Interview Jason Furman, Former Chair of The Council of Economic Advisers - by Noah Smith - Noahpinion

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Interview: Jason Furman, former chair of the Council

of Economic Advisers
The Harvard economist talks about inflation, wages, and where the Obama
administration fell short
Noah Smith
Jul 6 17 8
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1 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
Interview: Jason Furman, former chair of the Council of Economic Advis... https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/interview-jason-furman-former-chair
chart a path back to good times.
In the interview that follows, I talk to Jason about in�ation, wage growth, productivity, and
what the Obama administration could have done better.
Type your email… Subscribe
N.S.: So, you've been fairly ambivalent about where the macroeconomy is headed. You're not
sounding the alarm about in�ation as much as Larry Summers or Olivier Blanchard, but you're
taking the possibility pretty seriously. Has your outlook on near-term in�ation and growth changed
recently, and if so, how?
J.F.: Before getting to in�ation, we should not lose sight of the big picture. What is most
important is real economic growth and employment. We don’t have numbers for the second
quarter yet but assuming GDP comes in at a 10 percent annual rate we will have had more
growth in the �rst half of 2021 than the Congressional Budget O�ce had forecast for the
entire year. Most forecasters expect GDP to be above pre-pandemic projections by the end
of the year. If that happens it would be a remarkable contrast not just to the overly slow
recovery from the last crisis but also to previous recessions all of which were associated
with output losses.
I believe this is because of the interaction of two factors: �rst, this was a massive negative
supply shock that is going away comparatively rapidly due to vaccination. There is no
reason the economy cannot just pick up where it le� o� now that it is getting safer to do so.
But this factor interacts with a second one: the remarkable public policy response that
drove a wedge between GDP which fell dramatically and real disposable personal incomes
which rose sharply. This has enabled people to increase their spending as it has become
safer to do so. The �scal response was much larger in the United States than in Europe,
their comparative economic outlooks over the next year will provide evidence for whether
this matters. I expect it will and that the U.S. recovery will be further and faster than
Europe’s.
Now that we’ve gotten the very important part out of the way let’s talk about a somewhat
2 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
important issue: in�ation. So far in�ation has vastly exceeded what most people expected. It
may be transitory (more on that in a moment) but it is worth admitting that even if it is
transitory it is much more transitory in�ation than almost anyone expected. Back in January
and February a number of forecasters did not think we would even hit two percent in�ation
this year. As recently as May the Survey of Professional Forecasters was expecting 2.1
percent PCE in�ation for the entire year, we have already gotten more than that in just the
�rst �ve months of the year. For the year as a whole in�ation is very likely to end up above 3
percent and could even be above 4 percent, amounts that would have—and were—
dismissed as scaremongering just a few months ago.
You asked what has surprised me about in�ation. First let’s talk about what is not
surprising: base e�ects, pandemic-related prices like restaurants and travel returning to
normal, and transitory increases for certain bottleneck-related goods (for example most
everything that uses lower-end microchips). Everyone knew those were coming and built
them into their forecasts. Other countries are experiencing something similar but the
contrast with the United States is telling: over the last twelve months consumer prices have
risen 2.0 percent in the Euro area, 2.1 percent in the United Kingdom, and 5.0 percent in the
United States (part, but only part, of this di�erence is due to the fact that we have reopened
more). Prices in the United States have been rising at an 8 percent annual rate, de�nitely a
lot of that is special factors but even stripping those special factors out and you are le� with
something more like a still unusually rapid 4 percent annual rate.
The big surprise to me has been the strength of labor demand and the comparative
weakness of labor supply. You see this in record job openings and quits juxtaposed to the
labor force participation rate which has barely increased from last summer. This disconnect
is evidenced in the most rapid nominal wage gains since the 1980s. Moreover these rapid
nominal wage gains come on top of a recessionary period where nominal wage growth
never slowed and was even higher for lower-wage workers, something that is extremely
unusual and possibly unprecedented. So instead of thinking about the economy as having
the substantial amount of slack you would expect from an economy with an unemployment
rate of around 6 percent it may have less slack than it has had at almost any point in recent
history.
Looking forward, everyone expects the in�ation rate to fall from its 8 percent annual rate as
bottlenecks get resolved, labor supply returns more fully, and demand cools—particularly
for goods. But I still expect it to be elevated because some sectors will see rising prices
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(shelter is the best candidate), sticky wages and prices will take some time to adjust up, and
most importantly, demand is likely to continue to exceed supply because of the combination
of lagged e�ects of past �scal support, another 3-4 percent of GDP in already enacted �scal
support coming next year, and unprecedentedly loose �nancial conditions.
The in�ation rate could temporarily dip over the remainder of this year as used car and
other bottleneck prices come down but then my best guess would be about 3 percent
in�ation next year—with a massive margin of error around that prediction.
N.S.: OK, so let's talk about in�ation a bit more. First of all, I've written that the most likely cause of
sustained high in�ation is neither supply constraints nor excess spending on its own, but a regime
shi� -- a public perception that the Fed no longer cares as much about �ghting in�ation as much as
it used to. Do you agree with that? My argument was based on the idea that the Philipps curve is
usually quite �at, but can shi� substantially in the event of a policy regime shi�.
J.F.: I like to think of in�ation in terms of micro or bottom-up factors (e.g., what is going on
with cars and houses), macro or top-down factors (e.g., what is the balance of supply of
demand), and expectations (e.g., what is the regime). I already talked about the previous two
and they are a good way to think about in�ation over the next year or two but let’s now turn
to the regime shi�. We may already have had somewhat of a regime shi�. It is possible we
have had one on �scal policy given how massively expansionary it has been relative to the
past and how no one is talking about reducing the de�cit. But I am skeptical given how
much the political sytem has generally returned to the view that everything must be paid
for. In fact my own view is that we have not had enough of a regime shi� on �scal policy.
Monetary policy is a better candidate for a possible regime shi�—one that we might already
have had and might go further in the future. O�cially the goal has shi�ed to �exible
average in�ation targeting, a small shi� from in�ation targeting that allows a persistent
overshoot. Some argue that framework should allow a sustained overshoot given that
in�ation undershot for over a decade prior to it. More importantly Fed Chair Powell and the
other governors (but not the regional Presidents) are talking very di�erently about monetary
policy, one that has been widely celebrated by the full employment community which has
talked about how as a non-economist Powell is avoiding the mistakes macroeconomists
have led us into. You cannot celebrate those changes (as many have) and then be indignant
at the claim of a regime shi�. Just look at how the Fed has declared it will not raise rates to
even 37 basis points until we are already at maximum employment and in�ation is poised to
4 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
overshoot 2 percent for “some time”. That is a very, very di�erent approach than we have
seen in the past.
It is still uncertain, however, how much the monetary policy regime has shi�ed because the
FOMC appears to believe in�ation will come down to its 2 percent target next year and stay
there. At the current moment it is hard to distinguish between them having a very dovish
reaction function or a very dovish forecast. If it is a very dovish forecast then if in�ation
comes in higher than they expect they will tighten faster and we will be back to something
more like the old regime. I view this as the most likely. But another possibility is that they
have a very dovish reaction function and even if in�ation is closer to 3 percent next year (the
center of my very uncertain forecast) they will �nd another reason not to raise rates.
Ultimately there is a better possibility than at any point in the last three decades that we
will have a few years of in�ation well above 2 percent. If this happens I don’t think the Fed
will try to get in�ation back to its target. And then at its next framework review about four
years from now it could end up ratifying reality with a higher in�ation target like a 2 to 3
percent range or 3 percent in�ation. So far the bond markets and professional forecasters
are giving very little weight to this possibility and expect them to keep in�ation to 2 percent
over the longer term. I’m much less sure and place at least a 20 percent chance of a higher
in�ation target, but possibly that is wishful thinking on my part because I would like them
to raise the in�ation target.
N.S.: Second of all, why should we worry about in�ation? Is it because in�ation that's not caused by
rising wages will end up reducing real wages, because wages are nominally sticky and can't adjust to
keep up? Or some other reason?
