IGEM-TSP-21-241 Hydogen Installations Supplement To TD13 Draft Rev 5.0 14.12.20

Supplement to IGEM/TD/13 Edition 2 Draft rev 5.
0 Date 14/12/2020
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
S1.4 IGEM/TD/13 standard applies to the safe design, construction, inspection, testing,
operation and maintenance of pressure regulating installations (PRIs) in accordance
with current knowledge and operational experience.
This supplement provides additional requirements for new PRIs to be used for the
transmission of hydrogen including Natural Gas/hydrogen blended mixtures
(subsequently referred to as NG/H blends), and for the repurposing of Natural Gas
(NG) PRIs for hydrogen service. The section numbers in this supplement (preceded
by ‘S’) refer to the section numbers in the main document and specify the
requirements and qualifications which are in addition to those in the main
document. Where there is no numbered section in this supplement corresponding
to a section in the main document, the requirements of the main document apply
in full.
The term hydrogen service is used to indicate PRI plant and equipment transporting
hydrogen or a NG/H blend. The requirements for hydrogen service apply equally to
NG/H blends, unless the text indicates that the requirement depends upon the
concentration of hydrogen in the blend.
S1.11 This supplement was published on ## #### 202#.
SECTION 2: SCOPE
S2.1 NG/H blends shall be considered to be equivalent to 100 mol.% hydrogen with
respect to limits on design stresses and the potential effect on the material
properties, unless an additional technical evaluation is carried out to qualify the
materials. NG/H blends containing in excess of 10 mol.% hydrogen shall be
considered to be equivalent to 100 mol.% hydrogen with respect to all other
requirements.
This supplement gives additional recommendations for PRIs and installations:
• with an upstream Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) not greater than 100
bar
• with an outlet pressure greater than or equal to 7 bar
• for use with hydrogen or NG/H blends with a hydrogen content greater than
10%
• operating with a temperature range between -20°C and 120°C
S2.2 This supplement also gives additional recommendations relating to the repurposing
of NG PRIs to hydrogen service. These recommendations are in addition to those
in the main body of the document, which should continue to be applied except
where explicitly superseded by the recommendations of this supplement.
Repurposing in accordance with the recommendations of this supplement should

only be considered for PRIs and installations which have been operated in
accordance with the recommendations of the main document for at least 5 years.
Note: The material performance factors defined in ASME B31.12 are based on limiting the hoop
stress, not derating the tensile properties. The design factors in Table S1 are based on the
material performance factors for pressures not exceeding 137.9 barg (2,000 psig).
SECTION 3: COMPETENCY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
S3.1 Hydrogen and NG/H blends have significantly differed properties to NG, and
therefore additional precautions and training are required to ensure operators are
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Supplement to IGEM/TD/13 Edition 2 Draft rev 5.0 Date 14/12/2020
competent to design, construct, inspect, test, operate and maintain PRIs and
installations in hydrogen service.
S3.2 The key difference in the parameters of NG and NG/H blends are the higher ignition
probability, poor flame visibility and higher leakage rate.
S3.3 SAFETY MANAGEMENT
Risk assessments and procedures will need to be prepared and reviewed to reflect
the specific hydrogen service to be used.
Note: The following are some of the differences between NG and hydrogen which will need to be
considered
• increased flammable range

• increased probability of ignition
• poor visibility of flame in daylight
• higher leakage rate of hydrogen compared to NG
• increased flame speed (with the potential for unconfined vapour cloud
explosions with significant overpressure, as compared to flash fires with
negligible overpressure for NG)
• requirement for ATEX equipment rated for Equipment Group IIC rather than IIA
• increased noise from venting
SECTION 5: PLANNING, LOCATION, LAYOUT AND SECURITY
S5.1 Where possible all PRIs and installations operating in hydrogen service should be
located outside to allow good ventilation throughout the PRI and ensuring there is
no congested pipework which would allow gas to accumulate.
Note: Definition of congested or confined installation is given in IGEM/SR/25 Appendix 6.
S5.2 Where the main pipework or part of the main pipework of a PRI or installation is to
be installed inside a housing then the housing shall be suitable for use with
hydrogen meeting the general requirements of IGEM/TD/13 and addressing the
following issues:
• the housing shall have good low and high-level natural ventilation to the open
air
• include an outlet opening located at the highest point in the housing in exterior
walls or the roof
• in areas where natural ventilation is not possible, consideration shall be given
for the installation of permanent atmosphere analysis equipment at suitably
located point (s) and/or forced ventilation
• explosion relief shall be designed so that if an explosion occurs the pressure will
be relieved without generating dangerous missiles.
S5.3 PRI and installation layout shall consider the hazardous areas generated by all
equipment, with careful consideration given to the location of vent or relief systems
and the hazardous area generated. Further guidance on hazardous areas resulting
from vent or relief systems can be found in EI IP-MCSP-P15 and section S10.1.
SECTION 6: HOUSINGS
S6.1 Instrumentation kiosks and cabinets are permitted to provide weather protection
for telemetry and control equipment including smallbore pipework. The guidance in
IGEM/TD/13 Section 6 shall be applied to these enclosures.
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SECTION 7: DESIGN OF A PRI
S7.1 A PRI shall be designed in accordance with IGEM/TD/13 Section 7. Specific

consideration shall be given to:
• calculation of gas velocity

• design of venting systems
• hazardous areas generated.
The guidance in EI IP-MCSP-P15 (see section S10.1) shall be considered to achieve

