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A Comparison of Thomas Aquinas’ and Martin Luther’s Views on

the Role of Philosophical Reflection in Theology

by

Dinku Lamessa Bato

St. Paul, Minnesota

2011
Introduction

The history of the interrelationship between Christian theology and philosophy

dates back to the times of Tertullian and Justin Martyr who had differing opinions

particularly on the role of philosophical reflections in Christian theology. Justin Martyr,

for instance, argued for the affirmative role of philosophy (Platonism in particular) in

theological discussion. Tertullian, on the other hand, doubted about any common ground

between the two as articulated in his famous dictum: “what has Athens to do with

Jerusalem? Or the Academy with the church?” For yet others—Augustine, for instance—

lies a middle ground between these exclusive claims where the theologian selectively

employs philosophical ideas and methods, an idea he likened to an event in exodus from

Egypt wherein Israelites spoiled the Egyptians of their gold and silver. By doing so, he

advocated for the extraction of all that is good in philosophy toward explaining the

Christian message.1 In the same fashion as the forgoing argument, I will briefly discuss in

this paper the position of two theologians—Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther—on the

role of philosophical reflection in theological discourse.

The Views of Thomas Aquinas

For Aquinas, philosophy and theology are two distinct enterprises. The main

distinction between the two lies in the fact that philosophy starts from the premise that

our natural mental faculties are reliable ways of perceiving and making sense of the
1
Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (MA: Blackwell Publishers,
2001), 222-23.

1
2

natural world whereas theology, on the other hand, considers the divine revelations

contained in the Bible as the starting point and authoritative.2 Aquinas distinguishes

between believing something on the basis of God’s revelation and knowing on the

grounds of natural philosophical evidence. He further distinguishes between two kinds of

divine truth which humanity can reach to. The first relates to truths which natural reason

can discover (the existence of God, for instance) and on the other hand knowledge about

God which surpasses human understanding and reason (Trinity and Christology, for

instance).3

Aquinas also argues that there is no actual incongruity between these truths (truth

discovered by human faculties and truth which is revealed to humanity by God). Here he

expounds that the gifts of grace perfect nature but do not supplant or suppress it. Put

differently, the light of faith which is given to us as a grace does not destroy the light of

natural reason. He intuits that although human faculty is insufficient to comprehend

divine revelation/mystery, the two types of knowledge are not incompatible because of

unity of their sources. For Aquinas, therefore, there cannot be real conflict between

philosophy and theology which means that philosophy can be appropriately employed in

theological reflections while still recognizing the distinctiveness, legitimacy, and

limitation of philosophical argumentation since the things known to us by philosophical

means will fall short of those which we accept in faith.4

2
Gavin D'Costa, Theology in the Public Square: Church, Academy and Nation, Challenges in
Contemporary Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005), 12.
3
John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated
Being, Monographs of the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy No. 1 (Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 25.
4
Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic
Perspectives, 2 vols. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 18-19.
3

Any probable conflict between theology and philosophy is ascribed to an abuse or

misuse of philosophy resulting from the weakness of human reason where the

philosopher must have made some mistake in arriving at this conclusion. Here one can

observe that Aquinas gives preeminence to ones belief to correct one’s philosophy in the

case of any contradiction between the two. Aquinas further identifies three ways in which

a theologian may use philosophy: (1) in order to show certain things which he describes

as preamble to faith, such as God’s existence, or the unity of God, and other things, of

this kind which, he says, are proved in philosophy and presupposed by faith; (2) in order

to make evident certain things which are right to faith by using analogies drawn from the

philosophical order for the purpose of clarification; (3) in order to counter attack

opposition against the faith either by showing that such attacks are false in their claims,

or at least by showing that their claims have not themselves been established.5

The theologian is warned in his/her use of philosophical methods in theological

reflections for it may lead the theologian into error in one of two ways that Aquinas

identifies: (1) by introducing things which are opposed to the faith and which are not, in

Thomas’s judgment, true philosophy but rather a corruption or and abuse of philosophy;

(2) by attempting to include within philosophy things which are reserved for faith. 6

Some points from Aquinas’ discussion of the theology and philosophy (faith and

reason) relationship should be recalled here. He, first and foremost, does clearly

differentiate between faith and reason while if the motive for accepting something as true

in the case of religious belief is divine authority, in the case of philosophy it can only be