J.F.: I would rather we were in a regime of steady about 3 percent average in�ation instead
of the steady sub 2 percent average in�ation we were in for the last decade. The higher
in�ation target would have some costs in terms of greater inconvenience of adjusting prices
and understanding them over time—I would never advocate that we annually change the
de�nition of a foot. But unlike the de�nition of the foot, changing price levels every year
has meaningful bene�ts in terms of �ghting recessions and the terrible toll they take on the
most vulnerable workers and possibly even average growth rates over time. Speci�cally,
interest rates have come down over time so the Fed has less ability to cut rates, a higher
in�ation rate would mean that when interest rates were cut to zero that would be more
powerful, technically the real rate would be more negative—but you could think of that as it
5 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
being cheaper to borrow because you can pay back the debt more easily with all the price
and wage increases you are going to get. In addition, an older and less fashionable
argument—but no less true argument—is that in�ation “greases the wheels of the labor
market” where nominal wages cannot be cut then in�ation leads to larger real wage
reductions in recessions and thus helping to maintain employment.
But in the current environment in�ation raises a number of potential concerns and
problems, mostly because we are talking about unexpected and inconsistent in�ation that
falls outside of the generally accepted regime. Those potential concerns and problems
include:
First, real wages. We are accustomed to think of a hot labor market leading to larger rises in
wages than prices. That is probably true for the types of gradually heated labor markets we
had in the late 1990s and prior to the pandemic. It is much less clear if that is the case now.
So far nominal wages have risen a lot but prices have risen even more so this has not been a
good year for real wages. For it to be a better year we will need to see price increases
translating into wage increases (which has not happened for decades but very well might
now) and then see wage increases not translate back into price increases.
Second, problems associated with the monetary policy reaction. The Fed massively
underestimated in�ation so far this year and I fear they continue to put much too little
weight on the possibility that in�ation above 2 percent is persistent. If we get this
persistent in�ation then it could cause them to react in ways that surprise markets (as they
did at the last FOMC meeting), more abruptly raise rates, and possibly even cause a
recession. If the Fed ultimately is committed to 2 percent in�ation then it could be painful
to bring in�ation back down again if it ends up around 3 percent for another year or two.
Third, we have bene�ted a lot from the very �at Phillips curve, a curve that was �at in part
due to anchored expectations. If these expectations become less stable then it could be
harder in the future to run experiments like we did in the late 1990s and just prior to the
recession where we push the unemployment rate lower and lower. The Fed’s credibility may
have allowed those better outcomes. I think and hope we can shi� to the same situation but
1 percentage point higher. But it certainly has risks.
Fourth, in the current environment the same factors giving rise to in�ation could also be
giving rise to housing bubbles and asset price bubbles that threaten to destabilize the
economy in the future.
6 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
The Fed is operating under substantial uncertainty. Its most important job should be to
avoid recessions with their terrible and persistent consequences for the most vulnerable
workers. The argument for pushing further is strong in terms of bringing vulnerable
workers into jobs and possibly raising real wages. But the argument on the other side is not
about the wealthy—they do just �ne in recessions—it is about those same workers who are
the �rst to su�er in a recession. So it is really important to get this right and understand it
as a balancing of risks for vulnerable workers and not some sort of battle between capital
and labor.
N.S.: What about the possibility of "�scal dominance"? The federal government's debt level is just
much higher than it was in the early 80s, when Paul Volcker tamed in�ation. In 1980, federal
government debt held by the public was about 24% of GDP; now it's about 100%. The average
maturity of this debt has not changed much over the years, meaning that much of this is still short-
term debt that needs to be rolled over. This means that if the Fed raises rates to �ght in�ation, it
could severely increase the amount of interest that the federal government is required to pay each
month. That could force the government into a punishing austerity program that would hurt the
economy, on top of the monetary e�ect of higher interest rates. Is it possible that this will tie the
Fed's hands? In other words, even without explicit political interference -- even with perfect central
bank independence -- is it possible that the threat of higher interest payments will make the Fed very
hesitant to raise rates to �ght in�ation? And might that lead to the kind of monetary regime change,
and spiraling in�ation, that you're worried about? Or is �scal dominance not something that should
concern us?
