SAROCAM VS INTERORIENT MARITIME 493 SCRA 502 (2006)
ESTOP HIM FROM CLAIMING DISABILITY BENEFITS UDNER THE POEA
FACTS: On June 27, 2000, petitioner Benjamin Sarocam was hired by
Interorient Maritime and Demaco United Ltd., for 12-month contract
as “bosun” on borad M/V Despina. While navigating to China,
Sarocam suffered lumbar sprain when he accidentally fell from a
ladder. On Nov 15, 2000, he was examined and was found to have
neuromyositis and diabetes. The examining physician prescribed
medicine and recommended signing of and hospitalization. He was
repatriated on Nov 30, 2000.
On Dec 5, 2000, petitioner was referred to the company-designated
physician. Sarocam was given medicine for his back pain and diabetes
and was advised to return for a checkup. On Dec 13, he returned to
the clinic with normal results; petitioner was then declared “fit for
duty.”
On Mar 20, 2001, petitioner executed a release and quitclaim in favor
of his Interorient Maritime where he acknowledged receipt of $405 as
sick wages. However on Nov 2001, petitioner filed a complaint with
NLRC for disability benefit, illness allowance/reimbursement of
medical expenses, damages and fees. To support his claim, he
presented medical certificates issued by his 3 personal doctors,
recommending Grade VIII disability under POEA schedule of disability
grading.
LA dismissed the complaint citing that he was not entitled to disability
benefits because he was declared fit for duty and had previously
executed a release and quitclaim in favor of his employers and had
already received his sickness allowance. NLRC affirmed the same.
Sarocam’s argument: the quitclaim he executed is invalid, as the
amount he received was much lower than what he should have
received under the POEA standard employment contract. Quitclaims
are frowned upon by the courts as they are contrary to public policy.
ISSUES: W/N SAROCAM’S EXECUTION OF A RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM
STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
HELD: While the petitioner may be correct in stating that quitclaims
are frowned upon for being contrary to public policy, the Court has,
likewise recognized legitimate waivers that represent voluntary and
reasonable settlement of a worker’s claim which should be respected
as the law between the parties. Where the person making the
waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof,
and consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as being a valid and binding
undertaking.
In the present case, Sarocam wrote the release and quitclaim with his
own hand. From the document itself, the element of voluntariness in
its execution is evident. He also appears to have fully understood the
contents of the document he was signing, as the important provision
thereof had been relayed to him in Filipino.
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If
the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later
be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where
there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are
unconscionable on its face, the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person
making the waiver did so voluntarily, and the consideration for the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.
Let it be emphasized that the constitutional policy to provide full
protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress
employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does
not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right.

DAYAN V. BPI 369 SCRA 712 (2001)
FACTS:
 Petitioner Rogelio C. Dayan (Dayan) started his employment
on 30 June 1956 with the Commercial Bank and Trust
Company (CBTC). CBTC was eventually absorbed by the Bank
of the Philippine Islands (BPI) where Dayan was maintained as
employee.
 In 1981, Dayan was promoted Administrative Assistant by
respondent bank in its centralized accounting office. He held
several positions thereafter - Assistant Manager of Internal
Operations in 1983, Assistant Manager of Correspondent Bank
in 1988, Assistant Manager of Branch Operations in 1990,
Assistant Manager of the Supplies Inventory in 1991, and then
Senior Assistant Manager of the Supplies Inventory in 1991-
1992. In addition to the series of promotions, Dayan was the
recipient of various commendations.
 December 1991, the post of Purchasing Officer became
vacant. The vacated position was offered to Dayan which he
initially declined but, due to the insistence of his superiors, he
later
accepted on a temporary basis in February 1993.
 10 June 1993, Asst VP Gerlanda E. De Castro of the bank, in a
memorandum, placed petitioner under suspension.
 Dayan is placed under suspension due to matters presented to
him in a meeting on the same morning of the suspension
memo.
 It appears that BPI conducted earlier interviews regarding
supposed malpractices committed by Dayan during his term as
Purchasing Officer. The report signed and noted by Rololfo
Bernejo (Mgr) and Victor Guillermo (Sr Mgr) contained alleged
misconduct such as asking for 5% commission on purchase
orders, “donations totaling 5K” for medical bills, overpricing
BPI Family Bank’s passbook, etc. The report also made
negative findings and observations about his work
performance.
 14 June 1993, petitioner wrote a memorandum to the bank
narrating what had transpired in his meeting with the bank on
10 June 1993 where he denied all the accusations against him
and contested his preventive suspension. His denials and plea
for compassion notwithstanding, petitioner was dismissed by
respondent bank via a notice of termination, dated 25
October 1993, signed by AVP Gerlanda de Castro.
  In a letter of confession, dated 28 October 1993, petitioner
ultimately admitted his infractions and instead asked for
financial assistance. He, at the same time, executed an
undated "Release Waiver and Quitclaim" acknowledging
receipt of P400,000.00 financial assistance from the bank and
thereby releasing and discharging it from any action or claim
arising from his employment with the bank and membership
in the retirement plan.
 Subsequently, however, petitioner claimed that the letter
and the quitclaim were signed by him under duress.
 On 14 February 1994, he filed a case for Illegal Dismissal and
Illegal Suspension, with a prayer for an award of retirement
benefits, before the Labor Arbiter.
 In his decision of 30 June 1995, the Labor Arbiter upheld the
validity of the dismissal of petitioner based on loss of trust
and confidence and denied his claim for retirement benefits
and damages.
 On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the labor
arbiter and declared the dismissal to be illegal on the ground
that petitioner was denied due process ratiocinating that a
hearing should have been afforded petitioner for a chance to
confront the witnesses against him.
 BPI filed with SC, a petition for certiorari questioning the NLRC
decision. The Court referred the petition to CA. The appellate
court reversed the judgment of the NLRC.
 In its petition for review before the SC, petitioner argues that
the CA has wrongly relied on unsworn statements taken by
the bank from its contractual employees. Petitioner believes
that the factual conclusions of the NLRC which has acquired
expertise on the matters entrusted to it should have instead
been respected by the appellate court.
ISSUE: WON CA committed an error in granting Dayan’s dismissal;
WON the respondent should be reinstated in BPI
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating
the decision of the Labor Arbiter and setting aside the NLRC's decision
is AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals was convinced that petitioners dismissal had
been justified under Article 282 of the Labor Code
A bank, its operation being essentially imbued with public interest,
owes great fidelity to the public it deals with. In turn, it cannot be
compelled to continue in its employ a person in whom it has lost trust
and confidence and whose continued employment would patently be
inimical to the bank interest. The law, in protecting the rights of labor,
authorized neither oppression nor self-destruction of an employer
company which itself is possessed of rights that must be entitled to
recognition and respect
The lack of notice and hearing is considered as being a mere failure to
observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes
the dismissal ineffectual but not necessarily illegal. The procedural
infirmity is then remedied by ordering the payment to the employee
his full backwages from the start of his dismissal until the court finally
rules that the dismissal has been for a valid cause.
FRANCISCO V. NLRC 500 SCRA 690 (2007)
FACTS: In 1995, petitioner was hired by Kasei Corporation. She was
designated as Accountant and Corporate Secretary and was assigned
to handle all the accounting needs of the company.

 She was also designated as Liaison Officer to secure licenses for
the initial operation of the company.
 In 1996, petitioner was designated Acting Manager.
 As Acting Manager, petitioner was assigned to handle recruitment
of all employees and perform management administration
functions; represent the company in all dealings with government
agencies, especially with the BIR, SSS and in the city government
of Makati; and to administer all other matters pertaining to the
operation of Kasei Restaurant which is owned and operated by
Kasei Corporation.
 For five years, petitioner performed the duties of Acting Manager.
As of December 31, 2000 her salary was P27,500.00.
 In January 2001, petitioner was replaced by Fuentes as Manager.
 Petitioner alleged that she was required to sign a prepared
resolution for her replacement but she was assured that she
would still be connected with Kasei Corporation.
 Then, the designated Treasurer, Acedo, convened a meeting of all
employees of Kasei Corporation and announced that petitioner
was still connected with Kasei Corporation as Technical Assistant.
 Thereafter, Sept. 2001, Kasei Corporation reduced her salary by
P2,500.00 a month.
 Petitioner was not paid her mid-year bonus allegedly because the
company was not earning well.
 In October 2001, petitioner did not receive her salary from the
company.
 She made repeated follow-ups with the company but she was
advised that the company was not earning well.
 On October 15, 2001, petitioner asked for her salary from Acedo
but she was informed that she is no longer connected with the
company.
 Since she was no longer paid her salary, petitioner did not report
for work and filed an action for constructive dismissal before the
labor arbiter.
ISSUE: WON there was an employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and private respondent Kasei Corporation
HELD: The SC held that there has been no uniform test to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relation.
The better approach would therefore be to adopt a two-tiered test
involving:
 (1) the putative employer's power to control the employee
with respect to the means and methods by which the work is
to be accomplished; and
 (2) the underlying economic realities of the activity
orrelationship.
This is especially appropriate in this case where there is no written
agreement or terms of reference to base the relationship on; and due
to the complexity of the relationship based on the various positions
and responsibilities given to the worker over the period of the latter's
employment.
Thus, the determination of the relationship between employer and
employee depends upon the circumstances of the whole economic
activity, such as:
 (1) the extent to which the services performed are an integral
part of the employer's business;
 (2) the extent of the worker's investment in equipment and
facilities;
 (3) the nature and degree of control exercised by the
employer; (4) the worker's opportunity for profit and loss;
 (5) the amount of initiative, skill,judgment or foresight
required for the success of the claimed independent
enterprise;
  (6) the permanency and duration of the relationship between
the worker and the employer; and
 (7) the degree of dependency of the worker upon the
employer for his continued employment in that line of
business.

