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Case Commentary: L. Chandra Kumar v/s U.O.I [A.I.R 1997 SC 1125]

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DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2485403

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 1

CASE COMMENTARY: L. CHANDRA KUMAR v. UOI [AIR 1997 SC 1125]

SHIVAM GOEL

[LL.M., NUJS (Kolkata); LL.B., Faculty of Law, Delhi University; B.Com (H), Delhi
University]

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2485403

 2

Comparative Public Law

Case Commentary:

L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI [AIR 1997 SC 1125]1

General background-

For a long time search was going on for a mechanism to relieve the courts, including High
Courts and the Supreme Court, from the burden of service litigation which formed a
substantial portion of pending litigation. As early as in 1958, this problem engaged the
attention of the Law Commission which recommended for the establishment of tribunals
consisting of judicial and administrative members to decide service matters2. In 1969
Administrative Reform Commission also recommended for the establishment of civil service
3
tribunals both for the Central and State civil servants. Central Government appointed a
committee under the Chairmanship of Justice J.C. Shah of the SC of India in 1969 which also
made similar recommendation. In 1975, Swarn Singh Committee again recommended for
setting up of service tribunals. The idea of setting up service tribunals also found favour with
the Supreme Court of India, which in K.K. Dutta v. Union of India4 advocated for setting up
of service tribunals to save the courts from avalanche of writ petitions and appeals in service
matters.5

It was against this backdrop that Parliament passed Constitution (Forty- Second Amendment)
Act, 1976, which added Part- XIV- A in the Constitution. This Part is entitled as ‘Tribunals’
and consists of only two Articles- Article 323-A, dealing with administrative tribunals and
Article 323-B, dealing with tribunals for other matters.

Article 323-A empowers the Parliament to provide for the establishment of administrative
tribunals for the adjudication of disputes relating to recruitment and conditions of service of
persons appointed to public services of the Centre, the states, local bodies, public
corporations and other public authorities. In other words, Article 323-A, enables the
Parliament to take out the adjudication of disputes relating to service matters from the civil
courts and the High Courts and place it before the administrative tribunals. In pursuance of

1
Author- A.M. Ahmadi, C.J. – 7 Judge Bench Decision
2
XIV REPORT OF REFORM OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, (1958)
3
REPORT ON PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION,1969
4
(1980) 4 SCC 38: 1980 SCC (L&S) 485: AIR 1980 SC 2056
5
See Para 83 of the Judgement- L.Chandra Kumar v. UOI [AIR 1997 SC 1125]

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2485403

 3

Article 323-A, the Parliament passed the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The Act
authorised the Central Government to establish one Central Administrative Tribunal and the
State Administrative Tribunals. The purpose of the Act was to provide speedy and
inexpensive justice to the aggrieved public servants. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
provides for three types of tribunals, here:

1. The Central Government establishes an administrative tribunal called the Central

Administrative Tribunal (CAT), which has the jurisdiction to deal with service
matters pertaining to the Central Government employees, or of any union territory, or
local or other government under the control of the Government of India, or of a
corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government. The CAT is a multi-
member body consisting of a chairman, vice-chairmen and members. At present, it
has a chairman, 16 vice-chairmen and 49 members. They are drawn from both judicial
and administrative streams and are appointed by the President.
2. The Central Government may, on receipt of a request in this behalf from any State
Government, establish an administrative tribunal for such State employees. Like the
CAT, the SATs (State Administrative Tribunals) exercise original jurisdiction in
relation to recruitment and all service matters of State Government employees. The
chairman, vice-chairman and members of the SATs are appointed by the President
after consultation with the Governor of the State concerned.
3. Two or more States might ask for a joint tribunal, which is called the Joint
Administrative Tribunal (JAT), which exercises powers of the administrative tribunals
for such states. The chairman, vice-chairman and members of a JAT are appointed by
the President after consultation with the Governors of the concerned States.

Hence, each tribunal is to consist of a chairperson and such number of vice-chairpersons and
judicial and administrative members as the appropriate government might deem fit.

Under Article 323-B, the Parliament and the State Legislatures are authorised to provide for
the establishment of tribunals for the adjudication of disputes relating to the following
matters: taxation; foreign exchange, import and export; industrial and labour; land reforms;
ceiling on urban property; elections to Parliament and State Legislatures; food stuffs; rent and
tenancy rights6.

6
Added by the 75th Amendment Act of 1993
 4

It is necessary to take note of the following:

1. While Article 323-A contemplates establishment of tribunals for public service

matters only, Article 323-B contemplates establishment of tribunals for certain other
matters (taxation, foreign exchange, industrial and labour disputes, land reforms,
elections to Parliament and State Legislatures etc.)

2. While tribunals under Article 323-A can be established only by the Parliament,
tribunals under Article 323-B can be established both by Parliament and State
Legislatures with respect to matters falling within their legislative competence.

3. Under Article 323-A, only one tribunal for the Centre and one for each State or two or
more States may be established, there is no question of hierarchy of tribunals; whereas
under Article 323-B a hierarchy of tribunals may be created.

Head note: L.Chandra Kumar v. UOI7, the judgement, was delivered by the Constitution
Bench of seven- judges. In this case the impact of Articles 323-A and 323-B (under which
Tribunals were created) on the power of judicial review and superintendence-- of the High-
Courts (under Articles 226 and 227) and of the Supreme Court (under Article 32) was in
question.

The Clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B to the extent they exclude
the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court were held to be unconstitutional. It
was held that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High-courts under Article 226/227 and upon
the Supreme Court under Article 32 is part of the inviolable basic-structure of the
Constitution of India. While this jurisdiction (of the High-Courts under Article 226/227 and
of the Supreme Court under Article 32) cannot be ousted, other courts and tribunals may
perform a supplemental- as opposed to a substitutional- role in discharging the powers
conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution.8

The power of High-Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of
legislations can never be ousted or excluded; it forms the part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. The power vested in the High-Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over

7
AIR 1997 SC 1125
 5

the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of
the basic structure of the Constitution.

Facts of the case: There were special leave petitions, civil appeals and writ petitions which
formed a batch of matters, brought before the Supreme Court in this case, owing their origin
to separate decisions of different High-Courts and several provisions in different enactments-
- thereby raising several distinct questions of law, which were grouped together in this case
for the purpose of adjudication upon them. These matters were broadly pertaining to- the
constitutional validity of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of Article 323-A and sub-clause (d) of
clause (3) of Article 323-B of the Constitution of India, 1950; and also in regards to the
constitutional validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; moreover what was also the
subject of challenge was whether the Tribunals constituted under Part XIV- A of the
Constitution of India can be effective substitutes for the High-Courts in discharging the
power of judicial review.

Issues:

1. Whether the power conferred upon Parliament or State Legislatures, as the case may
be, by sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of Article 323-A or by sub-clause (d) of clause (3)
of Article 323-B of the Constitution, totally exclude the jurisdiction of all courts,
except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, in respect of disputes and
complaints referred to in clause (1) of Article 323-A or with regard to all or any of the
matters specified in clause (2) of Article 323-B, runs counter to the power of judicial
review conferred on the High-Courts under Articles 226/227 and on the Supreme
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution?

2. Whether the Tribunals, constituted either under Article 323-A, or under Article 323-B
of the Constitution, possess the competence to test the constitutional validity of a
statutory provision/rule?

3. Whether these Tribunals, as they are functioning at present, can be said to be effective
substitutes for the High-Courts in discharging the power of judicial review? If not,
what are the changes required to make them conform to their founding objectives?
 6

Critical analysis of the case:

In pursuance of the power conferred upon it by Clause (1) of Article 323- A of the
Constitution, the Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985, the Central
Administrative Tribunal (CAT) comprising of five Benches was established on 1 November
1985. However, even before CAT had been established, several writ petitions had been filed
in various high-courts as well as the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of
Article 323- A, as also the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985. The
principal violation complained of was that of the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, and that of the high-courts under
Article 226 of the Constitution.

The exclusion of judicial review under Articles 226, 227 and 32 was questioned as violating
the basic structure of the Constitution in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI. Two questions arose
for consideration in this case:

1. Whether the exclusion of the jurisdiction of High-courts under Article 226 and 227 of
the Constitution in service matters specified in Section 28 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985, and the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in such service matters
in the administrative tribunals to be constituted under the impugned Act, subject to an
exception in favour of the jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 136, is
unconstitutional and void?

2. Whether the composition of the Administrative Tribunal and the mode of appointment
of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members have the effect of introducing a
constitutional infirmity invalidating the provisions of the impugned Act?

Chief Justice Bhagwati and Justice Ranganath Misra delivered two separate, but
concurring judgements.

Chief Justice Bhagwati reiterated the earlier view expressed by him in Minerva Mills
v.UOI9 about the power of Parliament to set up effective alternative institutional mechanism

9
AIR 1986 SC 2030
 7

or arrangements for judicial review by amending the Constitution. If, by such constitutional
amendment, the power of judicial review of the high-court is taken away and vested “in any
other institutional mechanism or authority, it would not be violative of the basic structure
doctrine, so long as the essential condition is fulfilled, i.e., the alternative institutional
mechanism or authority set up by Parliamentary amendment is no less effective than the high-
court.”

The learned Chief Justice said that as question involving interpretation of Articles 14, 15, 16
and 31 arises for decision, it is necessary that, “those who adjudicate upon these questions
should have some medium of legal training and judicial experience.” In that view, he agreed
with Justice Ranganath Misra about the invalidity of Clause (c) of Section 6 (1) of the
impugned Act, which prescribed qualifications for the office of Chairman of the tribunal, that
is-- at least two years experience as Secretary to the Government of India or any other post
under the Central Government or state governments carrying the scale of pay which is not
less than that of the Secretary to Government of India.

The appointment of the Chairman, the Vice- Chairman and Administrative Members should
be made, in the opinion of the learned Chief Justice, only after the consultation with and the
recommendations of the Chief Justice of India, unless there are cogent reasons for not
accepting the same. Another suggestion was that district judge or an advocate who is
qualified to be a judge of the High-Court should be regarded as eligible for being the Vice-
Chairman of the administrative tribunal and if, to such an effect amendment was not carried
out, the impugned Act would have to be declared to be invalid, since it cannot be severed
from the other provisions.

Hence, in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI, in the final decision the Court held that Section 28
which excludes jurisdiction of the High-Courts under Articles 226/227 is not
unconstitutional. The Court ruled that this section does not totally bar judicial review. It also
said that Administrative Tribunals under the 1985 Act are substitute of High- Courts and will
deal with all service matters even involving Articles 14, 15 and 16. It also advised for
changing the qualifications of Chairman of the tribunal. As a result, the Act was further
amended in 1987. In UOI v. Parmanand10, a two-judges Bench upheld the authority of the
Administrative Tribunals to decide the constitutionality of service rules.

10
AIR 1989 SC 1185
 8

The Sampath Kumar ruling examined the constitutionality of the Administrative

Tribunals Act, 1985 and did not consider the Constitutional validity of Article 323-A (2)
(d).Subsequently, a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High- Court in Sakinala
Harinath v. State of A.P.11, declared sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of Article 323-A
unconstitutional. It was held that this provision is repugnant to the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Kesavanand Bharati v. State of Kerala.12

In J.B. Chopra and Ors v. UOI13, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court had an occasion to
consider the question that: Whether the CAT constituted under the Administrative Tribunal
Act, 1985 has the authority and the jurisdiction to strike down a rule framed by the President
of India under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, as being violative of Articles 14
and 16(1) of the Constitution.

