of the public. Other sources of
complaints are fellow police officers (3%), Civil Society Organizations (19%), and
government agencies such as NHRC (14%).
The data collected for 2019 was based on all completed complaint records
received before November 16, 2018 through December 2019. While the ones
collected for 2020 cover complaints received and processed between January
and July 2020. It is, however, important to note that a comparative analysis of
2019 data and 2020 data won’t reveal any meaningful insight as to whether there
has been an increase or decrease in police misconduct since last year. This is
because this study covers only the first seven months of 2020 and all of 2019.
Internal Investigations
Complaints response Unit (CRU)
Complaints of misconduct made directly to the Nigeria Police are received
through the CRU of the NPF, investigated, and forwarded to appropriate

29
departments or units for further finding and determination of possible disciplinary
action.
These complaints are lodged through various channels, some of which are
online. With the increase in the use of smartphones, more and more complaints
are received through online channels. Below is a chart breaking down complaints
received by channels by the Complaints Response Unit of the NPF in 2019 and
2020:
Figure 1: Complaints Breakdown by Channels (CRU)

2019 2020

46
2% 239 169 12
499 11% 11% 1% 369
23% 25%

260 496
12% 33%
7 991
0% 119 46% 410
6% 28%
303
2%0%

Facebook Others Phone Call Primary Email SMS Twitter WhatsApp WhatsApp Twitter SMS Primary Email Phone Call Others Facebook

Note: “Others” include complaints received through hand-written statements, in-

person-delivery, suggestion box, verbal report.
A total of 2,046 complaints of Police misconduct were made to the CRU in 2019
and 1,439 in 2020. An analysis of the channels of receiving complaints revealed
that phone calls account for a significant percentage of usage more than the
others. 46% of received complaints made to the CRU in 2019 were by phone and
33% in 2020. This is followed closely by WhatsApp which accounts for 23% in
2019 and 25% in 2020.
A further breakdown of the CRU data reveals that while the total number of
complaints received by the unit is 2,046 in 2019 and 1,439 in 2020. The number
of offences is slightly more: 2,161(2019) and 1,489 (2020). This implies that in
some complaints, multiple types of offences were reported.
Complaints Breakdown by Offence

30
 2019
105 17 60 5
2020
5% 1% 414 4% 0% 178
16
20% 12% 1%
22
1%

1487 1179
73% 82%

Absence from duty/late for duty Breach of confidence

Discreditable conduct Improper conduct

Absence from duty/late for duty Breach of confidence

Discreditable conduct Improper conduct Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of Authority
Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of Authority

Furthermore, the data shows the “Improper Conduct” category of misconduct to

be leading disparately with 73% and 82% of total offences of 2019 and 2020
respectively. The “Improper Conduct/Professional Misconduct” category of
misconduct entails offences such as “failing to pay a lawful debt”, “possessing a
firearm for personal protection”, “verbal abuse”, “police inaction”, “Crime
Labelling”, “borrowing money from an inferior in rank”, and several other
organisational-related offences.
Following far behind is “Breach of Confidence” with 20% in 2019 and 13% in
2020. This category encompasses the following offences: (i) divulging Force
secrets; (ii) informing a person against whom a warrant has been issued of that
warrant or service of that summons; (iii) communicating to the public press about
the Force without proper authorisation; and (iv) showing a person outside the
Force any book or document belonging to the Government or the Force without
proper authorisation.
“Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of Authority” comes even farther behind
with 5% and 4% in 2019 and 2020 respectively. This category accounts for a
large portion of behaviours that members of the Police have become infamous
for among Nigerian citizens. It entails: (i) making unlawful or unnecessary arrest
without good or sufficient cause; (ii) use of unnecessary violence to any prisoner
or other person with whom he may be brought into contact in the execution of his
duty; (iii) incivility to a member of the public; (iv) unlawful search and potential
violations of human rights; (v) entering or remaining in a premises unlawfully; (vi)
failing to inform an individual for the reason for their arrest, right to counsel or

31
failing to provide an opportunity to exercise these rights; (vii) involves the
unnecessary use, display or discharge of a firearm.

X-SQUAD (FCID)
The X-Squad Unit of the Force Criminal Investigation Department (FCID) of the
NPF is the unit within the police force responsible for investigating criminal
offences committed by officers and recommending disciplinary actions where
applicable. According to the data collected from the unit a total of 22 cases were
handled in 2019 and a total of 55 in 2020.
Figure 3: Total number of complaints received by the X-Squad Unit of the
FCID (2019 and 2020)

2019 2020
7 11
32% 20%
10
45%

31
56%
13
5 24%
23%

Corrupt Practice Discreditable Conduct Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of Authority Corrupt Practice Discreditable Conduct Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of Authority

The data collected covers April 2019 to September 2020. All the offences
presented fall under 3 categories that typically suggest criminal nature in
complaints lodged. 45% of the reported cases in 2019 fall under ‘Unlawful and
Unnecessary Exercise of Authority’ and in 2020 it accounts for just 20% of total
offences. Whereas, ‘Corrupt Practice’ takes the lead in 2020 with 56% and
accounts for 32% in 2019. In both years ‘Discreditable Conduct’ appears to be
the least reported case with 23% and 24% in 2019 and 2020 respectively.
Of the 22 offences investigated by the X-Squad, 15 were referred to the Provost
Department for disciplinary action. There is no information provided as to
whether those disciplinary actions have been taken.

32
Public Complaints Bureau (PCB)
The PCB is a unit in the Nigeria Police Force that was made responsible for
receiving and investigating complaints against its officers. However, over the
years, the impact of PCB has increasingly become mild and with the creation of
newer units with similar functions, its responsibilities have become fewer. Below
is the data of complaints handled by the Bureau in 2019 and 2020:

2019 2020

7
23 21
28%
40% 36%

13
52%
1
4%
1
2% 4
16%
13
22%

Corrupt Practice Falsehood/Prevarication Corrupt Practice Falsehood/Prevarication

Neglect of Duty Unlawful and Unnecesary Exercise of Authority Neglect of Duty Unlawful and Unnecesary Exercise of Authority

A total of 58 cases were handle by the PCB in 2019 and a total of 25 in 2020.
Only a certain four category of offences feature in both years and in both years
the category, “Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of Authority” leads with 40%
and 52% in 2019 and 2020 respectively. It is followed by “Corrupt Practice”36%
and 28% in 2019 and 2020. They are followed closely by “Neglect of Duty” with
22% and 16%.

