Professional Documents
Culture Documents
281347069
281347069
RTC:
The court denied the Motion to Dismiss by the oppositors and grants
the application of the petitioner in the titling of the said lot.
CA:
The CA reverse the decision of the RTC and ruled that the
classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative
of the executive department of the government and in the absence of
such classification; the lands remain as unclassified until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Issue:
Whether or not lot no. 2372 of the ilog cadastre is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain and the alleged
1
possession of the applicants through their predecessors-in-
interest is sufficient to sustain their claim for prescription
Ruling:
The court held that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State and the burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable
or disposable.
In the case at bar, the petitioner failed to prove that (1) the subject
property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of
the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and
registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.
The fact that no third person appeared before the RTC to oppose the
petitioner’s application for registration is also irrelevant. The burden
of proof imposed by law on petitioner does not shift. Indeed, a
person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the
basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must
prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove
his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the
evidence of the oppositors. Furthermore, the court has the bounden
duty, even in the absence of any opposition, to require the petitioner
to show, by a preponderance of evidence and by positive and
absolute proof, so far as possible, that he is the owner in fee simple
of the lands which he is attempting to register
The Survey Plan and Technical Description of the subject property
submitted by petitioner merely plot the location, area and boundaries
thereof. Although they help in establishing the identity of the property
sought to be registered, they are completely ineffectual in proving that
7
petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest actually possessed the
subject property in the concept of an owner for the necessary period.
Facts:
8
in favor of the complainant indigenous people and recommended to
DENR to cancel Alcantara’s renewed FLGLA No. 542 and declare the
area as ancestral lands of the B’laans. Alcantara filed before the
Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the decision of the COSLAP, but
the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the COSLAP, ruling that the
issues and arguments it raised had all been addressed squarely in
the Supreme Court's decision in G.R. No. 145838 which upheld the
COSLAP's decision and which had long become final and executory.
Issue(s):
Whether petitioner, based on his alleged residual rights, may continue
his enjoyment of the land up to the expiration of FLGA No. 542 on
December 31, 2018;
Whether respondents DENR officials committed grave abuse of
discretion in implementing the COSLAP's decision.
Ruling:
The question whether FLGLA No. 542 is valid has been settled
conclusively in G.R. No. 145838 in which the Court made final finding
that FLGLA No. 542 was issued illegally, and that it was made in
violation of prevailing laws. It was likewise declared that FLGLA No.
542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 410 which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands
forming part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral
lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and
these lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be
distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural
group concerned. Petitioner’s alleged "residual right" has no legal
basis and contradicts his admission that FLGLA No. 542 has been
declared invalid by the Court in its decision in G.R. No. 145838.
Petitioner has had no residue of any right and no entitlement to the
land, from the very beginning.
The Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent DENR officials in their implementation of the COSLAP
decision, FLGLA No. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the
State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources and
public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under the
Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land
grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action,
can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or modified,
whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. Thus, a
9
privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys
protection under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the
Constitution. In cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict
with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the
supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of the State.
Such a privilege or license is not even a property or property
right, nor does it create a vested right; as such, no irrevocable
rights are created in its issuance.
Facts:
10
their claim. On 29 October 2001, the court a quo issued an Order
granting the application for registration of title of the subject property.
Feeling aggrieved, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals,
alleging that petitioners’ own evidence tends to show that the subject
property is not alienable and disposable because it was a salt bed
and a fishpond and under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
except for agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. Likewise, under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. On 23 August 2004, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the Republic, thus,
overturning the Order of the court a quo.
Issue:
Held:
NO. It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. However, such presumption is not conclusive. It can be
rebutted by the applicant’s presentation of incontrovertible evidence
showing that the land subject of the application for registration is
alienable and disposable.
12
i. Effect of the Regalian Doctrine: All lands of the public domain
belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to
an asserted ownership of land. Property of the public domain is
beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of the private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
REPUBLIC VS HEIRS OF LACHICA-SIN
GR. NO. 157485
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred on a question of law in upholding
respondents’ claim to supposed “private rights” over subject land
despite the DENR certification that it is classified as timberland.
Ruling:
The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which
respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject
property, through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it
was declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960. It must be
noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the
Property Registration Decree.
The Court held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest
under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from
June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. With respect to the second
requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was
alienable and disposable before 1960, citing petitioner’s failure to
show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a
timberland before its formal classification as such on said year. In
Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic, the members of this Court were in
disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable
after June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement that there must
be a declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the
burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do
so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-
interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights
within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property. The SC grant
14
the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss the civil case for lack of
merit.
Ruling:
No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title
to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:
16
“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that
when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has
been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never
to have been public land.”
Facts:
Ruling: The RTC and CA ruled that the Proclamation No. 1801 was
not a legal impediment in the titling of lands in Boracay Islands. The
CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a
declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were
part of a forest reserve.
19
i. But: University Land Awarded to Indigenous People voided
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
GR NO. 184869
Facts:
This case involves the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation
appropriating state university property to be allocated to indigenous
peoples and cultural communities.
Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered
educational institution owned and run by the State. In 1958 President
Garcia issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401
hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as
school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over
3,080 hectares of those lands.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after forty-five years (January 7,
2003) issued Presidential Proclamation 310. Said proclamation takes
670 hectares from CMU’s registered lands for distribution to
indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan,
Maramag, Bukidnon.
CMU subsequently filed a petition to declare the presidential
proclamation as unconstitutional.
RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional,
being a valid State act. More so, the RTC posited that the ultimate
owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in
its behalf.
20
Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 310 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. Presidential Proclamation No. 310 is unconstitutional for being
contrary to law and public policy.
CMU is a school established to promote agriculture and industry; as
such the need for a vast tract of agricultural land for future programs
of expansion is justified. When President Garcia issued Proclamation
No. 476 exempting from sale or settlement and reserving for
the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land
reservation of 3,080 hectares is for the promotion of the school’s
agriculture and industry.
Through the years the CMU lands were used to support the
expanding activities of the school in the fields of agricultural
technology and scientific research. It is in Bukidnon that it was built,
so that there are enough resources and wide open spaces. These are
needed fro an agricultural educational institution to grow, and for the
furtherance of development and training of future farmers of
Mindanao.
The taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for
educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is
a gross misinterpretation of law.
Indeed ,the education of the youth and agrarian reform are among
the highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In
this case, neither have to be compromised. Certainly, there must still
be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land
reservation which can be allocated to qualified beneficiaries.
The decision in this case is of optimum significance. This ruling
concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and
research facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the
exemptions from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARP).
State colleges and universities like the CMU are the country’s conduit
towards scientific and technological advancement in the field of
agriculture, which is apparently an important field in our society.
Still, the proclamation of President Arroyo is immaterial, for the lands
in dispute ceased to be alienable public lands from the time President
Garcia dedicated them for CMU’s use in scientific and technological
research in the field of agriculture.Thus, the petition of the CMU
asking for the unconstitutionality of Proclamation No. 310 is granted.
21
C. The Problem of Registration and the Present Challenge
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987April 29, 2009
Facts:
Issues:
Ruling:
Ruling:
26
b. Purpose of Registration
CONSUELO LEGARDA vs. N.M.SALEEBY
G.R.No. L-8936 October 2,1915
Facts:
The plaintiffs, Consuelo and Mauro, and the defendant, Saleeby, are
owners of adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Between the said lots was a stone wall which is located on the lot of
the plaintiffs. On the 2nd day of March, 1906, the plaintiffs presented
a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their
lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of
October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be
registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for
under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included
the wall. Subsequently, the defendant presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied
by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the
registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for
under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the
petition of the defendant also included said wall. On December
13,1912, the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been
included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in
the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented
a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and
correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties.
However, the lower without notice to the defendant, denied said
petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for
the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name
of the defendant. The decision of the lower court is based upon the
theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant
was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was
binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it.
Issue:
27
Who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons?
Ruling:
The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would
seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title
then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with
registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has
been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has
been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by
the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all.
Facts:
28
A parcel of land (Lot No. 1253) situated in Atabay, San Jose, Antique
was owned by Zoilo Labiao as per Original Certificate of Title No. RO-
2301 issued on March 3, 1931. Sometime in 1931, Zoilo died.
Subsequently, on May 12, 1986, Loreto Labiao, son of Zoilo, sold to
Gabino Vagilidad Jr. a portion of Lot No. 1253, measuring 1,604
square meters as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Loreto.
Zoilo’s children Loreto, Efren Labiao and Priscilla Espanueva, in view
of their father’s death, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
dated January 20, 1987, adjudicating the entire Lot No. 1253,
covering 4,280 square meters, to Loreto. On January 29, 1987,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-16693 was issued in favor of
LORETO, EFREN and PRISCILLA, but on even date, TCT No. T-
16693 was cancelled and TCT No. T-16694, covering the said
property, was issued in the name of LORETO alone.
On July 31, 1987, Gabino Jr., as petitioner, filed a Petition for the
Surrender of TCT No. T-16694, covering Lot No. 1253 against
LORETO, docketed as Cadastral Case No. 87-731-A. The parties
however seemed to have already reached an amicable settlement
without the knowledge of their counsels, the trial court issued an
Order dated March 21, 1994 sending the case to the archives.
Gabino Jr. paid real estate taxes on the land he bought from Loreto
as per Tax Declaration No. 1038 where the property was specified as
Lot No. 1253-B. Gabino Jr. thereafter sold the same lot to Wilfredo
Vagilidad as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989. On
the same date, Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land involving
the opt-described property was also executed by Loreto in favor of
Wilfredo.
On February 14, 1990, the sale of Lot No. 1253-B to Wilfredo was
registered. Consequently, TCT No. T-18023, cancelling TCT No.
16694, was issued in favor of Wilfredo pursuant to the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989. Spouses Wilfredo and Lolita
obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank in the amount of
P150,000.00 and mortgaged Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the said
loan and the transaction was inscribed at the back of TCT No. 18023
as Entry No. 186876. Subsequently, the real estate mortgage was
cancelled under Entry No. 191053 as per inscription dated November
17, 1992 in TCT No. 18023.
Subsequently, Wilfredo obtained another loan from Development
Bank of the Philippines in the amount of P200,000.00 and mortgaged
29
Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the loan and the transaction was
inscribed at the back of TCT No. 18023 as Entry No. 196268. The
said loan was paid and, consequently, the mortgage was cancelled
as Entry No. 202500.
Spouses Gabino and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad, as plaintiffs, filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages.
But Wilfredo claimed that they are the owner the land because they
already bought it to from the former owner who sold the same to
Gabino. Then Gabino claimed that Wilfredo resort to fraud to obtain
ownership of the said property. They raised that defendant Wilfredo
requested Gabino Jr. to transfer the ownership of Lot No. 1253-B in
defendant Wilfredo’s name for loaning purposes with the agreement
that the land will be returned when the plaintiffs need the same. They
added that, pursuant to the mentioned agreement, plaintiff Gabino Jr.,
without the knowledge and consent of his spouse, Dorothy, executed
the Deed of Sale dated December 7, 1989 in favor of defendant
Wilfredo receiving nothing as payment therefor.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. Gabino, Jr. and Dorothy
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The mere fact that Loreto sold a definite portion of the co-owned
lot by metes and bounds before partition does not, per se, render the
sale a nullity. We held in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong that the fact that
an agreement purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned
property does not render the sale void, for it is well-established that
the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is
legally possible to do so.
In the case at bar, the contract of sale between Loreto and Gabino,
Jr. on May 12, 1986 could be legally recognized. At the time of sale,
Loreto had an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square meter
30
property or some 1,426 square meters but sold some 1,604 square
meters to Gabino, Jr. We have ruled that if a co-owner sells more
than his aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only his
share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
sale. Be that as it may, the co-heirs of Loreto waived all their rights
and interests over Lot No. 1253 in favor of Loreto in an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987. They declared that they
have previously received their respective shares from the other estate
of their parents Zoilo and Purificacion. The rights of Gabino, JR. as
owner over Lot No. 1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not
effectively transferred by Loreto to Wilfredo in the Deed of Absolute
Sale of Portion of Land. Nor were these rights alienated from Gabino,
Jr. upon the issuance of the title to the subject property in the name of
Wilfredo. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring
ownership. Its alleged incontrovertibility cannot be successfully
invoked by Wilfredo because certificates of title cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud.
Facts:
31
mother, Urbana Kalaw and sister, Perla Moratilla, co-owned Lot
13713, 15,000 square-meter, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
When the petitioner verified the property, she found out that the
application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion
of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713, to
residential, commercial, and recreational uses was approved and the
property was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or
patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership
Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Petitioner bought Raquel’s 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot and was then
issued Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, indicating that she owned 5,000
square meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other
10,000 square meters.
When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes, she was shocked
to that, without giving her notice, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A
was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and
overlapping with the 105,648 square meter parcel of land known as
Lot 1-B, both in the name of Francisco Catigbac. The reverse side of
TCT No. 129642 bore three entries, reflecting the supposed sale of
Lot 1-B to Summit Realty.
33
issued in the name of Catigbac, instead of Summit Realty.
Issue:
Ruling:
i. PNB vs CA
153 SCRA 435
Facts:
Montemayor mortgaged to PNB three lots covered by Torrens
Certificate of Title to guarantee the loan granted by PNB to Jaramilla,
35
Bacani and Vitug. Since Jaramilla, Bacani and Vitug failed to pay
their loans, the lots were foreclosed and sold at public auction.
Certificate of sale was then issued to PNB for being the highest
bidder.
It was then found that the subject properties used as guarantees for
mortgage were conjugal properties of spouses Montemayor and
Vitug. The heirs of Vitug with his first wife question the validity of the
mortgage and pray for the declaration of the public auction as void.
Issue:
Is the Torrens Certificate of Title conclusive?
Ruling:
Yes. The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing
with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man make
such inquiry. A Torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership
of the land covered by a final degree of registration.The PNB had a
reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the
properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee
in goodfaith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties
were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the
mortgagor.
ii. Limitations:
Merely confirms pre-existing right; not a means of
acquiring ownership
Facts:
36
Sixto Dumolong, married to Isabel Marquez, was originally awarded a
parcel of land in Capiz in 1927. Sixto and Isabel whose marriage was
not blessed with any child lived separately since 1920. Subsequently,
Sixto cohabited extramaritally with Placida Dumolong with whom he
had a son by the name of Renito Dumolong and other children.
About three months later, the spouses sold the lot for P40,000.00 to
petitioner-spouses Antonio Bornales and Florenda Diaz Bornales
through a Deed of Absolute Sale.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against all
the defendants including the petitioners herein who were expressly
declared purchasers in bad faith. The subject land was held to be the
conjugal property of Sixto Dumolong and plaintiff Isabel Marquez and
that the Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property
was a forgery through the machinations of the defaulted defendants.
The appellate court affirmed the appealed decision.The petitioners
37
claim that they were not aware of any defect in the title of their
vendors.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The chain of events starting from the reconstitution of the original
certificates of title to the execution of the deed of absolute sale in
favor of the petitioners reveals a clear scheme to dispossess the
private respondent of her share in the property subject of this
controversy.
Having been the cultivators of the land, petitioners were aware that
the private respondent was the legal wife of Sixto Dumolong and was
a rightful heir to the properties of the latter. They should have not
bought the land from Placida, considering their knowledge of the fact
that Placida could not have own any portion of the land.
Having bought the land registered under the Torrens system from
their vendors who procured title thereto by means of fraud, petitioners
cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against the
private respondent to the extent of her interest therein. The Torrens
system of land registration should not be used as a means to
perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property.
Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith.
38
Thus, it is a settled rule that the defense of indefeasibility of a
certificate of title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with
notice of the flaws in his transferor's title. If at all, the petitioners only
acquire the right which their vendors then had.
39
plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of Lot No.
7340.The lower court rendered its judgment in favour of the
defendants.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision if court a quo
Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the
accretion mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land to the
riparian owner, and should not extend to registered land. Thus, the lot
in question having remained the registered land of the petitioners,
then the private respondents cannot acquire title there in derogation
to that of the petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not
protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his
registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining
stream is well settled. InPayatas Estate Improvement Co. vs.
Tuason, 53 Phil. 55.Registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the
banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current
become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old
Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New).
40
Does not make holder true owner of all property described
therein
CORONEL v IAC
155 SCRA 270
Facts:
Issue:
Whether the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is the true owner
of all the property
41
Ruling:
No, the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is not necessarily the
owner of all property.
The private respondents never sold their 1/3 share, what their co-
owners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the same lot;
and that Ignacio Manalo sold only the 2/3 share to third-party
defendant Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner
Rodolfo Coronel.
Facts:
Petitioner possessed and a registered owner of a 41, 545-sq.m parcel
of land for more than 20 years. On the other hand, the Southwest
portion of the petitioner’s land is bounded by the respondents’
land.The respondents subdivided their land among themselves and
placed 2 monuments inside the Southwest portion of the petitioner’s
land. Hence, petitioner filed an action to quit title. In the per-trail, the
parties agreed that they will appoint a public surveyor to relocate the
disputed area to determine the true and correct boundaries of their
parcels. Subsequently, the surveyor submitted a report wherein there
are overlapping on the boundaries of the 2 lands and that the
overlapping are due to the defect in the survey on petitioner's land
since it did not duly conform with the previously approved survey.
Wherefore, he submitted a report that respondents' land, prevails
over petitioner's land, since the former was surveyed and titled
ahead.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute.
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute. It is hardly
persuasive that private respondents' predecessor, Dominga Balanga,
believing that she has a rightful claim to the overlapped portions,
however, no such objection was made. These facts could only be
construed to mean that private respondents' predecessor, Dominga
Balanga, never believed that she has a right and legal claim to the
overlapped portion. Besides, considering that petitioner and his
predecessor or predecessors have been in continuous possession in
the concept of an owner, for almost 50 years when the property was
registered, up to when the respondents placed 2 monuments inside
his land, the latter if they have any right at all to the overlapped
portion, are guilty of laches.
43
The registration of lands of the public domain under the
torrens system, by itself cannot cover public lands into
private lands
Facts:
Issue:
Between the petitioner and the respondent,who has the better right of
possession of the disputed lots?
Ruling:
The antecedent cases which were both ruled in favor of the Republic
and its lessees or permittees laid to rest the issues of ownership and
of possession oover the subject lands. The registration of lands of
the public domain under the Torrens system cannot convert public
lands into private lands.The Republic, as the rightful owner of the
expanded areas – portions of the public domain – has the right to
place its lessees and permittees (among them Zoila de Chavez) in
possession of the fishpond lots. The certificate of title which Hacienda
Bigaa have, does not in fact support their claim of ownership over the
lands in dispute. Since the transfer of lands by the Ayalas and Zobels
to Hacienda Bigaa,Inc. is void, the latter has no better right over the
subject land than the defendant. For that reason,there can be no valid
cause for the ejectment of Epifanio Chavez by Hacienda Bigaa, Inc..
Thus, the case for forcible entry should be dismissed.
45
B. Systems of Registration Prior to PD 1529
a. Spanish Title
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs MUNOZ
G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968
Facts:
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO)
was claiming to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land
located in municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose Del
Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province
of Rizal. PIADECO relied on the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 as
incontrovertible evidence of its ownership. Piadeco applied
for registration as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of
this land. In 1964, the NAWASA director ordered the cancellation of
Piadeco’s certificate because it encroached beyond what was
allowed in the certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and
Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled
in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa.
Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst.
Director of Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer
recognized and should have never been used to apply for a
Certificate. Justice Sanchez noted the dubious validity of the title in
his opinion, stating “Private ownership of land must be proved not
only through the genuineness of title but also with clear identity of the
land claimed xxx no definite area seems to have been mentioned in
the title.
Issue:
46
Ruling:
47
C. Nature of Judicial Proceedings
a. Sec. 2, PD 1529
i. In Rem Proceedings
Ching vs. Malaya
Facts:
The petitioners had alleged in their complaint for ejectment, filed
before MTC, that the private respondents had forced their way into
the disputed premises without any right whatsoever and had refused
to vacate the same despite repeated demands. These demands were
based on the petitioners' case that they were the owners of the said
property, having acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. The private
respondents, in their answer, had challenged the claimed sale,
arguing that the property belonged to them by right of inheritance.
The MTC ruled in favor of Ching. Alvarado appealed before the RTC
and Judge Asuncion held that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the
case because the issue between the two parties was not a mere
possession case. The two parties actually adduced evidence of
ownership: i.e. Deed of Sale presented by Ching & inheritance claims
by Alvarado. Judge Asuncion ruled that MTCs have no jurisdiction
over ownership cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling:
The MTC has jurisdiction. The pertinent provisions of that law read as
follows:
Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases. -In all civil actions,
including those mentioned in Rules fifty-nine and sixty-two (now Rule
57 and 60) of the Rules of Court, arising in his municipality or city,
and not exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the
justice of the peace (now municipal judge) and the judge of a
municipal court (now city court) shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction. In forcible entry and detainer proceedings, the justice of
the peace or judge of the municipal court shall have original
jurisdiction, but the said justice or judge may receive evidence upon
48
the question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the
property, solely for the purpose of determining the character and
extent of possession and damages for detention.
Facts:
On October 20, 1987, the Salazars filed a new motion praying that
the RD of Tarlac be ordered to comply with the court’s order issued
on November 7, 1986. The RD, however, explained that to comply
with the said court order would remove the basis for many other
transfer certificates of title and would result in the deprivation of the
right to due process of the registered owners thereof. On this basis,
the RTC denied the motion and advised the Salazars to elevate the
matter en consulta to the Land Registration Commission. After the
Salazars moved for reconsideration, the RTC directed the RD of
Tarlac to comply with the orders. Threatened with contempt, the RD
elevated the matter en consulta to the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration, which, in turn, issued a resolution
50
directing the RD to comply with the RTC’s orders.
51
erode the very reason why the Torrens system was adopted in this
country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any
question on the legality of the title, except claims that were noted, at
the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. Rarely will the court allow another person to
attack the validity and indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate, unless
there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed
in court proceeded in accordance with law. Furthermore, the court
also noted that for 30 years the Salazars never contested the
ownership of the said property in any court, nor the transfer of the
portions of the property to the petitioners. Hence, the Supreme court
granted the petition and the appellate courts decision was set aside,
and the case was reinstated to the RTC.
52
registered with the Register of Deeds. Petitioners have been in actual
possession of the Unit in question, since they bought the same from
its former owners
Due to non-payment of delinquent real estate taxes, Juan D.
Hernandez, City Treasurer of Baguio City, sold the property at a
public auction to bidder Tayag (respondent) who caused the
ownership of said property consolidated under his name as per
decision of the trial court . Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking
the annulment of the auction sale. They cited irregularities in the
proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements. The
Complaint was dismissed for the reason that a previous judgment by
Branch 6 of the same court under LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R in 1987
in1987 had consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in favor
of Respondent Tayag and also upheld the legality of the questioned
auction sale. Hence, to rule again on the same issue would amount
to passing upon a judgment made by a coequal court, contrary to the
principle of “conclusiveness of judgment.”
Issue:
Ruling
Yes, Land Registration courts can now hear and decide even
controversial and contentious cases, as well as thos invoking
substantial issues. The court now has the authority to act not only
on applications for original regisgtration but alson on all petitions filed
after the original registration of title. Presidential Decree (PD) 1529,
however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
expeditious termination of cases. This Decree had eliminated the
distinction between general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial
court and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land
registration court.
53
ii. To avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious
resolution of cases
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. v ANGELA V. MADAYAG
G.R. No. 164687 February 12, 2009
Facts:
On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application
for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square
meters located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.
Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-
01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Region 1, San Fernando City. On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM
Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional
Survey Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the
respondent’s survey plan because the lot encroached on the
properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that,
despite being the new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified
of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001. Petitioner then manifested
its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. The
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their respective
oppositions. On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its formal
opposition. Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought seven
parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta, delineated as Lots B,
C, D, E, G, H and I in Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-
21329, approved by the Land Registration Commission on August 26,
1976, and previously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090
approved by the Bureau of Lands on December 29, 1970. These
parcels of land are covered by separate certificates of title, some of
which are already in the name of the petitioner while the others are
still in the name of the previous owners.
On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default, except as
to the petitioner, the Republic, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas.
54
Thereafter, respondent commenced the presentation of evidence.
The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved by
the DENR should be accorded the presumption of regularity, and that
the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions arising
from an application for registration.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appelas committed manifest errorr in holding
that the Lower Court has acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the proceedings and archiving the case.
Ruling:
It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits
and to promote the expeditious resolution of cases, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter’s limited
jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court. Land
registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even
controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving
substantial issues. When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the
latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such
jurisdiction to make it effective. It may, therefore, hear and determine
all questions that arise from a petition for registration. In view of the
nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to
determine whether the issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a
valid and existing certificate of title. An application for registration of
an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing
title, which is not allowed by law. But the RTC need not wait for the
decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order
to determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms
part of already titled property. The court may now verify this allegation
based on the respondent’s survey plan vis-à-vis the certificates of title
of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey
plan precisely serves to establish the true identity of the land to
ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof
already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the
possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of
any adjoining land.Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court
may require the filing of additional papers to aid in its determination of
the propriety of the application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529
55
b. But First Level Courts may be delegated to hear and decide
cadastral and land registration proceedings
c. Scope of Jurisdiction
i. The RTC has jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve
the title to or possession of real property or any interest therein
ii. Hence, the CA or the LRA has no jurisdiction to cancel a
certificate of title
Manotok v. Barque
G.R. No. 162335 &162605 December 18, 2008
Facts:
57
Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of
a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the
LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the
first place.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the
Land Registration Commissioner. Nowhere in the aforecited provision
is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the
Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the
power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes
the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact, as
we shall see shortly such laws take great care to ensure that a
petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb
existing Torrens titles.
It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had
jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892
which took effect on 16 February 1976, the system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of
Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to
be registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) within six
months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until 16
August 1976. If not, non-compliance therewith will result in a
reclassification of the real property.
In the case at bar, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling that
Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable
evidence of land ownership. And, without legal or equitable title to the
subject property, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and
petitioner Pedro R. Santiago lacked the personality to claim
entitlement to possession of the same. Title to real property refers to
that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of
the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can
maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession
and enjoyment of the property.
Facts:
The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and
have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and
the Government itself. The petitioners contend on the basis of a
Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April
25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to
cover lands, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos,
Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between
Dingalan Bayin the north and Tayabas Bay in the south. Considering
the vastness of the land claim, many suits have been filed all for the
purpose of owning the lands.
60
Issue:
WON the heirs of Don Mariano have the legal claim over the
properties involved.
Ruling:
No, the Supreme Court ruled otherwise. While the petitioners contend
that the lands are subject of The Spanish Mortgage Law or the “Titulo
Propriedad Numero 4136”, It is settled that by virtue of Pd no 892
which took effect on February 16. 1976 the syte of registration under
the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish
titles or grants should cause their lands coverd thereby to be
registered under the Land Registration Act within 6 months from date
of effectivity of the said decree. In this case the heirs have no legal
claim over the said lands because PD 892 invaldates any claim of
title and must be first registered under the Torrens system of titling.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM
BARANDA V. GUSTILO
GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988
Facts:
This case involves two cases (G.R. No. 64432 and G.R. No. 6204)
over the same parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara,
Iloilo covered by OCT No. 6406. This is the subject of the dispute
between petitioner Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, and
respondents Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao. OCT
No. 6406 was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued in the
names of the petitioner. However, the respondents refused to honor it
on the ground that they also have a TCT numbered T-25772 over the
same lot. The court resolved that TCT No. T-25772 was acquired
61
fraudulently, and declared it null and void. It held the validity of Title
No. T-106098 to which, the court also ordered the writ of possession
to the petitioners be carried out. However, a notice of lis pendens "on
account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No. 15871)
still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in
the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This prompted
the petitioners to file for a new petition directing the Acting Register of
Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new
certificates of titles issued.
Issues:
1. Whether the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with
the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of
lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were
earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042
and G.R. No. 64432.
Ruling:
2. No. Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall
be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an
62
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal
property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If
the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration
thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal
by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.
The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal by the lower court is
correct and provides that "where any party in interest does not agree
with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an
order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made,"
which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds."
This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner
before he can have recourse to the courts.
c. When Register of Deeds may deny registration of
voluntary instruments
AURELIO BALBIN v REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR
G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
Facts:
66
It shows that there was an annotation in the memorandum of
encumbrance on the Original Certificate of Title of 3 separate sales
executed by the registered owner, Cornelio, in favor of Florention,
Juana Gabayan and Roberto Bravo. The said persons received their
co-owners duplicate CT’s. The petitioners failed to present the 3 co-
owner’s copies of CT’s, which is why the RoD denied said annotation.
Thus, the petitioners referred the matter to the LRC, who on the other
hand upheld the decision of the RoD.
Issue:
Ruling
In the case at bar, there were several copies of the same title in
existence, there integrity might be affected if it was annotated in once
copy and not on the others..
67
conjugal nature of the property, the donation bears on its face an
infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the fact that
2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than ½
his share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he
had sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.
Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and
first cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva de Agana, the
latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The subject matter of
this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti, Laguna
consisting of 81,300x square meters, more or less, initially covered by
an Original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924
owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On
August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforesaid land was sold
to them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in
Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva
conveying and transferring the property in question in favour of the
petitioners. Subsequently, the OCT was cancelled and a new
certificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by
TCT NO. RT-6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On November
17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva,
Jr., and Restituto R. Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim with the Office of the Registered of Deeds of Laguna.
When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt
was made to settle said controversy amicably, but they failed. So,
petitioners instituted court suit against the private respondent and
her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filling a complaint for
Quieting of the Title and Damages with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna on February 3, 1977.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring
the deedd of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted
transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio. Thus,
petitioners file a notice of appeal to the IAC. However, the IAC, on
May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
69
Ruling:
No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that
the conveyance be executed “before the judge of a court of record or
clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace,
who shall certify such acknowledgement substantially in from next
hereinafter stated” was violated.
The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the
registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not
lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. With
reference to the special law, Section 127 of the land Registration Act,
Act 496 “Deed of Conveyance, affecting lands, whether registered
under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made
substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as
effective to convey, encumber or bind the lands as though made in
accordance with more prolix forms heretofore in use.”
LAND, IN GENERAL
A. Land Classification. Sec. 3, 1987 Phil Constitution
a.
70
(1) CRUZ V. DENR SECRETARY
GR No. 135385 December 6, 2000
Facts:
Ruling:
Concurring Opinion(s):
72
IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand
Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common
experiences in the course of history. The Philippines became a
democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still
continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic
society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a
whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization,
it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and
customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the
land laws in our national legal system.
73
incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A
person’s possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has
nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous
peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous
peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of
justice. In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any
abuse by the NCIP of its quasi-judicial powers. Section 67 states that
the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals
by petition for review. The regular remedies under our rules of
procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by the
decision of the NCIP.Anent the use of customary laws in determining
the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to say that
such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the
Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for
the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
domains."
Separate Opinion(s):
74
must be respected.
Facts:
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants. The Republic then appealed to the CA. In
2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. On May
22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition in the trial court,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064
classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
75
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and other
landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.
They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested
rights” over portions of Boracay. On November 21, 2006, this Court
ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
Issue:
Whether the private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.
Ruling:
No. The petitions were denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals
was reversed.
76
b. Friar lands. One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act,
as well as his successor in interest may not claim successional
rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time
immemorial as this contravenes the historical fact that the
Government of the Philippine Islands bought the friar lands not
from individual persons but from certain companies, a society
and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only “actual
settlers and occupants at the time said land are acquired by the
Government were given preference to lease, purchase or acquire
their holdings in disregard of the settlement and occupation of
persons before the government acquired the lands.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
The initial claim that OCT 164 of which all the other subject titles are
derivatives is null and void has been proven wrong as held in
previous cases (Pinlac). It has been found that OCT 614 did legally
exist and was previously issued in the name of the Philippine
Government in 1910. An Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of
Natural Resources specifically tasked to investigate the historical
background of the Piedad Estate, found that as early as prior to the
Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had already been
disposed of. The Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens
system which means that all lots therein are titled. Also, as held in the
Balicudiong case one who acquired title under the Friar Land Act, as
well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights
to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial unless it
is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers and
occupants at the time said land were acquired by the government.
Also, the plaintiffs did not pray to be declared owners of the subject
property-despite their alleged adverse possession-but only to be
adjudged as the bona fide occupants thereof, conceding to the
State’s ownership of the property. Being so, they are not real parties
in interest for the purpose of maintaining a suit for cancellation of the
subject titles. Their interest is mere expectancy based on the
probability that the government would give them preference as
78
buyers or lessees of the subject lands. On real-parties in interest may
file for the cancellation of title of property and not one whose interest
is based on mere expectancy.
REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES
A. Non-registrable Properties
REPUBLIC V. CA
131 SCRA 532
Facts:
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the
application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to
the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 89709 however, the petitioner Republic appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals.
79
There are facts and circumstances in the record which render
untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents'
fishponds.
Issue:
Ruling:
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in
the names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the
bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property
of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502,
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to
registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the
lands in question as private property in the names of the private
respondents is null and void. The only valid conclusion therefore is
that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed
only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the
bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private respondents claim
as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation.
80
i. Properties of public dominion are reserved for public
purposes. (Article 420, Civil Code)
REPUBLIC V. ALAGAD
169 SCRA 466
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
This case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
82
iii. A public market & public plaza are properties of public
dominion.
Facts:
On May 22, 1981, Antipolo filed a complaint (Civil Case 41353) at the
CFI Rizal, Branch XIII, Pasig against named “Heirs of Joaquin
Avendaño”, and their assignees praying for nullification of the
judgment rendered by the Registration Court. The defendants, in their
83
Answer, pleaded a special defense of res judicata. After a preliminary
hearing on the mentioned special defense, the case was dismissed.
Antipolo perfected an appeal to the then Court of Appeals. A notice to
file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court, which Antipolo claimed it
had not received. Upon motion of the Avendaño heirs to dismiss on
the ground the Antipolo had not filed its Brief within the reglementary
period, the appeal was dismissed on August 23, 1983 despite the fact
that before the dismissal, Antipolo had submitted its Appellant’s Brief.
Antipolo filed a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
It follows that the titles issued in favor of the Avendaño heirs must
also be held to be null and void.
84
MARTINEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-31271 April 29, 1974
Facts:
While Civil Case No. 751 was still pending the Honorable Florencio
Moreno, then Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
ordered another investigation of the said parcel of land, directing the
appellees herein to remove the dikes they had constructed, on the
strength of the authority vested in him by Republic Act No. 2056,
approved on June 13, 1958, entitled "An Act To Prohibit, Remove
and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams. Dikes, Or Any Other
Walls In Public Navigable Waters, Or Waterways and In Communal
Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in Such Waters or Waterways
And In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To Provide Penalties For Its
Violation, And For Other Purposes.
CA
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No. 2 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15856 of the petitioners-appellants is a public
stream and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered
reverted to public domain, is assailed by the petitioners-appellants as
being a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the torrens title
originally issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-appellants'
predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano Garcia, which is violative of the
rule of res judicata. It is argued that as the decree of registration
issued by the Land Registration Court was not re-opened through a
86
petition for review filed within one (1) year from the entry of the
decree of title, the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto in favor of
the appellants for the land covered thereby is no longer open to
attack under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and
the jurisprudence on the matter established by this Tribunal. Section
38 of the Land Registration Act cited by appellants expressly makes a
decree of registration, which ordinarily makes the title absolute and
indefeasible, subject to the exemption stated in Section 39 of the said
Act among which are: "liens, claims or rights arising or existing under
the laws or Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands which the statute of the Philippine Islands cannot require to
appear of record in the registry."
Ruling:
The evidence submitted before the trial court which was passed upon
by the respondent Court of Appeals shows that Lot No. 2 (Plan Psu
992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856, is a river of the public
domain. The technical description of both Lots Nos. 1 and 2
appearing in Original Certificate of Title No. 14318 of the Register of
Deeds of Pampanga, from which the present Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15856 was derived, confirms the fact that Lot No. 2
embraced in said title is bounded practically on all sides by rivers. As
held by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case No.
1247 for injunction filed by the petitioners' predecessors-in-interest
against the Municipal Mayor of Lubao and decided in 1916 (Exh. "L"),
Lot No. 2 is a branch of the main river that has been covered with
water since time immemorial and, therefore, part of the public
domain. This finding having been affirmed by the Supreme Court,
there is no longer any doubt that Lot No. 2 of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15856 of petitioners is a river which is not capable of private
87
appropriation or acquisition by prescription.
NAVERA V. QUICHO
5 SCRA 45
Facts:
On January 24, 1961 the municipality of Ligao filed for the correction
of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Godofredo
Navera, covering Lot No. 2793-A, on the ground that a portion of 123
sq. m. was erroneously included in said title during the cadastral
survey of Ligao.
The municipality of Ligao alleged that the land amounting to 123 sq.
m. is erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A, for said portion of land
is part of a street in the municipality. Thus, the municipality prays for
the correction in the certificate of title, with a view to excluding
therefrom, the portion of 123 sq. m. erroneously included therein.
The trial court affirmed the petition of the municipality. The ruling of
the trial court is founded on the principle that, if a person obtains a
title under the Torrens System which includes by mistake or oversight
a land which cannot be registered, he does not by virtue of such
certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included
therein. Hence, this petition by Navera.
Issue:
Ruling:
88
Even if the portion to be segregated was really erroneously included
in the title issued to petitioner because it is part of the Natera street
which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that portion may be
excluded under Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law any
public highway, even if not noted on a title, is deemed excluded
therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrance, is in our opinion correct.
This is upon the principle that a person who obtains a title which
includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered does
not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land
erroneously included therein. But this theory only holds true if there is
no dispute that the portion to be excluded is really part of a public
highway. This principle only applies if there is unanimity as to the
issue of fact involved.
89
iv. Ropponggi property in Tokyo, Japan is a property of
public dominion.
LAUREL V. GARCIA
187 SCRA 797
Facts:
90
with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting
with the Roppongi lot.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be
alienated by the Philippine government.
Ruling:
1. No. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is
expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which
bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the
commerce of man. And the property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until
there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such.
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances must
be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence.
2. No. A conflict of law rule cannot apply when no conflict of law
situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) there
is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the
capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of
conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and
(2) a foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to
conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to
determine which law should apply. In the present case, none of the
above elements exists.
Facts:
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the
application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to
the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 89709 however, the petitioner Republic appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals.
Issue:
92
Whether the registration of the lots valid.
Ruling:
NAVERA V. QUICHO
5 SCRA 454
Facts:
93
On January 24, 1961, the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court of
First Instance of Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No. 496, as
amended, for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304
issued in the name of Godofredo Navera, covering Lot No. 2793-A,
on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. was erroneously included
in said title during the cadastral survey of Ligao.
Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief
which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under Section 112
of Act 496 because the same would involve the opening of the
original decree of registration. He contends that, under said section,
the court can only authorize an alteration which may not impair the
rights recorded in the decree, or one which will not prejudice such
rights, or one which is consented to by all parties concerned, or can
authorize the correction of any error or mistake which would not
involve the reopening of the original decree of registration. Here the
petition will have such effect, for it will involve the correction of the
technical description of the land covered by the certificate of title in
question, segregating therefrom the portion alleged to have been
erroneously included, which eventually will cause the amendment of
the original decree of registration. This cannot be done at this stage
after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of the certificate of title.
The court a quo issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and
requiring Navera to answer the petition within the reglementary
period. The courts based its decision on the rationale that “It is a rule
of law that lands brought under the operation of the Torrens System
94
are deemed relieved from all claims and encumbrances not
appearing on the title. Among the burdens on the land registered
which continue to exist, pursuant to said Section 39, is "any public
highway, way, private way established by law, or any Government
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title does not
state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal or
lateral thereof, have been determined." The principle involved here is
that, if a person obtains a title under the Torrens System which
includes by mistake or oversight a land which cannot be registered,
he does not by virtue of such certificate alone become the owner of
the land illegally included therein.
Petitioner Navera does not agree with this ruling Navera contends
that the purpose of the instant petition is not merely to correct a
clerical error but to reopen the original decree of registration which
was issued in 1937, and this is so because the petition seeks to direct
the register of deeds to make the necessary correction in the
technical description in order that the portion erroneously included
may be returned to the municipality of Ligao. In effect, therefore, the
petition does not seek merely the correction of a mistake or error but
the return or reconveyance of a portion of a registered property to
respondent.
Issue:
Ruling:
95
excluded is really part of a public highway. This principle only applies
if there is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved.
Facts:
96
Respondent Salvador Zartiga claimed ownership over nine (9) lots
which a total area of more or less 289.9920 hectares. He claimed that
he had been the absolute owner and possessor of said parcels of
land, having bought the same from Datu Julian Bagobo under a deed
executed in 1927, but that petitioners had occupied certain portions of
the nine (9) lots, about forty-nine (49) hectares of the 285 hectares,
without his knowledge and consent. Petitioners, on the other hand,
denied private respondent's ownership and alleged that the land in
question is public land; that neither private respondent nor his
predecessor-in-interest had occupied the property. The Director of
Lands intervened, asserting the property subject matter of Civil Case
No. 670 to be "public agricultural land, owned by the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines. The Municipality of Bansalan, on its
part, filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the nine (9)
parcels of land included in the petition for registration were reserved
for townsite of, and actually occupied by, the Municipality of
Bansalan. Evidence was introduced to the effect that about 10,000
people inhabited the poblacion of Bansalan and that approximately
500 buildings, private and government-owned, as well as schools,
markets, religious, commercial and residential structures, and other
constructions, including municipal roads and other infrastructures,
already stood in place within the disputed area.
The trial court and Court of appeals ruled in favour of Zartiga and
awarded him the Lots No. 2326, 2325, 2342, 2343, 2344 and 2416.
Issue:
Ruling:
Evidently, the litigated area was forestal land. The fact that Datu
Julian Bagobo and the other occupants had to make kaingin in order
to clear the lots is certainly indicative of the forestal nature of the
same. Datu Julian Bagobo and his predecessors who claimed
possession over the area did not and could not have acquired
ownership over the said land considering that the same was then
inalienable and non- disposable. It remained so for many years. In
fact, it was only on February 4, 1956 when the contested portions of
the public domain were declared and classified as alienable and
97
disposable per Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-480 issued by the
then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The picture
becomes clear enough. Respondent Zartiga knew that he could not
directly acquire the lots since they were part of the public domain. So,
he had to get access to the land indirectly. He also realized that the
indirect way was Datu Julian Bagobo who claimed possession over
the area. He had to clothe the datu with a color of ownership so that
the latter could subsequently transfer the land to him. Respondent
accomplished this in a haphazard manner — by railroading the
issuance of a tax declaration to the uneducated datu and
manipulating the alleged sale within the same day. This explains why
there could not be sufficient and concrete evidence of the alleged
deed of sale, why the contested lots could never be accurately
identified (boundaries were not uniformly identified) and why private
respondent never raised a hand when the townsite of Bansalan was
being developed.
Facts:
After trial, the court rendered judgment annulling TCT No. T-9550
issued to defendants Dizons covering Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182, as
well as other subdivision titles issued to Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda
de Calatagan over the areas outside its private property covered by
TCT No. 722. This ruling was based upon the finding that the
disputed areas form part of the navigable water, or are portions of the
sea, beach and foreshores of the bay.
Issue:
Ruling:
99
In the present case, as the lots covered by TCT No. T-9550 issued in
the names of defendants Dizons (and which were purchased by the
latter from defendants Ayala y Cia., and/or Alfonso Zobel) were found
to be portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters, the lower
court committed no error in rendering judgment against said
defendants and ordering the reversion of said properties to the public
dominion.
Facts:
The subject of the petition is a lot situated on the Western side of San
Mateo River. To prevent the river from entering the lot, a dike was
built on the northern side of the river. In 1937, flood occurred and the
river destroyed the dike, left its original bed and meandered into the
Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular place of
land. In 1945, the US Army conducted excavations in the lenticular
strip which stands between the old river bed and the new course. The
US Army has paid for such activities. In 1947, the sand and gravel
100
plant was turned over to the respondents. The respondents continued
the activities carried out by the US army. The petitioner then filed the
case praying that the excavation, bulldozing and extraction activities
be restrained.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. A "river" consists of water, a bed and banks, these several parts
constituting the river, the whole river. Since a river is but one
compound concept, it should have only one nature. And since rivers
are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three component
elements be of the same nature also.
REPUBLIC V. SIOSON
9 SCRA 533
Facts:
The applicants appealed from the judgment in so far it did not decree
the registration of Lot No. 4 in their names.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without hearing
the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual and
extrinsic fraud had been committed by the respondents.
Ruling:
REPUBLIC V. CA
132 SCRA 514
Facts:
The lot subject matter of this land registration case is situated near
the shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20) meters there from in
Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna. It was purchased by Benedicto
del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. When Benedicto del Rio
died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the
subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's
share in the inheritance. Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private
respondent, filed his application for registration of said parcel on May
9, 1966. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and
by private oppositors. Sometime before 1966, private oppositors
103
obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses on
the land in question. Although there was no definite commitment as to
rentals, some of them had made voluntary payments to private
respondent. In violation of the original agreement, private oppositors
constructed residential houses on the land which prompted private
respondent to file an ejectment suit against the former in 1966.
4Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private
oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales applications
with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios
application for registration. The Court of First Instance of Laguna
dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and
obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The
Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective
Petitions for Review of said decision.
Issue:
Ruling:
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of
tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a
public land and therefore capable of registration as private property
provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The
purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the
acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant
already possesses over the land.
104
property. Applicant by himself and through his father before him,
has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and
adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30)
years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts. Applicant
has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly
entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.
MATEO V. MORENO
28 SCRA 796
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
It is true that Jacobo who was then the owner from whom Mateo
subsequently bought the property, was able to get her free patent
application approved in 1953 and to secure the corresponding
certificate of title, but said title did not change the public character of
the Sapang Cabay.
106
v. Man-made alluvial deposits are not registrable.
REPUBLIC V. CA
132 SCRA 514
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The following are the three
requisites that need to occur before an accretion is said to have taken
place: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers.The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of
the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457
of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention.
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Evidence shows the
addition to the said property was artificial and man-made. The alleged
alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the
current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards
the river and encroaching upon it.Moreover,the lots in question were
108
not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted on
May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of
Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The
alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or
33 years after it had permanently formed allegedly on 1939. Said
areas existed only after the private respondents transferred their
dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. The accretion
claimed is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan
river by reclamation.The lots sought to be registered were portions of
the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as
property of the public domain .They are not open to registration under
the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question
as private property in the names of the private respondents is null
and void.
MANECLANG V. IAC
161 SCRA 469
Facts:
Ruling:
REPUBLIC V. REYES
155 SCRA 313
Facts:
110
June 21, 1956 the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the Registration Book
for the Province of Rizal.
Issue:
Ruling:
That it is well settled that any title issued on non-disposable lots even
in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be
cancelled. In the case at bar, the free patents and certificates of title
issued to Eusebio and Lara cover areas which form parts of Laguna
de Bay. These are neither agricultural nor disposable. Subject patents
and titles were erroneously issued due to misrepresentations and
false reports and must therefore be cancelled. Any false statement in
an application for public land shall ipso facto produce the cancellation
of the title granted. This rule applies even after the issuance of the
certificate of title. A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to
perpetuate fraud, and the doctrine of indefeasibility of torrens title
does not apply to free patent secured through fraud. Likewise, the
Court ruled in Cuevas vs. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1986], that mere
possession of land does not itself divest the land of its public
character.
Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its
ownership of the land nor operate to change the public character of
the land to private.
111
c. Forests or timberlands, public forests or forest reserves.
113
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
REPUBLIC V. CA
154 SCRA 476
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the petitioner clearly proved thru the reports
and testimonies of the district foresters that the land applied for
registration is a part of a forestland. As to the claim of the applicants
that they have been in possession of the land since 1915, the court
cited its decision in Director of Forestry v. Munoz (23 SCRA
1184),where it stated that possession of forest lands, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
In its decision, the Court also addressed the CA’s ruling by citing its
decision in Heirs of Amunatequi v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69,
75), where it ruled, ―A forested area classified as forest land of the
115
public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
REPUBLIC V. ANIMAS
56 SCRA 499
Facts:
The land covered by the free patent and title in question was
originally applied for by Precila Soria, who on February 23, 1966,
transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant
Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application therefor on February 3,
1969, as a transferee from Precila Soria.
On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the
President of the Philippines for the land in question, and on July 20,
1970, after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of
General Santos City, Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508
was issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol.
116
under the Public Land Act; that in a reclassification of the public lands
in the vicinity where the land in question is situated made by the
Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land was plotted on
Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to be inside the area which was
reverted to the category of public forest, whereas the application for
free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3, 1969, or more
than eleven years thereafter; that the said patent and title were
obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol never
occupied and cultivated the land applied for.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes, it is.
After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground
that the area covered by the patent and title is not disposable public
land, it being a part of the forest zone and, hence the patent and title
thereto are null and void.
118
i. Forest land, defined.
Facts:
There are two petitions in this case. The Court of Appeals declared
the disputed property as forest land. These two petitions have their
genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its
registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel
of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre,
filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose
Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the
application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they
prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre
containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the
names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. During the progress of the
trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and
interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter
also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot
registered in his name. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz
adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest
of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the
proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades
Borre. Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry
119
filed their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private
litigants that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are,
as to the northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square
meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square
meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that
must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that these
two (2) private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable
one in view of the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the
application was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have
to be accepted that during that period, the land was a classified forest
land so much so that timber licenses had to be issued to certain
licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose Amunategui
himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the
area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood
and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the
testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively indicates, and
the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was
sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the
application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the
District Forester that that could not be done because it was classified
as a public forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that
even under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2)
years after this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in
order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he
must have shown "‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty
(30) years, preceding the filing of the application;’
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of
the applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required
period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for
him to have shown a registerable title for the entire period of thirty
(30) years before filing of the application, he had been in
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all
throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and
applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of
that; the result must be to deny all these applications; this Court
stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the same to
resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among
themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to
possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go all the
way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be
as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final
judgment;
Issue:
Ruling:
122
the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s
finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to
cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous
warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done
because it was classified as "public forest."
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the
burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942.
ii. Inclusion of a forest land in tile nullifies the title.
Facts:
Issue:
124
iii. Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
126
iv. Forest lands are not registrable. Requirements for
exemption.
Facts:
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court
of Appeals. In its decision dated February 26, 1992, penned by
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,the appellate court reversed and set
aside the decision of the CFI.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in
question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcia’s right to
the property was largely dependent on the existence and validity of
the possessory information title the probative value,and inasmuch as
127
the land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA concluded
that she did not validly acquire title thereto.
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and
was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G.
Diaz.
Issue:
Ruling:
128
judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all
persons.
129
d. Mangrove swamps are comprised within the public
forests.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
and dismissed the application for registration of title of Villareal and
held that It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable.
The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the
forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession
130
of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private
property. It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the
legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now,
mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the
Philippines.
Facts:
As early as 1905 the parcel of land (LOT 855) was under the
exclusive possession of Francisco Borja who cut trees therefrom and
converted them into firewood. Moreover, he established a salt factory,
selling salts and the firewood. After his death, his son Arturo took
possession of the land, continued to cut trees up until 1910. May of
1917, Antero Borja sold the land to Deogracias Gayacao evidenced
by a private instrument.
Issue:
Ruling:
The decision of the lower court is affirmed. "In the case of Mapa v.
Insular Government ..., this court said that the phrase 'agricultural
lands' as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Whatever may have
132
been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act
of Congress of July Ist 1902, classifies the public lands in the
Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all
public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps,
manglare, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The definition of forestry
as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917
cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment," 9 What is
even more persuasive as to the correctness of the decision reached
by the lower court is that in the Garchitorena decision, this Court,
through Justice Ostrand who was famed for his authoritative opinions
on public land controversies, promulgated in 1933, more than fifteen
years after the effectivity of the Revised Administrative Code, was
equally explicit:
In fact, it cannot be said with certainty that there was a finding in the
appealed decision that to the disputed lot was originally mangrove
swamps. As stated therein: "Mangrove swamps where only trees of
mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse fit only
for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial
value as lumber, do not convert the land into public land. Such lands
are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public
domain." Based on such a finding which must be accorded due
weight and is control the sole question raised on appeal is one of law,
133
the decision arrived at by the lower court is not open to any valid
objection.
e. Foreshore lands.
Facts:
134
31, 1951, the said Modesto Castillo was declared the true and
absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon, for which
OCT No. 0-665 was issued to him by the Register of Deeds. By virtue
of an instrument dated March 18, 1960, the said Lots 1 and 2 covered
by OCT No. 0-665, together with Lot No. 12374 covered by TCT No.
3254-A and Lot No. 12377 covered by TCT No. 3251-A, were
consolidated and sub-divided into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After
the death of Modesto Castillo, in 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo,
et al., executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in
favor of Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which OCT No. D-
665 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of title
were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al. The Republic of the
Philippines then filed a Civil Case with the lower court for the
annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants, and for the
reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving
shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
Ruling:
Shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use
and, therefore, not registrable. Accretions on the bank of a lake, like
Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have
been added while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public
domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally
declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use.
The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case
because, as already ruled by this Court, mere possession of land
does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character.
REPUBLIC V. ALAGAD
G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989
Facts:
135
On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for
registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila,
Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan
Psu-116971, which was amended after the land was divided into two
parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with
an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-226971,
amd. 2. The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed
ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in
possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely
under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the
land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. Republic
claims that the decree and title rendered and issued in LRC Case is
concerned, are void ab initio. The trial court ruled that the parcel of
land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, and hence, available for disposition and registration.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Supreme court reversed the decision of the lower court. The
parcel of land is a foreshore land so it is not registerable. It defines a
foreshore land as that part of (the land) which is between high and
low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. If the
submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not
become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters. The Court
cannot make a ruling because the case is not a trier of facts, and it is
in possession of no evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive
136
disposition, hence the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
Facts:
The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the
shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio.
After the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos
Del Rio. The private oppositors in this case sought and obtained
permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses on said
land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and
instead constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an
ejectment suit against the private oppositors and later on sought to
register the land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed
their respective sales applications with the Bureau of Lands, and they
opposed Santos del Rio’s application for registration. The CFI of
Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed
and obtained a favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The
Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective
petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court. The
Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered
with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed
of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of
registration.
Issue:
Ruling:
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of
tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a
public land and therefore capable of registration as private property
provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The
purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the
acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant
137
already possesses over the land.
CAGAMPANG V. MORANO
G.R. No. L-25738. March 14, 1968
Facts:
The case began with a forcible entry and detainer suit instituted by
Silverio Cagampang to recover from the defendant, Flaviano Morano,
a parcel of land abutting on the sea in the municipality of Bacuag,
Surigao del Norte. Plaintiff, who claimed to have been in possession
of the land for over 80 years, charged that in 1960 defendant, through
strategy and stealth, occupied a portion of the land and refused to
vacate it, to the prejudice of plaintiff; wherefore, the latter sought to
have possession restored to him, to collect a rental of P3.00 a month,
plus P5,000.00 damages and costs. The defendant's answer pleaded
occupancy by virtue of a foreshore "grant from proper authorities".
At the ocular inspection in 1965, the Court found that the lot in
question is not reached, much less, covered by the highest ordinary
tide. It can only be reached or covered by the highest tide during the
months of May, June and July or during the months when the highest
tide of the year will occur.
Issue:
Whether or not lands covered by the sea at high tide not due to
abnormal conditions are part of the shore and therefore public land.
Ruling:
At the ocular inspection, the Court found that the land was covered by
the sea water at high tide in the months of May, June and, July. This
finding makes it clear that the land was part of the shore, and was,
138
therefore, public land belonging to the State, conformably to Article 1,
paragraph 3 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866:
Art. 1. — The following are part of the national domain open to public
use: (3) The Shores. By shore is understood that space covered and
uncovered by the movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit
is the line reached by the highest equinoctial tides. Where the tides
are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line
reached by the sea during ordinary storms and tempests. By Article
420 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shores are declared property
of the public domain.