5
Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 25.
6
Ibid., XXV.
4

naturally accessible evidence. Secondly, in the course of defending the theologian’s right

to use philosophy in his theologizing, Aquinas has also defended the legitimacy of

philosophy. Not only is it different from faith and from theology; it can arrive at truth,

and even at some truths concerning divine things. Finally, Aquinas has allowed faith to

play a negative role in the believer’s assessment of any philosophical conclusion which

conflicts with revealed data. In such cases, because of his conviction that two

contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time and because of God’s

authorship of revealed truth, Thomas holds that there must be something wrong with

one’s philosophizing.7

In a way of demonstrating how philosophical reasoning may aid theological

reflection I resort to a brief discussion of Aquinas’ famous argument about the existence

of God in his Five Ways. These lines of argument draw on some aspect of the world

which “points” to the existence of its creator.8 The first way—argument from motion—

draws from the laws of motion or the way in which things in the world are in motion

(rotation, revolution, gravity, etc). Based on this Aquinas establishes the fact that “for

every motion there is a cause” and “[f]rom the fact that things are in motion, Aquinas

argues thus for the existence of a single original cause of all this motion and this, he

concludes, is none other than God.”9 The second is related to the existence of cause and

effect in the material world where an effect is explained by the cause that influenced the

7
Ibid., xxii-xxv.
8
McGrath, Christian Theology, 245.
9
Ibid., 246.
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event. Based on the cause and effect relationship Aquinas avers that all effects have a

single original or primal cause which is none other than God.10

The existence of contingent beings informs Aquinas’s third way where the

necessary being (God) is the cause for the existence of the former (human beings). This

argument explains the what (cause) and why (purpose) questions as related to the

existence of human being in the world. The fourth way draws from the human value

system that includes truth, goodness, and nobility, for instance. Similar to his argument of

causation, Aquinas here argues that the there must be an ultimate source of these values

to be found among human beings. The fifth way is a teleological argument that purports

the presence of purpose in creation revealing an intelligent design. Here it is further

argued that“natural processes and objects seems to be adapted with certain definite

objective in mind” whose source is granted to be God for Aquinas.11 Though there are

arguments that the five ways are basically similar in essence with a general framework of

cause and effect, still one can clearly observe how Thomas Aquinas had attempted to

demonstrate the viability and importance of philosophical reflection in theology. Put

differently, he highlighted that the contents of the Christian faith can be proved to be in

agreement with human reason.

Martin Luther’s View

Luther’s view of the interrelationship between philosophy and theology stands in

clear contrast to that of Aquinas whose claim stresses that truth was identical in

philosophy and theology. Arguing for the impossibility of such kind of relationship,

10
Ibid.
11
Ibid. See also Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 497.
6

Luther at the disputation on 11 January 1539 that dealt with John 1:14: “The word

became flesh,” effectively contended that reason had to obey Christ.12 Along this line he

further indicated that:

Theology and philosophy repeatedly came into conflict because of their respective rules
of thought. This was apparent in the doctrine of the Trinity and in the incarnation, God’s
coming into the world. Truth was not always uniform in the different disciplines of
philosophy. Thus theology drew the conclusion that philosophy should be limited to its
own sphere and that in the realm of faith one had to speak with a new language. God was
not subject to reason and logical conclusions.13

In another occasion (at the graduation disputation of Erasmus Alber in 1543) Luther

again indicated that “it was impossible for philosophy to reconcile the unity of God with

the Trinitarian distinctions of the divine persons, and he rejected all attempts at doing so.

. . . One had to hold fast in faith to the Son of God revealed in flesh.”14

Luther, however, indefatigably rejects the theory of double truth that “the same

proposition can be true in philosophy and false in Christian theology, and vice versa.”15

In the same vein, Gerrish states that although for Luther “it is to be held that two truths

never contradict each other, yet the same proposition is not true in different disciplines.”

Dragseth also comments that “Luther saw no contradiction between the deliverance of

12
James L. Schaaf By Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: The Preservation of the Church, 3 vols., vol.
3 (Minniapolis, MN: Augusburg Fortress, 1993), 133.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Eberhard Bethge, Ethics, 1st Touchstone ed. (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1995), 197., cited in Oswald Bayer, Jeffrey G. Silcock, and Mark C. Mattes, Theology the
Lutheran Way, English ed., Lutheran Quarterly Books (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co.,
2007), 79.
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philosophy and theology, but ‘philosophical categories and techniques are not applicable

in theological matters”16 (emphasis in the original).