J.F.: It would take a large institutional shi� for “�scal dominance,” or really any �scal
considerations at all, to a�ect the Fed’s policymaking. They’ve been e�ectively independent
of the Treasury for nearly 70 years now and have acted in a highly independent, anti-
in�ationary manner for forty years. It’s very far from the DNA of the institution. Look at the
way Chair Powell stood up to tremendous public pressure from President Trump, that is
what the Fed is mostly about. It is possible we will see such an institutional shi� but given
that 5 FOMC voters are reserve bank Presidents, the governors have long terms, the Senate
needs to con�rm them, it would be a di�cult and unlikely—but not impossible—process.
Note that the budget forecasts do assume that interest rates rise. CBO expects the federal
funds rate to rise to 2.6% by the end of the window and the 10-year Treasury to rise to 3.6%.
Even with these assumptions they expect the debt to only grow slowly as a share of GDP
and the real interest payments on the debt, the metric I like to look at, to be much lower
7 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
than they have been historically. Real interest rates have been so low that even if they end
up higher they are still likely to be low in historical context.
I should add, if I were sitting in the White House right now I would be more worried about
the political implications of sustained higher in�ation than about the magnitude of interest
payments and the de�cit. The later is abstract and any number would still seem (and be)
quite large. The former is something people directly experience. So I would probably be
rooting for (but not doing anything to achieve) the Fed to at least sound more hawkish to
better keep in�ation expectations in check. In the short run this motivation is the opposite
of the one presumed to underly �scal dominance.
N.S.: OK, let's hope you're right about that, because �scal dominance is scary! OK, so to sum up the
macro conversation, you think the Fed can and will signal that it's ready to raise interest rates to
curb in�ation if necessary, and that �scal discipline of some sort hasn't been completely thrown to
the winds, and because of this, in�ation will come back down in a reasonable time frame?
J.F.: That’s a pretty good summary, I wasn’t as concise in my answers because I have a
tremendous amount of uncertainty around everything. But yes, that all seems like the most
likely scenario. And to be clear, I wish �scal discipline was thrown a little more to the winds
than I think it will actually be.
N.S.: Anyway, while I have you here, let's talk about some longer term problems. How do we raise
productivity growth in America? Are recent tech breakthroughs going to be enough? How can policy
help?
J.F.: My idea for speeding up productivity growth: everything. Probably the single most
important policy lever is immigration which both increases population and also brings with
it ideas and innovations. This is also a conceptually straightforward, but admittedly
politically fraught, lever for the federal government to pull. Another straightforward step is
spending more basic research by massively increasing the budgets for the NSF, NIH and
other scienti�c research. Ensuring that people can live and work where they are most
productivity is another important step, something that requires land use and occupational
licensing reforms by states and cities across the country. I don’t know how much extra
productivity growth we would get from corporate tax reform but I think we should try
because it could even be done in a revenue-raising way, including the proposals President
Biden has made plus allowing businesses to expense their investments, disallowing interest
deductions, and possibly expanding the R&D tax credit.
8 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
N.S.: And how do we raise real wages?
J.F.: Real wages have grown relatively slowly since the 1970s. They have grown in real terms,
you have to take some pretty poor measures of in�ation overly seriously to believe anything
other than that. But they have not grown as fast as they did in the decades before and they
have not grown as fast for workers at the middle or the bottom as for those at the top. The
biggest cause of the slowdown in real wage growth is the productivity slowdown, but the
increase in inequality has played a larger role as well. Note that causes are not always the
same as solutions, but understanding how big a role the productivity slowdown has played
does lead me to think much harder about the productivity component of the solution.
The other part of boosting real wages is improving the distribution of income. I don’t
personally feel any passion in the holy wars over the causes of the increase in inequality
because it I think it has been large enough that there is room for all of the explanations to
play a role. Moreover, just because something caused inequality does not necessarily mean
that addressing it is the best solution (e.g., to the degree you think technology is the cause
there may be not feasible or desirable solution). The amount a worker can produce for an
hour of labor plays an important role in how much they are paid, getting people who can
make more per hour is clearly part of the solution, and education is the main tool we have
here. But pay is determined by more than just marginal products so we should be raising
the minimum wage, strengthening labor unions, addressing issues like wage collusion and
non-competes. Finally, one of the exciting intellectual developments over the last �ve years
is an increased awareness that reduced product market competition can play a role in labor
markets too—so a revitalized competition agenda would help as well.
