SC DECISIONS LABOR CASE DI Gegz, ole - 2019 coe ace FETEL ‘sponcen Skis and Talent Employment ‘Pool ne. Step) fs engaged inhuman re management and echnical services, ‘one ots cles petkonerLingnam Res- {aurant. na contract of employment respondent Jesse Colste a prjet employee respondent Step assigned to work wih petitioner Lngiam Restaurant as asitant cook. Colas fled. complaint frie isms agninctLingnam Restaurant and Step. In defense, Lingnam Retarant dened that twas the employ -erof Coast nd alleged that Step was Colste's real employer ‘The Labor Arbiter (LA) fund no meritin the defence of Lingnam Restaurant. The National [Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the TA decision an hel tht Stepan independent ‘contractor. The Cour of Appeals (CA) reversed the [NLRC decision and reinstated the LA dedsion. Did the CA err? Ralling: No. ‘The Court notes that Step, in ts cautionary ‘leading fled before the Labor Arbiter, stated ‘that it entered into an-agreement with petitioner ‘ingnam Restaurant in 2002, whereltagreed to abor-only contracting rosie Lina Resa with human esure 0 perform aces related tothe operation of resaras Tsar bythe aun of Appeals, Step merely acted as a placement agency. ‘roving human resoures to Lingnam Resta "a The seve ened by Sein ier of inna Restaurant was no the performance of Trcic but he spo of enon work at Lingam Restaurant. nhs case Step pode petitioner with an assistant cook in | Jessie Cobste, Soe e | ‘nthe employment contract between Jessie” | Colt and Step fromJan4,2006uptohines, | 2007, Colaste was assigned as kitchen helper at | LUngnam Restaurant, while inthe subsequent em ployment contacts from No.5, 2007 up ofan 2008, and from an. 2008 up io March 52008, | ine was assigned as asant cook ‘The thee employment corractsstate that Jessie Cols’ work resuk performance shall be ner test person, conto and make Sure that the end re isin accordance wth the ‘standard specified by client to Step Inc.” lence the Couragres wih the Court of Ap- eis thatthe work performance of Cols sun derthe trict supenision and contol ofthe int ‘nga Restaura as wellas the endresut. ‘As assistant cook of ign Restaura, Coaste’s works crety rated to the resturant ‘snes of petoner. He weksin pettone's ‘estarantand presumably under the supervision ts ce cook This faltunder the defation oflabor ony contracting under Section Sf Rule Vth, Book of the Amended Rules To imple nent The Labor Code since the contactor, te, Inerly supple Jessie Coles a esstant cook to the pina Lingnam Restaurant theob of Colast avast cooks directly rlted othe ‘main business of Lingnam Restaurant, and Step doesnot eerie the right to conral the pero trance of the work of Clase, the contractual employee. Ma Sep Is engage in laborenly contracting, she principal, pettoner Lingnam Restaurant, re ‘deemed the employer of Colas, in accordance sith ection 7, fale VFA, Book ofthe Amend {ed Rules To implement The Labor Code Coase started working wth peioner since 2006 and he shoud be considered a regular “employee of ptones, Liga Restaurant. Sued len bmplment 0) Me, andes Colne, Gi No. 24667, December 3, 2019,>» Legitimate job contractor poe eareariat ama one ea ae sna anand i pn ie Pea ne PPS Piz at hh ofres tee to ce Saltese Seer eerste ere intially hired by PP but were subsequentiy Metered to Cont prevent them fem taining Soe "Sri day epee aortas Soe ‘branches. They were performing me in accoranoe Certemesteter ee a ee Gncmeereae a esree Se re O Tena Socrates bi sine ‘aplalandaDeraraentofLaborané Emply- ‘net eke erate of restrain undertakes and lst fom tof and etna andere the rho ‘onion respondents. Whois thea employe : ating cau, ‘The NLRC was ao comect in kg that CHB best xa and ieee ison CHM 206 neal norms set, ‘thas sn aored capital tock the art 0 nln ands apt sek inthe senate APS, Pl ih ed already ell. saute fnacletenen hoy Oat "hs eset caret meng PS alle. akon get CE moncuTent se, subnal apia topropert cay out obliga vith Par wel to uct cer sommes | tomiepaee. z 2 report Neon crete CIN chin tate est Teprceos esol eon Creayenentncasreaterbon ne ‘sty ova monor an siper ie thee mendes nd prance. ‘Ths sinter stanly ‘tei cordntor, uo alice in therafia ha eye marten ens CH fhe nce wi company plies, ules, and assigned Pia Ht banch hey maybe. yeep ya a their tasks and finerions inthe ‘St Cnt yet ak ‘motor enchareaofdepkament they wack. a and punctuality of