As the lot was covered by the highest tides from May to July, and
there is no showing that these tides are due to abnormal conditions,
the land is obviously part of the shore and public property. Hence,
legal possession thereof appertains to the national government or its
grantees.
139
iii. Seashore, foreshore land and portions of the territorial
waters and beaches cannot be registered.
DIZON V. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 April 30, 1965
Facts:
The Dizons, Sy-Jucos, and Gocos filed a protest with the Bureau of
Fisheries, claiming the properties to be private land but were
dismissed by the Director of Fisheries. On October 1, 1954, the
protestants filed an action in the CFI of Manila to restrain the Director
of Fisheries from issuing the fishpond permits but the court dismissed
this petition for non-exhaustion of administrative remedy. On appeal
to this Court, the decision of the lower court was sustained.
Protestants then filed an appeal with the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Hence the Dizons filed Civil Case in the CFI of
Batangas, to quiet their titles over Lots 49 and 1.
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Ruling:
One of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the
final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; that
shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use
(Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not registrable. Thus, it has
142
long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial
waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a
certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private
ownership or confer title upon the registrant
CANTOJA V. LIM
G.R. No. 168386 March 29, 2010
Facts:
143
which was utilized as “dock-board of the Cantoja’s Fishing
Business. It was ascertained that no portion has been occupied or
possessed by any other person or persons, nor was there any
adverse claimant thereof. Like the DENR Secretary, the Office of the
President also relied on the findings of Special Investigator that the
petitioner’s titled land is an inalienable foreshore area which could not
be subject of a valid patent or title.
Issue:
Ruling:
145
f. Previously titles lands.
Facts:
146
well as the original certificate of title subsequently obtained by her,
were null and void.
Issue:
Ruling:
In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the
name of oppositors' wife as of 21 June 1956, nine (9) years earlier.
Clearly, appellants' petition for registration of the same parcel of land
on 26 November 1965, on the ground that the first certificate of title
(OCT No. P-6053) covering the said property is a nullity, can no
longer prosper. Having become registered land under Act 496, for all
legal purposes, by the issuance of the public land patent and the
recording thereof, further registration of the same would lead to the
obviously undesirable result of two certificates of title being issued for
the same piece of land, even if both certificates should be in the
name of the same person. And if they were to be issued to different
persons, the indefeasibility of the first title, which is the most valued
characteristic of Torrens titles, would be torn away.
147
for review of the decree should have been filed before the one year
period had elapsed. Thereafter, the proper party to bring the action
would only be the person prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent act —
the owner and grantor, and not another applicant or claimant.
Furthermore, the relief provided by the law in such instance may be
secured by the aggrieved party, not in another registration, for land
already registered in the name of a person cannot be the subject of
another registration, but in an appropriate action such as one for
reconveyance or reversion, or for damages in case the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
g. Mineral Lands.
Sec. 3, Art. XII, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Sec. 2, CA 141
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines thru the Director of Lands filed three
Civil Cases for the annulment of Free Patents and of Original
148
Certificates of Title, on the ground of misrepresentation and false data
and information furnished by the defendants.
The lands embraced in the patents and titles comprise a total area of
58.4169 hectares, and situated in the Municipal District of Mankayan,
Mountain Province.
The defendants in the three civil cases filed an amended joint answer
with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. The proceedings
on the three civil cases were suspended pending the outcome of the
criminal cases.
149
The trial court ruled in favor of the defense and dismissed the three
criminal cases for insufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction
of the accused.
The court of appeals sustained the ruling of the trial court. As such
intervenor filed this petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands.
(2) Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the benefits
of Republic Act No. 3872.
Ruling:
Facts:
The evidence for the applicant who was 70 years old at the time he
testified shows that he acquired the land from his father-in-law,
Dongail, when he married his daughter; that he was then 18 years
old; that at the time of his acquisition, it was planted with camote,
casava, langka, gabi, coffee and avocados; that he lived on the land
since his marriage up to the present; that he has been paying the
151
taxes during the Japanese occupation and even before it; that he was
never disturbed in his possession. Supporting his oral testimony,
applicant submitted tax declarations both dated March 20, 1948, the
former for a rural land and the latter for urban land and improvement
therein. The receipt showing payment of the taxes on such tax
declarations is dated Feb. 8, 1949. The said tax declarations show
that they cancel tax declaration No. 439 dated Feb. 10, 1947 which
was presented by the Oppositor Atok Big Wedge Mining Company
as its Exhibit 14, and the land tax under Exh. 14 was paid by
applicant in 1947. Applicant has also submitted Exh. `C’, which
indicates that all pre-war records of tax declarations and real property
receipts of the municipality of Itogon where the property is located
were burned and destroyed during the last world war. The Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company came in also as oppositor claiming that the
land in question is within its mineral claims - Sally, Evelyn and Ethel
Atok Big Wedge Mining Company submitted Exhibits 6, 7 and 8, all
showing that the annual assessment work of these mineral claims
were maintained from 1932 to 1967 for Sally and Evelyn and from
1946 to 1967 for Ethel. It was likewise shown that these mineral
claims were recorded in the mining recorder’s office; Sally and Evelyn
on Jan. 2, 1931 and Ethel on March 18, 1921.” Petitioner’s
presentation of evidence proving registration of the mining claims of
petitioner in the Mining Recorder of Benguet dating back to 1931, at
the latest, notably about sixteen (16) years before private respondent
declared the land in question for taxation purposes and thirty four (34)
years before private respondent filed the land registration
proceedings in 1965, apparently impressed the court a quo. And so it
ruled in favor of petitioner as oppositor in the land registration
proceedings, the court a quo ratiocinating in this wise:
“The mining claims were recorded ahead of the time when the
applicant declared the land for taxation purposes based on his
documentary exhibits. So the evidence of the applicant cannot
prevail over the documentary exhibits of the oppositor Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company. The foregoing facts show that the mining
company had established its rights long before applicant asserted
ownership over the land. The perfection of mining claims over the
mineral lands involved, segregated them from the public domain and
the beneficial ownership thereof became vested in the locator.”
The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled in favor of the
152
applicant, ruling that the applicant possessed the land in the concept
of an owner.
Issue:
Whether or not the ownership of subject land had long been vested
on petitioner after it had allegedly located and recorded its mining
claim in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902.
Ruling:
The records bear out that private respondent has been in possession
of subject parcel of land in concept of owner for more than thirty (30)
years. The court a quo made the following factual findings based on
the testimony of private respondent: The land applied for is almost
90% improved with numerous irrigated rice terraces newly planted to
palay at the time of the ocular inspection and others planted to
vegetables such as potatoes, banana plants, flowering plants and
fruit trees such as mangoes, jackfruits, coffee plants, avocados and
citrus - all fruit bearing.
h. Watershed.
Facts:
Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was
155
awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on
April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry. Against this award, bidders
Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions
for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on
December 6, 1963.
Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in
the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting
Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964,
the license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry. It
was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
as required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.
156
On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by
Ravago Commercial Company, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as
having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and
is therefore void ab initio.
Issue:
Ruling:
We fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner-
appellant's timber license was signed and released without authority
by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is
therefore void ab initio.
In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the
Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license.
The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on
December 19, 1963, and released to the petitioner on January 6,
1964 .The authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a
new ordinary timber license was contained in general memorandum
order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked by general
memorandum order No. 60, which was promulgated on December
19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer any
authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license
is therefore void ab initio .
i. Grazing Lands.
158
Facts:
On March 14, 1873 the Alcalde Mayor and judge of the Court of First
Instance in Tuguegarao, Cagayan purportedly granted to Domingo
Bunagan a possessory information title for a tract of land,called
Nottab, Gaceta de Manila dated November 3, 1885 mentions
Bunagan as having obtained a "composicion gratuita" for a parcel of
land in Enrile, Cagayan or a gratuitous adjustment title as
distinguished from an onerous adjustment title.
Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab land, whatever its
area, is forestal and grazing land, and consequently, was inalienable
land and, therefore, all supposed sales regarding that land were void.
Before the application was filed, Lope Guzman Rivas sold to his co-
petitioner Vijandre l/2 of the entire land at P50 a hectare. Vijandre
159
undertook to finance the registration of the land. Should the
registration of the land not materialize for causes not imputable to
Vijandre, then Lope would return to mall cash advances
The trial court declared the disputed land public land and dismissed
the applications of Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and the claims
of Pascua and Cavaco.
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision. It granted the
application of Lope and Vijandre, except with respect to Lot No. 13,
which was already covered by OCT No. 0-393. The Directors of
Lands and Forest Development appealed to this Court. Lope
Guzman Rivas and Vijandre did not file any appellees' brief.
The Solicitor General contends that the Appellate Court erred (1) in
not declaring that the disputed land is part of a forest reservation; (2)
in not finding that Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and their
predecessors have not been in the open, continuous, uninterrupted,
exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land and that their
possession was not in the concept of owner: (3) in not finding that
Domingo Bunagan's Spanish titles were not authentic and (4) in not
finding that the 1960 decision in favor of Cavaco is not res judicata.
On the other hand, lawyer Pascua argues (1) that the disputed land
was already private in the hands of Domingo Bunagans (2) that
portions of said land, 1,222 hectares and 9 hectares, were titled in the
names of Cavaco and Melardo Agapay (Benjamin V. Pascua)
respectively; (3) that the pasture lease agreements did not convert
private land into public land and (4) that Bunagan's Spanish titles
were authentic and valid.
Issue:
160
Whether or not the disputed land is non-registrable property.
Ruling:
The decision of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside. The
application for registration of Lope Guzman Rivas and Pacifico V.
Vijandre and the counter-application of lawyer Fernando A. Pascua
are dismissed
Grazing lands and timber lands are riot alienable under section 1,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly
agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable).
161
Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the
object of private ownership
j. Military Reservations.
Facts:
It was not until August 22, 1969 that the Solicitor-General entered his
162
appearance in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision
based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is part of a
duly established military reservation. Such motion was denied by
respondent Judge on December 8, 1969. It must be noted that the
location of the lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute.
Apparently, the respondent Judge in refusing to set aside his decision
was impressed by the claim that the private respondents had been in
possession "since the Spanish regime," and thus came within the
protection of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp John
Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private rights."
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act,
enacted as far back as 1903, specifically governs the subject matter
of reservations. As provided therein: "All lands or buildings, or any
interests therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the
boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be
military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations
of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands, buildings, and
interests therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall
become registered land in accordance with the provisions of said
Land Registration Act, under the circumstances hereinafter stated."
The validity of this statute was sustained as against the allegation
that there was a violation of the due process clause, in a 1910
decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron." Finally, an
earlier case of decisive significance was referred to: "What is even
more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part of the
private respondents to seek a re-opening under Republic Act No. 931
is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a
1926 decision. We there explicitly held: "The defendant's contention
that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to
order the registration portions of a legally established military
reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment of military
163
reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission
and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or buildings, or any
interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the
boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be
military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations
of the Land Registration Act. ... ." ' "
Facts:
Upon Vicente’s death, his sons, Victorino (the father of Arturo) and
Pablo possessed the property that was subsequently turned over to
Arturo. Thereafter, Arturo sold two-thirds (2/3) undivided portion of the
land to Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara.
The Director of Lands likewise filed his opposition alleging that the
applicants do not possess sufficient title to the land.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the lower
court.
Issue:
Ruling:
165
private respondents with the 30-year possession requirement. The
intervening period commencing from the promulgation of Proc. No. 10
in 1925 declaring the land in question as part of the U.S. Military
Reservation until 1953 when the land was deemed reverted back to
the public domain disturbed private respondents, possession over the
land in question because during this interregnum, no amount of time
in whatever nature of possession could have ripen such possession
into private ownership, the land having been segregate as part of a
military reservation.
166
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. It may be argued that the grant of authority to sell public lands,
pursuant to PEA, does not convert alienable lands of public domain
into private or patrimonial lands. In a ruling involving PEA “alienable
lands of public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties,
or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before
these lands can become private or patrimonial lands.
i. CHAVEZ V. PEA
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
Facts:
168
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating Public Estates Authority
(PEA). PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore
and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the
"lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP containing a total
area of 1,915,894 square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA,
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"
located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Parañaque City.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250
hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete
the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA
through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the
Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the
JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The
Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in
Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16,
1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as alienable
lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the
certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
169
Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task
Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate
Committee Report No. 560. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality
of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate
Committees.
The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there
were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an
order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant
violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO
dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated
June 22, 1999.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President
under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada
approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the
President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory
grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issue:
Ruling:
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an
additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part
of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying
170
these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered
by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these
submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present
state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until
reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the
Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming part of the
public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually
reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as
public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then
officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no
longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed
lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain and within the commerce of man.
The DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not.
Thus, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the
public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of
PEA.
Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are
alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that
these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by
PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.
Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and
are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable,
unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain.
REPUBLIC V. CA
172
Facts:
173
Application was amended. This payment did not include the military
camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the same had already been excluded
from the Sales Application at the time the payment was
made. Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose
P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus,
pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of
20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao.
On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio
de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of
Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20
hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares. On August 11, 1956, President
Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the
disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the
Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach,
Davao City. In the following October 9, President Magsaysay
revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No.
1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under the administration of
the Director of Hospital. Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the
12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of
Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on
the strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical
center site purposes. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and
successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed
the registration oil the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had
aquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of
Award issued to him by the Director of Lands. A certain Arsenio
Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that
the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2
belongs to him. After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of
Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966, directing "the
registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-
5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City
of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the
name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services,
Department of Health. The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and
Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment of the trial court and
appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. On July 5,
1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration,
174
maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but
the Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on
June 17, 1975. Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal.
Issue:
Ruling:
175
and for specific public uses for service, any land belonging to the
private domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use of which
is not otherwise directed by law. the land reserved "shall be used for
the specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise
provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA
141) authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract
or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use ofthe
commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the
inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the
public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other
improvements for the public benefit. It is true that Proclamation No.
350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if any there
be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to
prove any private rights over the property reserved. Wee-settled is
the rule that unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing
evidence that a certain portion of the public domain was acquired by
him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other means
for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or patents, the
property must be held to be part of the public domain. Nor could
respondent Alejandro de Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained
title by prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares, inasmuch as
by applying for the sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that the
12.8081-hectare lot was included in the original sales application for
33 hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily admits that
the portions applied for are part of the public domain, against which
no acquisitive prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section
48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
176
Facts:
177
over to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the
provisions of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement on Dec. 6,
1956 but the same has not been reserved for military purposes by the
Republic of the Philippines."
Issue:
Ruling:
178
alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or
permanently disposed of by the Government ... ." Included in the
petition is an executive order of the then President Herbert Hoover of
June 19, 1929, declaring to be a naval reservation of the Government
of the United States "that tract of land known as lot no. 141,
residence Section D, Baguio naval reservation, heretofore reserved
for naval purposes ... ." If there were still any lingering doubt, that
ought to be removed by this reaffirmation of a presidential
determination, then binding and conclusive as we were under
American sovereignty, that the lot in question should be a naval
reservation.
Facts:
It was not until August 22, 1969 that the Solicitor-General entered his
appearance in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision
based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is part of a
179
duly established military reservation. Such motion was denied by
respondent Judge on December 8, 1969. It must be noted that the
location of the lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute.
Apparently, the respondent Judge in refusing to set aside his decision
was impressed by the claim that the private respondents had been in
possession "since the Spanish regime," and thus came within the
protection of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp John
Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private rights."
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act,
enacted as far back as 1903, specifically governs the subject matter
of reservations. As provided therein: "All lands or buildings, or any
interests therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the
boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be
military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations
of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands, buildings, and
interests therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall
become registered land in accordance with the provisions of said
Land Registration Act, under the circumstances hereinafter stated."
The validity of this statute was sustained as against the allegation
that there was a violation of the due process clause, in a 1910
decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron." Finally, an
earlier case of decisive significance was referred to: "What is even
more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part of the
private respondents to seek a re-opening under Republic Act No. 931
is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a
1926 decision. We there explicitly held: "The defendant's contention
that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to
order the registration portions of a legally established military
reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment of military
reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission
and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or buildings, or any
180
interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the
boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be
military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations
of the Land Registration Act. ... ." ' "
Facts:
181
adjudicated as private property. He ruled that claims for private lands
by all persons not presented for registration within the period fixed
were barred forever. The 1922 decision established the rule that lots
of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, being public domain, are not
registerable under Act No. 496. As held by Judge Belmonte in a 1973
case, the Baguio Court of First Instance "has no Jurisdiction to
entertain any land registration proceedings" under Act No. 496 and
the Public Land Law, covering any lot within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation. After more than half a century from the 1922 decision
declaring the townsite public domain, or during the years 1972 to
1976, petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio
applications for the registration of lots inside the Baguio Townsite
Reservation. They alleged that in case the lots are not registerable
under Act No. 496, then section 48 (b) and (c) of the Public Land Law
should be applied because they and their predecessors have been in
possession of the lots for more than thirty years.
Issue:
182
Ruling:
183
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANGALANG
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the court which awarded title do not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action.
Ruling:
184
The decision of land registration court in Civil Reservation Case No. 1
declared all lands comprised within the Baguio Townsite Reservation
as public lands, with the exception of lands "reserved for specific
public purposes and those claimed and adjudicated private property."
Outside of those lands specifically excepted from the effects of the
decision, all lands within the limits of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation were declared 'public lands' no longer registrable under
the Land Registration Act. It is clear, therefore, that the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Banquet, presided over by Judge Pio R.
Marcos, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Land
Registration Case and to render a decision awarding title to the land
in question to the applicants Mariano Kiang et al. The decision of
Judge Marcos was null and void ab initio for want of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
Facts:
The subject land had been part of the land claim of Mateo Cariño.
Within this site, a sawmill and other buildings had been constructed
by H.C. Heald in connection with his lumber business. On March 14,
1916, H.C. Heald sold the buildings to Sioco Cariño, son of Mateo
Cariño and grandfather of private respondent Jose Cariño. Sioco
Cariño then took possession of the buildings and the land on which
the buildings were situated. The petition originated from an action for
recovery of possession of the eastern half of a parcel of land situated
in Residence Section "J", Camp Seven, Baguio City. On October 22,
1928, Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of
Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" with
Sioco Cariño. On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cariño sold the subject
land to his son, Guzman Cariño.
On May 23, 1955, Guzman Cariño filed a Free Patent Application
over the land in question. The application was given due course, but
Guzman later withdrew it when he decided to file his opposition to the
petition later filed by the heirs of Ting-el Dicman. The petition sought
to establish ownership over Lot 76-A and Lot 76-B. Guzman Cariño
opposed the petition insofar as he insisted ownership over Lot 76-B,
185
the land in controversy. The Estate of Sioco Cariño likewise filed an
opposition.
On March 6, 1963, the trial court rendered a partial judgment and
confirmed that the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-el
Dicman, there having been no adverse claim. But as to Lot 76-B, the
trial court found it necessary to hold further hearing in order to decide
on the adverse claims of the parties.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition was
pending in the trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 628 “excluding from the operation of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as ‘Igorot
Claims’ situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same open to
disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land
Act.”
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation No. 628 reserved the subject land from
Igorot claims?
Ruling:
Segregating and reserving certain Igorot claims and prohibiting
encumbrance or alienation therein for 15 years from the grant of the
patent is not applicable where vested interest are affected. The
executive issuance can only go as far as to classify public land, but it
cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights. Proclamation No.
628 issued by then President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960
had the effect of “segregating” and “reserving” certain Igorot claims
identified therein, including one purportedly belonging to the “Heirs of
Dicman,” and prohibiting any encumbrance or alienation of these
claims for a period of 15 years from acquisition of patent. But by the
time the Proclamation had been issued, all rights over the property in
question had already been vested in private respondent. The
executive issuance can only go so far as to classify public land, but it
cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights.
Proceedings for registration of land
A.Judicial Registration
a.Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title
i. Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,applicatns for registration
of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain,second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
186
possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is
under bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,1945, or
earlier.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REMMAN ENTERPRISES
G.R. NO. 199310
Facts:
Respondent Remman Ent. Inc. applied for a judicial confirmation of
title with the RTC of Taguig. Said application is comprised of two
parcels of land also located in Taguig. On Dec. 31, 2001, RTC found
that the application for registration was sufficient in form and
substance and scheduled an initial hearing which was published in
the Official Gazette, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, and the notice was posted in conspicuous places in the
City Hall of Taguig.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents on May 2007. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
187
granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.
Ruling:
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership
of land. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that the
respondents failed to present incontrovertible evidence to establish
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12,
1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for registration was
denied.
188
ii.Public Land Act: Two requisites for judicial confirmation of
title. The two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, name;y: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest
under bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
NATIONAL COLLEGES OF FISHERIES (ANCF) VS HEIRS OF
MAXIMA LACHICA SIN
G.R. NO. 157485
Facts:
Respondent heirs instituted a complaint against the National
College of fisheries (ANCF) in Kalibo, aklan), for recovery of
possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with
damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231-square meter-portion
of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a
cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land
they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation. the respondent
heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of
land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in
New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said
bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale, and then
developed the same by planting coconut trees, banana plants,
mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said land
until her death in 1945.
189
Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously
in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. To
prove possession, respondents presented several tax declarations,
the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being
claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of
land within the area, for educational purposes of ANCF and that the
subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of
private ownership.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of
respondents. The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs
over the disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors’ open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an
imperfect title, which should be respected and protected. The RTC
affirmed the MCTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Maxima Lachica Sin acquired private
rights by virtue of their possession to the disputed property so as to
entitle them for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Ruling:
The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which
respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject
property, through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it
was declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,
namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945 ; and (2) the classification of
the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to
show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a
timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does
not lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and
disposable prior to said date.
On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are
inalienable public lands.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the
190
burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to
do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-
interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private
rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus
constrained to reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the
prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 ( 4390)
for lack of merit.
192
and occupied from the time of her grandparents, during the Spanish
time, up to the present. Cresencia submitted documents, among
others, to support her requested confirmation of imperfect title.
Issue:
Who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to the benefits of
C.A. No. 141 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for
confirmation and registration of imperfect title.
Ruling:
Neither RCAM nor Cresencia is entitled to the benefitsof C.A. No. 141
and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for confirmation and
registration of imperfect title,.
a. The RC M failed to prove possession of the property in the manner
and for the period required by law
The possession contemplated by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 is
actual, not fictional or constructive. In Carlos v Republic of the
Philippines, the Court explained the character of the required
possession, as follows:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not
to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together
with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a
land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Accordingly, to prove its compliance with Section 48(b)' s possession
requirement, the RCAM had to show that it performed specific overt
acts in the character an owner would naturally exercise over his own
property. Proof of actual possession of the property at the time of the
filing of the application is required because the phrase adverse,
continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner," the RCAM used
to describe its alleged possession, is a conclusion of law,not an
allegation of fact. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent [and] notorious x x x continuous when uninterrupted,
193
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when [the
possession is characterized by acts manifesting] exclusive dominion
over the land and an appropriation of it to [the applicant's] own use
and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood."
Very noticeably, the RCAM failed to show or point to any specific act
characterizing its claimed possession in the manner described above.
The various documents that it submitted, as well as the bare
assertions it made and those of its witnesses, that it had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the property,
hardly constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence required in
cases of this nature. We elaborate below on these points.
Under the same legal parameters we used to affirm the RTC's denial
of the RCAM' s application, we also find insufficient the evidence that
Cresencia presented to prove her claimed possession of the property
in the manner and for the period required by C.A. No. 141. Like the
RCAM, Cresencia was bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably
proves her compliance with the requirements for confirmation of title.
To our mind, she also failed to discharge this burden of proof; thus,
the CA erred when it affirmed the contrary findings of the RTC and
confirmed Cresencia’s title over the property.
At any rate, even if we were to consider these pieces of evidence to
be sufficient, which we do not, confirmation and registration of title
over the property in Cresencia' s name was still improper in the
absence of competent and persuasive evidence on record proving
that the property is alienable and disposable.
194
b. Ordinary Land Registration Proceeding
i. Who may apply?
A private corporation may nor hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares. The rule does not apply where at the time of the
corporation acquired the land, the same was already
private land as when it was possessed by its predecessor
in the manner and for such length of time as to entitle the
letter to registration.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the land is already a private land.
2. Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against
their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies.
Ruling:
1. YES. Already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient.
195
It had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption. The application
for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by
the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of
said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law
196
and the taxes due thereon have been paid.
On May 29, 1981 respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the
registration of the property in the name of the private respondent. The
Director of Lands interposed this petition raising the issue of whether
or not a corporation may apply for registration of title to land. After
comments were filed by the respondents, the Court gave the petition
due course. The legal issue raised by the petitioner Director of Lands
has been squarely dealt with in two recent cases (The Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., etc., No. L-73002 (December 29, 1986), 146 SCRA 509.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, if the land was already private at the time Meralco
bought it from Natividad, then the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution
against corporations holding alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease (1973 Const., Art. XIV, See. 11) does not apply.
Petitioner, however, contends that a corporation is not among those
that may apply for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Public Land Act.
As ruled in the Acme case, the fact that the confirmation proceedings
were instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental
circumstance, "productive of a defect hardly more than procedural
and in no wise affecting the substance and merits of the right of
ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings." Considering
that it is not disputed that the Natividads could have had their title
confirmed; only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would
deny private respondent the right to register its property which was
validly acquired.
197
SUSI VS RAZON
G.R.NO. 24066
Facts:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela
Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring
plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in
the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made
by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that
the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the
latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.For
his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each
allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the
land in question was a property of the Government of the United
States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands
before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with
law.After trial, the CFI of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring
Susi entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made
by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs
against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took
this appeal, assigning thereto that :the holding that plaintiff is entitled
to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the
sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the
ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of
the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be
cancelled; and The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880,
Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving
the right to repurchase the same. September 5, 1899, sold it to
Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it
(Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi
had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing
himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the
sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession
and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except
198
during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on
September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the CFI of Pampanga
to recover the possession of said land, after considering the evidence
introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of
Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint.
Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in
question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of
Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914. Having learned
of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on
December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-
five years. After making the proper administrative investigation, the
Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold
the land to Angela Razon. On August 31, 1921, the register of deeds
issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said
document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in
question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for
forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of
Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the
case being one of title to real property. Valentin Susi then brought this
action.
Issue:
Whether or not the land in question being of the public domain, the
plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession.
Ruling:
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in
possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely,
and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year
1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the
forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is
controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had
been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon
applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been
in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for
thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac
had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December
18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and
199
occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach
of memory. Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant
of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling
the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed
of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale
thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right.
Facts:
In February 23, 1952, Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to
INC which built a chapel on the lot. Saturnino Sacayanan, who was
born in 1941 and became a member of INC in 1948, testified to the
sale by Sabuco and the erection of the small chapel by INC
in1952. Subsequently, Sabuco sold the bigger lot to Bernardo
200
Badanguio less the small portion where the INC chapel was built.
Issue:
Ruling:
The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and
1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is
201
also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest,
Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way
before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the
subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and
occupation––from Sabuco, including those of his parents, to INC; and
from Sabuco to Badanguio to INC––had been in the concept of
owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property. These
had not been disturbed as attested to by respondent’s witnesses.
REPUBLIC VS CA
73 SCRA 146
Facts:
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city
of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction
and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation
for the said project.
202
object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a
foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within
the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on
the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the
dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pasay City and RREC, and the
decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.
Issue:
Ruling:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. A strip
of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a
seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin
of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide
usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. The duty of the court is to
interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden
its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of
Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided
expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the
exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands. It bears
stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as
amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack,
have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899,
and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
203
iv. A public land sales applicant cannot be a proper party to file
original registration of the same land covered by his sales
application.
Facts:
Issue:
205
Exception: Successor who acquired by prescription a land
previously subject to free patent application of his predecessor-
in-interest may file registration.
DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT VS CA
205 SCRA 486
Facts:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title
over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989
dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in compliance with the
mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated
to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely
procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. The
Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated
this recourse to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper
publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case is mandatory.
Ruling:
YES. Petition was granted.The pertinent part of Section 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of
initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a
proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the
state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale
clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
206
shall have been duly complied with.
Ruling:
The Suprem Court held that the applicant's predecessor-in-interest is
a mere mortgagee, and ownership of the thing mortgaged is retained
by Basilia Beltran, the mortgagor. The mortgagee, however, may
recover the loan, although the mortgage document evidencing the
loan was non-registrable being a purely private instrument. Failure of
mortgagor to redeem the property does not automatically vest
ownership of the property to the mortgagee, which would grant the
latter the right to appropriate the thing mortgaged or dispose of it. The
act of applicant in registering the property in his own name upon
mortgagor's failure to redeem the property would amount to a pactum
commissorium which is against good morals and public policy.
208
land surrendered to him by the debtor.
RAMIREZ VS C.A.
144 SCRA 292
Facts:
On September 15,1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and
Valentina Bonifacio filed an application for registration of a parcel of
Riceland in Pamplona, Las Pinas Rizal. The petitioners presented
parol evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase
from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the American regime
but the corresponding contract of sale was lost and no copy or record
of the same was available. Thereafter, the court ordered the issuance
of OCT No. 2273 in the petitioners’ names. On March 30, 1960, the
private respondents filed a petition to review the decree of registration
on the ground of fraud. They alleged, among others, that in 1938
respondents obtained a loan of P400.00 from the petitioners which
they secured with a mortgage on the land in question by way of
antichresis and that for this reason, Tax Declaration No. 8777 was
cancelled and substituted by Tax Declaration Nos. 9522 and 2385
issued in the names of the petitioners. In their answer, the spouses
Ramirez denied the material allegations of the petition, they based
their claim to the land on two deeds of sale allegedly executed on
April 15, 1937 and April 23, 1937 which they allegedly found
accidentally in March 1960. After trial, the court found that the deeds
of sale were spurious, and that the respondents took possession of
the land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938,
mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to secure the payment of a loan
in the amount of P400.00. It was agreed that the respondents could
not redeem the property within a period of five years and that the
petitioners would take possession of the land, enjoy its fruits, and pay
the land taxes thereon. Finding the claims of the herein respondents
sustained by the evidence, it ordered the cancellation of Original
Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the
names of herein petitioners and the issuance in lieu thereof of
another original certificate of title in the names of herein respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not an antichretic creditor can acquire by prescription the
land surrendered to him by the debtor.
Ruling:
NO. The Court ruled that the issue was submitted to the appellate
209
court and was correctly resolved therein. The Court of Appeals
stated:...The petition alleged that 'the applicants Hilario Ramirez and
Valentina Bonifacio willfully and fraudulently suppressed the facts that
the petitioners are the legal and rightful owners of the rice field in
question and that they possess the said rice field merely as
antichretic creditors as security for the loan of P400.00; that the
applicants are guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment
when they declared in their application, in the case at bar, that no
other person had any claim or interest in the said land.' These we
believe are sufficient allegations of extrinsic fraud.
In the applicant's application for registration, which followed the form
required by the Land Registration Act, the applicants alleged that 'to
the best of our knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or
incumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor any
other person having any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable,
in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy.' This allegation is
false and made in bad faith, for, as We have found, the applicants are
not the owners of the land sought to be registered and they are in
possession thereof only as antichretic creditors.
Issue:
Ruling:
211
The appealed order of dismissal of these proceedings on the ground
of res judicata is affirmed.
212
viii. Only the Government through the Solicitor General, has the
personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to
acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship.
BALAIS-MABANAG VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. NO. 153142
Facts:
On January 19, 1985, Romulo A. Coronel and other Coronels
executed a document entitled receipt of down payment, stipulating
that they received from respondent Ramona through her mother,
respondent Concepcion D. Alcaraz, the sum of P50,000.00 as down
payment on the total purchase price of P1,240,000.00 for their
“inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 119627 of the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City.”
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by
TCT No. 327043 to the petitioner for the higher price
ofP1,580,000.00. So the Coronels rescinded their contract with
Ramona by depositing her down payment of P50,000.00 in the
bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. On February 22,
1985, Concepcion filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages in her own name in the RTC in Quezon City against the
Coronels. On March 1, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision ordering
defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale and
the plaintiffs’ claim for damages and attorney’s fees, as well as the
counterclaims of defendants and intervenors are dismissed. Upon
denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Coronels and the
petitioner appealed to the CA but was denied hence they appealed
the CA judgment to SC but affirmed the CA decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the registration by the
Registrar of Deeds of the deed of absolute sale despite the lack of
indication of the citizenship of the buyer of the subject property.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. In the complaint dated February 22, 1985,
respondent Concepcion, as plaintiff, categorically averred that she
was a Filipino citizen. The petitioner did not deny or disprove the
averment of Filipino citizenship during the trial and on appeal. The
petitioner did not also advert to the issue of citizenship after the
complaint was amended in order to implead Ramona as a co-plaintiff,
despite the petitioner’s opportunity to do so.
Yet, now, when the final decision of the RTC is already being
implemented, the petitioner would thwart the execution by assailing
the directive of the RTC for the Branch Clerk of Court to execute
the deed of absolute sale and by blocking the registration of the deed
of absolute sale in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, on the
ground that Ramona was disqualified from owning land in the
Philippines.
214
The petitioner’s move was outrightly unwarranted. The issue of
citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised
to forestall the execution of a final and executory judgment where the
objecting party had the opportunity to raise the issue prior to the
finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the capacity of the
winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the
execution of a final decision.
215
c. Grounds for application: Manner of acquisition of land
MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can register the subject land under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both
Ruling:
216
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to
the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can
petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in
1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for
public use service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
217
because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a
Torrens Title. There must be a separate action for the
registration thereof.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the
alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-
cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over
the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil
Code. ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous
to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments
from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. Art. 457.
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters.
219
properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State
regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality
cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion,
the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible
accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the
public domain by clear provision of law.
GRANDE VS COURT OF APPEALS
5 SCRA 524
Facts:
220
Whether or not the respondents have acquired the alluvial property
through prescription.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that
respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since
1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the
existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an
examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive
as to them and cannot be reviewed by us.
Facts:
221
1969. Thereafter, in 1974, the subject property was transferred to
Eusebio Leaban’s daughter, Pacencia Leaban, who, in turn, declared
the same for taxation purposes under her name. On 15 June 1979,
the subject property was then conveyed by Pacencia Leaban to her
daughter, herein respondent Gregoria L. Diloy, by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
In 1997, respondent Gregoria L. Diloy filed an Application for
Registration of Title over the subject property.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, on behalf of the
Republic, filed an Opposition to the Application for Registration of
Title.
During the hearing of the Application for Registration of Title,
respondent presented her father, Rustico Diloy, and Armando Ramos
as witnesses to strengthen her claim that her predecessors-in-interest
had been in actual, continuous, open, notorious and adverse
possession of the subject property.
The MCTC rendered a Decision dated 5 May 1999 in favor of the
respondent, granting her application for registration over the subject
property.
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the
respondent failed to prove her possession as required under
Presidential Decree No. 1529. The said Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. Subsequently, the Republic appealed the Decision of the
MCTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeal of the Republic. Aggrieved, the Republic filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision which was likewise denied.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots Nos. 1099 and
1546 from their predecessors-interests, who in turn acquired said lots
though a grant by the government by virtue of their proven, open,
exclusive and undisputed possession for more than 30years. An
issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin obtained from
223
the then Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond
Permit covering portions of Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546. Azurin filed with
the Bureau of Lands a complaint for correction, amendment or
cancellation of the Homestead Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. 1546
and the Free Patent of Macatindog over Lot No. 1099 alleging among
others that the patentees secured their patents and titles through
fraud, misrepresentation and illegal machinations. The Solicitor
General sided with Azurin; when the case was brought to the Court of
First Instance, the SG stated that the disputed portions of land were
actually claimed by Azurin and that such lands could not be disposed
by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. Hence, the
patents and titles issued to de Porkan and Macatindog were void
insofar as the portion occupied and covered by the fishpond permit of
Azurin. After hearing however, the CFI dismissed the complaints and
upheld the validity of the titles/patents of de Porkan & Macatindog
over the lands in dispute. The SG in the present petition avers among
others that the lots in dispute could not be the subject of disposition
under the Homestead and Free Patent provisions of the Public Act
since they are marshy and swampy, certified as such as more
suitable for fishpond development, disposable only thru lease under
the Public Land Act.
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
227
d. Form and Contents of Application
i. Waiver of lack of verification
Facts:
228
A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate was applied for
registration in the Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18,
1956 by John M. Miller and Emilio Espinosa, Jr.
After notice and publication, initial hearing was held on June 20,
1957. The Director of Lands and Bureau of Public Highways filed
written oppositions. Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed
verbal oppositions. All persons, except the abovementioned
oppositors, were declared in default on July 8, 1957.
Issue:
229
The act of proceeding to trial on the merits without objection is
generally a waiver of all uncertainties, ambiguities, irregularities,
formal defects, of fault or defects of any kind in the pleading of the
adverse party.
230
ii. When the applicant is a non-resident; additional
requirements
iii. When 2 or more parcels of land applied for; additional
requirements
iv. When land borders on road; additional requirements
v. Requirement of additional facts
e. Where to file
Delegated jurisdiction of First Level Courts
f. What to file
g. Ocular inspection may be mad
h. Amendments. Need publication and notice is changes are
substantial.
i. As to parties. An amendment due to change of name of
applicant does not require publication.
Facts:
231
Situated in the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan, the area consists of
187,288 sq. m., more or less. The initial application for registration
was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, Act 496, as amended. The Republic of the
Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed the application
alleging that the applicant, Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee
simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land for
at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application. The
opposition likewise specifically alleged that the applicant is a private
corporation disqualified under the 1973 Constitution from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain citing Section 11, Article 14. The
Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging
that the land is within the unclassified public land and, hence,
inalienable. Other private parties also filed their oppositions, but were
subsequently withdrawn. In an amended application, Pacific Farms,
Inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the applicant from Pacific
Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta. Despite the supposed amendment,
there was no republication. On 4 October 1979, the trial court
rendered a decision adjudicating the subject property to J. Antonio
Araneta. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, the
decision of the lower court was affirmed on 12 December1985.
Hence, the petition for review.
Issue:
Held:
BENIN vs TUASON
57 SCRA 531
Facts:
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of
three parcels of agricultural lands located in Laloma, Caloocan, Rizal,
inherited from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who
inturn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they an
d their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of
land
openly,adversely,and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively
enjoyed the fruits harvestedtherefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's
grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6,
1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands in
1933, Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said
parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in
233
1940under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the
last World War,
or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Ma
nila and other places, after having secured the permission of the
plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals
to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually
served with summons. The other defendants were ordered
summonedbypublication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of th
e Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared.
The other defendants were all declared in default.
Issue:
Whether the plaintiff has a valid claim over the disputed property.
Held:
Facts:
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of
the parcels of agricultural lands; that they inherited said parcels of
land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same
from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in
interest had possessed these parcels of land openly, adversely, and
peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits
235
harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had
said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the
cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in 1933 Sixto
Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of
land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940
under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last
World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter,
evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the
permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid
monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
Sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful
possession of their lands, the J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their
agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and
intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment,
illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the
dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the
improvements, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a
result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from their
lessees.
The plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of
defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their
lands had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct
or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as
Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land
Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original
applicants for registration, the defendants.
The plaintiffs alleged that before the decision was handed down in
the application for registration by the defendants, the area,
boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered
and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were
made after the publication of the original application, were never
published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No.
7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of
March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914,
known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names
of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and
Diliman Estate); and that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC
No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no
jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication.
In its answer, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., among others, specifically
236
denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each
case.
After trial, the lower court, among others, concluded that the decision
and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio, having
been rendered without jurisdiction and the plaintiffs are the owners
and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in their
respective complaints.
J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. appealed from the decision. It contends that
the trial court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court lacked
or was without jurisdiction to issue decree No. 17431 for the alleged
reason that the amendment to the original plan was not published.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred when it held that the Land Registration
Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681.
Held:
The lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court
was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681.
If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for
registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the
original application, as published, a new publication of the amended
application must be made.
The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons
concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new
publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original
application, and the decision of the registration court would be a
nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land.
The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed
with respect to the publicity that is required in registration
proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to
present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of
failure of notice.
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the
area covered by the original application and the original plan as
previously published, a new publication is not necessary. In the latter
case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not
237
affected by the failure of a new publication.
When the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of
registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as
published, it did not mention the fact that the difference in area is only
27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of 27.10 square
meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the
determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
The very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the
conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan ... included
additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as
published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1
has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86
hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters,
between the computation of the area when the original plan was
made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was
prepared, cannot be considered substantial as would affect the
identity of Parcel 1.
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
No, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition. Section
23 of P.D. No. 1529 was never meant to dispense with the
requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. What it simply
239
means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient
compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although
the law mandates that it be published "once in the Official Gazette
and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is to
accord primacy to the official publication.
Facts:
In the case at bar, the appellee's "petition" for naturalization that was
240
not published, but a "notice" summarizing the allegations of said
pleading. The publication of such notice is insufficient to vest, in the
trial court, jurisdiction to hear and decide this case. Besides, said
notice was published in the "Nueva Era," and the records do not
show that this newspaper is of general circulation in Surigao del
Norte, the province in which the appellee resides.
Issue:
Whether the defect in the publication of the petition deprives the court
of jurisdiction.
Held:
Sec. 9 of Com. Act No. 473 requires that the "petition" for
naturalization be published "in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province where the petitioner
resides.
241
Instances of defective publication
a) Different description
242
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
244
Respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their
residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City,
from one Cristeta Dazo BeleN. At the time of the purchase,
respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens. The
spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2)
parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. This
time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to
embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization. The court a
quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the
lots in question. At the outset, petitioner submits that private
respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject
properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor. It
maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed
to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever
classification belongs to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus,
before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the
State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court
adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the
land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the
court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
Issue:
Held:
245
the time they applied for registration of the properties in question,
said properties as discussed above were already private lands;
consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration
thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The
parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the
public domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides
that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a
maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
246
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, METRO MANILA vs.
THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MALABON,
METRO MANILA, BRANCH 170
Facts:
c) the registry return receipts for the copies of the notices which
were sent to the Director of Lands, the Office of the Solicitor General,
the National Land Title's and Deeds Registration Administration
(NLTDRA) Salome Castillo, and Jose Castillo
Issue:
Held:
248
the publication of the petition, such defect deprives the court of
jurisdiction. And when the court a quo lacks jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case and all its
aspects.
C. Opposition
Facts:
249
Petitioner Leyva had an alleged Compromise Agreement with private
respondent Jandoc. Said agreement was entails that spouses Leyva
will withdraw their opposition to the land registration case filed by
Jandoc, if the latter will transfer a ownership over a parcel of land
belonging to Jandoc. The agreement was purpotedly executed in
1963 but was only notarized in 1972.
On the other hand, private respondent Laiz executed an
agreement of sale with Jandoc in 1959 involving the same parcel of
land. Laiz was able to acquire transfer of ownership and possession
of the said land by virtue of a case he filed for specific perfomance
against Jandoc.
The RTC ruling was then affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals which
are the following:
1. The Compromise Agreement was null and void for being
undated and belatedly notarized.
2. In the registration proceedings, Laiz was mentioned as an
adverse possessor but not Leyva.
3. The agreement of sale between Laiz and Jandoc is valid, and
also supported by an earnest money given by Laiz.
4. Due execution of the agreement was witnessed by three
credible witnesses.
5. It has been established that the subject was lot was occupied
by Laiz since 1954, and was given TCT over the said lot by
virtue of specific performance.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that the Agreement of
Sale prevails over the alleged Compromise Agreement. The reliance
of Leyva on his expert witnesses was not able to overcome the
testimonies given by the three witnesses. As held in our
jurisprudence, "the positive testimony of the three attesting witnesses
ought to prevail over the expert opinions which cannot be
mathematically precise but which on the contrary, are subject to
250
inherent infirmities." In any event, it is well established that the
appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court
for the latter is in a better position to gauge credibility of witnesses.”
It is evident that what petitioner seeks from Supreme Court a review
of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
findings of the trial court. Indeed, it has long been established to the
point of being elementary, that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by this Court except in
certain instances which have no application here. Petition was
denied.
ii. Oppositor need not show title; but must appear to have an
interest
251
DE CASTRO VS MARCOS
26 SCRA 644
Facts:
Issue:
252
Whether De Castro have the personality or legal standing to oppose
the application for registration of Akia.
Ruling:
253
iii. A mere foreshore lessee of a public land cannot be an
oppositor
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
255
iv. Homesteader, purchaser of friar land and all persons who
claim to be in possession prior to issuance of their titles or
awards to public lands
Facts:
Rufino Akia before the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, acting
as a cadastral court, for the reopening of cadastral proceedings,
pursuant to Republic Act 931. Respondent Akia there sought the
registration in his name of 15,922 square meters of land situated in
the City of Baguio. On July 30, 1965, petitioner Virginia L. de Castro
moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1,000 square meters
allegedly included in the 15,922 square meters of land specified in
respondent Akia's petition below. It appears that petitioner Virginia de
Castro filed with the Bureau of Lands Township Sales Application
[TSAV-3559 (E-V-405)] covering a 1,000 square meter-parcel of land
identified as Lot 1, Quezon Hill Subdivision, Residential Section "K",
Baguio City. It was surveyed for which she paid a fee of P150.00 on
October 21, 1955. Public auction, duly published, was conducted at
which petitioner de Castro was the highest bidder. On December 17,
1955, the lot was awarded in her favor at a cost of P4.30 per square
meter, or a total of P4,300.00. Petitioner fully paid the purchase price
which, with interests, amounted to P4,306.38. Petitioner, it is claimed,
had been paying taxes on the lot.On August 16, 1965, petitioner's
motion for intervention, despite Akia's opposition, was granted by the
court below.
Issues
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Fernandez vs Aboratigue
36 SCRA 476
Facts:
Issue:
260
Held:
261
b. Contents
i. Names and addresses of adjoining owners
Facts:
262
The Bacases filed their Application for Registration on November 12,
1964 covering a parcel of land together with all the improvements
found thereon, located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City with Lot No.
4354 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan, L.R.C. Record No. 1612.
They alleged ownership in fee simple of the property and indicated in
their application the names and addresses of the adjoining owners,
as well as a statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth Military Area)
recently occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance.
The director of the Bureau of Lands, registered its written opposition
and on On April 10, 1968, based on the evidence presented by the
Bacases, the Land Registration Court (LRC) rendered a decision
holding that the applicants had conclusively established their
ownership over the subject land and that their possession, including
that of their predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse,
peaceful, uninterrupted, and in concept of owners for more than forty
(40) years. No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the
decision of the LRC. Thus, the decision became final and executory,
resulting in the issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate
of title over the subject property
The LRC’s decision in both applications for registration the Republic
filed a complaint for annulment of titles against the Bacases and the
Chabons before the RTC. More specifically, on September 7, 1970 or
one (1) year and ten (10) months from the issuance of OCT No. 0-
358, a civil case for annulment, cancellation of original certificate of
title, reconveyance of lot or damages was filed by the Republic
against the Bacases.
The Republic averred that the subject land had long been reserved in
1938 for military purposes at the time it was applied for and, so, it
was no longer disposable and subject to registration. The RTC
dismissed the complaints of the Republic they ruled that the
respondents did not commit fraud in filing their applications for
registration.The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Thus, the appeal
on the Supreme Court.
Issue:
263
Held:
The Republic can question even final and executory judgment when
there was fraud.
It can also question a final and executory judgment when the LRC
had no jurisdiction over the land in question. With respect to the
Bacases, although the lower courts might have been correct in ruling
that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law
when they alleged that Camp Evangelista was an occupant, the
Republic is not precluded and estopped from questioning the validity
of the title.
The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the
existence of actual and extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a
judgment decreeing registration is null and void.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and
the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim
of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
c. Partial Opposition
i. Sufficiency of unverified opposition
265
d. Affirmative Relief in Opposition
D. Order of Default
a. General Default
b. Special Default
c. Distinctions between General and Special Default
d. Effects of Default
i. “entered against the whole world” hence all persons are
bound by the order of default
Facts:
The Spouses Cachero filed a case in the CFI of La Union against the
respondents for recovery of possession and ownership of 2 parcels of
266
land in Barrio Basca, Aringay, LaUnion. The lower court rendered
judgment declaring the petitioners owners of the subject land. The
judgment became final and executory. About 7 years later the
Spouses Cachero filed for the registration under the Torrens Act of
the subject land (109,480 sq. m.) identified as Lot No. 6860 of the
Cadastral Survey and another parcel of land (50,412 square meters)
identified as Lot No. 6859 of the same Cadastral Survey, both lots
being situated in Sitio Iriw, Basca Aringay, La Union. Subsequently,
Atty. Yaranon filed oppositions in said case in behalf of the
respondents Tomas Cachero died before judgment and was
substituted by
hischildren.The judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses findin
g that the spouses and their predecessors-in-interest had been
in continuous and notorious possession of subject lots for more than
60 years in concept of owners except for a one-hectare portion of Lot
No. 6860 which the Cacheros had sold to Bernardino Marzan; that
Tomas Cachero had inherited said lots from his late father, Simeon
Cachero; and that the applicant spouses had been religiously paying
the realty taxes on the parcels of land as owners thereof. The
respondents thru their counsel, Atty. Yaranon, filed a motion for
reconsiderationon the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction over
the case and that the subject lands, which have been the subject
of cadastral proceedings, showed that neither the Cacheros nor their
predecessors-in-interest had ever entered a claim for either lot. The
Cacheros opposed the motion and argued that by the time the motion
for reconsideration was filed, the judgment sought to be reconsidered
had already become final. The motion was denied. About 7 months
after the filing of the motion for reconsideration, persons not parties to
the registration proceedings filed a "
petition for review of judgment and/or decree
." They alleged that they were the owners of the land designated as
Lot No. 6859 which they purchased sometime in 1929 and that they
have been in continuous possession thereof since then. They also
alleged that the petitioners fraudulently omitted to give them notice of
their application for registration and that in the earlier cadastral
survey, Lots Numbered6859 and 6860 had been declared public land
for lack of any original claimant and at the cadastral hearing only the
Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry, and they had file cadastral
answer. The petition prayed for the re-opening, review and setting
aside of the judgment and for the accord to them of an opportunity to
267
prove their asserted contentions. The petition for review was denied.
The Registration Court ruled that the according to the report of the
chief surveyor of the Land Registration Commission, there was no
decree of registration issued as regards the subject lots. It also ruled
that the movants had failed to show fraud on the Cacheros' part.
Paulina Nodo and Felix Genova subsequently died and were
substituted by their heirs. These Genova heirs filed an amended
petition which was also denied by the Registration Court. Then, they
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which forwarded it to the
Supreme Court, holding that the former had no appellate
jurisdiction over the matter. The CA also declared that the Genovas
are third persons who came into the case.
Issue:
Held:
268
ii. All allegations are deemed confessed
Facts:
269
Moreover, Judge constantino, who took over the same branch
presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of Possession
against the spouses. Immediately, petitioner filed a motion to quash
which was denied.
Issue:
270
Ruling:
271
e. Remedy of a defaulted interested person
f. It is improper to declare a person in default simply because he
failed to appear at the pre-trial after filing an opposition. Remedy
is the special civil action of certiorari not an appeal.
272
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and
decision of the respondent Judge, and mandamus to order the
respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioner’s Motion for
New Trial. The petitioner also prays for the dismissal of the
respondent corporation’s application for registration. On Sept. 8,
1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent
Garcia in the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded
to the SolGen thru the director of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the
Director of lands filed an opposition to this application, and at the
same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized the
Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same.
Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with
the conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute
Party Applicant from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp without amending
the boundaries of the area stated in the original application. Said
motion was granted by the respondent Judge Santiago. A notice of
initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties concerned,
with the warning that a party who failed to appear would be declared
in default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official
Gazette and posted by the sheriff as required by law. On Jan. 23,
1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel
was present; an order of general default was issued by the
respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the
evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent
Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in
favor of the respondent corporation. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his counsel to
appear at the initial hearing was excusable,a nd that the decision was
contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however denied.
Issue:
Held:
First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the
respondent corporation purchased the subject lots, have pending
sales applications as evidenced in the plans submitted to the land
registration court by Maria Garcia herself. As such sales applicants,
they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and that
the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of
Lands, to which the applications were submitted. Therefore, their
possession was not that of an owner, as required by law. (The private
respondents were conspicuously silent on this point, as if they were
trying to conceal this vital fact)
274
More than anything else, however, registration in this instance cannot
be granted on the basis of Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public
Land Act as said provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of
the public domain. It appears from Forestry Administrative Order No.
4-1157, dated April 28, 1971, that the subject lands…were forest
lands and only later declared as alienable or disposable by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the
assumption that the applicant herein, through its predecessors-in-
interest, had been in possession for at least thirty years, such
possession never ripened into private ownership. The respondent
Garcia and Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales patents
precisely because they wanted to acquire ownership over the subject
lands. An examination of the dates will show that the filing of the
sales applications, apparently on October 24, 1971, was done after
the lands had been declared as alienable and disposable.
The pertinent provision of law which states: “If no person appears and
answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion
of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general
default to be recorded …,” cannot be interpreted to mean that the
court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been
filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical,
unwarranted, and unjust
275
The respondent Judge, in denying the petitioner’s Motion for New
Trial, ignored the established rule that courts should be liberal in
setting aside a default judgment. “The Court, in the exercise of wise
discretion, could have restored their standing in court and given them
an even chance to face their opponents.
276
Facts:
On June 16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion to
dismiss, neither the parties nor their respective counsels appeared in
court. While the motion to dismiss was pending resolution by the
court because defendants had not yet presented to the court the
required proof of service, plaintiff, on January 11, 1974, filed a petition
to declare the defendants in default that defendants had been served
with summons and copies of the complaint on June 8, 1973; that as
of January 11, 1974, or after a lapse of seven (7) months from the
service of summons, defendants had not filed their answer to the
complaint. The court granted the petition and, consequently, it
received ex parte the evidence of the plaintiff and rendered judgment
in favor of Catolico. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but
Catolico file a motion to postpone hearing of motion for
reconsideration.
277
On May 31, 1974, while defendants' motion for reconsideration was
still pending before the court because the defendants had not filed yet
their reply to the opposition as they had not received a copy, Catolico
filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment, alleging that said
judgment had already become final and executory because the
defendants failed to have the order of default lifted; that the motion for
reconsideration was filed out of time; that there was a "manifest
attempt on the part of the defendants to delay the proceedings to
afford them an opportunity to have all their assets and shares
dissipated by continuous sale of the same to the prejudice". Thence,
the court denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration.
Defendants’ filed their notice of appeal. On July 22, Pio R. Marcos, as
President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of defendant
Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation, wrote a letter to respondent
Sheriff asking that the defendants be given a little chance to exhaust
the legal remedies available to hold in abeyance the execution and
garnishment for the reasons that defendants were not given a chance
to have their day in court in the motion for immediate execution of
judgment and that they have already appealed from the lower court's
decision and order of immediate execution.
Issue:
Held:
278
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he declared the petitioners in default. The
motion to dismiss was pending before the court when such
declaration was made, and it is generally irregular to enter an order of
default while a motion to dismiss remains pending and undisposed of.
The irregularity of the order of default is evident from the fact that
when the petitioners were declared in default, their time for filing an
answer had not yet commenced to run anew because on said date,
their counsel had not yet received any notice of the action taken by
the court on their motion to dismiss. There may be cases where the
attendance of certain circumstances "may be considered substantive
enough to truncate the adverse literal application of the pertinent
rules violated." Inasmuch as petitioners were declared in default while
their motion to dismiss was still pending resolution, they were,
therefore, incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the trial of
the case on the merits, in their absence, without due notice to them of
the date of hearing, was a denial of due process. Consequently, the
order of default, the judgment and the order of execution are patent
nullities.