33
IGP MONITORING UNIT

Absence from duty/late for duty without leave or

2019
reasonable excuse
173 147
7% 6% 121 Breach of confidence
185 5% Corrupt Practice
7% 140
5% 19 Damage to clothing or other articles supplied
115 Discreditable conduct
234 1%
4%
9% Disobedience to Lawful Orders
147 Drinking or soliciting for drink on duty
6%
242 Keeping a house for sale of liquor
9% 125 Drunkenness/Drug Use
5%
141 Falsehood or Prevarication
5% Insubordinate or oppressive conduct
368 204
14% Malingering
118 95 8% Neglect of duty
5% 4%
Improper conduct
Uncleanliness
Unlawful Exercise of Authority

The data extracted from the documents made available by the IGP’s Monitoring
Unit appear to be largely overlapping those provided by the Provost Department
and fraught with inconsistencies. However, the data does indirectly communicate
a pressing need within the accountability system of policing in Nigeria.
In 2019, ‘Malingering’ leads in the list of offences handled with 14%, followed by
‘Neglect of Duty’ and ‘Improper Conduct’ with 9% each. ‘Drunkenness and Drug
Use’, ‘Uncleanliness’, ‘Unlawful Exercise of Authority’, and ‘Absence from Duty’
all tail behind with 8%, 7%, 10%, and 6%. ‘Damage to Clothing’ records the least
committed offence with 1%.

34
 Absence from duty/late for duty without leave or

143
2020 reasonable excuse
205 Breach of confidence
7% 10%
135 Corrupt Practice
6% 109
5% Damage to clothing or other articles supplied
140
7% 117 Discreditable conduct
5%
116 Disobedience to Lawful Orders
5% 165
8% Drinking or soliciting for drink on duty
148 Keeping a house for sale of liquor
7% Drunkenness/Drug Use
152
112 7%
5% Falsehood or Prevarication
94 184 Insubordinate or oppressive conduct
4% 114 9%
137 80 Malingering
5% 4%
6% Neglect of duty
Improper conduct
Uncleanliness
Unlawful Exercise of Authority

In 2020, ‘Absence from Duty’ leads with 10% of total handled offences, followed
closely by “Disobedience to Lawful Order” (9%), ‘Damage to Clothing’ (8%),
‘Discreditable Conduct’ (7%), ‘Improper Conduct’ (7%) and ‘Malingering’ (7%).
PROVOST DEPARTMENT
The Provost Department is the foremost disciplinary unit of the Nigeria Police. It
is charged with investigating all offences and misdemeanours carried out by
police officers in the country. It has designated sub-departments in every state
and the FCT. The Provost Department is also responsible for assigning
disciplinary actions and for executing recommended ones. Below is a breakdown
of complaints of police misconduct received by Provost Department in 2019 and
2020:

35
Total Complaints Lodged to Provost Department (2019)

2019Absence from duty

Breach of confidence
32 28
10% 9% 14 Corrupt Practice
12
4% 5%
Damage to clothing or other articles supplied
26 32 Discreditable conduct
8% 10% Disobedience to Lawful Orders
Drunkenness/ Use of drugs
24 8
8% Keeping a house for sale of liquor
3%
Falsehood or Prevarication
36
20 12% Insubordinate or oppressive conduct
6%
Malingering
29 19
9% 6% Neglect of duty
22
7% Improper conduct
2 7 Uncleanliness
1% 2%
Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of Authority

2020 Absence from duty

28 25 Breach of confidence
12% 10% 9 Corrupt Practice
9 4%
4% Damage to clothing or other articles supplied
16 Discreditable conduct
24
7% 10% Disobedience to Lawful Orders
Drunkenness/ Use of drugs
22 5 Drinking or soliciting for drink on duty
9% 2% Falsehood or Prevarication

34 Insubordinate or oppressive conduct

14% Malingering
11
5% 25 Neglect of duty
10% 12
13 5% Improper conduct
5% Uncleanliness
5 4 Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of
2% 2% Authority

Although the Provost department is the chief disciplinary body within the Police
Force, complaints are rarely made directly to the department from members of
the public, hence the disproportionately low number recorded in this study.
However, this can be explained to cover only the complaints made against police
officers in the FCT since the Force Provost Department has State offices and

36
smaller units across the country. A look at the 2019 and 2020 charts of the
provost department reveals that the highest category of offence recorded,
“Discreditable Conduct”, increased by 2% going from 12% in 2019 to 14% in
2020. This category is closely followed “Corrupt Practice” and “Unlawful and
Unnecessary Exercise of Authority” which both have 10% and 10% and 10% and
20% in 2019 and 2020 respectively.
The least recorded complaint is the “Drinking or Soliciting for Drink on Duty”
category with 1% and 2% in 2019 and 2020 respectively.
CASE DISPOSITION
Once the Provost Department has received a complaint, there are seven ways
ways that a complaint can be resolved or disposed through any of the following
ways:

 A complainant and the member(s) involved can agree to an informal

resolution.
 A complainant can request to freely and voluntarily withdraw his or her
complaint.
 A complaint can be disposed due to non-cooperation.
 A complaint can be disposed due to lack of evidence.
 A complaint can be resolved by explanation to complainant.
 A complaint can be investigated and transferred for criminal proceedings.
 A complaint can be investigated and transferred to orderly room
proceeding.

37
 2019 42
12%
24
7%
26
168 8%
49%
32
9%

29
21 8%
6%

WITHDRAWN BY COMPLAINANT ABANDONED DUE TO NON-COOPERATION

LACK OF EVIDENCE RESOLVED BY EXPLANATION TO COMPLAINANT
RESOLVED INFORMALLY LEADING TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
LEADING TO ORDERLY ROOM PROCEEDING

34 25
8%
202011%
17
6%

168
55% 22
7%

14 25
5% 8%

WITHDRAWN BY COMPLAINANT ABANDONED DUE TO NON-COOPERATION

LACK OF EVIDENCE RESOLVED BY EXPLANATION TO COMPLAINANT
RESOLVED INFORMALLY LEADING TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
LEADING TO ORDERLY ROOM PROCEEDING

In its handling of complaints, the Provost Department transferred a total of 49%

in 2019 and 55% in 2020 of all cases for orderly room proceedings – a 6%
increase. Withdrawn cases by complainants take the distant second position with
a 1% difference between them: 12% in 2019 and 11% in 2020. These figures are
consistent with the percentages reported in the previous year.