CBM en coon ee any EC ‘eased TAD mp yey ‘slaorcemmitely eng seestiaeieie denen ned tom CRU scrote "dstnary snc fr vat ofcopary "ules and reutons as edenced by hears fee odessa ean ed then. eotinttsor tx erpemeamt ihe chee res babe ‘episode acer isc IED. eng Sh Den ade tat reofer dialer sie dt pros sully bela eric erp irs ‘Spay aon spend ponte, ‘cr reve hess pe fr mk ‘nth CRMand erect seed nde ‘elmer Thy weet ered enfontate aeons rep caro ted egos ‘ote tet oper cape 1 ue and regions, Duragthe cose of he ‘pment, GM ple ges reel Padi SS Peat nd Pegg cones, "Th Co ns CM age ah men and hs te eof (Gulp Pia ine ery Pr a, RN. Ben, ant, 208, 2 | |Pakyaw workers espondents Armando Gullaran and 30 R= filed complaints for illegal dis- missal, underpayment of wages and non-payment of allowance, separation pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, and for moral and exemplary damages against petitioners Ramiro Lim & Sons Agricultural Co. Inc., Sima Real Estate Development Inc. and Ramiro Lim. They alleged that they were agricultural workers of the petitioners, employed to work in all the agricultural stages of work on the 84-hectare hacienda owned by petitioners. They were paid on a mixed pakyaw and daily basis. They were alleg- edly illegally dismissed on July 22, 2000 when they asked to be paid based on the prevailing minimum wage then. Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that respondents were employed as laborers on a pakyaw basis. When their attention was called to the plan to conduct stricter measures to pre- vent wastage and production Tosses due to their half hearted performance, respondents refused to return to work, paralyzing operations for about three weeks. 7 ‘The Court of Appeals (GA) found that since the respondents have been performing services nec- essary and desirable to the business of petitioners which are badges of regular employment, even though they did not work throughout the year and the employment depended on a specific sea- son, it granted their reinstatement and payment of full backwages and attorney's fees. Did the CA err? . ————<$________-_—-- Ruling: No. Ithas already been settled by this Court that" respondents were regular seasonal workers, The CA decision, which was affirmed with finality by this Court, held: ‘Third, Anent their complaint for illegal dismissal. Although petitioners do not work throughout the year and their employment depends upon a specific season, like for instance, milling seasons; and for only a specific task like, weeding, plowing, fertilizing, to name a few, inasmuch as they have been per- Sorming services necessary and desirable to private respondents’ business, serve as badges of regular employment. ‘The fact that petitioners “do not work continu- ously for one whole year but only for the duration of season does not detract from considering them reg: ular employees. Itis well-entrenched in our jurispru- dence that seasonal workers who are called from time 10 time and aye temporarily laid off during offseason «are not separated from service in said period, but are merely considered on leave until re-employed. xxx A distinguishing characteristic of a task basis engagement or pakyaw, as opposed to straight-hour ‘wage payment, is the non-consideration of the time spent in working. In a payment by pakyaw basis, the emphasis is on the task itself, in the sense that payment is reckoned in terms of completion of the work, not in terms of the number of hours spent in the completion of the work. (Ramiro Lim & Sons Agricultural Co., et-al. vs. Armando Guilaran, et.al., G.R. No. 221967, February 6, 2019).Account execs are independent contractors etitioners Antonio Valeroso and Allan Lega tona alleged that they started working on ‘Nov. 1, 1998 and July 13, 1998, respectively, as account executives tasked to solicit cable subscrip. tions for respondent Skjeable Corps 8 ‘They received commissions FAhging rom 15,000 to'P530,000 éach uponireaching'a specit! iequota every month and ajallowance'oFP6,500 to P7000 per rhonth? From Belg direct hires of respondent, they were transferted on Jan. t, 2007 {o Skill Plus Manpower Sérvicés: In February 2009, they were inforined that theit commissions would be rediced due tc the introdilction of prepaid ‘ards soldito cable subscribers resulting in lower monthly cable subscriptions: = On the-other hand, respondént claimed that it did not tetminate the servicé 8f petitioners for there was never an émployer-employee rela” tionship between them. Itaverred that in 1998, respondent engaged petitioners as independent Contractors under a sales agency agreement, In 2007, it decided to streamline its operations and instead‘of contracting with numerous independent account executives such as petitioners, respondent ‘engaged the services of an independent contrac: tor, Armada Resources & Marketing Solutions, nc. formerly Skill Plus Manpower Services. 'As a result, petitioners’ contracts were termi- nated but they, together with other sales execu- tives, were transferred to Armada, which became their employer. In 2009, respondent and Armada again entered into a sales agency agreement ‘wherein petitioners were again tasked to solicit accounts/generate sales for respondent. Which argument finds merit? Ruling: That of SkyCable Corp. Indeed, “the presence of the power of control Is indicative of an employment relationship while the absence thereof is indicative of independent contractorship.” “Moreover, evidence on record reveal the exist- cence of ifidependent contractorship between the parties, As mentioned, the sales agency agreement provided the primary evidence of such relationship. “While the existence of employer-employee relation ‘hip isa matter oftaw, the characterization made toner Legatona, infact in is eease acknokeke that he was performing sale settee a8 sas genivindependent contractor and not am employee of respondent. nthe same token, De Cuesta and Navase, made sworn testimonies that, petitioners are employees of Armada, which san independent contractor engaged to provide market: ing servic for respondent. Nelther an we subscribe to pettoners conten ‘ion thatthey ar considered regular employeesof respondent fo they perform functions necessary and desirable to the business operation of respond: entin consonance with Article 20 ofthe Labor Code. We have eld that “Article 280 isnot the yardstick for determining the existence ofan employ ‘ment relationship because it merely distinguishes ‘Between tio kinds of employees, ie, regular em Dloyees and casual employees for purposes of dete- mining the rights to certain benefits, suchas to join ‘or form a union, o to security of tenure. Article 280 does not apply where the existence ofan employ- ‘ment relationship isin disput,” sin his case Evident the legal reason of petonersas sles, acount executives ro respondent can be thatofan inde 08 ident had control with to the details of “how pertioners must conduct thei sales civityof 1m the case of Abante, rv. Lamadrid Bearing & Parts Corporation, 474 Phil. 44, 426 2004), En. permaco Abante, jy a commission salesman who. pursued his sellin activities without interference mndent company and re cr supervision from lied on his own resources to perform his function “was held to be an independent contractor. (Del Castillo, J; §C 2nd Division, Antonio Valeroso, et al. vs, Skycable Corporation, G.R. No. 202015, July 13,2016). 8June 2,197 respondent The copa eng nthe snes of ering sad ocer wal maes, epoyel prior ele Gerla ‘aerpmesenger deliver eis cin, the vipine ng diane Teepe eum. Te was pido “peice ins heart fis lary depen ie mabe bls he debe. c na complae orig dks ly Sh peso aos eso eI eset pene ans SS vuiiaphetenals Sbecaal ns hae = hes ee eps ie wo ro deer sie cepors tow caer te, woe geapoes Docs isd nd eh? e ives twotherm aling No nthe fan case itis undspued ha he Piece-rate worker comps ws engin te sins ding tn dae a bea ‘ha ters nti Gaal eg at 2 trimester bene "Seu Gerth pay ot ay te bt at Gorath petmigaces ea ‘ete tinea | ne canotte scampi ne Onision het es Gao | anpdarenpineatie compa taceen | ‘outicntbci naan i ita daea thc head | te esos oteete ane ea curse tesa ‘ieee a Se Bisepitetne kecveeeariany Sasiodun Late athenten en ee at usin, hse ine ai wlan Sd cet dacs open fie i Wik gf ine ay ee the conrangtest Germine fae | Ploeeindeed eur employe, tan eligi war bed efor ts leh ‘re neces and indispensible tothe wal Ds resort ofthe empl. "he Cor, meee, camntsubef9 the company contro that eal 03 ‘eur emplonee bot mereljapcerate work ‘Snel slay depends on the mabe fit het able wo delve Incends LeyReardo Gamboa le fs, 70 Pi 20, 59901, the Court et the i os ‘eguucemplomnent, Thetem “wa i Earn ‘ran oF rings. expat fet re | Tyme by he ices jst eto of cempenston nd doesn define tn ese of thereon Ths he fa hat Groin (hebass of rode does no render upon as cee sc | Fn be enembered tht owing ny greens he otra, what termine ‘ehether aan employments rears eot Toe ocd fee epee 0 Heh he pert rer fn accdey ich eth ‘proved ohiing de employe oe MRT ‘pring say the mace of eat ‘erred rao the parr nes etescomidringalleemsance adnan ‘eth lagi tie fs pcorance as ‘Srna exstence. Geld Geral. The {ise orp Laude er ao GN {as Oaaber3 208.. Floating status of security guards ttioner Spectrum Security Services In. cimployed respondents Dav Grave and six ‘hers as security guards aid posted them ‘ete premises of Toiden Philippines, Ise. aiden) cated at the First Philippine Industrial Park in Sto, Tomas, Barangas. ‘rhe petitioner implemented an acton plan 2s | part ofits operational and manpower supervision | Gnhancement program geared towards the gradual replacement of security guards at Ibiden. Thus. i iRaued separate *noticeG) to return to unie"‘o the respondents in uly and Aust 2008, directing them to report to its head fice and to update _gheir documents for reassignment ‘On Aug. 4, 2008, the respondents filed their ‘complaint against the petitioner for constructiv ‘Glamissal, aiming thatthe Implementation ofthe ‘ction plan was a retaliatory measure against them {for bringing several complaints to recover unpald holiday pay and 13th moth pay. ‘When the case reached the Court of Appeals (CA, itpromulgated on March I, 20tta decision, ‘dismissing the petition for certiorari. Ieconciuded that although the complaint for legal dismissal twas prematurely fled because six months had not new: ‘fore the Labor Arbiter that exceeded the » (eee stem nth period rendered the ptiionss Table for constructive dismissal ofthe respondents, ‘Did the CA err? . ~ Ruling: Yes. ‘We cannot uphold the CA. Security guards, like other employees in the private sector are entitled to security of tenure. ‘However, their situation should be differentiated from that of other employees or ‘workers. “The employment of security guards generally depends on their: employers” ‘contracts with clients Who are third parties to the employment relation ship, and the requirements ‘of the latter for security services and what wil be beneficial to them ciate the posting ofthe security guards. Itis also relevant ‘to mention that their employers retain the manage ‘ment prerogative to change thelr assignments and ‘Positions or assignments that will prevent _ an feminist bad faith, or are motivated by discrimination OF si eyed rc punshent ot h pela codons of hc re aaa ee re Under perodgfreared ordre” loved. Qu when terantedetag read *) | or offdetal satus exceeds the reasonable of mont aout esssinment should th, ‘ aed ete sho bene een pots _Atr the period fsx months, the employes should ‘ther recall the affected security guards to worker ‘consider them permartently retrenched pursuant to. the requirements ofthe lav; echerise, the em plojers wou be held to have dismissed them, an ‘would be lable for such dismissals. Soxx Nor was the CA justified to simply dismiss the right ofthe pettioner to implement the action plan and thereby effect he rotation and replace- ent ofthe respondents. their security posted at Ibiden. We have already recogni ee the management prerogative ofthe petitionéf~ fs thelr employer to change their postings and - assignments without severing their employment relationship. Although the CA might have regarded {the implementation of the action plan as dubious ‘because the petitioner ad relieved the espond= tents from their posts at Tiden just 16 days after they had brought their complaint forthe recovery of certain money clams from the former, thereby {imputing bad falth to the petitioner would be be- ref of factual or legal basis considering the falare ‘of the respondents to sufficiently establish the fact ‘ftheirdlsmissal from their employment. In ilegal dismissal cases, the general rule is that the em- ployer has the burden of ‘proving that the dismissal ‘was legal. To discharge this burden, the employes ‘must first prove, by substantial evidence, that he hnad been cismissed from employment. P05, ‘case, We find otherwise. Respondents fallecto_ ‘properly establish that they were dismissed Dy the petitioner, Aside from the respondents plait allegation that they were illegally dismissed by the petitioner, no other evidence was presented by the respondents to support their contentions (Ber- samin,},,SC 3rd Div. ‘spectrum Security Services, Inc. v. David Grave,etalGR. No. 196650, January 7, 2017). i aReassignment etitioner Oliver V. Vergara was employed as Piseerccrte neon ‘ty Agency Inc. CDM). “He was assigned ata branch of BPI Family Sav- {ngs Bank in San Agustin, Pampanga. ‘On March 7, 201, at around 9 a.m. while Verge ra was on duty, he had an argument with another CDM employee named Hipolito Fernandez. In the coutse ofthe argument, Vergara allegedly pointed ‘a shotgun at Fernandez. ‘On March 8, 2013, CDM's operations officer served upon Vergara a memorandum of dscipli nary action relieving him of his post at the bank and advising him to report to CDM's office: ‘On March 13, 2013, Vergara filed a complaint for among others, legal dismissal, against CDM and its corporate officer Vilma Pablo. oes this complaint prosper? alling: No. “As to Vergara’ claim of illegal dismissal, the ‘Court affirms the findings of the.CA that he was not dismissed from employment. “In illegal termination cases, jurisprudence had underscored that the fact of dismissal must be es: tablished and overt acts of an emg indicating the intention to dismiss.” ‘In this case, Vergara was not at all able to substantiate his allegation of verbal dismissal. At most, he was subjected to a disciplinary action BRAD ese of security guard Inappropriately, a was imposed withogt a prior investigation. * |. Based on the memorandum dated March 8, 2013, Vergara was relieved of his postat BPI San “Agustin branch and was asked to report to CDM's ‘office fr violation ofthe code of ethics (proper use = of firearms); and grave threat to Femandez (point: Sng 12 gauge shotgun). ‘Tinis memorandum was served to him the very next day after the incident, Additionally, the writ- tenaccount of Lito Panoy, a fellow security guard ‘who witnessed the altercation, was dated March 1B, 2013-a week after Vergara was discharged from his place of assignment. Thus, it's clear that no Jvestgation was conducted before the findings of violation came about. However, in view of the quitelaim and release executed by Vergara the respondents cannot be ‘held liable for relieving him from his post. Besides, even in the absence of the quifciaim, there is no ‘evidence to suggest that he was being suspended ‘or dismissed from work, er the memorandum, recalling Vergara from. * his duty is a penalty in itself; ng him from his place of tis tantamount to illegal st ‘of termination would in tion, as he may also ‘be subjected to reassignment only. (Oliver V. ‘Vergara vs. CDM Security Agency, Inc. and Vilma Pablo, G.R. No. 225862).a 8 y espondent Vilma S. De Peralta fled a complaint for legal dismissal, illegal de- > luction, unpaid commission, annual profit > sharing, damages, and attorney's fees against ~ petitioner Toyota Pasi, nc + The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the com- §plaint for lack of meri, but ordered petitioner to 1 _ pay respondent the amount of PLLIIL.5O, repre: senting the latter's salary for January 2012. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the LA ruling with modification finding Petitioner liable to respondent in the amount of P61, 248.08, representing the latter's unpaid commissions, tax rebate for achieved monthly + targets, salary deductions, salary for the month of January 2012, and success share/profit sharing. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the NLRC naling in toto. ‘The petitioner argues thatthe CA erred in awarding respondent her monetary claims as they do not partake of unpaid wages/salares, as wellas the labor standard benefits of employees provided ‘bylaw Does this argument find merit? Ruling: No. ‘The petitions without merit. xxx In ran v. NLRC, 352 Phil. 261 1998). the Court thoroughly explained: ‘This definition explicitly includes commis- sions as part of wages. While commissions are, indeed, incentives or forms of encouragement to inspire employees to put litle more industry on the jobs particulary assigned to them, sll these ‘commissions are direct remunerations for services tendered. n fact, commissions have been defined as the recompense, compensation or reward of an ‘agent, salesman, executor, trustee, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or ‘on the profit fo the principal. The nature ofthe ‘work ofa salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate Commissions as wages ‘early that commissions, : wee or ssh "as are part of a salesman's XEXX ‘The NLRC aserts thatthe inclusion of commis: saat etn om the practice of granting commissions only ater an enuployee has earned the minimum wage or over While such practice does exist, the universality and prevalence of such a practice fs questionable at best. In truth, this Court has taken judicial now tice ofthe fact that some salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend entirely on commis: sions and allowances or commissions alone, al though an employer-employee relationship exists. Undoubtedly, this salary structure is intend ced for the benefit ofthe corporation establishing such, on the apparent assumption that thereby its salesmen would be moved to greater enterprise and, Ailigence and close more sales in the expectation of. {increasing their sales commissions. This, however, does not detract from the character of such com- missions as part ofthe salary or wage paid to each. ofits salesmen for rendering services tothe corpo- ration. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) In this case, respondent's monetary claims, such a5 commissions, tax rebates for achieved ‘monthly targets, and success share/profit sharing, are given to her as incentives or forms of encouragement in order for her to put extra effort in performing her duties as an ISE. Clearly, such claims fall within the ambit of the term “commissions” which in turn, fall within the definition of wages pursuant to prevailing Jaw and jurisprudence. Thus, respondent’s allegation of nonpayment of such monetary benefits places the burden on the employer, Lé., petitioner, to prove with a'reasonable degree of certainty that it paid sald benefits and that the ‘employee, j..; respondent, actually received such payment or that the employee was not enti ded thereto. (Perlas-Bernabe, J, SC ist Division, ‘Toyota Pasig, Inc. vs. Vilma S. De Peralta, G.R. ‘No. 213488, November 07, 2016).‘branches they were employed tn Thyfrer aed that ‘le ove ens sent hem a Show eae later tenet sy, they werent ey i nised om employment Sait tal spon aed that there sto mis ce they ent pene rst notice eftermnaion of empl Sting them show came wy they shold not be dismissed forte conte arene ftom were Hwee, petton- cs np ta ts edence Shoal ot be pen weghe site theres no prof that ‘hey receed this note, ‘Which contention find er x peticner or espondnts ating Petitioners? Indeed o evidence was ‘resented proving that each Worker's freedom of expression Wine peaiones adit thatthe neces may have been sent, they have never stl dite o rece ay of them. s ‘Where och pares ina labor ise have not presented ‘substantial eidence to prove and evry petitioner received thar allegatons the alone ony ofthe frst oie of term considered wb in eqn ation of employment. There ate n0 receiving copies ora Insucha case, te seas of, Juste aed i favor of abr nowiedgemen receipts. What Ths, ptionersate ety respondents presented were “sample eters of respondents ‘and ot the actual neces that set aleedl seit at. iniadaeinwanitcen ‘conser hve een aay J" damised, ‘This Cour notes tht had etoners bee able tsub- tania prove thelr dit, it would ave bee rendered lal not ony for avingbeén made without ut case bt also for being in vilaon of thee ‘costal rts. Alaborer doesnot ose i ot er ight to treo of expres sion upon employment This Aon andthe os recap tat employers tae propery "eh tc ms so be rte the human ise aborers ae gen prinacy or hee Fis. ropery igs pee ‘She Harr oone ‘When bores aoe scvncesreptg the Blom ina pur they éosointeerese ode et te fecegresion They ae ge Inger vey cov ing nly te weap fe ie | Sythe Constitee the nace |rman Bacoloe, Joey F. G lua, Helen 6. Tores, Fre © Vllegas, Raymond Caras: an ‘relia. Tres led acomptat ft Blogal isms and money cialens against respondents VL Makaball Hospital ne ine hospital), Alea doe ula ler Ching (eh en pn gaa EPS say Serasue ems oa Ne arrose oe | Sang) svmnes ast fuceescr ra cance Sen Tt strata aoe nt ota te oe ‘ena ex ecb pence Merealonnapet oases Hatntiencen Soeaente Tins hae omcalonoan Seoralfntoun Sagaten Tnalaganaeac terse ested tyne caer Be Phot Pen ged ce Sadr petone se Ch ioe hymn Ca oa Crane reams Sipoteene Wee af Seen tite es Core Tie anal eon Bin Congnys Coat Ke, asa okt P ETIMIONERS, doctors Lynt ting ‘As propetiy inte un by the ‘GA, the Verilcaion/Gertteste of | Noo-Forum