the least onerous hazardous area classification for the installation.
Note: The principles of IGEM/G/7 may be applied to the assessment of design risks for PRIs in
hydrogen service. The application should be extended to include the additional hazards posed
by hydrogen.
S7.2 PIPEWORK SIZING
PRI outlet pipework shall be sized such that the gas velocity shall not exceed the
erosional velocity at peak conditions. High hydrogen gas velocities in piping
increases turbulence and pressure drop, contributes to excessive sound pressure
levels (aerodynamic noise) and can cause internal piping erosion and acoustically
induced vibration.
The erosional velocity is calculated as follows:
𝜌𝑆𝑇𝐷 𝑄𝑆𝑇𝐷
𝑣= 𝜋 2
𝜌𝐷
4 𝑖
v = velocity, ms-1
Di = internal dimeter, m
ρSTD = gas density at standard conditions, kg/m3
QSTD = volume flow rate at standard conditions m3/s
Ρ = gas density at pipeline conditions.
To estimate the highest velocity, the above equation is evaluated at the highest
temperature, lowest pressure and highest flowrate. Lower velocities are
recommended.
S7.3 DESIGN PRESSURE BOUNDARIES
S7.3.1 The design of regulator streams shall take into consideration the flowrate and
pressure differential to ensure the critical flow limit is not exceeded in hydrogen
service.
Regulator impulse lines shall be located so that they are not affected by pressure
variations due to turbulence and flow instabilities (vortex shedding).
Regulators and other components should not vent process gas to the atmosphere
in an uncontrolled way.
S7.4 ISOLATION OF PRIS AND COMPONENTS
S7.4.4 Selection of valves
A key consideration for hydrogen is to prevent leakage both across the valve and
to atmosphere.
Leakage to atmosphere is frequently caused by leaks through the valve body (such
as through the seal for the top works/bonnet or along the valve stem though the
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seal/packing arrangement) and to a lesser extent by leaking castings. To minimise

the potential for leaks the following, or equivalent, is recommended:
• double block and bleed (DBB), single block and bleed with positive isolation
• each casting to be hydraulically leak tested
• soft seats in a metal retainer for in-line automatic valves and automatic
vents; specify bubble tight shut off (refer to standards API 598, API 6D, ISO
5208)
• metal to metal seat or soft seats in a retainer for in-line manual valves;
these should be combined with a means of positive isolation if used to block
the flow path before attempting invasive maintenance or inspection inside
the PRI
• metallic seat with valve outlet blocked
• no through bolting, body flanges or threaded connections in assembly of the
body of the valve.
S7.4.4.1 Valves having shell (body, bonnet, cover and/or end flange components) made of
cast or ductile iron shall not be used.
Flow control valves and pilot/control systems containing components made from
martensitic steels, cast iron, copper and nickel alloys shall be qualified for hydrogen
service.
Non-metallic materials present in seals shall be qualified for hydrogen service.
S7.5 GAS CLEANING
The differential pressures across blocked filters in hydrogen service will be different
from NG. For similar energy flows the pressure drop will increase by a factor of
1.08 for hydrogen.
The limits for acceptable operation should be defined. Filter units shall not contain
hydrogen sensitive materials.
Note: To protect soft seats from possible damage from particulates carried with the gas, a strainer
of 300 microns (50 mesh) or finer should be installed upstream of valves or valve clusters with
soft seats which are normally open to flow during operation. Typically, this excludes vents,
drains, and pressure relief valves (pressure relief valves should not have a strainer upstream
since a partially blocked strainer would reduce the relieving capacity).
S7.6 HEATING GAS
S7.6.1 For hydrogen, a reduction in pressure does not create a reduction in temperature
and for some operating parameters there will be a small increase in temperature.
Note: Hydrogen gas will increase in temperature approximately 5.6 oC when the pressure is reduced
from 137.9 bar (2,000 psig) to atmospheric pressure. The temperature increase is a function
of the starting temperature as well as the initial and final pressures.
S7.6.2 For hydrogen service a reduction in pressure may create a reduction in

temperature, this will be dependent upon the quantity of NG in the NG/H blend.
The maximum and minimum outlet temperatures of the PRI should not exceed
the limits of the downstream connected pipeline or main.
S7.7 NOISE AND VIBRATION
S7.7.1 Velocities for hydrogen and NG/H blends will exceed the velocities in NG pipelines.
The sonic velocity of hydrogen is approximately four times that of NG so erosion
and abrasion shall be considered. Specific attention should be given to control
valves and relief valves which usually have sonic or near sonic velocities. The high
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sonic velocity may result in problems at lower differential pressures than acceptable
for other gases. See section S7.2 for pipework sizing.
S7.7.2 Vibration and acoustic fatigue
S7.7.2.1 High velocities in pipework systems increases turbulence and pressure drop,
contributing to excessive sound pressure levels (aerodynamic noise) and potentially
causing internal piping erosion. Acoustically induced vibration shall be avoided at
all times.
S7.7.3 Consideration of fatigue shall take account of the higher rate of fatigue crack growth
and degradation of endurance limits in hydrogen service.
Note: The rate of fatigue crack growth in hydrogen service may be 10 to 50 times higher than that
in air.
S7.7.4 The design of pipework systems should take into account the higher flow rates and
velocities in hydrogen service. Pipework systems that were well off resonance at
the highest NG flow rates might be affected by significant vibration in a high-speed
hydrogen flow.
S7.8 BREATHERS, MANUAL VENT LINES AND RELIEF VENT LINES
S7.8.1 The design of vent lines should take into consideration the increase in temperature
which will occur when hydrogen is vented to atmosphere.
Note: Further guidance on hazardous areas resulting from vent or relief systems can be found in EI
IP-MCSP-P15 and CGA G-5.5. Hydrogen Vent Systems.
S7.8.3 & S7.8.4 Manual and relief vent lines
Manual and relief venting systems shall be designed for the temperature changes
which will occur when the gas is depressurised. Unlike NG, when hydrogen is
depressurised, a small increase in temperature may occur.
Note: Hydrogen gas will increase in temperature approximately 5.6oC when the pressure is reduced
from 137.9 bar (2,000 psig) to atmosphere. The temperature increase is a function of the
starting temperature as well as the initial and final pressures.
For hydrogen there is a possibility of deflagration or detonation of the hydrogen-

