Doctrine: Land Titles and Deeds (Free Patent)

“A free patent issued over a private land is null and void and produces no legal effects
whatsoever.  Free patent applications under the Public Land Act apply only to disposable lands
of the public domain, and not to private lands which became such by virtue of a duly registered
possessory information or by open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, of the
present or previous occupants.”

Case Titile: Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, G.R. No. 151440
(J.Ynares-Santiago) (June 17, 2003)

Facts:

The instant controversy involves a 574 square meter parcel of land known as Lot No.
2344 located in Poblacion, Angat, Bulacan, which was formerly owned by the spouses Vicente
Santiago and Magdalena Sanchez. The spouses had five children, among whom were Pablo and
Marta. Pablo is the father of Simplicio Santiago and Guillermo Santiago; while Marta is the
mother of Jose Santiago.

On April 3, 1984, petitioners, the heirs of Simplicio Santiago, initiated a

complaint for accion publiciana with damages against Mariano Santiago, son of Jose
Santiago. They alleged that Lot 2344 was acquired by Simplicio by purchase from his father,
Pablo, and brother, Guillermo. When Simplicio retired from government service in 1968, he
constructed a house on the said lot. Before his demise on May 6, 1983, he applied for a free
patent, which was granted. Thus, on September 26, 1980, OCT No. P-10878 covering Lot 2344
was issued in his name. Sometime in 1983, Mariano Santiago, through stealth and evident bad
faith, constructed a house on a portion of Lot 2344 and refused to vacate the premises despite
written and oral demands.

On the other hand, Mariano Santiago contended that Lot 2344 was subdivided into three
portions, i.e., Lot 2344-A-C. Petitioners owned only Lot 2344-B, and Lots 2344-A and 2344-C
was fraudulently included in the free patent and certificate of title issued to Simplicio Santiago.
Mariano testified that he and his sister, Belen S. Marcelo, purchased Lot 2344-A from Simplicio
Santiago for the price of P5,000.00, as per deed of sale dated September 15, 1972. Immediately
after the sale, they constructed a house on the lot. Without their knowledge, however, Simplicio
secured a free patent and an OCT over the entire Lot 2344. On the other hand, he and his sister
inherited Lot 2344-C from their grandmother, Marta Santiago, who in turn inherited the lot from
her parents, Vicente and Magdalena.

Mariano’s testimony was corroborated by seventy-year old Socorro Ocampo, first cousin

of Simplicio and Mariano’s father, Jose, and by fifty-two-year old Flordeliza Austria, a long-time
neighbor of the parties. Both witnesses testified that since they were still children, the house of
Marta where she and Mariano’s family resided was already existing on Lot 2344-C.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners finding Mariano’s claim over the controverted lot
lacks basis and held that his defense constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of a Torrens
title which was barred by prescription for having been raised more than one year after the entry
of the decree of registration. It declared the children and heirs of the late Simplicio Santiago the
owners of the property covered by OCT No. P-10878 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, which
is registered in the name of Simplicio Santiago. The RTC also ordered Mariano Santiago to
remove and vacate the 57 square meter portion of the property covered by said title (O.C.T. No.
P-10878) on which his house is established and surrender the possession thereof to the Heirs of
Simplicio.

On appeal to the CA, it reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained respondents’
claim over Lots 2344-A and 2344-C and ruled that the Free Patent and the OCT issued in favor
of Simplicio Santiago are void, because Lot 2344 is a private land which cannot be the subject of
a Free Patent.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the free patent and the certificate of title issued to Simplicio Santiago are
valid.

Held:

No, the free patent and the certificate of title issued to Simplicio Santiago are void.

The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects whatsoever. Private ownership of land – as when there is a prima
facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants – is not
affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land law applies
only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to
lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership.
Consequently, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of
a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding only if the land covered by it is really a part of the
disposable land of the public domain.

In the instant case, it was established that Lot 2344 is a private property of the Santiago
clan since time immemorial, and that they have declared the same for taxation. Although tax
declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and
all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land by respondents and their predecessors in interests, they are deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. The land was thus segregated from the public domain and the director of lands had no
authority to issue a patent.

Hence, the free patent covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto, are void.
Doctrine: Land Titles and Deeds (Remedy; Action for Reconveyance)

“In the action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly respected as
incontrovertible; what is sought instead is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right.”

Case Title: Rodolfo V. Francisco v. Emiliana M. Rojas and the legitimate heirs of Jose A.
Rojas, G.R. No. 167120 (J.Peralta) (April 23, 2014)

Facts:

Rosalina V. Francisco, petitioner Rodolfo V. Francisco, and Carmela V. Francisco are the
applicants for registration in Land Registration Case No. 95-0004. Subject of the controversy is a
portion of the 3,181.74 hectares of a vast track of land, known as the Hacienda de Angono, in
Angono, Rizal. The entire hacienda used to be owned by one Don Buenaventura Guido y Santa
Ana upon whose death left a portion thereof, consisting of the said 3,181.74 hectares, to his two
(2) sons Francisco Guido and Hermogenes Guido.

