G.R. No.

L-2474             May 30, 1951

MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA
DUEÑAS, plaintiffs,
vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.
 Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, brought an action in the RTC for the
RECOVERY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF A PARCEL OF LAND
 alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas
 Emiliano Andal died and owner of the parcel of land
 acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias
 Eduvigis Macaraig, entered the land
 RTC- favor of the plaintiffs

 Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941

 His sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942
 On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of
Maria's father
 Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife.
 On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died
 On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to Mariano Andal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the Emiliano

 Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:

o Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of
marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
o This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband
to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
next preceding the birth of the child.
 Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is
presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred
(300) days following the dissolution of the marriage.
 This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have
had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.
 Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include
o absence during the initial period of conception,
o impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable
o imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of
prison regulations.
 There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of conception,
specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is
included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal.
 We admit that Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious
that he could hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But
experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse.
 There is neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and
incurable, nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned.
 The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not been overcome.
 Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas.
 G.R. No. L-49162               July 28, 1987

JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE S.
SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
CA and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.

 ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT

 Janice, minor, represented by her mother Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support with
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against Perico V. Jao.

 Perico denied paternity

 parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was conducted by NBI

 The result indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene
S. Salgado

 The trial court found the result legally conclusive

 second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, Janice was declared the child of Jao,
thus entitling her to his monthly support.

 Jao appealed to CA, questioning the trial court"s failure to appreciate the result of the blood grouping
tests

 CA reversed the trial court’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove paternity.

 In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was dealt with
in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals, an action for declaration of filiation, support and damages. In said case,
2 

the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant
Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this statement the defendant contended that the child
must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot
give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a
"possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during the
trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant Co Tao is the father of the child Manuel."
3

 There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-
paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity

 Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the instant case by
impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed the tests and the conduct of the tests
themselves

 NBI"s forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has had extensive practice in
this area for several years. The blood tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically
recognized blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the ABO System, under witness and supervision.
14  15

 SC affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the result of the blood grouping tests are
admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice.

 No evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing methods employed or failure to
provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result of such tests is to be
accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.
G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980

ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH MEJIAS, respondents.

ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT FILED BY RESPONDENT ELIZABETH MEJIAS AGAINST
PETITIONER ANTONIO MACADANGDANG

 Elizabeth Mejias is a married to Crispin Anahaw (

 She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967
 she and her husband separated in 1967
 7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter, she gave birth to Rolando Macadangdang
 Elizabeth filed a complaint for recognition and support against Antonio with CFI
 the lower court dismissed the complaint
 plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals
 CA reversed the lower court's decision AND declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio
Macadangdang

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses
Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and
2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving
her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.

Civil Code:

Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in such a way that access was not
possible;

(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
 Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but
there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in article
255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic
reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery
need not be proved in a criminal case.

since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same province, the fact remains that there was
always the possibility of access to each other

The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said
marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses.

Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the
legitimate son of respondent and her husband.

The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse.

This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access
between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child.

This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence — the
physical impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded
the birth of the child.

This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly
during the period of conception.

The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child.

impotency is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse. It is not synonymous with sterility. Sterility refers to
the inability to procreate, whereas, impotence refers to the physical inability to perform the act of sexual
intercourse.

With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized that adultery on the part of the wife, in itself,
cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the
husband (Tolentino, citing 1 Vera 170; 4 Borja 23-24).

it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or economic interest involved

there was the possibility of physical access to each other considering their proximity to each other and
considering further that respondent still visited and recuperated in her mother's house in Samal where her
spouse resided with her children.
G.R. No. L-75377 February 17, 1988

CHUA KENG GIAP, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and CHUA LIAN KING respondents.

Chua Keng Giap insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao

Chua Keng Giap filed a PETITION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE SY KAO RTC

The private respondent moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file the
petition because it had been declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao

IAP case invoked decided the paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner and reversed the trial judge in a
petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent.

Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, Sy Kao flatly and unequivocally declared that she was not the petitioner's mother.

The Court observed through Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.