Indicating the fundamental importance of the problem of the relation between

philosophy and theology which cannot be overestimated, Oswald Bayer, states that for

Luther “the problem is human reason, not so much theoretical reason but practical reason

guided by the imagination. It always reaches out for God, but it always falls short of the

mark.”17 On the other hand, Luther admits the fact that “the heathen do not fear and love

God”, does not “extinguish the light of reason entirely, because God established it at

creation which his promise and blessing. In fact, they fulfill the second table of the

Decalogue so brilliantly that “at times [they certainly] appear holier than Christians.”18 It

is further stated that Luther acknowledges that Aristotle, Demosthenes, and Cicero

having some knowledge of “the material and formal cause (causa materialis and

formalis) of social life and the arts they forfeit the knowledge about “their final and

efficient cause.”19

Human beings failure to notice their instrumentality and resort to self

aggrandizement to be the efficient and final cause destroys the way that God intended

reason to be used. In his strong argument that God is the only and prime cause of human

values, Luther seems to concur with Aquinas’ idea of causation. This also has a

concurrent implication that human reason serves as instrument in explaining certain facts

16
Jennifer Hockenbery Dragseth, The Devil's Whore: Reason and Philosophy in the Lutheran
Tradition (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 189.
17
Bayer, Silcock, and Mattes, Theology the Lutheran Way, 74-75.
18
Ibid., 76.
19
Ibid.
8

about God—His existence, for instance. On the other hand, as briefly indicated above, it

is evident that Luther considers the relationship between philosophy and theology, to be

one of radical conflict.

Based on this idea of conflict, Oswald identifies Luther’s difference with Aquinas

on the interrelationship between theology and philosophy: “In fact, to do theology means

to become involved in this conflict. The sharpness of the conflict is not toned down, as in

Thomas Aquinas, who concedes that philosophy has a relative independence. This allows

him to say that grace surpasses and perfects philosophy and nature.” Oswald further

warns: “On the other hand, we must guard against interpreting Luther’s theology from the

angle of transcendental philosophy, according to which grace does not surpass nature but

deepens it, so that God and his freedom are made the condition of human freedom.20

Conclusion

In line with Augustine’s idea of “spoiling the Egyptians of their gold” where one

is supposed to selectively employ the best and constructive conceptual tools in other

disciplines for theological reflections, both Aquinas and Luther concede to the fact that

selective philosophical reflection has a positive role to contribute in the process of

theologizing.

Thomas Aquinas maintained an esteemed view of philosophy—though demoted it

from lover to handmaid—a helpful companion in clarifying understanding in certain

fields that includes theology. Luther, in contrast, strongly objects the promotion of

philosophy warning Christians against her.21

20
Ibid., 76-77.
21
Dragseth, The Devil's Whore, 196.
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They generally agree on the idea of distinction between the disciplines under

discussions, Luther, however, “emphasizes the importance of historically irrevocable

distinction between philosophy and theology,” where this distinction is characterized

neither by the peaceful coexistence of difference or by their complete separation but a

relationship marked by conflict and dispute which constitutes the essential nature of both

theology and philosophy.


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References

Bayer, Oswald, Jeffrey G. Silcock, and Mark C. Mattes. Theology the Lutheran Way.
English ed., Lutheran Quarterly Books. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Pub. Co., 2007.

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, and Eberhard Bethge. Ethics. 1st Touchstone ed. New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1995.

By Martin Brecht, James L. Schaaf. Martin Luther: The Preservation of the Church. 3
vols. Vol. 3. Minniapolis, MN: Augusburg Fortress, 1993.

D'Costa, Gavin. Theology in the Public Square: Church, Academy and Nation.
Challenges in Contemporary Theology. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005.

Dragseth, Jennifer Hockenbery. The Devil's Whore: Reason and Philosophy in the
Lutheran Tradition. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.

Fiorenza, Francis Schüssler, and John P. Galvin. Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic
Perspectives. 2 vols. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991.

McGrath, Alister E. Christian Theology: An Introduction. 3rd ed. MA: Blackwell


Publishers, 2001.

Wippel, John F. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to
Uncreated Being. Monographs of the Society for Medieval and Renaissance
Philosophy No. 1. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000.

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