When the matter came up before the Division Bench, it deferred its judgement till the final
pronouncement of the decision in Sampath Kumar. Thereafter, the Division Bench analysed
the Constitution Bench’s decision to arrive at the conclusion that:

“The Administrative Tribunal being a substitute power of the High Court had the
necessary jurisdiction, power and authority to adjudicate upon all disputes relating to
service matters including the power to deal with all questions pertaining to the
Constitutional validity or otherwise of such laws as offending Articles 14 and 16(1) of
the Constitution.”

In M.B. Majumdar v. UOI14, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court had to confront the
contention, based on the premise that in Sampath Kumar the Supreme Court had equated the
tribunals established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 with high-courts, and that
the members of CAT must be paid the same salaries as were payable to judges of the high
court. The court, after analysing- the text of Article 323-A of the Constitution, the
provisions of the impugned Act, and the decision in Sampath Kumar, rejected the
contention that the tribunals were the equals of the high-courts in respect of their service
conditions. The Court clarified that in Sampath Kumar the tribunals under the Act had been
equated with high- courts only to the extent that the former were to act as substitutes for the

11
(1994) 1 APLJ (HC) 1
12
AIR 1973 SC 1461
13
AIR 1987 SC 357
14
AIR 1990 SC 2263
 9

latter in adjudicating service matters, the tribunals could not, therefore, seek parity for all
other purposes.

In R.K. Jain v. UOI15, a three judge Bench of Supreme Court had occasion to deal with
complaints concerning the functioning of the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate
Tribunal, which was set-up by exercising the power conferred by Article 323-B. In his
leading judgement, Justice Ramaswamy analysed the relevant constitutional provisions; the
decision in Sampath Kumar, J.B. Chopra and M.B. Majumdar, and held that the tribunals
created under Articles 323-A and 323-B could not be held to be substitutes of High- Courts
for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Having had the benefit of witnessing the working, for more than five years, of these
alternative institutional mechanisms, anguish was expressed over their ineffectiveness in
exercising the power of judicial review. It was regretted that their performance had left much
to be desired. Thereafter, it was noted that the sole remedy provided, that is, of an appeal to
the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, had (as seen over the years) proved
to be prohibitively costly, while also being inconvenient on account of the distances involved.
It was suggested that an expert body like the Law Commission of India should-- study the
feasibility of providing an appeal to a Bench of two judges of the concerned High- Court,
from the orders of the tribunals; and also to analyse the working of the tribunals since their
establishment, the possibility of inducting members of the Bar to such tribunals etc.

It was hoped that the recommendations of such an expert body would be immediately
adopted by the Government of India, and remedial steps would be initiated to overcome the
difficulties faced by the tribunals, making them capable of dispensing effective, inexpensive,
and satisfactory justice.

Law laid down in L. CHANDRA KUMAR v. UOI: In L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI16, a

Division Bench of the Supreme Court expressed the view that the decision rendered by the
Constitutional Bench of five Judges in Sampath Kumar case needed to be “comprehensively
reconsidered”, and a “fresh look by a larger Bench over all the issues adjudicated in Sampath
Kumar case was necessary”. In the light of the opinion of the Division Bench, the matter was
placed before a larger Bench of seven Judges.

15
(1993) 4 SCC 119
16
(1995) 1 SCC 400
 10

After considering various decisions on the point, the larger Bench observed that:

1. The power of judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and
the jurisdiction conferred on High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and on Supreme
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution.
2. For securing independence of judiciary, the judges of superior courts have been
entrusted with the power of judicial review. Though the Parliament is empowered to
amend the Constitution, the power of amendment cannot be exercised so as to damage
the essential feature of the Constitution or to destroy its basic structure.
3. The High Courts and the Supreme Court have been entrusted with the task of
upholding the Constitution (i.e. furthering the ends of the Constitution) and with a
view to achieving that end, they have to interpret the Constitution.

Verdict of the Court17:

The Court held that Clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the
extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High-Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles
226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional.

Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 excluded the power of judicial review
exercised by the High-Courts in service matters under Articles 226 and 227; however it did
not exclude the judicial review entirely in as much as the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution was kept intact. The Court held that Section 28 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other
legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the extent that
they exclude the jurisdiction of the High-Courts (under Articles 226 and 227) and the
Supreme Court (under Article 32) would be ultra-vires the Constitution.

The Court said that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High-Courts under Articles 226/227
and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable
basic structure of our Constitution.

The Court held that there was no Constitutional prohibition against administrative tribunals in
performing a supplemental as opposed to a substitutional role; that is in exercising their

17
Seen generally: Para- 98, 99 and 100 of the Judgement (L.Chandra Kumar v. UOI, AIR 1997 SC 1125)
 11

powers such tribunals cannot act as substitutes for High-Courts and the Supreme Court. Their
decisions will be subject to scrutiny by a Division Bench of the respective High-Courts i.e. all
decisions of these tribunals (tribunals created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the
Constitution of India) will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court
within whose jurisdiction the concerned tribunal falls.

