Council On Foreign Relations Foreign Affairs

Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence
Author(s): Marshall D. Shulman

Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Oct., 1973), pp. 35-58
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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TOWARD A WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
OF COEXISTENCE
By Marshall D. Shulman
THE barometer of tension has risen and fallen many times
during the last 26 years or so of our relationship with the
Soviet Union. While some fear the present abatement is no
more than a lull or a truce, it seems probable that we are on our
way to some new stage. What the nature of this stage may be,
however, has not yet become clear in our public discourse, nor
have we begun to clarify for ourselves the direction in which we
would like to shape events, to the extent that it lies within our
power to do so. Despite the distractions of our time, there is an
urgency to the task, for decisions have to be made and they
should be governed by a perspective that is larger than our im
mediate national preoccupations.
Let us begin with three questions: How should the present
stage of our relations with the Soviet Union be characterized?
Are we witnessing a historic shift in the foreign policy of the
Soviet Union? What should be our philosophy toward our rela
tions with the Communist world, our objectives, our criteria for
weighing alternative policies?
II
For those who live by words or phrases that sum up the entire
situation at a glance, there is no simple substitute for the term
"cold war." That term was once defined by the late George Licht
heim as "competitive attempts to alter the balance of power (be
tween the Soviet Union and the United States) without overt re
sort to force." By this definition, the term still has a certain
validity, although it does not convey the elements of collaborative
action which have lately become evident; moreover, the term
has acquired such emotional baggage, such connotations of abso
lute and intractable hostility, that it deserves to be retired. The
ambiguities of the word "d?tente," which has come into wide
usage, have led to much confusion. In its simplest meaning, "d?
tente" suggests a relaxation of tension, but some have taken this
to mean a "rapprochement," while others see it as signifying only
a subjective easing in the symptoms of tension without any real
change in its causes; they sometimes use the term "true d?tente"
36 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
to distinguish a more fundamental moderation in the adversary
relationship.
The Soviet preference is for the term "peaceful coexistence,"
which they have generally defined as a form of struggle between
states with different social systems without resort to war, but spe
cifically emphasizing the continuing ideological conflict. In
earlier periods, the term suggested a temporary and tactical turn
of events, but in recent Soviet usage "peaceful coexistence" has
come to imply a long-term political strategy. The acceptance by
the United States of the determination that in a nuclear age there
is no alternative to "peaceful coexistence"?in the statement of
Basic Principles of Relations between the two countries signed
at the Moscow Summit in 1972?is regarded by the U.S.S.R. as
the fundamental contractual basis for the "normalization" of the
relationship. In the context of this statement of Basic Principles,
the term implies a mixture of competition, restraint and coopera
tion?which may be as good a working definition as any.
Leaving aside questions of nomenclature, the important point
about the nature of the association is that it has become a multi
level relationship, and the movements on the various planes on
which the two nations now interact are not always in the same
direction. It is therefore necessary to bring to bear a more differ
entiated analysis of the relationship, in order to distinguish our
interests in its various aspects.
Briefly, we can distinguish the following seven planes in the
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States:
(1) The plane of strategic-military competition. Clearly this
deserves to be considered first, for both sides have come to a sober
recognition that their most urgent requirement is to avoid a gen
eral nuclear war. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
have begun an important educational process, in which the Soviet
Union and the United States are moving toward a more enlight
ened understanding of their real security interests, of the limited
political advantages of their strategic arsenals, of the increased
dangers and high costs of an unrestrained strategic-military com
petition, and of the desirability and complexity of finding an
equilibrium at moderate levels. Despite SALT, however, the
strategic-military competition is not yet stabilized, for both coun
tries continue to raise the quantitative or qualitative levels of
their nuclear arsenals.
(2) The plane of conventional military competition. During
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF COEXISTENCE 37
the past decade, both countries have greatly increased their capa
bilities for conventional war, and for reaching distant conflicts
with modernized forces. Although each shows signs of moving
toward restraint in avoiding direct involvement with the other,
this remains a potential source of danger in the coming decade,
for there has not yet evolved a codification of the rules of the
game for the establishment of bases and the use of conventional
forces in areas of strategic importance and political instability.
What is more imminently dangerous is the large, competitive and
unregulated traffic in arms to the developing countries, which is
likely to exacerbate local conflicts and increase the risk of in
volvement of the great powers.
(3) The plane of political competition. In the present fluid
environment, the two great powers are engaged in the competi
tive politics of maneuver for relative political influence in Eu
rope, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America. The
easing of the German problem, which had appeared to be the
most intractable and decisive territorial issue between the United
States and the Soviet Union until less than five years ago, has been
a key factor in opening the way to an improvement in relations
generally, and also to a period of flexible maneuvering for in
fluence in Western Europe. The Soviet Union is not a status quo
power, except in Eastern Europe, and it is in a historical phase
of development in which it is seeking a global presence and in
fluence commensurate with its status as a great power. It is en
couraged in this effort by its perception of the United States as
having passed the zenith of its influence as a world power.
Urgent aspects of the political competition from the Soviet point
of view are its effort to limit the developing American relation
ship with the People's Republic of China and to contain the
widening diplomatic activities of China on the world stage,
particularly in East and West Europe. But also to be noted on
the political plane of the relationship are some elements of coop
eration. In the Middle East, which both sides have recognized
as an area of imminent danger, the political competition is ac
companied by consultation and a substantial degree of restraint
to reduce the danger of their direct involvement with each other.
There have also been consultations and tacit cooperation in re
gard to Southeast Asia and Berlin, in which the Soviet Union
balanced relations with its allies against larger considerations.
(4) The plane of economic competition and cooperation. The
38 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
competitive side of economic relations concerns the use of trade