By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an

employee of Kasei Corporation because she was under the direct
control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporation's Technical
Consultant.

She reported for work regularly and served in various capacities as

Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical Consultant, Acting Manager
and Corporate Secretary,

She was selected and engaged by the company for compensation,

and is economically dependent upon respondent for her continued
employment in that line of business.

Her main job function involved accounting and tax services rendered
to respondent corporation on a regular basis over an indefinite period
of engagement.

Respondent corporation hired and engaged petitioner for

compensation, with the power to dismiss her for cause.

The corporation constructively dismissed petitioner when it reduced

her salary by P2,500 a month from January to September 2001.

This amounts to an illegal termination of employment,where the

petitioner is entitled to full backwages.

Since the position of petitioner as accountant is one of trust and

confidence, and under the principle of strained relations, petitioner is
further entitled to separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement.

STAR PAPER CORP VS SIMBOL 487 SCRA 228 (2008)
FACTS: Petitioner Star Paper Corp is a corporation engaged—
principally of paper products with Josephine Ongsitco as manager of
Personnel and Administration and Sebastian Chua as managing
director.
Simbol, et al are regular employees of the company. Symbol was
employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit,
also an employee there, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to
the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to
get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy
promulgated in 1995 stating:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case s/he
has a relative, up to the 3rd degree, already employed by the
company
2. In case of two of our employees (both single) developed a
friendly relationship during the course of their employment
and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above.
Simbol et al resigned pursuant to company policy. Each respondent
signed a release and confirmation agreement stating that they no
claims or demands of whatever nature against the company.
However, Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign
voluntarily but were forced toresign in view of an illegal company
policy. Zuniga, on the other hand, was dismissed for immoral conduct
(with no hearing) on the account of her supposed affair with a
married man who was another employee in the company.
Respondents filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive
dismissal, separation pay and fees. They averred that the said
company policy is illegal and contravenes Art 136 Labor Code.
LA dismissed the complaint on the account that the said policy was
management prerogative. NLRC affirmed the same.
CA reversed the NLRC decision and ordered Star Paper Corp to
reinstate Simbol et al to their former positions with loss of seniority
rights with full back wages.
ISSUE: W/N THE COMPANY POLICY IN QUESTION IS ILLEGAL AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
HELD: The Constitution clearly affirms labor as a primary social
economic force and protects the rights of workers and promote their
welfare. Art 136 Labor Code even provides: It shall be unlawful for an
employee to require as a condition for employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated or to actually
dismiss, discharge or discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of her marriage.
Petitioners argue that said company policy does not prohibit its
employees from marrying but that should two company employees
decide to marry one other, they have the right to choose who
between them should resign.
There are two types of employment policies involving spouse: policies
banning only spouses from work in the same company (no-spouse
employment policies) and those banning all immediate family
members including spouses from working in the same company (anti-
nepotism employment policies).
To determine of an employment policy is within the ambit of two
types of employment policies: Under the disparate treatment It is also significant to note that the respondents were hired after
analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is they found fit for the job but were asked to resign when they married
discriminatory on its face. For example, an employment policy a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of
prohibiting the employer from hiring wives of male employees, but respondents could be detrimental to its business operations. The
not husbands of female, is discriminatory on its face. Under the policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each
disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral other will be less efficient. If the courts uphold the questioned rule
policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class. For without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on
example, although most employment policies do not expressly an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an
indicate which spouse will be required to transfer or leave the employee’s right to security of tenure.
company, the policy often disproportionately affects one sex.
Moreover, while questioned policy may not facially violate Art 136
These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for Labor Code, it creates a disproportionate effect and under the
failure of the employer to present any evidence of business necessity disparate impact theory, the only way to pass judicial scrutiny is a
other than the general perception that spouses in the same show that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory effect. The
workplace might adversely affect the business. They hold that the failure of the petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in
absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification invalidates a imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right
rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of
employment of the other spouse in the same office. Unless the married persons working together in one company.
employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the of the
business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no
better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish
the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an
employee based on the identity of the employee’s spouse. This is
known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception. To
justify this, the employer must prove two factors:
1. That the employment qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved
2. There is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly
perform the duties of the job

Petitioner’s sole contention that the company did not just want to
have 2 or more of its employees related between the third degree by
affinity or consanguinity is lame as it does not provide a valid
reasonable business necessity required by law.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. CA 429 SCRA 81 (2004)
FACTS: The Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc.
(ARCOPhil) filed on July 17, 1995 a petition for declaratory relief
under Rule 63 0f the Rules of Court with the RTC of Quezon City to
declare as unconstitutional portions of RA 8042, otherwise known as
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 with a plea
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the government from enforcing the
said portions of the law. The questioned portions of the said RA deal
with illegal recruitment, penalties for illegal recruitment, and on the
venue of criminal action for illegal recruitment.
 On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order on the implementation or effectivity of the
questioned provisions based on the allegations of the private
respondents that they will suffer grave or irreparable damage
or injury if the law is implemented.
 ARCO-Phil was joined in the petition by eleven other
corporations which were allegedly members of the
organization when it filed an amended petition. The amended
petition also questioned other sections of the law which dealt
with the overseas deployment only of skilled Filipino workers
alleging discrimination against unskilled workers.
 Respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep.
Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.5
According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i)
discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and,
as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article
II, Section 126 and Article XV, Sections 17 and 3(3) of the
Constitution.8 As the law encouraged the deployment of
skilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are
granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers
also have the right to seek employment abroad. According to
the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process
is violated because they are prevented from finding
employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued
that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers,
while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It
was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are
subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the
prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad
would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.
 The respondent justified its plea for injunctive relief on the
allegation in its amended petition that its members are
exposed to the immediate and irreparable danger of being
deprived of their right to a livelihood and other constitutional
rights without due process, on its claim that a great number of
duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or
 suspended their operations for fear that (a) their officers and
employees would be prosecuted under the unjust and
unconstitutional penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 and
meted equally unjust and excessive penalties.
 alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate
 Petitioners filed a petition with the court of Appeals assailing
the order and the writ with the court of Appeals on the
grounds that it has not shown any convincing proof that in fact
damage or injury would result in the implementation of the
questioned statute. The Court however dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: WON the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s
order and the writ it issued
HELD: The SC also held that the assailed order and writ of preliminary
injunction is mooted by case law. The SC cited various cases it had
earlier decided on apply RA 8042. By these rulings, the SC, in effect,
affirmed the validity of the assailed provisions. Hence the
enforcement of the provisions cannot be enjoined unless the SC, by
final judgment declares the provisions to be unconstitutional.
In People v. Diaz,24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an
amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post
facto law because it is not applied retroactively. In JMM Promotion
and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 the issue of the extent of
the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or
calling vis-à-vis the equal protection clause and the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution were raised and we held, thus:
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the
meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be
deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living
because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and
unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an
actionable wrong.
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation
of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been
upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police
power by the state particularly when their conduct affects
either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and
public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut
range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in
which every one may so use his own property so as not to
pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or
accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is
to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police
power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to
pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed
fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests
determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional
Regulation Commission has begun to require previously
licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish
documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had
undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for
renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these
requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property
right under the due process clause. So long as professionals
and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no
such deprivation exists.
ASUNCION V. NLRC 362 SCRA 56 (2001)
ASUNCION V NLRC
FACTS: Asuncion was employed as an accountant/bookkeeper by the
respondent Mabini Medical Clinic.
 Officials of the DOLE conducted a routine inspection of the
company and discovered upon the disclosure of Asuncion
 violations of the labor standards laws (such as the non-
coverage from the SSS of the employees).
 The company was made to correct these violations.
 Medical Director, Dr. Juco, charged Asuncion with offenses
such Chronic Absentism, Habitual tardiness, Loitering,
Disobedience and insubordination.
 Petitioner was required to explain within two (2) days why she
should not be terminated based on the above charges.
 Three days later, petitioner submitted her response to the
memorandum.
 On the same day, respondent Dr. Juco, dismissed the
petitioner on the ground of disobedience of lawful orders and
for her failure to submit her reply within the two-day period.
 Labor Arbiter Caday rendered judgment declaring that the
petitioner was illegally dismissed.
 On appeal, NLRC rendered the assailed decision which set
aside the Labor Arbiter’s ruling.
ISSUE: WON NLRC erred in finding that Asuncion was dismissed by
the Company for a just or authorized cause
HELD: YES. There is lack of evidence to establish the charges of
absenteeism and tardiness.
 A worker’s employment is property in the constitutional
sense.
 He cannot be deprived of his work without due process.
 In order for the dismissal to be valid, not only must it be
based on just cause supported by clear and convincing
evidence, the employee must also be given an opportunity to
be heard and defend himself.
 It is the employer who has the burden of proving that the
dismissal was with just or authorized cause.
 The failure of the employer to discharge this burden means
that the dismissal is not justified and that the employee is
entitled to reinstatement and backwages.
 Company submitted mere handwritten listing and computer
print-outs. The handwritten listing was not signed by the one
who made the same. The handwritten listing and unsigned
computer print-outs were unauthenticated and, hence,
unreliable.
 Company failed to present a single piece of credible evidence
to serve as the basis for their charges against Asuncion and
consequently, failed to fulfill their burden of proving the facts
which constitute the just cause for the dismissal of the
petitioner.
 Asuncion’s letter did not amount to an admission of her
alleged absences.
 Her alleged absences were incurred on Saturdays.
 These should not be considered as absences as there was no
arrangement between her and the private respondents that
she is required to work on Saturdays.
 There is no evidence that the Company that Asuncion was
given any warning or reprimanded for her alleged absences
and tardiness.
  The two-day period given to Asuncion to explain and answer
the charges against her was most unreasonable, considering
that she was charged with several offenses and infractions
(35 absences, 23 half-days and 108 tardiness), some of which
were allegedly committed almost a year before, the charges
leveled against her lacked particularity.
 The law mandates that every opportunity and assistance
must be accorded to the employee by the management to
enable him to prepare adequately for his defense.
 If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the latter. The employer must affirmatively
show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a
justifiable cause.
 Asuncion has been illegally terminated, she is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority and the payment of
backwages.
MANEJA VS NLRC 290 SCRA 603 (1998)
FACTS: FACTS: Petitioner Rosario Maneja worked with private
respondent Manila Midtown Hotel beginning January 1985, as a
telephone operator. She was a member of the National Union of
Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN)
with an existing CBA with the private respondent.
In February 13, 1990, a fellow telephone operator, Rowena Loleng,
received a request for long distance call (RLDC) form and a deposit for
P500.00 from a Japanese guest but the call was unanswered. The
deposit was then forwarded to the cashier. The same evening, the
Japanese guest again made an RLDC and deposited another P500.00
but the call was also unanswered. Loleng passed the RLDC to Maneja
for follow up.
ON February 15, the cashier inquired about the P1000 deposit made.
After a search, the first one was found in the guest folio while the
other in the folder for cancelled calls. Petitioner Maneja saw that the
2nd RLDC form was not time stamped so she placed it in the machine
to stamp it with the date February 15. But after realizing that the call
was made 2 days before, she changed the date to February 13.
On March 7, the chief telephone operator asked the petitioner and
Loleng to explain the Feb 15 incident. Both submitted their written
explanation. On March 20, a written report was submitted, stating
that their actions were covered violations of the Offenses Subject to
Disciplinary Action (OSDA) as
1. Forging, falsifying official documents and;
2. Culpable carelessness—negligence or failure to follow specific
instruction/s or established procedure/s
On March 23, petitioner was then served notice of dismissal effective
on April 1. She refused to sign and wrote “under protest.”
On October 2, 1990, Maneja filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against private respondent before the labor arbiter (LA). LA found
that the petitioner was illegally dismissed, stating that even though
the case revolves on the matter of implementation and interpretation
of company policies and is thus within the jurisdiction of the
grievance procedure under the CBA, Art. 217 Labor Code confers
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all termination cases to LA. NLRC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction of LA because the case was
subject to voluntary arbitration.
Petitioner insists that her termination is not an unresolved grievance
as there had been no grievance meeting between the union and the
management. Petitioner alleged that it has been a company policy
that termination cases are not referred to the grievance machinery
but directly to LA.
 the interpretation or enforcement of the company policies or
ISSUE: W/N MANEJA’S TERMINATION WAS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS otherwise.”
OF LAW