Administrative Tribunals under Article 323-A could examine the constitutional validity of
various statutes or rules.18 However, there will be one exception to this rule i.e. the
administrative tribunals would not be competent to examine the validity of the statute under
which they are created.19 In such cases, the appropriate High Court would have to be
approached directly. Barring cases where the constitutionality of the parent Act is challenged,
all questions regarding services must be raised only before an administrative tribunal, and
writ would lie against an administrative tribunal’s decision to a High Court having
jurisdiction over it. An appeal would also lie to the High Court from a tribunal’s decision20;
however this direction was to apply to decisions rendered after the decision in this case-
L.Chandra Kumar v. UOI [AIR 1997 SC 1125]21. From a decision of High Court’s Division
Bench, an appeal could be preferred under Article 136 of the Constitution to the Supreme
Court of India.22

Administrative Tribunals need not consist only of members from the judicial stream but
could also include members from administrative stream, because a tribunal consisting of such
mixed composition would be able to bring varied experience to bear on the service matters
that comes to it for adjudication.23

An administrative tribunal may not be subject to the power of superintendence of a High

Court under Article 227, but the tribunals could work under the supervision of a nodal
government-department, which would preferably be the Ministry of Law. The Court

18
See Para 91 of the Judgement
19
In Para 94 of the Judgement, the Court held that- the Tribunals shall not entertain any questions regarding the
vires of their parent statutes following the settled principles that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot
declare that very Act to be unconstitutional.
20
See: Para 92
21
See: Para 95 of the Judgement
22
See: Para 93 of the Judgement- “…no appeal from the decision of a Tribunal will directly lie before the
Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution; but instead the aggrieved party will be entitled to move
the High-Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and from the decision of the Division Bench of the
High Court the aggrieved party could move this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.”
23
See: Para 96
 12

expressed a hope that the ministry would set up an independent nodal agency for overseeing
the work of tribunals.

Lastly, the Court upheld Section 5(6) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 as valid and
constitutional and held that Sections 5(2) and 5(6) of the Act must operate together and must
be harmoniously construed i.e. where a question involving the interpretation of a statutory
provision or rule in relation to the Constitution arises for consideration of a single Member
Bench of the Administrative Tribunal, the proviso to section 5(6) will automatically apply
and the Chairman or the Member concerned shall refer the matter to a Bench consisting of at
least two Members, one of whom must be a Judicial Member. This will ensure that questions
involving the vires of a statutory provision or rule will never arise for adjudication before a
single Member Bench or a Bench which does not consist of a Judicial Member. So construed,
Section 5(6) can no longer be susceptible to the charges of unconstitutionality.

Para-wise analysis & critical observations pertaining to the case: Detailed study of the
case.

From Para 1 to 3 of the Judgement, the Court categorically discusses the facts of the case
and also the issues on to which adjudication is to be done i.e. constitutional validity of Article
323-A (2) (d) and Article 323-B (3) (d) of the Constitution of India, so also of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; the Court also takes it to be a matter adjudication-
Whether Tribunals can be effective substitutes for High-Courts in discharging the power of
judicial review?

The “post- Sampath Kumar cases” which caused the Division Bench to refer the matter to the
present Bench of seven judges were as follows- J.B. Chopra v. UOI, M.B. Majumdar v. UOI,
Amuya Chandra Kalita v. UOI, R.K. Jain v. UOI and Dr. Mahabal Ram v. Indian Council of
Agricultural Research.

From Para 4 to 8 of the Judgement, the Court discusses the legal and historical background
amongst which Part XIV- A of the Constitution was enacted and so also the legislative intent
behind the enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It is pertinent to note that in
Para 7 of the Judgement, the Court brings to light the legislative intent behind the enactment
of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 as follows-- Administrative Tribunals were
established under the Act with the intent to give time-effective and cost-effective justice to
persons in matters pertaining to services and to ensure that such matters do not populate the
 13

already exploding docket of the ordinary courts (especially the Constitutional Courts). In Para
3 of the Judgement, the Court brings to light the fact that the present matter pending before it
for adjudication is in nature of a reference made to it by a Division Bench of this Court, based
on the contention and observation that the Sampath Kumar case requires a fresh look by a
larger bench. Sampath Kumar case was a five judge Bench decision and therefore, the Bench
constituted in the present case at hand was of seven judges. Need for fresh look in the
Sampath Kumar case arose owing to question as to whether or not Section 5(6) of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is constitutionally valid and whether or not the Tribunal
can at all have an Administrative Member on its Bench.

In Para 9, the Court explains the theory of effective alternative institutional mechanism, as
was stated and was upheld in the Sampath Kumar case. In its final decision in the Sampath
Kumar case, the court made the following observation-- though judicial review is a basic
feature of the Constitution, the vesting of the power of judicial review in an alternative
institutional mechanism, after taking it away from the High-Courts, would not do violence to
the basic structure so long as it was ensured that the alternative mechanism was an effective
and real substitute for the High Court. The Bench of five judges in the Sampath Kumar case
came to the conclusion that the Act (the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985), as it stood at
that time, did not measure up to the requirements which could make tribunals an effective
substitute to the High-Courts, and hence several amendments were suggested to the form and
content of the Tribunals in pursuance of the theory of effective alternative institutional
mechanism. The amendments so suggested in the case were given force of law by the
amending Act (Act 51 of 1987) after the conclusion of the case.

From Para 10 to 20, the Court explains the scheme and salient features of the Act (the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985), containing 37 Sections, grouped in 5 Chapters. The
Court brought to focus the controversy pertaining to section 5(2) and 5(6) of the Act-
standing in contradiction of each other; to that extent the Court satisfactorily explained how
this controversy can be brought to end, that is, by harmoniously construing section 5(2) and
5(6) in the light of each other, the same has been explained at length in the verdict of the
case- as already discussed.

It is important to note that section 28 of the Act as was originally enacted ousted the
jurisdiction of the High-Courts under Articles 226/227 and that of the Supreme Court under
Article 32 of the Constitution. Section 28 was in express terms of Article 323-A (2) (d).
 14

However, before the final hearing in Sampath Kumar’s case the provision as to section 28
was further amended to save the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution. The Court while adjudicating upon the matter in Sampath Kumar’s case held
section 28 of the Act as valid and constitutional as it saved the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under Articles 32 and 136, but court did not comment upon the constitutionality of
Article 323-A (2) (d) - which still remained un-amended ousting the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court under Article 32.

From Para 22 to 50, the Court at length discussed and analysed “post- Sampath Kumar
cases”, along with the relevant opinions put forth by the legal counsels appearing in various
cases in the nature of appeals, special leave petitions and writ petitions forming part of the
batch of matters which were clubbed together in the present case for adjudication.

