TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA VS. JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE

GR 157451; DECEMBER 16, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Platicio lived and worked in the United States of America for a long time. He then came
back to the Philippines after his retirement. Two years thereafter his arrival in the
Philippines, he married the respondent herein named Josefina C. Valmonte. When he
reached the age of 83, he made a will on June 15, 1982 but was only acknowledged on
August 9, 1983, designating Josefina as his only heir and at the same time the sole executrix
of his estate which takes effect after his death.
Oppositor Leticia Valmonte Ortega filed a case against Josefina questioning the
validity of the will, claiming inter alia, that Platicio did not have the testamentary capacity
required by law at the time he made the will. Oppositor averred that Platicio was already
83 years old hence the latter was in an advanced state of senility and was then no longer of
sound mind.
During the hearing, Josefina testified that despite Platicio’s old age, he was in good
health and was hospitalized only because of a cold. Platicio never suffered mental
infirmities and that he was able to do house chores and run errands outside the house. The
notary public and the attesting witnesses of the execution of the will testified that Platicio
was of sound mind when he made the will.

ISSUE:
Whether Placido Valmonte had testamentary capacity at the time he executed the will

HELD:
Yes. The civil code gives the following guidelines in determining the capacity of the
testator:
Art 789. In order to make a will, it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.
Art 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to
be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
Art 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The SC ruled that despite Platicio’s old age, he was still able to identify accurately
the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations.
As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that his wife was identified as
sole beneficiary. It has been held that the mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from
disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a week or
feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory
sufficient to enable him to know what he what he is disposing of his property.
The SC ruled by rule also by providing the instances when a will may be allowed as
enumerated by Article 839 of the Civil Code.
It was also ruled that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the
existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately,
other than the self-serving allegations of the petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever
presented. In addition, it is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not
affect the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not
sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty
years his junior, as the sole beneficiary. There was also no showing that the witnesses of
the proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will.
JULIANA BAGTAS V. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL.
GR L-6801; MARCH 14, 1912
TRENT, J.:

FACTS:
Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a
paralysis of the left side of his body, that a few years prior to his death his hearing became
impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his
head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand,
however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to
indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
Paguio then wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the disposition
of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Senor Marco, who transcribed
them and put them in form. These notes were then delivered to an attorney and such
attorney read them to Paguio asking them if they were his notes which Paguio assented
each time with an affirmative movement of his head. After the testator died, a case for the
invalidation grounded on the absence of testamentary capacity of Paguio was then filed by
Oppositors Isidro Paguio, et al (who is a son and several grandchildren by a former
marriage,
During the hearing, the witnesses of the will testified that Paguio was of sound mind
when he made the will. The oppositors presented, inter alia, two physicians and a doctor
that attended to Paguio for some four or five years. The doctor and two physicians testified
that Paguio had suffered paralysis and that he had some mental disorder.

HELD:
Whether the testator had testamentary capacity to make the will.

ISSUE:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the testimonies of the doctor and the two physicians do
not in any way strengthen the contention of the oppositors. The testimonies only confirms
the fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with
paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and mental strength was greatly impaired.
Neither of the physicians or the doctor attempted to state what was the mental condition of
the testator at the time Paguio executed the will.
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established,
and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of
competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the
opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. Mere weakness of mind
and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will.
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not
essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental
weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a will.
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme disease, nor debility of body will affect the
capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligent remains. The failure of memory is not
sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total,, or extend to his immediate family or
property.
ESTATE OF ISIDRA ABQUILAN, ATANASIO ABQUILAN V. FELICIANA ABQUILAN
GR L-24665; OCTOBER 13, 1926
STREET, J.:

FACTS:
The deceased Isidra Abquilan allegedly and purportedly made a will on November 6. The
deceased left no forced heirs, and her only heirs, in case of intestacy, are her brother,
Atanasio Abquilan, the proponent of the will, and Feliciana Abquilan, a sister, who is the
opponent.
The trial court found that the document propounded as the will of the deceased is
apocryphal, that the purported signatures of the deceased to the supposed will are
forgeries, and that the instrument in question was not executed by the deceased.

ISSUE:
Whether Isidra Abquilan had testamentary capacity to make the will.