HELD: Petitioner was illegally dismissed as there are two requisites in

a valid dismissal: 1. That the dismissal must be for any causes
expressed in Art 282 Labor Code and; 2. The employee must be given
an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
1. There is no cause for dismissal as the petitioner’s actions were
not contrary to company practice and there is also no basis for
personal appropriation based on the facts
2. An examination of the record reveals that no hearing
whatsoever was ever conducted by the Hotel before Maneja
was dismissed. While it may be true that the petitioner
submitted a written explanation, no hearing was actually
conducted before she was terminated. She was not accorded
the opportunity to fully defend herself which is clearly a
violation of her right to due process.

Art. 260 Labor Code further provides that the parties to a CBA shall
name or designate their respective representative to the grievance
machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall
automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in
advance by the parties to a CBA of the union and company. It can
thus be deduced that only disputes involving the union and the
company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary
arbitrators.
In the case at bar, the union does not have into the picture, not
having objected or voiced any dissent to the dismissal of Maneja. The
reason for this, according to the petitioner is that “the practice in said
hotel in cases of termination is that the latter cases are not referred
anymore to the grievance committed; and that the terminated
employee who wishes to question the legality of his termination
usually goes to LA for arbitration, whether the termination arose from
ANG TIBAY V. CIR 59 PHIL 635 (1940)
Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations 59 Phil 635 (1940)
Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR
TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company
which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of
leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor
Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within
the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and
National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio
hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they
were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were
not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not
able to present it before in the CIR.
ISSUE: WON there has been a due process of law. performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU.
The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They
are;
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
CENTURY TEXT MILLS INC VS NLRC 161 SCRA 528 (1988)
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
FACTS: Eduardo Calangi, a machine operator at Century Textile, was
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
terminated because he was allegedly behind the plot to kill his two
evidence presented.
supervisors, Melchor Meliton and Antonio Santos. Marin, another
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
factory worker, noticed that Torrena, a machine operator, put some
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
substance in a pitcher where Meliton and Santos usually drank from.
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support
It was later found out that the substance was formaldehyde. Torrena
its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it
confessed that Calangi personally instructed him to put the substance
is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
in the pitcher as an act of revenge against Melitona and Santos
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
because they repeatedly instigated the termination of the two
or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.”
machine operators. Torrena and Calangi were preventively
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
suspended and eventually dismissed.
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.
Calangi filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
Branch, NCR, MOLE, and was dismissed because the evidence was “so
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
overwhelming” and “sufficient enough” against Calangi and he failed
disclosed to the parties affected.
to inexplicably to deny or controvert any charges. Calangi filed an
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
appeal in NLRC and the decision of the Arbitration branch was
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
reversed.
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
Petitioner Century Textile Mills alleged that Calangi had been
decision.
previously informed of and given the chance to answer the
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
company’s accusations against him, but that he had “kept silent” all
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
the while.
parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
ISSUE: W/N RESPONDENT CALANGI WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED
BECAUSE HIS TERMINATION WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH DUE In the present case, there was nothing in the record that the Cainta
PROCESS Police interrogated Calangi himself. The basis for the ground of
dismissal is anchored solely on Torrena’s sworn statement which was
HELD: The SC held that Calangi’s termination was without notice and not proven sufficiently.
hearing. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute
essential elements of due process in cases of employee dismissal: According to Art 280 Labor Code, there is security of tenure. No loss
the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee of seniority rights and payment of back wages are the normal
concerned of the employer’s intent and the reason for the proposed consequences when finding an employee illegally dismissed but
dismissal while the requirement of hearing affords the employee reinstatement is not in the best interest of the parties involved. The
the opportunity to answer his employer’s charges against him and corporation cannot be forced to take back an employee who poses a
to accordingly defend himself. threat to the lives of other employees. Therefore, separation pay
must be paid in lieu of reinstatement.
Art 278 Labor Code states that an employer should furnish the worker
a written notice containing causes for termination and shall afford
ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with
company rules. It was also stated that the burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause rests on the
employer.

Rule 4, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor

Code states:
Sec 2 Notice of dismissal: Written notice of the particular acts or
omission constituting grounds for dismissal.
Sec 5 Answer and hearing: Employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of
his representatives if he so desires
Sec 6 Decision to dismiss: Employer should immediately inform the
worker in writing of the decision to dismiss him clearly stating the
reasons.

Prior consultation with the labor union is legally insufficient because

right to notice and hearing are rights personal to an employee. Such
consultation or consent is not a substitute for actual observance of
the rights.

PHIL ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS V. DRILON 163 SCRA 386
(1988)
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is
engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional
validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply
to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also
being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI
invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and
informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment
ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino
workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the
challenged Department Order No. 1.
HELD: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid
classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a
class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class
was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to
female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the
law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights
among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial
distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The
consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does
not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other
things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by
law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of
police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule
making powers.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the
petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction,
where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.
LEYTE LAND TRANSPORTATION CO V. LEYTE FRAMERS AND
WORKERS UNION 80 PHIL 842 (1948)

FACTS: Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) issued order directing Leyte

Land Transportation Company, Inc. (LLTCI) to grant various employees
increase in wages and salaries (5-10 pesos) to its drivers, conductors,
mechanics and other workers, and grant 15 days vacation with pay
and 15 days sick leave with pay to employees and laborers.

LLTCI appealed.

LLTCI’s contentions:

 CIR made a mistake in conceding salary/wage increases

merely because such increases would enable employees to
meet high cost of living.
 The increases, if added to the crippling losses, would only
throw the company into bankruptcy.
 CIR had no power to order such directives and violated
appellant’s freedom to contract.

ISSUE: WON appealed decision in effect has deprived LLTCI of its

rights to enter into contract of employment as it and the employee
may agree

HELD: NO. The fact that both parties are of full age and competent to
contract does not necessarily deprive the State of the power to
interfere where the parties do not stand upon an equality, or where
the public health demands that one party to the contract shall be
protected against himself.