The Sampath Kumar case examined the constitutionality of the Administrative Tribunals Act,
1985 and did not consider the constitutional validity of Article 323-A (2) (d). Subsequently, a
full judges Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High-Court in Sakinala Harinath v. State of A.P.
declared Article 323-A (2) (d) as unconstitutional, as the provision was not in conformity
with the basic structure doctrine so propounded in the Kesavanand Bharati v. State of Kerala.
It was held in this case that the theory of alternative institutional mechanisms established in
the Sampath Kumar’s case is in defiance of the proposition laid down in Kesavanand Bharti’s
case, Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 case and Indira Gandhi’s case; holding thereby that the
constitutional courts alone are competent to exercise the power of judicial review to
pronounce upon the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules.

In J.B. Chopra and Others v. UOI, the Division Bench of the Supreme Court had to decide
on the matter- Whether the CAT constituted under the impugned Act had the authority and
jurisdiction to strike down a rule framed by the President of India under the Proviso to Article
309 of the Constitution? The Division Bench in this case deferred its ruling until the final
pronouncement of the decision in the Sampath Kumar case; thereafter the Division Bench
basing its decision over the ruling given in the Sampath Kumar case held that administrative
tribunals are the necessary substitutes for the High-Courts and hence had power to adjudicate
upon all disputes relating to service matters including the power to deal with all questions
pertaining to the constitutional validity or otherwise of such laws as offending Articles 14 and
16(1) of the Constitution.
 15

In M.B. Majumdar v. UOI, the matter to be decided before the Division Bench of the
Supreme Court was- if the administrative tribunals constituted under Part XIV- A of the
Constitution of India and in pursuance of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 are the
equivalents of the High-Courts, then why should the Members of CAT be not paid salaries
equivalent to the ones paid to the High-Court judges? The Supreme Court in this case
clarified that in Sampath Kumar case the tribunals under the Act were equated with the High-
Courts only to the extent that the former were to act as the substitutes for the latter in
adjudicating upon the service matters only, the administrative tribunals cannot hence seek
parity with the High-Courts for all other purposes. Thus, SC held- Members of CAT cannot
claim salaries equivalent to that paid to the High-Court judges.

In R.K. Jain v. UOI, a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that tribunals created
under Part XIV- A of the Constitution cannot be held to be substitutes of the High-Courts for
exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution; the overall
performance of the administrative tribunals so established was regretted and it was
recommended that an expert body such as the Law Commission of India should undertake a
necessary study to seek the feasibility and if possible the revitalisation of the administrative
tribunals.

In Amuya Chandra Kalita v. UOI, the question for consideration that arose before the
Division Bench of the Supreme Court was- Whether a dispute before the CAT could be
decided by a Single Administrative Member? The Court basing its decision on section 5(2) of
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 held that a Bench of a Tribunal under the Act should
ordinarily consist of a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member; as also taking the
necessary clue from the Sampath Kumar case, the Court held that under the scheme of the
impugned Act, all cases should be heard by a Bench of two Members (one Administrative
and one Judicial). It appears that in this case, the Court did not give any attention to section
5(6) of the Act which enables a single Member of a Tribunal under the Act to hear and decide
cases.

In, Dr. Mahabal Ram v. Indian Council of Agricultural Research- the question of law- as
had arisen in Amuya Chandra case came for decision; however in this case vires of section
5(6) was in question. The Court held that harmonious construction must be pursued as
between sub-section (2) and (6) of section 5 and each of them must be interpreted in the light
of each other depending upon the nature of litigation. Where the case before the tribunal is
 16

pertaining to questions of law and interpretation of constitutional provisions, then the same
should not be assigned to a Single Member. However, the cases which do not involve
questions of law or constitutional interpretations can be heard by a Single Member Bench.

Taking note of the views expressed by various legal counsels appearing in various cases
which forms part of the batch of matters, clubbed together in this case for the purpose of
adjudication- the Court observed as follows--

Mr. Rama Jois and Mr. Shanti Bhushan urged the Court to review the judgement in Sampath
Kumar’s case and contended that Articles 323-A (2) (d) and 323-B (3) (d) should be declared
un-constitutional to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High-Court. Mr. Bhatt, the
learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. P.P. Rao and Mr. Venugopal on the other hand
urged the Court to uphold the constitutional validity of the said Articles, thereby allowing the
Tribunals to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. A.K.
Ganguly cited that the power of judicial review vested on the Constitutional Courts cannot be
bestowed on newly created quasi-judicial bodies which are susceptible to executive
influences.

What is to be noted is that the doctrine of effective institutional mechanism which purports
that Tribunals function as substitutes for the High-Courts was discarded in the present case of
L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI.

From Para 50 to 80 the Court has extensively discussed and appreciated the notion of the
power of judicial review. The Court held that judicial review is a basic and essential feature
of the Constitution and observed as follows:

1. The origin of the power of judicial review of the legislative action may be well traced
to the classic enunciation of the principle by Chief Justice John Marshall of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison24. So when the framers of our Constitution
were set about to carry out their monumental task, they were well aware of the
principle25 (as the principle laid down in Marbury v. Madison had already acquired a

24
5 U.S. 137; 2 L. Ed. 60; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352
25
In Marbury v. Madison, it was held as follows—“Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is unconstitutional
to the extent it purports to enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond that permitted by the
Constitution. Congress cannot pass laws that are contrary to the Constitution; and it is the role of the Judicial-
system to interpret what the Constitution permits”.
 17

history of nearly a century and a half then) that Constitutional Courts possess the
power to invalidate duly- enacted legislations if they are ultra-vires the Constitution.26

2. Broadly speaking, judicial review in India comprises of three aspects: judicial review
of legislative action, judicial review of judicial decisions and judicial review of
administrative action.27 The judges of the superior courts have to ensure that the
balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature
and the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress the
constitutional limitations. It is equally their duty to oversee that the judicial decisions
rendered by those who man the subordinate courts and tribunals do not fall foul of
strict standards of legal correctness and judicial independence.

It is interesting to note that the origins of the power of judicial review of legislative
action have not been attributed to one source alone. While Sastri, C.J., in State of
Madras v. V.G. Row28, found the power mentioned expressly in the text of the
Constitution; however, Gajendragadkar, C.J., in Special Reference No.1 of 1964,
preferred to trace it to the manner in which the Constitution has separated powers
between the three wings of the Government.29

3. The Constitution of India while conferring power of judicial review of legislative

action upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important safeguards. An analysis of
the manner in which the Framers of our Constitution incorporated provisions relating
to the judiciary would indicate that they were very greatly concerned with securing
the independence of the judiciary. These attempts were directed at ensuring that the
judiciary would be capable of effectively discharging its wide powers of judicial
review.

4. The statement of Dr. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the
Constituent Assembly that- Article 32 was the “most important” Article and that, “it is

26
See: Para 56 of the Judgement
27
See: Para 55 of the Judgement
28
(1952) SCR 597
29
See: Para 57, 60 and 61 of the Judgement
 18

the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it” has been specifically
reiterated in several Supreme Court decisions.30

5. The Supreme Court has always considered the power of judicial review vested in the
High Courts and in the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 respectively,
enabling legislative action to be subjected to the scrutiny of superior courts, to be
integral to our Constitutional scheme.

While several judgements have made specific references to this aspect Beg, J. and
Khanna, J. in Keshavananda Bharati case31; Chandrachud, C.J. and Bhagwati, J. in
Minerva Mills case32, the rest have made general observations highlighting the
significance of this feature.

It is important to note the observation of Chandrachud, C.J. in the Minerva Mills case,
at p.644, Para 21, “Our Constitution is founded on a nice balance of power among the
three wings of the State, namely, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. It is
the function of the Judges, nay their duty, to pronounce upon the validity of laws. If
courts are totally deprived of that power, the fundamental rights conferred upon the
people will become a mere adornment because rights without remedies are writ in
water. A controlled Constitution will then become uncontrolled.”33

However, the judgement of Chandrachud, C.J. in the Minerva Mill’s case must be
viewed in the context of his judgement in Indira Gandhi’s case34 where he had stated
that the Constitution, as originally enacted, excluded power of judicial review in
several important matters. The view of Chandrachud C.J., as in consonance with the
majority in the Minerva Mill’s case held that the concept of judicial review was not
part of the basic structure of the Constitution. It is also pertinent to note that

30
See: Para 73 of the Judgement
31
See: Para 62 of the Judgement- Khanna, J. held as follows: Judicial Review has become an integral part of our
constitutional system and a power has been vested in the High Courts and the Supreme Court to decide about the
constitutional validity of provisions of statutes. If the provisions of the statute are found to be violative of any
Article of the Constitution, which is touchstone for the validity of all laws, the Supreme Court and the High-
Courts are empowered to strike down the said provisions.
32
See: Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. UOI, AIR 1980 SC 1789
33
See: Para 66 of the Judgement
34
See: Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299
 19

Chandrachud, C.J. speaking for majority in Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union v.

UOI35 held that- the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 32 is an
important and integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution, and hence, he
seemed to have revised his view as he had then when he delivered the judgement in
Indira Gandhi’s case.

Bhagwati, J. in his minority judgement in Minerva Mill’s case held as follows-

“The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional system, the
power of judicial review is unquestionably part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. Of course, when I say this I should not be taken to suggest that effective
alternate institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review cannot be made
by Parliament.”

Opinion of Bhagwati, J. is most logical and appropriate, but what is debatable is his
argument that Parliament can provide for effective alternate institutional mechanisms
or arrangements for judicial review; if the legislature is to decide as to how the
judicial review is to be conducted and by whom, will it not be that- the independence
of the Judiciary as the third wing of the State that will suffer and how can then
Judiciary be called the Custodian of the Constitution—looking over that the
legislature and the executive wings of the State are functioning within their necessary
bounds?

It is important to note that in Sampath Kumar’s case both, Bhagwati, C.J. and Misra,
J. - in their separate judgements have relied upon the observations in the minority
judgement of Bhagwati, J. in the Minerva Mill’s case to lay the foundation of the
theory of alternate institutional mechanisms.

6. Therefore, the power of judicial review is an integral and essential feature of the
Constitution; constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power
of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations
can never be ousted or excluded.36

35
1981 SCR (2) 52
36
See: Para 78 of the Judgement
 20

Further, the power vested in the High-Courts to “exercise judicial superintendence over the
decisions of all courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions” is also part of the
basic structure of the Constitution; hence a situation where the High Courts are divested of all
other judicial functions except that of constitutional interpretation has equally to be avoided.

In Para 83 of the Judgement, the Court focused upon the factual position which occasioned
the adoption of the theory of alternative institutional mechanisms in Sampath Kumar’s case.
The Court noted that in his leading judgement (in Sampath Kumar’s case), R. Misra, J.
referred to the fact that since independence, the population explosion and the increase in
litigation greatly increased the burden of pendency in the High-Courts and studies conducted
by the Shah Committee and the Administrative Reforms Commission signified this fact, so
also the decision rendered by the SC in K.K. Dutta v. UOI is in view of the above, the theory
of alternative institutional mechanisms was adopted by the SC in the Sampath Kumar’s case.
Hence, Para 83 of the Judgement is an important means to understand the logic and the
notion behind the adoption of the theory of alternative institutional mechanism in the
Sampath Kumar case.

From Para 84 to 87, the Court has carried out a critical appreciation of the work done by the
Law Commission of India (in its 124th Report) in regards to the problem of docket explosion
which our courts face today. The Report was delivered in 1988 i.e. sometime after the
judgement in Sampath Kumar’s case and hence in the view of the Court, the data dealt with
was some-what outdated.

Law Commission of India in its 124th Report- described the pendency in the High- Courts as
catastrophic, crises ridden, almost unmanageable & imposing an immeasurable burden on the
system. LCI further stated that the prevailing view in Indian Jurisprudence that the
jurisdiction enjoyed by the High Court is a holy cow required a review. LCI recommended
the trimming of the jurisdiction of the High-Courts by setting up Specialist Courts/Tribunals
while simultaneously eliminating the jurisdiction of the High-Courts.

It is noteworthy that though the theory of alternate institutional mechanisms was propounded
in Sampath Kumar’s case in respect of the Administrative Tribunals, the concept of creating
alternate modes of dispute resolution which would relieve High-Courts of their burden while
simultaneously providing specialised justice- is not new; the same has been suggested by the
LCI from time to time, such as- in regards to the setting up of ‘Gram Nyayalayas’ in its 114th
 21

Report, in regards to setting up ‘Industrial/Labour Tribunals’ in its 122nd Report and in

regards to setting up ‘Educational Tribunals’ in its 123rd Report.

From Para 88 to 89, the Court scrutinizes the recommendations given by the Malimath
Committee. The Malimath Committee Report reasoned out the failures as to the working of
the Tribunals and was of the opinion that following were the reasons for its failure- lack of
competence; lack of objectivity and judicial approach; casual method of working;
unsatisfactory conditions of service and political interference in its judicial functioning

The Committee also made an important mentioning that- the decision of the State
Administrative Tribunals are not appealable except under Article 136 of the Constitution,
hence on the account of the heavy cost and remoteness of the forum, there is virtual negation
of the right to appeal (this observation of the Committee is worth appreciating).

The Committee also made efforts to test the overall efficacy of the theory of alternate
institutional mechanism. In Para 8.65 (of the Malimath Committee Report), the Committee
speaks as follows-

“Tribunals are not an end in themselves but a means to an end; even if the laudable
objectives of –speedy justice, uniformity of approach, predictability of decisions and
specialist justice are to be achieved, the framework of the Tribunal intended to be set
up to attain them must still retain its basic judicial character and inspire public
confidence. Any scheme of decentralisation of administration of justice providing for
an alternative institutional mechanism in substitution of the High Courts must pass the
aforesaid test in order to be constitutionally valid.”

This observation of the Malimath Committee is very inspiring.

The Court, however disagreed with the Committee on the recommendation that- the theory
of alternative institutional mechanisms be abandoned, the Committee recommended that-
institutional changes must be carried out within the High-Courts; they must be divided into
separate divisions for different branches of law, as is being done in England. Committee
stated that appointing more Judges to man the separate divisions while using the existing
infrastructure would be a better way of remedying the problem of pendency in the High-
Courts.37 The Court held that years have passed since the Committee delivered its report

37
See: Para 89 of the Judgement
 22

(Report of the Arrears Committee: 1989-1990) and the same seemed not feasible in the
present contest in regards to which the case is being decided.

What can be said is that, the Tribunals are adjudicatory bodies free from the trappings of the
Court, seeing High-Courts as the means to perform adjudicatory functions for which
Tribunals can be established is something that is un-called for. Purpose of Tribunals is
speedy, time-effective and cost effective justice based on the principles of natural justice;
bringing High-Courts in picture as a means to achieve the necessary end will only result in
increase in docket-explosion the High- Courts.

In Para 90 of the Judgement the Court agrees to the fact that- the various Tribunals have not
performed up to the desired expectations, but the Court cautions that- to draw an inference
that the unsatisfactory performance of the Tribunals points to their being founded on a
fundamentally unsound principles is not correct. The Court says that the reasons for which
the Tribunals were constituted still persists i.e. expeditious disposal of cases pertaining to
service matters, time effective and cost effective justice; the Court reaffirms that our
Constitutional scheme permits the setting up of such (administrative) Tribunals. The Court
assents to the fact that drastic measures need to be resorted to so as to elevate the standards to
the Tribunals, to ensure that they stand up to constitutional scrutiny in the discharge of the
power of judicial review conferred upon them. Hence, what can be made out from here is
that- the Judgement is written cautiously with pragmatic out-look, the Court seems aware of
the ground realities and makes no effort to cover it up with lucid or weightless comments,
Court’s acknowledgement that the Constitutional scheme does provides for setting up of
administrative tribunals is worth noting and this expresses Court’s judicial prudence in terms
that the Court seemed more focussed on the solution necessary rather than the problem being
made exponential.

In Para 92 of the Judgement the Court made an observation that- In R.K. Jain’s case, after
taking note of the necessary facts (i.e. ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Articles 226/227 and providing a remedy in terms of an appeal to be made directly to the
Supreme Court under Article 136 from the order of the Tribunal will result in the docket of
the Supreme Court being crowded with decisions of Tribunals that are challenged on
relatively trivial grounds and the Supreme Court will be forced to perform the role of a First
Appellate Court), it was suggested that the possibility of an appeal from the decision of the
Tribunals on questions of law to a Division Bench of a High Court within whose territorial
 23

jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, be pursued. The Court noted that no follow-up action was
taken pursuant to the suggestion given in the R.K. Jain’s case. The Court observed that, such
a measure would have improved matters considerably.

The Court held that the decisions of the Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323-A
or Article 323-B of the Constitution, is to be subjected to the High Court’s writ jurisdiction
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within
whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls.

Hence, it necessary to note that the Court in this case (L.Chandra Kumar v. UOI) expressed a
desire- that not only writ jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction but also the appellate
jurisdiction of the High-Courts must be retained, so far as the functioning of the Tribunals is
concerned.