and economic assistance as a source of political influence, partic
ularly in areas rich in energy resources. In Europe and Japan,
where the United States is involved in trade, monetary and in
vestment problems, the Soviet Union is more than an interested
spectator. The cooperative side of the economic relationship is
reflected in the massive Soviet effort to expand its imports of
grain, technology and consumer goods, and to develop Western
markets for Soviet goods to pay for these imports in the future.
U.S.-Soviet trade has increased from a little over $200 million in
1971 to $642 million in 1972; for 1973, trade is running at an
annual rate of $1.4 billion, of which almost $800 million is in
agricultural products. Currently, Soviet imports from the United
States exceed its exports by more than five times. Of greater sig
nificance is the determined Soviet effort to seek long-term, large
scale Western investment in the development of Soviet natural
resources in Siberia and other areas.
(5) The plane of ideological conflict. Although Soviet policy
is characterized by increasing pragmatism, the Soviet leadership
insists upon the continuation and the intensification of the ideo
logical struggle, at home and abroad, against an enemy iden
tified as "American imperialism." This insistence clearly has its
roots in organizational politics within the Soviet system, but it
presents operational problems in foreign policy, for the continued
reliance of the Soviet Union upon an external ideological adver
sary, as a device necessary to its system of political control, sets
limits in practice on the realization of its policy of "peaceful co
existence." In the United States, once-virulent expressions of
anti-Communist ideology have been de-fused by the fact that
a conservative American President, formerly of that persua
sion, now serves as the instrument of conciliation. The pragmatic
American temper is inclined to allow this plane of the relation
ship to be expressed in terms of the relative performance of the
two systems, without benefit of an accompanying verbal barrage.
(6) The plane of cultural relations. In a period in which the
technology of transport and communications has advanced rap
idly, international life has been inescapably characterized by
increasing interp?n?tration of each other's societies. This pre
sents serious operational difficulties for the Soviet system of po
litical control, at home and in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the
widening of human contacts is understood in the West as a neces
sary ingredient of "peaceful coexistence," as a solvent of hostile
stereotypes and a means of moderating residual adversary senti
ments. This problem was dramatically illustrated at the Hel
sinki meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, where the Western commitment to freedom of
information and travel was countered by Soviet efforts to contain
cultural exchanges in controllable channels. Nowhere are the
asymmetries of the Soviet and Western systems more in evidence
than in the inequalities to be observed in the implementation of
cultural relations, less in the performing arts than in the exchange
of scholars, students and journalists.
(7) The plane of functional cooperation. In the course of two
summit meetings, the Soviet Union and the United States have
signed more than ten bilateral agreements covering such areas
of functional cooperation as environmental protection, medical
science and public health, outer space, science and technology,
agriculture, oceanography, transportation, commerce and the
peaceful uses of atomic energy. Many of these provide for Joint
Commissions to implement the agreements. Although these
agreements are of limited scope and are in fields of peripheral
significance, they perform a symbolic function as a token that
the two political leaderships recognize some degree of com
monality of interests, and they may be of increasing practical
importance as awareness grows of the urgency of environmental
problems. Taken together with the agreements related to secur
ity, commerce, taxation, maritime affairs and cultural relations,
these forms of cooperation constitute the "web of interdepen
dency" which the two countries are consciously weaving.
Several general observations are needed to make this contra
puntal analysis more complete. Although the level of "atmo
spherics" is properly suspect as fickle and subject to manipula
tion, it is worth recording that the tone of the relationship has
been businesslike, frank in its acknowledgement of differences,
but free of the emotional inflammation of those differences which
marked earlier periods.
It is also important to remind ourselves that the background
against which this relationship has been developing is one of
rapid transformation in international politics. Partly as a conse
quence of the reduction in tension between the Soviet Union and
the United States, international politics is marked less by intense
polarization than by fluidity and a blurring of alignments. Non
4? FOREIGN AFFAIRS
military forms of power, particularly economic and technolog

ical, have become increasingly important as sources of political
influence. The return of Japan and Western Europe as signifi
cant factors in world politics and the emergence of China from
her diplomatic isolation have transformed the play of interna
tional politics. Against this background, it is clear that the Soviet
American relationship is less the dominant axis of international
politics than heretofore, and, further, that the major transform
ing forces of the world are less subject to the control of the two
superpowers than each had taken for granted in an earlier period.
The widening gap between the industrialized and the developing
nations is among the most ominous of the trends pointing to the
possibility of anarchic and violent ruptures in the international
system.
Finally, we have become more conscious of how deeply the
internal politics of each country is involved in the relations be
tween the Soviet Union and the United States. At one level, we
watch the fascinating drama of the summits between a General
Secretary of the Communist Party and a President who have
much in common?both conservative, pragmatic realists, former
hard-liners. Behind the President is a distracted society, and a
shifting balance in which entrenched pro-military pressures con
tend with a growing impulse toward anti-militarism and a reduc
tion in America's involvements abroad, while the staunchest
champions of "peaceful coexistence" are to be found among the
private interests of the business community. Behind the General
Secretary is a society of paradoxes: militarily strong but eco
nomically weak, tightly controlled but nervously insecure, in
which the support for "peaceful coexistence" from the cham
pions of economic modernization is ranged against military
interests and the orthodox Party apparatus whose vested interest
in an "imperialist enemy" is combined with a fear of the effect
of modernization upon the system.
Clearly the future course of events depends only in part upon
the chieftains, however committed they may be; it is to the inner
politics and the underlying forces operating in the two societies
that we must look in order to judge the prospects for continuity
of the present stage of their relationship. The American side of
this equation is presumably familiar to our readers; in the fol
lowing section, we turn to an analysis of the Soviet view of the
relationship and the factors that influence its behavior.
ill
Are we witnessing a historic shift in Soviet foreign policy?

According to Leonid Brezhnev, the answer is an emphatic yes.
At Bonn in May, the General Secretary told the people of West
Germany that the 24th Soviet Party Congress in 1971 set, and
the April 1973 plenum of the Party's Central Committee re
affirmed, the foreign policy goal of implementing a "radical turn
toward d?tente and peace on the European continent." To achieve
a better life for the Soviet people, he said, the Soviet leadership
had turned resolutely away from isolation and autarky, and was
bending its energies toward peaceful construction at home and
comprehensive cooperation with the outside world.
Then, on June 22, 1973, in a talk to American businessmen in
Washington, Brezhnev went further. Looking back over 42
years of Party and government experience, he said: "we have
certainly been prisoners of those old tendencies, those old trends,
and to this day we have not been able fully to break those fet
ters. . . ." The cold war, he said, "put the brake on the develop
ment of human relations, of normal human relations between
nations, and it slowed down the progress and advance of eco
nomic and scientific times. And I ask you gentlemen, as I ask
myself, was that a good period? Did it serve the interests of the
peoples? And my answer to that is no, no, no and again no."
Summing up, he said: "it has been and is my very firm belief
that human reason and common sense and the human intellect
will always be victorious over obscurantism."
And again in Washington: "I wish especially to emphasize
that we are convinced that on the basis of growing, mutual con
fidence, we can steadily move ahead. We want the further devel
opment of our relations to become a maximally stable process,
and what is more, an irreversible one."
That this is the ascendant sentiment of the Soviet leadership
was underscored by the award, on May Day of this year, of the
Lenin Peace Prize to the General Secretary, and an orchestrated
wave of praise of Brezhnev in the Soviet press for his "personal
contribution" to the Party's "peace program."
In the rest of the world, which has seen other "peace cam
paigns" come and go, Brezhnev's affirmations have been wel
comed with a certain reserve. Do they represent more than a
tactical turn toward a low-tension policy to gain economic help
and political advances? Will the new policy last?
42 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Undoubtedly, the present course offers tactical advantages to

the Soviet Union, but there is reason to believe that something
more fundamental may be involved, that the Soviet leadership is
responding to "objective factors" in the situation which require
a long-term commitment to a policy of low tension abroad and
consolidation in the Soviet sphere. It is essential to view the
present Soviet policy in the perspective of 20 years of halting,
inconsistent, incomplete, resisted efforts to shake off the Stalinist
legacy in Soviet foreign policy. In a significant sense, Brezhnev's
foreign policy represents the culmination of a process which
Khrushchev began but was unable to carry through.
From the Geneva summit of 1955 and the landmark 20th Party
Congress of 1956, Khrushchev sought to break away from the
Leninist doctrine of the "fatal inevitability of war" and the Sta
linist spirit of isolation and unmitigated hostility, and to establish
the basis for "businesslike" relations with the West. A combina
tion of factors prevented the consistent realization of his pur
pose: his own flamboyant and impulsive temperament, the
strength of the political opposition, which he inflamed with a
series of Party reorganizations, and the fatal effects of a series of
misfortunes?the U-2 affair, the failures in agriculture, the Cu
ban missile episode, and the open conflict with the Chinese Com
munists. By his injudicious efforts to exploit the first Soviet Sput
nik and intercontinental missile as symbols of a "shift in the
balance of power," he galvanized the U.S. missile program and
further deepened the Soviet strategic inferiority. By his polem
ical rhetoric about "wars of national liberation," he evoked
American preparations for "counterinsurgency" and the appre
hensions that contributed to the American involvement in Viet
nam. Nevertheless, it was Khrushchev who dared to start the
process of de-Stalinization, who faced the implications of the
nuclear age, and who foresaw the advantageous possibilities of a
long-term political strategy of "peaceful coexistence."
For its first five years, from 1964 to 1969, the Brezhnev-Ko
sygin group was occupied with the consolidation of a consensual
leadership at home; the effects of the Vietnam War and a per
ceived American propensity for intervention; and the acceler
ated effort to build strategic forces, a large modern navy and
modernized and mobile ground forces. During the 16 months
between the first U.S. proposal of SALT and the first Soviet
response, a debate raged over the desirability and the possibility
of an agreement with the Americans to stabilize the strategic
military competition. Then came Czechoslovakia, and another
year went by, while new weapons were introduced into the stra
tegic competition.
Three events in 1969 helped open possibilities for a further
development in Soviet policy: in the Federal Republic, the elec
tion of Willy Brandt as Chancellor, whose Ostpolitik overture
offered the possibility for clearing away the obstacle of the Ger
man issue; in the United States, Richard Nixon becoming Presi
dent, with a declaration that the "era of negotiation" was a pos
sible option; and in November, the start of the SALT process.
Perhaps it was the working of the dialectic, but the following
year found Soviet relations with the United States in a downward
spiral as a result of events in the Middle East and the Caribbean,
while SALT became bogged down in the issue of whether offen
sive or defensive weapons were to be limited first.
The decisive turn in Soviet policy and in Soviet-American
relations came in the early months of 1971. It was then that
Brezhnev took personal charge of relations with the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany, and of the Soviet
position in the SALT negotiations. A channel of confidential
communications was opened between Brezhnev and Nixon,
which was to lead to the May 1971 agreement that broke the
impasse in SALT. Vietnam was, in its own dialectical way, be
ginning to wind down. By February, internal debate in the Soviet
Union on the policy to be promulgated at the 24th Party Con
gress in March and on the Ninth Five-Year Plan was brought
to an abrupt close by the decisive commitment of Brezhnev's
personal prestige to the line of "normalization" of relations with
the United States. The move in this direction, which was to cul
minate in the Moscow summit of May 1972, was re?nforced by
the change in Chinese policy toward a more flexible diplomacy
and the opening of contacts with the United States, which made
improved Soviet relations with the United States both possible
and necessary.
Among the factors responsible for this sequence of evolution
in Soviet policy, the following six appear to have been of major
importance :
(1) The condition of the Soviet economy is clearly the pri
mary determinant of present Soviet foreign policy. The current
Five-Year Plan, begun in 1971, projected widespread modern
44 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ization of technology, improvements in productivity, and large
increases in consumer goods, but the performance of the Soviet
economy has fallen far short of expectations. Poor harvests have
created substantial shortages of both food and feed grains, com
pounding the effects of low agricultural and industrial produc
tivity and a shortage of industrial manpower. Rather than face
the politically painful choice of instituting substantial economic
reforms, the Soviet leadership has opted for a massive effort to
overcome its shortcomings by increasing the flow of trade, ad
vanced technology and capital from abroad. To overcome its
shortage of hard currency, the Soviet Union seeks help in de
veloping its manufactures for Western markets, and invites West
ern capital and technology to help exploit Soviet natural re
sources, such as its large Siberian reserves of natural gas, to be
paid for out of the export of these resources. In his meetings with
West German and American businessmen, Brezhnev has pro
jected opportunties for vast joint production ventures over
periods of 20 to 30 years. The realization of these expectations
manifestly requires an international climate of reduced tension.
(2) The achievement of strategic parity with the United
States has made it possible for the Soviet leadership to consider
a stabilization of the strategic competition on the basis of the
principle of "equal security," which it understands to mean
the end of the U.S. policy of negotiating from "positions of
strength." The Soviet leadership has expressed its awareness that
the stark alternative to this stabilization would be a further up
ward spiral into increasingly complex and costly weapons sys
tems, and that this would further impede the development of
Soviet industrial technology.
(3) Soviet perceptions of the United States encourage it to
believe that the President's proffered "era of negotiation" repre
sents a serious and durable option because, according to Soviet
analysts, it is a realistic and necessary response to such "objective
factors" as the rise of economic and social problems in the United
States and the decline of U.S. power and influence in the world.
These in turn create opportunities for relative increases in So
viet political influence in a climate of reduced tension.
(4) Soviet perceptions of Europe as an emerging economic
power center present both a potential problem and an opportun
ity. It has responded with a determined effort to encourage
Europe to develop in the direction of a neutral "independence"
rather than toward a closer Atlantic association with the United
States. It anticipates that in a climate of reduced tension, sym
bolized by the European security conference, Europe will not
develop its military capabilities and will diminish its support for
NATO. On the economic side, the Soviet Union no longer
mounts a rearguard action against West European integration.
Having accepted the reality of the European Economic Com
munity, it now bends its efforts to keep open and further develop
trading relations between it and COMECON, the East Euro
pean economic organization. Similarly, Soviet perceptions of the
growing economic strength of Japan lead it to anticipate and to
encourage a competitive struggle between the "triangle" of West
ern industrial powers: the United States, Western Europe and
Japan. This, too, is more likely to flourish in a climate of "peace
ful coexistence."
(5) Soviet apprehensions of China are difficult to weigh as a
factor in Soviet foreign policy, but it is clear that this is a matter
of visceral intensity to the Russians, and that it has both imme
diate and long-term dimensions. One aspect of the change in
Chinese policy toward a policy of enlarged contacts with the
West was that it relieved the Soviet Union of the inhibiting
charge by the Chinese of "collusion with imperialism" against
the policy of "peaceful coexistence." Moreover, the fear of a
Chinese-American alliance, or of American aid to China, has
increased the Soviet incentive to accelerate the "normaliza
tion" of its relations with the United States. On at least three
occasions, beginning in 1970, the Soviet Union has sought to en
list the United States in an agreement to take joint action with
the Soviet Union in the event of "provocative action" by a third
nuclear power?presumably China?but the proposal was con
verted at American insistence into Article IV of the Agreement
on the Prevention of Nuclear War, signed in Washington on
June 22, 1973.
This article commits the two countries to enter into urgent
consultations in the event of a risk of nuclear war between them,
or involving other countries. According to Henry Kissinger, it
was felt that this article, and the commitment in Article II of
the agreement to refrain from the threat or use of force against
each other or against other countries, would instead serve to re
duce the danger of war between Russia and China. Meanwhile,
Moscow is concerned with Chinese diplomatic efforts in Western
46 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Europe warning against the dangers of a d?tente with the Soviet

Union, and even more, with Chinese efforts to stimulate a greater
degree of independence on the part of the countries of Eastern
Europe. The 4,500-mile border between the Soviet Union and
China is a further source of conflict, which four years of negotia
tions have been unable to resolve, and the Soviets maintain a mas
sive army on this front. It seems plausible that Soviet interest
in quiescent relations in the West is strengthened by the necessity
of avoiding a two-front engagement in the event of active hostili
ties with China. In July, Brezhnev's declaration to a North
Vietnamese delegation in Moscow of Soviet interest in "the estab
lishment of equal and good-neighborly cooperation among all
Asian states without exception" has been regarded as an invita
tion to China to work toward a modus vivendi, particularly in a
post-Mao situation.
(6) The Soviet desire to consolidate its position in Eastern
Europe may be dealt with more briefly, but it is by no means a
negligible factor impelling the Soviet leadership to a policy of
"peaceful coexistence." The persistence of nationalism and the
social and political effects of advancing industrialization com
bine to make this area one of unrest and potential disturbances,
and the Soviet problem of control is likely to be made more diffi
cult by the increasing contacts of the West with the states of
Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union seeks assurance that there
will be no exacerbation of these difficulties from the West, and
no interference in the event of trouble. It clearly would like to
avoid the embarrassment of another Czechoslovakia, although
there can be no doubt that the Soviet leadership is determined
to maintain the position to which it feels it is entitled in Eastern
Europe as a result of World War II, and which it believes it
requires for reasons of security and as a symbol of its historical
and ideological advance. Although the climate of d?tente creates
complications for the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, as at
home, it is also a necessary condition, the Soviets believe, for
Western acceptance of the status quo in what they regard as the
Soviet sphere. The progress that has been made toward the
Western acceptance of the German Democratic Republic as a
separate state is regarded as an encouraging mark of the success
of this policy.
These six factors, however, do not tell the whole story, for
foreign policy in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, is not purely
an exercise in rational choices, but also involves the interplay of
domestic politics. As Brezhnev has indicated, his movement to
ward the fuller implementation of a policy of "peaceful coexis
tence" has not been without opposition, and occasional rumbles
of dire forebodings may still be observed as reminders that some
interests in the Soviet Union are watching for signs that their
skepticism is justified.
As might be expected, some of the skepticism is to be found
among the professional military services, which, like their oppo
site numbers in the United States, identify their claims upon the
national budget with national security, with mistrust of the
SALT process and the assumed deviousness of their adversary.
The main source of opposition, however, comes from the ortho
dox wing of the Party and its large ideological apparatus, and
from the even larger apparatus of the political police. For them,
"peaceful coexistence" means trouble?a weakening of the ideo
logical ?lan which is their stock-in-trade, an opening of the coun
try to influences which they can only regard as "subversive,"
increased trouble with intellectuals and nationality groups, and
an erosion of the image of the "imperialist threat" which legiti
mizes their power and on which their careers depend.
The burden of their argument, as it is illuminated by an occa
sional tracer shot fired from Red Star, the military newspaper,
Kommunist, the Party's theoretical organ, or even Pravda, is that
the abandonment of autarky opens the way to a fatal dependence
upon the capitalist countries, that the bid for foreign trade and
investment is unlikely to be productive, that the operational
effects of a d?tente policy will weaken the Soviet system at home
and in Eastern Europe, and that behind the facade of SALT,
the American "imperialists" are improving their lead in new
weapons technology. Some remain unenthusiastic about the
reconciliation with West Germany, against which residual mis
trust is still strong, and whose Social-Democratic leadership
represents a traditional ideological enemy.
The debate is joined by spokesmen of the "peaceful coexis
tence" policy from different lines of defense. Some, like Georgy
Arbatov, the head of the Institute on the U.S.A., in Kommunist
last February, seek to persuade the hard-liners that under present
circumstances, "peaceful coexistence" represents the most effec
tive form of struggle against American imperialism. Others, like
Dmitry Tomashevsky, of the Institute of World Economics and
48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
International Relations, in Red Star this past July, argue force