 The State still retains an interest in his welfare, however

reckless he may be.
  The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and
where the individual health, safety and welfare are sacrificed
or neglected, the State must suffer (citing a US case: West
Coast Hotel Company vs. Parrish).
 Citing Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v CIR (concurring): The policy
of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of intervention
even in contractual relations affected with public interest
Obiter regarding the criticism that the additional benefits
would benefit the union and well as non-union members, the
court held that as the workers are laborers of the company,
they are entitled to the increase regardless of their
affiliation.
 To make a distinction would only be an unjust and
unwarranted discrimination against non-members.
 Decision Affirmed.
ALALAYAN VS NATIONAL POWER CORP 24 SCRA 172
FACTS: NPC was given the power (pursuant to Sec 3, RA 3043,
approved June 17, 1961, entitled: An act to further amend
Commonwealth Act No 120, as amended by RA 2641) to require
franchise holders the conditions that:
1. They shall not realize a net profit of more than 12% annually
of its investments plus two-month operating expenses
2. NPC can renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for
the supply of electric power and energy
NPC has for some years now been supplying, distributing, servicing
and selling electric power and energy at fixed rate schedules to the
latter who have for some years now been and still are, legally
engaged in re-supplying, redistributing, re-servicing and reselling the
said electric power and energy to individual customers within the
coverage of their respective franchises.
Reference was made to the particular contracts petitioners entered
into with respondent NPC, the contracts to continue indefinitely
unless and until either party would give to the other 2 years previous
notice in writing of its intention to terminate the same.
On June 18, 1960, an act authorizing the increase of the capital stock
of NPC to P100M took effect. On June 17, 1961, it was alleged that
the challenged legislation became a law, purportedly to increase
further the authorized capital stock, but including the alleged rider
provision.
NPC approved a rate of at least 17.5% the effectivity of which, was at
first deferred to Nov 1, 1962, then subsequently to Jan 15, 1963, with
the threat that in case petitioners would fail to sign the revised
contract proving for the increased rate, NPC would then cease to
supply, distribute and service electric power and energy to them.
On Mar 21, 1963, the lower court, considering that there was no
sufficient ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
the petitioner claims, dismissed the same.
It was alleged in the facts that Alalayan did purchase and take power
and energy as follows: 60 kilowatts and of not less than 140,000
kilowatt-hours in any contract year at the rate of P120 per kilowatt
per year, payable in 12 equal monthly installments plus an energy
charge of P0.013 per kilowatt hour, payable on the basis of monthly
delivery.
Petitioner claims: the challenged provision is a violation of the
constitutional requirement that a bill cannot embrace more than one
subject to be expressed in its title.
ISSUE: W/N PETITIONER ALALAYAN IS DEPRIVED OF THE LIBERTY TO
CONTRACT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
HELD: The amendment does not constitute a rider problem. The rider
provision is aimed against the evils of so-called omnibus bills as
logrolling legislaton as well as surreptitious or unconsidered
enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular
matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of
the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional
provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider
being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill which
is not the case here.
Petitioner Alalayan is not deprived of the liberty to contract without
due process of the law. For in the face of a constitutional provision
that allows deprivation of liberty, including liberty of contract, as long
as due process is observed, the alleged nullity of a legislative act of
this character can only be shown if in fact there is such a denial.
which may be subjected in the interest of general welfare under the
police power, to restrictions valid in character and wide ranging in
scope as long as due process is observed.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It
furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid.
Standard of due process: responsiveness to the supremacy of reason
and obedience to the dictates of justice.

The Constitution, in view of its commitment to the claims of property,

would not be able to cope effectively with the problems of poverty
and misery that unfortunately afflict so many of our people, is not
susceptible to the indictment that the government is impotent to
take the necessary remedial measures.
PAL INC V. NLRC 225 SCRA 301 (1993)
There is the clause on the promotion of social justice to ensure the
FACTS: On March 15, 1985, PAL completely revised its 1966 Code of
wellbeing and economic security of all people, as well as the pledge
Discipline. The Code was circulated among the employees and was
of protection to labor with the specific authority to regulate the
immediately implemented, and some employees were subjected to
relations between landowners and tenants, between labor and
the disciplinary measures.
capital.
The Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a
The police power as an attribute to promote the common welfare
complaint before the NLRC contending that PAL, by its unilateral
would be diluted considerably of its reach and effectiveness if on
implementation of the Code, was guilty of unfair labor practice,
the mere plea that the liberty to contract would be restricted, the
specifically Paragraphs E and G of Art 249 and Art 253 of the Labor
statute complained of may be characterized as a denial of due
Code. PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had been circulated in
process.
limited numbers; that being penal in nature the Code must conform
to the requirements of sufficient publication, and that the Code was
The liberty relied upon is not freedom of the mind not freedom of the
arbitrary, oppressive, and prejudicial to the rights of the employees. It
person but the liberty to contract, associated with business activities,
prayed that implementation of the Code be held in abeyance; that
PAL should discuss the substance of the Code with PALEA; that
employees dismissed under the Code reinstated and their cases
subjected to further hearing; and that PAL be declared guilty of unfair
labor practice and be ordered to pay damages.
PAL filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting its prerogative as an
employer to prescribe rules and regulations regarding employees'
conduct in carrying out their duties and functions, and alleging that it
had not violated the CBA or any provision of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: WON the formulation of a Code of Discipline among
employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the
employees
HELD: YES. Employees have a right to participate in the deliberation
of matters which may affect their rights and the formulation of
policies relative thereto and one such matter is the formulation of a
code of discipline.
It was only on March 2, 1989, with the approval of RA 6715,
amending Art 211 of the Labor Code, that the law explicitly
considered it a State policy "to ensure the participation of workers in
decision and policy-making processes affecting their rights, duties and
welfare." However, even in the absence of said clear provision of law,
the exercise of management prerogatives was never considered
boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs. Medina, it was held that management's
prerogatives must be without abuse of discretion.
In San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union vs. Ople, we upheld the
company's right to implement a new system of distributing
itsproducts, but gave the following caveat: So long as a company's
management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the
advancement the employer's interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of the employee, under special
laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them.
All this points to the conclusion that the exercise of managerial
prerogatives is not unlimited. It is circumscribed by limitations found
in law, a CBA, or the general principles of fair play and justice.
Moreover, it must be duly established that the prerogative being
invoked is clearly a managerial one.
Verily, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives
regarding business operations per se and those which affect the
rights of the employees. In treating the latter, management should
see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its
decisions or modes of action. PAL asserts that all its employees have
been furnished copies of the Code, the LA and the NLRC found to the
contrary, which finding, is entitled to great respect.
PALEA recognizes the right of the Company to determine matters of
management policy and Company operations and to direct its
manpower. Management of the Company includes the right to
organize, plan, direct and control operations, to hire, assign
employees to work, transfer employees from one department to
another, to promote, demote, discipline, suspend or discharge
employees for just cause; to lay-off employees for valid and legal
causes, to introduce new or improved methods or facilities or to
change existing methods or facilities and the right to make and
enforce Company rules and regulations to carry out the functions of
management. The exercise by management of its prerogative shall be
done in a just, reasonable, humane and/or lawful manner.
Such provision in the CBA may not be interpreted as cession of
employees' rights to participate in the deliberation of matters which
may affect their rights and the formulation of policies relative
thereto. And one such matter is the formulation of a code of
discipline. Industrial peace cannot be achieved if the employees are
denied their just participation in the discussion of matters affecting
their rights.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.

PHIL ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS V. DRILON 163 SCRA 386
(1988)
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is
engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional
validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply
to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also
being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI
invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and
informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment
ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino
workers.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner’s reliance on the Constitutional guaranty
of worker participation in policy and decision making processes is
well-taken.
HELD: No, The petitioners' reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of
worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits" is not well-taken. The right granted
by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities
of the State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment
alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramount is that such
an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad
enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange
lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.
Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure
that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home.
In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner
cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection,
and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on
deployment. The Court finds furthermore that the Government has
not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that
it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain
countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the
petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction,
where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.

This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order

has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government,
however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In
the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a
decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court
in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order
to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the
extraordinary relief prayed for.
PT&TC VS NLRC 272 SCRA 596 (1997)

FACTS: Private respondent Grace de Guzman was initially hired by

PTTC on 3 separate occasions, to relieve 2 of its employees who went
on maternity leave. The reliever agreement stated that her
employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of
the agreed period. She was later asked to join the company as a
probationary employee with the probation period covering 150 days.
On her application form, she indicated her civil status was single
although she contracted marriage 3 months earlier.

Upon discovery, PTTC, through its Baguio branch supervisor, sent a

memo to de Guzman requiring her to explain the discrepancy and
reminding her of the company’s policy of not accepting married
women for employment. De Guzman, in her response, explained
that she was not aware of such a policy and that she had not
deliberately hidden her true civil status.

PTTC was unconvinced and dismissed de Guzman on January 29, 1992

which she then contested before the arbitration branch of NLRC
Baguio through a complaint for dismissal. PTTC claimed that the
dismissal was due to the fact that she concealed her civil status not
because of the fact that she was married.
LA held that de Guzman, who had already gain regular status, was
illegally dismissed by the petitioner. PTTC was ordered to reinstate
private respondent with payment of back wages and COLA on the
grounds that PTTC failed to provide sufficient grounds to terminate
her, and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against
on the account of her having contracted marriage in violation of
company rules.
PTTC appealed but NLRC uphed the LA decision with only a
modification that de Guzman deserved to be suspended for 3 months
on the account of her dishonest acts.
ISSUE: W/N PTTC ERRED IN DISMISSING DE GUZMAN
HELD: An employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to
severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ,
to convincingly establish—through substantial evidence—the
existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of
such employee, as one’s labor is regarded as constitutionally
protected property.
On the other hand, an employer is free to regulate, according to his
discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment,
from hiring to firing, except in cases of unlawful discrimination or
those which may be provided by law.
The petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified
from work any woman who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test
of, and the right against discrimination, afforded all women workers
by our labor laws and even the Constitution. Contrary to PTTC’s
assertion, the record clearly discloses that her ties with the company
were dissolved principally because the company’s policy that married
women are not qualified for employment in PTTC, and not merely
because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memo sent to de Guzman
by the branch supervisor with the reminder that “you’re fully aware
that the company is not accepting married women employee, as it
was verbally instructed to you.” Again, in the termination notice sent
to her by the same, she was made to understand her severance from
the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married
status but, over and on top of that, was ger violation of the
company’s policy against marriage (“and even told you that married
employees are not applicable are accepted in our company”).
Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made
to appear in the initiatory pleadings that PTTC was represented in
case only by its supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers who
could otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that
adopted by PTTC. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as
follows:
Art 136. Stipulation against marriage – It shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a women shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of marriage.
In Zialcita et al vs PAL, a PAL policy requiring that prospective flight
attendants must be single and that they will be automatically
separated from the service once they marry was declared void for
being violative of the clear mandate in Art 136 Labor Code with
regard to discrimination against married women. In Gualberto et al vs
Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corp, CA considered a policy of the
same nature as repugnant to the Civil Code, PD 148 and the
Constitution and therefore, void and unlawful.

BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL INC V. NAFLU 271 SCRA 275 (1997)
FACTS: Private respondent NAFLU, a co-complainant in the labor case,
is a labor union of which complainant is a member. - Complainant was
first employed by Brew Master on 16 September 1991 as route helper
with the latest daily wage of P119.00.
 From 19 April 1993 up to 19 May 1993, for a period of 1
month, complainant went on absent without permission
(AWOP).
 On 20 May 1993, Brew master sent him a Memo: “Please
explain in writing within 24 hours of your receipt of this memo
why no disciplinary action should be taken against you for the
following offense: You were absent since April 19, 1993 up to
May 19, 1993.”
 In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant explained: “Sa
dahilan po na ako ay hindi nakapagpaalam sainyo dahil inuwi
ko ang mga anak ko sa Samar dahil ang asawa ko ay lumayas
at walang mag-aalaga sa mga anak ko. Kaya naman hindi ako
naka long distance or telegrama dahil wala akong pera at
ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro utang pa.”
 Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, the company issued a
Notice of Termination: “...we regret to inform you that we do
not consider it valid. You are aware of the company Rules and
Regulations that absence without permission for 6
consecutive working days is considered abandonment of
work...”
 Complainants contend that individual complainant’s dismissal
was done without just cause; that it was not sufficiently
established that individual complainant’s absence from April
19, 1993 to June 16, 1993 are unjustified; that the penalty of
dismissal for such violation is too severe; that in imposing such
penalty, respondent should have taken into consideration
complainant’s length of service and as a first offender, a
penalty less punitive will suffice such as suspension for a
definite period.
 Upon the other hand, respondent contends that individual
complainant was dismissed for cause allowed by the company
Rules and Regulations and the Labor Code; that the act of
complainant in absenting from work for 1 month without
official leave is deleterious to the business of respondent; that
it will result to stoppage of production which will not only
destructive to respondent’s interests but also to the interest
of its employees in general; that the dismissal of complainant
from the service is legal.
 The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit,
citing the principle of managerial control, which recognizes
the employer’s prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and
regulations to govern the conduct of his employees. He relied
on Shoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC: “...that individual complainant has
indeed abandoned his work... therefore, under the law and
jurisprudence which upholds the right of an employer to
discharge an employee who incurs frequent, prolonged and
unexplained absences as being grossly remiss in his duties to
the employer and is therefore, dismissed for cause. An
 employee is deemed to have abandoned his position or to
have resigned from the same, whenever he has been absent
there from without previous permission of the employer for
three consecutive days or more. “
 The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's decision and held that
complainant’s dismissal was invalid for the following reasons:
Complainant-appellant’s prolonged absences, although
unauthorized, may not amount to gross neglect or
abandonment of work to warrant outright termination of
employment. Dismissal is too severe a penalty...Reliance on
the ruling enunciated in the cited case of Shoemart is quite
misplaced because of the obvious dissimilarities-- complainant
in the Shoemart Case was “an inveterate absentee who does
not deserve reinstatement” compared to herein
complainantappellant who is a first offender
ISSUE: WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
modifying the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
HELD: NO. Petitioner’s finding that complainant was guilty of
abandonment is misplaced. Abandonment as a just and valid ground
for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment. Two elements must then be
satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship. b) Verily, relations between capital and labor
are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest
and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good. While
the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations
to govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their
implementation must be fair, just and reasonable.
Complainant’s absence was precipitated by a grave family problem as
his wife unexpectedly deserted him and abandoned the family.
Considering that he had a full-time job, there was no one to whom he
could entrust the children and he was thus compelled to bring them
to the province. He was then under emotional, psychological, spiritual
and physical stress and strain. The reason for his absence is, under
these circumstances, justified. While his failure to inform and seek
petitioner's approval was an omission which must be corrected and
chastised, he did not merit the severest penalty of dismissal from the
service. - the elements of abandonment are not present here. First, as
held above, complainant's absence was justified under the
circumstances. As to the second requisite, complainant immediately
complied with the memo requiring him to explain his absence, and
upon knowledge of his termination, immediately sued for illegal
dismissal. These plainly refuted any claim that he was no longer
interested in returning to work.
Our Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and
protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state
policy, but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus
placing labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater safeguards.
While we do not decide here the validity of petitioner's Rules and
Regulations on continuous, unauthorized absences, what is plain is
that it was wielded with undue haste resulting in a deprivation of due
process, thus not allowing for a determination of just cause or
abandonment. In this light, petitioner's dismissal
was illegal. This is not to say that his absence should go unpunished,
as impliedly noted by the NLRC in declining to award back wages.
Disposition petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the
NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED.
 Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To
live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due.
These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law
and order in society.

FACTS: In 1982, respondent Quiamco was approached by Davalan,

Gabutero and Generoso to settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for
robbery filed by Quiamco against them.

 They surrendered to him a red Honda motorcycle and a

photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked
for the original certificate of registration but the three accused
never came to see him again.

 Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space

inside respondent’s business establishment, where it was
visible and accessible to the public.

 It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been

sold on installment basis to Gabutero by Uypitching Sons, Inc.
And to secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to
petitioner corporation.

 When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan

assumed the obligation and continued the payments.

 In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the

remaining installments.

 Nine years later, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by

policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the
motorcycle.

 The leader of the police team talked to the clerk in charge and
asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were
UYPITCHING V. QUIAMCO 510 SCRA 172 (2007)
 talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the
establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
 Unable to find respondent, the policemen on petitioner
Uypitching’s instruction and over the clerk’s objection, took
the motorcycle.
 Petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified
theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against
respondent but was dismissed.
 Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in
the RTC
 The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner
Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he
called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive
manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft
and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
 Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the
trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: WON the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law warranted the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs in favor of
respondent.
HELD: YES. They were held liable for damages not only for
instituting a groundless complaint against respondent but also for
making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from
respondent’s establishment in an abusive manner.
Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)
A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to
enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon.
There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of
possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain
possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he
must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a
preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary
to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner
Uypitching descended on respondent’s establishment with his
policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a
search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal
seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a
slanderous statement.
Petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and
transgressed the proper norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the
Civil Code.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes
that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or
injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at
petitioners’ instance was not only attended by bad faith but also
contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of
the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial
and injurious to respondent.
Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of
respondent.

SARMIENTO VS TUICO 162 SCRA 676 (1988)

FACTS: Asian Transmission Corp (ATC) terminated the services of

Catalino Sarmiento, VP of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union
(BATU), for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the company
premises.

BATU filed a notice of strike, claiming that ATC had committed an

unfair labor practice. ATC, then, filed a petition asking the Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the
matter or certify the same to NLRC for compulsory arbitration.

MOLE issued an order certifying the labor dispute to NLRC. At the

same time, it enjoined the management from locking out its
employees and the union from declaring a strike or similar concerted
action. Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC, however,
because of the acceptance by Pres. Aquino of the resignations of 8 of
its members, leaving only the vice-chairman in office.

MOLE set aside the previous orders and directly assumed jurisdiction
of the dispute, at the same time, enjoined the company to accept all
returning workers. This order was later set aside upon motion of both
BATU and ATC in view of the appointment of new commissioners in
NLRC. MOLE then returned the cases to NLRC and directed it to
expedite the resolution of all issues relating to the dispute.
Conformably, NLRC issued on Jan 13, 1987 a resolution, which it
affirmed in its resolution of Feb 12, denying the motion of
reconsideration.
Three criminal complaints were filed against the workers, two by the
personnel administrative officer of ATC and the third by Philippine
Constabulary. The first two complaints were for “Violation of Art 265
par 1, in relation to Art 273 Labor Code.” The third was for coercion.
In all 3 complaints, the defendants were charged with staging an
illegal strike, barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing
the workers through intimidation, harassment and force from
reporting for work.
Respondent Judge Orlando Tuico issued a warrant of arrest against
the petitioners and committed 72 of them to jail although he later
ordered the release of 61 of them to the custody of the mayor of
Calamba.
The petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the warrant of
arrest and the referral of the coercion charge to NLRC and later, for
the dismissal of the criminal cases on the ground that they came
under the primary jurisdiction of the NLRC.
ISSUES; W/N A RETURN TO WORK ORDER MAY BE VALIDLY ISSUED
BY NLRC PENDING DETERMINATION OF THE LEGALITY OF THE STRIKE;
W/N SUCH DETERMINATION, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
CERTAIN PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE SAID STRIKE MAY BE VALIDLY
RESTRAINED
HELD: The authority for the order is found in Art 264(g) Labor Code,
as amended by BP blg. 227, which provides:
When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to
cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest,
such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies
engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals,
and export oriented industries, including those within export
processing zones, MOLE shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute
and decide it or certify the same to the commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout
as specified in the assumption order. If one has already taken place at
the time of assumption or certification, all striking our locked out
employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout. The minister may seek the assistance of law-
enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as
well as such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
There can be no question that MOLE acted correctly in certifying
labor dispute to NLRC, given the predictable prejudice the strike
might cause not only to the parties but more especially to the
national interest. Thus, the return to work order was equally valid
as a statutory part and part of the certification order issued by
MOLE on Nov 24, 1986. The challenged order of NLRC was actually
only an implementation of the above provision of the Labor Code and
a reiteration of the directive earlier issued by MOLE in its own
assumption order of Sept 9, 1986.
It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return to work
order is to protect the workers who might otherwise be locked out
by the employer for threatening or waging the strike, the more
important reason is to prevent impairment of the national interest
in case the operations of the company are disrupted by a refusal of
the strikers to return to work as directed. More particularly, it is the
national economy that will suffer because of the resultant reduction
in our export earnings and our dollar reserves, not to mention
possible cancellation of contracts of the company with foreign
investors.
It is also to emphasize that the return to work order not so much
confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be
waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker’s
will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option but
of obligation.