In Para 96 of the Judgement the Court addresses the issue in regards to the competence of
those who man the Tribunals and the question of who is to exercise administrative
supervision over them. The Court held that- it must be remembered that the setting-up of the
tribunals is founded on the premise that specialist bodies comprising of both trained
administrators and those with judicial experience would by virtue of their specialised
knowledge , be better equipped to dispense speedy and efficient justice. The Court observed
that- to hold that the tribunal should consist only of judicial members would attack the
primary basis of the theory pursuant to which the Tribunals have been constituted.

What the Court decided and observed was in the light of the fact that the Selection
Committee was to be headed by a Judge of the Supreme Court, nominated by the Chief
Justice of India and hence, what could be ensured was that- the administrative members are
chosen from and amongst those who have necessary background and legal expertise to deal
with the cases. In light of this the decision and the observation of the Court is devoid of
criticism.

In Para 97 of the Judgement the Court observes that- one reason why the tribunals (so
created under Articles 323-A and 323-B) had been functioning inefficiently was because
there was no authority charged with supervising and fulfilling their administrative
requirements. To this end it was suggested that Tribunals be made subject to the supervisory
jurisdiction of the High-Courts within whose territorial jurisdiction they fall.
 24

What is important here to mention is that- the Court admitted that this was however not the
best way of solving the problem. The Court said-

“We do not think that our Constitutional scheme requires that all adjudicatory bodies
which fall under the territorial jurisdiction of the High-Courts should be subject to
their supervisory jurisdiction. If the idea is to divest the High-Courts of their onerous
burdens, then adding to their supervisory functions cannot, in any manner, be of
assistance to them.”

This to a great extent shows the knowledge of the Court of the ground realities and also at the
same time the lack of viable options that the Court had as a matter of its exercise. The Court
expressed a hope that the Ministry of Law would come up with an independent nodal agency
to supervise the work of the tribunals.

Remarks: The position of law as it subsists today is that Administrative Tribunals can
perform a supplemental role as opposed to a substitutional role, so far as the High-Courts are
concerned. It is a settled proposition that the High-Courts by nature are Constitutional Courts
and ousting their jurisdiction, so vested in them by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is
against the Doctrine of Basic Structure. Moreover, it has already been decided overtime by
plethora of judgements that- Tribunals under Part XIV-A of the Constitution shall be ‘forums
of first redressal’ in regards to matters—for the adjudication of which they have been
established; likewise on grounds desirable and legally correct, appeals shall lie to the High-
Courts and thereafter to the Supreme Court respectively, as the case may be, is well agreed
and appreciated.

It is agreed that Tribunals are free from the trappings of the courts and expound justice on the
principles of natural justice, thereby ensuring time effective and cost effective justice,
however based on observations made in the R.K. Jain’s case nothing can concretely be said
about the ‘quality of justice’ delivered or dispensed with.

Opening the forum in regards to appeal to the High-Courts and there from to the Supreme
Court, as from the orders of the Tribunals on one hand is necessary to ensure that justice
delivered or dispensed with is quality justice- in the nature of Fiat Justitia Ruat Caelum but
on the other hand, it may result in docket explosion in Constitutional Courts- to ensure lesser
burdening of which Part XIV- A of the Constitution was enacted in the first place.
 25

The scenario as it stands today is that, by establishment of Tribunals what can be ensured is
that, speedy justice is delivered (as tribunals are free from the trappings of the Courts) but
only to the extent of the lower realms of the judiciary, and the scenario becomes the same as
the case progresses the High-Court or the Supreme Court; that is situation similar to any other
case for adjudication of which no tribunals are established and thereby are adjudicated upon
by the ordinary courts.

The contentions raised in the present case and decisions rendered in regards to same are well
appreciated and can be summarised as follows- (1) Articles 323-A and 323-B are
unconstitutional to the extent they exclude jurisdiction of the High-Courts under Articles
226/227 and of Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution; (2) The tribunals
constituted under Part XIV- A of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to
examine the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules except statutes
establishing these tribunals; (3) These tribunals will continue to work as the courts of first
instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. The litigants
cannot move the High Court directly; (4) No appeal will lie under Article 136 to the Supreme
Court directly from the decisions of these tribunals. Special leave petitions will lie from the
decision of the High-Court.

But in the light of cases discussed in the present case along with the opinions of expert bodies
such as the Law Commission of India and the Malimath Committee, what can be said is that
experience in regards to tribunals in India constituted under Part XIV- A of the Constitution
of India, has been bitter and far from satisfaction and no concrete solution for the same has
been provided for or has been discussed in the present case. The SC in the present case was
more concerned with deciding- whether or not the jurisdiction of the High-Courts under
Articles 226 and 227, and that of the SC under Article 32, can be ousted by the
Administrative Tribunals; the SC did acknowledge that functioning of Administrative
Tribunals in India has been very poor but was still against the idea of their abolishment; what
is note-worthy is that the SC did not provide any concrete solution as to how the functioning
of the Administrative Tribunals be improved, except of the opinion that these Tribunals must
be placed under the scrutiny of the High-Courts so as to ensure that these Tribunals deliver
quality justice—irrespective of the fact that the problem of docket explosion with which the
High-Courts are suffering at present will remain un-resolved.
 26

Overall the Judgement is well-written but the Bench has not adjudicated upon all the issues of
vital importance i.e. Judgement doesn’t seem to be far-sighted (with all due Respect to the
Hon’ble Judges).The Judgement settles the debate that the jurisdiction of the Constitutional
Courts can never be ousted; and too great extent also proves that the purpose for which the
Tribunals were formed i.e. reducing the piling of the cases in the Constitutional Courts,
largely remains un-resolved (it is not that the Tribunals require sometime to establish
themselves fully- well and only then there functioning should be judged- because when this
Judgement was delivered nearly a decade had already elapsed since the Tribunals were first
established).

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