EXTERNAL

38
Police Service Commission
Of the three government agencies that receive complaints of misconduct by the
police in Nigeria, Police Service Commission is the only one charged with the
primary powers of receiving and investigating complaints, and assigning
disciplinary actions, including dismissal.
According to data received from PSC for the purpose of this study, a total
number of 219 cases of misconduct were handled and concluded by the
commission between January 2019 and September 2020. A total of 57 account
for those in 2019 while 163 represent those processed within the first nine
months of 2020.
In analysing the data, it was discovered that while the reports filed one case per
offending officer, there is approximately four offences making up a single case
against one police officer. This is the reason for the existence of a wide margin
between the number of cases versus the number of offences presented in the
succeeding analysis.
Misconduct Cases Handled by the Police Service Commission

18 11
14% 2019 9% 13
8 10%
6%

18 23
14% 18%

7
6%
5
4% 24
19%

Absence from duty/late for duty without leave Breach of confidence/Sabotage

Discreditable conduct Disobedience to Lawful Orders
Falsehood or Prevarication Insubordinate or oppressive conduct
Neglect of duty Improper conduct
Unlawful Exercise of Authority

Out of the 57 officers investigated for misconduct in 2019, a total of 116 offences
were processed with about 95% officers accused of more than three offences. In
the data gathered from the commission, it was discovered that only nine
categories of misconducts feature within the period covered with “Disobedience

39
to Lawful Orders” and “Discreditable Conduct” accounting for the highest
processed offences with 19% and 18% respectively. “Neglect of Duty” and
“Unlawful Exercise of Authority” both falling behind at 14% each.
Other offences include “Breach of Confidence” (10%) and “Improper Conduct”
(9%).

27 16
14% 2020 9% 13
7%
19
10%
31
16%
12
6%

21
11%
29
15%
9
5% 11
6%

Absence from duty/late for duty without leave Breach of confidence/Sabotage

Discreditable conduct Disobedience to Lawful Orders
Falsehood or Prevarication Insubordinate or oppressive conduct
Neglect of duty Improper conduct
Unlawful Exercise of Authority Unspecified

A total of 163 cases of misconduct were handled in 2020 by the commission with
an average of 3 cases per accused officer. “Discreditable Conduct” and
“Disobedience to Lawful Orders” account for more than 30% of all processed
cases with 17% and 15% respectively. 14% of all recorded cases in 2020 are
“unspecified”, ahead of “Neglect of Duty” (11%) and “Unlawful Exercise of
Authority” (10%) trailing behind. “Insubordinate or Oppressive Conduct” records
the least reported case with 5% in 2020.
As demonstrated by previous data appraised in this research, these set of
offences are the highlight of the prevailing frequency in police misconduct around
the country.
Misconduct by Rank
In a bid to better understand causes, symptoms and nature of police misconduct,
the collected statistical data were analysed and grouped by virtue of the ranks of
officers.

40
Findings revealed that the higher the rank the lower the instances of misconduct.
However, it is important to note that data obtained covers between the ranks of
Assistant Superintendent (ASP) and Deputy Inspector General (DIG).

2019 2020
11 12 2
2%2% 6 1%1%1% 10
11% 6%
17 14
61 9%
30% 38%
12
21% 28
17%

12
21% 8
14% 44
27%

DIG CP ACP CSP SP DSP ASP DIG DCP CP ACP CSP SP DSP ASP

The commission recorded that the rank of ASP accounts a significant percentage
of reported misconduct in both years 30% in 2019 and 38% in 2020. This is
followed DSP (21% in 2019 and 27% in 2020) and CSP (21% in 2019 and 19%
in 2020). The ranks with the least occurring case of misconduct are the Deputy
Commissioner (2% and 1%) and the Commissioner (2% and 1%) respectively.

41
Misconduct by Decision and Disposition
The Commission concluded and disposed of 90% of the cases handled in 2019
and 2020 and arrived at decisions on requisite disciplinary actions. The
remaining 10% were either pending or inconclusive as a result of some
clarification or insufficient information.
1
1 3 2%
2% 5% 2019 15
9 26%
16%

4
7%

14
10 25%
18%

REPRIMAND SEVERE REPRIMAND REDUCTION IN RANK EXONERATED

DISMISSED COMPULSORY RETIREMENT QUERY LETTER PENDING/UNCONCLUDED

13
8% 31
14
8%
2020
18%
14
8%

29
14 17%
8%

16
9%
22
17 13%
10%

REPRIMAND SEVERE REPRIMAND REDUCTION IN RANK EXONERATED

DISMISSED DISMISSED & PROSECUTED COMPULSORY RETIREMENT QUERY LETTER

PENDING/UNCONCLUDED

As for the decided disciplinary actions, “Severe Reprimand” and “Reprimand”

represent at 51% of all handled cases in 2019 divided almost equally among
them while they both account for a total of 35% of handled cases in 2020. This is

42
followed by the punishment of “Reduction in Rank” with 17% in 2019 and 13% in
2020, and “Dismissal” with 16% in 2019 and 10% in 2020. Although, in 2020 a
separate category, “Dismissal and Prosecution” accounts for 8% of case
decision. One dismissal was a posthumous one.
About 7% (2019) and 10% (2020) of officers tried were exonerated and absolved
of the accused offenses while 5% and 8% received a form of query letter either a
“Letter of Advice” or a “Letter of Warning” in 2019 and 2020 respectively.

43
 PUBLIC COMPLAINTS COMMISSION (PCC) AND NATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION (NHRC)
However, while Public Complaints Commission (PCC) and National Human
Rights Commission (NHRC) are not legally mandated to investigate and assign
disciplinary actions on offending police officers, they play significant roles in
upholding police accountability in the country.
The NHRC receives complaints of human rights violations across the country
including those committed by members of law enforcement. In a report of a
presidential set up in 2018 to investigate instances of human right abuses and
make recommendations for the reform of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad
(SARS), NHRC received a total of 113 complaints across the six geopolitical
zones and a total of 152 offences within the space of three months.
Figure: Complaints Against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad received by
NHRC (2018-2019)

Offence Category Offence Sub-category

23
15%
52
34%
43
28%
14
Corrupt Practice 9% 2 1
17
67 1% 11% 1%
44% Unlawful and Unnecessary
85. 56% Exercise of Authority

Bail/Extortion Confiscation/ Auctioning of Property Theft Torture Enforced Disappearance

Extrajudicial Killings Unlawful Arrest & Detention

The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) of the Nigeria Police was created over
two decades ago to tackle the rising spate of armed robberies across Nigeria.
More recently, SARS has grown increasingly notorious for its illegal and brutal
actions against citizens, especially young ones. Reports against it have often
been characterised by accusations of extortion, unlawful arrests, harassment,
and in some cases, extrajudicial killings.

44
56% of the reported offences fall under ‘Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of
Authority’ while 44% entail offences that can be broadly described as ‘Corrupt
Practice’. Further breaking them down into more specific offences shows that
34% relates to unlawful arrests and/or detention, followed by
confiscation/auctioning of property (28%), torture (15%) and extrajudicial killings
(9%).
The above data presents the severity of alleged accusations against SARS of the
Police Force and why aggressive investigation and accountability is important.
Summary
In conclusion, taking a wholistic look at the statistical data collected and analysed
across all five internal units and two external bodies reveal a number of things to
the critical eye.
A large number of citizens who experience police misconduct rarely lodge
complaints. Our findings tell us that more than 50% of lodged complaints end up
not being processed for one reason or the other. These reasons range from
unsubstantiated evidence to lack of willingness on the part of the police to
proceed with the investigation. However, when some of these complaints are
processed, they encounter interference of different kinds which include: lack of
funding, vested interests of high-ranking officers, politicians, traditional and
religious leaders, etc. These obstacles often affect the outcome of the
proceedings.
We also discovered that “Improper Conduct” and “Unlawful and Unnecessary
Exercise of Authority” account for almost 80% of reported cases across all units.
It is important to also note that misconduct data collected rarely includes police
officers above the rank of Superintendent. Most of the offences treated involved
only the rank and file. This is particularly suspicious because there have been
many reported instances where some of these misconducts were allowed or
even ordered by higher ranking police officers.
Also, the case disposition data rates among internal units were either
questionably low or non-existent. Reason for this was cited to be because
disciplinary actions were only carried out by the Provost Department. However,
the numbers received from the department do not corroborate the previous
claims.