Petitioner Sy Kao was not the son of Sy Kao and the deceased but of a certain Chua Eng Kun
and his wife Tan Kuy.

Nature of the case:

“A petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao”
Facts:
Petitioner insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao and that it was error for the
respondent court to reject his claim. He also says his motion for reconsideration should not have
been denied for tardiness because it was in fact filed on time under the Habaluyas ruling.
This case arose when Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the settlement of
the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of Quezon City. The private respondent moved
to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file the petition. The latter,
it was claimed, had been declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P.
No. Q-12592, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The decision in that case
had long become final and executory.

Issue:
Whether or not Keng Giap is the son of Chua Bing and Sy Kua.
Ruling:
There is no point in prolonging these proceedings with an examination of the procedural
objections to the grant of the motion to dismiss. In the end, assuming denial of the motion, the
resolution of the merits would have to be the same anyway as in the aforesaid case. The petitioner's
claim of filiation would still have to be rejected.
Discussion of the seasonableness of the motion for reconsideration is also unnecessary as the
motion would have been validly denied just the same even if filed on time.
 Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More
than anyone else, it was Sy Kao who could say — as indeed she has said these many years--that
Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.
The Supreme Court denied the petition.

G.R. No. 132980 March 25, 1999

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GLADYS C. LABRADOR, respondent.
The Facts

Gladys C. Labrador filed with RTC a PETITION FOR THE CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF
BIRTH OF SARAH ZITA ERASMO, her niece

Alleged:
1. Petitioner is of legal age, married, a resident of Cebu City, where she can be served with the
processes of this Honorable Court;
3. Petitioner is the sister of Maria Rosario Cañon who is presently residing in US
4. petitioner's sister, Maria Rosario Cañon, had a common law relationship with Degoberto
Erasmo, and during such cohabitation, petitioner's sister begot two (2) illegitimate children, one
of which is SARAH ZITA B. ERASMO, as shown in her birth certificate
5. During the registration of the birth of SARAH ZITA, petitioner's sister told the respondent Local
Civil Registrar that she was not legally married to the father of SARAH ZITA;
6. respondent erroneously entered the name of Sarah Zita in her birth record as SARAH ZITA C.
ERASMO, instead of SARAH ZITA CAÑON. the name of petitioner's sister, being the mother,
was also erroneously written by the herein respondent as Rosemarie Cañon, instead of Maria
Rosario Cañon;
7. In order to straighten the record of birth of SARAH ZITA ERASMO and pursuant to Article 176
of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
the mother
[t]here is a need to correct the entry in the record of birth of SARAH ZITA ERASMO to SARAH
ZITA CAÑON and to correct the name of her mother as appearing in her birth certificate from
ROSEMARIE CAÑON to MARIA ROSARIO CAÑON.

 Labrador then formally offered her evidence which included Maria Rosario's birth certificate   and a
8

certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it had no record of marriage between Maria Rosario
Cañon and Degoberto Erasmo. 

 RTC granted the Petition

The Issues
(a) Whether or not a change in the record of birth in a civil registry, which affects the civil status of a person, from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate" may be granted in a summary proceeding;
(b) Whether or not Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child.
The Court's Ruling: Rule 108 Inapplicable
 In the present case, the changes sought by Respondent Labrador were undoubtedly substantial:

o first, she sought to have the name appearing on the birth certificate changed from "Sarah Zita
Erasmo" to "Sarah Zita Cañon," thereby transforming the filiation of the child from legitimate to
illegitimate.
 o Second, she likewise sought to have the name of Sarah Zita's mother, which appeared as
"Rosemarie" in the child' birth record, changed to "Maria Rosario." Pursuant to Valencia, an
adversarial proceeding is essential in order to fully thresh out the allegations in respondent's
petition.

 Sarah Zita and her purported parents should have been parties to the proceeding.

o it would affect her legitimacy, as well as her successional and other rights.

o The rights of her parents over her and over each other would also be affected

o a change of name would affect not only the mother but possibly creditors, if any.

 no sufficient legal explanation has been given why an aunt, who had no appointment as guardian of the
minor, was the party-petitioner.