air mixture inside the vent stack which is characterised as combustion generating
a pressure wave that propagates at a subsonic rate. It is typically indicated by an
audible pop coming from the vent stack. This typically occurs when the hydrogen
flow initially starts and before the residual air has been purged from the vent piping.
The principle measure for the potential of deflagration or detonation inside the vent
stack and pipework is the ratio of the length to internal diameter (L/d). The greater
the L/d ratio the more likely deflagration or detonation will occur.
Deflagration is where the propagation of combustion produces a shockwave with a

velocity less than the speed of sound in the unreacted medium. Where the L/d ratio
of any section is greater than 60:1 but less than 100:1, a deflagration of a
contained hydrogen-air mixture is possible.
A detonation is where the propagation of explosion produces a shockwave with a

velocity exceeding the speed of sound in the unreacted medium. Where the L/d
ratio is greater than 100:1, the chance of a detonation of a hydrogen-air mixture
increases.
The L/d ratio of the vent pipe shall be below 60:1. The number of turns and
connections to the vent stack shall be limited in order to reduce the possibility of
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deflagration or detonation and it shall be designed to withstand an overpressure

event.
Note: Further information and guidance for venting systems can be found in CGA G-5.5. Hydrogen
Vent Systems.
S7.9 PIPE AND FITTINGS
S7.9.1 General
S7.9.1.1 Welded connections should be used where possible. Where welded connections are
not practical, leak resistant flange types such as raised face or ring type joint
flanges shall be used.
Threaded connections shall be used only where welded (including seal welded
threaded connections) and flanged connections are not practical. The sealant shall
be hydrogen compatible and shall be high temperature resistant to reduce the risk
of leaks during a fire. Typical uses of threaded connections are to match equipment,
especially instruments.
Erosion, abrasion and excessive noise shall be addressed in the design. The valve
seat ring shall be replaceable where erosion or abrasion might occur.
S7.9.2 Steel pipe for main PRI pipework
Grades higher than L485 (X70) shall not be used unless the pipe and weld material
is qualified for the intended service.
The maximum tensile strength of the pipe shall not exceed 690 N mm -2.
The maximum tensile strength of the weld metal shall not exceed 690 N mm -2.
Refer to Table S1 for further information.
S7.9.2.3 Material qualified for hydrogen service in accordance with ASME VIII Div 3 KD-10
may be used.
S7.9.2.5 The minimum wall thickness of line pipe shall be equal to or greater than the design
thickness as determined from:
t = PD(20fs)-1
t = design thickness of pipe (mm) (nominal less under-tolerance)

P = design pressure at the relevant design temperature (barg)
D = outside diameter of the pipe (mm)
s = SMYS (N mm-2)
f = design factor (see Table S1).
Material Grade Design Factor f Material Performance Factor h

L360 / X52 and below 0.5 1.0
L415 / X60 0.433 0.867
L450 / X65 0.4 0.8
L485 / X70 0.371 0.742
TABLE S1 - MAXIMUM DESIGN FACTOR
Note 1: Design factors are based on the material performance factors given in ASME B31.12.
Note 2: The hoop stress is limited to 180 N mm-2.
S7.9.2.6 Material Qualification
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Pipe and fitting materials shall be qualified for use in hydrogen service in
accordance with the hydrogen supplement to IGEM/TD/1 Section S5.8.
S7.9.3 Fittings
S7.9.3.1 Fittings shall be suitable for hydrogen service, see hydrogen supplement to
IGEM/TD/1 Section S5.8.
The maximum hardness shall not exceed 250 HV10 (or HV5).
S7.9.4 Gaskets
Gasket materials shall be appropriate for the design pressures and temperatures,
be hydrogen compatible and leak resistant. In addition, consideration shall be given
to resistance to fire, due to the flammability of hydrogen. Teflon or graphite filled
spiral wound gasket with a raised face flange or a copper ring with a ring joint
flange should be used.
S7.9.5 Bolting, studs, nuts and washers
Bolting studs, nuts and washer shall be compatible for the fitting and suitable for
use with hydrogen, where they may be exposed to hydrogen.
S7.9.6 Sensing, instrument and auxiliary pipework
S7.9.6.1 Pipework shall be stainless steel designed to minimise leakage by limiting the
number of compression fittings.
S7.9.7 Screwed pipework and fittings
The use of screwed pipework and fittings should be avoided where possible.
S7.9.8 Pre-testing
Pre-testing shall be in accordance with the latest edition of IGEM/TD/13.
S7.10 WELDING
Low hydrogen consumables shall be used.
Note: If the line pipe specification states the carbon equivalent is “as agreed” then the carbon
equivalent shall not exceed 0.43.
S7.10.1 Preparation
The hardness of the weld and heat affected zone shall not exceed 250 HV10 (or
HV5). The hardness determination is to be made via microhardness traverses on
mounted metallographic samples removed from process/operator weld qualification
samples. Production hardness testing also should be considered.
The maximum tensile strength of the weld metal shall not exceed 690 N mm -2.
S7.10.4 Post-weld stress relieving
Consideration shall be given to the need for stress relief using post-weld heat
treatment on thick sections and fittings or when the carbon equivalent is equal to
or greater 0.43.
S7.11 STRESS ANALYSIS
S7.11.1 The hoop and longitudinal stresses are limited to 180 N mm-2.
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The maximum hydrostatic (mean) stress, σm should meet:
σm ≤ 120 N mm-2 where σm = (σh + σl)/3
Note: The steady state concentration of hydrogen in a stressed lattice is related to the hydrostatic
stress. The objective of this condition is to ensure consistency with the limit on the hoop stress.
S7.11.2 Fatigue analysis shall take into account the increased rate of fatigue crack growth
rates in hydrogen service. The rate of fatigue crack growth in hydrogen service may
be 10 to 50 times higher than that in air.
A reduction factor of 50 should be applied to S-N curves applied in IGEM/TD/12.

The minimum fatigue life for future operation under hydrogen service is 40 years.
S7.11.3 Hydrogen stress cracking is associated with absorption of hydrogen and a delayed
time to failure during which hydrogen diffuses into regions of high triaxial stress.
The analysis of high stressed locations in thick components shall take into account
the risk of hydrogen stress cracking.
S7.12 METERING
Metering equipment must be calibrated for hydrogen service as appropriate.
SECTION 8: PRESSURE AND FLOW CONTROL
S8.2 PRESSURE REGULATING SYSTEMS
S8.2.1 The effect of the high sonic velocity of hydrogen should be taken into account when
the pressure drop through the regulator is greater than 10%. Hardened seats and
plugs should be used.
Special attention should be given to the stability of the regulators which may be
affected by the time taken for the sensed pressure to be transferred back to the
regulator control arrangement which may be reduced for hydrogen. There is also
potential for reductions in regulator stability if the inlet to the impulse line is in a
location which is affected by pressure variations caused by turbulence and flow
instability.
S8.5 PRESSURE SAFETY SYSTEMS
Pressure safety system shall be suitable for use with hydrogen. Hardened seats and
plugs shall be used for relief valves.
Relief valves shall be designed to operate safely at the increased temperatures

which will be experienced when hydrogen is vented.
SECTION 9: PROTECTION AGAINST CORROSION
S9.1 Cathodic Protection (CP)
The CP system shall be designed to ensure current limits and protection criteria
limits are appropriate for systems operating in hydrogen service.
Note: The steel grades that can be used for hydrogen service pipelines have a specified minimum
The protection criteria specified in BS EN 12954 for low alloyed carbon steels should
apply to pipeline systems in hydrogen service.
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The instant OFF pipe to soil potential should not be more negative than -1.20V vs
Cu/CuSO4 to mitigate against the risk of cathodic disbondment on the pipeline
coating.
SECTION 10: ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND INSTRUMENTATION
S10.1.2 Hazardous areas
Areas that may become hazardous as the result of the presence of flammable gas
are classified in the UK as Zone 0, 1 and 2 and are defined in EI IP-MCSP-P15 and
the Research Report: Dispersion Modelling in support of EI IP-MCSP-P15
Note: “NG/H blends with >30% hydrogen content shall be considered to be equivalent to refinery
hydrogen (80% hydrogen mixture) and EL IP-MCSP-P15 can be used to assess hazardous
areas. EI research report provides dispersion modelling results for 100% hydrogen and can
used to assess the hazardous areas. Where the hydrogen content ≤ 30% it shall be considered
to be NG (methane) and SR/25 may be used for hazardous area assessment.”
S10.2.4 Selection of equipment
Special attention should be made to ensure all electrical and instrumentation

equipment is suitable for the gas to be conveyed.
Note: Hydrogen and NG/H blends are in explosion group Group IIC whereas NG is in
Group IIA.
S10.2.4.3 Flow measurement
The design of any flow metering system shall be in accordance with appropriate
standards for hydrogen service.
S10.2.4.5 Leak detection equipment
Leak detection devices shall be installed at appropriate locations throughout the

PRIs and installations or mobile leakage detection devices shall be available if the
hydrogen service is unodorised.
S10.2.4.6 Flame detection equipment
Flame detection devices shall be installed at appropriate locations throughout PRIs

and installations if the flame from the hydrogen or NG/H blended gas is found to
be difficult to see in daylight or a flame colorant has not been added to the gas.
SECTION 11: CONSTRUCTION
Construction methods shall be carried out as per IGEM/TD/13. If PRIs and/or

installations are to be installed on an existing NG site then additional demarcation
of the equipment used for the installation shall be considered.
SECTION 13: COMMISSIONING, DE-COMMISSIONING AND DISPOSAL
S13.1.4 Purging
Only indirect purging operations using an inert gas such as nitrogen are permitted
on PRI’s and installations in hydrogen service.
Note: Guidance on indirect purging is provided in IGE/SR/22.
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SECTION 14: OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
S14.1 General
Any risk created by any undertaking and/or work practices, shall be assessed to
identify the measures that may be needed to eliminate them or to reduce them to
as low as reasonably practicable to comply legislative requirements. The following
steps should be incorporated in any risk assessment:
• identify the hazard

• decide who may be affected by work activities
• evaluate the risks and decide on whether existing measures are adequate
or if additional measures are required to reduce the risks
• make a record of the assessment and findings
• review the assessment from time to time and revise as necessary.
Note: Further guidance can be found in IGEM/G/7. Additional hazards posed by hydrogen must be
considered.
S14.2.3 Systems of work
S14.2.3.1 The systems of work shall be suitable for the different hazards posed by the
transportation of hydrogen or NG/H blends:

S14.2.3.3 Job instructions
Job instructions shall reflect the different hazards associated with hydrogen service
and the control measures required.
S14.2.3.4 Permits to work
The permit to work system shall reflect the additional hazards associated with
hydrogen service.
S14.2.4 Emergency arrangements
S14.2.4.1 The emergency arrangements shall be appropriate for the hazards and risks posed
by PRI and installation operation in hydrogen service. Clear signage shall be
installed so that PRIs and installations operating in hydrogen service can be clearly
identified by the emergency services.
S14.2.4.2 Where a site contains a mixture of hydrogen service and NG equipment then there
shall be a clear demarcation of the areas in hydrogen service.
S14.2.5 Training and competence
S14.2.5.1 Training should be designed so that relevant personnel have the appropriate
knowledge and understanding of the risks associated with hydrogen service and
the difference between NG PRIs and installations and PRIs and installations which
are used in hydrogen service.
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S14.2.5.2 Specific training shall be carried out for personnel working on PRI’s and installations
operating in hydrogen service incorporating the safety measures and procedures
necessary for the gas being transported.
S14.2.6 Records
S14.6.2.1 Maintenance should be supported by an adequate record system which is promptly

and accurately updated and clearly identifies the type of gas being transported
through the assets.
S14.6.2.2 Detailed technical and operational records should be maintained including flow
diagrams and plans of all plant and equipment differentiating the type of gas being
transported through the PRI or installation.
S14.6.2.3 Any change or modification to PRIs and installation should be recorded including
the type of gas to be transported and where appropriate reference made to
IGEM/GL/5.
S14.2.7 Site information
The site information shall clearly state the type of gas being transported through
the pipework, where more than one type of gas is being transported then drawings
and records should clearly differentiate between NG and hydrogen service
pipework.
Hazardous area assessment drawings and associated calculations shall be available

for PRIs and installations including demarcation of which type of gas is being
transported.
A combined hazardous area drawing shall be available for sites transporting

different gases.
Note: Reference should be made to IP-MCSP-P15 for further information.
S14.3 MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES AND INSTRUCTIONS
S14.3.1 Procedures should be used to highlight certain safety aspects on maintenance and
in particular the additional hazards and precautions associated with hydrogen
service, for example:

S14.4 MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHIES
A structured decision making process shall be used to identify the optimum

maintenance requirements for PRIs and installations taking into consideration the
additional hazards associated with hydrogen service and the control measures
installed. Key items to consider when developing a maintenance strategy should
address the hazards listed in S14.3.1.
S14.5 SAFETY DURING MAINTENANCE
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S14.5.1 General
S14.5.1.1 An assessment of the risks which may exist, or are foreseeable, during any
maintenance activity, should be carried out to help decide what measures are
necessary for safety.
S14.5.1.2 The assessment shall consider the additional hazards and control measures which
will be necessary to carry out maintenance safely.
S14.6 ISOLATIONS
S14.6.1 An isolation scheme for the PRI should be developed to ensure that the appropriate
level of safe isolation from all sources of danger is achieved taking into account the
increase leakage rate associated with hydrogen.
The risk of any uncontrolled gas escape or release should be reduced to a minimum
and attention paid to the disconnection and isolation of associated electrical
supplies, instrumentation and control equipment, cathodic protection, etc.
Note: HSG253 provides appropriate guidance.
S14.7 VENTING
Consideration shall be given to the additional precautions which should be put in

place for hydrogen service to manage the additional hazards noted in S14.3.1.
Note: Information and guidance for venting systems can be found in CGA G-5.5. Hydrogen Vent
Systems.
S14.8 PURGING
Only indirect purging operations using an inert gas such as nitrogen shall be
permitted on PRIs and installations in hydrogen service.
Note: Guidance on indirect purging is provided in IGE/SR/22. Attention should be given to the
asphyxiating effects of inert gas.
S14.9 LEAKAGE TESTING
S14.9.1 Special attention should be paid to the final leak check to take account of the
increased leakage rate associated with hydrogen and NG/H blends. Leak testing of
mechanical joints should be in accordance with an appropriate standard (e.g. ISO
20484).
S14.10 RE-COMMISSIONING
S14.10.1 Special attention shall be paid to ensure flame detection and leakage detection
devices if installed are functioning correctly following the completion of
maintenance activities and prior to recommissioning.
S14.11 MAINTENANCE REVIEW
The overall maintenance strategy shall be reviewed within 2 years of operating PRIs
and installations in hydrogen service to ensure maintenance is being applied
effectively.
S14.12 OPERATIONAL CHECKS
Regardless of which maintenance philosophy is used, operation of PRIs and

installations shall be checked periodically.
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Checks shall include:
• visual checks of the general condition and security of the PRI or installation
• possible leakage
• functional checks of safety devices.
Note: Further guidance on the frequency of checks is provided in EI IP-MCSP-P15.
S14.15 UPRATING AND DOWNRATING
Where a PRI is to be uprated or downrated the requirements of IGEM/TD/13 along

with specific requirements for hydrogen service detailed in this supplement shall be
used.
SECTION 16: RE-PURPOSING AN EXISTING NATURAL GAS