45
Finally, based solely on the findings in this study, external oversight bodies,
specifically PSC and NHRC, appear to do a better job of handling complaints and
reaching decisive conclusions. This once again proves that civilian accountability
systems are the more effective in checking police excesses.

46
 CHAPTER FOUR
FACTORS AFFECTING POLICE OFFICERS’ MISCONDUCT AND
EFECTIVENESS OF ACCOUNTABILITY BODIES
Introduction
Going by the findings made in this this study and those found in existing
literature, there are several factors underpinning the phenomenon of police
misconduct. Indeed, in most cases, the data in these studies support the
literature produced in Europe and the United States. However, our collected data
and responses gotten from our field interviews/questionnaires suggest similar
factors.
The evidence confirms the assertion that the quality of service police officers
provide members of the public are affected by a number of factors. According to
King (2009), three main factors account for most of the instances of misconduct
found among police officers. These are categorised as thus: individual factors,
environmental or cultural factors, and organisational/systemic factors.
In this chapter, the above factors will be explored in the context of Nigeria Police
in order to arrive at insights that can help improve policing. Also, the
accountability procedures as well as challenges faced in procedural justice will
be explored extensively.
Individual Factors
According to responses gathered through the questionnaires distributed to desk
officers in all the previously-mentioned agencies, departments, and units, causes
of recurring acts of misconducts by police officers against members of the public
range from ignorance of laws and regulations, personal impropriety or indiscipline
to weak accountability systems. 93% percent of respondents to the question “Do
officers know the rules governing misconduct?” admitted that not all officers are
aware of the rules although some do but still violate them while 7% reported that
most of them do not know the rules. Again, 87% of respondents presented that
while the officers might know the rules against the misconducts, they are hardly
aware of the severity of specific actions and the befitting disciplinary actions and
13% confidently believe that they are aware but do not seem to care or are
confident some citizens lack the knowledge of what does or doesn’t count as
misconduct. This ignorance of their rights on the part of citizens leave room for
police officers to exploit. One of the respondents explains it thus:

47
 “People manifest their character from the family when the opportunity
presents itself on the job.”
Another prominent factor on the individual level is stress. Sigler and Thweatt
(1997) have contended that a significant body of literature lends credence to the
opinion that police work is a very stressful job, it is a globally obtainable
phenomenon. At least 90% of respondents listed “stress” or “psychological
stress” as one of the things that affect the performance of police officers on an
individual level. This speaks to the personnel capacity of the Nigeria Police. As
recommended by the United Nations, the standard police population ratio is 450
citizens to one police officer. In Nigeria however, with a police population of
about 370,000, the ratio is around 540 citizens to ne police officers. This stress is
very likely to manifest through psychological or physical stress on individual
police officers and might lead to misconduct.
Environmental and Community Factors
Societal belief systems, income level, neighbourhood crime frequency, and a
police officer’s relationship to all of these factors will play a huge role in how a
police officer will carryout tasks. The level and kinds of trouble police officers can
become involved in is partially related to the nature of their assignment and the
area in which they work (Sherman, 1978).
At least 50% of the respondents believe that a police officer’s upbringing,
community of extraction, and sets of beliefs or ideals strongly influence how
he/she carries out his/her duties. Also, kind of neighbourhood or environment
they are stationed plays a significant role as well as the effectiveness of the
justice system.
A Kane (2002) study found substantial evidence in the study of police officer
behaviour, that community characteristics affected police officer arrest decisions
and how they respond (Brown and Frank, 2006; Smith, Visher, and Davidson,
1984).
Organisational and Systemic Factors
In response to factors that cause police misconduct, 10 out of 11 respondents
mentioned corruption in the system or simply ‘corruption’ as a factor. This often
includes an unlawful order from superiors to carryout certain action, and a culture
of cover-up within the Police Force.

48
A respondent to our interview questions states in clear terms how lack of
recurrent orientation weakens the system/organisation:
“Overall, the majority of Officers especially the inspectorate, rank and file
possess a less than passable knowledge of the rules governing police
misconduct. However, a fraction of the remainder exploit civilian’s
rudimentary knowledge of these rules in order to take advantage of them.”
While there is little empirical research available with regards the organisational
factors of police misconduct, scholars have noted the importance of police
organisations in preventing or promoting misconduct (Klockars et al., 2004;
Sherman, 1978). Specifically, Klockars et al. (2004) posited that police
organisations can prevent misconduct by creating rules, designing effective
surveillance methods to detect misconduct and then uphold accountability by
punishing wrongdoers and discouraging the culture of cover-up.

49
The Path to Procedural Justice
Most of the departments and units receive complaints electronically and
manually. With the exception of the Provost Department, every other
accountability unit receive complaints electronically through emails and social
media platforms.
On receiving these complaints, the details provided are appraised to determine
fitness and establish for investigation. In cases where details are missing and
can be provided, complainants are invited to shed more light after which an
investigation will be opened on reported cases.
Assigned punishments to guilty police officers don’t seem to reflect the severity of
offences committed and therefore not perceived to be fair.
The Process: Challenges and Constraints
All respondents to our questionnaire highlight three main challenges they face
while carrying out investigation of police misconduct. These constraints often
frustrate the efficiency and final outcome of the investigations.

 Lack of Funds: Investigators often lack adequate funding required to carry

out proper investigation of complaints and are either forced to make do
with little or nothing or bear financial costs of running the operations.
 Interference (External and Internal): In addition, investigations of police
misconducts are often hindered by interference internally by senior officers
who act as protectors of the officers in charge. This is often done without
familiarising themselves with the case being handled against these
officers. This often serves as encouragement for these officers to go back
to their errant ways. Investigation with a significant vested external/public
interest can also be sources of interference either through media
organisations, politicians, Civil Society Organisation, or an influential public
figure.
 Lack of Cooperation: A third challenge highted by all the respondents is
lack of co-operation on the part of the complainant. This happens due to a
number of reasons ranging from fear of being victimised by the police, to
lack of convenience to travel or make appearances when needed. Other
reasons may be as a result of waning interest and lack of faith in the
process.
The Aftermath: Consequences

50
In most cases, the outcome of complaint proceedings is forwarded to the Provost
Department for recommended disciplinary actions to be administered. Officers
who are found guilty typically face one of the following disciplinary actions:
a. Reprimand
b. Severe Reprimand
c. Reduction in Rank
d. Dismissal
Cases that are classified as criminal are charged to court and officers are tried
both as citizens and police officers. Respondents indicated concerns that errant
officers very often aren’t afraid of consequences that don’t involve reduction in
rank or dismissal from the Force. Since more than 60% of received complaints of
misconduct do not end in either of the two, it is troubling to know that these police
officers might return to their wayward ways. As a respondent puts it:
“While it can be observed that senior ranking officers more often than not
abide by these rules, the level of enforcement when junior ranking officers
flout the rules is less than tolerable.”

The failure of existing accountability systems to mitigate officer misconduct is

perhaps one reason why police truancy still continues undeterred in Nigeria, and
why the public may believe that police officers cannot possibly police themselves
without bias. Strengthening and optimising the current accountability procedures
will help deter police misconduct and will likely engender public confidence and
faith in the system.

Profiling
While there is no centralised and accessible database where details of erring
officers are kept in the Nigerian Police, previous incidents of misconduct reflect
on their record file and can influence whether or not they will receive promotions
in the future as well as disciplinary decisions if they ever become repeat
offenders.
However, it is important to note that these records are often unreliable and not
easily trackable. This leaves room for slipperiness in the system, thereby letting
individuals who need to be under review roam free within the Force.

51
 CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusions and Recommendations
This study has analysed data depicting the prevalence of police misconduct and
how complaints are handled between 2019 to 2020. Data gathered from the
varying sources illustrate that police misconduct remain widespread and
persistent in Nigeria.
Firstly, the absence of efficient storage and use of policing data especially with
respect to misconduct is a big hindrance to achieving efficient and citizen-friendly
policing. This unfortunate situation posed a lot of challenges in the process of
collecting, analysing, and understanding the extent of police misconduct and
other circumstances around it. Gaps and holes of missing information appear in
different parts of the collected numbers.
Secondly, police misconduct in Nigeria is widespread and only a tiny fraction of
those that occur are reported. The reasons for underreporting range from
ignorance of the complaints’ making process to an entrenched mistrust, and also
due to a lack of faith in Nigeria’s justice system.
Thirdly, there is a duplicity of functions within the internal accountability systems.
And this proliferation of several accountability departments creates a lack of unity
or synergy in strategy or process of handling complaints within the Force. With
the exception of CRU, there are no clearly-defined procedures and standard that
desk officers in all departments and units are required to follow and this has
made reported cases of misconduct under investigation hard to track and
critically assessed. Again, with the exception of CRU, there were no
comprehensive periodic reports detailing and explaining statistical data on
receiving and processing complaints of police misconduct.
It is also important to note that the Police Service Commission, although
restricted by lack of authority is some jurisdictions as well as meagre funding,
proved to be the most efficient in delivering justice to citizens and discipline to
police officers. Alas, the commission too falls too far behind in global standard
and in the achievement of a desirable police accountability system.
However, a wholistic assessment of this study has provided more than peripheral
insights into the phenomenon of police misconduct. It is important to note that
although the badly-behaved officers account for only a small percentage of the

52
entire Force, they tend to interact more with the civilian population and account
for a disproportionately high amount of all complaints of police misconduct made.
This is a thing of concern because these police officers are still allowed to remain
and operate within the Force even after being found guilty of misconduct, thereby
further entrenching and promoting bad behaviour in the organisation.
Recommendations
The problem of police misconduct should be looked at through a broader societal
lens. There are a number of factors that lead to misconduct among officer. These
factors include deficiency in behavioural and regulatory trainings, systemic or
organisational culture, lack of personal responsibility and outdated legislation in
holding law enforcement officers accountable.
Training Solutions:

 A set of rigorous recruitment criteria needs to be adopted when hiring

people into the Force. This standard should be in compliance with global
best practices and followed strictly. This will allow for critical assessments
of attitudes, motivations, psychological make-up, as well as quality of more
than just basic knowledge.
 Conduct comprehensive orientation of new members of the police on rules
and consequences regarding misconduct. Routine re-orientation of active
member should also be adopted.
 Frequent behavioural training should be adopted on an annual or bi-annual
basis. This will help keep members of the police Force in sync and familiar
with the standard of behaviours always required of them during the course
of discharging their duties.
Legislative Solutions:

 The National Assembly should create legislation assigning supervisory and

prosecutorial powers to PSC, NHRC, and PCC as well as room for
scheduled public engagement and assessment of the work of civilian
oversight bodies to determine effectiveness and build faith in the system
again.
 Legislators should create legislation granting watchdog licences to Civil
Society Organisations such as CLEEN Foundation, Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, etc. to supervise and call public attention to
accountability issues where necessary.
53
  Stiff punishments should be introduced and efficiently upheld against
internal and external interference of investigations of police misconduct.
This will serve as a deterrent against persons who try to influence or
interfere with ongoing investigations.
Administrative and Systemic Solutions:

 The digitalisation of handling complaints of police misconduct should be

adopted in line with international best practices. This will not only make the
job faster and smoother, it will also make tracking and periodic evaluation
and improve easily achievable.
 The frequency of misconduct hearing/trials should be increased and
optimised for faster and fairer accountability processes.
 A comprehensive centralised database for managing and tracking
offending officers should be set up. This will enable a profiling system that
can be updated and accessed by authorised entities where and when
necessary.
 A strict quarterly and annual report breaking down complaints by regions,
ranks, offences, and outcomes should be written and made available for
public perusal. This will engender trust and a sense of accountability
towards the police among the citizens.
 Incentives for good behaviour among police officers should be employed
whereby police office are positively rewarded for good actions while
misconduct are severely punished. This has a potential of making good
behaviour competitive and misconduct undesirable.
 The existing metrics and criteria for promotions and performance
evaluations should be amended to include consideration of misconduct.
This should be made elaborate and clearly-defined by stating the type of
disciplinary action administered for an offence or the number of complaints
against a police officer. All these can serve as rationale for measuring bad
behaviour.
 In the current system, the internal control system has proved inefficient in
conducting investigations and holding itself accountable. Members of the
public treat such internal investigations with suspicion and distrust because
the police cannot be trusted to handle cases against itself without bias.
Perhaps, employing the services of independent investigators or special
prosecutors will mitigate that concern. This practice has been deemed

54
 successful in many jurisdictions and has been endorsed by the Human
Rights Watch.

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63
 APPENDIX

OFFENCE CATEGORY SUMMARY

(a) Absence from Duty or Being Late for Duty Without Leave or
Reasonable Excuse: This includes leaving, not showing up to, and being
late to an assigned post without leave or a reasonable excuse.