Macroeconomic policy can play a role as well. Running hot labor markets—ideally one log
on the �re at a time—can increase real wages and reduce inequality.
Finally, even if we did everything I wanted—let alone everything that is feasible or actually
gets done—we still would probably not have su�cient wage growth. A good set of policies
would likely raise real wage growth by a few tenths of a percent per year. A sustained
increase of 1 percent per year would be amazing and surprising. Even with that it would
take a very long time, if ever, to get to incomes I would view as fully desirable or that make
up for the large increase in inequality over the last forty years. So tax and transfer programs
of whatever form you like should play a role as well. Note that the distinction between tax
and transfer programs and programs for market incomes may be a little blurrier than one
9 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
would traditionally think, at least when it comes to programs for children whether child
allowances, housing vouchers or healthcare, all of which appear to have substantial bene�ts
for longer-run mobility.
N.S.: Regarding pay and productivity, what do you think of the famous EPI graph showing a
divergence between the two?
J.F: I’m not a fan of the famous graph because I think it creates a misleading impression
about the sources of inequality, the productivity slowdown and the causal relationship
between productivity and pay. Before getting to these let me mention a number of well-
known technical issues with various iterations of that picture. Most important is that
di�erent price indices are generally used for productivity and pay and the former is lower
for technical and substantive reasons, overstating the gap between them. Productivity is an
average concept for the economy as a whole but pay is o�en shown as a median or a mean
of a subset of the economy. Sometimes the graph is done with just wages so it misses the
faster growing sources of compensation like health bene�ts. EPI acknowledges these issues
but many less sophisticated users of the graph do not realize the importance of this nuance.
But let me get to the three bigger points.
First, the source of inequality. A portion of inequality re�ects the fact that income has
shi�ed between capital and labor. This is the gap between compensation and productivity.
But a much larger portion of inequality re�ects increased inequality within labor income.
That is higher-paid managers getting paid more and regular workers less. The picture
glosses over this entirely.
Second, the picture does not emphasize the dramatic slowdown in productivity growth
from around 2.8 percent annually from 1948 to 1973 to around 1.8 percent annually from
1973 to the present. That is a huge deal and quantitatively accounts for the majority of the
slow wage growth. In part it is hard to see the slowdown on the graph for the technical
reason that the Y axis is not shown on a ratio scale (or in logs) so it makes it seem like
productivity growth is faster later on than it actually is (moving 1 unit from the baseline to
1% is a much bigger deal than going from from 250% to 251% but both take up the same
space on the y axis).
Third, and most important, the graph is o�en interpreted to mean that productivity and pay
are unrelated. But the graph shows aggregate data so cannot tell you anything about what is
ultimately a microeconomic claim. Moreover, even the macro data leads to strange
10 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
conclusions—like if productivity had been 2.8% annually instead of 1.8% annually do you
really think pay would have been unchanged? To believe that is to believe the labor share
would have fallen from around two-thirds of income to less than one-third of income. That
is very unlikely because when businesses are more productive it is not that they want to pay
their workers more but they are forced into it by the (imperfect) competition we have.
Other than that… Seriously, inequality is really important, graphs that show pay for workers
at di�erent percentiles or incomes for households at di�erent percentiles are powerful,
important, and do tell us something real about the economy. Would just use those.
N.S.: Next question: What important things do you think we've learned from the Obama years, in
terms of economic policy and/or the politics of getting economic policy passed? What are some
mistakes you think the Obama administration made on this front, and how can we do better this
time around?
J.F.: Obama’s proposals were better than what actually passed Congress. If he had gotten
what he had proposed we would have had a signi�cantly larger stimulus in 2009 and
another round in 2011, a cap-and-trade system for climate change, a tax on oil, universal
preschool, support for childcare, a large infrastructure program, a substantial set of green
investments, a higher minimum wage, laws that made it easier for unions to organize, a
reformed UI system with greater coverage, higher replacement rates and automatic
triggers, and much much more.
Of course Presidents are judged by what they got done and not by what they proposed. But
in the “mistakes” question the �rst order issue is really one of legislative tactics, what
would have gotten more of what Obama proposed done? I don’t know the answer to that.