INSTALLATION
S16.1 GENERAL
Repurposing in accordance with the recommendations of this supplement should

only be considered for installations which comply with and have been operated in
accordance with the recommendations of the latest editions of IGEM/TD/13 or
IGEM/TD/1, and which have been audited in accordance with the recommendations
of Section 14.0 and the records are in accordance with Section 15.0.
S16.2 REPURPOSING PROCEDURE
S16.2.1 The repurposing of a NG installation to hydrogen service shall be controlled in

accordance with a formal procedure.
The following control stages shall be adopted:
(a) viability – identification of any fundamental characteristic which may

prevent repurposing, including flow analysis and assessment of pressure
drop
(b) design and condition assessment – design review including materials

acceptability, stress and fatigue analysis, assessment of operation and
maintenance data to identify and recorded defects and damage and
identification of all modifications necessary for future operation
(c) Integrity status – completion of inspection, damage assessment specialist

studies identified in (b) to confirm that the condition, integrity and
functionality of the installation following the change of service are
acceptable
(d) modification – completion of all necessary modifications identified in (b) and

(c) to ensure functionality and operability for future service
(e) validation – formal confirmation that the condition, integrity, functionality,

operability and safety of the installation and the risks posed by it are
acceptable for the proposed repurposing.
(f) Change of service shall be notified to the regulator.
(g) change of service – introduce new gas and raise pressure to the new MOP.
An overview of the requirements for repurposing is shown in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1 - REQUIREMENTS FOR REPURPOSING OF AN INSTALLATION
S16.3 DEFINING THE PROPOSED NEW OPERATING PARAMETERS
S16.3.1 The initial step to determining the suitability of a PRI for repurposing is to define
the type of gas to be transported along with the following parameters which will be
considered as part of the design review:
• Define the content of hydrogen in the blend

• inlet pressure
• outlet pressure
• maximum and minimum flowrate
• odorant
• flame visibility.
S16.4 RECORDS REVIEW
S16.4.1 To determine the suitability of a PRI for repurposing, the original design and
construction records for the PRI shall be reviewed along with the historical
operational, maintenance, inspection, modification and repair records.
S16.5 DESIGN AND CONDITION ASSESSMENTS
S16.5.1 The design and construction records for the PRI shall be reviewed in accordance
with Table 2 Design Assessment checklist and Design Review Special
Considerations detailed in S16.6.
S16.5.2 Any areas which are identified as not being suitable for use with the proposed
operating parameters shall be recorded. For example, the hazardous area extends
beyond site boundary.
Ref Item Review Description Y/N or

n/a
14
1 Location and Confirm the location and existing layout of the PRI is
layout suitable for the new gas blend as detailed in S5.
2 Hazardous area Complete a hazardous area analysis and plant layout for
assessment the new gas blend as per S5.3.
3 Housings, kiosks Review the housing to ensure they meet the
buildings requirements detailed in S6.
4 PRI Design Review the PRI design to ensure it is suitable for the
blend of gas and flowrate.
5 Flowrate Carry out flow analysis to confirm that the flow through
velocity the existing installation pipework can be maintained at
the required volume and velocity.
6 Pipework sizing Confirm the pipework sizing meets the requirements of
S7.2.
7 Pressure Ensure the design pressure boundaries meet the
boundaries requirements of S7.3.
8 Isolation valves Review the isolation valves to confirm they are suitable
for the desired flowrate and meet the requirements of
S7.4.
9 Gas Cleaning / Confirm the existing filters meet the desired flow rate
Filters and the gas cleaning requirements detailed in S7.5.
Note: the differential pressures across loaded filters will

be somewhat affected. For similar energy flows the
pressure drop will increase by a factor of 1.08 for
hydrogen.
10 Heating/ Cooling Review the requirement for cooling or preheat which will
of Gas be dependent upon the new gas blend and operating
pressure see S7.6. If the existing preheat system is not
required, then the PRI should be modified to remove
preheat system from the gas flow path.
11 Regulators Review the suitability of the pressure regulating
equipment for the new gas blend, flow rate and
operating pressure, special attention should be paid to
soft parts/plugs as detailed in S8.2.
12 Protective Review protective devices for the suitability for use
devices with gas blend and confirm they meet the requirements
of S7.4 and S8.5.
13 Vibration/ Noise Review the revised flowrate and flow analysis to
determine if the new operating parameters have the
potential to cause excessive vibration and noise ensure
the requirements detail in S7.7 can be met.
14 Auxiliary Review all the pipework and fitting to ensure they are
pipework / suitable and meet the requirements of S7.9. Special
Fittings Bolts attention should be paid to minimising leakage
associated with the new blend of gas. The assessment
should include the following items:
• gaskets
• fittings
• bolting, studs, nuts, and washers
• sensing, instrument, and auxiliary pipework.
15 Vents/ Review the vent lines and breathers to ensure the
Breathers requirements for sections S7.8 and S8.2 can be met.
16 Metering Review the metering equipment and its suitability for use
with the proposed gas.
17 Corrosion Review the corrosion protection measures both above
Protection ground coating systems and CP systems as per the
requirements in sections S9.1.
18 Electrical and Carry out a review of the electrical and instrumentation
Instrumentation equipment as per section S10, including an assessment
15
for the requirement for leakage and flame detection

instruments.
19 Signage and Review site signage and requirements for demarcation
demarcation of areas where the PRI will operate with NG and those
with the hydrogen and NG/H blends.
TABLE S2 - DESIGN ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST
S16.6 DESIGN REVIEW SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
S16.6.1 The minimum wall thickness of line pipe shall comply with Clause S7.9.2.
S16.6.2 The maximum allowable stress in the installation pipework shall comply with the
requirements of Clause S7.9.2.5.
S16.6.3 If a design pipework stress analysis is not available, this shall be carried out in
accordance with the methodology in IGEM/TD/12, subject to the requirements of
Clause S7.11.
S16.6.4 Fatigue analysis shall evaluate the total fatigue damage for the installation, taking
into account previous damage and possible future damage evaluated using
increased crack growth rates for hydrogen or NG/H blends, in accordance with
Clause S7.11. The minimum fatigue life for future operation in hydrogen service is
40 years.
S16.6.5 Materials records shall be reviewed to ensure all materials comply with the
restrictions in Section S7. The performance limits of any polymer materials
incorporated in equipment components and the effectiveness of seals and
lubricants, and the compatibility of auxiliary and impulse lines with hydrogen shall
be established.
S16.6.6 An assessment of site condition shall consider:
• damage assessment of exposed pipework, components and pressure

vessels
• corrosion assessment of buried pipework and inaccessible areas
• condition of civil/structural elements
• vibration survey.
S16.6.7 Steel and concrete supports shall be checked to ensure full support is provided and
no additional displacements or loadings are applied to pipework, components and
equipment.
S16.7 INTEGRITY STATUS
S16.7.1 Assess the condition of the pipework and components and carry out appropriate
fitness for service assessment on any detected damage. Defect assessment
calculations should assume a reduction of 50% in fracture toughness and ductility
unless specific material qualification data is available.
S16.7.2 Assess the acceptability of any existing repairs and modifications for hydrogen
service. Particular attention should be applied to leak clamps, epoxy shells and
grouted tees.
S16.7.3 The potential susceptibility of the risk of pre-existing stress corrosion cracking
(SCC) which may be exacerbated by the presence of hydrogen in the steel shall be
assessed.
S16.8 FUNCTIONALITY AND OPERABILITY STUDIES
16
S16.8.1 Functional and operability tests shall be carried out on the existing PRI operating
with NG to inform how the PRI would behave in hydrogen service. These tests shall
include the following:
• flow and differential pressure measurements at maximum flow

• noise surveys carried out at a range of operating pressures, flows and
venting conditions
• vibration surveys at a range of operating pressures and flows
• speed of operation of protective devices
• metering accuracy
• operation of regulators.
Note: See IGEM/TD/13 Clause 14.2 for more detail on functional and operability tests.
S16.8.2 The function and operability tests shall be used to inform the design review of the
PRI and predict the function and operability of the PRI.
S16.8.3 On completion of the study and immediately following commissioning, the

functional and operability assessment shall be repeated for the PRI in hydrogen
service.
S16.9 CHANGE OF SERVICE ASSESSMENT
S16.9.1 The design review, condition assessment, integrity assessment and functional
operability studies shall be reviewed to determine if the PRI is suitable for use in
hydrogen service at the operating parameters required.
S16.9.2 In cases where it is not possible to achieve the requirements, such as where the
predicted hazardous area extends beyond the site, then a Quantified Risk
Assessment (QRA) shall be undertaken to determine the level of risks posed to the
general public in the vicinity of the PRI.
S16.9.3 Where the PRI is suitable for uprating with modifications, the modifications should
be carried out before the hydrostatic test is undertaken.
Note: The modifications which may be necessary are described in IGEM/TD/13 Clause 14.15.7.5.
S16.9.4 The PRI should then be subjected to a strength test, consistent with the revised
MOP, as described in Section 12.
S16.10 MODIFICATIONS FOR CHANGE USE
S16.10.1 When all the requirements of IGEM/TD/13 Clauses 14.15.7.2 to 14.15.7.4 have
been taken into account and the PRI is suitable for change of service with
modifications, such modifications shall be carried out before any change in gas or
operating parameter is allowed.
S16.10.2 The modifications should be controlled and documented using the IGEM/GL/5
modification procedure.
S16.11 DOCUMENT APPROVAL TO IMPLEMENT CHANGE OF SERVICE
S16.11.1 On completion of any modification required to the PRI and following all the design
reviews, functional and operability studies and commissioning plan there shall be a
formal review of all the documentation before a Competent Person approves the
PRI for operation in hydrogen service.
S16.11.2 Only after formal acceptance that the PRI is suitable for use in hydrogen service
shall the PRI be commissioned for use with the new gas blend and the operating
parameters be revised.
17
S16.12 COMMISSIONING PRI FOR CHANGE OF SERVICE
S16.12.1 Commissioning shall not commence until a detailed commissioning plan has been
developed and the PRI has been approved for change of service by a Competent
Person.
S16.12.2 Immediately prior to commissioning, the PRI shall be surveyed to ensure that no
operations are being carried out adjacent to the PRI and all equipment and signage
is suitable for the change of use.
If the pressure is to be raised, then it shall be increased in incremental steps not

exceeding 10% of the original design pressure and the pressure is held after each
incremental step to allow sufficient time for the PRI to be surveyed for any sign of
leakage. This shall incorporate the whole of the PRI, with due regard being given
to those sections which are subjected to routine leakage survey.
S16.12.3 A leak detection survey of all joints and at valves and regulators, including internal
leakage due to backflow through slam shut valves, shall be carried out.
S16.12.4 The functional and operability tests detailed in S16.8 shall be repeated for the PRI
with new gas, to confirm the PRI is operating safely within the design limits.
S16.12.5 Metering equipment shall be checked to confirm accurate flow measurement for
hydrogen service.
S16.13 POST CHANGE OF SERVICE INSPECTION AND ASSESSMENT
S16.13.1 The PRI shall be subjected to additional inspections immediately after

commissioning to confirm the PRI continues to operate safely following the change
of use. These inspections shall include:
• leakage surveys
• noise studies at night and during the daytime
• temperature measurement
• functional tests
• vibration.
S16.13.2 Following successful post change of service assessment, the PRI should revert to
revised inspection and maintenance frequencies developed for the PRI with the new
gas.
18

IGEM-TSP-21-241 Hydogen Installations Supplement To TD13 Draft Rev 5.0 14.12.20

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IGEM-TSP-21-241 Hydogen Installations Supplement To TD13 Draft Rev 5.0 14.12.20

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Supplement to IGEM/TD/13 Edition 2 Draft rev 5.

S1.11 This supplement was published on ## #### 202#.

This supplement gives additional recommendations for PRIs and installations:

Repurposing in accordance with the recommendations of this supplement should

SECTION 3: COMPETENCY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE

S3.3 SAFETY MANAGEMENT

• increased flammable range

SECTION 5: PLANNING, LOCATION, LAYOUT AND SECURITY

Note: Definition of congested or confined installation is given in IGEM/SR/25 Appendix 6.

SECTION 7: DESIGN OF A PRI

S7.1 A PRI shall be designed in accordance with IGEM/TD/13 Section 7. Specific

• calculation of gas velocity

The guidance in EI IP-MCSP-P15 (see section S10.1) shall be considered to achieve

S7.2 PIPEWORK SIZING

The erosional velocity is calculated as follows:

S7.3 DESIGN PRESSURE BOUNDARIES

S7.4 ISOLATION OF PRIS AND COMPONENTS

S7.4.4 Selection of valves

seal/packing arrangement) and to a lesser extent by leaking castings. To minimise

Non-metallic materials present in seals shall be qualified for hydrogen service.

S7.5 GAS CLEANING

S7.6 HEATING GAS

S7.6.2 For hydrogen service a reduction in pressure may create a reduction in

S7.7 NOISE AND VIBRATION

S7.7.2 Vibration and acoustic fatigue

S7.8 BREATHERS, MANUAL VENT LINES AND RELIEF VENT LINES

S7.8.3 & S7.8.4 Manual and relief vent lines

For hydrogen there is a possibility of deflagration or detonation of the hydrogen-

Deflagration is where the propagation of combustion produces a shockwave with a

A detonation is where the propagation of explosion produces a shockwave with a

deflagration or detonation and it shall be designed to withstand an overpressure

S7.9 PIPE AND FITTINGS

S7.9.2 Steel pipe for main PRI pipework

Refer to Table S1 for further information.

t = design thickness of pipe (mm) (nominal less under-tolerance)

Material Grade Design Factor f Material Performance Factor h

TABLE S1 - MAXIMUM DESIGN FACTOR

Note 2: The hoop stress is limited to 180 N mm-2.

S7.9.2.6 Material Qualification

S7.9.5 Bolting, studs, nuts and washers

S7.9.6 Sensing, instrument and auxiliary pipework

S7.9.7 Screwed pipework and fittings

Pre-testing shall be in accordance with the latest edition of IGEM/TD/13.

Low hydrogen consumables shall be used.

S7.10.4 Post-weld stress relieving

S7.11 STRESS ANALYSIS

The maximum hydrostatic (mean) stress, σm should meet:

σm ≤ 120 N mm-2 where σm = (σh + σl)/3

A reduction factor of 50 should be applied to S-N curves applied in IGEM/TD/12.

Metering equipment must be calibrated for hydrogen service as appropriate.

SECTION 8: PRESSURE AND FLOW CONTROL

S8.2 PRESSURE REGULATING SYSTEMS

S8.5 PRESSURE SAFETY SYSTEMS

Relief valves shall be designed to operate safely at the increased temperatures

SECTION 9: PROTECTION AGAINST CORROSION

S9.1 Cathodic Protection (CP)

SECTION 10: ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND INSTRUMENTATION

S10.1.2 Hazardous areas

S10.2.4 Selection of equipment

Special attention should be made to ensure all electrical and instrumentation

S10.2.4.3 Flow measurement

S10.2.4.5 Leak detection equipment

Leak detection devices shall be installed at appropriate locations throughout the