 Her evidence consisted mainly of her testimony and a certification from the civil registry of Cebu City that
such office had no record of a marriage between Rosemarie/Maria Rosario Cañon and Degoberto
Erasmo Respondent Labrador was not able to prove the allegations in her petition.

 not enough to fully substantiate her claim that Sarah Zita was illegitimate.

 Indeed, respondent correctly cites Article 176 of the Family Code, which states that "illegitimate children
shall use the surname[s] . . . of their mothers." But to enforce such provision, the proper recourse is an
adversarial contest. It must be stressed that Rule 108 does not contemplate an ordinary civil action but a
special proceeding.

G.R. No. 109144 August 19, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.

 Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C. Prieto were charged with the crime
of rape against a 15-year old Mongoloid child, Sandra Salcedo-weak of mind and in intellect as to be
capable of giving rational and legal consent.
 Sandra Salcedo- 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo.
 Four security men were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and
accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad.
 The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife, his son Alexander and wife, and daughter
Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers' quarters inside Provincial Headquarters
 Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen and told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo
'yan, bastos."
 The result revealed that Sandra was pregnant and gave birth to Jacob Salcedo.
 Complaint was filed by Pastora Salcedo.
 During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures of different persons were laid on
the table and Sandra was asked to pick up the pictures of her assailants. Sandra singled out the pictures
of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel
Prieto
 Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as the persons who raped
her and said she wished them dead, as they did something bad to her.
 The result of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type
"O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and Moreno Tumibad type "O".
 RTC convicted Moreno Tumimpad of the crime charged but acquitted the other accused, Ruel Prieto

ISSUE: Whether or not Blood test can prove paternity?

The following is the victim's own testimony:

The witness when she stood up held both her thighs (sic) with her two hand (sic)
down to her sexual organ saying a word "panty" and she placed her hand on her
 breast and did something as if sucking and held her private part (sic) and did a
push and pull movement and she cried.

Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his conviction was based on the medical
finding that he and the victim have the same blood type "O".

The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the
same blood type may have been the father of the child.

Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the
child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a
particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in
many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such tests.
Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the
results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity.
This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely
accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to
turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are
not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father
or any one of many others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ
LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, Respondents.

 spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties e

 Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed on November 13, 1989. He died
intestate.

 The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued.

 Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew,
respectively) instituted before the RTC for the ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION OF VICENTE'S ESTATE in favor of Aguilar. They alleged

 Alleged that the decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives and that one
Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since childhood is, in
fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a
legal heir

 Marissa alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and
capable of administering his estate

 Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian

 documentary evidence (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (2) Baptismal Certificate
(3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet of the late Vicente naming her
as his daughter (4) School Records
  She also testified that the said spouses reared an continuously treated her as
their legitimate daughter.

 RTC- in favor or Marissa- legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian.

 CA- reversed- not the biological daughter, not a legal heir

Issue: Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate child and the sole heir
of the late spouses.

Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are
likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a
written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil
registry together with the birth certificate of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164;
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its
recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where
the birth took place or was recorded. virtual law library
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it
was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the
child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, which ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding Article only
in the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom;
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature
or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where
a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.

Her appellee's evidence is insufficient to establish her biological and blood kinship
with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record is strong and convincing that
she is not, but that said couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a
child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and
without he and his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared, considered,
and loved her as their own true child, giving her the status as not so, such that she
herself had believed that she was really their daughter and entitled to inherit from
them as such.

The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the following:

First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never became
pregnant

the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of
an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of simulation of
the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document.

Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's Certificate of Live Birth
was repudiated by the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Isabel by Vicente,
saying that he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs of the estate.
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized document, they stated that "(they)
are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or
ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live
Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The repudiation was made
twenty-eight years after he signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.

Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making up the Civil
Registry and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As related above, the
totality of contrary evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently
rebutted the truth of the content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.

petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit

G.R. No. L-29771 May 29, 1987

CONSOLACION LUMAHIN DE APARICIO, Accompanied by her husband BENITO APARICIO, plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
HIPOLITO PARAGUYA, defendant-appellant.