Shopping with _-sertaking execute by pettionars ounsel fs not vad At sated In ‘Alves, a certicate against forum “Shopping must Be signed by the Dart and incaeo hie cru the same om ie eoure s8F must bo armed with a special ower of atorney, Srice potion: is counsel no! show to nave “bees authorized by doctors Vil a6, Canias tnd Znola to sign a Eetiicate of non-ocum shopping on thei beta the exosuon of said cortfeate by counsel lates the foregoing rules. Nnethless, ho CA ted to consider tha concopt of "substantial ‘omniance to te requirements of Hiatal ‘um stopping, 2 thas boon shown ‘bal ttes ofthe she evionars ox ules own vetieation ang derieate agave rum shopp "The vetfcaion ofa pleading is formal and nol a ufsicsonal ee uement_ is tended to assure sig tue ord corey A such, te 2URt may order te conection of ipverited peadings. ot may ack ‘nce wit the ules “The vetfcaion requirements ome substantial comgied wth winen @ person uho nas suticiont oat fo Swear te the Wuth of te allegations in the einpant or peton sane ie! verfleton ands: raters alegéd therein ave beén do good fat orare tue and? conect. Thus : empiance it at easton of po {flere makes a proper vicalon inthis case, hee out of 3x tinors signed tne soparate vert Eaters apendes tthe Petition for | Cerrar Teisignatures aa suf len assurance that the aleastons Inthe potion were mage In sad (Gib or ove ue and comens Thus, | ‘hove substantial complance with ‘On tho cihor hand, a8 a ‘ul, tho corticate agains forum shop: ing must be signed by all plain: ils or potions; otenie, rose ‘who didnot sgn wil be droppes at parlos tothe case, Under reason” able or ustiiable lutions, sue {3 when the plane oF petiton. Sritae toner oes ityoke a common cadse of econ or defonce, the signature of one Son neces een song besecomaeay | comianeenre sa | Here, three of six petitioners | sures be teen of eros | steppe Ah et he Cho nero sew ana Sie ie eppes at prt a natn gh dono pe tte he cau, wv, hls ta hr aha ese tre bate the nen fe Hg of cathe of tenes Shopng and al a ne foaratrun staan Sey Meccutal ce pertones See Secchi "potter tase ot aon arene sae fen arrose Sitnaced the Sno, Sinaancen hey nr eo otro wo prorat Tiseesnel bese ovo ater ne eran et {tect reer cance 3 ces granted lobesranupel attach ot Dost oie "cont 3 tes of van o to voip ead enn S dameset Horas je diate tte Potton woe Sor» gan de soe an sete ere nate Ayes ene he rcpt eth Stacey ows ote Rene panda on ane cn cde ily Ses ps Slr eof er er aot ttt pepe eee Sry SSeS Shon ta ny ve saa Monorail nev ava novaaeas apa in) ioVerification of petition a N° coritented with the decision of the Na- caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity eerie tpas Relations Commission (NLRO), ‘attested by the sanctity of an-oath to secure an respondent HSY Marketing Ld. filed a peti assuranes that the allegations in the pleading have tion for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). teen made in good faith, or are true and correct __” The verification of the petition was fjgned by. and not merely speculative” its counsel, Eller Roel. Daclan, in which he attest. TS. for verification to be valid, the affan ted that, “I caused the preparation ofthe foregoing ynusthave “Sak “ledge to swear to the truth, petition and attest chat, based upon facts relayed ofthe allegations in the complaint or petition.” to me by my clients and upon authentic records Facts relayed to the counsel) ‘by the client would, ‘made avilable, all the allegations rentfained there- be insufficient for counsel wo swear to the rruhof in are true and correct.” the allegations ina pleading ‘Otherwise, counsel Petitioner Charlie Hubilla contends that Would be able to disclaim liability for any mister: respondents’ petition should not have been given resentation by the simple expediency of stating ‘due course since the verification does not comply. thathe or she was merely relaying facts with which with the requirements of the rules. he or she had no competency to attest to. Does this contention find merit? ‘For this reason, the Rules of Court require no less than personal kn of the facts to suffi, Ruling: Yes. ciently verify pleas ‘the policy behind the requirement of verif- Respondents’ counsel, not having sufficient cation is to guard against the filing of fraudulent .ersonal knowledge to attest to the allegati pleadings. Litigants run the risk of perury if they ‘ithe