fully and openly the need for Western capital and technology as
the paramount considerations of the moment. An unusually broad
perspective was represented in an article in Izvestia last Feb
ruary, entitled, "The Logic of Coexistence," by Vladimir Osi
pov, an observer on the staff of the newspaper. Osipov wrote of
"a whole new series of new factors in the life of the international
community of states which now speak for all-around coopera
tion," and concluded that "the global nature of the interdepen
dence of states makes anachronistic foreign policy concepts of
former centuries based on the opposition of some countries to
others and the knocking together of military alliances."
The net result of these conflicting domestic pressures has been
that Brezhnev has won a free hand to implement his policy of
"peaceful coexistence" abroad, while the apparatus of orthodoxy
and control has been given a free hand to tighten the lines of
ideological vigilance at home, and to prosecute the "ideological
struggle" between capitalism and Soviet socialism with renewed
vigor. Perhaps this too represents the dialectic at work.
At the plenum of the Central Committee in April of this year,
Brezhnev was strengthened by the removal from the Politburo
of Pyotr Y. Shelest, an apparent hard-liner, but at the same time
the prime spokesmen for military and secret police interests re
spectively, Marshal Andrei A. Grechko and Yuri V. Andropov,
were added.
Although some skeptics in the West believe that Brezhnev
speaks publicly of his domestic opposition to encourage Western
responsiveness, it seems probable that he does feel the need of
some early and tangible signs that the policy with which he has
identified himself is successful. Hence, the Soviet impatience
for the symbolism of an East-West summit meeting before the
end of this year to cap the proceedings of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the urgency of his pre
sentations to West German and American businessmen. The
ratification of the Moscow-Bonn Treaty and the commitment
of the United States to "peaceful coexistence" in the statement of
Basic Principles have been widely hailed in the Soviet press as
early evidence of Brezhnev's success.
In the light of Soviet domestic politics and the "objective
factors" listed above, what can we conclude about the prospects
for continuity in Soviet foreign policy? It is surely conceivable
that if Soviet expectations of a substantial expansion of trade and
foreign investment are unrealized, if the arms competition
mounts, if another Czechoslovakia should occur in Eastern
Europe, or if a conflict in the Middle East or elsewhere should
threaten a Soviet-American confrontation, there would be pres
sures upon Brezhnev for a policy change, or even the possibility
of his replacement by a coalition of disaffected interests. Even
without these events, given the age of the present Soviet leader
ship, it is always possible that younger men may come to power
in the Soviet Union, and by no means is it clear what their pro
pensities would be?at least, it cannot be taken for granted that
they would automatically subscribe to the pragmatic inclination
because they belong to another generation.
A reasonable conclusion would seem to be that in the absence
of extreme irrationality the margins within which the present
policy would change would be relatively limited in the event any
of the contingencies described above should come to pass. Al
though it is possible, and may even be probable, that we will go
through periods in which the policy of "peaceful coexistence"
may be inflected to a somewhat more militant degree, the
underlying conditions determining Soviet foreign policy would
constrain a return to the more extreme forms of militancy and
hostility of the past. It seems apparent that even to the extent
such changes may stem from the workings of Soviet domestic
politics, the amplitude of their effects would be substantially
influenced by our own actions.
IV
This brings us to the question of our philosophy. To the extent

that we can be said to have had a philosophy about this in the
past, it was a negative one?"containment" or "anticommunism."
They were the challengers to the status quo, and we were its
defenders. For the most part, we reacted to crises as we saw them
coming, sometimes reasonably, sometimes with clouded judg
ment.
Now we have the possibility of thinking more clearly and less
reactively about our relations with the Soviet Union, and about
the place of this relationship in the whole of our foreign policy.
In a time of turbulent and swift change, the central purpose of
our foreign policy is to do what we can to help shape a world
environment in which the values we hold to be the essence of our
5? FOREIGN AFFAIRS
society?when we are true to ourselves?can endure and grow
in realization. The main task of our foreign policy therefore is
to work closely with those nations which share these values to
strengthen the international system, in the sense of a codification
of civilized practices among nations, and the further develop
ment of its institutionalization in the United Nations. This does
not mean defending the status quo, which would in any case
be an impossible task. Against the inexorable pressures for
change which mark this period in international life, imperialism
and hegemonial control over territory cannot provide a lasting
stability. The alternative to international violence and anarchy
is the development of an international system which can accom
modate change without violence, and in which security does not
depend upon the control of territory. What follows from this is
that the guiding purpose of our policy toward the Soviet Union
should be to draw it, over time, into constructive participation
in this kind of an international system.
This means working toward some fundamental transforma
tions. It does not mean trying to convert the Soviet Union to
capitalism; the difference in social systems need not be a source
of conflict, and in any case, both societies are likely to evolve con
siderably in the coming decades, each in its own way. What it
does mean is that we declare quite frankly our interest in en
couraging the Soviets to work constructively and responsibly
within an international system which is neither their nor our
hegemonial domain. That we will continue to be rivals for a
considerable time seems dictated by our situations. But that
rivalry can be less dangerous to the world and less overcast with
hostility if it operates within commonly accepted rules of the
game, and in time it may be diminished by a recognition of our
growing common needs.
What general principle should guide our policies toward the
internal situation in the Soviet Union? As individuals, we find
repellent the extent of the police control over the creative life
and the human rights of the people of the Soviet Union, and we
hope that a period of prolonged low tension on the international
plane, despite its immediate regressive effects, will in the long
run contribute to an easing of this repugnant aspect of the Soviet
system. As individuals and private groups, we can and should
express our humanitarian concern over the violation of human
rights in the Soviet Union, as we should do in our own country
and elsewhere, including countries that are allied to us. The pros
pect of a modernized Soviet Union, in which the people are well
fed and well-housed and clothed, and in which there is room for
the free expression of the human spirit, would be a cause for re
joicing, for they are our fellow men. But as a government, our
concerns are properly limited to those aspects of the Soviet sys
tem that bear directly upon its foreign policy; for example, the
extent of military influence in Soviet politics.
If these represent our long-term purposes, what principles
should guide our present responses to the Soviet Union? Granted
that the Soviet leadership sees present tactical advantages in mov
ing toward a political strategy of "peaceful coexistence." But if
we are correct in believing that this course also reflects a longer
term movement toward a moderated and codified mixture of
competition, restraint and cooperation, what follows?
There can be no doubt that we should welcome this develop
ment, and do all we can to encourage it and to translate it into
concrete measures. In doing so, we should be under no illusions.
The relationship has its dangers and its difficulties. The Soviet
Union is still committed to fundamentally different objectives
than we are; it will take advantage of opportunities that present
themselves to increase its influence, and to work toward an ex
panded hegemonial sphere. Under conditions of a relaxation of
tension, we shall be obliged to call upon deeper, steadier and
more positive motivations from our people and our allies than
we have been accustomed to doing during the simpler years of the
cold war. We shall have to clarify our understanding of the kind
of military balance that is needed, and the role of other forms of
power. We shall have to look freshly and thoughtfully at the
profound changes taking place within and among the nations of
the world. For all that, we should encourage the present turn of
Soviet policy, above all because it offers the possibility of reduc
ing the risk of nuclear war and of bringing some sanity and a
sense of proportion to bear upon the management of the weapons
of mass destruction we have learned to make. We should wel
come it because we can compete effectively on its terms, and be
cause it offers the possibility of long-term transformations in a
constructive direction.
V
To reduce these general principles to specifics, let us retu
52 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
the multi-level analysis introduced at the outset, and see what
criteria should guide us in the decisions we have to make about
each of the aspects of our relationship.
( i ) On the plane of strategic-military competition, a number
of basic issues of strategic doctrine and policy remain unre
solved: whether we can accept parity or should try to regain
superiority; whether parity means equality or an asymmetrical
balance; whether we should place our reliance on mutual deter
rence or require the additional forces capable of fighting a nu
clear war and capable of striking Soviet military targets. We
tend to resolve these issues not by rational discussion and deci
sion, but by the interplay of political and economic pressures and
the behind-the-scenes struggles of bureaucratic groups. We
clearly need to subordinate this process to an overarching judg
ment of our real security interests in a nuclear age. The deter
mination of our military requirements on the basis of rational
principles, clearly articulated and enforced upon lower-order pa
rochial interests, would orient and mobilize an enlightened pub
lic opinion to balance private pressures, and would affect the
interplay of pressures in the adversary system. Two criteria for
a clearer concept of security which flow from our preceding dis
cussion are: first, that a military equilibrium with the Soviet
Union is a necessary condition for international stability, in Eu
rope and centrally; and second, that our optimum security inter
ests would be best served by having that equilibrium as stable
and at as moderate a level as can be managed by negotiation.
Illustratively, these criteria would suggest that the pursuit of
superiority, in the belief that it offers putative political if not
military advantages, is an anachronistic mode of thought which
leads inescapably to a higher level of competition. Further, if we
interpret parity as meaning equality in respect to numbers of
each kind of weapons system, both sides will be building up to
higher levels. Given the large and still growing weapons arsenals
on both sides and the real possibilities for the spread of nuclear
weapons to more countries and even to groups of people, we are
too complacent about the possibility of nuclear war. We should
seek a radical acceleration of the SALT process to reduce overall
numbers of weapons on both sides, and to bring under control
qualitative developments in multiple warheads and accuracy,
which will otherwise create great instability. We should ponder
the lesson that short-sighted "bargaining" tactics have had the
effect of undermining the essential purpose of SALT. The com
plexities of working out equitable arms-limitation arrangements
require more effective staff support for arms control as an inte
gral aspect of our security policy than we now have in the much
weakened Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a more
effective and better-informed public constituency.
(2) The competition in conventional weapons may represent
a more imminent hazard in the next few years. The probabilities
of conflict arising out of competing efforts to use armed forces
to influence the outcome in unstable areas appear to be increas
ing. The criteria to bring to bear in this field are: first, that a
military equilibrium in the conventional field is needed to per
form the negative function of assuring that neither side will
intervene with force to encourage or prevent political change;
second, that the equilibrium should be as low as negotiation and
mutual example can make it; and third, that a codification of
rules of engagement in unstable areas is urgently needed. This
would suggest that the competition in conventional weapons and
their employment should be made a matter for highest-level ne
gotiation, analagous to SALT. This may be no less complex a
problem than SALT, as the talks on force reductions in Europe
are demonstrating, because it is more directly related to conflict
ing political objectives. One aspect of the problem that may be
amenable to agreement would be the competition in arms sales,
which is exacerbating the problems of the Middle East and the
subcontinent, and is encouraging the rise of military dictatorships
throughout the developing world. The convening of an interna
tional conference on the arms trade, as proposed by Senator M?n
dale, might at least serve to open to public attention the shadowy
world of the traffic in conventional weapons.
(3) In respect to the political competition, we need to define
the principles to guide our responses to Soviet efforts to expand
their influence in the developing world and in Western Europe
and Japan, and also to guide our conduct in relation to Eastern
Europe and China. As we have seen, the Soviet Union is becom
ing a global presence and seeks to expand its political influence
wherever it can. In the past, we have tended to feel that any ex
pansion of Soviet influence is dangerou? and should be resisted.
What criteria can guide our present responses to this expansion?
We can affirm, first, that a responsible and constructive partici
pation by the Soviet Union in assisting the developing countries
54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
with such problems as economic development, population and