279
g. Motion to dismiss grounded on res judicata is allowed in land
registration cases. Rules of Court apply in a suppletory
character whenever applicable or convenient.
Facts:
Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blanco’s
and subsequently declared ownership over the land for taxation
purposes and took possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over
the property who built his house thereon. Respondent Cayaba claims
to be the owner of the property by virtue of a deed of sale executed in
his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor from the heirs of Verano and
280
ousted the caretaker from the property and constructed an apartment
thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of the
land. The court decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the
CA reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint of the
petitioner on grounds that the description of the property in the
complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the
respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to
be completely different. The court did not find any compliance to the
requirement of the law that the property in dispute must be clearly
identified. Contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner,
the court choose the respondent’s evidence as they were able to
provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the
adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner
merely presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as
mere guess works. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for
registration of the property before the CFI which was opposed by the
petitioner. The CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of
res judicata thus this appeal before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioner
should be granted.
RULING:
The SC held that the Land Registration Act does not provide for
pleading similar to a motion to dismiss but the Rules of Court allows
its application in land registration proceeding as only suppletory when
it is practicable and convenient. Therefore, the court may sustain a
motion to dismiss in land registration proceeding as the case at bar.
Noted by the court in the ordinary civil case, the counterclaim can be
taken as a complaint where the defendantbecomes the plaintiff. The
original plaintiff thus becomes defendant in the counterclaim and he
may choose to answer the counterclaim or be declared in default or
file a motion to dismiss the same. The respondent clearly opted for
the last choice. The SC held that res judicata operates in the case at
bar with its requisites present in the case: [a] the former judgment
must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a
judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and
second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner,
Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not
281
result in a difference in parties between the two cases. The
employment of two different actions does not allow one to escape
against the principle of res judicata where one and the same cause of
action cannot be litigated twice. Although the first action was litigated
before a competent court of general jurisdiction and the other over a
registration court is of no significance since that both courts should be
of equal jurisdiction is not a requisite for res judicata to apply. For
convenience, the SC should decide whether to dismiss the
application for registration or the opposition thereto. Because the
conflicting claims of both parties have been settled and decided by
the court previously, it upheld the finality of its decision and dismissed
the petition.
E. Hearing
a. Speedy Hearing
b. Rules of procedure applicable
i. Order of trial
c. Burden of proof falls on applicant
Facts:
282
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants. The Republic then appealed to the CA. In
2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. On May
22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition in the trial court,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and other
landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior
vested rights” over portions of Boracay. On November 21, 2006, this
Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the private claimants have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay.
Held:
283
and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public
forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to
its effectivity. A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required.
Facts:
On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then CFI
of Pangasinan, an application for registration in her favor of a parcel
of land consisting of 6,843 square meters, more or less, located at
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The Director of Lands, in representation of
the Republic of the Philippines, filed an opposition, alleging that
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have acquired
the land under any of the Spanish titles or any other recognized mode
for the acquisition of title; that neither she nor her predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land in concept of owner at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is
a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether the land applied for has been in the possession of her
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest for more than 20 years and
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence
required in the proceedings
Held:
284
No. It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged
twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and
Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty years
period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private
respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The
bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan
had been in possession of the property for more than twenty years
found in private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature.
LARAGAN VS CA
Facts:
285
The trial court rendered judgment confirming the title of the applicants
over the parcel of land applied for and ordering its registration in the
names of the applicants. The oppositors appealed to the CA. On 9
November 1977, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, but excluded the southern portion of the land applied for, the
appellate court declaring such excluded portion to be public land, and
part of the public domain, in view of the failure of the applicants and
oppositors to prove registrable title over the same. The petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but their motion was
denied.
Issue:
Held:
REPUBLIC vs SAYO
Facts:
287
1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement
and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance
with its terms.
Issue:
Held:
288
controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented
nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land.
What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof
of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable
proposition. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little
extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all
of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the
agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over
the land.
Facts:
289
mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated
to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely
procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application.
Issue:
Held:
Judgment
a. Partial Judgment
290
i. Duty of land reg. officials to renderreport may extend even after
finality of judgment but not yet beyond one year from entry of
decree
Facts:
Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in
Bayambang, Pangasinan on August 30, 1968.The lots were among
those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez
owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan.
Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion).
291
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision setting
aside the decision dated August 5, 1981 and the order dated October
6, 1981 for the issuance of decrees. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied. AHence, this recourse.
Issue:
Whether the decision dated August 5, 1981 had become final and
executory, that it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, or set aside.
Ruling:
Petition denied.
292
MENDOZA VS. CA
84 scra 76
Facts:
In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, is owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied for a title. During
pendency of the application before the land registration court,
Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz. The contract of sale was
admitted in court in lieu of the pending application for land title. The
registration court rendered a decision in July 1965, ordering the
registration of the two parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to
the usufructuary rights of Mendoza.
The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon
failure of Cruz to pay Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that the title
issued in the name of Cruz be cancelled. The land registration court
ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that the court erred in its
earlier decision in issuing the land title to Cruz – who was not a party
to the application of title initiated by Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz.
Issue:
Whether the title can be dealt with in the name of a “third party”.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals ruling must be sustained. First of all, it was
proven that Mendoza caused the registration in the name of Cruz
pursuant to their contract of sale. Second, Mendoza overlooks
Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes
the registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding
in the name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person to whom the land
293
has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of
time between the filing of the application for registration and the
issuance of the decree of title.
“SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of
the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, the land therein described may be dealt with and instruments
relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds
at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner
as if no application had been made. The interested party may,
however, present such instruments to the Court of First Instance
instead of presenting them to the office of the register of deeds,
together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with
the application, and the court after notice to the parties, shall order
such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by a said
instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of
the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed
by said instruments. . . .
A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration
proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the
instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together
with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the
application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the
case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case
show that these requirements have been complied with in this case.
294
d. Only claimed property or portion can be adjudged
JULIA CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA
Facts:
Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the concept of
an owner of the land since 1921; that they’ve been paying taxes; that
the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only took them
to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set in.
Issue:
295
Ruling:
296
297
e. Where portions of land subject of a land registration case are
covered by titles based on homestead, free or sales patent, the
court cannot simply invalidate them; subject of separate
litigation.
Facts:
On November 19, 1926 a sales application was filed with the Bureau
of Lands by Benito Tolentino for a tract of public agricultural land with
an area of 5 hectares, situated in Barrio Callang Municipality of
Gamu, Province of Isabela. In accordance with the application, which
was given number 8706, the land was advertised for sale to the
highest bidder and on February 15, 1928 was duly awarded to the
applicant pursuant to the provisions of Chapter V of the Public Land
Act On January 19, 1950, Tolentino having complied with the legal
requirements as to actual occupancy, cultivation and improvement of
the area applied for as well as the payment of the purchase price, the
Director of Lands signed the corresponding order for the issuance of
a patent in his favor. Upon investigation, however, the applicant
discovered that a portion of the land covered by his application with
an area of 2.3506 hectares, specifically that portion identified as Lot
No. 8091 Pls-62, had been applied for as a homestead by the herein
defendant Braulio Cosme on March 22, 1949 and that Homestead
Patent No. V-19 had been issued to him by the Bureau of Lands on
the following August 19, pursuant to which he obtained Original
Certificate of Title No. P-880 from the Office of the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Isabela on November 10, 1949. The homestead
settlement application had been filed with the now defunct National
Land Settlement administration pursuant to Executive Proclamation
No. 610 promulgated in 1940, under which certain areas of public
agricultural land in Isabela were reserved for settlement purposes,
and it was upon recommendation of that office that the patent was
issued by the Director of Lands.
Upon protest by Benito Tolentino filed with the Bureau of Lands, an
298
investigation was conducted by the District Land Officer for Isabela,
and when it was verified that the land covered by the homestead
patent was embraced within the area awarded to Tolentino in 1928,
the Director of Lands filed the present action on November 27, 1953,
for the cancellation of the homestead patent and the original
certificate of title issued to the defendant Braulio Cosme.
Their principal contention is that after the certificate of title was issued
on November 10, 1949 by virtue of Homestead Patent No V-19 the
land in question came under the operation of the Land Registration
Act as provided in Section 122 thereof, and that upon the expiration
of one year from the date of its issuance, the said title became
incontrovertible.
Issue:
Whether the court can invalidate the lands covered by titles based on
homestead,free or sales patent.
Ruling:
No. Where a portion of a land subject of a land registration case are
covered by titles based on homestead, free or sales patent, the court
cannot simply invalidate them.
A certificate of title based on a patent, even after the expiration of
one year from the issuance thereof, is still subject to certain
conditions and restriction.As a matter of fact, in appropriate cases
and after prior administrative investigations by the Director of
Lands, proper actions may be instituted by said official which may
lead to the cancellation of the patent and the title, and the consequent
reversion of the land to the Government.On the other hand certificate
of title issued pursuant to Act 2259, after the lapse of one (1) year,
becomes incontrovertible.The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is
that, while with the due registration and issuance of a certificate of
title over a land acquired pursuant to the Public Land Law, said
property becomes registered in contemplation of Act 496,in view of its
nature and manner of acquisition, such certificate of title, when in
conflict with one obtained on the same date through judicial
proceedings, must give way to the latter.7
299
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
issuance thereof, ... a certificate of title, be it original or a duplicate,
may only be ordered cancelled under special circumstances, and one
of them is when the title is void. And a title will be considered void if it
is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for the
registration of a land in his name although he knows that the property
belongs to another.
f. Finality of Judgment
i. Now 15 days counted from receipt of the notice of judgment.
ii. As to the government, period of appeal shall be reckoned from
the receipt of the decision by the solicitor general who
represents the government in all registration proceeding.
Facts:
300
After about 20 years, a compromise agreement was entered into by
the parties. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval renounced their claims and ceded —
Issues:
301
Ruling:
Facts:
302
ownership in fee simple by inheritance from the late Maria Padilla,
sought the registration of title under Act 496, as amended, of a vast
tract of land, situated at the municipality of Laur, province of Nueva
Ecija, admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of
Fort Magsaysay.
The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines opposed the application, claiming that the applicant
was without sufficient title and was not in open, exclusive, continuous
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for
at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application; that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of
the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under
Proclamation No. 237, dated December 10, 1955 of the President.
The applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of
parties, requesting that the Parañaque Investment and Development
Corporation be considered as the applicant in his place, it having
acquired all his rights, interests, ownership and dominion over the
property subject matter of the application. The motion was granted by
the lower court.
It is beyond dispute that the land subject of the application is included
within the area reserved for military purposes under Proclamation No.
237, dated December 19, 1955, of the President. The land is largely
uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested with a heavy growth of
timber of commercial quantities.
It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by
virtue of a possessory information title issued during the Spanish
regime on March 5, 1895, and upon his death in 1900, he transmitted
the ownership and possession thereof to his daughter and sole heir,
Maria Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the land thru
tenants and utilized portions for pasture, until her death sometime in
1944.
On November 19, 1966, the lower court rendered decision holding
that the parcel of land applied for is adjudicated to and ordered to be
registered in favor of:
303
(b) Roman C. Tamayo, Filipino citizen, married, resident of Cullit,
Lallo, Cagayan, one-third (1/3) portion of the said property.
On March 11, 1967, the lower court, ruling that its decision of
November 19, 1966 had become final as to the share of Roman C.
Tamayo, directed the issuance of a decree of registration of the entire
land, one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso in favor of Roman C. Tamayo, and
two-thirds (2/3) pro indiviso in favor of Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation, subject to the final outcome of the appeal.
On April 12, 1967, the lower court approved the Amended Record on
Appeal which, together with the evidence and transcripts, was
forwarded to this Court in due course of appeal.
Issue:
Ruling:
The appeal taken by the Government was from the entire decision,
which is not severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole decision.
305
iv. Court retains control of the case for 1 year, notwithstanding
lapse of 15 days from the receipt of judgment.
Facts:
Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in
Bayambang, Pangasinan on August 30, 1968.The lots were among
those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez
owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan.
Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion).
Issue:
Whether the decision dated August 5, 1981 had become final and
executory, that it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, or set aside.
Ruling:
Petition denied.
v. Hence, the case may still be reopended and the decision set
aside when granted
Facts:
In the same year, there was a petition for review for the said lot. It
was alleged that said lot was registered in the name of appellee De
los Santos through actual fraud, through deceit and through
intentional omission of facts. It was stated further that a simulated
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent
appellee, Felix Camaya.
308
Issue:
Whether the case may still be reopened and the decision set aside
when granted
Ruling:
Yes, it may.
As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the period of
one year filed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
B.Decree of Registration
On March 24, 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming the titles
of La Urbana, Inc. over lot 5 and lot 1, Psu-56145, with certain
reservations, and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of the
latter.On May 17, 1960 de Erquiaga, one of the successors-in-
interest of La Urbana, Inc. filed a petition for reconstitution of the
decision of March 24, 1938. During the pendency of the reconstitution
proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from de
Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for the latter.
309
prayed that the application for the reconstitution of records be denied
and that "the parcels of land in question be ordered registered in the
respective names of the herein oppositors or declare the same as
public land and be subdivided to oppositors who are landless." On
June 13, 1963 the respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree
in favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the
decision in the land registration case had already become final and
executory. Moreover, the court issued another order granting a writ of
possession in favor of De Banuvar and "against all persons who have
entered and occupied portions of lot 1, Psu-56145 before the
issuance of the decree."
ISSUE:
RULING:
310
There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court
may order or issue a decree. The reason is ... that the judgment is
merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or
enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue
the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed
cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is
ordered to be registered.
i. Court may still issue order even beyond 15 days from entry of
judgment
Facts:
311
appealed. The motion was thereafter denied by the court by Order
dated September 22, 1975. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Court could still issue orders despite lapse of long period
of time from entry of judgment.
Held:
312
c. Finality and incontrovertibility of decree; significance of the
decree
314
i. When considered final
12 SCRA 678
Facts:
Teodora Busuego applied for a decree of registration of the Lot No.
2497, Gapan Cadastre. A decree of registration was issued in favor of
the applicant. Within one year from the issuance of the decree, the
spouses Amando Joson and Victoria Balmeo filed in the same
proceeding, a petition for the setting aside of said decree and the
cancellation of the certificate issued thereunder, on the ground that
the decision ordering the decree was obtained by Busuego by
misrepresenting herself to be the sole owner of the lot when in truth,
petitioners, through their predecessor-in-interest, were owners of
one-half thereof, having acquired the same by purchase from
Teodora's mother, Fausta Busuego. In a separate petition, Antonio
and Rogelio Busuego, children of a deceased brother of Teodora,
also prayed for the same relief on the allegation that their father was
an undivided co-owner (with Teodora) of one-half of Lot 2497, having
acquired the same by descent from their father, Severino Busuego.
The court dismissed the said petitions for the reason that its
jurisdiction as a cadastral court being special and limited, it has no
authority to pass upon the issues raised in the pleadings. Hence, the
315
present appeal by the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the decreed issued in favor of the respondent Busuego is
final.
RULING:
It has been held that the adjudication of land in a registration or
cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long
as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within
which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision
or decree and adjudicate the land to another.
... As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the
period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered
continues to be under control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it. Such is the ruling laid down in the case of De los Reyes
vs. De Villa (48 Phil. 227), which was later reiterated in that of Roman
Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Philippine Railway Co. and Reynes(49
Phil. 546). ... ( Afalla et al v. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622).
In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from
the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act
496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the
decision and granted the said decree.
316
Review of Decree, when allowed
Facts:
317
Judgment filed by the respondents on August 1999. The lower court
nullified the title held by the petiotioners, and was ordered to be
cancelled including the tax declaration covering the subject land.
The petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals on February
2006, but was dismissed by the said court.
Issue:
Ruling:
318
Clearly, the facts pleaded by the respondents in their motion for
summary judgment have been duly disputed and contested by
petitioner, raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a
full-blown trial. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed
or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the
place of trial. In the present case, the petitioner was able to point out
the genuine issues. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact that requires
the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim.
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting
of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or
doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed
of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast
on the complainant’s title to real property or any interest therein.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper,
the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on
the real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
319
distinct from a motion for new trial and the right to the remedy is not
affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the grounds
upon which it may have been presented. Thus, where petitioners
acquired their interest in the land before any final decree had been
entered, the litigation was therefore in effect still pending and, in
these circumstances, they can hardly be considered innocent
purchasers in good faith.
The Supreme court granted the petitioners review and reversed and
set aside the ruling of the lower court.
Facts:
320
Bolanos and ordered herein respondents-appellants (J.M. Tuason &
co. ) their agents and all persons acting for the in their behalf as well
as all other from disturbing the physical possession of Bolanos of the
parcel of land comprising of 13.26 hectares and included in the area
covered by TCT Nos. 37677 & 37686. The petition of Bolanos not to
be disturbed in their physical possession was upon the ground that in
the three other civil cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the same
Court of First Instance of Rizal, the said court has rendered a
decision, still pending appeal, declaring Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 from which the two above-mentioned titles have been
derived null and void, principally for want of jurisdiction of the court
that issued said original title on account of defects in the publication
of the notices of the proceedings for their registration.
In a previous case filed by appellant Tuason against appellees for the
recovery of the possession of said land (Tuason vs. Bolaños, 93 Phil.
106), wherein appellees Bolanos had alleged among their defenses
that appellant Tuason's titles were obtained "thru fraud or error and
without knowledge (of) or notice, either personal or thru publication
to" said appellees, this Court upheld the validity of the questioned
titles and affirmed the decision of the trial court "declaring defendant
(now appellee Bolaños) to be without any right to the land in question
and ordering him to restore possession thereof to plaintiff (now
appellant) Tuason."
Issue:
Whether or not the land registration court has jurisdiction to hear and
to resolve issues of possession, in any of its aspects, after the
original registration proceedings have come to an end and a writ of
possession has already been issued?
Ruling:
322
d. Enforcement of the Decree; Period for enforcement
FACTS:
On March 24, 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming the titles
of La Urbana, Inc. over lot 5 and lot 1, Psu-56145, with certain
reservations, and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of the
latter. On May 17, 1960 de Erquiaga, one of the successors-in-
interest of La Urbana, Inc. filed a petition for reconstitution of the
decision of March 24, 1938. During the pendency of the reconstitution
proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from de
Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for the latter. However,
the petitioners opposed the application for the reconstitution, on a
claim that they have been in actual, adverse, open and uninterrupted
possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of
owners since time immemorial, long before the World War II, and
have introduced improvements thereon. They prayed that the
application for the reconstitution of records be denied and that "the
parcels of land in question be ordered registered in the respective
names of the herein oppositors or declare the same as public land
and be subdivided to oppositors who are landless." On June 13, 1963
the respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De
Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision in the
land registration case had already become final and executory.
Moreover, the court issued another order granting a writ of
possession in favor of De Banuvar and "against all persons who have
entered and occupied portions of lot 1, Psu-56145 before the
issuance of the decree."
ISSUE:
323
RULING:
161 SCRA 56
Facts:
Two (2) parcels of land are in dispute for allegedly being covered by
certificates of title and registration decrees under three (3) different
entities, namely Morris Carpo, Quezon City Dev’t. and Financing
Corp. (QCDF) and Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty). Thus,
324
Carpo instituted a complaint before the CFI under Respondent Judge
Vera against Realty and Macondray Farms, Inc. (Macondray) for the
declaration of nullity of its corresponding certificate of title, on the
ground that the same was issued by a court not sitting as a land
registration court but one of ordinary jurisdiction, and that the judge
had no authority since the records which was made basis of the title
was lost during the war and is pending reconstitution;
In reply, Realty denied the allegations and countered that the Reyes
Court which issued its title was performing a purely ministerial duty,
and that it was Carpo’s title that was null for having been issued
despite being covered by another title. Realty further impleaded
through a third-party complaint QCDF for nullity of its own title
covering the same subject properties;
In reply, QCDF filed a fourth-party complaint against Alvendia, et al.
being the source of its own title, praying therefor for the
reimbursement of its purchase price paid for the said properties.
However, the same was dismissed for QCDF’s lack of interest in
prosecuting the case;
On January 20, 1981, the trial court rendered judgment annulling
Realty’s and QCDF’s titles to the property in favor of Carpo. The
same was appealed before the High Court by Realty, but the latter
resolved to refer the case the Court of Appeals for determination of
the merits; and
The CA in turn set aside the trial court’s decision and issued a new
one in favor of Realty. However, the case was subjected to the
reorganization of the Judiciary, from which resulted a re-raffling of the
case and later on, a reversal of the prior decision through Carpo’s
MR. Further, the change from CA to IAC yielded a change in Justices
assigned to the case.
Issues:
1.Whether the Special Third Civil Cases Division was conferred with
jurisdiction to try and render a decision of final resolution for the
Court;
2. Whether a Petition for Certiorari was the proper remedy in the
case;
3.Whether Carpo’s title is valid as against Realty’s and QCDF”s ,
since Realty’s title was issued when the records relative thereto was
undergoing reconstitution;
4. Whether Carpo was an innocent purchaser for value; and
5. Whether QCDF was properly impleaded to the case.
325
Ruling:
1. Yes.“ A reading of the law will readily show that what BP 129
prohibits is appointment from one class of divisions to another class.
For instance, a Justice appointed to the Criminal Cases Divisions
cannot be assigned to the Civil Cases Divisions. Justice Bidin was
reassigned from the Fourth
Civil Cases Division, while Justice Camilon was reassigned from the
Second Civil Cases Division. The two therefore come from the same
class of divisions to which they were appointed. Thus, the
reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the Special Third
Civil Cases Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of two (2)
"regular" members, is still within legal bounds”
2. Yes. There are two modes by which cases decided by the then
Courts of First Instance in their original jurisdiction may be reviewed:
(1) an ordinary appeal either to the Supreme Court or to the Court of
Appeals, or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court. To the
latter category belong cases in which only errors or questions of law
are involved. Each of these modes have different procedural
requirements. x x x Realty originally filed a Petition for certiorari with
this Court docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of
the Vera Court, and asking that it be allowed to appeal directly to this
Court as it was raising only questions of law. However, this Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction for proper determination on the merits of the appeal. " It
may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition first
filed as an appeal, and not as a special civil action for certiorari. After
as, a petition for review by certiorari is also a form of appeal. (People
v. Resuello L-30165, August 22, 1969, 69 SCRA 35). x x x Thus it
was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera Court
"cannot be passed upon anymore in the Court of Appeals decision
because appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy." Precisely,
petitioners brought the case to this Court on appeal, albeit by way of
certiorari;
3. No. Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No.
657, the parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but
only had to go back to the preceding stage where records are
available. The land registration case itself remained pending and the
Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it.
The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when an that
remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration
326
Office to issue a decree of registration (which would be the basis for
the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to implement a
judgment which had become final (See Government v. Abural, 39
Phil. 996 [1919] at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 [1961], 1
SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. De Banuvar, 134 Phil. 257
[1968], 26 SCRA 316). There are however authentic copies of the
decisions of the CFI and the Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2
and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover, there is an
official report of the decision of this Court affirming both the CFI and
the CA decisions. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for the
issuance of a decree of registration.”;
4. No. x x x Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an
innocent purchaser for value. He merely relies on the presumption of
good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code. x x x Carpo bought the
disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered owners,
by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary
Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. However, it was only later,
on October 13, 1970, that the decree of registration in favor of the
Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book for the Province of
Rizal and that an Original Certificate of Title was issued. It was on the
same day, October 13, 1970, that the deed evidencing the sale
between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of
Property, and the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled as
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was
issued. x x x Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title
which Carpo could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an
innocent purchaser for value. Not being a purchaser for value and in
good faith, he is in no better position than his predecessors-in-
interest;
5. Yes. Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the
third-party complaint filed against it by Realty was procedurally
defective in that the relief being sought by the latter from the former is
not in respect of Carpo's claim, policy considerations and the factual
circumstances of the case compel this Court now to rule as well on
QCDFC's claim to the disputed property.** To rule on QCDFC's claim
now is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to put to rest these conflicting
claims over the property. After an, QCDFC was afforded fun
opportunity, and exercised its right, to prove its claim over the land. It
presented documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It was even
permitted to file a fourth-party complaint which, however, was
327
dismissed since it failed to prosecute its case.
Facts:
328
the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owner’s duplicate of the
TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D
covering the property.
MANOTOK opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.
Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land
belonging to Lot No. 823, TCT No. 210177 actually involves 2 parcels
with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while TCT No. RT-
22481 (372302) pertains only to a 1 parcel of land, with a similar area
of 342,945 square meters.
In 1997 – Barques’ petition was DENIED. Lot. No. 823 already
registered in the name of the Manotoks. --> Barques MR was
denied They appealed to the LRA LRA Reversed.
LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent.
Hence, it ordered the Barque title to be reconstituted. BUT
cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of
the 1991 Manotok TCT.
The LRA denied the Manotoks’ MR and the Barques’ prayer for
immediate reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and the Barques
appealed the LRA decision to the CA.
In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought
the dismissal of the cases claiming ownership of the subject property.
In 2002 and 2003 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the
RD of QC to cancel the Reconstituted Manotok Title and to
reconstitute the Barques’ “valid, genuine and existing” TCT No.
210177.
Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were
ordered consolidated on August 2, 2004.December 12, 2005, SC
First Division affirmed both decisions of the CA. Manotoks filed
MR Denied in April 2006 Resolution.
Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second
MR with their MR attached. Denied in June 2006 Resolution.
Eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of
Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the meantime, the Barques filed
multiple motions with the First Division for execution of the judgment,
while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for
Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral
arguments). Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.
On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan
filed a motion to intervene, to which was attached their petition in
intervention. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin
329
Manahan, was issued Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No. 823
and attached the findings of the NBI that the documents of the
Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be.
Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB
recommended to the Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok
Title should be reverted to the state
Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.
In 2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1 st division decision
and entry of judgment recalled and the CA’s Amended Decisions in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside.
The En Banc remanded the case to the CA.
The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of
WON the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation
by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a
Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the Maotoks
should be annulled.
CA’s findings None of the parties were able to prove a valid
alienation of Lot 823 from the government in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the “Friar Lands Act”.
Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks is the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required
by Section 18 of the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the factual
allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the
purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants
revealed badges of fraud and irregularity.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks - Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in
1919. They have since occupied the land, built their houses and
buildings on it. The subject land is now known as Manotok
Compound.
Barques - Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from
Emiliano Setosta who had a TCT in his name.
Manahans - The lot originally belonged to his parents but was
subsequently bought by his wife. They had a caretaker on the
property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just
declared the property for taxation to protect their rights.
ISSUE:
It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the
sale of friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of
the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).
332
Re: Manahans, No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can
be found in the records of either the DENR-NCR, LMB or National
Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin
Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is no competent
evidence to show that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his
successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared the land
for tax purposes, or paid the taxes due thereon.
Facts:
Issue:
333
Whether the title issued in the name of CLT valid.
Ruling:
Facts:
Lot No. 823 is a part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land
acquired by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar
Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de
Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto
Order of the Philippine Islands on December 23, 1903, as indicated
in Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904. The
Piedad Estate has been titled in the name of the Government under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 and was placed under the
administration of the Director of Lands.
After the promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the
Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the
1st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court. The decision of
the 1st Division was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
But when the Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the
Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc,
which the Court en banc accepted on July 26, 2006.
335
The Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that their
predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales
Certificate No. 511 covering the lot No 823.
On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en banc
resolution that SET ASIDE the decision and resolutions of the
1st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6 with 1
abstention, the Court REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of
the CA and the LRA, and REMANDED the cases to the CA for further
proceedings to determine the validity of the Manotoks’ title.
In due time, the CA received evidence with primary focus on whether
the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the
Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar
Land. The Barques and Manahans were likewise allowed to present
evidence on their respective claims that may have an impact on the
correct determination of the status of the Manotok title.
Issue:
Ruling:
“Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 (Exh. 10) was not
signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary of the
Interior. Exhibits 33 and 34-OSG-LMB contained only the signature
of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly secured from the
National Archives a certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204
dated December 7, 1932 (Exh. 51-A) which likewise lacks the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it
was signed only by the Director of Lands.
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 provides:
336
SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. (Emphasis supplied.)
C. Post-Judgment incidents
a. Writ of Possession
i. The writ may be issued not only against the person defeated in
the registration case but also against any one adversely
occupying the land during the proceedings up to the issuance of
the decree.
Facts:
Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same
parties and parcels of land in question.
1) In the first case, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an
application for registration of the subject parcel of land, which
resulted in an OCT. After the heirs tried to take possession of the
property, a reconveyance of property was filed against them by
Vencila et al., asserting that:
a. They have acquired the land by purchase or inheritance – and in
OCEN possession for 30 years
b. The parcels of land that they own were by mistake part of Juan
Reyes’ estate
2) The second case involved the death of the administratix of the
estate of the owners/heirs of the land. After her death, a TCT was
issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued in the
name of several persons. A writ of possession was issued by the trial
court against petitioners.
3) The third case involved one of the registered owners of the land
who filed a petition for complaint against the occupants who refused
to vacate the land and sign the Sheriff’s return.
337
The heirs of Juan Reyes moved to dismiss the case of reconveyance
stating that the other parties had no cause of action and that they
were barred by prior judgement already.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, then set aside the
same order, and then reversed itself partially (some cases were
dismissed, some were not -- since there were several petitioners).
The parties whose cases were dismissed appealed to the SC.
These petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors
nor defeated oppositors in the said land registration case, as their
names don’t appear in the amended application for registration. They
argue that they have occupied the parcels of land for more than 30
years which began long before the application for registration and
that even after registration, they continued to possess the land.
Issue/s:
338
2. Yes. A writ of possession may be issued not only against a person
who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone
unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof
during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final
decree.
Note: In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the
applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily carries
with it the right of ownership (right to possess-may be obtained
through writ of possession).
On the issue of contempt, the court ruled that the occupants were not
guilty. Contempt only applies when after the sheriff dispossess or
eject the occupants, they enter/attempt to enter the property. It was
the sheriff’s and not the petitioners’ fault that there was delivery of
possession was unsuccessful.
339
ii. When unavailable. The writ does not lie against a person who
entered the land after the issuance of the decree and who was
not a party in the case. He can only be proceeded against in a
separate action for ejectment for reivindicatory action.
340
defendants to be place in possession of the property in question, Lot
3382. Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed, this time by the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Nuevo and Judge Leviste erred in granting the writ of
possession filed by the parties.
Ruling:
The Court held that when parties against whom a writ of possession
is sought have been in possession of the land for at least ten years,
and they entered into possession apparently after the issuance of the
final decree, and none of them had been a party in the registration
proceedings, the writ of possession will not issue. A person who took
possession of the land after final adjudication of the same in
registration proceedings cannot be summarily ousted through a writ
of possession secured by a mere motion and that regardless of any
tittle or lack of title of persons to hold possession of the land in
question, they cannot be ousted without giving them their day in court
in proper independent proceedings. In the case at bar, the
defendants-petitioners had been in possession of the lot since 1960
under an alleged lease contract and were not a party to the original
registration case of the same way back in 1930. This notwithstanding,
the writ was issued after pre-trial and hearing of the motion for the
issuance of the writ only and not after final adjudication of the rights
of the parties over the lot in controversy. Therefore, it was a patent
error on the part of respondent Judge Nuevo to issue the questioned
writ. The rule is "when other persons have subsequently entered the
property, claiming the right of possession, the owner of the registered
property or his successors in interest cannot dispossess such
persons by merely asking for a writ of possession. The remedy is to
resort to the courts of justice and institute a separate action for
unlawful entry or detainer or for reinvidicatory action, as the case may
be." The act of Judge Leviste issuing the orders constituted
disrespect and disregard of the authority and jurisdiction of this Court.
He should have waited for this Court's decision before acting on said
motion for reconsideration and issuing the said orders.
341
iii. When issued as a matter of course
LUCERO V. LOOT
G.R. No. L-16995
Facts:
Julio Lucero filed and was granted a writ of possession of property
(based on a final decree in a land registration proceeding). Although
the other party filed a motion to quash the writ, this was granted by
CFI Iloilo’s Judge Fernan.
The Loots opposed the decision on the ground that there were
defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the motion was
not under oath. The court dismissed these as trivial arguments. Two
motions for reconsideration were also denied. The writ of possession
prayed for was issued in favor of Lucero.
The Loots went straight to the Supreme Court for an appeal for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in
accordance with law.
Ruling:
Yes, the order granting the writ of possession was based on a
decision promulgated on a land registration case in 1938, which
became a final decree on October 29, 1941.
After the final decree, the issuance of the writ of possession was only
a ministerial duty of the court if no writ has been issued to the
registered owner yet. The final decree, in effect, immediately
empowered the court to enforce the order/judgment/decree. This
automatic process is to avoid further delay and inconvenience to a
successful land registration litigant if he were compelled to
commence another action to secure possession.
342
the questions of fact raised by the Loots, the SC can do nothing.
These must be raised at the CA of appeals; otherwise, the parties
contesting the facts are deemed to have waived the opportunity to
question the correctness of the findings.
Facts:
On July of 1941, a decision was rendered adjudicating a parcel of
land in favour of Delfina Aquino. However, the decree of registration
was not issued except until after 14yrs and only after 24 yrs had
343
passed that an OCT was issued in favour of the latter.
On august of 1970(after the decree has been issued but before title),
the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual (oppositors to the cadastral
proceeding) brought a suit againsts the children of Delfina Aquino, the
appellees.
The appellants argued that they had been in possession of the said
land since 1941 an rayed that a new title be made out in their names.
Parenthetically, it shows that the Aquino’s title encroached upon a
4sq.m. portion of adjoining land which belongs to Cesar Castro.
Subsequently, Castro filed a complaint of intervention to recover the
said land.
A judgemtn has been rendered awarding the 4sw.m. portion of
overlapped land to Castro and dismissing the complaint filed by the
Barroga’s and Padaca’s. Thereafter, at the instance of defendant
Angel Albano, et. Al (heirs of Delfina Aquino), the court ordered
executon of judgemtn. However, the Barroga and Padaca’s moved to
quash said writ, stating that there was nothing to execute since the
verdict was simply one of dismissing the complaint. The matter
apparently ended. No further development anent this case appears in
the record. However, the record shows that on August of 1975 the
Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the motion of Angel
albano et. Al. for a writ of possesson to the said land and was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court may still issue order even beyond 15 days
from entry of judgment
Ruling:
On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court
in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente, etc., et al., ruling that:
(2) he has the right, too, under Section 17 of the same Act, to a writ of
possession as against any "party to the registration proceeding and
who is directly and personally affected and reached by the decree"
(or who had been served with process therein but had not appeared
nor answered); and
344
(3) his right to obtain a writ of possession is not subject to the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding execution of
judgments, since the decree "is to exist forever." These doctrines
have since been reiterated and reaffirmed.
345
perfecting an appeal. ...
... There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree. The reason is ... that the judgment
is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted
or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue
the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed
cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is
ordered to be registered.
Issue:
347
vi. A person who took possession of a parcel of land after final
adjudication of the same in registration proceedings cannot be
summarily ousted through a writ of possession secured by mere
motion.
b. Writ of Demolirion
Facts:
The trial court granted a writ of possession in favor of Lucero. This
was opposed to by oppositors Loot, but the court didn’t see
any merit in the same. A motion for reconsideration was filed three
times, however it was all denied. Then an appeal was filed to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not there is prescription with regard to the issuance of a
writ of possession.
Ruling::
Regarding the writ of possession, once the final decree has been
issued the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course
if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner.
There is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of
possession, and inasmuch as the final decree has already been
entered, it follows that a writ of possession should be issued in favor
of the registered owner.
In Demorar v. Ibañez it was decided that: ".. a writ of possession may
be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the
land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings ...
The issuance of the decree of registration is part of the registration
348
proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the said proceedings.
Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said
lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject
to judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the
duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the
successful claimant." As a matter of fact, in a 1948 decision, it was
held by us that "the fact that the petitioners have instituted, more than
one year after the decree of registration had been issued, an ordinary
action with the Court of First Instance attacking the validity of the
decree on the ground of fraud, is not a bar to the issuance of the writ
of possession applied for by the registered owners."
Moreover, in Marcelo vs Mencias it was held that “If the writ of
possession issued in a land registration implies the delivery of the
possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, a writ
of demolition must, likewise issue, especially considering that the
latter writ is but a complement of the latter, which, without said writ of
execution would be ineffective”.
349
ii. A writ of demolition is but a compliment of the writ of
possession and may be issued by a special order of the court.
350
an inherent element of the right of ownership. Hence, a writ of
possession may be issued not only against the person who has been
defeated in a registration case, but also against any one unlawfully
and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the
registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree. It is
the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by
the successful party.
351
AYALA CORPORATION vs. RAY BURTON DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
294 SCRA 48
FACTS:
Early in June of 1990, RBDC made another set of building plans for
“Trafalgar Plaza” and submitted the same for approval, this time to
the Building Official of the Makati City Engineer’s Office, not to
AYALA. In these plans, the building was to be 26-storey high, or a
height of 98.60 meters, with a total gross floor area of 28,600 square
meters. After having obtained the necessary building permits from
the City Engineer’s Office, RBDC began to construct “Trafalgar
Plaza” in accordance with these new plans.
ISSUE:
RULING:
YES.
CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Basic concepts
a. Nature of Proceedings
Facts:
In Cadastral Proceeding of the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, a decision was rendered on July 31, 1941 adjudicating a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. One
of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in
default. However, for reasons not disclosed by the record, but as to
which no sinister or prejudicial character is imputed by the appellants,
the decree of registration did not issue except until after the lapse of
fourteen (14) years or so, or on October 14, 1955; and it was only
after twenty-four (24) years had passed, or on November 17, 1979,
that an original certificate of title (No. C-2185) was issued in Delfina
Aquino's name. On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration
had been handed down but before title issued in Delfina Aquino's
favor, the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual — appellants
Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca-brought suit in the same
Court of First Instance against the children and heirs of Delfina
Aquino — appellees Angel Albano, et al. Said appellants alleged that
they, and their mother, Ruperta Pascual, had been in possession of
Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; and they
prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, that the
defendants be commanded to reconvey the land to them, and that a
new title be made out in their names. After trial on the merits,
judgment was rendered dismissing the Barroga's and Padaca's
complaint.
Issue:
354
What is the nature of the cadastral proceedings.
Ruling:
The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope
of success of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for recovery of title Lot No.
9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the
cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership over the
property, and in which proceeding the former's predecessor-in-
interest, Ruperta Pascual, had taken part as oppositor but had been
declared in default. The judgment of the cadastral court was one
"against a specific thing" and therefore "conclusive upon the title to
the thing." It was a judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole
world, inclusive of persons not parties thereto,and particularly upon
those who had actually taken part in the proceeding (like the
appellants' predecessor, Ruperta Pascual, who had intervened
therein as an oppositor) as well as "their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and
in the same capacity
355
public
Facts:
G.R. No. L-35778:
On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower
court an application for registration of title under Act 496 of one (1)
parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan,
containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less. On July
7, 1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as
to the Republic of the Philippines and the Province of Bataan. On July
24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an
opposition to the application stating that the parcel of land applied for
is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not
subject to private appropriation. Records show that in the hearing of
this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez, 62 years old,
testified that he is the owner of the land applied for, having inherited
the same from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less;
that he started possessing the land in 1938; that about 8 hectares of
the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that
kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon; that he declared the land for
taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost
during the war, and that possession was continuous, open,
undisturbed and in the concept of owner.
356
Tanalega, 27 years old, testified that she had possessed the land
"openly, adversely, notoriously and in the concept of owner since
February 2, 1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas
who allegedly possessed this land" in the same manner since 1935;
that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the land for the years
1970-1972.
In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate
decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed
the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of
applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now respondents
herein.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court is without jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the application for voluntary registration under Act 496 and
that the lands in question can no longer be subject to registration by
voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to
compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.
Ruling:
The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned
decisions is in order. In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming
any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition is required
by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return
day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving
the details required by law, such as: (1) Age of the claimant; (2)
Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers,
as the case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality,
township or settlement in which the lots are situated; (4) Names of
the owners of adjoining lots; (5) If claimant is in possession of the lots
claims and can show no express grant of the land by the Government
to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer need state the
length of time property was held in possession and the manner it was
acquired, giving the length of time, as far as known, during which his
predecessors, if any, held possession; (6) If claimant is not in
possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the
interest claimed by him and the time and manner of its acquisition; (7)
If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value;
and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of
adverse claimants as far as known. In the absence of successful
claimants, the property is declared public land.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file
357
their answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to
substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying,
otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims
would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have
declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had
already become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights
over the subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral
proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this
doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues
already determined by final judgment. A mere casual cultivation of
portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession
under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive
and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the
State. The possession of public land however long the period thereof
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession
and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State. Applicants,
therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of owners of the entire area in
question during the period required by law.
WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9,1972 and October 16,
1972 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I should be, as
they are hereby reversed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Facts:
360
titles from which they were purportedly issued, and setting the case
for hearing. This motion to dismiss was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent trial court erred in sustaining the
validity of the TCT NOs. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a
supporting decree of registration.
Held:
Yes. The unilateral action of respondent court in substituting its own
findings regarding the extent of the coverage of the land included in
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, ostensibly to correct the error in, and
conform with, the technical description found in OCT 351 based on
the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas cannot
be sustained. That function is properly lodged with the office of the
trial court sitting as a land registration court and only after a full-dress
investigation of the matter on the merits. It is before the land
registration court that private respondent must adduce the proof that
the disputed parcels of land is legally registered in its favor.Under Act
496, it is the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration
Commission which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the
certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets
the title to and binds the land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5
SCRA 240 [1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had
been issued covering the parcel of land applied for, then the
361
certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet
the title to nor bind the land and is null and void.
Facts:
On April 19, 1917, lot No. 625 was decreed in favor of Florentino
Pamintuan, the petitioner herein, by the CFI of Pampanga, and that
certificate of title No. 540 covering the said lot was thereupon issued
to him in June, 1918. Cadastral case No. 132 was instituted.
Florentino Pamintuan inadvertently failed to claim the lot of trial of the
cadastral case, and the CFI in a decision dated April 29, 1919,
awarded it to the respondents Nicomedes, Maria, Mercedes, Rose
and Eusebia Espinosa, and ordered the cancellation of certificate of
title No. 540. Florentino Pamintuan knew nothing about the
adjudication of the land until the clerk of the CFI
of Pampanga required him to surrender his certificate of title for
cancellation. He then presented a motion to the court asking that the
decision of the court in the cadastral case be set aside and that the
writ of possession issued by virtue of said decision be recalled.
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
In 1916, the subject land located in Bataan was surveyed for
Potenciano Gabriel. Survey Plan Psu- 9742, with an area of
2,729,712 square meters was subsequently amended because it was
found that certain portions of the land covered by Plan I-1054 in the
name of Quimson and later transferred to Naval were included. The
undivided portions were excluded by order of the Court and so Plan
Psu- 9742 was amended with an area of 2,436,280 or a reduction of
293,432 square meters. The OCT No. 1264 issued in the name of
Potenciano Gabriel on November 1, 1918 contained the reduced
area. A cadastral survey was also made and the land of Gabriel,
covered by Plan Psu-9742 Amd. became Lot No. 557 with a reduced
area of 2,096,433 square meters, or a further reduction by 339,847
square meters. No new certificate of title was issued. Accordingly the
363
partition of the estate of Gabriel by his heirs was based on plan Psu-
9742 Amd. instead of Lot No. 557 with a smaller area of 2,096,433
square meters.
Issue:
Whether or not courts have the authority to order the necessary
correction of an erroneous technical description and make it conform
to the correct area.
Held:
In cadastral cases, the jurisdiction of the court over lands already
registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in
the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair
the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such
jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. In
this case, the lower court merely corrected the error in the technical
description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd. so as to make it
conform to the areas and technical description of Lot No. 557 of the
Hermoso Cadastre and Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre which lots
embody the correct technical description thereof.
Facts:
In 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to
reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, in the
CFI of Baguio, as to the parcel of land he claims. The subject land
was among those declared public lands by final decision rendered in
the November 13, 1922 case. His prayer was that the land be
registered in his name. On December 18, 1961, private petitioners
Francisco Joaquin, Sr., Francisco Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita Buchholz
registered opposition to the reopening. They claimed themselves as
farm lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in
364
their favour. On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed the
reopening.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has power to reopen the cadastral
proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes
Held:
The title of RA 931 authorizes the filing in the proper court, under
certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have
been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered
within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. The
body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of
land that have been, or are about to be declared land of the public
domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty
years next preceding the approval of this Act. There thus appears to
be a seeming inconsistency between title and body. RA 931 claims of
title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that
have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this
Act.
B. Order for speedy settlement and adjudication
D. Answer
365
JOSE O. DURAN vs. BERNABE OLIVIA
Facts:
An application for the registration in their names of sixteen lots was
filed by Jose O. Duran and Teresa Diaz Vda. de Duran .On April 20,
1954, the case was heard initially and on May 5, 1954, the oppositors
filed their opposition to the application. Four years after, the
oppositors filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that
the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots
respectively claimed by them. The applicants filed their objection to
said motion, alleging that the reasons for the motion to dismiss do not
appear in the application but are mere assertions of the parties and
that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider the application even
though the lots subject matter thereof are already covered by
certificates of title. After a reply to the opposition was filed by the
oppositors, the lower court resolved the motion to dismiss and
rendered successively the two orders of dismissal appealed from.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the application with respect to
particular lots upon mere assertion that these lots are covered by
certificates of title based merely upon the granted public land patents
is correct.
Ruling:
Yes, the motion to dismiss is proper in cadastral proceedings which
involve land covered by a certificate of title issued pursuant to a
public land patent. The appellants’ claim that a certificate of title
based upon a mere homestead, sales or free patent covering private
land is null and void as well as the claim that the lower court
possesses jurisdiction to try and decide the instant land registration
proceedings even with respect to the lots already covered by
certificates of title are without merit. The primary and fundamental
purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the
titles to land; to put to stop any question of legality of title thereto.
That being the purpose of the law, there would be no end to litigation
if every property covered by torrens title may still be relitigated in a
subsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to the above
purpose, we have held in a long line of decisions that a homestead
patent once registered under the Land Registration Act cannot be the
366
subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title issued
thereon is null and void. A homestead patent, once registered under
the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title,
and cannot thereafter be the subject of an investigation for
determination or judgment in a cadastral case. Any new title which
the cadastral court may order to be issued is null and void and should
be cancelled. All that the cadastral court may do is to make correction
of technical errors in the description of the property contained in its
title, or to proceed to the partition thereof if it is owned by two or more
co-owners. As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of
title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows
that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to
entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land
covered by the certificates of title of the respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner relates Supreme Court’s decision in Valdehueza v.
Republic and the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in Yu v.
Republic. In Valdehueza v. Republic, Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of expropriation of Lot No. 939 in Lahug, Cebu City, and
ruled that therein petitioners, Francisca Valdehueza, et al., were not
entitled to recover possession of the lot but only to demand its fair
market value. In Yu v. Republic, the Court of Appeals annulled the
subsequent sale of the lot by Francisca Valdehueza, respondents,
367
Ramon Yu, and held that the latter were not purchasers in good
faith. The parties did not appeal the decision and so, judgment
became final and executory. Respondents filed a complaint for
reversion of the expropriated property. Republic of thePhilippines,
denied respondents’ right to reacquire title and ownership over the lot
on the ground of res judicata.
ISSUES:
Is the action barred by res judicata? Are respondents entitled to
reversion of the expropriated property?
RULING:
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the
new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second
action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In
the present case, the first three elements are present. The
doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to
the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute
bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. Considering that the sale on which respondents
based their right to reversion has long been nullified, they have not
an iota of right over the property and thus, have no legal personality
to bring forth the action for reversion of expropriated property. Lack
of legal personality to sue means that the respondents are not the
real parties-in-interest. This is a ground for the dismissal of the
case, related to the ground that the complaint evidently states no
cause of action. Consequently, the second issue is now mooted
and made academic by our determination of res judicata in this
case.
368
E. Hearing
F. Judgment
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
370
Catbalogan Cadastral survey, together with the oral and documentary
evidence.
Facts:
371
ISSUE:
Held:
372
Petition granted.
Facts:
The land in dispute is Lot No. 1736, a large tract of agricultural land in
Barrio Kapok, Orion, Bataan, alleged to have been occupied since
1913 by the grandfather of applicant, Vicente Rodriguez, who, filed
Lease Application with the Bureau of Lands, but which was rejected
upon investigation that the land was classified as within the U.S.
Military Reservation. Upon the death of Vicente Rodriguez in 1924,
possession of the property was taken over by his three sons, the two
waived their share in favor of petitioner Arturo Rodriguez. Thereafter,
Arturo sold two-thirds portion of the land to Guillermo Reyes and
373
Francisco S. Alcantara.In 1953, the land in question was deemed
reverted to the public domain as it was excluded from the US-
Philippine Military Bases Agreement. In 1965, Arturo Rodriguez
together with Reyes and Alcantara filed a petition for registration of
their title to Lot No. 1736 on the ground of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession for more than 30 years. Thirty-
nine persons headed by Rosauro Canaria filed their Opposition to the
petition for registration contending, that they have been in actual,
peaceful, adverse and continuous possession of portions of Lot No.
1736 for more than thirty years and have introduced improvements
thereon.The Director of Lands likewise filed his opposition alleging
that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess
sufficient title to the land applied for, as they have not been in OCEN
possession and occupation of the land sought to be registered for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application.
The trial court ruled in favor of the applicants. Canaria filed a motion
for reconsideration but it was denied. Director of Lands filed for a
motion to dismiss or for reconsideration alleging that the present
petition for registration was intended to reopen Cadastral Case No.
15, L.R.C. Record No. 1021, wherein a cadastral court already
declared Lot 1736 as public land; and that a decision in a cadastral
case constitutes res judicata. The lower court ruled in favor of the
applicants confirming their title. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial
court but subsequently reversed its decision upon motion by
respondents contending that the cadastral case constitutes res
judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the prior decision of the cadastral court in a proper
cadastral proceeding declaring that the lot in question as public land
constitute res judicata, as such, a bar to the present application by
subsequent possessors for registration of title or confirmation of
imperfect title over the same parcel of land.
Held:
Res Judicata does not apply. When Cadastral Case No. 15 was
instituted in 1927 and terminated in 1930, the land in question was
still classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation and was deemed
reverted to the public domain only in 1953. On this basis, the Court
finds that the decision in the aforesaid cadastral case does not
constitute res judicata upon a subsequent action for land registration
374
considering the futility of filing any claim then over the land in
question since the same would nevertheless have been denied
because during the pendency of the cadastral case, said land was
not alienable nor disposable as was shown by the denial of the lease
application filed then by private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest.
A decision in cadastral proceedings declaring a lot public land is not
the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land
Registration Act. Thus, a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is
public, does not preclude the same applicant from subsequently
seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided
he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public
land remains alienable and disposable. But while the cadastral
proceedings in 1927 cannot be considered a bar to the registration
proceedings instituted by private respondents in 1965, the chronology
of events in the case at bar clearly negates compliance by private
respondents-applicants with the thirty-year possession requirement.
As such there is not claim for an imperfect title. Petition granted.
d. Effect of failure to appeal.
Facts:
Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claims ownership of Lot No. 395 of the
Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court
dated December 26, 1923, in favor of his father, sought recovery of
ownership and possession thereof from the named defendant, and of
the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-
1956. Defendants asserted their ownership over said property as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued to their
predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and their
continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.
title to Lot No. 395 was definitely confirmed as against the whole
world, including the Government;
375
2.) The same cadastral court issued a decree dated December
19, 1925 declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final
and directing the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de los
Santos. Although no such certificate was actually issued;
4.) Juan de la Merced, until his death in 1931, was the overseer
of Inocencio de los Santos for a big portion of land which
included Lot 395 in question and was, therefore, a trustee for
said lot at the time he applied for it as a homestead;
Issue:
What is the effect of failure to appeal the decision of a cadastral court
proceeding within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the
decision?
Held:
376
There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by
specific provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and affect the same, and such registration
shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province
where the land lies. In other words, in cases of public lands, the
property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in
the registration book of the registry of deeds had been accomplished.
(But in the other way, the land had become private land.) With
respect to the question of when title to the land in a cadastral
proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Abural, said: -After trial in a cadastral case, three
actions are taken. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of
the claimants. This constitutes the decision — the judgment — the
decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The second
action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its
order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the
Land Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from
the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from
the decision. The third and last action devolves upon the General
Land Registration Office. This office has been instituted "for the due
effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the
registration of land." The judgment in a cadastral survey, including
the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law says, the
judicial decree when final is the base of the certificate of title. The
issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is a ministerial
act. The date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is
unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to
be performed is the mere formulation of technical description. As a
general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final,
conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day
period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a
copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any
step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party
377
may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to
the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud.
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the
land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period
to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral
court, without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate
of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration
of subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would
no longer be necessary. As we have here a decree issued by the
cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of
the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicating
ownership to him of the said property had already become final, and
there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral
proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as
of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree.
FACTS:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of
the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos, then
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On December 16,
1958, a petition for review was filed in the same proceeding alleging
that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los Santos
"through actual fraud, through deceit and through intentional omission
of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and
a decree of registration obtained on August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was
stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in
favor of the other respondent, Felix L. Camaya, on October 26, 1958,
covering the said lot. The prayer was for the opening of the decree of
registration, the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title, as well
as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in
378
favor of petitioners, now appellant Cayanan and others.
This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which is on
appeal. It was the view of the lower court: "Such being the case, as
admitted by the petitioners, even if the petition has been filed within
one (1) year after entry of final decree, the same cannot be favorably
acted upon for the reason that the questioned lot has already been
transferred to Felix L. Camaya in accordance with section 38 of the
Land Registration Act. While it is true that the petition states that such
transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not for value and that Felix L.
Camaya is not an innocent purchaser, this question can be properly
threshed out in an ordinary civil action and not in a simple petition,
like the one at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cadastral court who tried and issue a decree of
registration has the power to set aside said judgment and
readajudicate the land in favor of another?
HELD:
The case should not be filed in another CFI considering that the
cadastral court is also a court of first instance. It has been held that
the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from
entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is not
issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed
has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing,
may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land
to another."
"In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from
the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act
496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the
decision and granted the said decree."
As a matter of fact, several decisions held that:
Santos v. Ichon,(1959): "It is true that under previous rulings of this
court, appellee could have moved for the reopening of the case in the
cadastral court so that he could be given an opportunity to prove his
right to the land in question and get a decree in his favor, since the
adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not
379
become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after
the entry of the final decree, and until then the court rendering the
decree may, after hearing, set aside the decision or decree and
adjudicate the land to another person."
Afalla v. Rosauro,: "As long as the final decree is not issued by the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with the
law, and the period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not
elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein
rendered continues to be under the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it."
Facts:
Fabian Abellera filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance
claiming title to the hacienda found in municipality of Aringay,
Province of La Union, by virtue of a donation which he failed to
accept in a public instrument as required in article 633 of the Civil
Code but was dismissed.
380
After the dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff brought another
action against the same defendants for ejectment. This second action
was dismissed, on the ground that the title to the tract of land from
which he sought to eject the defendants might well be litigated in the
cadastral case then pending in the same court which included the
tract of land, divided into lots and claimed by both the plaintiff and the
defendants, the court of first instance being of the opinion that, should
title to the tract of land be confirmed and decreed in the name of the
plaintiff, the latter could bring an action against the defendants for
damages. From this order of dismissal, the plaintiff did not appeal.
The plaintiff again brought another action with the same court for
ejectment against the same defendants in the two previous cases ,
or their successors-in-interest, including new or additional defendants
who are the claimants of lots in the cadastral case, which lie within
the area of the tract of land claimed by the plaintiff, and prayed for
judgment declaring him the owner of the tract of land from which he
had sought defendants' ejectment in the two previous cases; for the
possession of the lots unlawfully occupied or detained by the
defendants; for the recovery of damages from each and every one of
the defendants, amounting all in all to P40,000 and costs; and for
general relief.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The cadastral court possesses no authority to award damages,
for its power is confined to the determination as to whether the
381
claimants are really entitled to the lost, as alleged in their answers;
and, after finding that they are, to the confirmation of their title to, and
registration of, the lots in their name. In the present action for
ejectment, not only does the plaintiff seek to have a judicial
pronouncement that he is the owner of the tract of land which he
claims is unlawfully occupied by the defendants but also to recover
damages. After hearing, the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff
the owner of the lots and entitled to their possession and may issue a
writ directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof, but it cannot
award damages to the plaintiff. Where there is a case for ejectment
between parties who, one against the other, claim the same parcel of
land or lot in a cadastral case, it has been customary or the practice
of courts to hold a joint hearing of both the ejectment and the
cadastral cases in which the same parcel of land is litigated and to
render a decision in both cases in its double role, as court of first
instance of general jurisdiction and as cadastral court of limited
jurisdiction.
Medina vs Valdellon
Facts:
The complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan alleges that spouses Dolores Medina and Moises Bernal,
who are the plaintiffs in this case, are the owners of a parcel of land
situated at Bo. San Pascual, Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an assessed
value of P800.00.The defendants are family friends of the plaintiffs
and were allowed to remain in the premises and to construct their
residential house, subject to the condition that defendants will return
unto the plaintiffs the premises upon demand. On demand,
defendants-spouses refused and remain obstinate in their refusal to
surrender the property in question. Because of said defendants'
unjustified acts plaintiffs had to institute action and incur damage of
P500 as expenses for court litigation; the reasonable value of the use
of the premises is P100 a month, taking into consideration its
commercial value; and prayed that the defendants be ordered to
vacate the premises and surrender unto plaintiffs the said property
and defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs the amount of P500 as
incidental expenses and the amount of P100 a month from the filing
382
of this action to the time they surrender its possession to the plaintiffs.
The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint because another
case pending between the same parties over the same property,
namely Land Registration Case. The plaintiffs moved for Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award
damages.
Ruling:
No. It is true that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI)
acting as a land registration court has a limited and special
jurisdiction confined to the determination of the legality and propriety
of the issue of title over the land subject matter of registration, and it
has no power to entertain issues of rightful possession and claim for
damages emanating from ownership.
Facts:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of
the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos, then
383
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On December 16,
1958, a petition for review was filed in the same proceeding alleging
that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los Santos
"through actual fraud, through deceit and through intentional omission
of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and
a decree of registration obtained on August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was
stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in
favor of the other respondent, appellee Felix L. Camaya, on October
26, 1958, covering the said lot. The prayer was for the opening of the
decree of registration, the cancellation of the Original Certificate of
Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of
said lot in favor of petitioners, now appellant Cayanan and others.
Issue:
Ruling:
"It may be stated that we find had no case squarely ruling on this
particular point. The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded
by Section 38 of Act 496 may be sought in 'the competent Court of
First Instance' is no sufficient indication that the petition must be filed
in the Court of First Instance, exercising its general jurisdiction,
considering the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts
on land registration cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held that
the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from
entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is not
384
issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed
has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing,
may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land
to another."
Then came the concluding portion of the opinion: "In the present
case, as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of the
issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496, the same
are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and
granted the said decree."
REPUBLIC V. ESTENZO
Facts:
385
situated in Barrio Valencia, Ormoc City. Herein petitioners maintain
that the land is public land by virtue of a 1940 cadastral court
decision. Private respondents meanwhile take the opposite view
claiming the land as their own based on their purchase thereof from
the original claimant, Apolonia Parrilla, and its subsequent
adjudication in their favor in 1972.
The Republic and the Director of Lands now assail that decision by
way of appeal by certiorari.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. The argument of the petitioners is impressed with merit. Rep. Act
No. 931 section 1 provides:
All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object
of cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in
actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason
had been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the
time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on
account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are
about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of
judicial proceedings instituted within the forty year next
preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right
within five years after the date on which this Act shall take
effect, to petition for a re-opening of the judicial proceedings
under the provisions of act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and
fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such parcels of land
as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
Government . . .
This law took effect on June 20, 1953, hence, the period for
reopening cadastral proceedings expired on June 20, 1958. However,
Rep. Act No. 2061 section 2 extended this period until December 31,
1968, after which there had been no further extension. [Republic v.
Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35780, January 27, 1983,120 SCRA 220].
In the case at bar, the SPOUSES filed their petition more than three
years after the lapse of the reglementary period required by the law.
The period having expired, respondent judge was without jurisdiction
when he entertained SPOUSES' petition to re-open the decision of
the cadastral court.
387
Transactions pending original registration
A.
B. Land may be registered in favor of a total stranger.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes.
The law does not require that the application for registration be
amended by substituting the "buyer" or the person to whom the
property has been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it require
that the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been
conveyed" be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to
the land registration proceedings.
The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be
presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion
that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2)
389
that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar
facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these
requirements have been complied with.
Certificate of Title
BALBIN VS RD
28 SCRA 12
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes.
83 SCRA 453
Facts:
The basis of Republic's claim is that said lots were bequeathed to the
Bureau of Education on September 21, 1926 by the late Esteban
Jalandoni through his will. Republic further alleged that the said
392
parcels of land were already registered under the Torrens System
"before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of Meerkamp and
Company"; that said company sold the lots to Esteban Jalandoni; that
TCT No. 6014 was issued to the Bureau of Education when the
subject property was bequeathed to it.
The trial court rendered its decision on the Amended Petition against
393
Republic. From the said decision, Republic appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal. Hence,
an appeal by certiorari was filed by the petitioner.
Issue:
Ruling:
The trial court made an express finding that the alleged deed of
donation by Mosquera in favor of de Ocampo, acknowledged before
one Notary Public John Boardman does not appear in his notarial
book and the Provincial Assessor of Negros Occidental likewise
issued a certification, stating that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were never
declared in the name of Mosquera. His later certification states that
the said lots were assessed in the name of the Bureau of Education,
and that the technical descriptions in the Bureau of Lands records
show that the same lots were in the name of Meerkamp and
Company.
394
remanded to the said Court to give due course to and consider on its
merits Republic's appeal.
395
G.R. No. 105027 April 22, 1994
Facts:
The controversy arose when herein appellees learned that the same
parcels were being claimed by herein appellant, B.E. San Diego,
Incorporated.
All parties resolutely seeking to enforce their respective claims over
the subject properties, three civil suits for quieting of title were filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
It is Lorenzana Food Corporation's contention that the OCT in B.E.
San Diego's name is null and void because Lorenzana Food
Corporation's title emanated from an OCT issued more than thirty-
nine years prior to the issuance of B.E. San Diego's original
certificate of title.
In answer, B.E. San Diego countered that it and its predecessors-in-
interest have been in the open continuous and adverse possession in
concept of owner of the subject property for more than fifty years prior
to Lorenzana Food Corporation's purchase of the two parcels. It was
further argued that Lorenzana Food Corporation was erroneously
claiming the subject property because of Lorenzana's titled property
is described to be located in Barrio Talaba, while B.E. San Diego's
property is situated in Barrio Niog.
Plaintiffs Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua claim ownership
over the parcels they respectively purchased from the heirs of Juan
Cuenca.
396
Issue:
Ruling:
With these errors, the titles of the petitioners do not deserve the
sanctity given to torrens title.
397
iv. Overlapping Titles
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
398
determine which of the titles is valid. Thus, the trial court may rely on
their findings and conclusions.
400
C. Effect of Issuance of Title
PAGADUAN v OCUMA
GR No. 176308 May 8, 2009
Facts:
The subject lot used to be part of a big parcel of land that originally
belonged to Nicolas Cleto as evidenced by Certificate of Title (C.T.)
No. 14. The big parcel of land was the subject of two separate lines of
dispositions. The first line of dispositions began with the sale by Cleto
to Antonio Cereso on May 11, 1925. Cereso in turn sold the land to
the siblings with the surname Antipolo on September 23, 1943. The
Antipolos sold the property to Agaton Pagaduan, father of petitioners,
on March 24, 1961. All the dispositions in this line were not registered
and did not result in the issuance of new certificates of title in the
name of the purchasers.
On November 26, 1961, Eugenia Reyes executed a unilateral deed of
sale where she sold the northern portion with an area of 32,325
square meters to respondents for P1,500.00 and the southern portion
consisting of 8,754 square meters to Agaton Pagaduan for P500.00.
Later, on June 5, 1962, Eugenia executed another deed of sale, this
time conveying the entire parcel of land, including the southern
portion, in respondent’s favor.
On July 26, 1989, petitioners instituted a complaint for reconveyance
of the southern portion with an area of 8,754 square meters, with
damages, against respondents before the RTC of Olongapo City.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the registration of the southern
portion in the name of respondents had created an implied trust in
favor of Agaton Pagaduan, petitioners, however, failed to show that
401
they had taken possession of the said portion. Hence, the appellate
court concluded that prescription had set in, thereby precluding
petitioners’ recovery of the disputed portion.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The lower court rendered its decision finding that the mortgage was
validly constituted and its foreclosure was in order. The Court of
Appeals certified the appeal of this Court on the ground that it
involves only questions of law.
Issue:
Whether Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan are the true owners
of the land
Ruling:
403
No, they are not the true owners.
Egao v CA
174 SCRA 484
Facts:
The respondents claim that they are the owners of the parcel of land
by virtue of the deed of sale they entered into with Roberto Marfori.
The respondents also introduced improvements; they as well paid the
taxes of the property. However, the petitioners illegally occupied
portions of the land. Petitioner answers that they are the true owner
of the land by virtue of the Certificate of Title issued by the Register of
Deeds pursuant to their Free Patent. The lower court ruled in favor of
Egao. The CA reversed the decision on grounds that the main issue
should be whether Egao can validly sell the land to Marfori who
subsequently transferred the ownership to the respondents. The CA
holds both Egao and Marfori to be in pari delicto for violating the 5-
year restriction provided by Commonwealth 141 against
encumbrance and alienation of public lands acquired thrufree
patent or homestead patent.
Issue:
404
petitioners. Thus, they are not considered to be innocent purchaser
as contrary to the ruling of the CA. Where a purchaser neglects to
make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the
existence of a defect in his vendor's title, and relying on the belief that
there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the property
without making any further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a
purchaser in good faith for value.
Facts:
The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land,
registered in their names. Both are now deceased. They were
survived by the following children.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescriptive period started when the deed of sale
was registered with the Register of Deeds.
Ruling:
406
registered with the Register of Deeds.
CHING vs. CA
181 SCRA 9
407
Facts:
A Decree was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga
Lumandan in Land Registration and Original Certificate of Title
correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal covering a parcel of land.
13 years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was filed by
private respondent Asedillo for reconveyance of the said property and
cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession.
Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was
directed by the trial court. The summons and the complaint were
published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general
circulation.
The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled
and a new TCT was issued in favor of Asedillo.
Issue:
Ruling:
408
land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a
particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible
thing.
Sec. 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended)
requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since ChingLeng was
already in the other world when the summons was published he could
not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The Madrids argue that neither prescription nor laches can
operate against them because their title to the property is registered
under the Torrens system and therefore imprescriptable. Such
principles, while admittedly correct, are subject to certain
exceptions. The fact that the Madrids were able to secure TCT No.
167250, and Marquez, TCT Nos. 167220 and 167256, did not
operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens
system does not create or vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring
ownership,especially considering the fact that both the Madrids and
Marquezes obtained their respective TCT’s only in October 1986,
twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners first took possession of
the land. If the Madrids and Marquezes wished to assert their
ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of
possession and not merely to have the land registered under their
respective names.
CABRERA v CA
267 SCRA 339
Facts:
410
In 1950, a parcel of unregistered land which was owned in mutual by
Daniel, Albertana and Felicidad Teokemian, having inherited the
same from their late father, Domingo Teokemian, was sold to Andres
Orais wherein Felicidad was not able to sign in the Deed of Sale.In
1957, Virgilia Orais, daughter of the vendee issued Free Patent and
Original Certificate of Title over the said property.In 1972, the one-
third share of Felicidad Teokemian in her possession was sold to
spouses Elanoand Felicidad Cabrera who instantly took possession
of it. In 1988, Virgilia Orais filed a civil case for quieting of title against
Felicidad Teokemian and Felicidad Cabrera. On April 27, 1989, the
lower court rendered judgment in favor of defendants against the
plaintiff, ruling that the latter can no longer recover the portion of land
occupied by the past due to laches. The Court of Appeals reversed
such findings upon appeal on the justification that the defendant’s
action for reconveyance based on an implied trust had already been
barred by prescription and that the action of the plaintiffs is not barred
by laches because what was sold to the Cabreras was a definite
portion of the community property.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. The argument that laches does not apply because what was
sold to the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property,
and, therefore, void, is untenable.
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of
the subject property to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad
Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion allotted to her. There has,
therefore, been a partial partition, where the transferees of an
undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to
occupy a definite portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for
a period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition
or right.
411
AVILA vs. TAPUCAR
G.R. No. L-45947 August 27, 1991
Facts:
Issue:
Whether the free patent and original certificate of title which were
erroneously issued and vested ownership of lands in favor of the
Bahans is proper.
Ruling:
TAN vs BANTEGUI
GR No. 154027 October 24, 2005
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
The tax sale did not conform to the requirements prescribed under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 464, otherwise known as the Real
Property Tax Code. The auction sale of real property for the collection
of delinquent taxes is in personam, not in rem. Although sufficient in
proceedings in rem like land registration, mere notice by publication
will not satisfy the requirements of proceedings in personam.
“[P]ublication of the notice of delinquency [will] not suffice,
considering that the procedure in tax sales is in personam.” It is still
incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice directly to the
taxpayer -- the registered owner of the property -- in order to protect
the latter’s interests. Although preceded by proper advertisement
and publication, an auction sale is void absent an actual notice to a
delinquent taxpayer. A certificate of title under the Torrens system
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of
the person whose name appears on it. While it is true that Transfer
Certificates of Title have already been issued in the names of the
subsequent purchasers, they should nonetheless be invalidated.
Considering the failure to abide by the mandatory requirements of a
414
proceeding in personam, no better title than that of the original owner
can be assumed by the transferees.
DEMASIADO vs VELASCO
71 SCRA 105
Facts:
Plaintiff bought the land in question through pacto de retro sale from
his uncle Ambrosio Demasiado which vendor a retro could
repurchase within ten years after the first five years from the date of
the document. That said vendor a retro subsequently executed a
deed of definite sale of same lot in favor of the plaintiff Melquiades
Demasiado and his wife Jovita Pareja It is admitted that both deeds
of sale though contained in a public document have not been
415
registered in the office of the Register of Deeds. From the evidence of
the plaintiff, it has been established that plaintiff's claim to the land in
question is premised on two unregistered documents. This shows
that when said document was executed parties already knew that lot
5169 has been titled and it would have been easy for parties to
inquire from the office of the Register of Deeds as to whether this
land is titled or not. Based on the evidence presented by plaintiff and
defendants, the plaintiff has not even proved his clear right over the
whole lot. Deeds of Sale could not be superior to the existing valid
original certificate of title.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff has clear right over the disputed lot.
Ruling:
Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, (Act No. 496) the
certificate of title covering registered land "shall be received as
evidence in all courts of the Philippines, and shall be conclusive as to
all matters contained therein (principally, the Identity of the owner of
the land covered thereby) except so far as provided" in the Act itself.
And there is no pretense that appellant comes under any of the
exceptions mentioned in Section 39 of the Act. What appellant tries to
point out, however, is that the trial court admitted the certificate of title
invoked by appellee without the same being properly Identified.
According to appellant, although the trial court did rule that said
certificate "should be admitted", it did not actually rule that "they are
hereby admitted." We believe such argument is unavailing,
considering that His Honor's ruling that said certificate, "the owner's
copy of Original certificate of Title No. 61801 is admissible", was
precisely made after originally sustaining appellant's counsel's
objection to its admission, which must be deemed to be clearly even
if not categorically, a reconsideration and reversal of its earlier ruling
rejecting the same.
416
c. its location
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
f. General incidents
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Section 70 of Act No. 496 that registered land, and ownership therein,
shall in all respects be subject to the same burdens and incidents
attached by law to unregistered land", and that nothing in Act No. 496
"shall in any way be construed "to change the laws of descent, or the
rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants and other
cotenants " "or to change or affect in any other way any other rights
or liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land,
419
except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in the
amendments hereof".
LEGAL INCIDENTS OF REGISTRATION LAND
1 Registered land is subject to the same legal burdens and incidents
as unregistered land and, therefore, fake unregistered land, it is
subject to attachment and execution for the payment of debts. The
rights and liabilities which are created by law and are made
applicable to unregistered land, are applicable to registered land,
except as otherwise provided in Act No. 496.
2. The rights arising from the relation of husband and wife are
applicable to registered lands.
3. Registered land is subject (a) to any alien of any description
established by law on land and the b thereon, or the interest of the
owner in such land or buildings, (b) to the laws of descent, and (c) to
the rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants, will other
cotenants except as otherwise expressly provoked in Act No. 496.
The deed of donation made Andrea Budlong a co-owner of Lot No.
5447. She became the successor-in-interest of the donors, Isabela
Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc. The fact that in OCT No. 4718, which
was issued subsequent to the donation, the donors appear to be the
co-owners and not Andrea Budlong did not extinguish at all the rights
of Andrea as a co-owner.
Section 70 of Act No. 496 is crystal clear. It unmistakably provides
that the conversion of unregistered land into registered land does not
affect the rights of the CO-owners nor the legal rights and liabilities
applicable to unregistered land
G. ATTRIBUTES
i. IMPRESCRIPTIBLE
Section 47, PD 1529 Registered land not subject to
prescription. –No title to registered land in derogation of the title
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
Fundamental principle in land registration that the
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein.
CANA VS. EVANGELICAL FREE CHURCH
G.R. 157573
FACTS:
Petitioner Elinel Caña is a former pastor assigned in the respondents
420
affiliate Malabon Christian Evangelical Church (MCEC). The disputed
property consists of a lot and a church, covered by a transfer certificate in
the name of the respondent Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines.
A review was then filed by the respondents with the Court of Appeals,
who also dismissed the same for the case being insufficient in form and
substance. Thereafter, the respondents complied by attaching sufficient
and relevant documents to its suit.
Then the CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and ordered said petitioner to
vacate said property. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by
the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not said petitioner has lawful title to the disputed
property.
The Supreme Court held that the respondent's title over the subject
property is evidence of its ownership thereof. It is a fundamental
principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence
of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
421
person whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that
the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof.
FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration was filed with the CA, the CA affirmed
the ruling of the trial court for absence of a valid issue raised by
defendants.
RULING:
423
Also, there is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may
be said to justify appellants' claim that said decree granted the
ownership of said lands to them and their successors by
title. Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to believe that
they acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole country
was declared by the previous regime as a land reform area.
Even assuming that said titles may still be challenged base on their
claim applying Presidential Deree no. 2 purportedly making them and
their successors owners of said land, the present case does not
provide the vehicle for that remedy since the judicial action required is
a direct, and not a collateral, attack. Petition was granted.
FACTS:
By the stipulation of the parties it appears that on March 13, 1916,
free patent No. 3699 was issued over the land subject of the action in
the name of Domingo Mejia. This patent was transcribed in the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1916 and
certificate of title No. 380 issued in the name of Domingo Mejia. On
March 24, 1916, after the issuance of the patent but before the
registration of the same, patentee Domingo Mejia deeded the land to
Zacarias Ciscar, who immediately took possession thereof and
enjoyed its fruits. Upon his death the property was included in the
distribution of his estate and adjudicated to Roque Sanchez. Roque
Sanchez in turn sold the land on January 21, 1940 to Andres
424
Gamponia, Defendant herein. Sanchez was in possession and
enjoyment of the land from the time he acquired it by inheritance from
Ciscar up to the time he sold it to Defendant Andres Gamponia, the
latter has also possessed and enjoyed the property from the time he
bought it to date.
Upon the above facts the court a quo held that the sale by the
patentee to Zacarias Ciscar is null and void, as the sale was made
only 11 days after the issuance of a patent in violation of the
provisions of section 35 of Act No. 926. The Court further held that
since the land is registered land no title in derogation to that of the
registered owner could have been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar
or his successors in interest, namely, Roque Sanchez and Defendant
Andres Gamponia.
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff's right of action has already prescribed by virtue of
the possession of the land by the Defendant and his predecessors in
interest for a period of 37 years
RULING:
Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are
constrained to find, however, that while no legal defense to the action
lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the Defendant and that is, the
equitable defense of laches. No hold that the defense of prescription
or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered
owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense
of laches. Otherwise, stated, we hold that while Defendant may not
be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his
predecessors’ long continued possession for 37 years, the original
owner’s right to recover back the possession of the property and the
title thereto from the Defendant has, by the long period of 37 years
and by patentee’s inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale
demand.
In Go Chi Gun, et al., vs. Co Cho, et al., (96 Phil., 622) we held that
the equitable defense of laches requires four elements:(1) conduct on
the part of the Defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
Defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
425
institute a suit, (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
Defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; (4) injury or prejudice to the Defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.
All the four elements mentioned above are present in the case at
bar. .
“The reason upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of
time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the
changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in
which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court of equity
finds that the position of the parties has to change that equitable relief
cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening
rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will
not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the
consequences of his own neglect.” (Penn Mutual Life Inc. Co., et al.,
vs. City of Austin et al., U. S. 962.)
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and one is hereby
entered absolving the Defendant from the action.
427
disputed land has a right to possess and recover the same, as
against private respondent Reñosa who merely claims a right to
possess from his predecessor-in-interest Capt. Cruz who likewise
never acquired any right to possess the disputed property. Both Capt.
Cruz and respondent Reñosa cannot be considered exactly as
possessors in good faith because both of them knew at the time they
entered into possession that petitioner was the registered owner of
the disputed land.
Capt. Cruz cannot be considered a possessor in good faith because
as beneficiary of the compromise agreement he should be in a
position to know that there were suspensive conditions attached to
his possible acquisition of the disputed property and that if the
conditions were not fulfilled, his right as beneficiary would never
arise. Aside from the compromise agreement as the only basis of
Capt. Cruz' alleged right to the property in question, he and
respondent Reñosa were never able to prove transfer to ownership of
the same from petitioner to Capt. Cruz, thus strengthening the
obvious fact that the suspensive conditions imposed in the
compromise agreement were never fulfilled and hence petitioner
never transferred title to the reserved properties in favor of the
beneficiaries therein. As registered owner of the land and in the
absence of any equal or better right on the part of respondent
Reñosa to possess the disputed land, petitioner is entitled to
possession and initiated the correct action when it brought a case to
recover possession of the same.
428
their legitimate children; that plaintiffs inherited from Mariano Dablo a
parcel of unirrigated riceland in Zambales. This parcel of land is
covered by Original Certificate of Title in the name of Hrs. of Mariano
Dablo; it was issued in the name of the heirs of Mariano Dablo on and
was transcribed in the Registry Book of the Resister of Deeds of
Zambales. Mariano Dablo had been in peaceful, continuous, open,
public and adverse possession of the property as owner thereof since
1911 until his death when the plaintiffs succeeded in the possession
of the property, until the defendants illegally entered and occupied it
in 1946. Regional trial court declared that the petitioners are the legal
owners of lot in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are the legal owners of lot in question.
RULING:
SC held that the private respondents are the true and rightful owners
of the western portion of the land in dispute.However, the remedy
granted by respondent Court of Appeals, that is, the cancellation of
Original Certificate of Title No P-3593, does not appear to be proper
and apt.
429
ii. INDEFEASIBLE AND INCONTROVERTIBLE
MELGAR VS PAGAYON
21 SCRA
FACTS:
A parcel of land was originally owned by Basilia Paccial, who sold it to
one Palomino subject to the right of repurchase within a period of
three years. The period expired without such a right being exercised.
Petitioner acquired the rights and interests. Earlier on January 30,
1925, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment
decreeing the registration in the above lot in favor of vendor Basilia
Paccial noted that it was encumbered to the Palomillo "for the sum of
TEN PESOS (P10.00). The original certificate of title was issued in
430
the name of Basilia Paccial with the foregoing encumbrances and
conditions annotated thereon. Salvador Pagayon, the predecessor-in-
interest of the other respondents in this proceeding acquired the
property for the sum of P2,000.00. The Deed of Sale was registered,
and the next day Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name
of Salvador Pagayon which cancelled the Original Certificate of Title
in favor of Paccial.
Issue:
Ruling:
432
Church, which petitioner refers to
as Malabon Christian Evangelical Church (MCEC).
Ruing:
433
Instances when defense of indefeasibility is NOT available:
1 The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not
apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title. The
Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. As such, a
title issued based on void documents does not run against
the State and its subdivisions.
434
2 Principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the patent
and the title based thereon are null and void. The Director
of Lands had no authority to grant a free patent over
privately owned land. Although OCT No. P-30187 was
merely collaterally attacked, it was still correctly nullified
because the free patent on which it was based was null and
void.
DE GUZMAN VS AGBALA
FACTS:
435
The subject parcels of land were inherited by Carmen, who died
single, without any compulsory heir. Said land was the subject of a
deed of donation in favor of her niece Madelene Javier Cruz.
According to Madelene, she was present when all the signatories
thereon, including the notary public, signed the document. From that
time on, she received the rentals of the properties covered by the
donation. Carmen even informed her tenants that Madelene would
inherit the properties upon her death. The respondent then filed a civil
case against Madelene praying that the deed of donation be nullified,
as well as the subsequent transfers to other parties of the properties
covered by the spurious donation.
An amended complaint was filed on September 15, 1988 to
include the transferees of the properties including petitioner spouses
Raymundo and Perla de Guzman, who were the transferees of the
land.
Respondent claimed that the deed of donation was fake. This
was confirmed by the handwriting expert of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Rogelio Azores.
The RTC, in its decision, declared the deed of donation in favor
of Madelene null and void ab initio. Such decision was affirmed by the
CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not OCT No. P-30187 was correctly nullified
RULING:
Yes. Although OCT No. P-30187 was merely collaterally attacked; it
was still correctly nullified because the free patent on which it was
based was null and void ab initio. The principle of indefeasibility does
not apply when the patent and the title based thereon are null and
void. An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe
and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack. OCT No.
P-30187 was registered on the basis of a free patent which the RTC
ruled was issued by the Director of Lands without authority. The
petitioners falsely claimed that the land was public land when in fact it
was not as it was private land previously owned by Carmen who
inherited it from her parents. This finding was affirmed by the CA.
436
3 Purchase from one who procured title by Fraud
FACTS:
437
In 1927, Spouses Sixto and Isabel Dumolong were awarded a parcel
of land. Their marriage, however was not blessed by a child. Sixto
then had an extramarital affair and he cohabited with Placida who
even used Sixto’s surname. Placida and Sixto begot children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bornales may invoke the indefeasibility of a Torrens
title
RULING:
No. Having bought the land registered under the Torrens
system from their vendors who procured title thereto by means of
fraud, petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of
title against the private respondent to the extent of her interest
therein. The Torrens system of land registration should not be used
as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real
property. Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith.
Thus, it is a settled rule that the defense of indefeasibility of a
certificate of title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with
notice of the flaws in his transferor’s title. If at all, the petitioners only
acquire the right which their vendors then had.
438
A title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the
source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
FACTS:
Guillerma Tiro et al. filed before the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of
Title against PES. Petitioners alleged that they are the children of the
late Julian Tiro. They averred that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in actual possession of the disputed land since time
immemorial until they were prevented from entering the same by
persons claiming to be the new owners sometime in 1995. But they
discovered that OCT No. RO-1121 had already been cancelled as
early as 1969 and was presently registered in the name of
439
respondent. The petitioners prayed that all the transactions
emanating from the "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and
Confirmation of Sale," executed by Maxima Ochea, be declared void,
including the transfer made in favor of the respondent; that the title
which was issued in the name of respondent be cancelled; and that
the property be restored and registered in the name of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the act of the RD
of registering a clearly void and unregistrable document confers no
valid title on the presentor and his successors-in-interest.
181 SCRA 46
FACTS:
On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses filed a case in the CFI
of Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioners. Their complaint states that they are the registered owners
under the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 of the
parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan which
is now in the possession of petitioners. But petitioners alleged that
they became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective
aliquot parts of said river bed bordering their properties. While the
above-mentioned case was still pending, petitioners filed a complaint
against the respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon with
the CFI of Pangasinan for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or
action to clear title to a parcel of land. Petitioners alleged that the land
441
in question belongs to them and that it was only on April 13, 1971,
when respondent spouses filed a complaint against them, that they
found out that the said land was granted by the Government to
Herminigildo Agpoon under Free Patent No. 23263, pursuant to which
OCT. 2370 was issued in the latter's name. And the said patent and
subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto are null and void since the
said land, an abandoned river bed, is of private ownership and,
therefore, cannot be the subject of a public land grant. The trial court
rendered a decision ordering the defendants to surrender to the
plaintiffs the physical possession of the land in question.
RULING:
The aforesaid case of Antonio relied upon by the lower court in its
dismissal order is not controlling. It is true that by filing the application
for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted either the invalidity or
insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the name of his
predecessor in interest on July 22, 1894, but neither the allegation
made in his answer that his aforesaid predecessor in interest was the
absolute owner of the property covered by said Titulo Real nor his
implied admission of the latter's invalidity or insufficiency are grounds
for the annulment of the free patent and original certificate of title in
442
question. Evidently, it was Barroga's privilege to rely or not to rely
upon his claim of private ownership in favor of his predecessor in
interest and of whatever the latter's Titulo Real was worth. He
decided not to rely upon them and to consider that the property
covered by the Titulo Real was still part of the public domain. Acting
accordingly he applied for a free patent and was successful. It must
be borne in mind that the Titulo Real was not an indefeasible title and
that its holder still had to prove that he had possessed the land
covered by it without interruption during a period of ten years by
virtue of a good title and in good faith (Royal Decree of June
25,1880). We may well presume that Barroga felt that he had no
sufficient evidence to prove this, for which reason he decided to
acquire the land as part of the public domain.
443
6 A certificate of title issue on the basis of a free patent
procured through fraud or in violation of the law may be
cancelled since such title is not cloaked with
indefeasibility.
MARTINEZ VS CA
FACTS:
Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who during
his lifetime inherited the properties from his mother, Rosa Martinez
Emitaño, who in turn inherited them from her own mother, Celedonia
444
Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged that sometime in 1992,
petitioner, Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria
Martinez and as thus one of the descendants of Celedoniaand under
that name applied for free patents over the properties with the
CENRO. Unbeknownst to private respondents, the corresponding
OCTs were thus issued in the name of Gregoria Martinez. When
private respondents later filed an application for land registration over
the same properties, petitioner opposed the same. This impelled
private respondents to file the instant complaint.
The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and
land titles should be annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation in
their procurement. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the
cancellation of petitioner’s titles. Before the Court of Appeals, She
argued the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of the
lapse of one year from the issuance of the titles.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No, the titles of the petitioner are not considered indefeasible and
incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one year from their
issuance since the certificate of title in this case has been issued on
the basis of free patent procured through fraud manifested in the
facts that Gregoria Merquines has misrepresented herself as
Gregoria Martinez who happened to be one of the descendants of
Celedonia.
CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA
FACTS:
446
showing that De Vera’s property (located in Calasiao, Pangasinan)
measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada however noticed that
the Torrens title under De Vera indicated that his property measures
8752 sq. m. He learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being
occupied by Juliana. Estrada sued to evict Juliana.
Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the concept of
an owner of the land since 1921; that they’ve been paying taxes; that
the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only took them
to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set in.
ISSUE:
RULING:
447
portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. By that, the only
portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Vera’s estate is that which
was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A recalculation
must however be made to specify the exact measure of land
belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained by Juliana (portion
which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m. should go to de Vera’s
estate.
IGLESIA VS CFI OF NE
FACTS:
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding that title acquired
earlier by homestead is superior to that secured in a subsequent land
registration proceedings.
450
Petitioners filed a verified petition for the annulment of the trial court’s
decision. According to petitioners, their
parents, spouses Luciano P. Lim and Salud Nakpil Bautista, are
the registered owners of a parcel of land. They acquired it from
Domingo L. Santos. The lot contained an area of 795 square meters
more or less and was covered by TCT No. 27997. Furthermore, they
alleged that their parents had been in actual physical possession of
the property. A fired razed Quezon City Hall, the records destroyed
was the original copy of TCT No. 27997 and thus, one of the
petitioners applied for and was issued a reconstituted title, TCT No.
RT-97223, in September 1994.
Ruling:
451
annulment of judgment was rightfully dismissed.
The Court of Appeals did not dismiss the petition for annulment
of judgment outright. In fact, it required respondent Cañosa to
file her answer, and even allowed the
filing of an amended answer─proof that it was predisposed to
consider the arguments of both parties before it even decided to
finally dismiss the petition. Mere filing of a petition for annulment
of judgment does not guarantee the holding of trial or reception
of evidence. A petition for annulment of judgment may in fact be
dismissed outright if it has no prima facie merit. With more
reason that the Court of Appeals may dismiss a petition even
without a hearing if it finds that based on the averments in the
petition and the responsive pleading, the annulment of the
assailed judgment is not warranted.
TAPUROC VS LOQUELLANO
G.R. No. 152007
FACTS:
On September 19, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint against
respondents, the complaint alleges that petitioners Procopio Tapuroc
and all the successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe
are the co-owners, co-heirs of the original owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 5,795 square meters situated in Booy, Tagbilaran,
Bohol; that in 1992, when petitioners decided to partition the subject
property, they discovered from the Office of the City Assessor that the
title covering the land was already in the name of a certain Evans
Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed in favor of the latter by
their predecessors-in-interest in 1967; that said Deed of Sale is a
forged document because the alleged vendors therein, did not sign
452
the conveying deed; and that one of the alleged vendors, Antonia
Ebe, had already passed away in 1960, ong before the purported
Deed of Sale was said to have been executed in 1967. Hence,
Petitioners, pray for the nullification of the same Deed of Sale, the
cancellation of the title issued pursuant thereto and the restoration of
the previous title in their names, plus damages.
Respondents assert that they had been in open, continuous, and
peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said sale,
and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due thereon.
On June 7, 1999, the trial court finding that the evidence adduced by
the petitioners insufficient to establish their claim that the questioned
Deed of Sale was a forgery. A motion for reconsideration was filed
with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that
petitioners are barred from filing their petition due to laches.
453
NATALIA REALTY VS VALDEZ
173 SCRA 534
FACTS: Petitioner, Natalia Realty, filed separate ejectment cases
against respondents with the RTC of Rizal for allegedly unlawfully
occupying parcels of lands which were covered by the petitioners
transfer certificates. The respondents file a consolidated answer
moving to dismiss said case based on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Then the trial court rendered a summary judgment upon finding that
there is no valid issue raised by the respondents, but only
conclusions that they have been in actual possession of the subject
lands for more than 30 years. They were then ordered to vacate the
lots and to pay monthly rents. So the respondents filed an appeal with
the Intermediate Appellate Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a valid claim over the
disputed land?
RULING: The Supreme Court approved the ruling of the lower court
that the certificate of title issued to the petitioners in accordance with
the Land Registration Act is indefeasible after the expiration of one
year from the entry of the decree of registration. After the lapse of one
year, the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is
binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether or not they
were notified of or participated in the registration proceedings. The
said titles were issued to the petitioners more than 30 years ago.
Furthermore, the SC averred that, under the law, Section 48 of the
Property Registration Decree 20 expressly provides that a certificate
of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered,
modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law.
Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless.
Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of
lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed
by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by adverse possession.
Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both
immaterial and inconsequential.
454
ownership of said lands to them and their successors by title.
Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to believe that they
acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole country was
declared by the previous regime as a land reform area.
455
RULING:
Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots applied for
by petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that Decree
1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana, Manila while the lot
applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by the Bureau of
Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an area of 156
hectares located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers away from Sta.
Ana, Manila. Hence, the necessity of a trial on the merits to ascertain
the disputed facts. Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration
issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the basis for
the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the
corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the
land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240 [1962]).
Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering
the parcel of land applied for, then the certificate of title issued over
the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and
is null and void.
456
parties admit, the TCTs do not show that they are actually derivatives
of OCT 351.
The trial court cannot be faulted for not having granted respondent
Ortigas' motion to dismiss simply because the TCTs relied upon by
the latter do not accurately reflect their supposed origin. Thus, in
Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. 769 [1926]) this Court held
that the "simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens
System, does not make the possessor the true owner of all the
property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the
Torrens System, which includes by mistake or oversight land which
cannot be registered under the Torrens System, he does not, by
virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally
included (citing Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915])."
As it is in this case, a certificate of title cannot be considered
conclusive evidence of ownership where the certificate itself is faulty
as to its purported origin.
FACTS;
457
Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-
2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original Certificate
of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds
covering a parcel of land with an area of 51,852 square meters.
Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was
commenced on December 27, 1978 by Pedro Asedillo with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as
Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid property
and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on
possession. Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad
Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not
No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private
respondent's complaint).
The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro Asedillo, declaring him to be the
true and absolute owner of the property and ordering alfredo ching to
surrender the title to the Registry of Deeds for its cancellation.
The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled
and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Pedro
Asedillo who subsequently sold the property to Villa Esperanza
Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979. Upon knowing, Alfredo
Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a verified petition
on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of
jurisdiction which was granted by the court on May 29, 1980.
458
RULING:
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest."
Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when the summons
was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte
proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held
(Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
459
review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
damages if the property has passed unto the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.
FACTS:
460
P-168, in the name of respondent Magdalena Domondon, pursuant to
Free Patent No. 309504 issued on 24 January 1966 .
Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the Court
of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, a complaint
for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965,
against private respondents. Herein respondent Judge, who also
handled the case, dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint,
without prejudice, on the ground that the court had no authority to
cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of
Lands on the basis of a mere collateral attack.
Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied.
461
patent over land that has passed to private ownership and which has
thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by
him would be null and void. The nullity arises, not from fraud or
deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority being limited
only to lands of public dominion and not those that are privately
owned.
FACTS:
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial
Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez on May 18,
1975, covering, among others, the property involved in this case, for
unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the
petitioner.
The Provincial Sheriff then caused the issuance of the notice of sale
of the property in question, scheduling the public auction sale. The
petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate
of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date by the Provincial
Sheriff.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of
National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property in question
by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same and ordering plaintiffs to
turn over possession of the land to defendant National Grains
Authority.
RULING:
Yes. In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a
registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a
better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute
sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily
binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private
respondents.
It has been invariably restated by this Court, that the real purpose of
the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court,
or sitting on the "mirador su casato," avoid the possibility of losing his
land. An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not allowed.
465
free from all encumbrances except those noted in said
certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be
subsisting, namely:
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two
years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over
the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to
the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that
period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.
466
herein petitioners, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court on January 24, 1958, restraining the respondent Judge from
taking further cognizance of the aforementioned registration case No.
323 until further orders from this Court.
On June 30, 1957, the court decreed registration of said Lot No. 1
plan Psu-103916-Amd. in the name of the City of Tagaytay, free from
any liens and encumbrances, and the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title upon the finality of said decision.
Ruling:
This decision is limited only to the action of the trial court, sitting as
land registration court, decreeing for the second time, the registration
of Lot No. 1 of subdivision plan Psu-103916-Amd. infavor of
respondent City of Tagaytay, a lot already previously decreed by a
competent court in favor of the petitioners, which action, Supreme
Court held, is null and void.
On June 22, 1909, RupertaCabucos bought from, and fully paid to the
Government, Lot No. 638 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate situated
in Cebu City for which a formal deed of conveyance was executed in
her favor on November 27, 1915 by the Friar Lands Agency. On
February 28, 1916 Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3918 (T-320)
was issued to her. The Banilad Friar Lands Estate was among the
friar lands acquired by the Government for resale to actual tenants or
occupants pursuant to Act 1120 of the Philippine Commission.
469
February 18, 1963 the Deputy Auditor General, as stated, denied the
claim. This decision was the subject of two motions for
reconsideration, the later one having been denied on June 10, 1963.
On July 9 of the same year Raymunda S. Digran appealed to this
Court from said decision altho on July 1, 1963 she filed an amended
claim for compensation with the Auditor General. On August 7, 1963
the Auditor General desisted from rendering a decision on the
amended claim on July 1, 1963 for the reason that the case was
already sub judice.
SEC. 19. No purchaser or lessee under this Act shall acquire any
exclusive rights to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation
works, or to any water supply upon which such irrigation works
are or may be dependent, but all of such irrigation works and
water supplies shall remain under the exclusive control of the
Government of the Philippine Islands and be administered
under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
for the common benefit of those interests dependent upon
them. And the Government reserves as a part of the contract of
sale in each instance the right to levy an equitable contribution
or tax for the maintenance of such irrigation works, the
assessment of which shall be based upon the amount of
benefits received, and each purchaser under this Act, by
470
accepting the certificate of sale or deed herein provided to be
given, shall be held to assent thereto. And it is further provided
that all lands leased or conveyed under this Act shall remain
subject to the right of way of such irrigation canals, ditches, and
reservoirs as now exist or as the Government may hereafter
see fit to construct.
SEC. 20. All persons receiving title to lands under the provisions of
this Act shall hold such lands subject to the same public
servitudes as existed upon lands owned by private persons
under the sovereignty of Spain, including those with reference
to the littoral of the sea and the banks of navigable rivers and
rivers upon which rafting may be done.
471
E. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS THAT RUN WITH THE LAND
a. Nature of Restrictive Covenants
FACTS:
472
ISSUES:
HELD:
The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid since they are
not synonymous with easements. Restrictive covenants on the use of
land or the location or character of buildings or other structures
thereon may broadly be said to create easements or rights but it can
also be contended that such covenants, being limitations on the
manner in which one may use his own property, do not result in true
easements, but a case of servitudes (burden), sometimes
characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative
easements, which is the most common easement created by
covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner of the
land from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he would be
entitled to do. The provisions in a restrictive covenant prescribing the
type of the building to be erected are crafted not solely for creating
easements nor as a restriction as to the type of construction, but may
also be aimed as a check on the subsequent uses of the building
conformably with what the developer originally might have intended
the stipulations to be.
474
amended: Provided, however, that the Register of Deeds shall
annotate on the new certificate of title covering the street,
passageway or open space, a memorandum to the effect that
except by way of donation in favor of the national government,
province, city or municipality, no portion of any street,
passageway, waterway or open space so delineated on the plan
shall be enclosed or otherwise disposed of by the registered
owner without the approval of the Court of First Instance of the
province or city in which the land is situated,
A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one
or more, requiring new technical descriptions, shall file with the
Land Registration Commission, a consolidation plan on which
shall be shown the lots to be affected, as they were before, and
as they will appear after the consolidation. Upon the surrender
of the owner’s duplicate certificates and the receipt of
consolidation plan duty approved by the Commision, the
Register of Deeds concerned shall cancel the corresponding
certificates of title and issue a new one for the consolidated lots.
The Commission may not order or cause any change,
modification, or amendment in the contents of any certificate of
title, or of any decree or plan, including the technical
descriptions therein, covering any real property registered under
the Torrens system, nor order the cancellation of the said
certificate of title and the issuance of a new one which would
result in the enlargement of the area covered by the certificate of
title.
a Simple Subdivisions.
Section 50, PD 1529
b Complex Subdivisions
PD 957
REPUBLIC VS SAYO
191 SCRA 71
FACTS:
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an
original application for registration of a tract of land. The land was
formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but
had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act
No.236. The Government including the heirs of Liberato Bayaua
opposed such registration. An order of general default was thereafter
entered against the whole world except the oppositors. The case
dragged on for about twenty (20) years until a compromise
agreement was entered into by and among all the parties. Under the
compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as
applicants) renounced their claims and ceded portions of land in favor
of Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development, Heirs of Liberato
Bayaua, and Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc. Under the
compromise agreement, 5,500 hectares was adjudicated to and
acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of
this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their
counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. The
parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to
and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. On March 5, 1981,
the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its
terms. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that
decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and
rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not compromise agreement is a proper remedy in
confirming the title of the private respondents over a tract of land?
HELD:
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development
to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondent. It was
476
error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the
compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval.
It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the
Government; this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and
decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in
land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually
received by the Solicitor General."
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the
judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and
void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the
remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private
parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent
evidence their respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge
complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration
Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of
origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein,
receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering
judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant.
REPUBLIC VS CA
135 SCRA 156
FACTS:
In 1961, the CFI of Quezon rendered a decision, ordering the
registration of 885 hectares of public forestland in favor of the
Maxinos. The decision became final and executory so a decree of
registration and an OCT were issued. Eight (8) years after the
decision was rendered, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the
same CFI an amended petition to annul the decision, decree, and title
on the ground that they are void because the land in question was
still a part of the unclassified public forest. The Maxinos opposed the
petition. The CFI judge denied the petition and when appealed, the
same was dismissed on the ground that the order had allegedly long
become final and unappealable so the Government was estopped
thru the registration made by its agents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government was estopped in appealing the
registration order?
477
RULING:
No. The Government sufficiently proved that the parcel of land
involved in the present case is a part of a forestland, thus non-
registerable. As to the ruling of CA that the government was
estopped to appeal because the land was erroneously registered by
its own agency, the Court ruled otherwise basing on its decision in
Government of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of Pampanga, (50 Phil.
975, 980), where it held that the Government should not be estopped
by the mistakes or errors of its agents.
FACTS:
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12
parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion
later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Gomez et al –
her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property among them. After
notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject
lots in Gomez et al’s favor. The decision became final and executory
hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots
adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and
petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the 12 parcels of
land were formerly part of a titled land which was already granted by
homestead patent in 1929. Under the law, land already granted by
homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another
registration. The lower court granted Silverio’s recommendation.
Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration
Act) which provides that after judgment has become final and
executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the
Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of
registration and certificate of title. That once the judgment becomes
478
final and executory under Sec 30, the decree of registration must
issue as a matter of course.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to set aside the lower court’s initial ruling on
approving the adjudication even after it had become final and
executory.
HELD:
Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a
cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in
the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year
after the entry of the final decree of registration. The Supreme Court
has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the
Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one
(1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is
not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding
continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.
HENCE, the case may still be reopened and the decision set
aside when granted.
FACTS:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No.
56 of the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos,
then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On December
16, 1958, a petition for review was filed in the same proceeding
alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De
los Santos "through actual fraud, through deceit and through
intentional omission of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid
decision was rendered and a decree of registration obtained on
August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was stated further that a simulated Deed
of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent, Felix
L. Camaya, on October 26, 1958, covering the said lot. The prayer
was for the opening of the decree of registration, the cancellation of
the Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of
479
Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners, now
appellant Cayanan and others.
This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which
is on appeal. It was the view of the lower court: "Such being the case,
as admitted by the petitioners, even if the petition has been filed
within one (1) year after entry of final decree, the same cannot be
favorably acted upon for the reason that the questioned lot has
already been transferred to Felix L. Camaya in accordance with
section 38 of the Land Registration Act. While it is true that the
petition states that such transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not for
value and that Felix L. Camaya is not an innocent purchaser, this
question can be properly threshed out in an ordinary civil action and
not in a simple petition, like the one at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cadastral court who tried and issue a decree
of registration has the power to set aside said judgment and
readajudicate the land in favor of another?
HELD:
The case should not be filed in another CFI considering that
the cadastral court is also a court of first instance. It has been held
that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does
not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year
from entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is
not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed
has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing,
may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land
to another."
"In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from
the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act
496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the
decision and granted the said decree."
As a matter of fact, several decisions held that:
1 Santos v. Ichon,(1959): "It is true that under previous rulings of this
court, appellee could have moved for the reopening of the case in the
cadastral court so that he could be given an opportunity to prove his
right to the land in question and get a decree in his favor, since the
480
adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after
the entry of the final decree, and until then the court rendering the
decree may, after hearing, set aside the decision or decree and
adjudicate the land to another person."
2 Afalla v. Rosauro,: "As long as the final decree is not issued by the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with the
law, and the period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not
elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein
rendered continues to be under the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it."
481
b. Requirements
482
The Republic went to the Supreme Court on a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory
injunction. Before the Supreme Court could rule on the petition,
however, the parties entered anew into another compromise
agreement. The Republic, now represented by the Land Authority,
covenanted to satisfy on or before 31 August 1964 the balance of
P143,150.00 plus 6% per annum interest from 24 August 1962.
Respondents-landowners, for their part, agreed to renounce "any and
all further claims against the former which had been recognized and
ordered paid" by the lower court in its order of 26 April 1963 "in the
event (of) full payment of said compromise price . . . on or before said
date,"
The Republic failed again to pay its obligation in full, as per
agreement. Out of P143,150.00, it was able to pay, as of 31 August
1964, P85,260.65 on the principal and P17,010.98 on the interest, or
a total of P102,271.63 only. This precipitated the filing of
respondents-landowners' motion, dated 10 November 1964, in the
lower court praying for issuance of an order directing the Sheriff of
the City of Manila to enforce the writ of execution of 28 July
1962. nroblesvirtualaw
The Republic moved for reconsideration of the lower court's order
alleging, in addition to the two basic arguments previously raised in
its oposition to respondents-landowners' motion of 10 November
1964, that the garnishment of the funds of the Land Authority violates
Sections 14 and 21 10 of Republic Act No. 992, otherwise known as
the Revised Budget Act, because the money garnished was
appropriated by Congress "for the operation and maintenance of the
nineteen (19) Settlement Projects and twelve (12) Agencies under the
administration of . . . (the) Authority, pursuant to the provision of R. A.
3844, (and) to cover salaries of personnel, travelling, supplies and
materials and other administrative expenses," and are, therefore, not
funds for the payment of expropriated estates. This was opposed by
respondents-landowners who argued that Sections 14 and 21 of
Republic Act No. 992 "refer to voluntary expenditure and/or payment
by the government official charged with custody of such funds but are
not applicable to forcible seizure through garnishment pursuant to a
writ of execution," as in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibr
Hence, this present petition for certiorari and prohibition with
483
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
whether the lower court acted without or excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discreton in hearing the case.lnrob
HELD:
The first plea of herein petitioner, that the Court of First Instance of
Leyte lacked jurisdiction to act in the case because of Section 154 (3)
of the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), enacted on 8
August 1963, is plainly without merit. Said Section 154 (3) provides
that -
Expropriation proceedings instituted by the Land Tenure
administration pending in the Court of First Instance at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall be transferred and continued in the
respective Courts of Agrarian Relations whereby the Republic
undertook to pay the balance of the expropriation price with interest
on or before 31 August 1964. Whatever writ of execution could be
issued by the respondent judge must necessarily be predicated on
the second compromise, and conform to the terms
thereof.chanroblesvir
and that it is undeniable that the petitioner Republic had not made full
payment of P143,150.00, plus legal interest from 24 August 1962, on
or before 31 August 1964. Such default, however, only entitled
respondents to demand execution on the basis of the compromise
approved by this Court.chanroblesblesvirtual
The lower court was, therefore, already divested of its control over
the cause when the motion of 12 April 1963 was filed; it was already
shorn of its jurisdiction when its controversial order of 26 April 1963
was issued pursuant thereto, ordering payment of the original award
made in 14 June 1962. All that the lower court could do under the
circumstances was to enforce the amended decision of 24 August
1962. Instead of a motion for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court, the proper move for respondents-landowners would have been
to file a separate and independent civil action to set aside, by
annulment or rescission, both the first compromise agreement and
the amended decision embodying the same.chanroblesvirtualawl
libraryanroblesvirtualaw
484
The writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, and the
respondent Court of First Instance of Leyte restrained from further
proceeding in its Civil Case.The preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is made permanent. No costs. Let a copy of this opinion be
sent to the Honorable, the President of the Philippines, through the
Secretary of Justice.
Facts:
Respondent court confirmed the titles of La Urbana, Inc. over lots in
questions with reservations, and ordered the registration of these lots
in favor of the Benuvar.
A petition for reconstitution was made. At the pendency of the
reconstitution proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1
from Santiago de Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for
the latter. The petitioners opposed, on a claim that they have been in
actual, adverse, open and uninterrupted possession and occupation
of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial,
long before the second world war.
For "lack of proper notices," the respondent court denied the petition.
However, in its later order the court reconsidered and granted the
petition.
The petitioners interposed an appeal from this last order. Respondent
court dismissed the appeal "for failure to post the required bond," but
withheld action on the motion for immediate execution as to lot 1
"until after this order dismissing the appeal shall have become final."
The herein petitioners then filed a petition for mandamus with the
Court of Appeals, to compel the trial court to give due course to their
appeal. This petition was finally dismissed.
De Banuvar filed a motion for the issuance of a decree over lot 1. The
petitioners opposed and contended that the decision is not final and
485
executory because La Urbana, Inc. appears to have appealed from
the said decision by virtue of a notation the counsel received the
same "Con mi excepcion” making the execution of the said decision
impossible. De Banuvar asserted that the issuance of the decree is
but a ministerial duty of the respondent court.
Respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De
Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision in the
land registration case had already become final and executory.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision is not yet final and executory because
the La Urbana, Inc. appealed therefrom, as may be seen from the
notation of the reconstituted decision stating, "Recibi copia. Con mi
excepcion.”
Ruling:
This contention is without merit.
Supreme Court held that the decision of March 24, 1938 had long
become final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. The
certification of the acting provincial land officer of Masbate, dated
March 8, 1960, recites that no "appeal has been taken by the Director
of Lands or any private oppositors from the decision rendered." The
notation found at the foot of the last page of the reconstituted
decision, showing that the La Urbana, Inc. excepted from that
decision, did not have the effect of perfecting an appeal. An appeal
was not perfected by the mere notation, "Con mi exception." The
judgment rendered in a land registration case becomes final upon the
expiration of thirty days to be counted from the date on which the
party appealing receives notice of the decision.
The requirement contained in the decision of March 24, 1938
regarding the segregation of a portion of lot 1, subject of an
agreement between the Director of Lands and the applicant, while it
does leave something yet to be done, does not detract from the
finality of the decision, because the segregation adverted to refers to
a defined and delimited portion of the said parcel and may be
accomplished anytime after the decision became final and executory.
486
d. Effect of failure to appeal.
NIETO V. QUINES
6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)
FACTS:
Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the Bureau
Of Lands cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands in
the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land applied for
as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated as Lot No.
3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were completed,
cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the Director of Lands
in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying upon the
assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of Lands that they
would take care of his homestead in the cadastral proceedings,
Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein. However, one
Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots including Lot
No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on August 16, 1930,
rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino was awarded the lots
claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included in the award, apparently
because neither the Director of Lands nor any of his representatives
appeared during the bearing to inform the court that it was under
homestead application. On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of
the final decree of registration and the original certificate of title to
Maria Florentino, a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was
granted to Bartolome Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan, on September 15, 1930 issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 623 in his name. Six months thereafter, or on
March 12, 1931, the same Register Deeds issued Original Certificate
of Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots
487
awarded to her the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044. Floretino
sold the said land to Arturo Nieto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral
proceedings, prevails over the title of Quines, which is from
homestead. What is the effect of failure to appeal?
HELD:
The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail because a
cadastral proceeding is one in rem and any decision rendered therein
by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world, including
the Government. As a general rule, registration of title under the
cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the
passage of thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of
receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court
adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect
an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the
judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by
the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special
provision providing for fraud."
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the
land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to
appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court,
without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title
would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of
subsequent disposition the land where court proceedings would no
longer be necessary.
488
e. Execution pending appeal not allowed in registration
proceedings.
FACTS:
Alipio Alinsurin, later substituted by Parañaque Investment
and Development Corporation, sought to register under Act 496, a
parcel of land indisputably included within the area reserved for
military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No.237, dated
December 19, 1955. Applicant claimed that his predecessors
acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued
during the Spanish Regime on March 5, 1895. The application was
opposed by the Government. The lower court adjudicated (a) 2/3
portion of the land in favor of the corporation, subject to the rights of
one Ariosto Santos per a manifestation submitted in court, and (b) 1/3
portion to Roman Tamayo. Within the extended period, the
Government filed the corresponding record on appeal, copy of which
was duly served upon the corporation and Tamayo. Pending approval
of the Record on Appeal, and on motion of the corporation and
of Tamayo, the lower court directed the issuance of a registration
decree of the entire parcel applied for, 1/3 pro-indiviso in favor of
Tamayo, and 2/3 pro-indiviso in favour of the corporation, and
declared that as to Tamayo's share, the court's decision had become
final, but as to the share of the corporation, the registration shall be
subject to the final outcome of the appeal. Hence, the Government
instituted this Special Civil Action for certiorari and mandamus and
the Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
the lower court from issuing a writ of possession, the corporation
and Tamayo from exercising acts of ownership over the property, and
the register of deeds from accepting for registration documents on the
489
land until the government shall have filed a notice of lis pendens.