pleading, was notable to vali Sign the verification despite knowledge that the _fgotsasstated. stared allegations are not true or are products of S herefore, respondents’ petition for cesiiara: © mere speculation. ribefore “Verification is not an empty ritual or 3 vonsidered as an unsigned pleading, (Charlie meaningless formality. Its import must never be Hubilla vs. HSY Marketing Ltd., G-R-No- 207354; sacrificed in the name of mere expedience orsheer Jan 10, 2018)-PAO’s attorney’s fees | itioner Joselito A. Alva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of I3th month pay, service incentive leave, holiday premium, ECOLA, payment for rest day, night shift differential pay, moral and ‘exemplary damages and attorney's fees against respondents High Capacity Secutity Force, Inc. and Armando M, Villanueva. He was assisted in his case bya lawyer of the Public attorney's Office (PAO). Both the Labor Arbiter (LA) and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRO) awarded ira attorney's fees. When the case reached the Court Of Appeals (CA) the award of attorney's fees was deleted noting that petitioner was represented by the PAO. Did the CA err? Rulings Yes. Needless to say, in addition to the fact that attor- ney’s fees partake of an indemnity for damages award- edto the employee, there is nothing that prevents Alvaand the PAO from entering into an agreement assigning attomey’s fees in favor of the latter. It must be noted that in 2007, Congress passed R.A. No. 9406 inserting new sections in Chapter 5, Title Ill, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (E.0. 292), or the Administrative Code of 1987. R.A. No. 9406 sanctions the receipt by the PAO of attorney's fees, and provides that such fees shall constitute a ‘rust fund to be used for the special allowances of their officials and lawyers, viz. * SEC. 6. New sections are hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title Ill, Book IV of Execittive Order No. 292, to read as follows: 200 XX. ‘SEC. 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit. - The clients of the PAO shall [sic] exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to in stituting an action in court and other quasi-judi bodies, as an original proceeding or on appeal. ‘The costs of the suit, attorney’s fees and contin- ‘gent fees imposed upon the adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be deposited. | in the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special allowances of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO. {n fact, the matter of entitlement to attorney's fees by a claimant who was represented by the PAO | has already been settled in Our Haus Realty Devel- ‘opment Corp. v. Alexander Parian, etal, 740 Phil. | 699 2014). ‘The Court, speaking through Associate Justice | Arturo D. Brion, ruled that the employees are entitled to attorney's fees, notwithstanding their | availment of the free legal services offered by the PAO. The Court ruled that the amount of attomey’s {ees shall be awarded to the PAO as a token rec- ‘ompense to them for their provision of free legal services to litigants who have no means of hiring a private lawyer, to wit: Itis settled that in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and, | thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and | interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally justifiable. Moreover, under the PAO Law | or Republic Act No! 8406, the costs ofthe suit, attor- | 75 fees and contingent fees imposed upon the ad- ‘versary of the PAO Clients after a successful litigation [be deposited in the National as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special allowances of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO.» ‘Thus, the respondentsarestillentitied toattor- =| ney's fees: The attorney's fees awarded to them willbe «| paid to the PAO. It serves asa token recompense to the | PAO for its provision of free legal services to litigants ‘who have no means of hiring a private lawyer. Alva’s availment of free legal services from the PAO does not disqualify him from an award of attorney's fees. Simply put, Alva should be awarded _ attorney's fees notwithstanding the fact that he was represented by the PAO. (Reyes, Ir, J. SC 2nd Div., Joselito A. Alva vs. High Capacity Security Force, Ine. and Armando M. Villanueva, G.R. No. 203328, November 8 2017).. ”