environment is desirable and should be encouraged?through the
United Nations where possible; and second, that in those in
stances in which Soviet influence becomes so preponderant as to
threaten the independence of the country involved, efforts should
be made to balance that influence by political and economic
means. Two additional considerations tend to make the issue less
acute : the demonstrated capacity of the developing countries to
resist threats to their independence, and the limitations of Soviet
resources, which have had the effect of concentrating Soviet
efforts upon a limited number of countries. In Europe, the Soviet
Union seeks, through bilateral contacts and the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, to influence the nations of
Western Europe toward a more neutralist orientation and to gain
acceptance from the West of a Soviet sphere of influence in East
ern Europe. The criterion discussed earlier, of the central impor
tance to the United States of a close association with the nations
of Western Europe in strengthening the international system in
accordance with their shared values, would suggest that active
competition against this Soviet effort is required, and similar
considerations would apply in relation to Japan. In Eastern
Europe, the principles of the right of free access and of noninter
ference by force in processes of internal change should argue
against the acceptance by the West of hegemonial control by the
Soviet Union over Eastern Europe, which is in any case an ana
chronistic and unstable relationship. At present, Soviet sensi
tivities are delicate on this issue, but over time the Soviets may
come to appreciate their own interests in a more resilient rela
tionship which permits the states of Eastern Europe to partici
pate actively in the functional forms of association which are
developing across Europe.
A few brief points need to be added about the political compe
tition as it affects our relations with the People's Republic of
China. Although it has clearly been desirable to have developed
contacts with China and although these contacts have had a use
ful effect upon our relations with the Soviet Union, it should not
be part of our objective to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet conflict, and
we should exercise care to see that our actions cannot be inter
preted as having that intent. Our objective should be to encour
age both countries to move in the direction of moderation and
cooperation; in particular, we look forward to the time when
China will feel sufficiently secure to participate in international
arms-limitation arrangements.
(4) The economic aspect of the Soviet-American relationship
involves some of the most interesting and difficult decisions of all.
We have seen that the hope of the Soviet leadership for increased
trade and investment from the West, and particularly from the
United States, is a major factor in its present policy. Of course,
much of the response of American firms is based upon their pri
vate interests and is governed by coordinated government policy
only to the extent that it depends upon large-scale credits, gov
ernment guarantees, or legislative action on the Most Favored
Nation provision. Even to this extent it is a useful exercise to
weigh the considerations involved from a national point of view.
If purely economic considerations are weighed, it is apparent that
the advantages are heavily in favor of the Soviet Union, although
the prospect of selling in Soviet markets has a strong appeal for
particular sectors of the business community, and Soviet sources
could help to fill America's future energy needs. Among the non
economic arguments in favor of a positive response, it is said that
the growth of economic interdependence will encourage restraint
in Soviet behavior, contribute to a relationship of confidence,
and may lead to long-term transformations in the Soviet system.
On the other side, the fear is expressed that U. S. trade and in
vestment may help to strengthen the Soviet Union for later eco
nomic or military challenges to the United States, that large-scale
credits will give the Soviet Union leverage as a debtor state, and
that this influx of trade and technology helps to postpone needed
economic reforms in the Soviet system.
What criteria should the United States apply in deciding at
what level, with what types of trade and investment, and in what
time scale it should respond? On balance, it would seem that a
positive response would be useful, mainly for noneconomic rea
sons. If we judge the present Soviet course a desirable one from
our point of view, it is obviously necessary to sustain the eco
nomic motivation at some level. A modest affirmative response,
largely in grain, consumer goods and machinery, with the pros
pect of a gradually upward-sloping increase over the years, in
volving an increasing mix of long-term investments in jointly
financed resource-development projects, would represent a con
servative course, and would hold out a continuing incentive to the
Soviet leadership to conduct itself with restraint. If we were to
56 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
withhold trade and investment in the expectation that it would
oblige the Soviet Union to institute fundamental economic re
forms, this would be a risky course, and the consequences would
be unpredictable, whereas the influx of American technology
and businessmen is more likely over a period of time to encourage
internal pressures for modernized administration, some decen
tralization in planning, and a greater reliance upon market mech
anisms.
Questions have been raised whether the increase of trade and
investment should be made subject to more explicit conditions.
For example, the Senate has passed an amendment proposed by
Senator Humphrey requesting the President to seek an agree
ment with the Soviet Union for the mutual reduction of arma
ments and military expenditures in conjunction with the grant
ing of credits and guarantees by the United States government.
Whether such an agreement proves feasible or not, the amend
ment serves to register the point that future levels of military
expenditure in the Soviet Union will be taken into account as
part of the context in which future credits will be discussed.
Senator Jackson's amendment, tying the Most Favored Nation
clause to the question of unrestricted emigration, with particular
reference to the emigration of Soviet Jews, has resulted in an
unprecedented effort on the part of the Soviet Union to satisfy
the Congress on a matter regarded in Moscow as a sensitive inter
nal affair. As a general principle, the effective combination of
private and group pressure with a formal government position
of noninterference in Soviet internal affairs might have long
run advantages over an explicit and frontal government-spon
sored challenge.
(5) The ideological aspect of the relationship could be con
ducted anywhere on the decibel scale from a quiet competition
of ideas to a noisy brouhaha between ideologues. There is a
fundamental contradiction in the Soviet position that "peaceful
coexistence between states with different social systems is pos
sible," but that it is consistent with, and even intensifies, the
"ideological struggle." Although the Soviet press has recently
been unaccustomedly moderate in its tone of reporting on life in
America, it continues to use "imperialism" as a synonym for U.S.
policy and regularly calls for a "systematic struggle against
reactionary ideology and propaganda." It is evident that this
campaign represents an organizational concession to domestic
cold warriors, but the effect is of more than domestic conse
quence. From the point of view of the United States, a campaign
of "ideological struggle" against the "imperialist enemy" per
petuates attitudes of implacable hostility and sets narrow limits
on the relaxation of tension, and there is a strange inconsistency
between this Soviet stance and its attacks on foreign radio broad
casts as contravening the spirit of "peaceful coexistence."
(6) The cultural-relations aspect of Soviet-American rela
tions presents a number of dilemmas. In principle, the two sides
are agreed that cultural relations should be expanded. In the
Basic Principles of Relations, the President and the General
Secretary reaffirmed "their intention to deepen cultural ties with
one another and to encourage fuller familiarization with each
other's cultural values." Another agreement on the subject was
signed in Washington this June. In his television speech to the
American people, Secretary Brezhnev said: "To live at peace,
we must trust each other, and to trust each other, we must know
each other better. We, for our part, want Americans to visualize
our way of life and our way of thinking as completely and cor
rectly as possible." The sentiments are unexceptionable, but the
implementation presents difficulties. The American side, in
meshing itself with Soviet institutions and practices, becomes
centralized, involved in government channels, quotas, tit-for-tat
games of reciprocity over various restrictions and other degrad
ing exercises, which demonstrate the truth of the French saying:
"each one takes on the visage of his adversary." In the Soviet
system, cultural relations are regarded as a highly sensitive mat
ter, subject to an elaborate and pervasive control apparatus which
limits exchanges to officially selected delegations and representa
tives in approved fields. In all Soviet institutions, the "Foreign
Departments" that have the responsibility for monitoring and
approving all contacts with foreigners have their own standards
for judging the utility of cultural relations. Undoubtedly there is
some mutual benefit even in the constricted and asymmetrical
exchanges now possible, but it is much less useful than it could
be if it conformed to the standard expressed by Secretary Brezh
nev. Our guiding criterion is to be found in the belief that unre
stricted human contacts are integral to the "normalization" of
relations between nations, and while adapting to the unhappy
limitations of the present, we should not lose sight of the aspira
tion to bring cultural relations with the Soviet Union into con
58 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
formity with prevailing standards elsewhere.