(b) Breach of Confidence: It includes divulging Force secrets; informing a

person against whom a warrant has been issued of that warrant or service
of that summons; communicating to the public press about the Force
without proper authorisation; showing a person outside the Force any book
or document belonging to the Government or of the Force without proper
authorisation. (benefit/entitlement,)

(c) Corrupt Practice: This category involves unduly obtaining promotion or

other advantage in the Force; giving or receiving a bribe; failing to
account for or return any property received in official capacity; soliciting,
accepting or receiving a gratuity, present, reward subscription or
testimonial without the approval of the Inspector-General; improperly
uses his character and position as a Force member for his private
advantage; in his capacity as a member of the Force, signs, writes or
gives without the approval of the Inspector-General, any testimonial of
recommendation with the object of obtaining employment for any person or
of supporting an application for the grant of a licence of any kind; or
without the approval of the Inspector-General, supports an application for
the grant of a licence of any kind. (demanding money for bail)

(d) Damage to Clothing or Other Articles: This constitutes wilfully or

negligently causing waste, loss or damage in respect of any article of
clothing or accoutrement or in respect of any book, document or other
property of the Government or of the Force issued assigned for use or in
his care; and fails to report any loss or damage to the above mentioned,
however caused.

(e) Discreditable Conduct: Acts in a disorderly manner; or assaults a

member of the Force; or acts in any manner prejudicial to discipline or

64
 unbecoming of a member of the Force - could be seen as abusive, rude,
discourteous, disrespectful, aggressive, intimidating)

(f) Disobedience to Orders: Disobeys or without good and sufficient cause

omits or neglects to carry out any lawful order written or otherwise
(involvement in civil matters).

(g) Drunkenness: If he is unfit for duty through drinking intoxicating liquor;

(h) Drinking or Soliciting Drink on Duty Without the Consent of His

Superior officer: drinks, or receives from any person, any intoxicating
liquor while he is on duty or brings liquor into barracks; or demands or
endeavours to persuade any person to give him or to purchase or obtain
for him any intoxicating liquor whilst he is on duty; entering whilst on duty
any premises for the sale of liquor or where liquor is stored and distributed.

(j) Keeping a House for the Sale of Liquor: This includes keeping a house
in his own or in any other name or directly or indirectly interested in such
house.

(k) Falsehood or Prevarication: Knowingly makes or signs a false statement

in an official document or book; wilfully or negligently makes any false,
misleading or inaccurate statement; or without good and sufficient cause,
destroys or mutilates an official document or record or alters or erases any
entry therein.

(l) Insubordinate or Oppressive Conduct: This constitutes being

insubordinate by word or demeanour; being oppressive or tyrannical in his
conduct relating to an inferior in rank; uses obscene, abusive or insulting
language to a member of the Force; wilfully or negligently makes a false
complaint or statement against an inferior in rank.

(m) Malingering: Feigning or exaggerating any sickness or injury with a view

to evading duty.

(n) Neglect of Duty: This is a broad category that encompasses alleged

behaviour that a member failed to or refused to perform a duty or provide

65
 an expected service. Neglects, or without good and sufficient cause omits
promptly and diligently to attend to or to carry out anything which is his
duty as a member of the Force; this includes those committed by omission
or deliberate neglect - includes failure to identify oneself, mismanagement
of public complaints, inadequate investigations, improper care of prisoners,
failure to release detained persons into a safe environment, and failure to
provide appropriate medical care. This category could also include
allegations of deficient reporting related to notebooks, investigations,
reports.

(o) Improper Conduct: This includes lending money to a superior or

borrowing money from an inferior; failing to pay a lawful debt; operating in
any trade, business or profession or accepts any other paid employment
without proper authority; possessing a firearm for personal protection;
making an anonymous communication to the Inspector-General or to a
superior police officer; canvassing the Inspector-General or any superior
police officer or other servant of the Government with regard to any matter
concerning the Force; or signs or circulates a petition or statement with
regard to any matter concerning the Force except through the proper
channel of correspondence to the Inspector-General (professional
misconduct).

(p) Uncleanliness: While on duty or off duty in uniform in a public place, is

improperly dressed or is dirty or untidy in his person, clothing or
accoutrements. (dirty in person)

(q) Unlawful or Unnecessary Exercise of Authority: This includes making

an unlawful or unnecessary arrest without good or sufficient cause; uses
any unnecessary violence to any prisoner or other person with whom he
may be brought into contact in the execution of his duty; or is uncivil
to a member of the public; unlawful search and potential violations of
human rights; entering or remaining in a premises unlawfully; This
category involves allegations of failing to inform an individual for the
reason for their arrest, right to counsel or failing to provide an opportunity
to exercise these rights (includes allegations of inappropriate or
excessive use of force; involves the use, display or discharge of a
firearm). (uncivil to members of the public. Traffic related offences)

66
67
 CASE DISPOSITION BY DECISION – 2019
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………
No. of No. OF No. OF No. of No. No. OF No. OF
S/ OFFENCES/ COMPLAIN COMPLAIN COMPLAINT COMPLAIN OFSCOMPL COMPLAIN COMPLAI
N MISCONDUC TS TS S UN- TS AINTS T NTS
T WITHDRAW ABANDON SUBSTANTI RESOLVED RESOLVED SLEADING LEADING
N BY ED DUE TO ATED BY BY BY WITH TO TO
COMPLAIN NON- AVAILABLE EXPLANATI RESOLUTIO CRIMINAL ORDERLY
ANT? COOPERAT EVIDENCE? ON TO N WITH PROCEEDI ROOM
ION OF COMPLAIN COMPLAINA NGS? PROCEED
COMPLAIN ANT? NT? ING?
ANT?
1 Absence
from
duty/late for
duty without
leave or
reasonable
excuse
2 Breach of
confidence
3 Corrupt
Practice
4 Damage to
clothing or
other articles

68
 supplied
5 Discreditable
conduct
6 Disobedienc
e to Lawful
Orders
7 Drunkenness
/ Use of
drugs
8 Drinking or
soliciting for
drink om
duty
9 Keeping a
house for
sale of liquor
1 Drunkenness
0 /Drug Use
1 Falsehood or
1 Prevarication
1 Insubordinat
2 e or
oppressive
conduct
1 Malingering
3
1 Neglect of
4 duty

69
1 Improper
5 conduct
1 Uncleanlines
6 s
1 Unlawful and
7 Unnecessary
Exercise of
Authority