HELD:
No. In the making of a will on November 6, 1924, Isidra Abquilan was not in a condition
such as to enable her to have participated in the act, she being in fact at that time suffering
from paralysis to cerebral haemorrhage in such a degree as completely to discapacitate her
for intelligent participation in the act of making a will.
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses demonstrate that no will at all was
made on November 6, the date attributed to the questioned document, and that, instead an
attempt was made on the night of that day to fabricate another will, which failed of
completion because of the refusal of Alejandro Genito to be party to the making of a will in
which the testatrix took no part. The instrument was thence clearly fabricated.
CATALINA BUGNAO v. FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL.
GR 4445; September 18, 1909
Carson, J.:

FACTS:
The late Domingo Ubag executed a will designating his widow as his sole heir. The
execution of the will was challenged by Domingo’s relatives who would stand to be
benefited from the estate if the will were to be proven void for lack of testamentary
incapacity. Respondents presented inter alia, testimonies and other evidences to prove that
Domingo Ubag was testamentary incapacited to execute the will. They averred that
Domingo was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand, or to make himself
understood, further they say that respondents were inside the house of Macario when the
latter executed the will. On cross-examination of the witnesses presented by respondents,
the court proved that such claims was more apparent than real. Petitioner on the other
hand presented the subscribing witnesses in the execution of the will as her witness, they
contended among others that though Domingo was extremely ill and was too sick to rise
unaided from his bed, that he needed assistance to rise in a sitting position, his he did not
lack the testamentary capacity to execute the will.

ISSUE:
Whether Domingo Ubag had testamentary capacity to execute the will.

HELD.
Yes. The SC held that the testimonies of the witnesses for the respondents is not sufficient
to raise even a doubt as to the truth of the testimony of the subscribing witnesses as to the
fact of the execution of the will, or as to the manner and from in which it was executed. It
can be clearly inferred that the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid
furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the
boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken
together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and
explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong
evidence of testamentary capacity.
The SC also considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in the
ascending or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him from his
brothers and sisters, who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and
his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that
none of his brothers or sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at
the time of his death or attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to
leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and made no provision for his brothers
and sisters, who themselves were grown men and women, by no means tends to disclose
either an unsound mind or the presence of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in any
wise corroborates contestants' allegation that the will never was executed.
Further, testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend d the nature of the
transaction which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the
testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his
property among the objects of his bounty.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF TOMAS RODRIGUEZ, MANUEL TORRES, & LUZ LOPEZ
DE BUENO V. MARGARITA LOPEZ
GR L-25966; NOVEMBER 1, 1926
STREET, J.:

FACTS:
Tomas Rodriguez executed a will designating his cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter
Luz Lopez de Bueno as his only heirs. It is a matter of fact that Vicente Lopez is the
guardian of Tomas because of the latter’s inability to take care of himself. Four days after
the execution of the will, Vicente Lopez died and a month thereafter, followed the death of
the testator.
Margarita Lopez, being a cousin and nearest relative of the testator, challenged the
execution of the will, declaring among others that Luz Lopez had no right to inherit from
Vicente Lopez for his successional rights. Margarita’s main premise is that Vicente Lopez
had no testamentary capacity to inherit because of the accidental relation of guardian and
ward existing between the testator and the heir. Further, she claims that intestate
succession should take place because under Article 912 and 764, it states that a will may be
valid even though the person instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit and legal
succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the said heir
instituted is disqualified to succeed.

ISSUE:
Whether Vicente Lopez had the testamentary capacity to inherit from the will.
Whether Luz Lopez De Bueno is entitled to the one half share of his father by accretion.
Whether intestate succession will take place or accretion.

HELD:
No, however the testamentary incapacity of Vicente Lopez is not general incapacity but an
accidental disability to receive the legacy.
Yes, the Supreme Court harmonized the conflicting provisions related to the case, first,
because of the special incapacity of Victor Lopez to inherit, accretion takes place rather
than intestate succession according to article 983 of the civil code. Second, the high court,
in opposition to appellant’s contention that articles 912 and 764 should apply to the case,
said that the more general provision of the law is to be considered as being limited by the
more specific, in reiteration:
“In case of conflict, therefore the provisions of the former article must be considered by the
latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate
succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression “and (if) there is no
right of accretion.” It is true that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4
of article 912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above
referred to, by which the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this
interpretation supplies the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In
addition to this, Article 986 of the Civil code affords independent proof that the intestate
succession to a vacant portion can occur when accretion is impossible.”
Luz Lopez De Bueno is not only entitled to one half of the property (her share) but also she
would receive in conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but
also the half which pertained to him.
The supreme court in its conclusion said that it may be worth observing that there
has always existed both in the civil and in the common law a certain legal intendment,
amounting to a mild presumption, against partial intestacy. In Roman law, as is well known,
partial testacy systems a presumption against it, - a presumption which has its basis is the
supposed intention of the testator.
IN RE WILL OF THE LATE MATEA ABELLA. MONS. SANTIAGO SANCHO
VS. MARCIANA ABELLA
GR L-39033; NOVEMBER 13, 1933
VILLA-REAL, J.:

FACTS:

On April 13, 1932, Marciana Abella, the testator, a resident of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, went to San
Fernando, La Union to consult a physician because of her physical condition. She was
accompanied by her niece, Filomena Inay and they stopped at the convent of the parish
church of San Fernando. Marciana then consulted the said physician and she learned after
examination that she has dyspepsia(pain in the stomach) and cancer of the stomach.
While staying at the convent, Marciana, on April 26, 1932, ordered a sexton(a
person who takes care of the convent) to call Attorney Reinoso to whom she expressed her
desire to make a will. Three days later, the instrument was then signed by the testator in
the presence of the witnesses.
On July 3, 1932, Matea Abella died of the senile debility in the Municipality of Sinait.
Opponent herein averred that testatrix was deaf, eyesight was defective, poor
memory, complained of headaches and of stomachaches, was dotty five years before, and
prior to her death, she bequeathed properties which already donated to other persons.

ISSUE:
Whether the testator had testamentary capacity to execute the will

HELD:
Yes. Marciana Abella had the testamentary capacity to execute the will. The facts that
proved that she had the testamentary capacity to execute the will are the following:
1. She walked twice to the doctor’s clinic.
2. She personally furnished doctor all necessary date regarding history of her illness
3. She was able to call an attorney
4. She personally furnished attorney all the date she wished embody in her relative to
her properties and the persons in whose favour she wished to bequeath them
5. She was able to affix her signature in her own handwriting to the original as well as
to the copies of her will which consisted of nine pages.
The high court said that neither sinile debility, nor blindness, nor deafness, nor poor
memory, is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person for making his will. In addition, the
mere fact that in her will, Matea Abella disposed of properties, which she had already
donated to other persons at a prior date, is not an indication of mental insanity. At most it
constitutes forgetfulness or a change of mind, due to ignorance of the irrevocability of
certain donations.
FRANCISA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE V. CA, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE,
FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S.
ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA
GR L-46430-31; JULY 30, 1979
GUERRERO, J.:

FACTS:
A notarized Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial was entered on the properties of spouses of
Don Jesus Alsua, wife Doñ a Florentina, and all their remaining four living children, on
November 25, 1949.
On January 5, 1956, both of the spouses made their holographic wills with the
provisions conforming to the implementation of the extrajudicial partition. Codicils
amending and supplementing the spouses’ respective holographic wills on 1956 and
eventually admitted to probate.
Don Jesus became executor on the death of Doñ a Florentina and cancelled his
previous holographic will, appointed daughter Francisca as executrix, and collated the
properties to be donated to his four children. At the death of their father, Francisca filed a
petition of probate of the1959 will and was opposed by brother respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether Don Jesus had testamentary capacity to execute a new will thereby cancelling the
previous will and codicil he made and in effect amending the 1949 partition.

HELD:
Yes, the main contention of the private respondents herein on the issue of testamentary
capacity was that Don Jesus as a man of culture and honor and would not show himself to
violate the previous agreement, and the other as one whose mental faculties or his
possession of the same had been diminished considering that when the will was made, he
was already 84 years of age, and in view of his weakness and advanced age, the actual
administration of his properties had been left to his assistant Madarieta, who for his part
received from Francisco and her husband, Joseph Betts.
The Supreme Court made note to Art. 799 of the civil code which provides that to be
of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the
will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and
the character of the testamentary act. The facts of the case also show that Don Jesus knew
exactly what his actions were and the fun implications thereof considering that a testator
may revoke his will anytime before his death.
IN THEMATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATEOF MARIE GARNIER GARREAU, LIRIO
PFANNENSCHMIDT RAMIREZ V. JOSE MA. RAMIREZ
GR L-19910; MAY 31, 1971
MAKALINTAL, J.:

FACTS: