Willensfreiheit in Theologie und Neurowissenschaften : Ein historisch-

systematischer Wegweiser

Wolfgang Achtner

Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 288 pp. ISBN 978-3-534-23508-7 (Hbk.), € 59.00.

The interaction between Christian theology and neurosciences tends to be seen as one of
conflict and incompatibility. Statements by leading neuroscientists about the illusory character
of freedom put into question the traditional Christian conception of human beings. In
Germany, the debate about human freedom is particularly vehement. This renders voices like
Achtner's, whose historical learning and argumentative rigor make it possible to manage the
subject in a balanced manner, even more valuable. The protestant theologian shows that
regarding free will important parallelisms exist between both disciplines.

The book is divided into two parts of unequal length. The first, much longer, adopts a
historical approach. Here Achtner presents various modulations of the concept of free will in
five different epochs: Greek philosophy, the Bible, the church fathers, medieval Scholastics and
Reformation Europe. Many different authors are studied in detail. Augustine and Luther are
highlighted, but the relationship between thomism, nominalism and medieval mystic or the
dispute between Erasmus and Luther deserve special attention as well. Moreover, the main
points of the approach to the subject in the protestant theology of the 19th and 20th centuries
are outlined. Despite the clear and lively prose, the richness of information makes reading
quite demanding.

The second part, shorter and more heterogeneous than desirable, has a systematic
intent. It tries to summarize the results of the previous historical analysis, confronting them
with neuroscientific data. Achtner aims to develop an integral, dynamic and personal model of
free will capable of being included into a multidimensional concept of person, drawing its
plausibility from both theological tradition and neurosciences and giving due recognition to the
complexity of the experience that human beings have of themselves. Ultimately it is not free
will, but the person, who acts.

The dialogue between theology and neurosciences is put to work for this purpose.
According to Achtner, free will unfolds along three orthogonal axes: development of self
(historical-biographical dimension), freedom of choice (rational dimension) and freedom of
action (emotional dimension). Precisely the relation between reason and emotion makes up
the core of the debate originated in the neurosciences as a result of Libet's experiment
concerning the so called readiness potential, which established that conscious choices taken in
the neocortex (seat of reason, so to speak) are preceded by unconscious electric processes in
the limbic system (seat of emotions). This experiment is open to different interpretations,
ranging from complete denial of free will (Singer, Roth) over attribution to the will of a mere
veto function (Libet) to the wholehearted defense of free will (Kornhuber, Deecke).

It is important to realize that most participants in this debate disregard personal

experiences as well as human corporality, that mind is reduced to neural processes. Following
a proposal from German psychiatrist Th. Fuchs, Achtner tries to go beyond the double dualism
which underlies the implicit anthropology of neurosciences (conscious-unconscious, reason-
emotions), to understand free will as an element of the system body-brain-person-
environment. This system of systems has three levels of integration, each of them with its
specific form of causality. The most complex of these three levels is associated with the
prefrontal cortex and stands out for its inverse causality (from the future into the present and
past: a consequence of human ability to anticipate outcome of actions). The number of
freedom grades or options for action increases with the complexity of each level. Furthermore,
such freedom grades are endowed with plasticity, i.e., they change and readjust continually,
opening up the temporal dimension. Free will is not something which one possesses or not,
but something which must be conquered.

But dialogue between theology and neurosciences has also a prominent role when it
comes to specify and assess, in the light of present knowledge, the four fundamental views of
free will developed in the history of Christian theology. (1) The conception of liberum
arbitrium, associated with thomism, stresses the role of reason in guiding action, something
which has not been confirmed as such by neuroscientific studies. (2) The nominalist conception
stresses, on the other hand, the role of the will. This is not understood as autonomous reality,
but as a moment in the self-constitution of the person through action. Similarities with biblical
anthropology and with the aforementioned Fuchs' model are remarkable. (3) The mystic
conception is characterized by the transformation of the autonomy of self by means of a
qualitative perception of the whole; moreover, it presupposes the possibility of interrupting
sensomotoric impulses which originate action. All this points to a new level of integration,
more comprehensive than the one associated with prefrontal cortex, whose existence,
however, has not been scientifically established yet. (4) The conception of justification by grace
alone states that true freedom has to do neither with self-autonomy nor with mystical self-
transcendence, but results exclusively from faith in the Word of God. Since such faith happens
without intervention of free will, i.e., extra nos, the «Lutheran» conception has nothing in
common with neuroscientific research.

It is obvious that these last two views take us beyond the system body-brain-person-
environment. They compel us to explicitly consider the religious dimension, first as mystic
eagerness to transcend the limits of self and then as faith in the redemption already
accomplished in Christ, which is independent of human action. That's why the concept of free
will is inadequate: it must yield to faith (in Christ), which is always an act of the whole person.
And since faith in Christ reaches its peak in Protestantism, the latter presents itself as the
religion of true freedom.

To conclude, just two critical comments, which do not take any shine off this superb
book. Although the author displays a sound knowledge of neurocientific research, one misses a
more systematic presentation of this. It is difficult to shake off the impression of a certain
degree of arbitrariness in the use of and capitalizing on neural data when it comes to assess
the four mentioned theological conceptions. And something analogous could be said about the
confessional bias Achtner stamps on the final pages of his study: in spite of rigorous historical
analysis, he sacrifices the liveliness of some theological positions to demonstrate a pre-
established view.