 Trinidad Montilde, had a love affair with a priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and in the process she
conceived.
 When she was almost four (4) months pregnant and in order to conceal her disgrace she decided to
marry Anastacio Mamburao. Father Lumain solemnized their marriage
 They never lived together as man and wife.
 192 days after the marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain.
 As shown by her birth certificate her registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. 
 Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will and testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his
daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights and interests.
 Consolacion filed an action in the CFI against Hipolito Paraguya for the RECOVERY OF CERTAIN
PARCELS OF LAND she claims to have inherited from her father Fr. Lumain and for damages.
GRANTED
 CA- Hipolito

Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare and their children Rev. Fr. Felix Lumain and Macario
Lumain are dead.
 it was their two children Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and Macario Lumain who succeeded them in the
possession of the same property.
Hipolito alleging that he had bought it from the late Roman Lumain, the admitted original owner.
Plaintiff maintains that she is entitled to inherit the property of the deceased Rev. Fr. Felipe
Lumain on the ground that she had been recognized as daughter of the latter in his testament
Defendant, on the other hand, maintains that plaintiff is not entitled to inherit the property of the
deceased Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain for the reason that she is an adulterous child.

Let us not forget that the spouses Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare died leaving two legitimate children:
Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and Macario Lumain

A natural or a legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate

children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall
such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
In the light of the foregoing, it is obvious that, after the death of Fr. Felipe Lumain, plaintiff and
Macario Lumain became co-owners of all the properties left by their deceased parents.
Consequently, plaintiff is only an owner of one-half (1/2) undivided share of said properties and
the remaining undivided half belongs to the heirs of the late Macario Lumain who took no
intervention in this case.
appellant points out that appellee Consolacion Lumain is the legitimate child of spouses Anastacio Mamburao
and Trinidad Montilde as she was born on September 12, 1924, 192 days after the marriage of said spouses
citing the provision of Article 255 of the Civil Code
ART. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage and before
three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

However, the Court finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of appellee Consolacion in this case. In the
last will and testament of Fr. Lumain he not only acknowledged appellee Consolacion as his natural daughter but
designated her as his only heir. 

As Fr. Lumain died without any compulsory heir, appellee Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as duly
instituted in his will. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in
favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992

AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by the former,
his mother and natural guardian, petitioners, vs. IVAN MENDEZ

 Amelita Constantino filed AN ACTION FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT, SUPPORT AND DAMAGES

against Ivan Mendez with CFI

 Amelita Constantino alleges, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant where she worked as a
waitress;

 the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico

 Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita;

 Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having
sexual intercourse

 after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man

 they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan
is in Manila,
 Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears

 Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to
be born

 Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint impleading as co-plaintiff her
son Michael Constantino who was born on August 3, 1975

 Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint reiterating his previous answer denying that
Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son.

 Amelita Constantino, sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as the
illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.

 RTC: to recognize as his own illegitimate child the plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino who shall be
entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining to a child of such status; to give a
permanent monthly support in favor

 CA: set aside

ISSUE: whether or not there’s a sufficient evidence to prove the paternity?

 Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is
the father of her son Michael Constantino.

 Amelita's testimony on cross-examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first
or second week of November, 1974 is inconsistent with her response that she could not remember
the date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974

 Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial
point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had
sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974.

 Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975

 Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974, said testimony is
contradicted by her own evidence

 the letter dated February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez informing him that Amelita is four (4)
months pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was
conceived on or about October 11, 1974.

 Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend is belied her own letter addressed to
Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain
traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend
because of gossips so she left her work.

 The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her
son.

 As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 193 & 214of the Civil Code on
the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but
agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery.
Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual
desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she
admitted that she was attracted to Ivan
 the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit

[G.R. No. 86302. September 24, 1991.]

CASIMIRO MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA
TORING TUÑACAO, Respondents.

 The Teopista claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter
denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day.
 Teopista Toring Tuñacao alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring,
who was then single, and Casimiro Mendoza, married to Emiliana Barrientos. \
 She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such
and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child
that it was her mother who told her that her father was Casimiro.
 Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiff’s allegations
 Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro.
 Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro’s only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring, declared
that Teopista’s father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who later
abandoned her.
 RTC dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition
 CA reversed the judgment

ISSUE: whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an
illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza

The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article 283 of the Civil Code,
applicable not only to natural children but also to spurious children.

Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his
natural child:

(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more
or less with that of the conception;

(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by
the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father.

(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

This article has been substantially reproduced in the Family Code as follows:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
 the established evidence is that plaintiff continuously lived with her mother, together with
her sister Paulina.
 Neither the plaintiff nor her husband had come to live with the defendant.
 The defendant never spent for the support and education of the plaintiff.
 He did not allow the plaintiff to carry his surname.
 The instances when the defendant gave money to the plaintiff were, more or less, off-and-
on or rather isolatedly periodic.
a) the defendant’s parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and
Isaac Mendoza that Teopista is the daughter of the defendant;
b) that Teopista calls the defendant as "Papa Miroy" ;
c) that Teopista would kiss defendant’s hand when she met him;
d) that the defendant gave to her and her husband the income of the passenger truck as
well as the proceeds of the sale thereof,
 all these acts, taken altogether, are not sufficient to show that the plaintiff had possessed
continuously the status of a recognized illegitimate child.

 the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to
comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
 "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only
that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
 The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own,
directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without
publicity (since the relation is illegitimate).
 There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
 Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate
child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code.
 But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless
established that status by another method.
 an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or
proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code.
 Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible
in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased,
or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
 requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree
may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.

2. The pedigree must be in issue.

3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.

4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.

5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
 All the above requisites are present in the case at bar.
 The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the
mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time
of Isaac’s testimony.
 The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which
were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition.
 The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the
controversy arose between her and Casimiro.
 the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence
other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.
 The said declarations have not been refuted.
 Casimiro could have done this by deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the
trial of the case.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent and
her witnesses, such as the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of
Teopista’s husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle and
gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the permission he gave Lolito
Tuñacao to build a house on his land after he found that the latter was living on a rented
lot, and, no less remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro opened with Teopista, we
can reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.

 Teopista Toring Tuñacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such.
 Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate
child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status.
G.R. No. 76873 October 26, 1989
DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all surnamed
UYGUANGCO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN PENARANDA and GRACIANO BACJAO UYGUANGCO, respondents.

ISSUE: whether he should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is
already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil Code.

 The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals.   1

 Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children (her co-
petitioners herein),

 considerable properties which they divided among themselves.   2

 Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the extrajudicial
settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against all the
petitioners.

 Graciano alleged that he was born to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao and that at the age of
15 he moved to his father's hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental, at the latter's urging and also of
Dorotea and his half-brothers.

 he received support from his father while he was studying

 He was also assigned by his father, without objection from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at the
Uyguangco store

 petitioners elicited an admission from Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article
278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco.   5

These are "the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing."

 respondent insists, that he has a right to show under Article 283 that he is "in continuous possession of
the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family."

Under the Family Code, it is provided that:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in proving his illegitimate filiation:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name
has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 8

The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in
1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows:
 The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Italics supplied.)

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO
MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.

 Lupo Mariategui died without a will

 Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages.
 first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died, he begot four (4) children,
 his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter
 Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married and had three children, Felipa
Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
 At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still
unmarried On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves
 Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower
court an amended complaint claiming that Lot were owned by their common father,
 they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for
PARTITION OF THE ESTATE OF THEIR DECEASED FATHER AND ANNULMENT OF THE
DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION
 RTC: The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous
enjoyment and possession of status of children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain
either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained
 Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui,
including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal
shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui;

ISSUES:

(a) whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui,

(b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their
successional rights over said estate.

 the action is principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased.
 Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married
 The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
 Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to
controvert these facts.
 So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not
denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact
 Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate.
 Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child.
 Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a
record of birth referred to in the said article. Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence
any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of
Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
 there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo
Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is
inapplicable to this case.
 prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by
the co-owner
 Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can
only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of
defraudation
 prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents commenced the
instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots
involved.
 CA Affirmed