The more common view among progressives is that he should have proposed even more,
started from a higher negotiating position and then would have gotten more. A less
common but also possible perspective is sometimes when you try for too much you end up
with nothing so he should have limited his ambitions. I confess I do not know which of
these is right and suspect it varies from issue to issue.
My broader perspective is that Presidents should get whatever they can to improve the
economy done. When we had uni�ed control of the Congress in 2009 and 2010 that would
have meant getting more purely Democratic stu� done. We largely lived within the
constraint of 60 votes in 2009-10 and that might have been a mistake. Freeing ourselves
from the constraint earlier on could have led to a bigger �scal stimulus. But unless we had
11 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
gotten rid of the �libuster entirely, you would still have needed 60 votes for the A�ordable
Care Act, cap and trade and Wall Street Reform. Still, I wish we had done more to push
through infrastructure—although it is easy to say that in hindsight, at the time it seemed
almost impossible to get as much done as we did.
A�er 2011 we had a Republican Congress. At that time I was all for picking the subset of
our agenda that we could do with Republicans and compromising to get that done. I would
even have compromised more in some of the �scal negotiations if it had meant more
revenue and smaller discretionary spending cuts than we ultimately got.
My biggest regret is that we didn’t pass immigration reform. Maybe we could have taken
advantage of the large majorities in 2009 and 2010? Maybe we could have compromised
more with a Republican leadership that genuinely wanted to do it but could not get their
rank and �le to go along. There is no issue that is more important to the more than 10
million people in the United States without documentation or to the future of the country.
It might have been too politically costly in 2010 and too impossible from 2011-16, we
certainly tried, but if you ran history again 10 times we should have been able to get
immigration done in at least 2 of those re-runs. Unfortunately our actual run of history was
not one of those.
N.S.: And �nal question: Assuming that the Biden administration has limited political capital and
can't pass all the policies it would like, what would be your top priorities right now for economic
policies? What should we really be pushing for, �rst and foremost?
J.F.: On his �scal proposals, I’m even more enthusiastic about the families plan than the
jobs plan. The evidence is very clear about investments in children and the bene�ciaries of
those investments are relatively clear too. So I would put preschool at the very top of the list
and then some of the other elements of the families plan including childcare and caregiving
(the later is in the jobs plan). The most important piece of the jobs plan is the clean energy
standard which would bring net emissions to zero in the power sector in a very e�cient
manner, unfortunately this may be the piece that has the longest odds, but anything that
could be done for it would be good. Anything related to green innovation is good. Biden has
not proposed a formal health plan but here the highest priority should be the coverage gap,
ensuring that low-income people in the states that have not expanded Medicaid can get
coverage, this should come well before anything like expanding Medicare bene�ts or the
Medicare age.
12 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
Finally, the �scal envelope should be expanded as much as possible to �t as many priorities
as possible—which is to say, we should both be comfortable with adding a substantial
amount to the de�cit for well-designed investments and we should also be very willing to
raise taxes on high-income households and corporations, including just about everything
Biden has proposed.
On the non-�scal proposals, I would raise the minimum wage as much as possible. Senators
Romney and Cotton have proposed $10 per hour, Biden could start the negotiation from
there. In fact, the higher you think the minimum wage should be the larger is the problem
associated with it being too low. If you happen to think the minimum wage should be $20
an hour then it being $7.25 instead of $10/hour is a much bigger problem than if you think it
should be $10/hour. It would be nice to make it easier to unionize as well, although I’m less
sure what the compromise would look like there. Finally, I would reform our antitrust rules
and put in place a pro-competition digital regulator, something that has at least some
support from both sides of the aisle.
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Mark Louis 6 hr ago

My somewhat cynical take: we have no idea why productivity slowed and we have no idea how
to raise it. As a result real wages have barely grown. So far, higher inflation appears to be hurting
real wages, but maybe we should raise the inflation target because we can't think of anything
else to do.
Reply
Oblivionrecurs Jul 7
13 of 14 7/8/2021, 1:15 AM
Noah what is your email? I miss the bunnies. Please Inflate my bunny pictures reserves.
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