During the pendency of the appeal in the registration case, a certain
Honofre A.Andrada and others filed with the Court of First Instance a
complaint against the corporation and Tamayo for reconveyance of a
portion of the land in question. The trial court assumed jurisdiction
over, and decided, the case in favor of Andrada. Pursuant thereto, but
in violation of the Supreme Court's injunction (in L-27594), the
corporation executed a subdivision plan of the parcel subject of
the land registration, and the trial court ordered the Register of Deeds
to cancel the original certificate of title and to issue new titles to
Andrada, et al., "free from all liens and encumbrances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the execution pending appeal is applicable?
HELD:
The court held that:
1. NOTICE OF APPEAL; FAILURE TO SERVE APPELLEE WITH
NOTICE OFAPPEAL CANNOT IMPAIR RIGHT OF APPEAL, IF
APPELLEE WAS SERVED WITH COPYOF RECORD ON APPEAL.
— The failure of appellants to serve a copy of their notice of appeal to
the counsel for one of the several appellees is not fatal to the
appeal,where admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original,
as well as the amended record on appeal in both of which the notice
of appeal is embodied. Such failure cannot impair the right of appeal,
especially if the substantial rights of the adverse party is not impaired
and the appeal taken was from the entire decision which is not
severable.
2. LAND REGISTRATION; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL NOT
APPLICABLE INLAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. —
Execution pending appeal is not applicable in land registration
proceedings. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent
purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon
reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal.
3.LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE ISSUED BASED ON
JUDGMENT THAT ISNOT FINAL IS A NULLITY. — A Torrens Title
issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final, the judgment being
on appeal, is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the
Land Registration Act, which requires that a decree shall be issued
only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and
490
executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the register of
deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.
4. ISSUANCE OF TITLE DESPITE TIMELY APPEAL IS
ERRONEOUS.— The lower court acted without jurisdiction or
exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a
quo.
TALAVERA VS MANGOBA
8 SCRA 837, 1963
FACTS:
491
appeal brief, appellant contends that in denying the motion for new
trial, the court a quo deprive him of his day in court.
RULING:
492
iii. Failure to hire new counsel is not excusable.
ANTONIO VS RAMOS
2 SCRA 731, 1961
FACTS:
On January of 1953, Dominga Antonio et., al. filed for recovery
of a parcel of land against Jose, Leonora and Nicolas Francisco. Only
Francisco was able to answer, thus, declaring Nicolas and Leonora in
default. On the date of trial, neither Francisco not his counsel
appeared despite early notice. Hence, evidence was presented by
the plaintiff’s. On August 23, 1956 a judgment has been redndered in
favour of the Antonio’s. Francisco filed a motion for a new trial on
493
September of 1956, praying that the decision dated August 23 of
1956 be set aside, alleging that their failure to appear during the
hearing of the case was due to accident, mistake and excusable
negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against(Counsel lost the envelope containing the notice to the trial
before he has the opportunity to open the same). This, however, was
denied by the court. Francisco appealed to the CA, denied. Appealed
to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of counsel constitute an excusable
mistake and negligence, so as to entitle his client, the appellant
herein, to be heard.
RULING:
The allegation of counsel that he forgot to note the notice of
hearing in his calendar is flimsy. It does not constitute the accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, contemplated by the Rules of
Court. The exercise of ordinary prudence on his part could have
guarded against or avoided such mistake or negligence. Counsel did
not exercise ordinary prudence because he did not perform his
routine job or duty of noting down the notice of hearing in his
calendar. On this point, the learned trial judge commented:
Considering the motion for new trial and the opposition thereto,
the court believes the negligence of the counsel is not excusable in
view of his admission that he received the registry notice from the
court on May 24, 1956, and that it was duly registered and that its
envelope shows it came from the court which made the envelope and
its contents so important that he should have immediately opened the
same and not just put it aside, that he misplaced the same is also
indicative of his recklessness (See Gonzales vs. Amon, L-8963, Feb.
29, 1956). Furthermore counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco
had all the time from March 24, 1956, until the date of the trial on
Aug. 20, 1956 to inquire from the Court records or Clerk of Court
about the nature of the registered notice that was sent to him on
March 24, 1956, if he really misplaced the same. This is what a
diligent counsel should do as required by ordinary prudence. All he
had to do was examine the records of this case. This Court noted that
since it reconvened June 18, 1956, counsel for the defendant Nicolas
Francisco has been appearing in Court almost every week if not
494
everyday. He had therefore, ample opportunity to verify the nature of
the said registered notice of hearing which he allegedly misplaced
upon his receipt thereof on March 24, 1956. Little need be added to
these observations of the trial court, except to state that lawyers
should always be vigilant and alert, in order to properly safeguard the
rights and interests of their clients. Upon the lawyers specially
devolve the duty to evaluate the urgency and importance of
registered letters coming from the courts where they daily ply their
trade.
FACTS:
In the early dawn of March 19, 1990, Cesar Soliven was
standing at the corner of the McArthur Highway and Felomina St. in
Aguilar, Pangasinan waiting for a ride back to his residence in
Barangay Pagomboa after spending the night around the poblacion
during the eve of the town's fiesta (pp. 3-4, tsn, May 9, 1991). While
standing at the aforementioned place, a man smelling of liquor, who
was identified later on as Eduardo dela Cruz (appellant herein), stood
495
beside him. Subsequently, Merly Caburnay, a neighbor of Soliven,
passed by, proceeding towards the direction of Barangay Pogomboa.
Appellant, who appeared drunk followed the girl but Soliven did not
mind. Instead, he went home.
Early the following morning, Soliven, while in his house, heard
the cry of Carmelita Caburnay, mother of his neighbor, Merly. When
he went out of the house, he learned that Merly was raped and her
dead body was found in a nearby ricefield (pp. 5-6, tsn, id.). Prior to
Soliven's knowledge of the happening, Mayor Domingo Madrid of
Aguilar was already informed of the discovery of the dead body of the
victim and was able to proceed immediately to the crime site. There,
the Mayor was informed that a man walking suspiciously has [sic] just
left the place. So, Mayor Madrid lost no time, took a tricycle and
overtook the man. The man was identified as appellant and he was
found with dirty clothes, his maong pants torn and his T-shirt stained
with blood. He also bore scratches on his neck and arms. When
asked to explain his dirty appearance and the presence of dried
straws of palay at the back of his pants, appellant only answered that
on his was home, he felt sleepy and lied down for a while on the field.
Because of his unsatisfactory explanation, the police arrested him on
that same morning on suspicion that he was the perpetrator of the
crime. (pp. 4-8, tsn, March 14, 1991).
Four days later, Cesar Soliven was invited to the police
headquarters for the purpose of identifying the man he saw in the
early dawn of March 19, 1990 following the victim Merly Caburnay.
Standing in front of the prison cell, Soliven pointed to appellant, who
was among the four men inside the cell, as the person he saw. The
victim, Merly Caburnay, was at the time of the crime only ten years
old while the accused was forty-eight years old. In his defense, the
accused asserted that on 18 March 1990 he was invited by one
Andoy Versoza, his landlord, to cook and prepare food for the latter's
visitors. At around 6:00 p.m. of the said date, he, together with his two
aunts, went around the plaza and watched some shows until
midnight. Thereafter, he drank a bottle of gin and another bottle of
beer until 1:00 a.m. of the following day. They then strolled about the
plaza for two hours. Afterwards, they rested for awhile near the
highway beside the church and at about 5:00 a.m., they attended
mass. When he was advised by his aunts to go home, he decided to
walk because he had no more money. Along the way, he was
arrested by the police for raping and killing Merly Caburnay. He
496
vehemently denied having committed the crime. He likewise claimed
that there were no rice stalks at the back of his pants when he was
arrested.
Although the prosecution did not present any eyewitness, the
trial court found the circumstantial evidence as sufficient for
conviction. Moreover, the defense has not shown any improper or
ulterior motive on the part of Soliven for testifying against the
accused. It is settled that where there is no evidence, and nothing to
indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
any improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated
and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit. Nor is the
non-presentation of the victim's companions of any help to the cause
of the accused. In the first place, it was never established that the two
companions were with the victim when she was on her way home or
when she was raped and killed. It was duly established that, after
obtaining permission from her mother, she went "to the fiesta in
Aguilar" with her cousin and her mother's sister-in-law, and that
immediately before the incident the victim was walking alone but "was
following persons." Accordingly, her two companions, who were not
eyewitnesses, could not have testified on the rape and killing of the
victim. In any event, the prosecution has the prerogative to determine
who should be presented as witnesses on the bases of its own
assessment of their necessity. Every objection to the admissibility of
evidence shall be made at the time such evidence is offered, or as
soon thereafter as the ground for objection shall become apparent,
otherwise the objection shall be considered waived. Moreover, the
bloodstains on the pants of the accused were testified to by Dr. Wilma
Flores-Peralta 28 and Mayor Domingo Madrid. Finally, the presence of
scratches on his neck and arms was not satisfactorily explained by
the accused. Taken together with the other circumstances present
here, this fact serves to buttress the prosecution's case.
ISSUES:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;(b) The facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and(c) The combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD:
It is settled that for alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and
497
place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time
the same was committed. 31 In this case, the place where the
accused claims to be 32 is more or less ten meters away from the
scene of the crime )a ricefield in Barangay
33
Pogomboa). Furthermore, the place where he was questioned by
Mayor Madrid of Aguilar and apprehended by the police authorities is
twenty meters away from the place where the naked body of the
victim was found. 34 Hence, the physical impossibility of the accused's
presence at the crime scene, which is necessary is order that the
defense of alibi may be considered, is lacking.
The accused committed a heinous crime. He was not content with
unleashing his bestial lust upon the tender and frail body of a 10-
year-old; he also brutally inflicted upon her severe injuries which
caused her untimely demise. Another life was lost because a beast in
man's clothing was on the loose. He must pay for what he did in
prison, a place which, unfortunately, is definitely much better than
what he truly deserves.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged
decision of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. L-4227 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against the accused-appellant Eduardo dela Cruz y
Laoang.
GARCIA VS MENDOZA
203 SCRA 732 (1991)
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her
husband, Cirilo Mendoza, had purchased Lot No. 32080 located in
498
San Carlos City, Pangasinan on April 24, 1938. They subsequently
sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petitioners Sps. Dulcesimo
Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario, who then took
possession of said lot. On February 23, 1988, the cadastral court
issued a decision adjudicating Lot No. 32080 in favor of Dominador
G. Mendoza, their son.
Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza falsely
claimed that his father, Cirilo Mendoza, inherited the property from
Hermenegildo Mendoza; that Mendoza made it appear that Lot 32080
was an exclusive property of Cirilo Mendoza, who had been in
possession of the lot since October 15, 1987, and subsequently,
donated the same to his son, Mendoza. The petitioners filed with the
court a petition for review of judgment but denied, so they appealed.
Mendoza countered that a petition for relief from judgment under Sec.
38, Act No. 496, does not apply to a cadastral proceeding.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the remedy of petition for review of judgment
exists or is warranted by Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act).
HELD:
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners. Sec. 11, Act
2259 clearly states that except as otherwise provided by the
Cadastral Act, all the provision of the Land Registration Act are
applicable to cadastral proceedings as well as to the decree and
certificates of title granted and issued under the Cadastral Act.
RUBLICO VS ORELLANO
30 SCRA 511 (1969)
FACTS:
Fausto Orellana, filed his answer in Cadastral Case No. IL-N-2,
L.R.C. Record No. N-211 for Lots Nos. 1664 and 1665, with the Court
of First Instance of Lanao, claiming ownership and praying that the
said lots be adjudged and decreed in his favor. On 20 November
1964, the court a quo approved the report and recommendation of
the clerk of court and rendered judgment adjudicating Lots 1664 and
499
1665 in favor of respondent-appellee Orellana. Petitioners-appellants
filed a petition to annul the judgment and/or review the decree of
registration, alleging ownership of the lots adjudicated to the
respondent; that respondent, "by means of fraud, made the court to
believe that he is the owner" and that said judgment "was secured by
means of fraud". Orellana filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The
court, on 23 September 1965, sustained the motion, holding that
petitioners-appellants had no personality to file their petition because
they did not file an answer and were declared in default and that they
should have first secured the lifting of the order of general default,
with respect to themselves, before they filed their petition for review.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not a petitioner for review under Section 38 of Act
496 need not be an original claimant in a cadastral proceeding and
need not secure the lifting of the order of general default with respect
to himself
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that a petitioner for review under
Section 38 of Act 496, as amended, need not be an original claimant
in a cadastral proceeding and need not secure the lifting of the order
of general default with respect to himself. The aim of the law in giving
aggrieved parties, victimized by registration proceedings of their
estate in land by means of fraud, the opportunity to review the decree
would be defeated if such parties would be limited to those who had
filed their opposition to the petition for registration or to first require
them to procure the lifting of the order of general default before they
could file a petition for review. The essential requisites or elements for
the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: (a) that the
petitioner has a real or dominical right; (b) that he has been deprived
thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within one year
from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as
yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. The provision does not
require that the petitioner be an original claimant who had filed an
answer and because fraud might intervene precisely to prevent a
person from filing an answer.
500
iii. Those entitled to a review of the decree are those who
were deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original
registration case.
CRISOLO vs. CA
68 SCRA 435 (1975)
FACTS:
On August 20, 1965, judgment was rendered by the Court of
First Instance, Branch VII, of Pangasinan, ordering the registration of
Lots 1 and 2, situated in the Poblacion of Mabini, Pangasinan, and
more particularly bounded and described in the technical descriptions
(Exhibits B and B-1) in the name of applicant spouses, Pedro C.
Crisolo and Soledad de G. Crisolo. On September 20, 1965, the court
ordered the issuance of the Decree, followed three months later by
writ of possession in favor of the spouses. Within a year from the
501
issuance of this decree of registration, respondent-ward, represented
by his guardian, filed a petition for review of the decree under Section
38 of Act 496 on the ground of fraud which allegedly consisted in
petitioner’s taking advantage of the insanity of respondent-ward to
secure the execution of a deed of exchange of properties by and
between the petitioner and said respondent-ward, and in petitioner’s
instituting the land registration proceedings while said ward was
confined at the National Psychopathic Hospital. The trial court
dismissed the petition and held that Section 38 of Act 496 was not
applicable because respondent had opportunity to oppose the
registration proceedings but abandoned his opposition.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and when
petitioner moved to have the appeal certified to the Supreme Court
because it involved purely questions of law, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion and instead sustained the allegation of fraud. It
rendered a decision reversing that of the trial court and remanding
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the re-opening
of the land registration proceedings.
RULING:
NO. Respondents are not entitled to the remedy under Section
38 of Act 496 because respondent-ward was given opportunity to
oppose the registration but abandoned his opposition. Under Section
38 of Act 496, the persons entitled to a review of the decree of
registration are those who were fraudulently deprived of their
opportunity to be heard in the original registration case and not those
who were not denied for their day in court by fraud, which the law
provides as the sole ground for reopening the decree of registration.
Thus, where an oppositor, through counsel, announced his opposition
to the registration of the land involved but later abandoned the same,
he cannot claim that he was fraudulently deprived of his day in court
to entitle him of the remedy under Section 38 of Act 496; and a
petition for review of a decree of registration will be denied where the
petitioner had notice of the original proceeding but failed to
substantiate his claim.
502
iv. A homestead applicant may avail of the remedy.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
In Nieto vs. Quines, the Court affirmed the doctrine in these words:
It is the Court’s view that the petitioners have amply alleged below
such real, legally protected interest over the parcels in question
sufficient to clothe them with the necessary personality to question,
independently of the Director of Lands, the validity of the grant of title
over the said properties to the private respondents.
504
v. A person who does not claim the land to be his private
property but admits that such land is public cannot avail of the
remedy.
BONIEL VS REYES
35 SCRA 218 (1970)
FACTS:
Petitioners therein alleged to be the bona fide actual occupants
and cultivators of a 46.2877-hectare parcel of public agricultural land
designated as Lot No. SI-17618-D and located at Bo. Langka, Lupon,
Davao province, and that on October 12, 1965, one Ramon Ombay,
late husband of co-petitioner Mauricia Ombay had filed a free patent
application for the land; that sometime on September 11, 1964, one
Rafael S. Yap had clandestinely filed a sales application for the very
same parcel of land, which was favorably by the land inspector of the
Bureau of Lands who certified in the records the findings of his
investigation as to the absence of any claimants of the land; and that
as a result of such alleged fraud and collusion between Yap and the
bureau personnel, Yap was issued, the sales patent in December,
1965 and the corresponding original certificate of title No. P-18131 on
February 11, 1966. Petitioners prayed of respondent court that it
annul Yap's title and instead award the land to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court validly dismissed the petition.
RULING:
A person claiming to have been deprived of the land or an
interest therein, in which case within one year from entry of the
decree he may in the same proceeding ask for review and the
issuance of the decree in his own name and implead the adverse
party. But here, the land is not claimed to be private property of
petitioner nor of his co-petitioners but was admittedly formerly a part
of the alienable and disposable public land awarded under sales
patent to Yap. Accordingly, since petitioner and his co-petitioners
make no claim of their application for a free patent to the land having
been approved nor a patent their favor having been awarded, they
505
had no valid cause of action to file an action for annulment of Yap's
patent and for cancellation of the title issued to Yap by virtue thereof.
Their claim based on alleged fraudulent issuance of title to the public
land in favor of Yap should be addressed in proper administrative
proceedings to the Director of Lands, who if he finds the claim
substantiated, may then take the necessary steps towards the
reversion of the land, to the public domain, and petitioners may then
press for favorable action on their application and the award of the
land to the tenant. The mere reversion of the land to the State would
not entitle them of itself to an award of the land to them, which is
beyond respondent court's jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition for
certiorari is hereby denied.
b. Where to file.
BALDOZ VS PAPA
14 SCRA 691 (1965)
FACTS:
On January 7, 1957, the spouses Bruno Papa and Valentina
Agaceta, parents of herein appellees, applied for the registration
under Act 496 of a parcel of land (Psu-59688) containing an area of
37,671 sq. meters in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Case
No. 2215, L.R.C. Record No. 12389). After the requisite publication of
the application in the Official Gazette, the case was called for hearing
on May 16, 1957 in the course of which an order of general default
was entered. On the same date, however, Baldomero Baldoz father
of herein appellant, filed a petition to lift the order of default as against
him and praying that his opposition to the application, thereto
attached, be admitted. Prior to October 1, 1958. oppositor Baldoz
died. On October 10, 1958, the latter's counsel filed a motion to set
aside the order of default alleging that the reason for the
nonappearance of oppositor Baldoz was his death on July 28, 1957
and praying that his son, appellant herein, be substituted as party-
oppositor. Although this motion was denied on October 31 of the
following year, appellant appears not to have appealed from the order
of denial aforesaid. On February 16, 1959, the court rendered
judgment decreeing the registration of the parcel of land described in
Psu 59688 in favor of appellees.
506
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court in said case committed a reversible
error in declaring oppositor Baldoz in default despite his having filed a
written opposition which was duly admitted by it and that its order
denying appellant's motion for substitution as oppositor therein has
deprived him of his day in court.
RULING:
The court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the
grounds (1) that the final judgment in Registration Case No. 2215 is
res judicata in the present action and (2) that the instant action, being
in the nature of a petition for review of a decree, cannot prosper
because it was filed more than one year from the date of the issuance
of the decree and because it is not based on fraud as provided for in
Section 38 of Act 496. The present is an appeal from said order.
FACTS:
Cacao Dianson, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner, filed
for Free-patent application for Lot 1 and Lot 2 of Psu-15365. Josefa
Mapa, predecessor-in-interest of respondent, filed for miscellaneous
sales application. The lot was awarded to Josefa in 1934. In 1956,
Cacao filed a letter protesting the construction of Josefa of a camarin
in “Portion A” of Lot 1 of Psu-153657. Mapa countered claiming that
such area was awarded to her in public bidding. Bureau of Lands
Investigator then investigated and found that Cacao sold the land to a
certain Agripino Farol. Agripino Farol also transferred the rights and
interests to herein petitioner Walstrom. The regional land director
rendered a decision in favor of Mapa, excluding Portion A from Lot 1
of Psu-153657. The Director of Lands reversed the decision. Mapa
appealed with DANR but the appeal was dismissed. Upon
reconsideration, however, the DANR Secretary reinstated the order of
the regional land director. Wastrom filed for reconsideration but was
denied for being filed out of time. Subsequent motions for
reconsideration were also denied and the writ of execution in favor of
507
Mapa was granted. Original Title issued in the name of Mapa
pursuant to miscellaneous sales patent was issued in 1971. In 1972,
Wastrom filed with CFI Baguio-Benguet for judicial relief as the
prescriptive period is about to lapse but such petition was denied on
the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the case may be reopened by the RTC?
RULING:
No. a decree of registration may be reopened or reviewed by
the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five essential
requisites, to wit:
(a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right;
(b) that he has been deprived thereof;
(c) through fraud;
(d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the
decree; and
(e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent
purchaser for value
The first element is patently not present because the petitioner can
not allege that she has already a real and dominical right to the piece
of property in controversy. The second element is also absent since
corollary to the aforecited ruling of the DANR Secretary, the petitioner
can not aver that she was deprived of property because she did not
have a real right over portion "A". The third element, the records are
bereft of any indication that there was fraud in the issuance of the
certificates of title.
FACTS:
Teodorico Cabascas, the late father of respondent Alejandro
Cabasbas, owns a parcel of land as evidenced by OCT no. 815.
Petitioners allege that the controversy arose from Civil Case No.
4870 filed by Alejandro to recover the lot of his father against Jose A.
de Kastro and Estanislawa de Kastro, spouses Lutgardo Reyes and
Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus. Pursuant to a compromise
agreement entered into by the parties, the spouses Lutgardo Reyes
and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus were declared to be the
registered owners of the western portion of the land originally owned
by the late Teodorico Cabasbas as per Original Certificate of Title No.
615, the land subject of the petition.
Subsequent transfers were then made until the petitioners
acquired ownership of the land subject of the petition. In 1968,
Alejandro filed another complaint praying for the nullification of the
compromise agreement with the allegation that it was obtained
through fraud as it was made to appear before the court of first
instance that the conveyance of title was made on February, 1946
when in fact it took place on September 14, 1944, in violation of the
Homestead Law. Alleging res judicata, petitioners prayed for the
dismissal of the case. However, Judge Ruiz refused to dismiss the
case asserting that the sale of a parcel of land was made on
September 14, 1944 in violation of the five-year period within which a
transfer of a homestead patent is prohibited.
ISSUE:
Whether there was an actual or extrinsic fraud rendering the
judgment null?
RULING:
No. Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be
extrinsic to the litigation. Was this not the rule there would be no end
to litigations, perjury being of such common occurrence in trials. In
fact, under the opposite rule, the losing party could attack the
judgment at any time by attributing imaginary falsehood to his
adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that judicial determination
509
however erroneous of matters brought within the court's jurisdiction
cannot be invalidated in another proceeding. It is the business of a
party to meet and repel his opponent's perjured evidence. Not every
kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment.
Only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a
ground for annulling a judgment.
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful
party in a litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses,
whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and
fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to
acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged
instruments on perjured testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination
of the case.
RAMIREZ VS CA
144 SCRA 292 (1986)
FACTS:
510
certiorari.
RULING:
511
e. A petition for reopening of the decree of registration is
different from an action for reconveyance.
FACTS:
In October 1997, filed before the RTC separate Complaints for
Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with
Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against
respondents. Petitioners claimed in their Complaints that they had
been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the subject
properties for more than 90 years until they were forcibly ousted by
armed men hired by respondents in 1991 and that the subject
properties from which they were forcibly evicted were not covered by
512
respondents’ certificates of title. Respondents moved for the
dismissal of the eight Complaints on the grounds of (1) prescription;
(2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action; and (4) res judicata.
The RTC dismissed the complaints of petitioners. The trial court
determined that the subject properties were already registered in the
names of respondents, and that petitioners were unable to prove by
clear and convincing evidence their title to the said properties. The
Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC
Resolutions. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the
Court of Appeals denied. Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the actions instituted by petitioners before the RTC
were for the reopening and review of the decree of registration and
reconveyance of the subject properties.
RULING:
Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a
decree of registration may be reopened when a person is deprived of
land or an interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation
obtained by actual fraud. On the other hand, an action for
reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible
but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in other persons’ names, to its rightful and
legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right. In both
instances, the land of which a person was deprived should be the
same land which was fraudulently or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, which is not the case herein, if the Court
considers the allegations in petitioners’ Complaints.
While petitioners improperly prayed for the cancellation of
respondents’ TCTs in their Complaints, there is nothing else in the
said Complaints that would support the conclusion that they are either
petitions for reopening and review of the decree of registration under
Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree or actions for
reconveyance based on implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil
Code. Instead, petitioners’ Complaints may be said to be in the
nature of an accion reivindicatoria, an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of the subject properties, from which they
were evicted sometime between 1991 and 1994 by respondents. IN
513
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
FACTS:
NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III,
its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition
of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas
purportedly applied for the lots in his name to the Bureau of Lands.
While the application for approval in the Bureau of Lands is pending,
Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco. Director of Lands released
an Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to
514
Tanjuatco on 1996, wherefore TCT’s were then issued in the name of
Tanjuatco. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of
Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages. Tanjuatco argued
that the complaint stated no cause of action against him because it
was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He
averred further that the complaint did not charge him with knowledge
of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s
complaint for reconveyance.
RULING:
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioner’s complaint for
reconveyance. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to
transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and
legal owner. In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer
of the property, specifically the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its
rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. To warrant a
reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming
ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of
the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name of the
defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal means; (3)
the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for
value; and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had
already become final and incontrovertible but within four years from
the discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an
implied trust. Petitioner failed to show the presence of these
requisites.
FACTS:
515
On 4 June 1992, Gabriel Drilon, husband of respondent
Eustaquia Drilon, applied for the issuance of titles by Free Patent
over the properties. On 8 October 1993, spouses Drilon sold the
properties to respondent spouses Alfredo and Fredeswenda Ybiosa
(spouses Ybiosa). Sometime in 1996, Eustaquia Drilon and spouses
Ybiosa demanded that petitioners vacate Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660.
This prompted petitioners to file, on 23 January 1997, an action for
reconveyance and declaration of nullity of the sale of Lot No. 3658
and Lot No. 3660.
Petitioners alleged that spouses Ybiosa were in bad faith when
they bought the properties as they were fully aware that petitioners
were actually and continuously occupying, cultivating and claiming
portions of the properties. The petition for reconveyance was
dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Petitioners, although occupants of the properties, have
no legal personality to assail the patents issued to Gabriel Drilon
as well as the sale of the properties to spouses Ybiosa.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners may question the validity of the sale and
ask for reconveyance of the properties.
RULING:
In Caro v. Sucaldito, the Court held that an applicant for a free
patent cannot be considered a party-in-interest with personality to file
an action for reconveyance. Citing Spouses Tankiko v. Cezar, the
Court stated:
Only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land.
Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for
sales patents thereon, respondents have no personality to file the
suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such
suit.
Since petitioners failed to show proof that they have title to the
properties, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that
petitioners have no legal personality to file a case for reconveyance
of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660.
516
i.Action for reversion of public lands fraudulently awarded
must be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of
Republic of the Philippines.
Daclag v Macahilig
G.R. No. 159578 July 28, 2008
FACTS:
517
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and
Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and Eusebio
Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in which she
confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and
conformed to the manner of partition and adjudication made therein.
Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag
(petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale, an OCT was issued in
the name of Daclag by virtue of her free patent
application.Respondents filed with the RTC for reconveyance. The
RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents. The CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
RULING:
518
d. Reconveyance does not aim to reopen the proceedings but only
to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the
rightful owner.
BAUTISTA-BORJA v BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 136197 December 10, 2008
FACTS:
By petitioner’s claim, respondents, through fraud and
deception, convinced her to take possession and cultivate parcels of
land which would eventually be partitioned; and that unknown to her,
however, the titles to the lands were cancelled by virtue of Deeds of
Sale purportedly executed on different dates by her parents in favor
of her siblings Simplicio and Francisco, a fact which she came to
know about only in 1994. Petitioner thus filed a complaint before the
RTC for Annulment of the Deeds of Sale and/or Partition of
Properties. The trial court held that petitioner’s cause of action had
prescribed as actions for reconveyance based on implied
trust prescribe in 10 years, and that laches had set in. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner can still file an action for reconveyance
RULING:
Yes, the petitioner can. If the trial court finds that the deed of
sale is void, then the action for the declaration of the contract’s nullity
is imprescriptible. Indeed, the Court has held in a number of cases
that an action for reconveyance of property based on a void contract
does not prescribe. However, if the trial court finds that the deed of
sale is merely voidable, then the action would have already
prescribed.” At all events, since the complaint on its face does not
indicate that the action has prescribed, an allegation of prescription
can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the
complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already
prescribed. Otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving
evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and
cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss.
519
e. When brought.
FACTS:
NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III,
its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition
of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas
purportedly applied for the lots in his name to the Bureau of Lands.
While the application for approval in the Bureau of Lands is pending,
Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco. Director of Lands released
an Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to
Tanjuatco on 1996, wherefore TCT’s were then issued in the name of
Tanjuatco. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of
Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages. Tanjuatco argued
that the complaint stated no cause of action against him because it
was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He
averred further that the complaint did not charge him with knowledge
of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s
complaint for reconveyance.
RULING:
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioner’s complaint for
reconveyance. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to
transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and
legal owner. In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer
of the property, specifically the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its
rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. To warrant a
reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming
ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of
the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name of the
defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal means; (3)
520
the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for
value; and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had
already become final and incontrovertible but within four years from
the discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an
implied trust. Petitioner failed to show the presence of these
requisites.
FACTS:
Private respondent Norma Leuenberger, inherited the whole of
Lot No. 140 from her grandmother. In 1952, she donated a portion of
Lot No. 140, about 3 ha., to the municipality for the purpose of high
school and had 4 ha. converted into a subdivision. However, in 1963,
she discovered that more or less 4 ha. of the parcel of land, was used
by petitioner, as a cemetery from 1934. On 1963, respondent wrote
the Mayor of the municipality regarding her discovery, demanding
payment of past rentals and requesting delivery of the area allegedly
illegally occupied by petitioner. On 1964, respondent filed a complaint
in the CFI for recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied
by the municipal cemetery. However, the petitioner defended its
alleged ownership of the subject lot, having bought it from Simeona
Ditching in 1934. The lower court decided in favor of the Municipality.
ISSUE:
RULING:
521
Deed of Sale to prove its purchase of the land in question which is
included in the TCT in the name of private respondent Norma
Leuenberger. Thus, it has been held that where the land is decreed in
the name of a person through fraud or mistake, such person is by
operation of law considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the persons from whom the property comes. The
beneficiary shag has the right to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the
irrevocability of the Torrens title and the trustee and his successors-
in-interest are bound to execute the deed of reconveyance.
RODRIGUEZ vs TORENA
79 SCRA 356 (1987)
FACTS:
Valentina Quiñones,the predecessor-in-interest of respondents,
owned a parcel of land in Davao City with an area of 39,043 square
meters which is designated as Lot No. 2017. The land was brought
for registration before a cadastral court in 1922 and a certificate of
title was issued on August 7, 1950. After its issuance,the certificate of
title was delivered to the petitioner by Atty. Suazo, the respondents’
counsel in the cadastral case. On July 9, 1958, the respondents filed
with the Court of First Instance of Davao, a complaint for ejectment
and damages against the petitioner, alleging that they are pro-indiviso
registered owners of the land and that the petitioner illegally,
maliciously, and by means of force and intimidation, entered the land
in question and occupied approximately 27,500 square meters
thereof.The petitioner claimed that the heirs of Valentina Quiñones
had already sold their rights over the land as early as 1941 and 1950
either through themselves or their successors in interest, thus making
him the rightful and legal owner of approximately 27,899 square
meters thereof; that he had been in the peaceful, continuous and
public possession of the same; that there was no lien, encumbrance
or adverse claim annotated on the certificate of title so that the series
of sales made in his favor, although not registered and annotated
522
thereon, are valid and binding between the parties, the said land not
having passed to a third person.
ISSUE:
Whether the existence of a decree of registration is a bar to an
action filed after one year from the issuance of the decree to compel
reconveyance of the property in question.
HELD:
A landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously
registered under the Torrens system is not barred from bringing an
action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the
reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not
aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside
the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who
secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real
owner thereof.
ESCONDE vs BORLONGAY
152 SCRA 603 (1987)
FACTS:
523
Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyanceagainstDelfin which was
rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground that (1) the
cause of action, if any, is barred by re judicata (2) the complaint fails
to state sufficient cause or causes of action for reconveyance and (3)
the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the case.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder to motion to dismiss and motion
for leave of court. The sheriff then, upon the courts order, delivered
possession to Delfin however he was barred in entering the premises.
Delfin filed a motion for an Alias writ of possession which was
granted. The sheriff turned over the possession to the representative
of Delfin, however, when the latter went to the premises he was again
barred by the petitioner. Then, Delfine asked for demolition and he
moved for a second alias writ of possession which was again,
granted. Subsequently, the writ of reconveyance filed by the petitioner
was dismissed. After which motions and motions have been filed. The
second resolve the issue, a temporary restraining order directing the
sheriff and Delfin to refrain from enforcing and/or carrying out the
third alias writ of possession. Petitioner then filed motion to amend
the resolution and TRO, either nullifying third alias writ of possession
served orto issue a mandatory injunction which was denied by the
said court.
RULING:
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy
granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. The
prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose
property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens
System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of
the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an
action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding
and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the
person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not
the real owner thereof. An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does
not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as
524
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or
reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner.
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that
reconveyance is not the proper remedy. There was no proof of
irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident
thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the
issuance of said title, and the period of one year within which intrinsic
fraud could be claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions,
the Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered
owner that: "Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows
the law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an
equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no
enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the
disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy." An action
for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed
within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery
is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original
certificate of title.
DACLAG V MACAHILIG
G.R. NO. 159578 JULY 28, 2008
FACTS:
525
RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents. The CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
RULING:
RULING:
The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate
of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually
an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe.
[37]
Moreover, a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by
operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real
owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the
prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey
the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription
does not commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for
reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit
for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
j. Form of pleading.
527
CABRERA vs CA
163 SCRA 214 (1988)
FACTS:
RULING:
528
An action for reconveyance may be filed even before the
issuance of the decree of registration. There is no reason, indeed,
why one has to wait until the land is actually registered before he can
sue for reconveyance. The private respondents filed their complaint
because they were unwilling to recognize the registration proceedings
for lack of compliance with the notification requirements. They did not
have to await its termination. As it happened, providentially, the
registration was granted during the trial of the plaintiffs' complaint for
recovery of the property. Hence, their pending action could
conveniently and properly be deemed an action for reconveyance,
filed within the one-year reglementary period prescribed by the Land
Registration Act. And there were valid grounds. The private
respondents were able to establish that the transfer of the land had
been made under fraudulent circumstances to their detriment as the
hereditary owners of the property. They also submitted that they had
not received notice of the registration proceedings and that no notice
thereof had been posted on the subject land as required by law.
These grounds were not controverted at the trial.
i. Fraud.
ESCONDE vs BORLONGAY
152 SCRA 603 (1987)
FACTS:
A parcel of land with an area of 2,273 sq. m was registered
under the name of private respondent Ramon V. Delfin.On February
13, 1978 private respondent filed his "Petition for Writ of Possession"
against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde .On March 29,
1983, the Sheriff turned over possession of the premises to the
representative of the private respondent. However, when private
529
respondent went to the premises, he was barred by the petitioner
from entering the property. Consequently, private respondent asked
for a writ of demolition for the removal of any construction of the
Esconde family on the premises and to cite petitioner Basilisa
Esconde for contempt of court.On November 17, 1983, private
respondent moved for a second alias writ of possession in view of the
failure of the petitioner to turn over possession of the premises to
private respondent. Petitioner then filed at Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan a Motion to Quash and/or to Hold in Abeyance Execution of
Second Alias Writ of Possession on the ground that they have filed a
civil action for reconveyance. Respondent Judge dismissed the
complaint for reconveyance because plaintiff's cause of action is
barred by res judicata.
HELD:
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy
granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another, for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. A
landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered
under the Torrens System is not barred from bringing an action, after
one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the
property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-
open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
registration, but only to show that the person who secured the
registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.In
the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper
remedy because there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of
title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established
that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the
period of one year within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had
long expired.
530
HUANG vs CA
G.R. No. 198525, 13 September 1994
FACTS:
In 1965 Dolores Sandoval purchased two adjacent lots in
Makati, but being advised by her sister-in-law Milagros that it is not
possible to acquire two lots in only one name, she registered the
other lot in the name of her brother Ricardo. Then Dolores
constructed her house in the lot she bought, thereafter her brother
also asked permission if he could construct a house on the lot
registered under his name, to which Dolores agreed to. Ricardo was
also given permission to mortgage said lot in order to secure a loan
from SSS, and to be used on his construction of his house. In March
1968, Dolores was able to obtain a deed of absolute sale with
assumption of mortgage over the property with the Huangs. In 1980,
Dolores sought the help of the barangay to compel the spouses
Ricardo and Milagros to execute the necessary request to the SSS
for the approval of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, as
well as for the release in her favor of the owner's duplicate certificate
of title in its possession so that the deed could be duly annotated on
the title and/or a new certificate of title issued in her name. But no
amicable settlement was reached. But on that same year, spouses
Ricardo and Milagros also filed a complaint against spouses Dolores
and Aniceto for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale and
quieting of title.
The trial court consolidating the cases, ruled in favor of the
Sandovals. It was shown that Dolores was the one who bought both
the lots, and even paid for the construction of a swimming pool and
fencing of the subject lots. The petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals who also affirmed the lower courts decision.Hence, the
petition.
531
RULING:
The Supreme Court noted that it was not possible for Ricardo
to have bought or constructed such improvements on the disputed lot
on his earnings alone, as it was shown to be substantially insufficient.
The Court agreed with the lower courts findings that it was Dolores
who bought said lots and made improvements on it. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court was not impressed with the contention of the
petitioners that they were not aware that what they were signing was
deed of absolute sale, from the evidence it was shown that spouses
voluntarily signed and read the contents of said document. Trust is a
fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the
existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to
the property to deal with it for the benefit of another. Trust is either
express or implied. Express trust is created by the intention of the
trustor or of the parties. Implied trust comes into being by operation of
law. A constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the
ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to
retain it. The duty to convey the property arises because it was
acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake, or
through breach of a fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful disposition
of another's property. On the other hand, a resulting trust arises
where a person makes or causes to be made a disposition of
property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does
not intend that the person taking or holding the property should have
the beneficial interest in the property.
In the present case, Dolores provided the money for the
purchase of
Lot 20 but the corresponding deed of sale and transfer certificate of
title were placed in the name of Ricardo Huang because she was
advised that the subdivision owner prohibited the acquisition of two
(2) lots by a single individual. Guided by the foregoing definitions, we
are in conformity with the common finding of the trial court and
respondent court that a resulting trust was created. Ricardo became
the trustee of Lot 20 and its improvements for the benefit of Dolores
as owner. The pertinent law is Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code which
provides that there is an implied trust when property is sold and the
legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for
the purpose of having the beneficial interest for the property. A
532
resulting trust arises because of the presumption that he who pays for
a thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself.
Petitioners are of the mistaken notion that the 10-year
prescriptive period is counted from the date of issuance of the
Torrens certificate of title. This rule applies only to the remedy of
reconveyance which has its basis on Sec. 53, par. 3, P.D. No. 1529.
Reconveyance is available in case of registration of property
procured by fraud thereby creating a constructive trust between the
parties, a situation which does not obtain in this case. Therefore, the
Court affirmed the decision of the RTC, thereby dismissing the
petition.
VILLAGONZALO VS IAC
FACTS:
In an action for reconveyance, RTC Leyte ordered the
cancellation of transfer certificate title in the name of private
respondent Cecilia Villagonzalo. Upon appeal with the Court of
Appeals (formerly IAC), said decision of lower court was reversed.
533
The appellate court found out that the private respondent was
able to loan an amount to her father in order that he can acquire said
land. Furthermore, the CA found the petitioners cause has already
prescribed. The appellate court held that the issuance of transfer
certificate of title to the private respondent was already a notice of
ownership to the whole world, thereby repudiating any fiduciary or
trust relationship involved. It anchored its conclusion on doctrinal
holdings that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years counted from the date when
adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. Due to the
inaction of the petitioners, the private respondent was made secure
over her ownership on the subject land, and thereafter spent time and
money in introducing improvements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of the land in the private
respondents’ name was not a repudiation of the implied trust created
between her and their father.
RULING:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the appellate court.
An action for reconveyance of real property to enforce an implied
trust shall prescribe after ten years, since it is an action based upon
an obligation created by law, and there can be no doubt as to its
prescriptibility. It is likewise established that said period of ten years is
counted from the date adverse title to the property is asserted by the
possessor thereof. In the case at bar, that assertion of adverse title,
which consequently was a repudiation of the implied trust for the
purpose of the statute of limitations, took place when trasfer
certificate of title was issued in the name of private respondent.
534
laches. Petitioners were, therefore, correctly faulted for their
unjustified inaction. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent
Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
ALZONA vs CAPUNITAN
G.R. No. L-10228 (February 28, 1962)
FACTS:
The parcels of land in question were part of the friar lands in the
Spanish times and were then possessed by spouses Perfecto Alomia
and Cepriana Almendras, both deceased; they were survived
survived by three children, Arcadio Alomia, Eulogio Alomia and
Crispina Alomia. Arcadio Alomia married Ildefonsa Almeda but they
did not have any children. When both Arcadio and his wife Ildefonsa
died, they were survived only by the two sisters of Ildefonsa namely
Marciana and Narcisa and also by the nephews and nieces of
Arcadio. Narcisa is the mother of herein defendant Gregoria
Capunitan married to Manuel Reyes. Eulogio Alomia, other hand, is
the father of plaintiff Gregorio and Eleuteria Alomia while Crispina
Alomia is the mother of plaintiff Cornelio Alzona. Of the three children
of Sps. Perfecto and Cepriana Alomia, it was Arcadio and wife
Ildefonsa who purchased and possessed the lands originally claimed
by their parents and was able to acquire title to two of the four lots in
question. When Arcadio died, his widow Ildefonsa, sold the lands in
question to her niece Gregoria Capunitan (defendant) daughter of
Narcisa Almeda and cousin of plaintiffs-appellants and in whose
name new certificate of title was issued in 1928.
535
After Ildefonsa's death, plaintiffs herein instituted an action in
the CFI of Laguna on October 11, 1929 for the recovery of the lots;
the case was set six times for hearing during 1930. The case was
dismissed because of the non-appearance of the parties and their
attorneys. On January 23, 1931, same plaintiffs, thru same counsel
filed another action for the recovery of lots Nos. 332, 210, 2968 and
2524. Again, due to numerous petitions for postponement from 1931
to 1936,nothing was done hence on August 31, 1936, the court
dismissed the case. The lower court found that the dismissal of these
two cases was not due to an amicable settlement because of
defendant's recognition of plaintiffs' rights or to a promise to reconvey
one-half of the property to them.
HELD:
The case at bar involves an implied or constructive trust upon
the defendants-appellees. The Court of Appeals declared that
Ildefonsa held in trust the 1/2 legally belonging to the plaintiffs; on
which condition, the defendants had full knowledge. The sale made
by Ildefonsa in favor of the defendants, was not void or inexistent
contract, action on which is imprescriptible (Art. 1450, N.C.C.). It is
voidable, at most, and as such is valid until revoked within the time
prescribed by law for its revocation, and that is undoubtedly the
reason why the Court of Appeals pronounced that "the appellees had
the right to ask for a reconveyance of their share, unless the action is
barred by prescription". The prescriptibility of an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, is now a settled
question in this jurisdiction. It prescribes in ten (10) years. The cause
of action of the plaintiffs against the defendants accrued in 1928
when the latter purchased and took possession of the two lots from
Ildefonsa Almeda. The action, being for recovery of title to and
possession of real property, the same should be brought within ten
(10) years from 1928, or up to 1938 (Sec. 40, Act 190). But after the
dismissal of the second case on August 31, 1936, the plaintiffs-
appellants went into a long swoon only to wake up when they filed the
present action on November 28, 1949 (according to the lower court)
or January 28, 1950 (according to appellants). In the first case, 13
536
years had elapsed and in the second, 14 years. In either case, the
action has long prescribed.
Furthermore, and by the same token, the defendants-appellees
being third persons, and having repudiated the trust and expressed
claim of ownership over litigated properties, by themselves and by
their predecessors-in-interest, they have also acquired the said
properties by the law of prescription (Tolentino vs. Vitug, 39 Phil. 126;
Government of the Philippines vs. Abadilla, 46 Phil. 642).
FACTS:
Lot No. 5815 of the Cabatuan Cadastre, situated in Cabatuan,
Iloilo, originally belonged to respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
Romualdo Grana. In 1929, he sold a 7,300 square meters portion
thereof to petitioner and her husband, the late Leon Almarza, who
since then had been in continuous, peaceful, open and adverse
possession thereof. The document evidencing the sale between the
parties was lost during the war, but sometime thereafter, the late
Laura Pancrudo, mother of private respondents Asuncion and Gilda
Arguelles, executed an affidavit acknowledging the sale of said
portion to petitioner and her husband. On the basis of said affidavit,
the Provincial Assessor issued a new tax declaration, beginning in the
year 1945 to Leon Almarza, annotating at the back thereof the
aforementioned affidavit of the late Laura Pancrudo. The tax
declaration, covering the 7,300 sq.m. portion of Lot No. 5815 sold to
petitioner and her husband was designated as Lot No. 5815-B. On
the other hand, a new tax declaration, Tax Declaration No. 3909 was
issued by the Provincial Assessor in the name of Romualdo Grana for
the remaining portion of Lot No. 5815, described therein as Lot No.
5815-A.
537
Sometime prior to July, 1950, Josefa Malote, mother of private
respondents Gil and Balbina Pancrudo, filed for and in behalf of her
children and the late Laura Pancrudo an answer in Cadastral Case
No. 78, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1321. In support of her claim over Lot
No. 5815, she presented in evidence Tax Declaration No. 3909
covering only a portion thereof designated therein as Lot No. 5815-A
and a land tax receipt dated March 30, 1950 showing payment of the
real estate tax for a portion only of Lot No. 5815 known and described
in the Tax Declaration as Lot No. 5815-A. On July 25, 1950, the
cadastral court declared Gil and Balbina Pancrudo owner of one-half
undivided share of Lot No. 5815 and the late Laura Pancrudo as
owner of the other undivided half share. Pursuant to a decree of title,
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-134, covering the entire Lot 5815
was issued in the name of said adjudicatees on May 29, 1951. On
November 1, 1951, Laura Pancrudo died, leaving private respondents
Asuncion Arguelles and Gilda Arguelles as her only children and legal
successors-in-interest. On April 20, 1977, the said heirs instituted
before the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo a case against
petitioner for recovery of the 7,300 sq.m. portion of Lot No. 5815 in
her possession and for damages. Basis of the action was OCT No. 0-
134 issued on May 29, 1951. Petitioner, in turn, interposed a
counterclaim for reconveyance of the disputed portion of Lot No.
5815 in her favor. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
respondents on the ground that petitioner's action for reconveyance
had prescribed more than ten years having elapsed from the
issuance of said certificate of title.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner’s action for reconveyance has
prescribed.
Whether or not laches have already set in against private
respondents
right to assert their ownership over the subject land.
HELD:
We held that prescription cannot be invoked in an action for
reconveyance, which is, in effect, an action to quiet title against the
plaintiff therein who is in possession of the land in question. The
reason, We explained, is "that as lawful possessor and owner of the
538
Disputed Portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in
effect, seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession is
imprescriptible. Her undisturbed possession over a period of 48 years
gave her a continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of equity to
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the
effect on her title." Private respondents obtained OCT No. 0-134 on
May 29,1951. Their action was instituted only on April 20, 1977, or
after a lapse of twenty-six [26] years. The neglect or failure of private
respondents to assert their alleged right under the certificate of title
for such unreasonable length of time makes them guilty of laches.'
They should now be held either to have abandoned or waived
whatever right they may have under said certificate of title.
Private respondents ordered to cause the segregation of the
disputed portion of 7,300 square meters from Lot No. 5815 of the
Cabatuan Cadastr and to reconvey the same to said petitioner. After
the segregation shall have been accomplished, the Register of Deeds
of Iloilo is hereby ordered to cancel OCT No. 0-134 in the names of
Balbina, Gil and Laura, all surnamed Pancrudo, and thereafter to
issue a new certificate of title covering said 7,300 square meter
portion in favor of petitioner and another certificate of title in favor of
private respondents covering the remaining portion of Lot No. 5815.
539
iii. Express Trust.
TAMAYO VS CALLEJO
FACTS:
This action, initiated in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, was brought by Aurelio Callejo, originally against
Mariano Tamayo only, and, later, against his brother Marcos Tamayo,
also, for the reconveyance of the northern portion of a parcel of land
formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2612, in the
names of said brothers. In due course, said court dismissed the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. The latter appealed to the
Court of Appeals which, in turn, rendered a decision the dispositive
part. In 1940, Mariano Tamayo sold the land to Estacio, whose
surveyor went to the land in 1952 to segregate it; that same year
Callejo registered his adverse claim to the land. Tamayo pleaded the
statute of limitations as defense, but the court found that in 1918,
when they had the land registered in their name, Mariano Tamayo, on
his behalf and that of his brother, executed a public document
acknowledging that his deceased parents had sold a parcel of the
land to Domantay.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the
respondent Aurelio Callejo's cause of action, if any, had already
prescribed.
2.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the
decision rendered by the trial court.
RULING:
Tamayo argues that if the erroneous inclusion in his certificate
of title of the parcel of land formerly sold by his parents to Fernando
Domantay created, by operation of law, an implied trust, the
540
corresponding action for reconveyance of said parcel prescribed ten
(10) years from the accrual of the cause of action, on November 15,
1915, when OCT No. 2612 was issued, or long before the institution
of this case on June 25, 1952. The express recognition by Mariano
Tamayo — on his behalf and that of his brother Marcos Tamayo — of
the previous sale, made by their parents, to Fernando Domantay had
the effect of imparting to the aforementioned trust the — nature of an
express trust — it having been created by the will of the parties, "no
particular words" being "required for the creation of an express trust,
it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" — which express
trust is a "continuing and subsisting" trust, not subject to the statute of
limitations, at least, until repudiated, in which event the period of
prescription begins to run only from the time of the repudiation.
It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals did not err in
overruling the plea of prescription. Also, petitioner questions the right
of Callejo to demand a reconveyance, insofar as it may affect the
portion of 70,000 square meters sold by him to Proceso Estacio,
upon the ground that the latter is a purchaser in good faith for value.
This is, however, a defense not available to petitioner herein, aside
from the fact that he has not even pleaded it in the trial court or
otherwise raised it either in that court or in the Court of Appeals. We
note that the dispositive part of the decision of the Court of Appeals
declares that the land in question is "declared reconveyed" to said
respondent. Such reconveyance cannot, however, be deemed made
without a survey defining with precision the metes and bounds of the
area to be segregated for herein respondent, Aurelio Callejo.
Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the court of origin for
the preparation of a subdivision plan of the portion thus to be
segregated and the judicial approval of such plan, and only after such
approval has become final and executory may the reconveyance be
either made or deemed effected. SO MODIFIED, the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in all other
respects, with the costs of this instance against petitioner Mariano
Tamayo. It is so ordered.
541
iv. Void Contract.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 5, 1982 in CA-G.R. No.
66849-R entitled "Spouses Mariano Castillo, Et Al., Plaintiffs-
Appellants v. Heirs of Vicente Madrigal, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.
On December 17, 1979, petitioners spouses Mariano Castillo and
Pilar Castillo, in their own behalf and in representation of the heirs of
Eduardo Castillo, filed a verified complaint before the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila for annulment of
contract and transfer certificate of title and/or reconveyance with
damages against private respondents heirs of Vicente Madrigal
and/or Susana Realty, Inc. and public respondent Register of Deeds
of the City of Manila. On February 4, 1980, private respondents filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that: (a) the complaint states no
cause of action; and (b) the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations. On March 25, 1980, the trial court dismissed the complaint
(pp. 120-126, Rollo). On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision
was affirmed in toto on August 5, 1982. Hence. the present petition.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not petitioners’ action for annulment of contract and
transfer certificate of title and or reconveyance with damages is
subject to prescription
2.) Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action against
private respondents.
542
RULING:
Both courts ruled incorrectly. It is evident in paragraphs 9, 10
and 12 of the complaint, supra, that petitioners sought the declaration
of the inexistence of the deed of sale because of the absence of their
consent. Thus, following the provision of Article 1410 of the Civil
Code, this kind of action is imprescriptible. The action for
reconveyance is likewise imprescriptible because its basis is the
alleged void contract of sale. This pronouncement is certainly far from
novel. We have encountered similar situations in the past which We
resolved in the same manner. One of these is the case of Baranda, Et
Al., v. Baranda, Et Al., G.R. No. 73275, May 20, 1987, 150 SCRA 59,
73
However, there should be no debate that the action for damages
against private respondents has already prescribed. In accordance
with Article 1144 of the Civil Code, 4 it should have been brought
within ten (10) years from the date of the sale to Vicente Madrigal and
the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 72066 in his name on
July 12, 1943, if against the heirs of Vicente Madrigal; or within ten
(10) years from the date of the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 36280 in the name of Susana Realty, Inc. on May 12, 1954, if
against the firm.
Notwithstanding the discussion on the imprescriptibility of
petitioners’ action for annulment of contract and transfer certificate of
title and/or reconveyance, the dismissal of their complaint by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action was correct. It was also Our ruling in the Baranda
case, supra, (and in other previous cases) that only as long as the
property is still in the name of the person who caused the wrongful
registration and has not passed to an innocent third person for value
will an action lie to compel that person to reconvey the property to the
real owner. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 5, 1982 is AFFIRMED,
subject to the modification regarding the issue on prescription.SO
ORDERED.
543
F. ACTION FOR DAMAGES
CHING VS CA
181 SCRA 9
FACTS:
544
The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was
cancelled and a new TCT was issued in favor of Asedillo.
ISUUE:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and
cancellation of title is in personam, and if so, would a dead man or his
estates be bound by service of summons and decision by publication.
RULING:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real
property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world,
like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an
action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ
in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek
personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or
property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect
thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of
land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a
particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible
thing. Sec. 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as
amended) requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since ChingLeng
was already in the other world when the summons was published he
could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.
545
546
G. ACTION FOR COMPENSATION FROM THE ASSURANCE
FUND
a. Requisites.
I. REVERSION
YUJUICO vs REPUBLIC
547
FACTS:
In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration
and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land located in
Parañaque City, in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance (CFI).The
application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
on behalf of the Director of Lands, and byMercedes Dizon, a private
party. Trial court ruled in favor of Castro. The Director of Lands and
Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from the adverse decision of the
Pasig-Rizal CFI. Thus, the order for the issuance of a decree of
registration became final, and a Decree was issued by the Land
Registration Commission (LRC). An Original Certificate of Title was
issued in the name of Fermina Castro by the Register of Deeds. Land
was then sold to Jesus Yujuico. The OCT of Castro was cancelled
and a TCT was issued in Yujuico’s name over Lot1 while another TCT
was issued in favor of herein co-petitioner Augusto Carpio.
Meanwhile, PD no. 1085 was issued and asserts that Land reclaimed
in the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay became the
properties of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government
corporation that undertook the reclamation of lands or the acquisition
of reclaimed lands. Thus, an OCT was issued in favor of PEA. The
PEA also acquired ownership of other parcels of land along the
Manila Bay coast which were subsequently sold to the Manila
Bay Development Corporation (MBDC) The PEA undertook the
construction of the Manila Coastal Road. As this was being planned,
Yujuico and Carpio discovered that a verification survey they
commissioned showed that the road directly overlapped their
property, and that they owned a portion of the land sold by the PEA to
the MBDC. Yujuico and Carpio filed before the Parañaque City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for the Removal of Cloud and
Annulment of Title with Damages. Respondent Republic argued that,
first, since the subject land was still underwater, it could not be
registered in the name of Fermina Castro. Second, the land
registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable
lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to
Fermina Castro was void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio,
being derived from a void title, were likewise void. Trial Court ruled in
favor of the petitioner and states that after 28 years without being
contested, the case had already become final and executory. The trial
548
court also found that the OSG had participated in the LRC case, and
could have questioned the validity of the decision but did not. On
appeal, reversed the decision of the lower court asserting that shores
are properties of the public domain intended for public use and,
therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title
does not convert the same into properties of private individuals.
HELD:
No. We maintain to agree with the findings of the court that the
property of Fermina Castro was registrable land, as based on the two
(2) ocular inspections conducted on March 22, 1974 by Lands
Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Lands Geodetic Engr.
Manuel Cervantes, finding ‘… the same no longer forms part of
Manila Bay but is definitely solid land which cannot be reached by
water even in the highest of tides’. This Berania-Cervantes report
based on ocular inspections literally overturned the findings and
recommendations of Land Director Narciso V. Villapando dated
November 15, 1973, and that of Director Ernesto C. Mendiola dated
December 1, 1977, and the fact that the Villapando-Mendiola reports
were merely based on projections in the cadastral map or table
surveys.
The recognition of petitioners’ legal ownership of the land is
further bolstered by the categorical and unequivocal acknowledgment
made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter where it stated that:
“Your ownership thereof was acknowledged by PEA when it did not
object to your membership in the CBP-IA Association, in which an
owner of a piece of land in CBP-IA automatically becomes a member
thereof.” Section 26, Rule 130 provides that “the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him.” The admissions of PEA which is the real party-in-
interest in this case on the nature of the land of Fermina Castro are
valid and binding on respondent Republic. Respondent’s claim that
the disputed land is underwater falls flat in the face of the admissions
of PEA against its interests. Hence, res judicata now effectively
precludes the relitigation of the issue of registrability of petitioners’ lot.
In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Parañaque RTC.
549
Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of
the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already barred
by laches. Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is already
precluded by res judicata in view of the peculiar facts and
circumstances obtaining therein.
J. CANCELLATION SUITS
K. ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
GALICIA VS MANLIQUEZ
550
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that their predecessor, Juan, was the true
and lawful owner of a parcel of land situated in Romblon. Such land is
declared in the name of Juan under various tax declarations. They
alleged that after years of possession of said land, Juan was driven
away from the property through force by the heirs of Inez Ramirez
and one of whom is defendant. Petitioners alleged that because of
poverty and lack of knowledge, Juan was not able to assert his right
over the property but he informed his children that they owned the
land and that the continuous possession of the property by defendant
has further deprived herein petitioners of their right over the
same.Defendants denied the allegations of petitioners in their
complaint asserting that Juan was not the owner and never took
possession of the disputed lot. They also contended that the subject
property was part of a larger parcel of land which was acquired
by Ines, predecessor-in-interest of defendant from a certain
Juan Galicha who is a different person from Juan Galicia.
During the scheduled pre-trial conference, none of the
defendants appeared. They filed a motion for postponement of the
pre-trial conference but it was belatedly received by the trial court. As
a consequence, defendants were declared in default. Herein
petitioners, as plaintiffs, were then allowed to present
evidence ex parte. On December 2, 1997, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioners declaring the plaintiffs as the true
and absolute owner of the property, affirming and confirming the
validity and legality of plaintiffs’ ownership over the property and
ordering defendants to vacate the land.
On December 1997, the RTC received a Motion for Leave of
Court to intervene with an attached Answer-in-Intervention filed by the
compulsory heirs of Ines, among whom are herein respondents. They
contended that the subject parcel of land forms part of the estate
of Ines which is yet to be partitioned among them; an intestate
proceeding is presently pending in the RTC of Odiongan, Romblon,
the outcome of Civil Case, one way or the other, would adversely
affect their interest; their rights would be better protected in the said
civil case; and their intervention would not unduly delay, or in any way
prejudice the rights of the original parties. The RTC denied the said
motion to intervene on the ground that it has already rendered
551
judgment and under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the
motion to intervene should have been filed before rendition of
judgment by the trial court.
Defendants filed an appeal with the CA but CA issued a
Resolution dismissing the appeal for failure of the defendants-
appellants to file their brief within the extended period granted by the
appellate court. Subsequently, the trial court issued a writ of
execution dated March 3, 2000. On May 23, 2000, herein
respondents filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA
anchored on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over their persons and
property and on extrinsic fraud. On January 14, 2002, the CA
granted the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have lost such ownership by
extinctive prescription because respondents and their predecessors
had been in uninterrupted adverse possession of the subject lot for
more than 40 years?
HELD:
As to the timeliness of the petition for annulment of judgment
filed with the CA, Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides
that a petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
must be filed within four years from its discovery; and if based on lack
of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The principle
of laches or “stale demands” ordains that the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or
the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. There is no absolute rule as to
what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud
and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of
equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations
or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice
would result.
552
In the present case, the CA found no evidence to show when
respondents acquired knowledge of the complaint that petitioners
filed with the RTC. Moreover, the Court finds that herein respondents'
right to due process is the overriding consideration in allowing them
to intervene in Civil Case No. OD-306. Petitioners also fault herein
respondents for their failure to avail of other remedies before filing a
petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. Petitioners cited the
remedies enumerated by the RTC in its Order of December 23, 1997.
However, the Court notes that the remedies enumerated therein refer
to those available to a party who has been declared in default. In the
present case, herein respondents could not have been declared in
default, and thus could not have availed of these remedies, because
they never became parties to Civil Case No. OD-306.
553
registration
FACTS:
Rebecca Levin, widow, 65 y/o, illiterate & knew only how to sign
her name owner of a lot with 2 houses (No. 326 & No. 328) located at
San Rafael St., Manila.
Bass handed Levin Php 10K saying that it was the partial
payment of the property w/c was sold to a Japanese & asked her to
give him the Torrens Title of the House & Lot --- w/c title was in the
possession of Agricultural &Industrial Bank due to a mortgage in the
amount of Php 2k --- 2k was deducted from 10K & they went to the
Bank to pay the debt & get the title --- remaining 8kwas also taken by
Bass as purported initial payment for the property at Antonio Rivera
554
St. (w/ receipt but only 6k was in the receipt Levin did not realized the
difference in the amount). Bass gave Levin the rentals on the building
at Antonio Rivera St. in order for Levin to believe that she already
owned that property.
Deed of Absolute sale to one Estaquio – Php 30K for No. 326 house
& lot ---w/c was later on sold to Bass for Php 65Kb.
The Title of Levin was then cancelled & issued a new one in the
name of Bass.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the entry in the day book of a deed of sale w/c
was presented & filed at the RD &full payment of the registration fees
constitute a complete act of registration w/c operates to convey and
affect the land.
FACTS:
556
Since per the OCT the land seemed unencumbered, the court
adjudicated the land in their favor. The OCT was then cancelled and
TCT No. 112235 (“Rivera Title”) was issued to the Riveras. Lots 5 and
7 (E and G) were then assigned to Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz
and Pacifico Garcia, and subsequent TCTs were issued in their
behalf. Garcia had Lot 7 (G) subdivided into lots A and B, retained lot
A and assigned B to Antonio Munoz. Munoz mortgaged lot B to
Associated Banking Corp.On the other hand, Cruz sold Lot 5 (E) to
Santiago Go. Go mortgaged Lot 5 to Philippine National Bank. Both
Munoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts, hence the two
banks foreclosed the properties. PNB bought the mortgaged Lot 5 at
the auction, but notice of lis pendens was already annotated on the
title.
The trial court ruled in favor of Gozon and co-plaintiffs and voided the
TCTs issued to the Riveras, others. CA affirmed the decision. Garcia
and PNB appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1920 Lapus title prevails over the 1963 Rivera title
and subsequent titles derived from it.
RULING:
557
defeated by the issuance 43 years later to other persons of another
title over the same lots due to the failure of the register of deeds to
cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapus. This must be so
considering that Lapus and his successors-in-interest remained in
possession of the disputed lots and the rival claimants never
possessed the same.
558
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. BASA, Jr.
FACTS:
559
allow the respondents to redeem the mortgaged properties. NHA
maintained that respondents’ right of redemption had long expired on
April 15, 1992 since the certificate of sale was inscribed on their TCT
Nos. 285413 and 287008 a year earlier, or on April 16, 1991. RTC
issued an Order admitting the Petition in Intervention and treating the
same as the petition to set aside sale. NHA filed a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the NHA. Respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, in its Amended
Decision, reconsidered its earlier stance. It declared that the period of
redemption had not expired as the certificate of sale had not been
registered or annotated in the original copies of the titles supposedly
kept with the Register of Deeds since said titles were earlier razed by
fire.
ISSUE:
HELD:
REPUBLIC VS RAVELO
FACTS:
On February 16, 1989, the Director of Lands issued Sales Patent No.
12458 covering the subject lot to respondent Ravelo. She was
subsequently issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4517
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City.
The petitioner filed a complaint for cancellation of title against
Ravelo on November 6, 1992. The petitioner alleged that the
issuance of the patent by the Director of Lands violated DENR
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 20. This A.O. mandates that
applications for sales patent should be filed with the DENR regional
office that has jurisdiction over the land applied for, not with the
Director of Lands in Manila.
On March 24, 1994, a notice of lis pendens (indicating the
pendency of the petitioner’s complaint) was inscribed as Entry No.
7219 on Ravelo’s OCT No. P-4517.
561
execution.
The Notice of Levy was registered with the Register of Deeds
on March 17, 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the Redondos are innocent purchasers in good faith and for
value
HELD:
May 11, 1993 agreement was not registered nor annotated in OCT
No. P-4517 because it was technically a side agreement relating to
but not directly affecting the registered property, and was thus
enforceable only between the parties – Chieng and the
Redondos. Thus, the government cannot be effectively put on notice
of the May 11, 1993 agreement when it registered its notice of lis
pendens on March 24, 1994.
563
prescriptive period of any cause of action starts from
the date when the cause of action accrues.
AFP-MBA VS SANTIAGO
G.R. No, 147559, June 2008
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
566
Tomas de Vera was the owner of two parcels of land in Tondo,
Manila. In 1961, de Vera sold the lands to Simplicio Santos. Santos
however did not register the sale in the Registry of Deeds, which
means that the land was still under de Vera’s name.
ISSUE:
Who has better right over the property: Santos who first bought it w/o
registering it or Campillo who subsequently purchased it at a public
auction and have it registered under his name.
RULING:
567
conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under our
Torrens system of land registration.
569
may not be registered.
Hence this petition for certiorari whereby petitioner contends
that Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court should apply in a
suppletory manner in that the date of the mailing should be
considered the date of filing of the document in the office of the
Register of Deeds.
ISSUE:
What date would be followed in cases the case was delivered thru
registered mail.
HELD:
The Court finds and so holds that the date of mailing of an
instrument to the Register of Deeds for purposes of registration
should be considered the date of filing and receipt thereof by the
Register of Deeds. It is this date that should be entered in the primary
entry book of the Register of Deeds which shall be regarded as the
date of its registration.
Since in this case, the deed of donation was admittedly sent by
registered mail to the Register of Deeds on September 9, 1988, said
date is in effect the date of filing, receipt and registration of the
instrument, although the instrument was actually received by said
office only on September 20, 1988.
SEC. 1. Filing with the court, defined.—The filing of pleadings,
appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers with the
court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them
personally with the clerk of the court or by sending them by registered
mail. In the first case, the clerk shall endorse on the pleading the date
and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of
motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits as
shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry
receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or
deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the
case.
The foregoing rule clearly provides that the date of mailing of the
motion, pleading, or any other papers, which may include instruments
as the deed of donation, is considered the date of filing as shown by
the post office stamp on the envelope or registry receipt.
570
a. Registration requirements
b. Effects of registration
FACTS:
571
Mago and Angela wife of Juan Neme. On August of 1953, the heirs of
Adriano and Ramona sold their undivided interest to Juan Neme who
sold the same to Villafranca.
The Lower Court dismissed the case. Thus, elevated to the SC.
HELD:
572
the owner-seller’s title, the buyer becomes the
owner of the portion as of the registration of the
sale despite title being in the name of the owner-
seller.
FACTS:
573
possession of the property and has been in adverse possession
under claim of ownership ever since, followed by his successors-in-
interest, the private respondents surnamed Sergas. Similarly, the
other vendee, Adela Alvarez, also took possession from the date of
sale in her favor in 1928 until she sold her portion in 1954 to private
respondent Domingo Rojas Francisco, who has also been in
uninterrupted possession since said date. Noteworthy also is the fact
that from the dates of the sales in 1926 and 1928, respectively, up to
the time of his death in 1960, or approximately at least 32, and at the
most 34 years, the vendor Roberto Alarcon took no steps to rescind
the sales nor reivindicate the property. And as far as petitioners are
concerned, more than 50 years had elapsed since the execution of
the deeds of sale in 1926 and 1928 and the date they instituted suit
for recovery of possession in 1978. Clearly, their passivity and
inaction and, before them, that of their father, constituted laches. As
held by respondent Judge, their cause of action must be considered
barred for it has been converted into a stale demand. And, although,
as petitioners claim, the defense of laches is not a ground for a
motion to dismiss there would be no point to continue litigating this
case in view of the finding that petitioners are guilty thereof.
True, land registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession, as petitioners correctly
contend. The protection given by law is in favor of registered owners.
As it is, although title to the disputed property is still in the name of
Roberto Alarcon, it has been subjected to the registration in 1963 of
the sale made by him to Esteban Sergas. Technically, therefore, the
latter became the owner in 1963 of the portion of the land sold to him.
It may also be stated that if petitioners' cause of action in seeking the
nullification of the sales is predicated on fraud, the same has
prescribed for not having been brought within four years from the
inscription of the deed of sale in favor of Esteban Sergas in 1963.
574
SOSTENES CAMPILLO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ZENAIDA DIAZ VDA. DE SANTOS 129 SCRA 513
FACTS:
ISSUE: Who has better right over the property: Santos who first
bought it w/o registering it or Campillo who subsequently purchased it
at a public auction and have it registered under his name?
HELD:
575
land in suit, acquires such right and interest as appears in the
certificate of title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted
therein. This must be so in order to preserve the efficacy and
conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under our
Torrens system of land registration.
FACTS:
576
Nos. 105276 and 105277. The lower courts upheld in toto the sale
executed by defendant Faustino Ibarra, Sr. in favor of spouses de la
Rosa and de Regla.
HELD:
FACTS:
The subject lot in Cagayan de Oro City forms part of the estate
of the late Pantaleon Jomoc. Because it was fictitiously sold and
transferred to third persons, petitioner Maria P. Vda. Jomoc, as
administratrix of the estate and in behalf of all the heirs, filed suit to
recover the property before the trial court of Misamis Oriental. The
case was decided in favor of Jomoc and was appealed by Mariano
So and one Gaw Sur Cheng to the Court of Appeals. While pending
the appeal, Jomoc executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
577
Sale of Land with private respondent for P300,000.00. The document
was not yet signed by all the parties nor notarized but in the
meantime, Maura So had made partial payments amounting to
P49,000.00. Mariano So, agreed to settle the case by executing a
Deed of Reconveyance of the land in favor of the heirs of Pantaleon
Jomoc. On February 28, 1983, the heirs of Jomoc executed another
extra-judicial settlement with absolute sale in favor of intervenors Lim
Leong Kang and Lim Pue filing. Later, Maura So demanded from the
Jomoc family the execution of a final deed of conveyance.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly ruled
that the spouses Lim do not have a better right. They purchased the
land with full knowledge of a previous sale to private respondent and
without requiring from the vendors-heirs any proof' of the prior
vendee's revocation of her purchase. They should have exercised
extra caution in their purchase especially if at the time of the sale, the
land was still covered by TCT No. 19648 bearing the name of
Mariano So and was not yet registered in the name of petitioners-
heirs of Pantaleon Jomoc, although it had been reconveyed to said
heirs. Not having done this, petitioners spouses Lim cannot be said to
be buyers in good faith. When they registered the sale on April 27,
1983 after having been charged with notice of lis pendens annotated
578
as early as February 28, 1983 (the same date of their purchase), they
did so in bad faith or on the belief that a registration may improve
their position being subsequent buyers of the same lot. Under Article
1544, mere registration is not enough to acquire new title. Good faith
must concur. The ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
FACTS:
579
that the TCT in their names was cancelled and a new one, TCT No.
351553, was issued in the name of Paterno; that a Deed of
Assignment was likewise executed by Paterno in favor of the
Spouses Tolentino, and; that on the basis of said document, TCT No.
351553 was cancelled and in its place TCT No. 351673 was issued in
the name of the Spouses Tolentino. Three months later, the Spouses
Tolentino executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Villarosa for
the sum of P276,000.00. TCT No. 354675 was issued in place of TCT
No. 351673.
HELD:
The court declared void the title of the Spouses Tolentino and
Paterno but upheld the validity of the title of Villarosa.
Having made the necessary inquiries and having found the title
to be authentic, Villarosa need not go beyond the certificate of title.
When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in this case,
buyers are not required by the law to inquire further than what the
Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face. He examined the
transferor’s title, which was then under the name of Spouses
Tolentino. He did not have to scrutinize each and every title and
previous owners of the property preceding Tolentino.
FACTS:
HELD:
No. Case law has it that he who alleges that he is a purchaser
in good faith and for value of registered land bears the onus of
proving such statement. This burden is not discharged by involving
the ordinary presumption of good faith.
582
Indeed, the general rule is that a purchaser may rely on what
appears on the face of a certificate of title. He may be considered a
purchaser in good faith even if he simply examines the latest
certificate of title. An exception to this rule is when there exist
important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise
reasonable man (and spur him) to go beyond the present title and to
investigate those that preceded it. The presence of anything which
excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor as
appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the
exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for
value nor a purchaser in good faith, hence, does not merit the
protection of the law.
583
FACTS:
HELD:
No. Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the
prohibited five year period are null and void. No title passed from the
Egaos to Marfori which could be validly transferred to herein
respondents.
Moreover, respondents are not innocent purchasers for value.
Where a purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries and
closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his
guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's
title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of
the vendor, purchases the property without making any further
investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for
value. Accordingly, respondents who are not innocent purchasers for
value have no standing to question petitioners' right to the land and to
file an action for quieting of title.
FACTS:
Nicolasa Resurreccion, the owner in fee simple of a three
parcels of land located at Taytay, Rizal, sold Lots Numbered 3 and 9
to one Agustin Esguerra. On March 16, 1926, Esguerra sold the
same two parcels to the spouses, Pedro Francisco and Francisca
Tolentino. The spouses registered the sale under Act No. 3344, and
declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of Pedro
Francisco. Afterwards, the property was declared in the name of their
son, Candido Francisco, the petitioner, who continued in possession
of the property after his parents’ demise. Three years later,
Resurreccion executed another deed of sale dated conveying all the
three parcels of land covered by her title, in favor of a certain Felisa
Afable, who registered the sale under the Torrens Act and obtained
title in her own name. Thirty-one years afterwards, Afable sold the
property to the persons now private respondents. Espiritus asked
Francisco to vacate lots Numbered 3 and 9, which the latter was
occupying and on which was in fact standing a house that he had
constructed. As might be expected, Candido refused. The Espiritus
thereupon sued him for recovery of title and possession in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal.
HELD:
No. There were sufficient strong indications to impel a closer
inquiry into the location, boundaries and condition of the two smaller
lots embraced in the purchase on the part of Casimiro Espiritu and
his co-vendees. That inquiry is in truth dictated by common sense,
expected of a man of ordinary prudence. Had that inquiry been made,
the adverse claim of Candido Francisco over the two small lots would
have immediately come to light, and the controversy would have died
a-borning.
585
The Espiritus’ failure to undertake such an inquiry precludes
their successful invocation of the character of purchasers in good
faith. The buyer, who could not have failed to know or discover that
the land sold to him was in the adverse possession of another, is a
buyer in bad faith, such knowledge being equivalent to registration.
FACTS:
586
and they learned that she had sold Lots 6 and 8 as well as three-
fourths of Lot 5 to a certain Felix Capito; on December 7, 1946, she
sold the remaining one-fourth of Lot 5 to Antero Sanchez, with the
former in turn having transferred his rights to now petitioner
Celedonio Fermin without such vendees, however, obtaining any
certificate of title in their names. were sustained in the lower court
decision as to Lots 1, 3, 4, 7, 9 and 11.
HELD:
FACTS:
588
Because Rosa Ver failed to settle her obligation with thePNB,
the latter sold at public auction the whole lot and PNB emerged as
the highest bidder. After the period of redemption had expired, the
PNB consolidated its title over it but it was not annotated upon the
owner's duplicate certificate of title. Later, the PNB presented a
petition before the trial court asking that the owner's certificate of title
No. 7683 be declared null and void, and a new certificate of title be
issued in its name. The trial court favored them. Later, the PNB sold
the property in question to Felizardo Reyes. On November 16, 1960,
the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and
intervenors finding and holding that: (a) The lot in question is a
conjugal partnership property, one-half of which must go to the heirs
of the late Iñigo Bitanga; (b) The other half goes to Rosa Ver as her
share; (c) That Felizardo Reyes is not a purchaser of a registered
land for value and in good faith, and (d) Since the issuance of TCT
No. 3944 in favor of the PNB, and Owner's Duplicate Certificate of
Title No. 3944, in favor of Felizardo Reyes were without legal basis,
they are declared nun and void and cancelled. On appeal by PNB
and Felizardo Reyes to the CA, respondent Court affirmed the
judgment appealed from except letter (d) thereof and ordered the RD
to issue another certificate of title in the names of the plaintiffs and
intervenors.
HELD:
The SC fully agree with the trial court and the respondent Court
and affirm the holding that "what the Philippine National Bank had
acquired from Rosa Ver by virtue of the mortgage was simply one-
half (½) of the entire property, for this was all she had in her power to
convey — the other half being, as it still is, the lawful share of the
plaintiffs-appellees as inheritance from their father, Iñigo
589
Bitanga. Nemo date quod non habet — One cannot give what is not
his. There is no dispute that the document of mortgage executed by
Rosa Ver was in accordance with the formalities required by law and
that was register in the day book of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos
Norte within a month after its execution. What is here contested is
whether Rosa Ver could, as she did in fact, m the entire Lot 9068 to
petitioner PNB. In other words, the issue refers to the intrinsic vanity
of the mortgage, as distinguished from its formal sufficiency.
Under Article 2085, New Civil Code (Art. 1857, Old Civil Code),
one of the essential requisites to the contract of pledge and mortgage
is that the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing
pledged or mortgaged. And under Article 493, New Civil Code (Art.
399, Old Civil Code), each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. And also
applying the law in force at the time of Inigo Bitanga's death in 1935,
Rosa Ver, as surviving spouse, cannot take part legally in the sharing
of the estate left by her deceased husband (one-half (½) of Lot 9068)
with respect to which she only had usufructuary rights. "The
usufructuary not being an owner, cannot alienate or dispose of the
objects included in the usufruct. Thus, he cannot ... mortgage or
pledge the thing.
590
vi. A statement that buyers purchased land “with full
knowledge of the flaws and defects in the title of
their vendors” is enough proof of their bad faith.
BERNALES vs IAC
FACTS:
591
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Cadiam have a better title over
the disputed land than Bernales and his co-plaintiffs
HELD:
Yes. In the case at bar, the Cadiam spouses who were found by
the Court of Appeals as innocent purchasers for value with a Transfer
Certificate of Title under the Torrens System in their names, have
evidently a better right than herein petitioners
VDA. DE JOMOC VS CA
FACTS:
593
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Cadiam have a better title over
the disputed land than Bernales and his co-plaintiffs
HELD:
Yes. In the case at bar, the Cadiam spouses who were found by
the Court of Appeals as innocent purchasers for value with a Transfer
Certificate of Title under the Torrens System in their names, have
evidently a better right than herein petitioners
e. Double sales
594
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LAZARO
MANGAWANG, ET AL.
FACTS:
Gavino Amposta again sold the same property to Lazaro and Arsenio
Mangawang. Vendees paid the balance of the purchase price, and an
absolute deed of sale was executed in their favor. Mangawang
brothers took possession thereof, and upon learning of this transfer,
the Development Bank of the Philippines, filed an action to recover its
possession and damages. Court rendered decision awarding the land
to the Mangawang brothers. Seasonably, the bank appealed to this
Court.
HELD:
595
flaw that lies in its title, and where the law adjudicates the property to
the purchaser who first registers the transaction in his name in the
registry of property
596
for the said properties.
597
FACTS:
On June 26, 1962, notice of the sale of said lots was issued by
the Sheriff and published in the "Daily Record" and La Nueva Era."
On July 25, 1962, the three parcels of land were sold at public
auction in favor of petitioner who was issued the corresponding
certificate of sale. After the lapse of one year, the City Sheriff
executed the final deed of sale in favor of petitioner over the three
parcels of land levied and sold on execution.
The RTC upheld the validity of the levy and sale at public
auction. On appeal at the instance of the herein private respondent,
the respondent appellate court modified the decision of the lower
court.
The appellate court said that the subject lots could not be
legally levied upon to satisfy the judgment debt of the de Veras in
favor of petitioner because at the time of the execution sale, the
judgment debtor, having previously sold said properties, was no
598
longer the owner thereof.
ISSUE: Whether who has a better right or title to the herein disputed
two parcels of land — Simplicio Santos who earlier purchased them
in a private sale but failed to register his sale, or petitioner Sostenes
Campillo who subsequently purchased them at an execution sale and
obtained a certificate of title.
RULING:
Petition granted.
599
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LAZARO
MANGAWANG
FACTS:
600
that was issued to him in the cadastral case, which was later
substituted by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the
vendees.
RULING:
Petition granted.
i. As between parties
FACTS:
602
respectively, and as collateral for both, they mortgaged the said land
covered by OCT No. P-6038.
The lower court declared null and void ab initio the patent and
certificate of title No. P-6038 issued in the name of the defendant
spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan and ordered also its
cancellation. Declaring the real estate mortgage executed by the
defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan in favor of the
Bank, recorded on OCT P-6038 null and void and unenforceable as
against the herein plaintiff, and ordering its cancellation, without
prejudice of the Bank's right to collect from the said spouses;
The Bank appealed, insisting that the lower court should have
declared it an innocent mortgagee in good faith and for value as
regards the mortgages executed in its favor by said spouses and duly
annotated on their abovementioned OCT P-6038 and that
consequently, the said mortgage annotations should be carried over
to and considered as encumbrances on the land covered by TCT No.
T-1212 of Gatioan which, as already stated, is the identical land
covered by OCT P-6038 of the Gaffuds.
ISSUE: Who has the better right of title in case of double sale through
a free patent application?
HELD:
In any event, again, the following ruling of this Court in the recent
case of De Villa v. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-24918, March 20, 1968,
applies to appellant:
604
We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title around
issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or
in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between original
parties and in case of successive registrations where more than
one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding under
the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person
who rely on the second certificate. The purchaser from the
owner of the later certificate and his successors, should resort
to his vendor for redress, rather than molest the holder of the
first certificate and his successors, who should be permitted to
resort secure in their title. (Citing Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil.
590)
FACTS:
605
Meanwhile, De Villa, having lost the duplicate of TCT No. 50
surrendered to him by Fabricante and learning that the original was
lost in the Register of Deeds, filed before the CFI on June 12, 1948 a
petition to reconstitute the same in favor of Cesario Fabricante with
the annotation of the mortgage in his favor.
The CFI found that the mortgage in De Villa's favor had been
annotated at the back of both the original and the duplicate of TCT
No. 50; that TCT No. RT-29(50), the reconstituted title from which De
Villa derived TCT No. 3347, covers Lot No. 9, Plan PSU 1185, and
originated from OCT No. 183, issued on January 30, 1920, while the
duplicate title issued to Fabricante on which Palma's TCT No. 12 was
based, as well as the TCT No. 1115 of DBP, covers Lot No. 2, Plan
PSU 11885, and originated from OCT No. 34, issued on November
25, 1920; that the two title certificates were issued covering the same
land and the rule is that the earlier in date — Original Certificate of
Title No. 183 — prevails; that the heirs of Trinidad acquired only
whatever right DBP had acquired; that the stigma of Fabricante's bad
faith extended to Palma and to DBP; that there was no prescription,
for plaintiff's action was not one for recovery of title or possession but
for a judicial determination of ownership — as to which of them, both
with valid certificates of title, really owns the land. Accordingly, it
stated in the dispositive portion:
HELD:
We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title are
issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part,
the earlier in date must prevail as between original parties and in
case of successive registrations where more than one certificate is
issued over the land, the person holding under the prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against the person who rely on the second
certificate. The purchaser from the owner of the later certificate and
his successors, should resort to his vendor for redress, rather than
molest the holder of the first certificate and his successors, who
should be permitted to rest secure in their title. Consequently, since
Original Certificate of Title No. 183 was registered on January 30,
607
1920, De Villa's claim which is based on said title should prevail, as
against Trinidad's whose original title was registered on November
25, 1920. And from the point of equity, this is the proper solution,
considering that unlike the titles of Palma and the DBP, De Villa's title
was never tainted with fraud.
FACTS:
The Republic was sustained by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. Thus, the petitioners appealed.
The petitioners contend that the Republic was itself barred from
608
putting up the defenses of prescription and laches because these had
not been pleaded earlier and that the Regional Trial Court and Court
of Appeals have erred and so should be reversed.
HELD:
FACTS:
609
Guillerma Tiro et al. filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Quieting of Title against PES. Petitioners alleged that they are the
children of the late Julian Tiro. They averred that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the
disputed land since time immemorial until they were prevented from
entering the same by persons claiming to be the new
owners sometime in 1995.
But they discovered that OCT No. RO-1121 had already been
cancelled as early as 1969 and was presently registered in the name
of respondent.
610
ISSUE:
HELD:
611
i. Remedy of the owner.
FACTS:
The proceedings at bar originated from two actions instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte by the spouses
Vicente Rañeses and Zenaida Buena against Antonino Lamadrid.
They were docketed as Civil Cases Numbered 2113 and 2313.
HELD:
613
iii. But if the certificate of title has already been
transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name of the forger, and while it remained that way,
the land was subsequently sold to an innocent
purchaser for value, the forged deed may be the
root of a valid title.
FACTS:
616
FACTS:
HELD:
617
v. Reason: the vendee has the right to rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title.
FACTS:
HELD:
TORRES VS. CA
FACTS:
The land erected with a building (TCT No. 53628 issued in his
name) is owned by Torres. He was and still in possession of the
realties, holding safely to his owner's duplicate certificate of title, and
paying the real estate taxes, and collecting rentals from tenants
occupying the building.
619
Torres filed civil case against Fernandez to annul TCT No.
86018 as well as the proceedings in LRC GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 133.
The trial court ruled that Torres is the true and legal evidence of
ownership of the subject immovable which was affirmed by the CA.
The trial court declared that Mota’s title is void but CA reversed
it.
620
HELD:
Yes, except if the owner still holds a valid and existing
certificate of title covering the same property.
621
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. THE HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
The PNB Branch Manager assured Alcedo that the bank would
exclude his lot as collateral for Sepe's forthcoming sugar crop loan.
Alcedo sued Sepe and PNB for collection and injunction with
damages. While pending, Alcedo's land was sold to PNB as the
highest bidder in the sale to which he filed an annulment of it and
reconveyance of the land to him free from liens and encumbrances,
with damages.
622
Alcedo withdrew his action to collect his one-half from the
proceeds of the sugar crop loans obtained by Sepe. PNB alleged that
it had no knowledge of the agreement between Mrs. Sepe and Alcedo
to split the crop loan proceeds between them.
The trial court favored Alcedo, declaring the public auction sale
and the certificate of sale as null and void, which decision was
affirmed by IAC.
HELD:
623
have released the property to Alcedo. The mortgage which Sepe
gave to the bank on Alcedo's lot as collateral for her 1971-72 sugar
crop loan was null and void for having been already disauthorized by
Alcedo. Since Alcedo's property secured only P13,100.00 of Sepe's
1970-71 sugar crop loan of P16,500.00 (because P3,400 was
secured by Sepe's own property), Alcedo's property may be held to
answer for only the unpaid balance, if any, of Sepe's 1970-71 loan,
but not the 1971-72 crop loan.
While Article 1358 of the New Civil Code requires that the
revocation of Alcedo's Special Power of Attorney to mortgage his
property should appear in a public instrument. Nevertheless, a
revocation embodied in a private writing is valid and binding between
the parties.
624
F. Mortgages and Leases
a. Nature of Mortgage
LIGON V CA
244 SCRA 693
Facts:
By virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale, the Islamic Directorate of the
Philippines (IDP), sold to Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) two parcels of lot. The
parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall undertake to
evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within forty-
five (45) days from the execution of the contract.
IDP failed to comply with this undertaking, prompting INK to file a
case. In its answer, IDP alleges that it was INK which failed to comply
as it did not pay full price within the specific period agreed upon. IDP
now prays for the rescission of the sale.
The trial court rendered a decision granting the relief sought by INK.
Later on, INK filed a motion against herein petitioner as the
mortgagee of the property, seeking for the surrender of the certificate
of title by the later for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale
with the Register of Deeds.
Petitioner filed an opposition alleging that the ownership of the
subject property is still in question. The trial court rendered a decision
ordering petitioner to surrender the certificate of title for the
registration of the sale and the annotation of the mortgage to the new
TCT to be issued in favor of INK. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale prejudicial to
the rights of the mortgagee.
Ruling:
625
No. Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which
subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer
certificates of title.
This is true even in the case of a real estate mortgage because
pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the
possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose
security it was constituted. It is inseparable from the property
mortgaged as it is a right in rem — a lien on the property whoever its
owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership; in
short, the personality of the owner is disregarded. Thus, all
subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage whether the
transfer to them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for
such mortgage until discharged follows the property.
GONZALES V IAC
157 SCRA 587
Facts:
Asuncion and Dioscoro Buensuceco were the original owners of a lot
but due to tax delinquency, the lot was sold at public auction in favor
of the province of Ilo-ilo. The daughter of the spouses, Hortencia,
discovered that the title of the land is still in the name of her parents.
She paid the taxes and was issued a deed of repurchase. The title
was reconstituted and issued in the name of Asuncion. It was then
sold to spouses Panzo. The spouses Panzo mortgaged the property
with Rural Bank of Pavia. Due to failure to pay, the property was
foreclosed and a deed was executed in favor of Rural Bank.
626
Petitioner, as judicial co-administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the
late Matias Yusay, thereafter filed for the cancellation of the title and
the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Yusay. She
alleges that the property was originally mortgaged to Yusay by
spouses Buensuceco and was later sold orally to the same. It is also
alleged that the property is in possession of Yusay as evidenced by
the presence of tenant Daguino. Defendant bank alleges good faith.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent nullification of the mortgagor’s certificate of
title nullifies the mortgage?
Ruling:
No.
Where the Torrens title of the land was in the name of the mortgagor
and later given as security for a bank loan, the subsequent
declaration of said title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying
the mortgage right of the bank, which had acted in good faith. Being
thus an innocent mortgagee for value, its right or lien upon the land
mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagors
obtained their title thereto thru fraud.
(1)All-embracing
A mortgage can be constituted on the building only
627
PRUDENTIAL BANK vs.HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS, FERNANDO
MAGCALE & TEODULA BALUYUT-MAGCALE
FACTS:
628
ISSUE: Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be
constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another.
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, this
Court ruled that, "it is obvious that the inclusion of "building" separate
and distinct from the land, in said provision of law can only mean that
a building is by itself an immovable property."
629
(2)Inseparable
(3)Indivisible
FACTS:
Respondent spouses mortgaged six parcels of land to PNB to
secure the payment of a loan. Two of the six parcels of land are
covered by free patent titles while the other four are untitled and
covered only by tax declarations.
For failure of respondent spouses to pay the loan after its
maturity, PNB, pursuant to a special power of attorney in the
mortgage deed, effected the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
and purchased the same at public auction. The certificate of sale was
duly registered with the Register of Deeds.
630
respondent spouses of the transaction in a letter dated May 31, 1972.
RULING:
The situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within the
purview of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious since the
aggregate number of the lots which comprise the collaterals for the
mortgage had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction.
There is no partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the
obligation to speak of. The aforesaid doctrine, which is actually
intended for the protection of the mortgagee, specifically refers to the
release of the mortgage which secures the satisfaction of the
indebtedness and naturally presupposes that the mortgage is
existing.
Once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure
thereof, said doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since, with the
full payment of the debt, there is nothing more to secure.
631
Indivisibility does not apply where the several heirs as Art.
2089 presupposes several heirs of the debtor or the
creditor.
FACTS:
632
On June 14, 1968, the Monetary Board, after finding thatIsland
Savings Bank failed to put up the required capital to restore its
solvency, issued Resolution No. 967 which prohibited Island Savings
Bank from doing business in the Philippines and instructed the Acting
Superintendent of Banks to take charge of the assets of Island
Savings Bank (pp. 48-49, rec).
ISSUE:
RULING:
The fact that when Sulpicio M. 'Tolentino executed his real estate
633
mortgage, no consideration was then in existence, as there was no
debt yet because Island Savings Bank had not made any release on
the loan, does not make the real estate mortgage void for lack of
consideration. It is not necessary that any consideration should pass
at the time of the execution of the contract of real mortgage
(Bonnevie vs. C.A., 125 SCRA 122 [1983]).
FACTS:
634
For failure of respondent spouses to pay the loan after its maturity,
petitioner bank, pursuant to a special power of attorney in the
mortgage deed, effected the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
under Act No. 3135, as amended, and purchased the same at public
auction for P12,735.30 which amount included the expenses of sale,
interest and
On May 9, 1972, petitioner entered into a contract to sell the six (6)
parcels of land to one Gerardo Badong for P27,000.00, with
P5,400.00 as down payment upon the execution of the contract.
Petitioner informed respondent spouses of the transaction in a letter
dated May 31, 1972.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its aforesaid
decision of May 11, 1976 holding that respondent spouses are
entitled to redeem the six (6) parcels of land on the theory of
"indivisibility of mortgage" and dismissing the petition in Special
Proceeding No. 2679 to declare the respondent spouses in contempt
of court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the debtor could ask for the release of the portion
even if the entire loan secured by several lots is not yet paid
635
RULING:
No.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that what the law proscribes is the
foreclosure of only a portion of the property or a number of the
several properties mortgaged corresponding to the unpaid portion of
the debt where before foreclosure proceedings partial payment was
made by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation. This
also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release of any portion
of the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots
mortgaged unless and until the loan thus, secured has been fully
paid, notwithstanding the fact that there has been a partial fulfillment
of the obligation. Hence, it is provided that the debtor who has paid a
part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of
the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied.
That the situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within the purview
of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious since the aggregate
number of the lots which comprise the collaterals for the mortgage
had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction. There is no
partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak
of. The aforesaid doctrine, which is actually intended for the
protection of the mortgagee, specifically refers to the release of the
mortgage which secures the satisfaction of the indebtedness and
naturally presupposes that the mortgage is existing. Once the
mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof, said
doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since, with the full payment of
the debt, there is nothing more to secure.
636
iv. Doctrine of innocent purchaser for value applies to an
innocent mortgagee for value
FACTS:
In October 1976, plaintiffs entrusted their owner's copy of their TCT
No. T-38632 covering the land in question to their nephew, defendant
Florentino Alcantara, whom they approached for the purpose of
obtaining a bigger loan from a bank in Manila with the land as
collateral. After a few days, Alcantara returned to plaintiffs' house and
he brought with him plaintiffs to the house of one Gregorio Cordero,
wherein Alcantara introduced to plaintiffs Aniano Tantuco, Efren
Rocha and Cordero who told plaintiffs that they have prepared the
latter's application for a real estate mortgage. These people
convinced plaintiffs to papers as a requirement for securing a loan
from the Bank in said Manila.
RULING:
No, the innocent mortgagee has to investigate with full diligence on
the validity of the certificate of title.
FACTS:
On November 3, 1976, Flora Jaldon, represented by her attorney-in-
fact, Manuel Jaldon, Jr., mortgaged a parcel of land located in
Cagayan De Oro City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
7564, to the Philippine Banking Corp. On December 10, 1976,
petitioner Unchuan, claiming to be the owner of one-half of the
mortgaged property, caused to be annotated on the title an adverse
claim.
On May 14, 1986, the bank filed a petition for the cancellation of the
annotations on its title and for the issuance of a writ of possession.
Named respondents were Unchuan and Faustino Neri, Jr. Unchuan
filed an opposition to the petition. In his affirmative and special
defenses, Unchuan again raised his claim of ownership to the 1/2
portion of the lot in question.
Hearing was set several times. On July 16, 1986, notice was sent
setting the hearing for August 19, 1986, but due to the failure of
Unchuan's counsel to appear, said hearing had to be reset for
September 2, 1986. The hearing set for September 2, 1986 had to be
reset again for September 23,1986 upon motion of counsel for
Unchuan. Finally, on September 23, 1986, hearing proceeded as
scheduled and the case was submitted for resolution upon
agreement of the parties. However, on September 25, 1986, Unchuan
filed a manifestation praying for the dismissal/suspension of the
petition for writ of possession on the ground that he had filed an
action for quieting of title on the property, Attached to the
manifestation was a copy of Unchuan's complaint in Civil Case No.
639
10770 for "Quieting of Title, Ownership, Annulment of Deed of
Mortgage, Foreclosure Proceedings and TCT No. 43346."
ISSUE:
Whether a decision should be in favor of Unchuan
RULING:
No, the case is not in favor of Unchuan.
It is too late in the day for Unchuan to question the summary nature
of the proceedings in the lower court. In the hearing of September 23,
1986, his counsel agreed to submit the case for resolution, even as
on said date, all that he had submitted for consideration of the court
was his Opposition to the Petition of Philippine Banking Corporation.
He is now estopped from questioning the procedure adopted by the
trial collaborated.
Moreover, there is nothing objectionable in the summary disposition
of third-party claims. On several occasions, the Court had sanctioned
summary proceedings to determine the nature of the possession of
third-party claimants.
On the basis of the record of the case, the trial judge ruled in favor of
Philippine Banking Corporation. This Tribunal has carefully gone over
the record, and is convinced that there is sufficient basis warranting
the issuance of a writ of possession.
The land involved is a Torrens-title property. It is basic that a person
dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only has to
rely on, the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and
claims which annotated on the title, for registration is the operative
act that binds the property.
640
Unchuan claims that he purchased one-half (1/2) of the property
"long before November 3, 1976." However, other than his bare
allegation, the only proof he presented in court is a handwritten
receipt for the payment of his contribution to realty taxes allegedly
signed by Flora Jaldon. He has not bothered to prove the authenticity
of the private writing, though. The alleged receipt does not even
sufficiently identify the land subject of the sale to Unchuan to be the
same land mortgaged and then sold to Philippine Banking
Corporation. Also, for a transaction as important as the sale of a
registered parcel of land; Unchuan has not even kept a record of
precisely when he bought the property, except that it was "long
before November 3, 1976," which incidentally is the day when Flora
Jaldon mortgaged the property to Philippine Banking Corporation.
Moreover, the sale was merely a verbal agreement; hence, it could
not be registered. All that Unchuan did was to file a belated adverse
claim on December 10, 1976, after the property had been mortgaged
to Philippine Banking Corporation. Note however, that since the filing
of the adverse claim, Unchuan has done nothing to prosecute his
claim of ownership over onehalf of the property. He has not, for
instance, compelled Jaldon to execute the property instrument so that
the sale could be registered (Assuming that the land was indeed sold
to him) and the proper title issued in his name. In fact, the mortgage
to the bank had been foreclosed, and a new title had been issued in
the name of Philippine Banking Corporation, but all the Unchuan did
was file an adverse claim.
FACTS:
Venegas, the owner of a parcel of land delivered the title and
executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of Datuin for purposes of
the latter to obtain a loan with the RCBC. However, Venegas learned
641
of Datuin's fraudulent scheme when she sold the lot to the
respondents in a deed of conditional sale. Venegas instituted a
complaint against Datuin for recovery of property and nullification with
damages.
ISSUE:
RULING:
642
obligation of the former in favor of petitioner. Under Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, the written acknowledgment and assumption of the
mortgage obligation by respondents had the effect of interrupting the
prescriptive period of the mortgage action.
Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for
their object the enforcement of obligations to pay principal with
interest or annuity runs from the last payment of the annuity or
of the interest.
643
101 SCRA 5 (1980)
FACTS:
But it was allegedly revealed that the land had already been sold to
Mejos and, therefore, its acceptance of the redemption price
amounting to would not produce any legal effect.
The bank further disclosed that there is pending in the trial court a
case for the annulment of the foreclosure sale of the said lot and the
release of the mortgage which was instituted by the Serrano spouses,
as mortgagors, against the bank and the Mejos spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court and the CA erred in not giving due course to
the bank's appeal.
RULING:
644
The SC ruled that the trial court and the CA acted correctly in refusing
to give due course to the bank's appeal not only because the order
sought to be appealed is in interlocutory but also because in the
present posture of the case it is imperative that the trial court
should consolidate the foreclosure case with the other case filed by
the Serrano spouses. Note that the latter case is also pending in the
sala of respondent Judge.
In the instant case, where the foreclosure sale has not yet been
confirmed but the statutory one-year period for redemption expired
and the mortgaged lot was sold by the mortgagee (as the only bidder
at the auction sale) to a third person, the trial court should give the
purchaser a chance to be heard before requiring the mortgagee-bank
to accept the redemption price tendered by the mortgagors.
645
may foreclose on the mortgage for the purpose of
alienating the mortgaged property to satisfy his
credit.
FACTS:
646
Weeks later, petitioner demanded from respondents the payment of
their outstanding obligations which had by then ballooned to more
than P20 million. Again, respondents ignored petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DBP has the legal right to foreclose on the real
property and the chattel mortgage?
RULING:
Since respondents neither assailed the due execution of the June 29,
1994 promissory notes nor presented proof of payment thereof, their
obligation remained outstanding. Upon default, by prior mutual
agreement, petitioner had the right to foreclose on the real and
chattel mortgages securing their loans.
FACTS:
In 1958, Caridad J. Torento executed a deed of First Mortgage over a
parcel of duly registered land in favor of defendant-appellant Dolores
M. Santos. This was done in order to secure her indebtedness to
Santos in the amount of 7000 Php. Said deed was validly registered
and a subsequent certificate of title in favor of Santos was issued.
648
put in auction, where Santos was the highest bidder in the amount
3500 Php. Said sale was then annotated at the TCT of the subject lot.
Afterwhich, Santos filed for the recovery of the deficiency resulting
from the price paid for the property and its value at the public auction.
The court then issued a writ of attachment over the properties of
Torento, who assigned to Matilda Gorospe all her rights on the
subject property particularly her statutory right of redemption.
On March 1961, the Sheriff, who conducted the sale of the foreclosed
property, issued a Certificate of Redemption in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees as successors in interest of Torrento over the foreclosed
property. The Certificate of Redemption was registered a on March
13, 1961 with Register of deeds, and the corresponding entry and
annotation made on the original of said certificate of title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of redemption may be transferred or
assigned by the owner?
RULING:
As held by the Supreme Court in Magno v. Viola, the term
"successor-in-interest' includes one to whom the debtor has
transferred his statutory right of redemption; or one to whom the
debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of
redemption; or one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by
operation of law; or one or more joint debtors who were not owners of
the property sold;. or the wife as regards her husband's homestead
by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband's title passes
to her. There is no question, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee Matilda
J. Gorospe is a "successor-in-interest" of the debtor Caridad J.
Torrento and as such could exercise the right to redeem the property
at any time within the period provided by law.
The Supreme Court then affirmed the decision of the CA and ordered
Santos to deliver the owner’s certificate of TCT to the Gorospes.
FACTS:
Four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino
to Guillermo Ponce and his wife Adela (since deceased) as security
for a loan of P2,200,000.00. The mortgages were registered. Two of
the lot were afterwards sold by the Aquinos to the Butuan Bay Wood
Export Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be annotated
on the certificates of title.
On order of the trial court, the covering titles were cancelled and
issued to Limpin. Limpin sold the two lots to Rogelio M. Sarmiento.
By virtue of said sale, TCTs Nos. 285450 and 285451 were cancelled
on November 4, 1983, and TCT’S were replaced in Sarmiento's
name.
Ponce filed suit against the Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of
the mortgage over the Aquinos' four lots. Judgment was rendered in
favor of Ponce. After the judgment became final, the Trial Court,
650
directed the sale at public auction of the 4 mortgaged lots to satisfy
the judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners exercised their equity of redemption on
time?
RULING:
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, no equivalent right of
redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale,
"when confirmed by an order of the court, ... shall operate to divest
the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by
law. Such rights exceptionally "allowed by law" (i.e., even after
confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the
charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938),
and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer on the
mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the
mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure-after
confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale-which right may be
exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
The Supreme Court held that the equity of redemption claimed and
invoked by Sarmiento over the subject properties, lapsed and ceased
to exist without having been properly exercised from the date of
651
issuance by the Trial Court of the Order confirming the sheriff’s sale
of said properties in favor of the private respondent.
TOLENTINO vs. CA
106 SCRA 513, 1981
FACTS:
652
day, upon advice of counsel and to protect her rights, she said.
She said this was to prevent BPI from encashing the check without
returning all the foreclosed properties. Then she filed a redemption
case against BPI, imputing bad faith for failing to return all the
foreclosed properties.
Issue:
In the case of a mortgage, is consignation necessary or is
tender of payment enough? May a check be used for tender of
payment and if so, when is the obligation extinguished? When the
check is filled out or when it is encashed?
Ratio:
The court ruled that Art. 1249 does not apply in this case
because the Tolentino’s debt was extinguished when the property
was foreclosed and sold to satisfy the debt. What remained was
their right to redeem said properties, which is not an obligation but
a privilege. Once they exercise the right to redeem, they would
then have an obligation to pay, but that obligation would be
extinguished only when the check is encashed.
Since the formal offer to redeem was made during the period of
redemption prescribed by law, the Tolentinos may redeem the two
other properties mortgaged to BPI within 30 days from entry of
judgment, plus 1% per month interest up to the time of
redemption, together with taxes or assessments BPI may have
paid after purchase.
653
finding of grave abuse of jurisdiction that would justify a reversal of
the decision.
RAMIREZ vs CA
219 SCRA 598
FACTS
On September 15, 1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez
and Valentina Bonifaciofiled an application for registration of a
parcel of riceland in Rizal. In their application for registration, they
alleged that to the best of their knowledge and belief, there is
nomortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said
land and that they hadacquired it by purchase from certain
Gregoria Pascual during the early part of the American regime
but the corresponding contract of sale was lot and no copy or
recordof the same was available.The Court found, however, that
the applicants are not the owners of the land sought tobe
registered. They were ANTICHRETIC CREDITORS- mere holders
placed inpossession of the land by its owners as security for loan.
The applicants were foundguilty of fraudulent misrepresentation
and concealment when they declared that noother person had any
claim or interest in the said land.
ISSUE
Can an antichretic creditor acquire land of debtor by prescription?
HELD
No.The petitioners are not possessors in the concept of
owners, but mere HOLDERS placed in possession of land by its
owners. Thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring
dominion. The court, from other cases like Trillana v. Manansala,
Valencia v. Acala and Barretto v. Barretto, held that the antichretic
654
creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land
surrendered to him by the debtor.
FACTS:
Private respondents, Spouses Dolino, alarmed of losing their right of
redemption over thesubject parcel of land from Juan Gandiocho,
purchaser of the aforesaid lot at a foreclosure sale of the previous
mortgage in favor of Cebu City Development Bank, went to Teotimo
Abellana,President of the City Savings Bank (formerly known as
Cebu City Savings and LoanAssociation, Inc.), to obtain a loan of
P30, 000. Prior thereto, their son Teofredo filed a similar loan
application and the subject lot was offered as security. Subsequently
they executed a promissory note in favor of CSB.The loan became
due and demandable without the spouses Dolino paying the same,
petitioner association caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. The land was sold at a publicauction to CSB being the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued which
wasalso registered. No redemption was being effected by Sps.
Dolino, their title to the property wascancelled and a new title was
issued in favor of CSB.Sps. Dolino then filed a case to annul the sale
at public auction and for the cancellation of certificate of sale issued
pursuant thereto, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was
inviolation of Act 3135, as amended. The trial court sustained the
validity of the loan and the realestate mortgage, but annulled the
extrajudicial foreclosure on the ground that it failed to complywith the
notice requirement of Act 3135. Not satisfied with the ruling of the trial
court, Sps. Dolino interposed a partial appeal to the CA,assailing the
validity of the mortgage executed between them and City Savings
Bank, amongothers. The CA ruled in favor of private respondents
declaring the said mortgage as void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a mortgage, whose property has been extrajudicially
655
foreclosed and sold ata corresponding foreclosure sale, may validly
execute a mortgage contract over the same property in favor of a
third party during the period of redemption.
RULING:
It is undisputed that the real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner
bank was executed byrespondent spouses during the period of
redemption. During the said period it cannot be said thatthe
mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property since the
rule up to now is theright of a purchaser of a foreclosure sale is
merely inchoate until after the period of redemptionhas expired
without the right being exercised. The title to the land sold under
mortgageforeclosure remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the
expiration of the redemption periodand the conveyance of the master
deed.The mortgagor remains as the absolute owner of the property
during the redemption period andhas the free disposal of his property,
there would be compliance with Article. 2085 of the CivilCode for the
constitution of another mortgage on the property. To hold otherwise
would createan inequitable situation wherein the mortgagor would be
deprived of the opportunity, which may be his last recourse, to raise
funds to timely redeem his property through another mortgage.
FACTS:
As found by respondent court and sustained by the record, on May 7,
1985, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan and docketed therein as LRC No. A-229, Record No. N-
33399, a petition for the cancellation of a memorandum of
encumbrance annotated upon its sixteen (16) transfer certificates of
title. As a backdrop, petitioner alleged that spouses Archimedes J.
Balingit and Ely Suntay executed in its favor the following real estate
mortgages.For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan
obligation with petitioner, the latter extrajudicially foreclosed under Act
656
3135, as amended, the sixteen (16) parcels of land covered by the
real estate mortgages executed by the said spouses in favor of
petitioner. The sheriff s certificate of sale was registered on April 3,
1972 with the Register of Deeds, with a memorandum thereof duly
annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of title of the
foreclosed properties.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether the action of the Register of Deeds in carrying the
annotations of levy over to the new title certificates issued in
purchaser's favor is vid and illegal.
RULING:
We find the foregoing contentions meritorious.
The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all
liens subordinate to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and the
purchaser at public auction held pursuant thereto acquires title free
from the subordinate liens. Ordinarily, thereafter the Register of
Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles without carrying over the
annotation of subordinate liens. 15 In a case with similar features, we
had earlier held that the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to
redeem, within the time allowed by Section 6 of Act 3136, the land
which was sold extrajudicially to satisfy the first mortgage, gives the
purchaser a perfect right to secure the cancellation of the annotation
of said creditor's attachment lien on the certificates of title of said
land.
657
It has likewise been declared in Bank of the Philippine Islands, etc., et
al. vs. Noblejas, etc., et al., 17 that "(a)ny subsequent lien or
encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificates of title cannot
in any way prejudice the mortgage previously registered, and the lots
subject thereto pass to the purchaser at the public auction sale free
from any lien or encumbrance. Otherwise, the value of the mortgage
could be easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse
claim, for no one would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound by the
posterior claim. . . . This alone is sufficient justification for the
dropping of the adverse claim from the new certificates of title to be
issued to her, as directed by respondent Commissioner in his opinion
subject of this appeal."
FACTS:
Spouses Lozada entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI the
Unit No. 402 of Cluster 1 of the Project. Six months later, PPGI
executed two Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CBC to
secure the credit facilities granted by CBC to PPGI in the combined
maximum amount of P37,000,000.00. The real estate mortgages
covered 51 units of the Project, including Unit No. 402. When PPGI
failed to pay its indebtedness despite repeated demands, CBC filed
with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of the Makati City RTC a
Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the real estate mortgages.
658
A year following the public auction sale of the foreclosed
properties held on 11 September 1998, spouses Lozada executed a
Notice of Adverse Claim dated 13 September 1999 as regards Unit
No. 402, which she registered with the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City. Said Notice of Adverse Claim was subsequently annotated on
CCT No. 69096 when it was issued in the name of CBC.
On 27 July 2001, CBC filed an Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of
a Writ of Possession in favor of petitioner [CBC] and against Erlinda
[sic] Lozada.
On 31 August 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the Ex
Parte Petition of CBC, and decreeing that a writ of possession issue
in favor of the China Banking Corporation.
29 October 2001, the spouses Lozada filed with the Court of
Appeals their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with Application
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order against
the Makati City RTC, Sheriff, CBC, and PPGI.
RULING OF THE CA:
The CA ruled in favor of the spouses Lozada, maintaining that
the possession of the spouses Lozada of Unit No. 402 constituted an
effective obstacle barring the Makati City RTC from issuing a writ to
place CBC in possession of the same.
CONTENTION OF SPOUSES LOZADA:
The writ of possession in favor of CBC deprived them of the
opportunity to defend their title and right to possess; or simply, that it
denied them due process.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of possession may be granted and issued by
the RTC ex parte or without notice to other parties.
HELD:
The purchaser at the public auction sale of an extrajudicially
foreclosed real property may seek possession thereof in accordance
with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
The Court expounded on the application of the foregoing
provision in De Gracia v. San Jose, thus:
The law expressly authorizes the purchaser to petition for a writ
of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte
motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration
or cadastral proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title; and
upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding
659
bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the
order for a writ of possession.
Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a
situation wherein the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed
property during the 12-month period for redemption.
In the case of Nera, the procedure under Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended, may be availed of by a purchaser seeking
possession of the foreclosed property he bought at the public auction
sale after the redemption period has expired without redemption
having been made.
Rights acquired by the purchaser of the foreclosed
property at the public auction sale upon the consolidation of his
title when no timely redemption of the property was made, to
wit:
1. the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of
the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of
one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is
entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand
it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his
name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of
title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land
even during the redemption period except that he has to
post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135,
as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption
period if the property is not redeemed.
Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of
the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
2. The purchaser in a public auction sale of a foreclosed property
is entitled to a writ of possession; and upon an ex parte
petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon the RTC to issue
such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. However,
while this is the general rule, the exception and its basis were
summarized by the Court in Roxas v. Buan, thus:
In the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages,
possession of the property may be awarded to the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale during the pendency of the period of redemption or
after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a separate
and independent action
FACTS:
662
executed an Affidavit of Consolidation. TCT No. 122627 was thus
cancelled and TCT No. N-216396 was in its stead issued in the name
of petitioner on July 27, 2000.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of possession should be implemented during the
pendency of the case for annulment of mortgages.
HELD:
No, It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the
absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during
the period of one year after the registration of sale. As such, he is
entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it any time
following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance
of a new transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the bond required
in Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer necessary. Possession of
the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as
confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the
court.
663
FACTS:
The property involved was a house and lot belonging to the petitioner
spouses, Romeo F. Veloso and Delia M. Veloso. Their ownership was
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 136559 of the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City. By deeds executed on October 3, and 16,
1978, they constituted a mortgage over the property as security for a
loan in the sum of P200,000.00 given by State Investment House,
Inc. (SIHI) to Globe Engineering Corporation, a firm of which Romeo
F. Veloso was the President and General Manager.About four months
later, Globe Engineering Corporation asked SIHI for an additional
loan. The request was turned down. Instead SIHI demanded that the
former pay its original loan in accordance with the terms of the
contract and its current statement of accounts. No payment having
been made, SIHI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
by the Sheriff of Quezon City pursuant to the mortgage deeds. The
public auction sale was held on December 4, 1980, after due
publication and notice. The highest bid for the property, P303,069.79,
was submitted by SIHI. Consequently, the Sheriff executed a
certificate of sale in SIHI's favor, conveying the property to it. After the
expiry of the redemption period, ownership over the property was
consolidated in SIHI and a new title, No. 285806, was issued to it.
664
foreclosure sale.
ISSUE:
WON the pendency of that action bar the issuance of a writ of
possession to mortgagee who has acquired it as highest bidder in the
subsequent public auction sale
HELD:
NO,The pendency of that action does not and cannot bar the
issuance of a writ of possession to the mortgagee who has, in the
meantime, extrajudically foreclosed the mortgaged property and
acquired it as highest bidder in the subsequent public auction sale.
The law is quite explicit on this point, and the right of the mortgagee
thereunder unquestionable. And decisions abound applying the law
and declaring it to be the court's ministerial duty to uphold the
mortgagee's right to possession even during the redemption
period. 4 The petitioners have simply failed to demonstrate with any
degree of persuasiveness why the clear provisions of law and the
jurisprudence in application thereof should not be equally controlling
in the case at bar.
FACTS:
Alexander and Julie Lam, petitioners, obtained a loan of P2M from
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, respondent. To secure its
payment, petitioners executed a deed of REM over their property in
Davao City, covered by TCT No. T-115893. After that, they were also
granted additional loans and signed several amendments to the
REM.
665
instituted an extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding with the Office of
the Clerk of Court and the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Davao, which was
granted by the latter. A Sheriff's sale was held and as the sole bidder,
the property was awarded to the respondent. A Provisional Certificate
of Sale was issued in favor of respondent and it was registered with
the RD.
RTC rendered a decision that the case will be heard ex parte and that
the defendant (petitioners) should not be allowed to participate in the
case as an adverse party as if the same is an ordinary civil action. On
January 23, 2004, petitioners filed a complaint for the specific
performance and annulment of the foreclosure of mortgage with the
RTC. Subsequently, February 11, 2004, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order regarding the hearing of the issuance of
Writ of Possession in ex parte.
ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of a writ of possession should be heard ex parte?
RULING:
Yes. The court quote with approval the following disquisition of the
CA: The respondent judge’s line of reasoning in declaring ex parte
petition as an adversarial proceeding is simply puerile. The fact that
the Spouses Lam were allowed to actively participate in the
proceedings for the said case, by filing an Answer and going through
pre-trial and mediation, was a glaring procedural anomaly that the
court a quo had inexcusably abetted. The court cannot allow the
erring court a quo to use that same aberration as an excuse for a
continuing defiance of the law and jurisprudence that defines a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession as a non-litigious ex
parte proceeding that does not require the participation of the
mortgagor.
667
A mortgagee becomes the absolute owner after
expiration of the period of redemption without the
mortgagor exercising right to redeem; possession
may be demanded after consolidation of ownership;
issuance of writ of possession
FACTS:
For alleged non-payment of obligations secured by a real estate
mortgage executed by Francisco and Norma David in its favor, IBAA
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. An auction sale was
held and the mortgaged property was sold to IBAA as the highest
bidder. The certificate of sale was registered. No redemption was not
having been effected by the mortgagors, ownership of the land was
consolidated in IBAA and a new certificate of title was issued in its
name. IBAA filed a petition for a writ of possession over the said lot
was filed by IBAA and such was subsequently granted. David
spouses filed a petition to prohibit the foreclosure sale on the ground
that the real transaction between the parties was not a real estate
mortgage but a trust receipt agreement. The second is where the
mortgagors were seeking the cancellation of IBAA’s transfer
certificate of title on the ground of the nullity of the foreclosure sale. In
this latter case, a preliminary injunction order against IBAA dealing
with or entering into the possession of the subject lot although the writ
itself had not yet been granted because the petitioner’s bond was still
awaiting approval.
668
Judge Felipe Kalalo recalled the writ of possession and
dismissed the LRC. This prompted IBAA to file a motion for
reconsideration where it argued that since the petitioner’s bond had
not yet been approved in the Case the injunction order issued therein
should be regarded only as a temporary restraining order which
should be deemed to have expired after twenty days from issuance
under BP No. 224 but the motion was denied on the ground that the
movant had earlier recognized the validity of the injunction order.
Judge Pedro Laggui issued an indemnity bond in the writ of
preliminary injunction and the the complaint itself was dismissed on
the ground that the foreclosure sale had been validly held because
the order issued in the case to restrain the said sale had been
served tardily on the provincial sheriff.
IBAA filed a second motion for reconsideration in the LRC
arguing that in view of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6565 and the
consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, there was no
more reason for not issuing the writ of possession. This motion was
also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a mortgagee becomes absolute owner after expiration
of period of redemption without mortgagor exercising right to
redeem?
HELD:
Yes, A mortgagee becomes absolute owner after expiration of period
of redemption without mortgagor exercising right to redeem;
possesion may be demanded after consolidation of ownership; writ of
possession. There is no longer any legal bar for the issuance of a
subsequent writ of possession which petitioner is rightfully entitled to.
Legal technicalities should be brushed aside to pave the way for the
dispensation of substantial justice.
Accordingly, we agree that the second motion for
reconsideration filed by IBAA should have been considered a new
application for a writ of possession although it was not correctly
captioned as such. It is the text and purpose and not the designation
of a pleading that should control 6 lest a mere technicality deprive a
party of a substantial right because of a fastidious obsession with
formality. A contrary rule would forever deprive IBAA of the means to
possess and enjoy the property it had acquired in the foreclosure
669
sale.
The new application for a writ of possession should have been
granted, especially since the reason for the withdrawal of the earlier
writ had already disappeared with the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 6565.
The right of the petitioner to the possession of the property is
clearly unassailable. It is founded on its right of ownership. As the
purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale, and to which the
respective titles thereto have already been issued, petitioner’s right
over the property has become absolute, vesting upon him the right of
possession over an enjoyment of the property which the Court must
aid in effecting its delivery. After such delivery, the purchaser
becomes the absolute owner of the property. As we said in Tan Soo
Huat v. Ongwico, the deed of conveyance entitled the purchaser to
have and to hold the purchased property. This means, that the
purchaser is entitled to go immediately upon the real property, and
this it is the Sheriff’s inescapable duty to place him in such
possession.
FACTS:
The spouses Lozada entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI, the
developer of Makati Prime City Condominium Townhomes Project.
PPGI agreed to sell to the spouses Lozada a unit.
6 months later, PPGI, executed 2 Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage in
favor of CBC to secure the credit facilities granted by CBC to PPGI.
The real estate mortgages covered 51 units of the Project, including
the unit sold to the spouses.
Thereafter, PPGI failed to pay its indebtedness despite repeated
demands, the former filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure. The
670
public auction sale took place and the CBC was the highest bidder.
The Certificate of Sale of the foreclosed properties was subsequently
issued in favor of CBC. Consequently, the Writ of possession were
issued in favor of the petitioner. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Writ of Possession may be granted in favor of the
petitioner.
RULING:
The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is
governed by Act No. 3135, as amended. The purchaser at the public
auction sale of an extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek
possession thereof in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended
Strictly, Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a situation
wherein the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed property
during the 12-month period for redemption. Upon the purchaser’s
filing of the ex parte petition and posting of the appropriate bond, the
RTC shall, as a matter of course, order the issuance of the writ of
possession in the purchaser’s favor.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the
absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during
the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is
entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at
any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the
issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in
fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption
period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7
of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the
redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the
land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed
owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
671
possession.
RULING:
Under the provision of Sec. 33, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court and Sec. 7 of Act 3135, as amended, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession during the
redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that
purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in
the case of property covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing of such
motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in
express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of
possession.
A writ of possession may also be issued after consolidation of
ownership of the property in the name of the purchaser. It is settled
that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of
the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one
year after the registration of sale. As such, he is entitled to the
possession of the property and can demand it any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance of a new
transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the bond required in
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer necessary. Possession of the
672
land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed
owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
JOVEN VS. CA
212 SCRA 700
Facts:
Private respondent Associated Bank filed with the RTC of Quezon
City a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of property
covered by TCT No. 254504. The property, consisting of a 953-
square meter lot and a residential house erected on it, situated at
Quezon City. Private respondent alleged that for failure of petitioners
Eduardo Vaca and Ma. Luisita Pilar to pay their mortgage obligation
to private respondent, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed
and the mortgaged property was sold on October 30, 1990 to private
respondent as the highest bidder; that the one-year period to redeem
having expired, TCT No. 254504 was cancelled and TCT No. 52593
in private respondent's name was issued in lieu thereof; and that
despite demands, petitioners refused to turn over possession of the
674
property to private respondent.chanroblesvirtualaw
Petitioner spouses filed an opposition alleging that there was a
pending action in another court which the petitioners had filed for the
annulment of the mortgage and its foreclosure.chanroblesvirtualaw
The RTC denied private respondent's petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession, and denied private respondent's motion for
reconsideration.chanroblesvirtua
On certiorari the Court of Appeals annulled the orders and ordered the
RTC to issue the writ of possession. Hence this petition.
Issue:ch
-whether or not the action for annulment of the mortgage
constitutes a prejudicial question in LRC for issuance of a writ of
possession and that it was error for the Court of Appeals to order the
RTC to issue the writ of possession in favor of the mortgagee.
-whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of
possession after the one-year period to redeem has expired is
subject to certain exceptions.hanroblesvirtualawlibrar
Held: Petitioners' contention has no merit. The question raised in this
case has already been settled in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, in
which it was held that the pendency of a separate civil suit
questioning the validity of the mortgage cannot bar the issuance of
the writ of possession, because the same is a ministerial act of the
trial court after title on the property has been consolidated in the
mortgagee.blesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners cited the cases of Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, and Barican v.Intermediate Appellate Court, where deferment was
ordered of the issuance of the writ of possession notwithstanding the
lapse of the one-year period of redemption. The deferment, however,
was due to the circumstances of the property which had been sold to
third parties who assumed the indebtedness of the mortgagor and
took possession of the property earlier so that at the time of the
hearing on the petition for a writ of possession, the original debtor
was no longer in possession. Under these circumstances, it was held
that the obligation of the court to issue the writ of possession had
ceased to be ministerial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrar
None of these equitable circumstances is present herein to justify
675
making an exception to the rule that the issuance of a writ of
possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure, after the
period of redemption, is a ministerial function of the court. In this
case, there is no dispute that the property was not redeemed within
one year from registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Private
respondent thus acquired the absolute right, as purchaser, to the
issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Act No. 3135, sec.
7.chanroblesvirtualawlibrar
EXCEPTIONS:
FACTS:
The spouses Conrado Crisostomo and Thelma Gallaza mortgaged
three (3) parcels of land, one a coconut plantation located at Maasim,
and the other two parcels situated at General Santos City, with
respondent Philippine National Bank, General Santos City Branch
(PNB for brevity), as security for a loan. The mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and the properties were sold at public
auction to the PNB as the highest bidder. After the expiration of the
one-year redemption period, PNB took possession of the same. On
October 8, 1974, the PNB appointed Matilde Abejeron as caretaker.
On October 21, 1975, the PNB executed a Deed of Promise to Sell
said land in favor of respondent Princessita Jabido-Maulit. When the
vendee, Princessita, tried to take physical possession of the land,
petitioners Fernando Abellon and his wife Conchita Abellon (the
Abellons, for short) claiming to be the tenants of the former owner,
Conrado Crisostomo, and to have planted most of the coconuts in
said land, refused to give up possession.
On September 17, 1976, respondents PNB and Princessita filed with
the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, an "Ex-Parte Motion for
the Issuance of Writ of Possession. As the Writ was not fully satisfied
because of the refusal of the Abellons and their workers to leave the
676
subject property, private respondents moved for the issuance of an
Alias Writ of Possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere refusal of the defeated party to surrender
the property to the winning party upon the order of the sheriff does
constitute contempt.
RULING:
Petitioners were successful in obtaining an Order upholding their
tenancy status and enjoining the defendants therein from depriving
them of their possession and cultivation of the subject property. Even
under Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, made applicable in
extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages by Section 6 of Act
No. 3135, the possession of property is given to a purchaser in
extrajudicial foreclosures unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor." In this case, the subject
land was being possessed and cultivated by the Abellons as third
parties, whose status as tenants was recognized in CAR Case No.
44. Petitioners-spouses are protected by Presidential Decree No.
1038, which provides that no tenant tiller of private agricultural lands
devoted to crops other than rice and/or corn, including but not limited
to abaca, banana, coconut, coffee, mongo durian and other
permanent crops shall be removed, ejected, ousted or excluded from
his farm holding unless for causes provided by law and directed by a
final decision or order of the court. Sale of the land is not included as
one of the just causes for removal of tenants.
FACTS:
On 25 June 1995, the spouses Lozada entered into a Contract to
Sell with PPGI a two-bedroom residential unit with an area of 42.90
square meters, covered by CCT No. 34898, for the total price
of P1,444,014.04. About six months later, PPGI executed two Deeds
of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CBC to secure the credit facilities
677
granted by CBC to PPGI in the combined maximum amount
ofP37,000,000.00. The real estate mortgages covered 51 units of the
Project. When PPGI failed to pay its indebtedness despite repeated
demands, CBC filed with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of
the Makati City RTC a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the real
estate. The public auction sale took place at which CBC was the
highest bidder, offering the amount of P30,000,000.00 for the
foreclosed properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in ruling that the
respondents were holding the subject property adversely to the
judgment debtor thus the issuance of the writ of possession was
improper and unwarranted.
678
RULING:
The purchaser in the public auction sale of a foreclosed property is
entitled to a writ of possession; and upon an exparte petition of the
purchaser, it is ministerial upon the RTC to issue such writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser. However, while this is the
general rule, as in all general rules, there is an exception.
It is true that in the case presently before this Court, PPGI executed
in favor of the spouses Lozada the Contract to Sell covering the Unit
before it constituted in favor of CBC the real estate mortgages on 51
Project units including spoueses Lozada’s unit. Nonetheless, it must
be emphasized that what PPGI executed in favor of the
spouses Lozada was a Contract to Sell, a mere promise to
sell, which, at the moment of its execution, did not yet transfer
possession, much less, title to the from PPGI to the
spouses Lozada. When PPGI constituted the real estate mortgage
on the Unit in favor of CBC six months later, possession of and title to
the property still resided in PPGI. And when PPGI subsequently
679
ceded possession of the Unit, upon its completion, to the
spouses Lozada, such right was already burdened by the terms and
conditions of the mortgage constituted thereon. By merely stepping
into the shoes of PPGI, the spouses Lozada’s right of possession to
the Unit cannot be less or more than PPGI’s.
FACTS:
On 9 June 1992 Iluminada Cayco executed a Real Estate Mortgage
(REM) over Lot 2630 which is located in Caloocan City and covered
by TCT No. (23211) 11591 in favor of Cesar Sulit to secure a loan
of P4 Million. Upon Cayco’s failure to pay said loan within the
stipulated period, Sulit resorted to extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage as authorized in the contract. Hence, in a public auction
the lot was sold to the mortgagee, who submitted a winning bid of P7
Million. On 13 December 1993 Sulit petitioned the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City for the issuance of a writ of possession in his
favor. On 17 January 1994 the RTC Judge issued a decision in favor
of Cesar Sulit, upon his posting of an indemnity bond in the amount of
One Hundred Twenty Thousand (P120,000.00) Pesos.
The rule is, however, not without exception. Under Section 35, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgages by Section 6 of Act 3135, the
possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a
purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure “unless a third party is
actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgagee or purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale is entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession
over the mortgaged property despite his failure to pay the surplus
proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor or the person entitled thereto.
Secondarily, it calls for a resolution of the further consequences of
such non-payment of the full amount for which the property was sold
to him pursuant to his bid.
RULING:
Now, in forced sales, low prices are generally offered and the mere
inadequacy of the price obtained at the sheriff’s sale, unless shocking
to the conscience, has been held insufficient to set aside a sale. This
is because no disadvantage is caused to the mortgagor. On the
contrary, a mortgagor stands to gain with a reduced price because he
possesses the right of redemption. When there is the right to
redeem, inadequacy of price becomes immaterial since the judgment
debtor may reacquire the property or sell his right to redeem, and
thus recover the loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the
price obtained at the auction sale.
681
that equitable considerations demand that a writ of possession should
also not issue in this case.
The general rule that mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set
aside a foreclosure sale is based on the theory that the lesser the
price the easier it will be for the owner to effect the redemption. The
same thing cannot be said where the amount of the bid is in excess
of the total mortgage debt. The reason is that in case the mortgagor
decides to exercise his right of redemption, Section 30 of Rule 39
provides that the redemption price should be equivalent to the
amount of the purchase price, plus one per cent monthly interest up
to the time of the redemption, together with the amount of any
assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon
after purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the same
rate.
682
xii. where the trial court had already granted the wit of
possession sought by the buyer at an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, a petition to consolidate said case
with the case pending before another court for
Declaration of Nullity of Contracts/Discharge of
Mortgage, Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Sales and Reconveyance had become moot and
academic.
FACTS:
On February 5, 1999, respondent Hermosa Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc. (Hermosa Bank) filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of
Writ of Possession against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite. The petition alleged that on November 28,
1997 Hermosa Bank purchased at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale
three parcels of land together with improvements therein; that the
Certificate of Sale of Realty issued to it was duly registered and
annotated with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite on December 17,
1997; that twelve (12) months from the date of registration of the sale
had already elapsed and neither petitioners nor any person entitled
thereto had exercised their right of redemption; that upon the
expiration of the period, Hermosa Bank caused the consolidation of
ownership over said parcels and secured under its name; and that
having consolidated its ownership thereon, it is entitled as a matter of
right to a writ of possession.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the petition under Rule 65 by the
CA based on it being moot and academic is patently erroneous;
RULING:
As the CA correctly found, the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite had already
granted the writ of possession sought by Hermosa. Hence, the
petition to consolidate the case before the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite with
the case pending before the RTC of Las Piñas, had become moot
and academic.
DE RAMOS vs. CA
213 SCRA 207
FACTS:
Private respondents mortgaged their 230 square meter residential lot
located in Modern Village, Paciano Rizal, Calamba, Laguna and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-35475 in the Register of
684
Deeds of the Province of Laguna, to the Luzon Development Bank
(hereinafter, the Bank) as security for a loan of P10,000.00 which is
evidenced by a promissory note. There being default in the payment
of the installments on due dates despite several written demands, the
Bank applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. In a
public auction on 30 July 1981, the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna sold
the mortgaged property to the Bank, the lone bidder therein, for
P23,808.29.
On 26 July 1983, the Bank filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna
which was docketed as SLRC Case No. III-83-C. In its Order dated
24 June 1985, the trial court granted the petition, ordered the
issuance of a writ of possession and directed the Provincial Sheriff or
any of his deputies to place the Bank in possession of the property,
the writ of possession was issued on 1 July 1985. During the
pendency of the petition for a writ of possession, or specifically on 3
September 1983, the Bank sold to the herein petitioners the property
in question under a Deed of Conditional Sale for P35,000.00 payable
in installments. After the said balance having been paid, the Bank
executed in the petitioners favor a Deed of Absolute Sale on
November 1983 which was registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds on 13 November 1983.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Orders are adjudications on the merits of the
causes of action and the issues involved.
RULING:
The principle of res judicata applies in this case. There being clearly
identical parties and identity of rights asserted in all three (3) cases —
the focal issue in this case having been fully adjudicated in the
aforecited cases — this case must be dismissed."
The essential requisites of res judicata are (1) there must be a final
judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between the
two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of
action.
The parties do not dispute the fact that Branches 37 and 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna had jurisdiction over SLRC
No. 111-83-C and Civil Case No. 894-85-C, respectively, that their
Orders which were pleaded as a bar to Civil Case No. 1031-86-C are
firm and final; and that the principal parties, causes of action and
issues involved in the latter are identical to those in the first two (2)
cases.
If the court in Civil Case No. 894-85-C finally decreed the dismissal of
the case for lack of jurisdiction, it was because the Order of 24 June
1985 in SLRC No. 111-83-C was already final; the court could not,
therefore, annul it. the authority to annul the same is vested in the
then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) pursuant to
Section 9(2) of B.P. No. 129. The message the court wanted to
convey was that the Order of 24 June 1985 constituted a prior final
judgment which barred Civil Case No. 894-85-C.
The 3 January 1986 Order in Civil Case No. 894-85-C was, by itself,
an adjudication on the merits of the Demamay spouses’ claim
because it declared them no longer entitled to the right upon which
their claims are based. A judgment is deemed to be rendered upon
the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to the
respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate
fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and
upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal,
technical or dilatory objectives or contentions.
687
xiv. The order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of
possession is final which can only be questioned on
appeal
FACTS:
Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation (respondent PODC)
was the registered owner of a parcel of land in San Fernando,
Pampanga (now San Fernando City). Respondent PODC secured
two loans from petitioner and Masantol Rural Bank, Inc. (MRBI). The
loans were evidenced by separate promissory notes executed by
Federico R. Mendoza and Anastacio E. de Vera. To secure payment
of the loans, respondent PODC executed a real estate mortgage over
the subject lot in favor of the creditor banks. The contract provided
that in case of failure or refusal of the mortgagor to pay the obligation
secured thereby, the real estate mortgage may be extrajudicially
foreclosed in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended.
On May 11, 2002, petitioner, through Eliza Garbes (with the authority
of petitioner’s board of directors), executed a notarized deed of
assignment in favor of respondent Dominic G. Aquino over its right to
redeem the property. On May 30, 2002, respondent Aquino remitted
Cashier’s Check No. to the Ex-OfficioSheriff as redemption money for
the property for which he was issued Receipt dated May 31, 2002.
688
On October 15, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of
Possession in the RTC of Pampanga. On December 20, 2002, the
court in LRC No. 890 issued an Order granting the petition and
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession, on a bond equivalent to
the market value of the property. It ruled that petitioner, as purchaser
at the foreclosure sale, was entitled to a writ of possession.
The appellate court ruled that the December 20, 2002 Order of the
RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession was interlocutory
and not final; hence, it may be questioned only via petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by appeal. The
CA cited the ruling of this Court in City of Manila v. Serrano. The CA
further held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it granted the
application of petitioner for a writ of possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it
sanctioned the Respondents’ resort to Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, questioning a final order and not an
interlocutory order of the RTC.
RULING:
The CA erred in holding that the Order of the RTC granting the
petition for a writ of possession was merely interlocutory. Interlocutory
orders are those that determine incidental matters and which do not
touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to question an improvident interlocutory order. On the other
hand, a final order is one that disposes of the whole matter or
terminates the particular proceedings or action leaving nothing to be
done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. It is
one that finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more
can be done with it in the lower court. The remedy to question a final
order is appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
b. EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
i. Not an equitable mortgage in this case:
FACTS:
690
Gumersindo. On October 12, 1956, Dionisia executed a "Deed of
and Promise To Sell" in favor of Salvador over a 90,000-square meter
portion of Lot No. 1213, without specifying whether it included the
50,000-square portion sold (with right of redemption) to Gumersindo.
ISSUE:
RULING:
691
Powers of Attorney and Trust
Mindanao Development Authority v. CA
133 SCRA 429, 1982
FACTS:
Respondent Francisco Ang Bansing was the owner of a big tract of
land situated in Barrio Panacan Davao City. Ang Bansing sold a
portion thereof, with an area of about 5 hectares to Juan Cruz Yap
Chuy. A cadastral survey was made and Lot 664-B-3 was designated
as Lot 1846-C of the Davao Cadastre. Juan Cruz sold Lot 1846-C to
the Commonwealth of the Philippines for the amount of P6,347.50.
On February 25, 1965, the President of the Philippines issued
Proclamation No. 459, transferring ownership of certain parcels of
land situated in Sasa Davao City, to the Mindanao Development
Authority, now the Southern Philippines Development Administration,
subject to private rights, if any. Lot 1846-C, the disputed parcel of
land, was among the parcels of land transferred to the Mindanao
Development Authority in said proclamation. He, in selling his
property to another, made a written promise to work for the titling of
the land, but it was not done. The court ruled that there was no
express trust, because the written promise did not categorically
create an obligation on the part of the landowner to hold the property
in trust for the other. Neither was the subject matter of the supposed
trust clearly described.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an express trust between Ang Bansing and
Juan Cruz over Lot 1846-C of Davao Cadastre
HELD:
No express trust had been created between Ang Bansing and Juan
Cruz over Lot 1846-C of the Davao Cadastre. Herein petitioner relies
mainly upon the following stipulation in the deed of sale executed by
Ang Bansing in favor of Juan Cruz to prove that an express trust had
been established with Ang Bansing as the settlor and trustee and
692
Juan Cruz as the cestui que trust or beneficiary. The stipulation,
however, is nothing but a condition that Ang Bansing shall pay the
expenses for the registration of his land and for Juan Cruz to
shoulder the expenses for the registration of the land sold to him. The
stipulation does not categorically create an obligation on the part of
Ang Bansing to hold the property in trust for Juan Cruz. Hence, there
is no express trust. Thus, the petition is denied.
In a separate opinion of Justice Aquino, however, it is said that the
disputed land should be adjudicated to the government agency
known as the Southern Philippines Development Administration, the
successor of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. It is argued that
Ang Bansing did not touch at all Lot No. 1846-C because he knew
that it was not his property and that it belonged to the State. It is
claimed that Ang Bansing was the true owner of Lot No. 1846-C,
there being an express trust in this case. In any event, the real
plaintiff in this case is the Republic of the Philippines and prescription
does not run against the State. The maxim is nullum tempus occurrit
regi or nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae (lapse of time does not bar
the right of the crown or lapse of time does not bar the
commonwealth). The best reason for its existence is the great public
policy of preserving public rights and property from damage and loss
through the negligence of public officers. The government officials
concerned were negligent in not intervening in the land registration
proceeding or in not promptly asking Ang Bansing to reconvey the
disputed lot to the Commonwealth or to the Republic of the
Philippines. Such negligence does not prejudice the State. The
negligence or omissions of public officers as to their public duties will
not work an estoppel against the State.
A. ATTACHMENTS
a. Registration
693
i. Duty of the Clerk of Court if the duplicate
certificate of title is not presented at the time of the
registration.
b. Effects of Attachment
694
have subsisted on the attached properties from the date of the
original levy. The writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution
except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the
termination, of a suit. It places the attached properties in custodia
legis, obtaining pendente lite a lien until the judgment of the proper
tribunal on the plaintiff's claim is established, when the lien becomes
effective as of the date of the levy.
There is no rule allowing substitution of attached property
although an attachment may be discharged wholly or in part upon the
security of a counterbond offered by the defendant upon application
to the court, with notice to, and after hearing, the attaching creditor, or
upon application of the defendant, with notice to the applicant and
after hearing, if it appears that the attachment was improperly or
irregularly issued.
If an attachment is excessive, the remedy of the defendant is to
apply to the court for a reduction or partial discharge of the
attachment, not the total discharge and substitution of the attached
properties. The reason for this is that the lien acquired by the plaintiff-
creditor as of the date of the original levy would be lost. It would in
effect constitute a deprivation without due process of law of the
attaching creditors' interest in the attached property as security for
the satisfaction of the judgment which he may obtain in the action.
The notice of levy in Civil Cases 365-MN and 374-MN was
annotated on FINASIA's TCTs Nos. 120450 on November 22 and 23,
1983 and on Villarosa's TCTs Nos. 13350-A and 13351-A on
November 7 and 30, 1983. By ordering the substitution on October
11, 1988, the Court obliterated the petitioners' earlier lien under the
original attachment and in effect deprived the petitioners of their
interest in the attached properties without due process of law.
695
for the registration of such right to claim.
696
case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of the adverse claim
because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet been probated. It
reasoned out that before the probate respondents are merely
presumptive heirs with a "contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest
in the two lots. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet been
probated, but there is still a pending proceeding for its probate. In that
will, the testator transmitted to his surviving siblings the right to
secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his conveyance of lots Nos.
371 and 373 to petitioner. Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial because of that will. To alert third persons, or for that
matter the whole world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad
Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of
Act No. 496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their
adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given
to them, then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent
purchaser for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim
will be nullified or frustrated. The purpose of annotating the adverse
claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third persons that
there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve
and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of
the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction
regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has some
basis and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably frivolous or
vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation of the
annotation thereof before it is finally determined by the courts that the
titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible
and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit. It has been said that the
annotation of an adverse claim should not be confused with its
validity which should be litigated in a proper proceeding and that the
registration of an invalid adverse claim is not as harmful as the non-
registration of a valid one.
697
of the disputed land. Annotation is done to apprise third
persons that there is a controversy over the ownership
of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the
adverse claimant during the pendency of the
controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any
transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the
outcome of the dispute.
ISSUE:
Did the lower court err in cancelling the adverse claim?
HELD:
We hold that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation
of the adverse claim. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet
been probated but the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its
probate. And in that will the testator transmitted to his surviving
brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or adverse
698
claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his
conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole
world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio
have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No. 496
gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim
on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them, then
the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser
for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be
nullified or frustrated. (See Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 952
as to the right of an heir to sue for the annulment of a conveyance
made in fraud of the deceased.)
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of
the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and
protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of
the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any
transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the
outcome of the dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has
some basis and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably frivolous
or vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation of the
annotation thereof before it is finally determined by the courts that the
titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible
and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit.
c. A mere money claim cannot be registered as an adverse
claim.
FACTS:
699
subject of mortgage loans obtained from respondent bank which had
been fully paid and discharged either by payment or redemption after
extra-judicial foreclosure. Upon the refusal of the Tacloban Register
of Deeds to register the bank's adverse claim, respondent bank filed
with the court of first instance of Leyte as a land registration court
three petitions 3 for an order to direct the Tacloban and Ormoc
Registers of Deeds to annotate its adverse claim on the titles, while
petitioner in turn opposed the petitions and filed his counter-petition
for an order directing respondent bank to return the said titles without
such annotations.
ISSUE(s):
HELD:
d. Formal Requisites.
ISSUE(s):
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court that
702
whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully
his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a
reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and
shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be
entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a
petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the
question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such
decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is
adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any
case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus
registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant
double or treble costs in its discretion. Hence, for the purpose of
registration and as required by the above quoted provision are the
formal requisites of an adverse claim. However, as the lower court
noted "the adverse claim filed and annotated on the back of the title
of Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the herein defendant, did
not meet the requirements provided for in Section 110 of Act 496, that
is setting forth fully how or under whom the heirs of Lozano acquired
the property. Thus, the effect of such non-compliance renders the
adverse claim non-registrable and ineffective.
703
FACTS:
ISSUE(s):
704
HELD:
705
i. Purpose of registering adverse claim:
FACTS:
706
petitioners being a voluntary dealing with a registered land, mere
registration of their adverse claim was insufficient.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No.
The Court has invariably ruled that in case of conflict between a
vendee and an attaching creditor, an attaching creditor who registers
the order of attachment and the sale of the property to him as the
highest bidder acquires a valid title to the property as against a
vendee who had previously bought the same property from the same
owner but who failed to register his deed of sale. This is because
registration is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar
as third persons are concerned. It is upon registration that there is
notice to the whole world. But where a party has knowledge of a prior
existing interest, as here, which is unregistered at the time he
acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him.
Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration.
Respondents were not purchasers in good faith and, as such, could
not acquire good title to the property as against the former transferee.
707
TERESITA ROSAL ARRAZOLA
vs.
PEDRO A. BERNAS and SOLEDAD VERNAS ALIVIO
FACTS:
This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which was
annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and T-6882 in
the name of Teresita Rosal Bernas (Arrazola).
Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas who on
May 5, 1967 executed a notarized will wherein he disinherited
Teresita and instituted his brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister
Soledad Bernas Alivio as heirs to all his properties, including the lots
in question which he had allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to
Teresita.
A month later, Elviro Bernas died, and his brother Pedro filed with the
Court of First Instance of Capiz a petition for the probate of his will.
On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of
deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.
He alleged in that adverse claim that Lots Nos. 371 and 373 were
conveyed by his brother Elviro to Teresita Rosal Bernas "involuntarily,
fictitiously and without consideration" and that in Elviro's will the two
lots were devised to him (Pedro) and his sister Soledad.
After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim, Teresita
R. Bernas Arrazola filed in the cadastral and probate proceedings a
motion for the cancellation of the annotation of adverse claim, which
was predicated on the grounds that she was not served with prior
notice" of the adverse claim and that there was "no petition for
approval or justification" thereof filed with the court. Pedro A. Bernas
and Soledad Bernas Alivio opposed the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim annotated in the name of the
petitioner should be cancelled.
HELD:
No.
708
It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet been probated but
the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its probate. And in
that will the testator transmitted to his surviving brother and sister, the
herein oppositors-appellants or adverse claimants, the right to secure
a declaration as to the invalidity of his conveyance of lots Nos. 371
and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole
world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio
have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No. 496
gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim
on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them, then
the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser
for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be
nullified or frustrated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a claim not validly registered is effective for the
purpose of protecting claimant's right or interest on the disputed land.
HELD:
No.
In Register of Deeds of Quezon City vs. Nicandro, it was held that for
the special remedy of adverse claim to be availed of, it must be
shown that there is no other provision in the law for registration of the
claimant's alleged right or interest in the property. In said case, the
basis of the adverse claim was a perfected contract of sale. As the
Land Registration Act specifically prescribes the procedure for
710
registration of the vendee's right on a registered property (Section
57), the filing of an adverse claim was held ineffective for the purpose
of protecting the vendee's right.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that Villanueva attempted to
register the agreement to sell under Section 52 of Act No. 496 and
that the registered owner, Garcia Realty, refused to surrender the
duplicate certificate for the annotation of said instrument. Instead,
Villanueva merely filed an adverse claim based on said agreement to
sell Considering that Section 62 of the Land Registration Act
prescribes the procedure for the registration of Villanueva's interest
less than an estate in fee simple on the disputed lot and there being
no showing of her inability to produce the owner's duplicate
certificate, the remedy provided in Section 110 of Act 496, which was
resorted to by Villanueva, is, therefore, ineffective for the purpose of
protecting her right or interest on the disputed lot.
Inasmuch as the adverse claim filed by Villanueva was not valid, the
same did not have the effect of a conveyance of her right or interest
on the disputed lot and could not prejudice any right that may have
arisen thereafter in favor of third parties.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
712
ii. The subject matter of a contract of sale between Lazaro
Tanedo and the respondents is “one hectare of whatever share
the former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey of
Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the
Register of Deeds of Tarlac”. It constitutes a part of Tanedo’s
future inheritance from his parents, which cannot be the source
of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the
parties. It may not be registered as an Adverse Claim.
FACTS:
Lazaro Tañedo executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Ricardo
Tañedo and Teresita Barrera in which he conveyed a parcel of land
which he will inherit. Upon the death of his father he executed an
affidavit of conformity to reaffirm the said sale. He also executed
another deed of sale in favor of the spouses covering the parcel of
land he already inherited. Ricardo registered the last deed of sale in
the registry of deeds in their favor.
Ricardo later learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his
children through a deed of sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Tañedo spouses have a better right over the
property against the children of Lazaro Tañedo
RULING:
Since a future inheritance generally cannot be a subject of a contract,
the deed of sale and the affidavit of conformity made by Lazaro has
no effect. The subject of dispute therefore is the deed of sale made
by him in favor of spouses Tañedo and another to his children after
he already legally acquired the property.
713
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and
that private respondents never took possession thereof. As between
two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a
preferred right over the other who has not registered his title, even if
the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.
FACTS:
714
7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated checks to
secure payment of said loan. Clearly, petitioner’s Affidavit of Adverse
Claim was based solely on the waiver of hereditary interest executed by
Comandante.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights valid.
Whether not the petitioner’s adverse claim based on such waiver likewise
valid and effective.
RULING:
Yes. In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of
Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties
has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect
to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the
property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of
the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death
and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly
purely hereditary in nature.
715
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner
entered into a contract involving the former’s future inheritance as
embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor.
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioner’s adverse claim
should have been determined by the trial court after the petition for
cancellation of petitioner’s adverse claim filed by Comandante It has been
held that the validity or efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be
determined by the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which
event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the
proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And, it is only
when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse
claim may be cancelled.
.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante is null and void for being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil
Code, hence, petitioner’s adverse claim which was based upon such
waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right or
interest over the property. Petition is denied.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu dated March 19, 1966 denying the petition for the cancellation
of an adverse claim registered by the adverse claimant on the
transfer certificate of title of the petitioners.
716
as counsel by petitioner, Maximo Abarquez, in Civil Case No. R-6573
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Maximo Abarquez vs.
Agripina Abarquez", for the annulment of a contract of sale with right
of repurchase and for the recovery of the land which was the subject
matter thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered a
decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to the petitioner and so he
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The case having been resolved and title having been issued to
petitioner, adverse claimant waited for petitioner to comply with ha
obligation under the document executed by him on June 10, 1961 by
delivering the one-half (½) portion of the said parcels of land.
Petitioner refused to comply with his obligation and instead offered to
sell the whole parcels of land covered by TCT No. 31841 to
petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal.
Upon being informed of the intention of the petitioner, adverse
claimant immediately took stops to protect his interest by filing an
affidavit of adverse claim on July 19, 1965 with the Register of Deeds
of Cebu. By virtue of the affidavit, the adverse claim for one-half (½)
717
of the lots covered by the June 10, 1961 document was annotated on
TCT No. 31841.
When the new transfer certificate of title No. 32996 was issued,
the annotation of adverse claim on TCT No. 31841 necessarily had to
appear on the new transfer certificate of title. This adverse claim on
TCT No. 32996 became the subject of cancellation proceedings filed
by herein petitioner-spouses on March 7, 1966 with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez,
filed his opposition to the petition for cancellation on March 18,
1966 .The trial court resolved the issue on March 19, 1966, denying
the petition to cancel adverse claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of the adverse claim of Atty.
Fernandez is valid.
RULING:
Yes. In resolving the issue of the validity or nullity for the
registration of the adverse claim, Section 110 of the Land Registration
Act (Act 496) should be considered. The contract for a contingent fee,
being valid, vested in Atty. Fernandez an interest or right over the lots
in question to the extent of one-half thereof. Said interest became
vested in Atty. Fernandez after the case was won on appeal because
only then did the assignment of the one-half (½) portion of the lots in
question became effective and binding. So that when he filed his
affidavit of adverse claim his interest was already an existing one.
There was therefore a valid interest in the lots to be registered in
favor of Atty. Fernandez adverse to Maximo Abarquez.
718
Moreover, the interest or claim of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in
question arose long after the original petition which took place many
years ago. And, there is no other provision of the Land Registration
Act under which the interest or claim may be registered except as an
adverse claim under Section 110 thereof.
ARRAZOLA VS BERNAS
86 SCRA 279
FACTS:
This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which
was annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and T-
6882 in the name of Teresita Rosal Bernas (Arrazola), covering Lots
Nos. 371 and 373 of the Pilar, Capiz cadastre with a total area of
12,830 square meters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of the adverse claim by the
lower court is correct.
RULING:
We hold that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation
of the adverse claim. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet
720
been probated but the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its
probate. And in that will the testator transmitted to his surviving
brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or adverse
claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his
conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole
world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio
have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No. 496
gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim
on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them, then
the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser
for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be
nullified or frustrated.
ESTELLA VS RD
106 PHIL 911
721
FACTS:
These are appeals from two decisions of the Land Registration
Commission dated 7 February and 30 April 1957, upholding the
refusal of the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Rizal to
record the claimant's adverse claims under the provisions of section
110, Act No. 496 .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim of the appellants
registerable?
RULING:
723
The appellant's claim that as neither the vendor nor the vendee
could claim ownership of it, it reversed to the State as patrimonial
property, which they may acquire by prescription or under the free
patent law. Even if their opposition of reversion to the State be
sustained, still their respective adverse claims cannot be registered.
Prescription does not run against the State. 2 Besides, the reversion
to the State of the parcel of land in question did not withdraw it from
the operation of the provisions of Act No. 496. Neither could the fact
that their adverse possession which might entitle them to fact that
their under the free patent law constitute a registerable adverse
claim.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located
on Garnet Street, Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Piñas City, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-36071, with an
area of one hundred thirty (130) square meters (sq.m.).
Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining
the lot of petitioner, located on Lyra Street, Moonwalk Village, Phase
2, Las Piñas City. There is a concrete fence, more or less two (2)
meters high, dividing Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village.
724
any claim of ownership over the property. Respondent was merely
asserting the existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support
at the rear portion of his estate to prevent the property from
collapsing, since his property is located at an elevated plateau of
fifteen (15) feet, more or less, above the level of petitioner’s
property. Respondent also filed a complaint for malicious mischief
and malicious destruction before the office of the barangay chairman.
RULING:
Respondent’s assertion that he has an adverse claim over the
65 sq.m. property of petitioner is misplaced since he does not have a
claim over the ownership of the land. The annotation of an adverse
claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential Decree
1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. Annotation is
done to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the
ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the
adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a
notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed
land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
In reality, what respondent is claiming is a judicial recognition of
the existence of the easement of subjacent and lateral support over
the 65 sq. m. portion of petitioner’s property covering the land
support/embankment area. His reason for the annotation is only to
prevent petitioner from removing the embankment or from digging on
the property for fear of soil erosion that might weaken the foundation
of the rear portion of his property which is adjacent to the property of
petitioner that the annotation at the back of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-36071, recognizing the existence of the legal easement of
subjacent and lateral support constituted on the lengthwise or
horizontal land support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square
meters, more or less, of the property of petitioner Margarita F. Castro,
is hereby ordered removed.
726
viii. The annotation of inscription of Entry No. 86-622/T-
83618 is obviously and indeed very clear indicating that the
plaintiffs’ registered adverse claim in reference to the sale of the
same property sought by defendants to be levied on attachment,
final execution and sale came ahead.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the
730
adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all notices may be
served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an
adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be
effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After
the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in
interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second
adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the
same claimant.
ARRAZOLA V. BERNAS
G.R. No. L-29740 November 10, 1978
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole
world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio
have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No. 496
gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim
on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them, then
the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser
for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be
733
nullified or frustrated. (See Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 952
as to the right of an heir to sue for the annulment of a conveyance
made in fraud of the deceased.)
FACTS:
On March 23, 1955, Paz Ty Sin Tei filed a petition in the land
registration record of TCT No. 58652 for the cancellation of the
adverse claim. The Court of First Instance of Manila cancelled it over
734
Lee Dy Piao's opposition. On appeal, this Court set aside the order of
cancellation and further held that the adverse claim could subsist
concurrently with a subsequent annotation of a notice of lis pendens
which referred to a case filed by Lee Dy Piao, involving the same
right or interest covered by the adverse claim.
ISSUE:
RULING:
735
whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the
certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of
the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the
adverse claimant's residence, and designate a place at which all
notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to
registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any
party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein
as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be
invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If any case the court after
notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivoluos
or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble costs in
its discretion.
736
J. A notice of lispendens serves the purposes of the adverse
claim.
FACTS:
The appellant filed Civil Case 3496 seeking from the defendant
the surrender of owner's duplicate of TCT T-1217 for the deed of sale
in favor of the appellant be registered or annotated in the certificate of
title. In this case, the defendant's answer raised the issue of validity
of the deed of sale in favor of the appellant.
More than four years after the appellant's adverse claim was
annotated and while case No. 3496 is (sic) pending, the appellee
presented for registration two deeds of sale affecting the land subject
of the action, the first conveyed 8.6186 hectares and the second
conveyed the remaining 3.0219 hectares and that TCT T-1217 was
cancelled and TCT T-7601 was issued to the appellee wherein the
adverse claim annotated was carried on.
737
Petitioner-appellee filed a motion to dismiss appeal in the Court
of Appeals on the ground that the issue involved has become moot
and academic, because oppositor-appellant Jose Juezan filed a
notice of lis pendens on the property covered by T.C.T. No. T-7601
and in connection with Civil Case No. 3496.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit and for being moot
and academic.
738
D. Notice of lispendens.
a. Contents
b. Nature & purpose of the notice
i. Definition and purpose:
FACTS:
739
Hilario Soriano alleged that during the marriage of his parents, the
couple acquired both real and personal properties, including the
subject properties. Soriano couple allegedly executed a Deed of
Assignment in favor of ODC involving the subject properties to pay for
Tomas Q. Soriano’s subscription of stocks in the said corporation.
Tomas Q. Soriano died intestate.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No.
740
Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property
involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment.
741
Now that the case is pending before us on appeal, there is no
certainty as to the outcome of the case. There is a need to warn the
whole world that a particular property is in litigation, serving as a
warning that the one who acquires an interest over said property
does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the
litigation over said property.
742
dealing with the property that it is under litigation.
August 6, 2008
FACTS:
743
A notice of lis pendens was inscribed on Ravelo's OCT.
The final deed of sale covering the subject lot in favor of Chieng
was inscribed. On the same date, TCT covering the subject lot was
issued to Chieng. The petitioner's complaint for cancellation and
reversion was carried at the back of Chieng's TCT.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's
ruling and declared the Redondos as innocent purchasers in good
faith.
744
ISSUE:
HELD:
745
iii. A notice of lispendens is ordinarily recorded
without the intervention of the court; may be ordered cancelled
any time.
FACTS:
When the said deed was presented to the Register of Deeds for
registration, the Deputy Clerk of Court was advised to secure a court
order in order that the new title issued in the name of herein petitioner
Maria Marasigan could be cancelled.
746
Registry of Deeds. He also prayed for the cancellation of the Deed
issued in favor of Marasigan.
The trial court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of Marron. Aggrieved, Marasigan filed the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes.
748
The notice of lis pendens is ordinarily recorded without the
intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but
an incident in an action, an extra judicial one, to be sure. It does not
affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively
advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so
deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in
the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of
the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which
may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of
such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the
action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at
any given time. And its continuance or removal — like the
continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment or injunction — is
not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and
ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
BIGLANGAWA V. CONSTANTINO
109 Phil 168
FACTS:
Both the trial court and the court of appeals ruled in favor of
Biglangawa and Espiritu. Constantino then filed with this court.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No.
750
ST. MARY OF THE WOODS SCHOOL, INC. and MARCIAL P.
SORIANO vs. OFFICE OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF MAKATI
CITY and HILARIO P. SORIANO
G.R. No. 174290
FACTS:
Private respondent claimed that several years after his father
Tomas Q. Soriano’s death, he discovered that the latter’s signature in
the Deed of Assignment of 10 May 1988 in favor of ODC was a
forgery. Being very familiar with his father’s signature, private
respondent compared Tomas Q. Soriano’s purported signature in the
Deed of Assignment of 10 May 1988 with Tomas Q. Soriano’s
genuine signature in another document captioned Second
Amendment of Credit Agreement. RTC dismissed the complaint files
by the private respondent.
On 16 May 2005, petitioners, et al., filed with the RTC a Motion
to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens[31] annotated on the titles covering
the subject properties, which Motion was opposed by the private
respondent.
As mentioned in the case, the notice of lis pendens can be
cancelled if it is not necessary to protect the interest of the party who
caused it to be recorded. Private respondent Hilario P. Soriano has
no interest to be protected insofar as the subject properties are
concerned because of his acknowledgment that he already received
his share in the estate of Tomas Soriano.
On 14 March 2006, private respondent filed before the Court of
Appeals a Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis Pendens on
the TCTs of the subject properties given that there was yet no final
judgment of dismissal of his Complaint, as its dismissal had been
duly appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not lispendens be cancelled
HELD:
The inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, under the
express provisions of law. As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party; or (2) when the annotation is
not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be
recorded.
The doctrine of lis pendens is based on consideration of public
751
policy and convenience, under the view that once a court has taken
cognizance of a controversy, it should be impossible to interfere with
the consummation of the judgment by any ad interim transfer,
encumbrance, or change of possession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, these consolidated
Petitions for Certiorari are hereby DISMISSED.
753
unnecessary or superfluous it would be the notice of
lispendens that will cancelled; reasons therefore.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Besides, it cannot really be said that the rights and interests of the
petitioner over the land in question are amply protected by the
annotation at the back of TCT 425582 issued in the name of Winmar
Poultry Farms, Inc., that "the property therein described is subject to
the resolution of LRC Consults No. 887." The statement that the
property described is subject to the resolution of a consulta, unlike a
statement of adverse claim, cannot serve as a notice and warning to
third persons dealing with the property that someone is claiming an
interest in the same or a better title than that of the registered owner
thereof. A consulta, as is generally understood, is but the reference of
a question to the Commissioner of Land Registration by a Register of
Deeds when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken when a
deed or instrument is presented to him for registration
ADMINISTRATIVE REGISTRATION
A. Concepts and procedures of public land disposition
B. Homesteads
FACTS:
Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes) was the father of the Lopez
siblings. During Hermogenes’ lifetime, he applied with the Bureau of
Lands for a homestead patent over a parcel of land. The Bureau of
Lands approved Hermogenes’ application. The patent was
subsequently transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for
transcription and issuance of the corresponding certificate of titlein
Hermogenes’ name. Unaware that he had already been awarded a
758
homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land, Hermogenes sold
the same to Ambrocio Aguilar (Aguilar) by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property, with
an area of 2.6950 hectares, was erroneously included in survey plan
H-138612 of Hermogenes’ property. The subject property supposedly
formed part of the land owned by Lauro Hizon (Hizon), which
adjoined that of Hermogenes. Resultantly, on 29 November 1965,
Hermogenes executed a Quitclaim over his rights and interests to the
subject property in Hizon’s favor. Hizon, in turn, sold the subject
property to Esquivel and Talens, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Unregistered Land. Hermogenes died. The Lopez siblings, as
Hermogenes’ heirs, filed an action with the RTC for the cancellation
of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959, executed between
Hermogenes and Aguilar, and which involved the entire 19.4888-
hectare land.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Court also cannot consider the subject property to have been
held in trust by Hermogenes for and on behalf of Hizon. Settled is the
rule that a homestead applicant must personally comply with the legal
requirements for a homestead grant. The homestead applicant
himself must possess the necessary qualifications, cultivate the land,
and reside thereon. It would be a circumvention of the law if an
individual were permitted to apply “in behalf of another,” as the latter
may be disqualified or might not comply with the residency and
cultivation requirements.
In the end, the Quitclaim dated 29 November 1965 could not have
validly conveyed or transferred ownership of the subject property
from Hermogenes to Hizon. It is null and void for being contrary to
the provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended. As a result, Hizon
acquired no right over the subject property which he could have sold
to Esquivel and Talens; and the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land dated 26 August 1968 executed by Hizon in favor
of Esquivel and Talens, is similarly void for lack of an object.
In the instant case, when Esquivel and Talens filed with the RTC their
application for registration of the subject property on 5 March
1993, 28 years had passed since the execution by Hermogenes of
the Quitclaim covering the subject property in favor of Hizon on 29
November 1965; and 25 years elapsed from the execution by Hizon
760
of the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property in favor of
Esquivel and Talens on 26 August 1968. During these periods,
without providing any reasons therefor, neither Hizon nor Esquivel
and Talens took possession of the subject property or exercised in
any other way their rights over the same.
FACTS:
In its Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193, the
RTC granted the action for reconveyance of the subject property to
Esquivel and Talens. The subject property, however, was already
supposedly sold by Lopez siblings to Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar.
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar alleged in their Petition for Annulment of
Judgment that the Lopez siblings, the successors-in-interest of
761
Hermogenes, were the registered owners of 15 parcels of land
situated at Overlooking, Sumulong Highway, Barangay Sta. Cruz.
Among these parcels of land were Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8, covered by
TCTs No. 207990 to No. 207997 of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina
City, with an aggregate area of 2.875 hectares, and which constituted
the subject property. Beginning 20 April 1994, Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar purchased the afore-mentioned lots from the Lopez siblings
and their assigns, namely, Atty. Angeles and Rogelio Amurao
(Amurao), as evidenced by several Deeds of Absolute Sale and
Deeds of Conditional Sale. Immediately after making such
purchases, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar introduced large scale
improvements on the subject property, among which were several
business establishments with a cost of no less than P50,000,000.
In 1996, when the subject property was involved in Civil Case No. 96-
4130 heard before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74,
entitled Heirs of Elino Adia v. Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, it was Atty.
Angeles who represented and protected the interest of Nordec Phils.
and Dr. Malvar in said case by filing a Motion to Dismiss. In Cabuay,
Jr., wherein Dr. Malvar and the Lopez siblings were named the
respondents in the Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity
and Forceful Effect of the Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting
Decisions of this Court involving the subject property, it was also Atty.
Angeles who appeared for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar.
762
ISSUE:
RULING:
763
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if
the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.
C. Free Patents
a. Who may acquire?
b. Purpose in granting a free patent
FACTS:
Rico Shipping, Inc., together with respondent Viray, obtained 3
separate loans from petitioner MBTC. The three loans were obtained
764
on July 1979, June 1981 and September 1981, or several years
before the free patents were issued to the respondent on December
1982.
However, on the due date, the debtors failed to pay the loan despite
demands to pay by MBTC. MBTC filed a complaint for sum of money
against the debtors. On April 1983, the RTC rendered a judgment in
favor of MBTC.
On March 1984, the RTC issued a writ of execution over the lots
owned by Viray, whereby, the lots sold at public auction in favor of
MBTC as the winning bidder. Thus, the Certificate of Sale issued to
MBTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the auction sale falls within the 5-year prohibition period laid
down in Section 118 of CA 141.
RULING:
The law clearly provides that lands which have been acquired under
free patent or homestead shall not be encumbered or alienated within
5 years from the date of issuance of the patent or be liable for the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of the
period.
ISSUE:
766
RULING:
Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved the
applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance of the
corresponding free patents in their favor in his capacity as
administrator of the disposable lands of the public domain, the action
for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least with his
prior authority and consent.
MARTINEZ vs. CA
G.R. No. 170409 January 28, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner, whose real name as appearing in her birth certificate is
Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and
as thus one of the descendants of Celedonia, and under that name
applied for free patents over the properties. Unknown to private
respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name
of Gregoria Martinez.
767
CENRO that she is the heir of Celedonia Martinez whom she
admitted in her Answer as the original absolute owner of the subject
parcels of land.
ISSUE:
Whether the free patents and land titles should be annulled due to
fraud and misrepresentation in their procurement.
RULING:
A cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate
of title would require allegations of the plaintiff’s ownership of the
contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate
of title as well as the defendant’s fraud or mistake, as the case may
be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel
of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly
not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent
or certificate of title obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio.
The real party-in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges
a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question
even before the grant of title to the defendant.
A certificate of title issued on the basis of a free patent procured thru
fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled since such title is not
cloaked with indefeasibility.
FACTS:
768
On 7 July 1979, Rico Shipping, Inc., represented by its President,
Erlinda Viray-Jarque, together with respondent Edgardo D. Viray
(Viray), in their own personal capacity and as solidary obligors,
obtained two separate loans from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (MBTC). The debtors failed and refused to pay on
due date. MBTC filed a complaint for sum of money against the
debtors with the RTC of Manila, Branch 4. On 28 April 1983, the RTC
of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of MBTC. Meanwhile, on 29
December 1982, the government issued Free Patents in favor of
Viray over three parcels of land, all situated in Barangay Bulua,
Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental. On 6 March 1984, the RTC
of Manila issued a writ of execution over the lots owned by Viray. On
12 October 1984, pursuant to the writ of execution, the City Sheriff of
Cagayan de Oro sold the lots at public auction in favor of MBTC as
the winning bidder. On 30 July 1991, Viray filed an action for
annulment of sale against the sheriff and MBTC with the RTC of
Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, Branch 23. Viray sought the
declaration of nullity of the execution sale, the sheriff’s certificate of
sale, the sheriff’s deed of final conveyance and the TCT's issued by
the Register of Deeds. The RTC of Cagayan de Oro City rendered its
decision in favor of MBTC. Viray filed an appeal with the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the auction sale falls within the five-year prohibition period
laid down in Section 118 of CA 141.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Petitioner MBTC insists that the five-year
prohibition period against the alienation or sale of the property
provided in Section 118 of CA 141 does not apply to an obligation
contracted before the grant or issuance of the free patent or
homestead. The alienation or sale stated in the law pertains to
voluntary sales and not to “forced” or execution sale.Respondent
Viray, on the other hand, maintains that the express prohibition in
Section 118 of CA 141 does not qualify or distinguish whether the
debt was contracted prior to the date of the issuance of the free
patent or within five years following the date of such
issuance. Further, respondent asserts that Section 118 of CA 141
absolutely prohibits any and all sales, whether voluntary or not, of
lands acquired under free patent or homestead, made within the five-
769
year prohibition period. The law clearly provides that lands which
have been acquired under free patent or homestead shall not be
encumbered or alienated within five years from the date of issuance
of the patent or be liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of the period.
In the present case, the three loans were obtained on separate dates
– 7 July 1979, 5 June 1981 and 3 September 1981, or several years
before the free patents on the lots were issued by the government to
respondent on 29 December 1982. For a period of five years or
from 29 December 1982 up to 28 December 1987, Section 118 of CA
141 provides that the lots comprising the free patents shall not be
made liable for the payment of any debt until the period of five years
expires. In this case, the execution sale of the lots occurred less than
two years after the date of the issuance of the patents. This clearly
falls within the five-year prohibition period provided in the law,
regardless of the dates when the loans were incurred.
E. Sales Patents
a. Who may apply?
b. How is it acquired?
c. Procedure for acquiring agricultural lands suitable for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes
d. When sale WITHOUT PUBLIC AUCTION is allowed:
770
with the Bureau of Lands Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) No.
(V-3)2 over a 4,172 square meter parcel of land located at San
Patricia Bacolod City. On 18 February 1966, his son, respondent
Serfino, Jr., filed MSA No. (V-3)1 over an adjoining lot with an area of
1,358 square meters.
Meanwhile, petitioners Agura, Alib, Sta. Rita and 106 others sent to
the President of the Philippines a petition dated 22 August 1969
requesting that the small parcels of land located in the areas covered
by private respondents' MSAs which they have been occupying for
thirty (30) years be awarded to them.
ISSUE:
HELD:
772
F. Special Patents
G. Emancipation Patents
H. Registration of Patents
I. Certificates of Title Issued Pursuant to Patents
a. OCT issued pursuant to a patent becomes indefeasible after 1
year from registration
Lot No. 3563 of the Arayat Cadastre was originally a part of the public
domain and it was so declared on October 12, 1933. Thereafter, Dr.
Jose Aliwalas applied with the Bureau of Lands for the issuance of a
homestead patent covering this lot. On December 12, 1936, the
Director of Lands granted this application and issued in favor of Jose
Aliwalas Homestead Patent No. 38588. OCT No. 159 was issued in
the name of Jose Aliwalas. As owner of this property, Jose Aliwalas,
thru his overseer Espiridion Manaul, had this parcel fenced and
vegetables were planted in some portions thereof and cattles were
raised on other portions. When the properties left by Dr. Jose Aliwalas
were petitioned among his surviving heirs, the lot in question was
alloted in favor of the plaintiff Victoria L. Vda. de Aliwalas as indicated
in the amended project of partition executed by her mind her nine
children, one of whom is Jose Aliwalas, Jr. After this amended project
of partition was approved and registered with the Register of Deeds
of Pampanga, OCT No. 52526-R was issued in the name of the
plaintiff on November 14, 1966.
773
alleged in his application that this parcel of land had been occupied
and cultivated originally and continuously thereafter by Gregorio
Tengco. After being given due course, this application was approved
by the Director of Lands who issued Free Patent No. 557692. This
free patent issued in favor of the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco was
predicated on the assumption that the lot still formed part of the public
domain and on the findings of the Public Land Inspector Romeo
Buenaventura who conducted an investigation thereon and who also
reported that the land in question was possessed and occupied by
the applicant. On rebuttal, the plaintiff adduced evidence showing that
the prewar records of the Bureau of Lands pertaining to public land
applications were burned during the war as indicated in the
certification issued by the Chief of the Records Management Division
of the Bureau of Lands. This is to explain why the Bureau has no
more record pertaining to the Homestead Patent issued in favor of
Jose Aliwalas in i936 which gave rise to the issuance of OCT No. 159
of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on April 8, 1937. The
certification also attests that what is now found in the files of the
Bureau of Lands is Free Patent V-557692 issued on February 5, 1974
in favor of the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco pertaining to Lot No. 3563.
Private respondents argue that since a homestead patent and an
original certificate of title had already been issued to their
predecessor-in-interest, the land had ceased to be part of the public
domain and, hence, the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction over the
controversy. Private respondents add that since an original certificate
of title had been issued pursuant to the homestead patent, their title
to the property had become conclusive, absolute, indefeasible and
imprescriptible.
ISSUE:
HELD:
774
disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of
the patent.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
J. Restrictions on alienable/encumbrance
a. Prohobition against encumbrance or alienable of homestead
patents within 5 years from issue; rationale or purpose of the
prohibition
FACTS:
Gregorio Cuenca was an applicant for a homestead patent for a
certain parcel of land in Negros Occidental. On Oct. 1951, an order
for issuance for the patent was given, but it was only after 20 years
on Oct. 1971 that the patent was issued by the president.
Unfortunately, Gregorio and his wife already died before said
issuance and herein petitioner Andrea Decolongon stated that she is
the only child and legal heir of the late Gregorio. In view of that, the
title was cancelled and placed in her name on May 1972.
The brothers and sisters of Gregorio, herein private respondents,
claimed that on May 1966 Gregorio has relinquished and transferred
all his rights to the said patent to Felicidad Cuenca. Therefore, an
action was filed by the private respondents for the reconveyance of
the subject land.
The CFI ruled in favor of Andrea Decolongon, which the private
780
respondents appealed with the Court of Appeals, who later reversed
said judgment. Hence, this petition filed by Andrea Decolongon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of relinquishment which conveyed the land
to the private respondents was within the prohibited five-year period.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that, from a long line of decisions they have
made with similar issues, they have time and again reiterated and
emphasized that the patent is deemed issued upon promulgation of
the order for issuance thereof by the Director of Lands.
In the case at bar, the issuance of patent was made on Oct. 1951, but
it was only 20 years later that the patent itself was issued. The Deed
of Relinquishment executed on May 1966 in favor of the private
respondents was valid since it has been 14 years after the order that
said parcel of land was relinquished in favor of the private
respondents.
The Supreme Court then denied the petition for review and affirmed
the CA decision.
FACTS:
On Aug. 1966, private respondent spouses Amando and Julia Arana,
mortgaged 6 parcels of land to herein petitioner PNB. Two of the
parcel of lands were acquired thru a homestead patent, while the
remaining four were only under tax declarations.
On July 1969, upon the failure of the private respondent spouses to
pay their loan upon maturity, PNB foreclosed said properties and
were publicly auctioned whereby PNB was the highest bidder.
Without any action of redemption from the spouses, the said bank
consolidated their ownership over the 6 parcels of land.
781
A civil suit was instituted by the respondent spouses for the
redemption of the said parcels of land, furthermore, they refused to
vacate the 2 lots which the bank has sold to a private person. The
bank agreed for the redemption of the parcels of land covered by
patent, but not the remaining four under tax decalaration.
A case was filed in the RTC by herein respondents agains the
petitioner bank, and the court rendered a decision in favor of the
former. The bank Is ordered to release the mortgage upon full
payment of the spouses of their balance and further contended that
the sale executed in favor of the third person be cancelled by the
bank.
The bank then filed a direct appeal thru certiorati to the Supreme
Court, as the dispute raises questions of law and not of facts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent spouses are entitled to redeem all the lots
covered by the mortgage?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the indivisibility of mortgage does not
apply to the instant case because the aggregate number of the lots
which comprise the collaterals for the mortgage had already been
foreclosed and sold at public auction. There is neither partial payment
nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak of. Note,
however, that applications for free patent covering the four (4)
unregistered parcels of land had been filed by respondent spouses,
and were then still pending action, which thus gives rise to the
admission that said properties involved in the aforestated cases were
public lands and which the petitioners never rebutted.
It is an essential requisite to the validity of a mortgage that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property, mortgaged. 21
Consequently, private respondents, not being owners as yet of the
subject lots when the same were supposedly mortgaged, they could
not have validly made any disposition of or created an encumbrance
on said four (4) lots to which they had neither title nor any vested
right. At most, what they had was a mere right of expectancy
dependent on the continuance of the circumstances then existing or a
contingent right dependent on the performance of some conditions,
22 but which could not be the proper object of a valid mortgage
contract.
782
Consequently, there was no need for private respondents to
repurchase the four (4) parcels from petitioner. That aspect of the
case actually calls for mutual restitution as an equitable remedy.
Therefore, incident to the nullity ab initio of the mortgage, mutual
restitution by the parties of what they had respectively received from
each other under the contract in connection with the four (4) lots must
be made and is hereby ordered to be effected by them. While the law
bars recovery in a case where the object of the contract is contrary to
law and one or both parties acted in bad faith, we cannot here apply
the doctrine of in pari delicto which admits of an exception, namely,
that when the contract is merely prohibited by law, not illegal per se,
and the prohibition is designed for the protection of the party seeking
to recover, he is entitled to the relief prayed for whenever public
policy is enhanced thereby. The Supreme Court then affirmed the
appeal of the petitioners.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs alleged that on June 15, 1952, they purchased from the
defendants two (2) hectares of the aforementioned parcel of land, on
the condition that the said portion would be reconveyed to plaintiffs
after the five-year prohibitory period, as provided for in the
783
Homestead Patent Law, shall have elapsed, and that defendants
failed to abide by said agreement. Plaintiffs averred that they were
not assailing the validity of the patent as a whole, but only with
respect to that portion of two (2) hectares owned by them which
defendants, through fraud, were able to register in their name. RTC
dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
HELD:
SANTANAS v MARINAS
94 SCRA 853
FACTS:
Respondent Marinas alleged that he acquired, on May 22, 1929,
under free patent and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 217, a parcel of land containing an area of four hectares, twelve
ares and eighty-six centares (41,286 sq. m.); that on January 16,
1956, he sold the above parcel of land to petitioner Francisco
784
Santana for a sum of P4,128.60; that the other petitioner Jose H.
Panganiban was included in the complaint because he is a
subsequent lienholder and/or encumbrancer, the property having
been sold to him by Santana on March 25, 1956 for the same amount
of P4,128.60.
On April 21, 1960, Sotero Mariñas — as plaintiff — filed in CFI of
Rizal a complaint to recover the above real property praying among
others, that he be allowed to repurchase the property.
The petitioners interposed the following affirmative defenses: (1) that
at the time the absolute sales were entered into, they were totally
ignorant of and had no knowledge whatsoever to any encumbrance
or right to repurchase by private respondent, who assured petitioner
Francisco Santana that he (Santana) could sell the land in question
absolutely and free from any encumbrance and is not subject to any
right of repurchase; (2) that they (petitioners) are purchasers in good
faith; (3) that being innocent purchasers for value, they acquired
absolute ownership over the property and private respondent cannot
enforce against them any right of repurchase of whatever nature (4)
that the property in question now a residential area with real estate
subdivisions and roads in front and at the back thereof.
The trial court ruled out respondent Marinas’ right to repurchase the
property and dismissed the complaint but that on appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision of dismissal and ordered
petitioners to reconvey the land to private respondent upon payment
to the former of "the repurchase price thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether under all the circumstances, the repurchase of the land in
question by Marinas is in consonance with the reason and purpose of
the law
HELD:
SC upheld petitioners’ proposition that to allow the repurchase of the
subject land, under the peculiar circumstances obtaining herein,
would be repugnant to the philosophy behind Section 119 of C.A. No.
141 and the jurisprudence laid down on the matter.
The findings of fact of the trial court are clear and duly supported by
the evidence. The property of Sotero Marinas has ceased to be in
the nature of a homestead, and that instead it has been transformed
into growing commercial and residential area. The vicinity of the
property is now a vast expanding business empire, the lands having
(been) converted into subdivisions. which are sold to the public at
785
fantastic prices. Close to this particular property of Sotero Mariñas
the subdivision being developed by a son of the plaintiff who has
extensive business interests centered on construction of buildings. By
plaintiff’s own admission, he is 78 years old and sick with a lung
ailment; while from the testimony of his son, Antonio Mariñas, it is
shown that the sons of plaintiff are all financially independent from the
latter and have their respective properties and means of livelihood.
Under these circumstances it is evident that to grant plaintiff the right
to repurchase the property at this time would be not for the purpose
of giving him back the land for his house and cultivation but for him to
exploit it for business purposes at the expense of the defendants who
are innocent purchaser(s) in good faith and for value."
In Simeon v. Peña We arrived at the conclusion that the plain intent,
the raison d tre, of Section 119, C.A. No. 141." . .is to give the
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and
his family the land that the state had gratuitously given to him as a
reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it."The basic objective
is to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and decent living
for destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of independent small
landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order."
786
VALLANGCA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 55336 May 4, 1989
FACTS:
After the Pacific war, Rabanes went to the residence of Ana Billena
on 2 February 1946 and made the latter sign a document which
Rabanes represented to Ana Billena as a mortgage contract written in
the Ilocano dialect. Billena, being an illiterate and trusting in her
cousin Rabanes signed the document. In the same year Billena was
informed that the document she signed was actually a Deed of
Absolute Sale and not a Mortgage Contract. This prompted Ana
Billena and her son Benjamin to Rabanes' place for the purpose of
redeeming the land and actually tendered to him the loan amount of
P800.00, this time, in genuine and legal Philippine currency.
However, Rabanes told them that the land could no longer be
redeemed.
Since Ana Billena and her three (3) sons were in possession and
actual cultivation of the land in question, Rabanes filed against them
on 7 July 1971 an injunction suit before the CFI of Cagayan and
787
Recovery of Possession in 1972. A decision by RTC and CA was
rendered upholding the ownership of Rabanes over the subject land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ana Billena and her heirs have the right to repurchase
the land notwithstanding the absence of any stipulation in the deed of
sale of the vendor's right to repurchase the land.
HELD:
788
b. Right cannot be waived
FACTS:
On 1 July 1978, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao City a complaint for the
expropriation of several parcels of land located in Davao City to carry
out its Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program; said action
was directed against the private respondents, with respect to the
mortgaged property, and fifteen (15) other persons. The case was
docketed as Special Civil Case No. 11157 and was raffled off to
Branch II of said court. As mortgagee, the petitioner filed therein a
motion to intervene, which the court granted.
ISSUES:
789
homestead patent superseded or repealed the five-year repurchase
period prescribed in Section 119 of the Public Land Act ; and
RULING:
A.) In affirming the trial court's decision, the respondent Court held
that Section 5 of the Rural Banks' Act, as amended, did not reduce
the period of redemption of homestead lands from the five (5) years
prescribed in Section 119 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, to two (2)
years from the date of registration of the foreclosure sale as fixed in
the former; in support of such conclusion, it summoned Oliva vs.
Lamadrid.
It should be noted that the period of two (2) years granted for the
redemption of property foreclosed under Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 2670, refers to lands "not
covered by a Torrens Title, a homestead or free patent," or to owners
of lands "without torrens title," who can "show five years or more of
peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the
concept of an owner, or of homesteads or free patent lands pending
the issuance of titles but already approved," or of "lands pending
homestead or free patent titles." Plaintiff, however, had, on the land in
question, a free patent and a Torrens title, which were issued over 26
years prior to the mortgage constituted in favor of the Bank.
Accordingly, there is no conflict between Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and Section 5 of Republic Act. No. 720,
as amended, and the period of two (2) years prescribed in the latter is
not applicable to him.
Respondent Court further ruled that C.A. No. 141 is a special law and
must prevail.
791
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DAVAO DEL SUR, BRANCH
XX, BLAS B. LABAD AND PACIENCIA L. LABAD
G.R. No. 75080 February 6, 1991
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the period ruled to be followed for the petitioners to
exercise their right of redemption is the period specified in the
decision of the trial court and not the period provided in Sec. 119 of
792
CA 141, as amended
RULING:
Sec. 119, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act) provides:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject
to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within a
period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
Under the above section, the five (5) year period for legal redemption
starts from the date of the execution of the deed of sale, even if full
payment of the purchase price is not made on said date, unless there
is a stipulation in the deed that ownership shall not vest in the vendee
until full payment of the price. On 14 March 1972, petitioners sold to
the respondents the two (2) parcels of land in question, which had
been acquired by said petitioners under Commonwealth Act No. 141,
by way of free patent. The sale was evidenced by a deed of absolute
sale.
It has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application. The RTC in its 14
October 1976 decision, erred in ruling that petitioners had the right to
repurchase the two (2) parcels of land but only within thirty (30) days
from the date the aforesaid decision became final. The right to
repurchase being granted by law (Sec. 119, Commonwealth Act No.
141), no other legal restriction could be added thereto. To hold
otherwise would sanction judicial legislation. Stated differently, the
RTC amended what is expressly provided for in the law. And, while
the law speaks of five (5) years from the date of conveyance within
which to exercise the right to repurchase, we regard the filing by
petitioners of the action for reconveyance on 10 July 1975 as having
suspended the running of the redemption period and to have kept
them within the protective mantle of Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141.
FACTS:
794
Filomena, Nieves and Antonio, all surnamed "Enervida"; and that the
sale of the property in question did not take place within the
prohibited period provided for in Section 118 of the Public Land Law,
the sale having taken place on November 20, 1957, although ratified
and acknowledged on December 3, 1957, before a Notary Public.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the appellant
made untruthful statement of facts and that he failed to correct the
alleged falsity regarding the death of his father and that he is the only
heir;
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the appellant
lacked the legal capacity to sue because his father is still very much
alive and in finding that his father is the only person authorized to
bring the action;
RULING:
795
be violative of Section 119 of the Public Land Law which reads:
i. But, widow and legal heirs have the right if vendor dies
Ferrer v. Mangente,
G.R. No. L-36410, 50 SCRA 424 April 13, 1973
796
FACTS:
The case was decided on a stipulation of facts. There it was shown
that the disputed property, Lot No. 53, located in Manjuyud, Negros
Oriental, was originally acquired by one Rolando Ferrer, under a
homestead patent issued on January 17, 1941, covering an area of
19 hectares. Upon his dying, single and intestate on February 14,
1945, without DEBTS and liabilities, his father, Segundo Ferrer,
executed an extrajudicial settlement of his estate adjudicating unto
himself such lot to which a homestead patent had previously been
issued. The father likewise obtained a new transfer certificate of title.
He then sold such lot, already thus registered in name to defendant,
Abraham Mangente, on July 2, 1963. In a little over two years, August
15, 1965 to be exact, he met his death. Plaintiff, who is his son,
sought to repurchase such property on June 28, 1968, the offer being
sent by registered mail and received by defendant on July 3, 1968. 2
On the above facts, plaintiff Felix Ferrer, who filed the action for
reconveyance, did prevail. In the well-written decision of the lower
court, presided by Judge Macario P. Santos, there is discernible the
commendable effort to deal justly with the respective claims of
plaintiff and defendant. Thus the judgment was rendered by him
"ordering the defendant to reconvey and deliver the possession of the
land in question to the plaintiff and upon payment by the latter to him
of the sum of three thousand five hundred (P3,500.00) pesos as
repurchase money, plus the additional sum of one thousand
(P1,000.00) pesos spent by him for removing the stamps of the trees
thereon." 3 The matter was elevated by defendant to the Court of
Appeals, but in a resolution of November 15, 1972, copy of which
was filed with this Court only on February 22 of this year, the case
was forwarded to this Court as the principal errors assigned are legal
in character
ISSUE:
1. WON The principal error assigned by appellant is that plaintiff is
devoid of any right to step into the shoes of his deceased father, as if
he were not a legal heir falling within the terms of Section 119 of the
Public Land Act.
2. WON the appellant raise the issue that the offer to repurchase was
not on time when well within such period, appellee did through the
registered mail?
797
RULING:
It has already been intimated in the opening paragraph of this opinion
that such an approach is at war with the cardinal postulate that the
land in question having been acquired by homestead patent inures to
the benefit, not only of the applicant, but of his family included in
which are both the deceased father Segundo Ferrer and his son,
appellee Felix Ferrer. The land in question was originally acquired
through a homestead patent. It did not lose such character by the
mere fact of the original grantee, his brother Rolando, having died in
the meanwhile with the title passing to their father. The applicant for a
homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law offers and is
entitled to its full protection.
The courts of the land, including this Tribunal, allow parties the full
benefit of filing the pleadings that way as long as the period given to
them has not expired. Appellant would want to be placed on a higher
plane, ignoring that to sustain his contention could lead to nullification
of a statutory right.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental dated
February 28, 1970 is affirmed.
FACTS:
After the Pacific war, Nazario Rabanes went to the residence of Ana
Billena on 2 February 1946 and made the latter sign a document
which Rabanes represented to Ana Billena as a MORTGAGE
contract written in the Ilocano dialect. Billena, being an illiterate and
trusting in her cousin Rabanes affixed her signature on the document
in the space indicated to her.Since Ana Billena and her three (3) sons
were in possession and actual cultivation of the land in question,
Rabanes filed against them on 7 July 1971 an injunction suit before
the Court of First Instance of Cagayan (Civil Case No. II-14). The trial
court order of dismissal.
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioners, invoking the rule on "res judicata contend that
the dismissal of the "Injunction" case filed on 7 July 1971 by
Rabanes against them, barred the filing by Rabanes against them
of the second action for "Recovery of Possession."
2. WON Petitioners maintain that the first suit, although styled as for
"Injunction", had for its actual primary purpose the recovery of the
land in dispute and, therefore, after its dismissal, no other action
for recovery of possession of the same land and against the same
parties (herein petitioners) could be pursued by the same
complainant (Rabanes).
799
3. WON the dismissal of the suit for injunction was not made without
prejudice.
RULING:
Under Section 40 of Act 190, which provides that: Sec. 40. Period of
Prescription as to real estate — An action for recovery of title to, or
possession of real property, or an interest therein, can only be
brought within 10 years after the cause of such action accrues.
According to petitioners, from the date private respondent claims to
have bought the land, that is, 2 February 1946, more than ten (10)
years had elapsed when Rabanes filed on 7 July 1971 his action for
injunction which, in effect, was an action for recovery of possession of
the disputed land. Hence, the action was barred by prescription.
Since the land is registered in the name of both Maximiniana
Crisostomo and Ana Billena, the latter could not outrightly dispose of
the undivided one-half share of the former (Crisostomo), without first
accomplishing an affidavit of adjudication of Crisostomo's interest or
share, and registering said affidavit of adjudication.The heirs of
private respondent Rabanes in turn aver, among others, that the
Court of Appeals was correct in finding petitioners' reliance on res
judicata as untenable.
In an impressive line of cases, 8 the requisites for res judicata have
long been established. They are: (a) that there be an earlier final
judgment; (b) that the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (e) that it is a judgment on the merits;
and (d) that there is between the first and the second actions, Identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action. Despite the above
oversight, the ruling of the Court of Appeals is nonetheless correct
when it held that the defense of res judicata was unavailing to the
petitioners.
Also the owner of the land is precluded from subjecting the same to
any encumbrance or alienation. After the lapse of five (5) years, such
prohibition is lifted, but the owner-vendor is entitled to repurchase the
property from the vendee within five (5) years from the date of the
execution of the deed of sale or conveyance.Applying the foregoing
800
rules in the instant case, it is to be noted that the free patent was
issued to the heirs of Esteban Billena on 5 December 1936. From this
date and until 5 December 1941, any transfer, conveyance or
alienation of the property covered by TCT 1005 was not allowed.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
1. WON the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court cited in
holding that appellants never bothered to tender the payment of
redemption and that the filing of judicial action to redeem did
not preserve appellants' right to redeem.
RULING:
FACTS:
For failure of respondent spouses to pay the loan after its maturity,
petitioner bank, pursuant to a special power of attorney in the
mortgage deed, effected the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
under Act No. 3135, as amended, and purchased the same at public
auction for P12,735.30 which amount included the expenses of sale,
interest and attorney's fees. The certificate of sale, dated July 1,
1969, was duly registered with the Register of Deeds on July 8, 1970.
After the one-year redemption period provided in said law expired
without respondent spouses having exercised their right or
redemption, petitioner executed and registered an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership over the six (6) parcels of land on July 9,
1970 and new titles were issued in its name for the two (2) parcels
covered by free patent titles and the corresponding tax declarations
for the four (4) parcels were placed in its name. Spouses were
informed of the consolidation of title and inviting them to repurchase
the lands not later than June 15, 1971. Spouses requesting petitioner
to extend the period of repurchase to November 5, 1971. On
804
December 19, 1971, petitioner sent another letter to respondent
spouses reminding them of the projected repurchase and informing
them that petitioner would take actual possession of the lands unless
the repurchase would be effected on or before November 30, 1971.
ISSUE:
HELD:
While the law bars recovery in a case where the object of the contract
is contrary to law and one or both parties acted in bad faith, we
cannot here apply the doctrine of in pari delicto which admits of an
exception, namely, that when the contract is merely prohibited by law,
not illegal per se, and the prohibition is designed for the protection of
the party seeking to recover, he is entitled to the relief prayed for
whenever public policy is enhanced thereby. Under the Public Land
Act, the prohibition to alienate is predicated on the fundamental policy
of the State to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader
that portion of public land which the State has gratuitously given to
him, and recovery is allowed even where the land acquired under the
Public Land Act was sold and not merely encumered, within the
prohibited period. This is without prejudice to such appropriate action
as the Government may take should it find that violations of the public
land laws were committed or involved in said transaction and
805
sanctions are in order.
L. Other restrictions
M. Effect of violations of restriction
N. Actions against improper, illegal issuance of patents
a. Reversion Suiots; objectives; where filed; nature of
FACTS:
ISSUE:
WON the remedy sought to annul the illegal patent was correct.
806
HELD:
Yes, The Court ordered the reversion of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 0662 to the State and declaring the same as
owned and belonging to the latter. The issue in respect of the validity
of OCT No. 0662 has been previously and directly raised in Civil
Case No. 7514 which is the proper action. Resolution of the same
issue in this Court will displace a tribunal which can best ascertain the
veracity of the factual allegations and which first acquired jurisdiction
over an action which exclusively pertains to it. There should be no
multiplicity of suits.
807
cancellation of the patent and the corresponding certificate title
issued, ands for the reversion of the covered thereby to the state.
ISSUE:
HELD:
808
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA
ABRILLE
G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976
FACTS:
Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the
owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an area of
FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY
TWO SQUARE METERS (525.652), more or less, under Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in her name. The deceased Luisa Villa
Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the aforesaid
parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and
379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which was
approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on March 17, 1967.
Under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, the sum of all the lands
(composed of 4 lots) contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a
total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters
more than the original area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title in
the name of said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille.
809
Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the
said Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public domain.
ISSUE:
810
without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director
of Lands.
FACTS:
The present case started with an action for illegal detainer filed in the
municipal court of Alcala Pangasinan. The plaintiff was Vicente
Kayaban, one of the petitioners herein, the other petitioner being his
wife Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban; and the defendants were the
spouses Benjamin Orpindo and Leonila Aguilar-Orpindo.
811
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Original Certificates of Title are null and void?
HELD:
Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved the
applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance of the
corresponding free patents in their favor in his capacity as
administrator of the disposable lands of the public domain, the action
for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least with his
prior authority and consent.
In the second place, the dictum of the lower court that the appellants
chose the wrong remedy in applying for free patents instead of
obtaining a judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles involves a
technicality that is of no material consequence now in view of the
declaration by the same court that the appellants are the rightful and
exclusive owners of the lands covered by said titles. Indeed, insofar
as the kind of land that may be the subject of one or the other remedy
is concerned, there is no difference between them. Both refer to
public lands suitable for agricultural purposes; both require
continuous occupation and cultivation either by the applicant himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest for a certain length of time;
and both are modes of confirming an imperfect or incomplete title —
one judicially and the other administratively.
812
Consultants
FACTS:
ISSUE:
813
HELD:
FACTS:
814
Respondents rejected the said valuation. Consequently, the
Provincial Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(Provincial DARAB) conducted a summary hearing on the amount of
just compensation. Thereafter, the Provincial DARAB affirmed the
valuation made by the petitioner.
815
the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the true measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s
loss. The word “just” is used to modify the meaning of the word
“compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
FACTS
816
On April 26, 2000, Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija a complaint for determination and
payment of just compensation against the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) and DAR.
Domingo opposed the said valuation and claimed that the just
compensation for the subject land should be computed using the
parameters set forth under Republic Act No. 6657.
RULING
817
Lee vs. LBP, GR No. 170422, March 7,2008
FACTS:
LBP filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals and
argued that the SAC erred in giving considerable weight on the
appraisal report of the private appraisal firm thereby disregarding the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657 and its implementing regulations.
RULING:
819
49 of R.A. No. 6657. AO No. 5 precisely filled in the details of
Section 17, R. A. No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the
factors mentioned therein may be taken into account.This formula
has to be considered by the SAC in tandem with all the factors
referred to in Section 17 of the law.
FACTS:
820
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228. Respondents rejected petitioner’s
valuation and instituted an action for a summary proceeding for the
preliminary determination of just compensation before the PARAD.
The SAC held that the value of P80,000.00 per hectare fixed by
the PARAD should be accorded weight and probative value and that
the SAC is guided by the various factors enumerated in Section 17 of
R.A. No. 6657 in determining just compensation. It disregarded
respondents’ claim that the valuation should be based on the current
market value of the landholding since no evidence was adduced in
support of the claim. The SAC also did not accept petitioner’s
valuation as it was based on P.D. No. 27, in which just compensation
was determined at the time of the taking of the property.
Petitioner insists that the values in E.O. No. 228 are applicable
to lands acquired under P.D. No. 27 in cognizance of the well-settled
rule that just compensation is the value of the property at the time of
the taking on 21 October 1972, when the ownership of the subject
property was transferred from the landowner to the farmers-
beneficiaries and when the former was effectively deprived of
dominion and possession over said land.
RULING:
Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that
822
PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in
the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private
respondents’ evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of
possession in 1993 and not on Land Bank’s evidence of the value
thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.
RULING:
In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due
private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature
as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value,
assessor’s value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court
is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of
823
just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and
guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.
EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS
FACTS:
which was occupied, developed and used as a city road by the city
824
taken over by the city. They subsequently met with Mayor Sering to
discuss their proposal but the mayor rebuffed them in public and
the petitioner.
respects.
and equity demand that the value at the time of actual payment
should be the basis, not the value at the time of the taking as the
ISSUE: Whether or not the value at the time of actual taking should
RULING
and the owner seeks recovery of the possession of the property prior
825
As pointed out in Republic v. Lara, the reason for this rule is:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a complaint on August 23, 1996 for
expropriation of a parcel of land (the property) in Brgy. Bibincahan,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon registered in the names of Angel Suarez, Carlos
Suarez, Ma. Teresa Suarez and Rosario Suarez (respondents).
In accordance with Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 42,
petitioner deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Legazpi City
Branch the amount of P7,465.71 “representing the provisional value”
of the property, alleged to cover an area of 24,350 square meters.
By Decision of April 15, 1999, the trial court adopted as basis
for determining just compensation the recommendation of the
Commissioners. Thus it disposed:
Petitioner contends that since it merely seeks an aerial
easement over the property, the decision of the appellate court
affirming the trial court’s order for the payment of just compensation
in the amount of P783, 860.46 representing the total value of the
826
property and excluding the application of Section 3A (b) of RA 6395 is
erroneous.
ISSUE: whether petitioner in its acquisition of an easement of right of
way (aerial) over a parcel of land, only a fee, not the full value of the
land, must be paid.
RULING:
An easement of right of way transmits no rights
except the easement itself, and respondent retains full
ownership of the property. The acquisition of such
easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly
observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect
of the installation of power lines, the limitations on the use
of the land for an indefinite period would deprive
respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason,
the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation,
which must be neither more nor less than the monetary
equivalent of the land
FACTS
On 5 November 1997, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for
827
eminent domain before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan .
The complaint alleged that the defendants were either the
registered owners or the claimants of the affected pieces of property.
The complaint also alleged the public purpose of the
Northwestern Luzon Project, as well as the urgency and necessity of
acquiring easements of right-of-way over the said parcels of land
consisting of 62,426.50 square meters. It also averred that the
affected properties had not been expropriated for public use and were
selected by NAPOCOR in a manner compatible with the greatest
public good and the least private injury and that the negotiations
between NAPOCOR and the defendants had failed. The complaint
prayed, among others, that the RTC issue a writ of possession in
favor of NAPOCOR in the event that it would be refused entry to the
affected properties.
Respondent Pure foods counters that determination of just
compensation is a factual finding, which may be reviewed by this
Court only when the case falls within the recognized exceptions to the
prohibition against factual review. Since the instant case does not fall
under any of the exceptions, it argues that the issue of just
compensation may not be reviewed in the instant proceeding.
On the other hand, there is a question of law when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted
and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. In the instant case, NAPOCOR is raising
a question of law, that is, whether or not only an easement fee of 10%
of the market value of the expropriated properties should be paid to
828
the affected owners.
ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation shall be based on the
market value of the affected properties
RULING
The question of just compensation for an easement of right-of-
way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by NAPOCOR’s
transmission lines has already been answered in National Power
Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation. In
that case, the Court held that because of the nature of the easement,
which will deprive the normal use of the land for an indefinite period,
just compensation must be based on the full market value of the
affected properties. The Court explained therein that expropriation is
not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding
transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in
a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by
transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit
of the term “expropriation.” In eminent domain or expropriation
proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to which
the owner of the condemned property is entitled is the market value.
Based on the foregoing elucidation, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC’s finding of the value of just compensation based on
the majority report’s valuation of P400.00 per square meter for the
properties belonging to respondents with the exception of respondent
Moldex. Both the Court of Appeals and the RTC were convinced that
the commissioners’ recommendation was arrived at after a judicious
consideration of all factors. Absent any showing that said valuation is
exorbitant and unjustified, the same is binding on this Court.
829
Denied
FACTS:
830
of the railway track to Carmona, Cavite. It, however, denied that the
property acquired from Forfom was leased to tenants. It stressed that
the acquisition of the properties used in the project was done through
negotiations with the respective owners. It claimed that it negotiated
with the respective owners of the affected properties and that they
were paid just compensation. Dr. Felix Limcaoco, it said, was not
paid because he failed to present the corresponding titles to his
properties. It claimed that the right to and just compensation for the
subject property was the declared fair market value at the time of the
taking which was P0.60 per square meter. Defendant explained that
President Ferdinand E. Marcos authorized the PNR to acquire said
right of way in a Cabinet Meeting on 1 November 1972 as evidenced
by an excerpt of the minutes of the meeting of the PNR Board of
Directors on Resolution No. 751.
831
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner FORFOM can recover the property
because respondent failed to file aby expropriation and to pay just
compensation.
RULING:
832
recovery of possession (in whole or in part) of the subject land,
unearned income, and rentals.
Facts:
De Catera is and was the owner and operator of several passenger
trucks. One of her trucks was the "Catera No. 5." One morning, said
passenger truck fell into the ditch because it was over speeding the
driver was trying to overtake another truck. Aleman and her son who
at that time were on the lawn in front of their house were hit by the
said truck thereby causing the instantaneous death of the son and the
injury of Florentina Aleman. Civil case No. 2969 is for the recovery of
damages instituted by Florentina Aleman and her husband Federico
Real for the death of their son and for the injury of Florentina
Aleman.Two of the passengers of the aforesaid truck were killed as a
result of the mishap.
The Southern Motors, Inc. filed with the provincial sheriff a third-party
claim to the bus, On 16 May in both cases the plaintiffs filed with the
Court a motion to strike out the third-party claim filed by the motor
company. The intervenor motor company filed an answer in
833
intervention setting up a counter claim and praying that it be declared
the owner of the bus attached by the sheriff to answer for the
damages awarded to the plaintiffs. The counter-claim of Southern
Motors, Inc. is dismissed. The filed a notice of appeal. Hence, the
appeal before the Court is that taken by the intervenor Southern
Motors, Inc. in both cases from that part of the judgment dismissing
its counterclaim
Issue
Which has a preferred right to the bus under attachment — the
Southern Motors, Inc. in whose favor, as seller of the bus, a chattel
mortgage thereon had been executed and recorded in the
corresponding registry of deeds, or the families of the vehicular
accident victims who, having been awarded damages for death and
injuries, had caused an attachment on the said bus owned by the
operator whose purchase and ownership thereof had been recorded
in the Motor Vehicles Office.
Ruling
A Mortgage in order to affect persons should not only be registered in
the Chattel Mortgage Registry, but the same should also be recorded
in the Motor Vehicle Office as required by section 5(e) of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law." Here, the Southern Motor, Inc. did not record in
the Motor Vehicle Office the mortgage executed in it's favor. Such
being the case the mortgage is ineffective as far as the appellees are
concerned. Its right or interest, therefore, in the truck, because of the
mortgage constituted in its favor, cannot prevail over of that appellees
who thought mere judgement creditors may be deemed innocent
purchase of the bus owner-operator Precentacion de Catera, who
had her purchase of the bus from Wenceslao Defensor recorded in
the Motor Vehicles Office,
834
DELFIN MONTANO vs. JOSE LIM ANG, ET AL
G.R. No. L-13057
Facts
Montano brought to the Philippines from the United States a Cadillac
car which he registered in his name in the Motor Vehicles Office and
for which he obtained a certificate of registration. He sold the car to
Jose Lim Ang and his wife Teodora A. for which the latter executed a
promissory note. Having paid part of the price, said spouses
executed on the same date a chattel mortgage on the car in favor of
Montano to guarantee the payment of the balance. Because Montano
did not want to transfer the registration certificate to Jose Lim Ang
before the registration of the mortgage, the latter was registered in
the office of the register of deeds, but Montano failed to notify the
Motor Vehicles Office of the execution of the mortgage.
Jose Lim Ang transferred the registration certificate to
Villanueva. Villanueva sold the car to Santos for Santos sold the car
to the Manila Trading & Supply Company and this company sold the
car to Tinio . . He also executed a chattel mortgage on the same car
to secure the payment of the promissory note. This mortgage was
registered both in the office of the register of deeds as well as in the
Motor Vehicles Office
Jose Lim Ang failed to pay the balance of the purchase price to
Montano in spite of the latter's demand. Montano requested the
sheriff of Manila to sell the car in accordance with the conditions
agreed upon in the chattel mortgage. Having found, however, that the
car was no longer in the possession of Lim Ang but in that of Angel M.
Tinio, Montano commenced the present action of replevin before the
835
Court of First Instance of Manila against spouses Lim.
Issue
Whether or not the chattel mortgage executed by Jose Lim Ang and
Teodora A. Gonzales in favor of Delfin Montano is binding against
third persons even if they failed to give notice thereof to the Motor
Vehicles Office as required by Section 5(e) of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law;
Ruling
"A mortgage in order to affect third persons should not only be
registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, but the same should also
be recorded in the Motor Vehicles Office as required by section 5(e)
of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. And the failure of the respondent
mortgagee to report the mortgage executed in its favor had the effect
of making said mortgage ineffective against Borlough, who had his
purchase registered in the said Motor Vehicles Office."' Adopting this
view in our case the inevitable conclusion is that as between Montano
whose mortgage over the car was not recorded in the Motor Vehicles
Office and Angel M. Tinio who notified said office of his purchase and
registered the car in his name, the latter is entitled to preference
considering that the mere registration of the chattel mortgage in the
office of the register of deeds is in itself not sufficient to hold it binding
against third persons.
836
Replacement of Lost or Destroyed Certificate
Facts
837
the petition, not being the registered owners of the property, nor
persons in interest, since all the rights and interest of the spouses
Camitan had already been transferred to respondent upon the sale of
the property. Respondent further accused petitioners of perjury;
intentionally suppressing from the trial court the fact that they were
not in possession of the property; and not serving notice on
respondent despite knowledge that it was in actual possession of the
property.7
The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ordered the annulment
of the impugned Order.8 It found that the Owner’s Copy is in the
possession of respondent since 1967. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
found that petitioners committed perjury in executing their Joint
Affidavit of Loss in support of their petition before the trial court as
they made it appear that the Owner’s Copy was still in the possession
of the spouses Camitan, when in fact, as early as 1967, the same
had already been given to respondent.
Issue
Ruling
The petition for issuance of the new Owner’s Copy before the trial
court was filed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the "Property Registration Decree," Section No. 109 of
which provides:
839
Reconstitution of Title
REPUBLIC v SANTUA
G.R. No. 155703 September 8, 2008
Facts:
840
23, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Petitioner filed a petition
for review.
Issue:
Ruling:
Once again, we caution the courts against the hasty and reckless
grant of petitions for reconstitution. Strict observance of the rules is
vital to prevent parties from exploiting reconstitution proceedings as a
quick but illegal way to obtain Torrens certificate of titles over parcels
of land which turn out to be already covered by existing titles. Courts
should bear in mind that should the petition for reconstitution be
denied for lack of sufficient basis, the petitioner is not left without a
remedy. He may still file an application for confirmation of his title
under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, if he is in fact the
lawful owner
Facts:
Petitioner claimed that she is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3209,
Pagsanjan, Laguna Cadastre, having inherited it from her parents,
Guillermo Abinsay and Leoncia Rivera. On December 4, 1930, the
cadastral court awarded the lot to Limuaco, who sold the lot to
petitioner’s parents on December 24, 1956, as evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner argued that Assessor’s Lot No. 19-pt
and Lot No. 3209 are the same. For respondent Republic of the
Philippines, the Solicitor General contended that what petitioner’s
predecessors-in-interest bought from Limuaco was Assesor’s Lot No.
19-pt, which was neither designated nor mentioned as Lot No.
3209. Also, the Solicitor General said the property described in the
documents presented is still unregistered land of the public domain
and there is no evidence that an OCT was actually issued to Lot No.
3209.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s order. The CA held that petitioner
failed to present the documents enumerated in Section 2, RA 26.
Issue:
VILLANUEVA v VILORIA
G.R. No. 155804 March 14, 2008
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate.
844
The trial court could not have validly acquired jurisdiction to
reconstitute the alleged lost owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT since
the same was not lost but was in the possession of petitioners who
had purchased the property from its late owner. As there is no proof
to support actual loss of the said owner’s duplicate copies of the said
certificates of title, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction and the
new titles issued in replacement thereof are void. If an owner’s
duplicate copy of certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in
possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the
court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction.
Facts:
Pacific Mills, Inc. originally owned five parcels of land covered by four
TCTs. These properties were subsequently purchased by
respondents on an installment basis from Pacific Mills on July 19,
1979. The RTC of Pasig rendered a decision ordering Pacific Mills to
pay its obligation under the loan agreement which the CA affirmed
after the respondent filed a collection case against the petitioner.
During the pendency of the appeal or on June 11, 1988,
the Quezon City Hall was razed by fire thereby destroying the records
of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, including the TCTs of Pacific
Mills.
Pacific Mills filed a petition for reconstitution of the burned TCTs
through administrative reconstitution, in accordance with Republic Act
No. 6732. On March 23, 1992, the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
issued to Pacific Mills the reconstituted TCTs. However, the aforesaid
alleged annotations of the preliminary attachment in favor of
petitioner were not incorporated in the reconstituted TCTs, but
annotated therein was the sale made by Pacific Mills to respondents
and their payment in full. On even date, the reconstituted TCTs were
cancelled in favor of the respondents.
On February 8, 1993, petitioner wrote the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City requesting for the annotation of the notice of levy, and,
subsequently, the annotation of a favorable decision of this Court
rendered on August 3, 1992, on the new TCTs issued to respondents.
845
On February 10, 1993, Samuel C. Cleofe, the Quezon City Register
of Deeds, informed respondents that the letter-request for re-
annotation of notice of levy had been entered in the Primary Entry
Book and asked them to surrender their owners’ duplicate copies of
TCTs. Immediately upon receipt of the said letter, respondents
verified the original copies of titles in the possession of the Registry of
Deeds and discovered that the following annotations were included at
the back of the titles: “Request for Re-Annotation of Notice of Levy”
and “Letter Request for Annotation of Entry of Judgment of Supreme
Court.” Thereafter, respondents filed on March 3, 1993, a Petition for
the Cancellation of Annotations in Land Titles before the RTC of
Quezon City. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
respondents. Under the circumstances, respondent [the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City] should and could have properly refused such
request instead of immediately annotating it. In the same light, “The
Register of Deeds may likewise properly refuse registration of an
order attachment when it appears that the title involved is not in the
name of the defendant and there is no evidence submitted to indicate
that the said defendant has any present or future interest in the
property covered by the titles.” The appellate court dismissed the
appeal because the issue raised by the petitioner was a pure
question of law, over which the CA had no jurisdiction.
Issue:
Ruling:
No, it is not.
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1529 merely involves the general functions of
the Register of Deeds, while Section 71 thereof relates to an
attachment or lien in a registered land in which the duplicate
certificate was not presented at the time of the registration of the said
lien or attachment.
A special law specifically deals with the procedure for the
reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title lost or destroyed.
846
Furthermore, Sections 8 and 11 of the same Act provide for the
procedure for the notation of an interest that did not appear in the
reconstituted certificate of title, mandating that a petition be filed
before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Clearly, therefore, it is not the ministerial function of the Register of
Deeds to record a right or an interest that was not duly noted in the
reconstituted certificate of title. As a matter of fact, this task is not
even within the ambit of the Register of Deed’s job as the
responsibility is lodged by law to the proper courts. As correctly
observed by respondents, P.D. No. 1529 principally pertains to the
registration of property, while R.A. No. 26 is a special law on the
procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that
were lost or destroyed. Specifically, Section 69 of P.D. No. 1529
refers to an attachment that arose after the issuance of a certificate of
title; while Section 71 of the same law pertains to the registration of
the order of a court of an attachment that was continued, reduced,
dissolved or otherwise affected by a judgment of the court.
Undoubtedly, the foregoing provisions find no application in the
present case since petitioner insists that its interest was
annotated prior to the reconstitution of the disputed certificates of title.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
848
issue in the first suit. Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-
litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a
previous case.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 is conclusive
upon the issue of validity of the [Spouses Layos'] OCT No. 239,
inasmuch as the said issue has already been mutually controverted
by the parties and ruled upon with finality by the Supreme Court no
less, in favor of the invalidity of the [Spouses Layos'] title.
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly
issued existing Torrens Titles (which become incontrovertible upon
the expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties
without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such
existing titles. The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by
such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles
over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in
the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of
stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System
of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates
of title over the same land to two different holders thereof.
A reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title
lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass
upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a
separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the
land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of
ownership of the land. The reconstitution of a title is simply the
reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
Possession of a lost certificate is not necessarily equivalent to
ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself,
does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a
particular property. Evidently, the Spouses Layos seek more than just
reconstitution of OCT No. 239 in LRC Case No. B-1758. They want to
hold a trial so as to prove before the San Pedro RTC the fraudulent
scheme perpetrated by several people, including their former
counsel, to sabotage their cases before the courts; the errors in the
Decisions of the courts that have long attained finality; and, ultimately,
849
the validity of their title to the subject property. Again, these are
matters beyond the jurisdiction of the San Pedro RTC to determine in
a case for reconstitution. If truly the Spouses Layos have been misled
and defrauded in a concerted effort to ruin their chances before the
courts, then their recourse is not to persist with this petition for
reconstitution of title, but to institute other actions to hold those
responsible administratively, civilly, and even criminally liable.
Facts:
The RTC rendered its decision ordering the reconstitution of the lost
OCT in favor of the legal heirs of Sofia Lazo.
850
Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals
which, granted the same and reversed the RTC judgment. The
appellate court at first held in favor of the petitioner on the ground that
no proper reconstitution can be done since respondent did not utilize
the sources of reconstitution provided under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 26 in
the order therein stated, merely presenting as it did a Certification
from the CENRO that a patent had been issued over Lot No. 7129 in
the name of the heirs of Sofia Lazo.
However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the
Court of Appeals reversed itself and held that respondent has
substantially complied with the requirements for reconstitution under
RA 26. The Court of Appeals traced the ownership of Lot No. 7129
based on the records of the Bureau of Lands, Friar Lands Division,
now the CENRO of the DENR. It found that: The property was part of
the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate covered by one mother title,
OCT No. 188. One such possessor was Sofia Lazo who was granted
Sales Patent No. 43619 on 21 July 1938. This led to the issuance by
the Philippine Government of a Deed of Conveyance which led to the
issuance by the Register of Deeds of a TCT in favor of the Heirs of
Sofia Lazo, and not an original certificate of title as claimed by
respondent. The plan and technical description having been
approved, may be used as basis for the inscription of the technical
description on the reconstituted certificate. Provided, however, that
no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the
office of the Register of Deeds concerned. The CA believed that
these government records as duly certified and reported by the
CENRO and the LRA uphold the prior existence of a certificate of title
in favor of the Heirs of Sofia Lazo over Lot No. 7129. Respondent’s
alleged failure to prove the loss of the owner’s duplicate certificate of
title was held to be justified by petitioner’s failure to deny or oppose
the allegation. As the allegation of loss was never specifically denied,
the averment in respondent’s petition was deemed admitted without
need of evidence to prove the same. Thus, respondent properly
resorted to the sources of reconstitution under Sec. 2(f) of R.A
26. The CA added that petitioner’s objections were belatedly raised
in the appeal before the appellate court and should be barred.
Issue:
No, it is not.
852
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v LAGRAMADA
G.R. No. 150741 June 12, 2008
Facts:
The trial court found the petition meritorious and ruled in favor of
respondents.
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
The Director of Lands filed a cadastral case involving four lots located
in Camarines Sur. He prayed that these parcels of land be declared
public land. Respondent Norma Royales was a claimant of these
lots.
On September 17, 1975, the CFI rendered a decision ordering the
registration of the lots in the name of respondent. However, before
the certificate of finality of the decision and order for the issuance of
the decree of registration could be issued by the court, the Registry of
Deeds of Camarines Sur was razed by fire on June 26, 1976 and all
the titles and documents therein were burned. 27 years later,
respondent filed a petition for the reconstitution of the September 17,
1975 CFI decision in the RTC. The RTC issued an order setting the
petition for hearing without directing the respondent to cause the
publication of said order in the Official Gazette. The RTC rendered a
decision granting the petition and ordered the reconstitution.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes, it is necessary.
The case here involves a cadastral undertaking. Under the cadastral
system, the government initiates the proceedings for the compulsory
registration of lands within a stated area by filing a petition in court
against the holder, claimants, possessors or occupants of such lands.
All claimants are compelled to act and present their answers
otherwise they lose their right to own their property. The purpose is to
serve public interest by requiring that the titles to the lands “be settled
and adjudicated.” Notice of the filing of the petition is published in the
Official Gazette. During the trial, conflicting claims are presented and
the court adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants.
When the decision becomes final, the court orders the issuance of
the decree of registration which, in turn, becomes the basis for the
issuance of a certificate of title. The cadastral system was conceived
to hasten the registration of lands and therefore make it more
effective. However, these two kinds of proceedings also vary in a
number of ways and the legislature chose to treat them differently in
Act 3110. Its intent to differentiate the two reconstitution procedures
should be given effect. It was presumed to know the meaning of the
words it employed and to have used them advisedly. It is Section 10
which is applicable to this cadastral proceeding. Consequently, the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for
reconstitution for failing to comply with the publication requirement.
Mantok v Barque
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605
856
Facts:
Issue:
CONDOMINIUM LAW
Hulst v PR Builders
566 SCRA 333 September 25, 2008
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Lesson learned:
No condominium unit can be sold without at the same time selling the
corresponding amount of rights, shares or other interest in the
condominium management body, the Condominium Corporation; and
no one can buy shares in a condominium unit. RA 4726 allows
foreigners to acquire condominium units and shares in condominium
corporations up to more than 40% of the total and outstanding capital
stocks of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation.
861
-To God Be The Glory-
862