(7) There is a potential future importance in the bilateral
agreements on functional cooperation in various fields, and the
various Joint Commissions provided for under these agreements,
which may be greater than is now appreciated. Even today,
American-Soviet relations are at their best when they bring to
gether specialists with common professional interests, and the
reports of close and successful collaboration in, for example,
oceanography and environmental problems are most encourag
ing. In the longer run, it seems likely that increasing awareness
of the urgency of problems relating to pollution, the environ
ment and resources needed to sustain life on the planet will
affect ways of thinking about national sovereignty, and that col
laboration in these fields will have a broadening effect on the con
text in which security problems will be faced. When the time
comes that this aspect of the Soviet-American relationship be
comes central rather than peripheral, the essential character of
that relationship cannot but change in its fundamental perspec
tives.
Whether it will take years or decades for the sense of living
on the same small planet to loom larger in the consciousness of
men than the rivalry of nations, no one of course can say. Change
sometimes moves like a glacier, sometimes like an avalanche. We
have negotiated the passage from the simplified enmities of the
past to that patchwork-quilt mixture of striving with and against
each other which has no simple designation. To move now from
the ambiguities of coexistence to a more constructive and less
dangerous stage will take patience and faith in our sense of direc
tion in the world, while we sustain an effectively functioning
society at home.

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Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence

Author(s): Marshall D. Shulman

competitive side of economic relations concerns the use of trade

military forms of power, particularly economic and technolog

Are we witnessing a historic shift in Soviet foreign policy?

Undoubtedly, the present course offers tactical advantages to

Europe warning against the dangers of a d?tente with the Soviet

International Relations, in Red Star this past July, argue force

This brings us to the question of our philosophy. To the extent

To reduce these general principles to specifics, let us retu

with such problems as economic development, population and

formity with prevailing standards elsewhere.

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