Sometime in September 1911, Decreto No. 6145, covering the same 3,181.74-hectare
portion of Hacienda de Angono was issued in favor of the brothers Francisco and Hermogenes.
On such basis, OCT No. 633 over the subject property was issued in the names of the two (2)
brothers. Several years later, OCT No. 633 was cancelled, and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 23377
was issued. Nine (9) years later, or sometime in 1942, the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes
adjudicated among themselves the subject property and transferred the one-half (1/2) portion
thereof to Jose A. Rojas, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents Rojases. Allegedly, the
adjudication was formalized by the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes only on December 17,
1973, when they purportedly executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate With Quitclaim.

On August 20, 1974, the heirs of Don Buenaventura Guido y Santa Ana, represented by
their lawyer, requested the LRA to issue the corresponding original certificate of title based on
Decreto No. 6145, evidently because OCT No. 633 which was earlier issued on the basis of the
same Decreto was previously cancelled. The said request, however, was denied.

Meanwhile, on March 29, 1976, Alfredo Guido, Sr., representing the other heirs, filed
with the Registry of Deeds of Morong a petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377, alleging
that the original of the same title could not be located in the files of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal when he and his co-heirs sought the registration of their aforementioned Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate With Quitclaim. The petition was supported by the owner’s duplicate copy
of the title sought to be reconstituted. The petition was granted and a reconstituted certificate of
title – TCT (23377) RT-M-0002 – was issued. After the reconstitution, the heirs presented before
the Registry of Deed of Morong the same Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate With Quitclaim.

Subsequently, the entire parcel of land covered by Decreto No. 6145 was subdivided into
twenty-one (21) lots and twenty-one (21) different certificates of title were issued in lieu of the
reconstituted TCT No. 23377. Thereafter, the heirs who executed the aforesaid document of
extra-judicial settlement, including the now spouses Jose Rojas and Emiliana Rojas, sold the
property to Pacil Management Corporation (Pacil), and new titles were issued in favor of Pacil
on June 26, 1976. Three (3) months later, Pacil reconveyed all the 21 lots to the former owners.
On August 25, 1978, fourteen (14) of the 21 lots were exchanged for shares of stock of
Interport Resources Corporation. On April 25, 1980, all the named heirs in the same Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate With Quitclaim renounced their rights over the remaining portion of
the 3,181.74 hectares in favor of their co-heir Alfredo Guido, Sr., in exchange for monetary
considerations.

On August 13, 1976, barely five (5) months from the time Alfredo Guido, Sr. filed his
petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 on March 29, 1976, which petition was approved
on the same date, an Application for Registration of Title over four (4) parcels of land (lots 1, 2,
3 and 4), which lots are presently alleged by the respondents to be "overlapping a portion of the
area covered by TCT No. 23377," was filed with the Br. 10, RTC of Rizal, by Rosalina, Rodolfo,
Carmela and Carmen, all surnamed Francisco (the Franciscos), about which petition the
respondents now claim to be unaware of.

The said court issued on June 22, 1977 an Order of General Default premised on the fact
that despite notice which was duly published, posted and served in accordance with law, "no
person has appeared as respondent in the case or filed an answer within the time for that purpose
allowed, with the exception of the Director of Lands, the Provincial Government of Rizal and the
Municipal Government of Binangonan, Rizal thru their counsel, who are given ten (10) days
from today within which to file their formal opposition."

The Land Registration Court declared the applicant Franciscos "the true and absolute
owners of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4.When said decision became final and executory, the Franciscos filed
with the Br. 10, RTC of Rizal a petition for the issuance of a decree of registration. As such, the
RTC directed the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue the desired decree.

To complicate matters, it appears that on August 22, 1979, in the then Br. 155 of Rizal,
represented by the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Decreto No.
6145 and the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377 against the heirs of Francisco Guido and
Hermogenes Guido, the spouses Jose Rojas and Emiliana Rojas, the Pacil Development
Corporation and Interport Resources Corporation, it being alleged in the same complaint that
both the Decreto No. 6145 and the owner’s copy of TCT No. 23377 were false, spurious and
fabricated and were never issued by virtue of judicial proceedings for registration of land either
under Act No, 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, or under any
other law.

RTC Branch 155 rendered a decision dismissing the Republic’s complaint and declaring
Decreto No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 "genuine and authentic." Thus, the Republic appealed to
the CA but was dismissed and the RTC Br.155 decision was upheld by the CA.

The Republic, again thru the Solicitor General, appealed to the SC via petition for review
in G.R. No. 84966. The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA subject to the declared superior rights
of bona fide occupants with registered titles within the area covered by the questioned decree and
bona fide occupants therein with lengths of possession which had ripened to ownership, the latter
to be determined in an appropriate proceeding.

Two (2) years after the SC promulgated the said decision, a Supplementary Report, dated
December 13, 1993, was submitted in LRC Case No. N-9293 by Director Silverio Perez of the
Land Registration Authority, recommending to the court that "the applicants (i.e., the Franciscos)
be ordered to submit a subdivision plan of Lot 6 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-240150
covered by TCT No. 2095, together with the corresponding technical descriptions duly approved
by the Regional Technical Director by segregating therefrom the parcels of land described as
Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 in plan Psu-04-001463 decided in favor of the applicants and the issuance of
new [transfer certificates of title]by the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal, in accordance with
the decision of the Supreme Court" x x x.

On March 13, 1995, the Franciscos, as applicants a quo moved for a transfer of venue to
the newly created RTC of Binangonan, Rizal. The case was then raffled to Branch 69 of said
court, where at the same application for registration was docketed as Land Registration Case No.
95-0004.

In the herein other assailed Order dated March 23, 1998, the Binangonan RTC directed
the Register of Deeds of Rizal to issue transfer certificates of title in favor of the applicant
Franciscos covering the subject parcels of land which are now technically identified as Lot 6-B,
Lot 6-C, Lot 6-D, and Lot 6-E in relation to Lot 6-A of plan Psu-04-083681 in accordance with
the recommendation of the Land Registration Authority in its Supplementary Report dated
December 13, 1993 and [the] decision of the SC in G.R. No. 84966;– in the names of applicants
who are hereby declared to be the owners and bona fide occupants of the land in question, with
possession for more than 30 years since the time that started way back during the American
regime, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, which has ripened into ownership, in
the following proportion or interest, to wit:

1) Carmen V. Francisco, married to Thomas Whalen, of legal age, and residing at

Angono, Rizal – 1/3
2) Rodolfo V. Francisco, married to Teofila Gil, of legal age, and residing at Angono,
Rizal – 1/3
3) Carmela V. Francisco, single, of legal age, and residing at Angono, Rizal – 1/3

Meanwhile, on January 3, 2001, the herein respondents- Rojases – filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the CA for the purpose already stated at the threshold hereof,
claiming that they came to know of the existence of Land Registration Case No. 95-0004 only
"sometime in June 2000" when a real estate agent by the name of Florentina Rivera discovered
the same and brought it to their knowledge.

On July 29, 2000, the subject parcels of land were eventually registered in the names of
petitioner and his sisters, Carmen and Carmela with the issuance of TCT Nos. M-102009, M-
102010, M-102011, and M-102012, covering lots 6-E, 6-C, 6-D, and 6-B, respectively.

The CA, on the petition for certiorari and prohibition ruled in favor of respondents-
Rojases. It annulled and set aside the Decision dated September 15, 1977, and the subsequent
Orders dated February 22, 1978, March 23, 1978 and May 8, 2000 of the respondent court and
its predecessor, the then Br.10, RTC of Rizal, in Land Registration Case No. 95-0004.
Consequently, CTC Nos. M-102012, M-102010, and M-102009 issued pursuant thereto by the
Register of Deeds at Morong, Rizal are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Petitioner moved for
a reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision, but it was denied by the CA. Hence, petitioner
appealed to the SC.

Issue/s:

Whether or not an action for reconveyance is the proper proceeding in the present case.

Held:

Yes, an action for reconveyance is the proper proceeding in the present case.

One of the appropriate legal remedies that should have been availed of by the Franciscos
is an action for reconveyance. Contrary to his declaration, proof of actual fraud is not required as
it may be filed even when no fraud intervened such as when there is mistake in including the
land for registration. In the action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly respected
as incontrovertible; what is sought instead is the transfer of the property wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another’s name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right.

An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from the discovery
of the fraud and if it is based on an implied or a constructive trust it prescribes ten (10) years
from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. However, an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is
imprescriptible if the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. 

In a long line of cases decided by the Court, an action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property. However, there is an exception to this rule that is, when the plaintiff is in
possession of the land to be reconveyed. The Court in a series of cases, has permitted the filing
of an action for reconveyance despite the lapse of more than ten (10) years from the issuance of
title to the land and declared that said action, when based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as
the land has not passed to an innocent buyer for value. But in all those cases, the common factual
backdrop was that the registered owners were never in possession of the disputed property. The
exception was based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for
fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.

The Court ruled that prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of
the disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession
gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. The Court held that where the plaintiff in
an action for reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, the action for reconveyance
becomes in effect an action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription. The
Court also declared that imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in
possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the
property title, which does not prescribe.

There was no doubt about the fact that an action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust ordinarily prescribes in ten (10) years. This rule assumes, however, that there is an actual
need to initiate that action, for when the right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly
or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the statute of limitation
would yet be irrelevant. An action for reconveyance, if nonetheless brought, would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, or its equivalent, an action that is imprescriptible.

In the case at bar, the Franciscos have based their claim to ownership of the subject lots
on the alleged fact of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Their application represented to the land
registration court that the parcels of land subjects of the case were unregistered and not yet
brought within the coverage of the Torrens system of registration. These are obvious as they filed
an application pursuant to Chapter III (I) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) by following the ordinary registration proceedings for the confirmation of
their title. Specifically, under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, three requisites must be satisfied: (1)
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12,
1945 or earlier; (2) pertains to alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and (3) under
a bona fide claim of ownership.

As the very nature of the action limits the subject matter to alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, an ordinary registration proceeding cannot be availed of by the Franciscos
in order to establish claims over lands which had already been brought within the coverage of the
Torrens system. Chapter III (I) of PD 1529 does not provide that original registration
proceedings can be automatically and unilaterally converted into a proceeding for the issuance of
new TCT involving parcels of land already registered under the Torrens system. Certainly, it is
improper to make a legal short-cut by implementing the judgment of the land registration court
against the parcels of land in the names of the Rojases and Guidos under the guise that it is
contemplated in Guido.

A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already
decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. Issuance of another decree
covering the same land is, therefore, null and void.

The rationale behind the Torrens System is that the public should be able to rely on a
registered title. The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. As held by the Court, the real purpose
of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality.
Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa" to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

It is clear that the March 23, 1998 Order of the RTC Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69,
which purports to merely enforce the September 15, 1977 Decision of the RTC, disturbs the
stability of TCT No. M-2095, a collateral attack that is impermissible under Section 48 of PD
1529 and well-entrenched jurisprudence. After the promulgation of the Guido on November 21,
1991, it can no longer be said that an original registration proceeding is proper, since Guido held
that Decreto No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 (the mother title from which TCT No. M-2095 was
derived) are genuine and authentic. What the land registration court should have done was to
dismiss the application for registration upon learning that the same property was already covered
by a valid TCT. The Court reiterates that, unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land
in a land registration or cadastral proceeding does not become final and incontrovertible until
after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration and that until
such time the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding
continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. Until then the
court rendering the decree may, after hearing, set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the
land to another person.
Doctrine: Land Registration (Venue and Jurisdiction)

"As long as a final decree has not been entered by the LRA and the period of one (1) year
has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it."

Case Title: Nicomedes J. Lozada v. Eulalia Bracewell, et. al, G.R. No. 179155
(J.Perlas-Bernabe) (April 2, 2014)

Facts:

On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for registration and confirmation
of title over a parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514, which was granted on February 23,
1989 by the RTC of Makati City. Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the LRA issued Decree No.
N-217036 in the name of petitioner, who later obtained OCT No. 0-78.

On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the aforementioned decree,
James Bracewell, Jr. (Bracewell) filed a petition for review of a decree of registration under
Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529 (Property Registration Decree) before the RTC
of Las Piñas City. He claimed that a portion of Plan PSU-129514, consisting of 3,097 square
meters identified as Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598 (subject lot) – of which he is the absolute owner
and possessor – is fraudulently included in Decree No. N-217036. He allegedly filed on
September 19, 1963 an application for registration and confirmation of the subject lot, as well as
of Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated in Las Piñas City, which was granted by the
RTC of Makati City on May 3, 1989. He further averred that petitioner deliberately concealed
the fact that he (Bracewell) is one of the adjoining owners, and left him totally ignorant of the
registration proceedings involving the lots covered by Plan PSU-129514. Instead of impleading
him, petitioner listed Bracewell’s grandmother, Maria Cailles, as an adjoining owner, although
she had already died by that time.

Petitioner countered that Bracewell is a mere interloper with respect to the subject lot,
which the Bureau of Lands had long declared to be part and parcel of Plan PSU-129514. He
argued that his Plan PSU-129514 was approved way back in 1951 whereas Bracewell’s Plan
PSU-180598 was surveyed only in 1960, and stated that the latter plan, in fact, contained a
footnote that a portion known as Lot 5, i.e., the subject lot, is a portion of the parcel of land
covered by Plan PSU-129514.

The overlapping was confirmed by LRA Director Felino M. Cortez in his 2nd
Supplementary Report dated August 5, 1996, which was submitted to the RTC of Makati City.
The report contains a recommendation that petitioner be ordered to cause the amendment of Plan
PSU-129514 in view of Bracewell’s claims.

The RTC of Las Piñas City ruled in favor of Bracewell, who had died during the
pendency of the case and was substituted by Eulalia Bracewell and his heirs (respondents).
Accordingly, it directed the LRA to set aside Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78, and
ordered petitioner to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 and to segregate therefrom the
subject lot. It faulted petitioner for deliberately preventing respondents from participating and
objecting to his application for registration when the documentary evidence showed that, as early
as 1962, Bracewell had been paying taxes for the subject lot; and that he (Bracewell) was
recognized as the owner thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands way back in 1965, as well
as in the City Assessor's Office.

The CA affirmed the decision of RTC, Las Piñas City. It held that respondents were able
to substantiate their claim of actual fraud in the procurement of Decree No. N-217036, which is
the only ground that may be invoked in a petition for review of a decree of registration under
Section 32 of PD 1529. Since the petition for review was filed within one (1) year from the
issuance of the questioned decree, and considering that the subject lot is located in Las Piñas
City, the RTC of said city had jurisdiction over the case. It further declared that: (a) there was no
need to submit the case a quo for conciliation proceedings because the LRA, which is an
instrumentality of the government, had been impleaded; (b) no forum shopping was committed
because the petition for review of the decree of registration before the Las Piñas City-RTC and
the application for land registration then pending before the Court involved different parties and
issues; and (c) the award of attorney’s fees was well within the sound discretion of the RTC.

Before the SC, petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Las Piñas City-RTC which set
aside and nullified the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City that had not yet become
final and was still within its exclusive control and discretion because the one (1) year period
within which the decree of registration issued by the LRA could be reviewed has not yet elapsed.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the Las Piñas City-RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for review of
Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as a result of the judgment rendered by the RTC of
Makati City.

Held:

Yes, the RTC, Las Piñas City has jurisdiction over the petition for review of Decree No.
N-217036, which was issued as a result of the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City.

Under Act No. 496 (Act 496), or the "Land Registration Act," as amended, which was the
law in force at the time of the commencement by both parties of their respective registration
proceedings – jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title was conferred upon the
Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the land sought
to be registered is situated.

The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD 1529, which took effect
on January 23, 1979, and under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land
registration is still vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city where the land is
situated.

Worth noting is the explanation proffered by respondents in their comment to the instant
petition that when petitioner filed his land registration case in December 1976, jurisdiction over
applications for registration of property situated in Las Piñas City was vested in the RTC of
Makati City in view of the fact that there were no RTC branches yet in the Las Piñas City at that
time. Bracewell’s own application over Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598, all situated in
Las Piñas City, was thus granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58.

Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," was enacted and took effect on August 14, 1981, authorizing the
creation of RTCs in different judicial regions, including the RTC of Las Piñas City as part of the
National Capital Judicial Region. As pointed out by the court a quo in its Decision dated July 31,
2003, the RTC of Las Piñas City was established "in or about 1994." Understandably, in
February 1998, Bracewell sought the review of Decree No. N-217036 before the Las Piñas City-
RTC, considering that the lot subject of this case is situated in Las Piñas City.

Petitioner maintains that the petition for review should have been filed with the RTC of
Makati City, which rendered the assailed decision and ordered the issuance of Decree No. N-
217036.

It should be pointed out, however, that with the passage of PD 1529, the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it
as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and determine all
questions, even contentious and substantial ones, arising from applications for original
registration of titles to lands and petitions filed after such registration. 47 Accordingly, and
considering further that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure
and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction, 48 petitioner cannot now rely on the Joson
pronouncement to advance its theory.

Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the review of a decree of registration falls within the
jurisdiction of and, hence, should be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance.”

Since the LRA’s issuance of a decree of registration only proceeds from the land
registration court’s directive, a petition taken under Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review
of the land registration court’s ruling. As such, case law instructs that for "as long as a final
decree has not been entered by the LRA and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from
the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it."

While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati City, which rendered the
decision directing the LRA to issue Decree No. N-217036, and should, applying the general rule
as above-stated, be the same court before which a petition for the review of Decree No. N-
217036 is filed, the Court must consider the circumstantial milieu in this case that, in the interest
of orderly procedure, warrants the filing of the said petition before the Las Piñas City-RTC.

Particularly, the Court refers to the fact that the application for original registration in this
case was only filed before the RTC of Makati Citybecause, during that time, i.e., December
1976, Las Piñas City had no RTC. Barring this situation, the aforesaid application should not
have been filed before the RTC of Makati City pursuant to the rules on venue prevailing at that
time. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which took effect on January
1, 1964, the proper venue for real actions, such as an application for original registration, lies
with the CFI of the province where the property is situated, viz.:

Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.— (a) Real actions. — Actions affecting title to,
or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the
property or any part thereof lies.

As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las Piñas City, the application
for its original registration should have been filed before the Las Piñas City-RTC were it not for
the fact that the said court had yet to be created at the time the application was filed. Be that as it
may, and considering further that the complication at hand is actually one of venue and not of
jurisdiction (given that RTCs do retain jurisdiction over review of registration decree cases
pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529), the Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of the situation, holds
that the Las Piñas City-RTC has the authority over the petition for the review of Decree No. N-
217036 filed in this case.
Doctrine: Indefeasibility of Torrens Title (Prescription)

“Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration must be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree. In the case of
public land grants or patents, the one-year period commences from the issuance of the patent by
the government.”

Case Title: Republic v. Bejamin Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168 (J.Garcia) (March 28, 2006)

Facts:

Sometime in December 1964, respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed with the Bureau of
Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) a Miscellaneous Sales Application covering a parcel of
land situated at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City. Upon favorable report and recommendation of the
District Land Officer, Guerrero’s application was approved per Order of Award with the
boundaries of the land awarded specified as follows: N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801; S-Culiat
Creek; E-Road; and W-Public Land. A sketch of the land awarded is contained at the back of the
Order of Award.

Subsequently, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 was issued in favor of respondent
under OCT No. 0-28. On July 29, 1983, one Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the
Bureau of Lands claiming that respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud, false
statement of facts and/or omission of material facts considering that 174 square meters awarded
to respondent covered the land where her house is situated and where she has been residing since
1961.

A formal investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands, after which the Director
of Lands issued an order dismissing the protest of Angelina Z. Bustamante. The dismissal of the
protest was affirmed by the then Minister of Natural Resources and by the Office of the President
in a Decision dated July 22, 1985. The case was remanded to the DENR as ordered by the
President for the latter’s office to conduct an ocular investigation and resurvey of the disputed
area as per MR filed by Bustamante.

Pursuant to the order of the Office of the President, an ocular investigation and relocation
survey was conducted by the DENR. A report was thereafter submitted with a finding that 83
square meters of the titled property of Guerrero consisting of 174 square meters is under
ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION of Marcelo Bustamante (husband of Angelina
Bustamante) with only 91 square meters under the physical possession of Guerrero. It was also
found out that OCT No. 0-28 is supposed to be traversed by a road 3 meters wide, as even the
Order of Award in favor of Guerrero, shows by the boundaries of the land indicated therein, viz:
bounded on the N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801, S-Culiat Creek, E-Road and W-Public Land.

On January 10, 1989, the Office of the President, upon receipt of the DENR Ocular
Investigation and Relocation Survey Report, issued an order directing the DENR to implement
the Report for the ‘proper correction’ of the technical description of the land covered by OCT
No. 0-28 issued to respondent.

Pursuant to the directive of the Office of the President, the Director of Lands on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines instituted the instant action Petition for Amendment of Plan and
Technical Description of OCT No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero on November 7,
1989.

On April 6, 1990, respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed a motion to dismiss the petition,
alleging among other things, that the RTC of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the
Director of Lands’ petition and that the said petition was defective in form and substance,
inasmuch as it failed to name Guerrero who holds a OCT No. 0-28 over the properties subject of
the petition, as respondent in the action, and that the title sought to be amended was irrevocable
and can no longer be questioned.

In its order dated July 8, 1992, the lower court denied the said motion to dismiss for lack
of merit. Trial of the petition followed with the Director of Lands, on one hand, and Guerrero, on
the other, presenting their respective evidence and witnesses.

On July 13, 1995, the RTC, on the postulate that petitioner Republic failed to prove its
allegation that respondent obtained the sales patent and the certificate of title through fraud and
misrepresentation, rendered judgment finding for the latter. The trial court likewise ruled that the
original certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) in the name of respondent acquired the characteristics
of indefeasibility after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of registration.

The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that it is a settled rule that a
certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is as conclusive
and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued upon private lands in ordinary or cadastral
registration proceedings. The effect of registration of a homestead or any other similar patent and
the issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title to the
land, in the same manner as if ownership had been determined by final decree of the court, and
the title so issued is absolutely conclusive and indisputable.

Issue/s:

Whether or not a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public
lands is conclusive and indefeasible despite the fact that respondent’s title was procured through
fraud and misrepresentation.

Held:

Yes, a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is
conclusive and indefeasible despite the fact that respondent’s title was procured through fraud
and misrepresentation.

It bears to stress that the property in question, while once part of the lands of the public
domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens
certificate. Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system by Act
No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens system of registration, the
government is required to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person
named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as
thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. As it were, the Torrens system aims to
obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the
Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part
of the registered owner, the system gives him complete peace of mind that he would be secured
in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.

Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes
registered land. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an
indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon. However,
Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an action
to reopen or revise a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud.

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an
intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public
interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done with an actual design
to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons. Fraud may also be either extrinsic or
intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in
the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated
therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and thus
prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.

The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic fraud had been
accepted and is contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration.
Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a
deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are; or in willfully
misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the party
entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about
the identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to withdraw his
application. In all these examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case.
The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.

The Court have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted
where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not collateral, and has
been controverted and decided. Thus, we have underscored the denial of relief where it appears
that the fraud consisted in the presentation at the trial of a supposed forged document, or a false
and perjured testimony, or in basing the judgment on a fraudulent compromise agreement, or in
the alleged fraudulent acts or omissions of the counsel which prevented the petitioner from
properly presenting the case.

Petitioner fails to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to justify a review of
the decree constitute actual and extrinsic fraud. It has not adduced adequate evidence that would
show that respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and the
corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from
asserting its right over the lot in question and from properly presenting its case by reason of such
fraud.

Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the
burden of proof. The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate
it in each case. It may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many
different ways. Thus, the law requires that fraud be established, not just by preponderance of
evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.

This Court agrees with the RTC that the issuance of the sales patent over the subject lot
was made in accordance with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation
should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the veracity of the material facts set out in
the application. The law also requires sufficient notice to the municipality and barrio where the
land is located in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims.

Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud, petitioner failed to avail
itself of the remedy within the prescribed period. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration must be filed within one year from the date of
entry of said decree.

In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period commences from the
issuance of the patent by the government.

In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent on August 16, 1982, while
petitioner instituted an action to amend respondent’s certificate of title on November 7, 1989 or
after the lapse of more than seven (7) years from the issuance of the patent. Clearly, petitioner
failed to timely avail of the remedy to contest Guerrero’s title.
 Prescription, basically, does not run against the State and the latter may still bring an
action, even after the lapse of one year, for the reversion to the public domain of lands which
have been fraudulently granted to private individuals. However, this remedy of reversion can
only be availed of in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or
certificates of title. In the present case, petitioner cannot successfully invoke this defense for, as
discussed earlier, it was never proven that respondent’s patent and title were obtained through
actual fraud or other illegal means.

A piece of land covered by a registered patent and the corresponding certificate of title
ceases to be part of the public domain. As such, it is considered a private property over which the
Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.

While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a sales patent in favor of
respondent, the protest was, however, filed with the Bureau of Lands instead of with the regional
trial court as mandated by the aforequoted provision of Section 38 of Act No. 496. Said
provision expressly states that a petition for review of a decree of registration shall be filed in the
"proper Court of First Instance" (now Regional Trial Court). The law did not say that such
petition may be filed with an administrative agency like the Bureau of Lands. To be sure, what
the law contemplates in allowing a review of the decree of registration is a full-blown trial before
a regular court where each party could be afforded full opportunity to present his/its case and
where each of them must establish his case by preponderance of evidence and not by mere
substantial evidence, the usual quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings.

As the review of a decree of registration constitutes an attack on the very integrity of land
titles and the Torrens system, a full-blown trial on the merits before a regular court is necessary
for the purpose of achieving a more in-depth and thorough determination of all issues involved.

Hence, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the protest filed by Bustamante with the Bureau
of Lands cannot be considered in the context of a petition to review the decree of registration
issued to respondent. It was only on November 7, 1989 that such petition was filed by the
Director of Lands with the RTC and obviously, it was way beyond the one-year period
prescribed by law.

It is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect
their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not run
the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be
unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would
be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land
conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the
worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued
thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.

While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of
registration of titles to lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to
bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of
proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of
the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the
legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the
registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens
system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials,
who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.

Respondent’s certificate of title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was
thus vested with the garment of indefeasibility.
Doctrine: Indefeasibility of Torrens Title (Exception)

“Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired
interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Stated differently,
placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership
thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
evidence of ownership.”

Case Title: Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa v. Heirs of Jose Baccud, et. al,
G.R. No. 187633 (J.Jardeleza) (April 4, 2016)

Facts:

On September 9, 1999, petitioners Delfin Tappa (Delfin) and Maria Tappa (Spouses

Tappa) filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages
(Complaint) against respondents Jose Bacud (Bacud), Henry Calabazaron (Calabazaron), and
Vicente Malupeng (Malupeng). The property subject of the complaint is a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 3341, Pls-793 with an area of 21,879 square meters, located in Kongcong,
Cabbo, Pefiablanca, Cagayan (Lot No. 3341).

Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot No. 3341, having been
issued an Original Certificate of Title No. P-69103 (OCT No. P-69103) on September 18, 1992,
by virtue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194.  Delfin allegedly inherited Lot No. 3341 from his
father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed that both Delfin and Lorenzo were in
open, continuous, notorious, exclusive possession of the lot since time immemorial. 

On the other hand, respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the
original owner of Lot No. 3341 was Genaro Tappa (Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo and
Irene. Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene by operation of law;
and they became ipso facto  co-owners of the property. As co-owners, Lorenzo and Irene each
owned 10,939 square meters of the lot as their respective shares. Lorenzo had children namely,
Delfin, Primitiva, and Fermina. Upon the death of Irene, her share in turn passed to her heirs,
Demetria, Juanita, Pantaleon and Jose Bacud. 

During trial respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit dated April 29, 1963
(1963 Affidavit) signed by Delfin, his sisters, Primitiva and Fermina, and their mother, Modesta
Angoluan.  The 1963 affidavit stated that Genaro originally owned Lot No. 3341. It further stated
that one-half of the property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole property was declared as
his, only for taxation purposes.

Calabazaron claimed that he became the owner of 2,520 square meters of Lot No. 3341
by virtue of two Deeds of Sale executed in his favor, one dated October 12, 1970 executed by
Demetria, and another dated August 22, 1971 executed by Juanita.  After the sale, Calabazaron
entered into possession of his portion and paid the real property taxes.  He remains in possession
up to this date.  Malupeng, on the other hand, claimed that he became the owner of 210 square
meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on November 30, 1970 by
Pantaleon in his favor.  After the sale, Malupeng entered into possession of his portion of
property and paid the real property taxes.  He remains in possession up to this date.  Bacud
claimed ownership over 1,690 square meters of Lot No. 3341 in his own right as heir of Irene.

Respondents started occupying their respective portions after the sale made to each of
them. They continued to occupy them despite several demands to vacate from Spouses Tappa.
Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed through force and
intimidation. Bacud and Malupeng denied this allegation.
 The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring to be the owners of Lot 3341and
unqualifiedly vests in them the full and untrammeled rights of ownership. Respondents were
ordered to convey the subject property to the petitioners. The RTC found that there was no
document in the hands of respondents as strong and persuasive as the title in the name of the
Spouses Tappa that will support respondents' claim of ownership and Irene's antecedent
ownership. The RTC stated that the 1963 Affidavit contains nothing more than the allegations of
the affiants and does not, by itself, constitute proof of ownership of land, especially as against
documents such as titles.

The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC holding that respondents’ possession
over Lot No. 3341 already ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription. The CA
ruled further that the two indispensable requisites for an action to quiet title under Articles 476
and 477 of the Civil Code were not met. 

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the action for quieting of title filed by Spouses Tappa against
respondent should prosper.

2. Whether or not there was a collateral attack on the certificate of title of Spouses
Tappa; and

Held:

1. No, the action for quieting of title filed by Spouses Tappa against respondent should
NOT prosper.

Under the rule, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two
requisites.

First, Spouses Tappa's claim of legal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free patent
and the certificate of title, OCT No. P-69103 issued in their name cannot stand. The certificate of
title indjcates that it was issued by virtue of Patent No. 021519-92-3194. We agree with the CA
that at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had already become private land
by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by respondents. Hence,
Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the coverage of the Public Land Act, which governs public
patent applications.

The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects whatsoever. Private ownership of land-as when there is a prima
facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants-is not
affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land Law applies
only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to
lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership.

In a case, the Court cancelled the titles issued pursuant to a free patent after finding that
the lots involved were privately owned since time immemorial. A free patent that purports to
convey land to which the Government did not have any title at the time of its issuance does not
vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. 

In this case, the parties were able to show that Lot No. 3341 was occupied by, and has
been in possession of the Tappa family, even before the 1963 Affidavit was executed. After the
execution of the 1963 Affidavit, respondents occupied their respective portions of the property.
Delfin testified that before his father, Lorenzo, died in 1961, Lorenzo had been occupying the lot
since before the war, and that Delfin was born there in 1934.

Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation purposes as early as 1948,
and paid the real property taxes (evidenced by real property tax payment receipts in the name of
Lorenzo from 1952 until his death in 1961). Spouses Tappa were likewise shown to pay the real
property taxes from 1961 to 2000. Similarly, respondents also declared their respective portions
of Lot No. 3341 for taxation in their names in 1994, and paid real property taxes on those
portions from 1967 to 2004. Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner,
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. 

Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in 1963, Bacud and
Malupeng started occupying portions of Lot No. 3341 and planted crops on the property, while
Calabazaron did the same on another portion of the lot in the 1970's. The complaint stated further
that since 1963. the respondents "continuously occupied portion of the subject land." 

In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 3341, the property had been segregated from the
public domain.  At the time the patent and the certificate of title were issued in 1992, Spouses
Tappa and their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession, at least to the half of the lot,
since 1934; and respondents were also in possession of the other half since 1963. Therefore, the
free patent issued covers a land already segregated from the public domain. As ruled by the
Court in of the cases, open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land by a person and their predecessors in interests, they are deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. The land was thus segregated from the public domain and the director of lands had no
authority to issue a patent. Hence, the free patent covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the
certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are void.

Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents' possession of the
disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. They even admitted such possession (since 1963) by
respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. Despite this, Spouses Tappa were able to obtain a
free patent of the whole property even if they were not in possession of some of its portions.
Therefore, Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194 and OCT No. P-69103 are void not only because it
covers a private land, but also because they fraudulently included respondents' portion of the
property. In a case, the Court held that "if a person obtains a title under the Torrens system,
which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system,
he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally
included."

In an action to quiet title, legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title
means beneficial ownership.  As discussed, the free patent and the certificate of title issued to
Spouses Tappa could not be the source of their legal title.

The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. The Court found that
although an instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses
Tappa's title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa's rights
to the property.

A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or
claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in
truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated)
or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.
 The 1963 Affidavit it is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It is dated and
appears to be executed and signed by Delfin, his mother, and sisters. It is also notarized by a
public notary. It states that Genaro originally owns the land described, and that one-half (l/2) of
which is actually owned by Irene as a co-heir. This is contrary to the claim of Spouses Tappa that
the property was solely Lorenzo's. Respondents' argue that this affidavit evidences the title of
their predecessor-in-interest over Lot No. 3341 and effectively, theirs.

The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA
correctly found that Spouses Tappa's claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the 1963
Affidavit was "unsubstantiated." The CA pointed out that, "[a]side from the testimony of Delfin
Tappa, no other evidence was presented to prove the claim of force and intimidation, hence, it is
at most, self-serving." Also, the 1963 Affidavit was duly notarized and, as such, is considered a
public document, and enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution.

Hence, the requisites for an action to quiet title are wanting in this case.

2. No, the certificate of title of Spouses Taapa was not collaterally attacked.

Section 48 of PD 1529, provides that "a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law." This rule is not applicable in this case.

As ruled by the Court, what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds. By title,
the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document." Ownership is different from
a certificate of title, the latter being only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land.  Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used. Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee,
or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of
the certificate of title. Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens
system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot
always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.

In this case, what respondents dispute, as raised in their Answer, is Spouses Tappa's
claim of sole ownership over Lot No. 3341. As affirmative defense, respondents claimed that
Spouses Tappa were owners of only one-half (1/2) of the lot since it was originally owned by
Genaro, the father of Lorenzo and Irene.  Respondents claim that Lorenzo and Irene became ipso
facto  co-owners of the lot.  Thus, respondents claim that, by virtue of a valid transfer from
Irene's heirs, they now have ownership and title over portions of Lot No. 3341, and that they
have been in continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of their occupied
portions. Malupeng and Calabazaron claim ownership and title over their respective portions by
virtue of a valid sale. Bacud claims ownership and title by virtue of succession. Therefore, it is
the ownership and title of Spouses Tappa which respondents ultimately attack. OCT No. P-
69103 only serves as the document representing Spouses Tappas' title.

Respondents cannot likewise argue that the certificate of title of Spouses Tappa is
indefeasible. The Court has already ruled that the one-year prescriptive period does not apply
when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the property. This
is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title, which is imprescriptible. In this case,
respondents have been proved to be in possession of the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341.
Thus, their claim against Spouses Tappa cannot be barred by the one-year prescriptive period.