TOTAL
CASE DISPOSITION BY DECISION – 2020
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE---
No. of No. OF No. OF No. of No. No. OF No. OF
S/ OFFENCES/ COMPLAIN COMPLAIN COMPLAINT COMPLAIN OFSCOMPL COMPLAIN COMPLAI
N MISCONDUC TS TS S UN- TS AINTS T NTS
T WITHDRAW ABANDON SUBSTANTI RESOLVED RESOLVED SLEADING LEADING
N BY ED DUE TO ATED BY BY BY WITH TO TO
COMPLAIN NON- AVAILABLE EXPLANATI RESOLUTIO CRIMINAL ORDERLY
ANT? COOPERAT EVIDENCE? ON TO N WITH PROCEEDI ROOM
ION OF COMPLAIN COMPLAINA NGS? PROCEED
COMPLAIN ANT? NT? ING?
ANT?
1 Absence
from
duty/late for
duty without

70
 leave or
reasonable
excuse
2 Breach of
confidence
3 Corrupt
Practice
4 Damage to
clothing or
other articles
supplied
5 Discreditable
conduct
6 Disobedienc
e to Lawful
Orders
7 Drunkenness
/ Use of
drugs
8 Drinking or
soliciting for
drink om
duty
9 Keeping a
house for
sale of liquor
1 Drunkenness
0 /Drug Use
71
1 Falsehood or
1 Prevarication
1 Insubordinat
2 e or
oppressive
conduct
1 Malingering
3
1 Neglect of
4 duty
1 Improper
5 conduct
1 Uncleanlines
6 s
1 Unlawful and
7 Unnecessary
Exercise of
Authority

TOTAL
COMPLAINTS DISPOSAL TIMELINE – 2019
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE ___________________

S/N OFFENCE DAYS WEEKS MONTHS YEARS

1. Absence from duty/late for duty without leave or
reasonable excuse

72
2.        Breach of confidence
3.        Corrupt Practice
4.        Damage to clothing or other articles supplied
5.        Discreditable conduct
6.        Disobedience to Lawful Orders
7.        Drunkenness/ Use of drugs
8.        Drinking or soliciting for drink om duty
9.        Keeping a house for sale of liquor
10.      Drunkenness/Drug Use
11.     Falsehood or Prevarication
12.     Insubordinate or oppressive conduct
13.     Malingering
14.     Neglect of duty
15.     Improper conduct
16.     Uncleanliness
17.     Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of Authority

TOTAL

73
 COMPLAINTS DISPOSAL TIMELINE – 2020

DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………

S/N OFFENCE DAYS WEEKS MONTHS YEARS

1. Absence from duty/late for duty without leave or
reasonable excuse
2.        Breach of confidence
3.        Corrupt Practice
4.        Damage to clothing or other articles supplied
5.        Discreditable conduct
6.        Disobedience to Lawful Orders
7.        Drunkenness/ Use of drugs
8.        Drinking or soliciting for drink om duty
9.        Keeping a house for sale of liquor
10.      Drunkenness/Drug Use
11.     Falsehood or Prevarication
12.     Insubordinate or oppressive conduct
13.     Malingering
14.     Neglect of duty
15.     Improper conduct
16.     Uncleanliness
17.     Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of Authority

TOTAL

74
 TYPES OF OFFICER MISCONDUCT- 2019
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………
S/N OFFENCE NO. NO. UNDER NO. NO. NO. SENT FOR
REPORTE INVESTIGATIO INVESTIGATE CHARGED CRIMINAL
D N D TO INVESTIGATIO
ORDERLY N
ROOM
1.      Absence from duty/late for
duty without leave or
reasonable excuse
2.      Breach of confidence
3.      Corrupt Practice
4.      Damage to clothing or other
articles supplied
5.      Discreditable conduct
6.      Disobedience to Lawful
Orders
7.      Drunkenness/ Use of drugs
8.      Drinking or soliciting for
drink om duty
9.      Keeping a house for sale of
liquor
10.     Drunkenness/Drug Use
11.     Falsehood or Prevarication
12.     Insubordinate or oppressive
conduct
75
13.     Malingering
14.     Neglect of duty
15.     Improper conduct
16.     Uncleanliness
17.     Unlawful and Unnecessary
Exercise of Authority

TOTAL

76
 TYPES OF OFFICER MISCONDUCT- 2020
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………
S/N OFFENCE NO. NO. UNDER NO. NO. NO. SENT FOR
REPORTE INVESTIGATIO INVESTIGATE CHARGED CRIMINAL
D N D TO INVESTIGATIO
ORDERLY N
ROOM
1.      Absence from duty/late for
duty without leave or
reasonable excuse
2.      Breach of confidence
3.      Corrupt Practice
4.      Damage to clothing or other
articles supplied
5.      Discreditable conduct
6.      Disobedience to Lawful
Orders
7.      Drunkenness/ Use of drugs
8.      Drinking or soliciting for
drink om duty
9.      Keeping a house for sale of
liquor
10.     Drunkenness/Drug Use
11.     Falsehood or Prevarication
12.     Insubordinate or oppressive
conduct
13.     Malingering

77
14.     Neglect of duty
15.     Improper conduct
16.     Uncleanliness
17.     Unlawful and Unnecessary
Exercise of Authority

TOTAL

NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST MISCONDUCT BY RANK – 2019

DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………

S/N OFFENCE CP DC ACP CSP SP DSP ASP INS SG CPL PC CSP

P T
1.        Absence from duty/late for
duty without leave or
reasonable excuse
2.        Breach of confidence
3.        Corrupt Practice
4.        Damage to clothing or other
articles supplied
5.        Discreditable conduct
6.        Disobedience to Lawful
Orders
7.        Drunkenness/ Use of drugs
8.        Drinking or soliciting for drink
om duty

78
9.        Keeping a house for sale of
liquor
10.     Drunkenness/Drug Use
11.     Falsehood or Prevarication
12.     Insubordinate or oppressive
conduct
13.     Malingering
14.     Neglect of duty
15.     Improper conduct
16.     Uncleanliness
17.     Unlawful and Unnecessary
Exercise of Authority

TOTAL

79
 NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST MISCONDUCT BY RANK – 2020
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………

S/N OFFENCE CP DC ACP CSP SP DSP ASP INS SG CPL PC CSP

P T
1.        Absence from duty/late for
duty without leave or
reasonable excuse
2.        Breach of confidence
3.        Corrupt Practice
4.        Damage to clothing or other
articles supplied
5.        Discreditable conduct
6.        Disobedience to Lawful
Orders
7.        Drunkenness/ Use of drugs
8.        Drinking or soliciting for drink
om duty
9.        Keeping a house for sale of
liquor
10.     Drunkenness/Drug Use
11.     Falsehood or Prevarication
12.     Insubordinate or oppressive
conduct
13.     Malingering
14.     Neglect of duty
15.     Improper conduct

80
 16.     Uncleanliness
17.     Unlawful and Unnecessary
Exercise of Authority

TOTAL

NUMBER OF CASE DISPOSITION – BY SANCTIONS – 2019

DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………
S/N RANK DISMISS REDUCTIO WITHHOLDING REPRIMA WARNI FINE CONFINEME FATIGU APPE
AL N IN RANK OR ND NG NT TO ES/ LS
DEFERMENT OF BARRACKS DRILL/
INCREMENT OTHER
1 CP

2 DCP

3 ACP

4 CSP

5 SP

6 DSP

7 ASP

8 INSP

81
9 CPL

10 PC

TOTA
L

NUMBER OF CASE DISPOSITION – BY SANCTIONS – 2020

DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………
S/N RANK DISMISS REDUCTIO WITHHOLDING REPRIMA WARNI FINE CONFINEME FATIGU APPE
AL N IN RANK OR ND NG NT TO ES/ LS
DEFERMENT OF BARRACKS DRILL/
INCREMENT OTHER
1 CP

2 DCP

3 ACP

4 CSP

5 SP

82
6 DSP

7 ASP

8 INSP

9 CPL

10 PC

TOTA
L

NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS LODGED

DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………
S/N OFFENCE 2019 2020
1 Absence from duty/late for duty without leave or reasonable
excuse
2        Breach of confidence
3        Corrupt Practice
4        Damage to clothing or other articles supplied

83
5        Discreditable conduct
6        Disobedience to Lawful Orders
7        Drunkenness/ Use of drugs
8        Drinking or soliciting for drink om duty
9        Keeping a house for sale of liquor
10      Drunkenness/Drug Use
11     Falsehood or Prevarication
12     Insubordinate or oppressive conduct
13     Malingering
14     Neglect of duty
15     Improper conduct
16     Uncleanliness
17     Unlawful and Unnecessary Exercise of Authority

TOTAL

OFFENCES INVESTIGATED AGAINST OFFICERS – CP (2019 - 2020)

DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………
S/N OFFENCE NATURE/BRIEF OF OFFFENCE OUTCOME OF
INVESTIGATION
1.

2.

84
3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

85
 OFFENCES INVESTIGATED AGAINST OFFICERS – DCP (2019 - 2020)
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………
S/N OFFENCE NATURE/BRIEF OF OFFFENCE OUTCOME OF
INVESTIGATION
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

86
87
 OFFENCES INVESTIGATED AGAINST OFFICERS – ACP (2019 - 2020)
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………………………
S/N OFFENCE NATURE/BRIEF OF OFFFENCE OUTCOME OF
INVESTIGATION
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

88
89
 OFFENCES INVESTIGATED AGAINST OFFICERS – CSP (2019 - 2020)
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE…………………………………………
S/N OFFENCE NATURE/BRIEF OF OFFFENCE OUTCOME OF
INVESTIGATION
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

90
91
 OFFENCES INVESTIGATED AGAINST OFFICERS – SP (2019 - 2020)
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE………………………………………
S/N OFFENCE NATURE/BRIEF OF OFFFENCE OUTCOME OF
INVESTIGATION
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

92
 OFFENCES INVESTIGATED AGAINST OFFICERS – DSP (2019 - 2020)
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE……………………………………………
S/N OFFENCE NATURE/BRIEF OF OFFFENCE OUTCOME OF
INVESTIGATION
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

93
 7.

OFFENCES INVESTIGATED AGAINST OFFICERS – ASP (2019 - 2020)

DEPARTMENT/OFFICE…………………………………………
S/N OFFENCE NATURE/BRIEF OF OFFFENCE OUTCOME OF
INVESTIGATION
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

94
 6.

7.

OFFENCES INVESTIGATED AGAINST OFFICERS – INSPECTORS (2019 - 2020)

DEPARTMENT/OFFICE…………………………………
S/N OFFENCE NATURE/BRIEF OF OFFFENCE OUTCOME OF
INVESTIGATION
1.

2.

3.

4.

95
5.

6.

7.

96
 OFFENCES INVESTIGATED AGAINST OFFICERS – SGT (2019 - 2020)
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE………………
S/N OFFENCE NATURE/BRIEF OF OFFFENCE OUTCOME OF
INVESTIGATION
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

97
 OFFENCES INVESTIGATED AGAINST OFFICERS – CPL (2019 - 2020)
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE………………
S/N OFFENCE NATURE/BRIEF OF OFFFENCE OUTCOME OF
INVESTIGATION
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

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7.

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 OFFENCES INVESTIGATED AGAINST OFFICERS – PC (2019 - 2020)
DEPARTMENT/OFFICE…………………………………………………………
…
S/N OFFENCE NATURE/BRIEF OF OFFFENCE OUTCOME OF
INVESTIGATION
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

100
7.

101
APPRAISAL OF AVAILABLE STATISTICS ON FREQUENCY OF REPORTED
OFFENCES AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS.
DEPARTMENT/ OFFICE…………………….

1. Through which platforms/mediums do you receive complaints of officer

misconduct?
2.
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
3. What are the first steps taken after a complaint against an officer has been
received?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
4. From your experience in this department how often does police
misconduct occur?
___________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
5. Do officers in this agency know the rules governing police misconduct?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
6. How strongly do they support those rules?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________

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7. Do officers know what disciplinary threat they face if they violate these
rules?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________

8. Do they think the discipline is fair?

___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________

9. What kind of challenges do you face when conducting investigations?

___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
10. Do you sometimes experience interference (internal or external)
when conducting investigations? If yes, what kind of interference?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
11. Does public pressure affect how the investigative process is carried
out? If yes, how?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________

12. Do you get cooperation and support from the police when
conducting investigations? If yes, what kind of cooperation?

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 ___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________

13. Do you receive cooperation from complainants when handling their

cases? If no, explain.
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
14. Do the accused officers cooperate with your investigation? If no,
what happens afterwards?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
15. What kind of disciplinary measures do officers face when they’ve
been investigated and found guilty?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
16. Do the disciplinary actions have an effect on their future conducts? If
yes, how? If no, why do you think this is so?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
17. Does finding an officer guilty have future implications for their
career? If yes, how? If no, why not?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________

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18. Are there special supervisory or probationary programs that
offending officers are required to partake in as part of their disciplinary
requirements?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
19. What kinds of offences can lead to ultimately dismissing an officer
from the Police Force?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
20. How many ways are complaints resolved/disposed? What are they?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
21. From your experience, what would you say are the factors that make
officers to commit these misconducts?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
22. In your opinion, what do you think should be done to prevent future
reoccurrence of misconduct among police officers?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
23. What has been your experience in handling cases involving police
misconduct generally?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
24. What specific lessons have you learnt in investigating police
misconduct over the years?

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 ___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
25. Do you communicate these lessons to appropriate police
authority/department?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
Are these lessons, when communicated, transmitted into policy or
operational changes in the system/investigative process? If yes, can you
name any policy changes that took place as a result of lessons learnt? If
No, what do you think prevented policy changes?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
26. What changes do you think should be introduced in managing police
misconduct?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
27. What actions should police management take in preventing the
incidence of police misconduct?
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________

106