The suspension of proceedings in the criminal complaints filed is

justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no question that the
acts complained of are connected with the compulsory arbitration
proceedings still pending in NLRC.

The 3 criminal cases should be suspended until the completion of the

compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC, conformably to the
policy embodied in Circular no. 15, series of 1982 and Circular no. 9,
series of 1986, issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the
implementation of BP 227. These circulars require fiscals and other
government prosecutors to first secure clearance of MOLE and/or
Office of the President before taking cognizance of complaints for
preliminary investigation and filing in court of the corresponding
informations of cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute,
including allegations of violence, coercion, physical injuries, assault
upon a person in authority and other similar acts of intimidation,
obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of
operation of the machines of such factory, or the employer’s
premises.

it does not appear from the record that such clearance was obtained,
conformably to the procedure laid down to attain the industrial peace
which is the primordial objects of this law.
GUSTILO V. WYETH PHILS 440 SCRA 67 (2004)

FACTS:
- Gustilo was employed by Wyeth Phils Inc. as a pharmaceutical
territory manager.
- He was in-charge of the various branches in Metro Bacolod City and
Negros Occidental.
- Among his tasks were visiting hospitals, pharmacies, drugstores and
physicians; preparing and submitting his predated itinerary; and
submitting periodic reports of his daily call visits, monthly itinerary
and weekly locator and incurred expenses.
- His employment records show that on various dates, Wyeth
reprimanded and suspended him for habitually neglecting to submit
his periodic reports.
> Nov. 28, 1994- Wyeth sent a notice reprimanding Gustilo for the
late submission of weekly expense report > July 5, 1995- late
submission of same report so Wyeth suspended him for 5 days
> Oct 16 to 20, 23-27, Nov 6-10, 13-17, (all 1995)- late submission of
his daily call reports
> Nov 20-24, 1995- didn’t submit his daily call reports so Wyeth
suspended him for 15 days.
- Wyeth put Gustilo in charge of promoting 4 Lederle (Wyeth’s sister
company) pharmaceutical products. G then submitted to Wyeth a
plan of action where Gustilo committed to make an ave of 18 daily
calls to physicians; submit promptly all periodic reports; and ensure
95% territory program performance for every cycle.
- Gustilo failed to achieve his objectives so Wyeth sent him 2 notices
charging him with willful violation of company rules and regulations
and directed him to submit a written explanation.
- Gustilo explained that he was overworked and an object of reprisal
by his immediate supervisor, Filemon Verzano Jr.
- Wyeth, upon the recommendation of a review panel, terminated
Gustilo’s services.
- Gustilo then filed with the Regional Arbiter Br. No. 6 in Bacolod City
a complaint against Wyeth for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and
payment for allowances, other monetary benefits, damages and
atty’s fees.
- The Labor Arbiter found that Gustilo was illegally dismissed from
employment and ordered Wyeth and Verzano to pay Gustilo jointly
and severally Php 991,157.90 representing back wages , separation
pay, car reimbursement, damages and attorney’s fees.
- Wyeth appealed to the NLRC in Cebu City
- NLRC- affirmed but modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision ordered
reinstatement of Gustilo, or in lieu of reinstatement, pay his
separation benefits.
- Wyeth’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied so they filed with
the CA a petition for Certiorari and TRO and a writ of preliminary
injunction.
- CA- reversed NLRC’s decision and dismissed Gustilo’s complaint for
illegal dismissal (as Gustilo was terminated based on Art.282 of the
Labor Code due to gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties) but awarded him separation pay considering the “mitigating
factors” of length of service, loyalty awards Gustilo received and
Verzano’s grudge against Gustilo.
- Gustilo filed an Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE
WON GUSTILO is entitled to his separation pay.
HELD
NO, Gustilo isn’t entitled to his Separation Pay OR to reinstatement as
there was a just cause for dismissal.
Reasoning
- Phil Journalists Inc v Mosqueda- SC ruled that the findings of the CA
are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court
- Family Planning Org of the Phils Inc v NLRC – SC held that “it is the
employer’s prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations
necessary or proper for the conduct of its business or concern to
provide certain disciplinary measures to
implement said rules and to assure that the same be complied with.
At the same time, it is one of the fundamental duties of the employee
to yield obedience to all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of
the employer, and willful or intentional disobedience thereof, as a
general rule, justifies rescission of the contract of service and the
preemptory dismissal of the employee."
- Piedad v Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.- a series of
irregularities when put together may constitute serious misconduct,
which under Art 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, is a just cause
for dismissal.
- The rule embodied in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code is that a person dismissed for cause as defined therein is not
entitled to separation pay.
- PLDT v NLRC and Abucay, - "x x x henceforth, separation pay shall
be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances
where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.
Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, x x x an offense involving
moral turpitude x x x, the employer may not be required to give the
dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or
whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice."
- Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v Court of
Appeals- “We are of course aware that financial assistance may be
allowed as a measure of social justice in exceptional circumstances
and as an equitable concession. We are likewise mindful that
financial assistance is allowed only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character (Zenco Sales,
Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 234 SCRA 689). x x x."
- In the case at bar, there is NO exceptional circumstances to warrant
the grant of financial assistance or separation pay to petitioner.
Gustilo did not only violate company disciplinary rules and
regulations. He falsified his employment application form by not
stating therein that he is the nephew of Mr. Danao, respondent
Wyeth’s Nutritional Territory Manager.
- Gustilo manifested his slack of moral principle through his
infractions. In Simple term, he is dishonest.
- Philippine Long Distance Telephone vs. NLRC andAbucay- [T]hose
who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and
their motives blameless x x x." Here, petitioner failed to measure up
to such requirement. Disposition Petition is DENIED
***Wyeth did not interpose an appeal to this Court. Hence, no
affirmative relief can be extended to it. So it has to comply with the
CA’s decision to grant Gustilo his Separation Pay.

GTE DIRECTORIES CORP V. SANCHEZ 197 SCRA 452 (1998)
FACTS: GTE Directories Corporation (GTE) is a foreign corporation
engaged in the Philippines in the business of publishing the PLDT
telephone directories for Metro Manila and several provinces.
 The practice was for its sales representatives to be given work
assignments within specific territories by the so-called "draw
method."
 These sales territories were so plotted to have an equal
number of advertisers as well as revenue.
 Within these territories, the sales representatives therein
assigned were given quotas that is they had to achieve a
certain amount of revenue or advertisements sold, decreased,
increased or cancelled within a given period of time.
 A territory was not fully released to the salesperson for
handling at one time, but assigned in increments or partial
releases of account.
 Increments were given by the so-called "Grid System," grids
(divisions/sections) within each territory usually numbering
five (i.e., Grids I-V).
 Each grid was assigned a fixed closing date.
 At such closing date, a salesperson should have achieved a
certain amount of the revenue target designated for his grid;
otherwise, he loses the forthcoming grid or forfeits the
remaining grids not yet received.
 The Grid System was installed for the following reasons:
 to give all salespersons an opportunity to contact advertisers
within a reasonable period;
 to assure GTE that it will get its share of advertising budget
from clients as early as possible; and
 to ensure an even flow of work throughout the company.
 June, 1984: GTE realized that competition among media for a
share of the advertising revenue had stepped up.
 GTE launched an aggressive campaign to get what it
considered to be its rightful share of the advertising budget of
its clientele before it could be allocated to other media.
 Among the actions taken were:
1. If the cancelled revenue accounts were not renewed within
the assigned period, said accounts were declared OPEN
TERRITORY to all sales representatives including the one who
reported the cancellation;
2. If not renewed during said open territory period, said
cancelled accounts were deemed no longer "open territory,"
and the same could be referred for handling to contractual
salespersons and/or outside agencies.
o A new "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy" was
thereafter drawn up.
o GTE informed all its sales representatives of the new
policy in a Memorandum dated October 12, 1984.
o The new policy did not sit well with the union.
o The Union demanded that it be given 15 days to raise
questions or objections.
o This, GTE granted, and by letter dated October 26,
1984, the union submitted its proposals for "revisions,
corrections and deletions of some policies
incorporated in the Sales Administrative Practices
issued on June 14, 1984 including the new policies
recently promulgated by Management."
o GTE next formulated a new set of "Sales Administrative
Practices," pursuant to which it issued on July 9, 1985,
a memorandum requiring all Premise Sales
Representatives (PSRs) to submit individual reports
reflecting target revenues as of deadlines, set at
August 2, 1985.
o This was superseded by another memorandum dated
July 16, 1985, revising the previous schedules on the
basis of "the consensus reached after several
discussions with your DSMs, as well as, most of you,"
The amount required initially (P30K) was reduced to
P20K
o Following this requirement, some Premise Sales
Representatives (members of the union) omitted to
submit reports regarding the P20K revenue.
o GTE again demanded for the said reports in another
Memorandum, but as before the PSR refused to
comply.
o August 6, 1985: the union filed in behalf of the sales
representatives, a notice of strike grounded on alleged
unfair labor practices of GTE
o On the same day GTE sent another Memorandum to
16 PSRs.
 No compliance was made.
 GTE suspended its sales representatives "without pay for five
(5) working days" and warned them that their failure to
submit the requisite reports would merit "more drastic
disciplinary actions."
 Still, no sales representative complied with the requirement
to submit the reports.
 So, by memorandum of the Marketing Director dated August
19, 1985, all the sales representatives concerned were
suspended anew effective August 20, 1985 until the submitted
the report.
 GTE gave its sales representatives an ultimatum.
 By memorandum dated August 23, 1985, GTE required them
for the last time, to submit the required reports within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the memorandum;
otherwise they would be terminated "for cause.”
 August 29, 1985: GTE terminated the employment of the
recalcitrant sales representatives (14), with the undertaking
to give them "separation pay, upon proper clearance and
submission of company documents, material etc., in . . .
(their) possession."
 Among those dismissed were the union's president and third
vice president, and several members of its board of directors
 On September 2, 1985, the union declared a strike
ISSUE: WON the union's objections to the regulations or policies
automatically suspend enforcement thereof and excuse the
employees' refusal to comply with the same?
  The Court failed to see how the objections and accusations
justify the deliberate and stubborn refusal of the sales
HELD: No. So long as a company's management prerogatives are representatives to obey the management's simple
exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's requirement for submission by all PSRs of individual reports
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the or memoranda requiring reflecting target revenues which it
rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, addressed to the employees concerned no less than six (6)
this Court will uphold them. times.

 Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it
must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what
are clearly management prerogatives.
 The free will of management to conduct its own business
affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.
 To sanction disregard or disobedience by employees of a rule
or order laid down by management, on the pleaded theory
that the rule or order is unreasonable, illegal, or otherwise
irregular for one reason or another, would be disastrous to
the discipline and order that it is in the interest of both the
employer and his employees.

 “Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to  Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules, defiance of
regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all management authority cannot be countenanced.
aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments,
working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to  Petition is granted, and the order of the public respondent is
be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, nullified and set aside.
working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal
and recall of work. . . .”

 In the case of GTE, it must thus be conceded that its adoption

of a new "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy" was within
its management prerogative to regulate, according to its own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment,
including the manner, procedure and processes by which
particular work activities should be done. There were, to be
sure, objections presented by the union, i.e., that the schedule
had not been "drawn (up) as a result of an agreement of all
concerned," that the new policy was incomprehensible,
discriminatory and whimsical, and "would result to further
reduction" of the sales representatives' compensation.
PCIB VS JACINTO 196 SCRA 197 (1991)

FACTS: Respondent Nilda Jacinto is a PCI (NAIA Branch) customer
relation assistant (CRA) whoa acts as alternate FX clerk or teller. On
May 1, 1984, PCIB discovered discovered the loss of some travelers
checks amounting to P25,325. As Jacinto acted as FX clerk on the said
day, an investigation was conducted by PCIB allowing Jacinto and
other personnel to explain their side.
Jacinto was found guilty of gross negligence and was given a 10-day
suspension without pay, was required to pay the loss by way of salary
deductions (P200/month + 50% of midyear and Christmas bonus and
profit sharing). She was transferred to the Baclaran branch on May
21, 1984.
On August 14, 1986, Jacinto filed a complaint with NLRC questioning
her suspension, penalty and transfer assignment. On Feb 19, 1988,
LA found the suspension and deductions to be unjustified and
ordered PCIB to erase from Jacinto’s 201 file said suspension and
return what has been deducted from her so far. PCIB was further
directed to return Jacinto to her former assignment. PCIB appealed.
Oct 23, 1989: NLRC affirmed the decision with only a modification
that Jacinto’s transfer be management prerogative.
ISSUE: W/N GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO JACINTO AS
SHE WAS NOT FORMALLY DESIGNATED TO PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS
OF AN FX CLERK
HELD: An employee who is entrusted with responsibility by his
employer should perform the task assigned to him with care and
dedication. The lack of written or formal designation should not be an
excuse to disclaim any responsibility for any damage suffered by the
employer due to his negligence. The measure of the responsibility of
an employee is that if he performed his assigned task efficiently and
according to the usual standards, he may not be held personally liable
for any damage arising there from. Failing in this, the employee must
suffer the consequences of his negligence of not lack of due care in
the performance of his duties.
NAIA branch OIC, Gilberto Marquez, verbally requested Jacinto to
assume the duties of the FX clerk who was on leave (no written
memo of assignment). Jacinto accepted the request; she herself
stated that she received the travelers checks, made the proof sheet
thereof, and thereafter placed the checks and proof sheet in the FX
cash box. The following day, she reported the loss of the said checks
from the cashbox.
Although she claimed to have prepared the proof sheet, none was
found in the box. She did not microfilm the checks as a matter of
course. She did not formally endorse the FX box to the night shift FX
clerk or to the cashier. More so, considering that she knew the lock of
the box to be defective, PCIB’s finding that Jacinto was grossly
negligent is well-taken.
Jacinto’s 10-day suspension without pay is a proper penalty in
accordance with the prescribed rules of PCIB. But since PCIB is guilty
of contributory negligence for failing to have the lock of the FX box
fixed and to have taken other security measures in the bank
premises, the penalty of reimbursement of the full value o loss is
mitigated by requiring Jacinto to reimburse the petitioner ½ of the
loss by way of salary deduction.

AVON COSMETICS INC V. LUNA 511 SCRA 376 (2007)
FACTS: Luna began working for Beautifont, Inc. in 1972, first as a
franchise dealer and then a year later, as a Supervisor.
 Sometime in 1978, Avon Cosmetics, Inc. (Avon), herein
petitioner, acquired and took over the management and
operations of Beautifont, Inc. Nonetheless, respondent Luna
continued working for said successor company.
 Aside from her work as a supervisor, respondent Luna also
acted as a make-up artist of petitioner Avon’s Theatrical
Promotion’s Group, for which she received a per diem for each
theatrical performance.
 On 5 November 1985, petitioner Avon and respondent Luna
entered into an agreement, entitled Supervisor’s Agreement
which later on made respondent Luna part of the independent
sales force of petitioner Avon.
 In 1988, Luna signed up as a Group Franchise Director of
Sandre Phil. Inc. concurrent with being a Group Supervisor of
Avon. As a Group Franchise Director, Luna began
selling/promoting Sandre products to other Avon employees
and friends.
 23 Sept. 1988 – Luna requested a law firm to render legal
opinion as to the consequence of the Supervisor’s Agreement
she executed with Avon. In response to her query, a lawyer in
the firm opined that the Supervisor’s agreement was
“contrary to law and public policy.” Luna wrote a letter to her
colleagues sharing the legal opinion she obtained from her
legal counsel
 11 Oct. 1988, Avon notified Luna of the termination or
cancellation of her Supervisor’s Agreement wih Avon for the
following reason:
o Luna signed up as Group Franchise Director of Sandre
Phil. Inc (SPI)
o She sold and promoted SPI products and even to
several employees of Avon
o Luna have written letters to other members of Avon
salesforce inducing them to violate their own contracts
with Avon.
 Aggreived, Luna filed a complaint for damages. RTC and CA
rendered their decision in favor of respondent
ISSUE: a)Whether or not paragraph 5 of the Supervisor’s Agreement
is void for being violative of law and public policy;
b)Whether or not paragraph 6 of the Supervisor’s Agreement which contravenes some established interests of society, or is inconsistent
authorizes petitioner Avon to terminate or cancel the agreement at with sound policy and good morals, or tends clearly to undermine the
will is void for being contrary to law and public policy. security of individual rights, whether of personal liability or of private
property.
HELD:
a.) The "exclusivity clause" as embodied in paragraph 5 of the
Supervisor’s Agreement is valid and not against public policy.
Such prohibition is neither directed to eliminate the competition like
Sandré Phils., Inc. nor foreclose new entrants to the market. In its
Memorandum, it admits that the reason for such exclusion is to
safeguard the network that it has cultivated through the years.
Admittedly, both companies employ the direct selling method in
order to peddle their products. By direct selling, petitioner Avon and
Sandre, the manufacturer, forego the use of a middleman in selling
their products, thus, controlling the price by which they are to be
sold. The limitation does not affect the public at all. It is only a means
by which petitioner Avon is able to protect its investment.

b.) No. The termination clause of the Supervisor’s Agreement clearly

provides for two ways of terminating and/or canceling the contract.
One mode does not exclude the other. The contract provided that it
can be terminated or cancelled for cause, it also stated that it can be
terminated without cause, both at any time and after written notice.
Thus, whether or not the termination or cancellation of the
Supervisor’s Agreement was "for cause," is immaterial. The only
requirement is that of notice to the other party. When petitioner
Avon chose to terminate the contract, for cause, respondent Luna
was duly notified thereof.
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS V. QUISUMBING 333
Public policy is that principle of the law, which holds that no subject SCRA 12 (2000)
or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to
the public or against the public good. As applied to contracts, in the INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS:
absence of express legislation or constitutional prohibition, a court, in
order to declare a contract void as against public policy, must find Generally, these conventions recognize the right already
that the contract as to the consideration or thing to be done, has a enumerated in our Constitution.
tendency to injure the public, is against the public good, or 1. right to work, free choice of employment.
2. equal pay for equal work (to prevent discrimination): persons who
work with substantially equal qualification, skill, effort and
responsibility under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
FACTS: Respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD
732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents.
 The School hires both foreign and local teachers as members
of its faculty, classifying the same into two:
 foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
 The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded
local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance.
 Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-
hires. The School justifies the difference on 2 "significant
economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure,
namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" - that is leaving his family
and friends for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an
educator); and
 (b) limited tenure - that he will eventually return to his home
country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of
obtaining suitable employment after along period in a foreign
land..
 At the negotiations for a new CBA, petitioner International
School alliance of Educators, “a legitimate labor union and
the collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members” of the School, contested the difference in salary
rates between foreign and local-hires.
 This issue, and the question of whether foreign-hires should
be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually
caused a deadlock between the parties.
 Petitioners filed notice of strike. The failure of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a
compromise prompted the DOLE to assume jurisdiction over
the dispute.
 DOLE issued an Order resolving the parity and representation
issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Sec. Quisumbing
denied petitioner's MFR. Petitioner now seeks relief in this
Court.
 Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification
employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that
the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination.
 The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its
faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other
than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as
local hires.
 Also foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike
the local hires who enjoy security of tenure
ISSUES
1. WON the International School’s point-of-hire classification for the
distinction in salary rates between foreign-hires and local hires is
discriminatory and an invalid classification under the law.
2. WON foreign-hires should belong to the same bargaining unit as
the local-hires
HELD
1. YES
Ratio:
The Constitution, Labor Code and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights impregnably institutionalize in
this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the
School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
Reasoning
- The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights in Art.7 provides that: “The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just
and favorable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular, fair
wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed
conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal
pay for equal work.” The Philippines, through its Constitution, has
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to
"humane conditions of work." The Constitution also directs the State
to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Hence, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure
also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates.
2. NO
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to
be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective
bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows
that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have
limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-
hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions
as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not
granted to local hires.
These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their
status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from
the latter.
Disposition Petition GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Sec. of
Labor and Employment are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they
uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires
higher salaries than local-hires.

Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the

Labor Code (Art.135)

The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are

adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which
are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
 The Labor Code was promulgated to promote the welfare and well-
being of the working man. Its spirit and intent mandate the speedy
administration of justice, with least attention to technicalities but
MAGALLANES VS SUN YAT SEN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 542 SCRA 78 without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process.
(2008)

FACTS: Azucenan Magallanes, Evelynm Bacolod, Judith Cotecson,

Grace Gonzales and Bella Gonzales were all employed as teachers in
the Sun Yat Sen Elementary School, Surigao City. Paz Go, Elena
Cubillan are principals of said school. Willy Ang Gan Teng and Benito
Ang are its directors, while Teotimo Tan is the school treasures. They
are all respondents herein.

In May 1994, respondents terminated the services of petitioners.

Thus, in August 1994, petitioners filed a complaint for the NLRC for
illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, payment of back wages,
13th month pay, ECOLA, separation pay, moral damages and fees.
UY V. BUENAO 484 SCRA 628 (2006)
LA rendered in favor of petitioners, citing that they were illegally
dismissed and ordered the respondents to reinstate them to their FACTS Amalia Bueno was the Manager of Countrywide Rural Bank of
former or equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights, and La Carota, Inc. (bank hereafter) Marbel Branch. She was verbally and
pay them their back wages, salary differential, 13th month pay summarily dismissed by Atty. Andrea Uy, interim President and
different and service incentive leave benefits.
Corporate Secretary of the bank, during a depositors' meeting. -
NLRC reversed the Arbiter’s judgment, holding that petitioners are Bueno filed a case for illegal dismissal and prayed for reinstatement
contractual employees and that respondents merely allowed their with full backwages and damages.
contracts to lapse.

ISSUE: W/N THE NLRC REVERSAL OF THE LA’S DECISION IS VALID AND ISSUE: WON Uy is an officer of the bank, making her soldarily liable
LAWFUL
with the corporation for illegal dismissal
HELD: Quasi-judicial agencies have neither business nor power to
modify or amend the final and executory Decisions of the appellate
courts. Under the principle of immutability of judgments, any HELD: NO - The minutes of the depositors' meeting clearly showed
alteration or amendment which substantially affects a final and that Uy was a mere depositor of the bank. She was only elected as
executor.
officer of the Interim Board of Directors craeted by the association of
depositors with the sole task of rehabilitating the bank (which is
under receivership).
 There is no evidence that the association of depositors that
elected the interim board was recognized by BSP. Hence, it
had no legal authority to act for the bank.
 The act of dismissing Bueno by Uy cannot be deemed as an act
as an officer of the bank. Consequently, it cannot be held that
there existed an employer-employee relationship between Uy
and Bueno.
 The requirement of employer-employee relationship is
jurisdictional for the provisions of the Labor Code on
Postemployment to apply. Since such relationship was not
established, the labor arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over
Uy.
Disposition CA decision finding Uy solidarily liable with the bank
reversed
LRTA V. VENUS 485 SCRA 301 (2006)
Under the present state of the law, the test in determining whether a
government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil
Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government
corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions
while those incorporated under the general Corporation Law are not
within its coverage.
FACTS: Consolidated petitions of Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA)
and Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (METRO), seeking the reversal of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals directing them to reinstate
private respondent workers to their former positions without loss of
seniority and other rights and privileges, and ordering them to jointly
and severally pay the latter their full back wages, benefits, and moral
damages. The LRTA and METRO were also ordered to jointly and
severally pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
total money judgment.
 Petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and controlled
corporation created by Executive Order No. 603, Series of
1980, as amended, to construct and maintain a light rail
transit system and provide the commuting public with an
efficient, economical, dependable and safe transportation.
Petitioner METRO, formerly Meralco Transit Organization,
Inc., was a qualified transportation corporation duly organized
in accordance with the provisions of the Corporation Code,
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
existing under Philippine laws.
 Petitioner LRTA, after a bidding process, entered into a ten
(10)-year Agreement for the Management and Operation of
the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System from June 8, 1984
until June 8, 1994 with petitioner METRO.
 Pursuant to the Agreement, petitioner METRO hired its own
employees, including private respondents. Petitioner METRO
thereafter entered into a collective bargaining agreement.
 In June 1989, , petitioners LRTA and METRO executed a Deed
of Sale where petitioner LRTA purchased the shares of stocks
in petitioner METRO. However, petitioners LRTA and METRO
continued with their distinct and separate juridical
personalities
 On July 25, 2000, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board – National Capital
Region against petitioner METRO on account of a deadlock in
the collective bargaining negotiation.
 On the same day, the Union struck. The power supply switches
in the different light rail transit substations were turned off.
They completely paralyzed the operations of the entire light
rail transit system. As the strike adversely affected the
mobility of the commuting public, then Secretary of Labor
Bienvenido E. Laguesma issued on that same day an
assumption of jurisdiction order directing all the striking
employees “to return to work immediately upon receipt of
this Order and for the Company to accept them back under
the same terms and conditions of employment prevailing prior
to the strike
 In their memorandum, DOLE Sheriffs reported to Sec.
Laguesma that they tried to personally serve the Order of
assumption of jurisdiction to the Union through its officials
and members but they refused to receive the same. The
sheriffs posted the Order in the different stations/terminals of
the light rail transit system. Further, the Order of assumption
of jurisdiction was published on the July 27, 2000 issues of the
Philippine Daily Inquirerand the Philippine Star.
 Despite the issuance, posting, and publication of the
assumption of jurisdiction and return to work order, the
Union officers and members failed to return to work. Thus,
effective July 27, 2000, private respondents, were considered
dismissed from employment
 Workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. On October 1,
2001, Labor Arbiter Luis D. Flores rendered a consolidated
judgment in favor of the private respondent workers
 On May 29, 2002, on appeal, the NLRC found that the striking
workers failed to heed the return to work order and reversed
and set aside the decision of the labor arbiter. The suit
against LRTA was dismissed since “LRTA is a government-
owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of
Executive Order No. 603 with an original charter” and “it had
no participation with the termination of complainants’
employment.” In fine, the cases against the LRTA and METRO
were dismissed, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction and for
lack of merit.
 On a petition for certiorari however, the Court of Appeals
reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Decision rendered by
the Labor Arbiter. Public respondent appellate court declared
the workers’ dismissal as illegal.
ISSUE
WON LRTA should be held liable for the illegal dismissal of
employees
HELD: NO.
Petitioner LRTA argues that it has no employer-employee
relationship with private respondent workers as they were hired by
petitioner METRO alone pursuant to its ten (10)-year Agreement for
the Management and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail
Transit System with petitioner METRO.
Petitioner LRTA further contends that it is a government owned and
controlled corporation with an original charter, Executive Order No.
603, Series of 1980, as amended, and thus under the exclusive
jurisdiction only of the Civil Service Commission, not the NLRC.
We agree with petitioner LRTA. Section 2 (1), Article IX – B, 1987
Constitution, expressly provides that “[t]he civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.” Corporations with original
charters are those which have been created by special law and not
through the general corporation law.
In Philippine National Oil Company – Energy Development
Corporation v. Hon. Leogrado- “under the present state of the law,
the test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled
corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its
creation such that government corporations created by special
charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under
the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage.”
There should be no dispute then that employment in petitioner LRTA
should be governed only by civil service rules, and not the Labor
Code and beyond the reach of the Department of Labor and
Employment, since petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and
controlled corporation with an original charter, Executive Order No.
603, Series of 1980
In contrast, petitioner METRO is covered by the Labor Code despite
its later acquisition by petitioner LRTA. In Lumanta v. National Labor
Relations Commission, this Court ruled that labor law claims against
government-owned and controlled corporations without original
charter fall within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and
Employment and not the Civil Service Commission
Petitioner METRO was originally organized under the Corporation
Code, and only became a government-owned and controlled
corporation after it was acquired by petitioner LRTA. Even then,
petitioner METRO has no original charter, hence, it is the
Department of Labor and Employment, and not the Civil Service
Commission, which has jurisdiction over disputes arising from the
employment of its workers.
We therefore hold that the employees of petitioner METRO cannot
be considered as employees of petitioner LRTA. The employees
hired by METRO are covered by the Labor Code and are under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, whereas
the employees of petitioner LRTA, a government-owned and
controlled corporation with original charter, are covered by civil
service rules.
We believe that METRO employees are not covered by the
prohibition against strikes applicable to employees embraced in the
Civil Service.
This being so, METRO employees are not covered by the Civil Service
law, rules and regulations but are covered by the Labor Code and,
therefore, the rights and prerogatives granted to private employees
thereunder, including the right to strike, are available to them.
Herein private respondent workers cannot have the best of two
worlds, e.g., be considered government employees of petitioner
LRTA, yet allowed to strike as private employees under our labor
laws.
Moreover, as noted by Secretary Benjamin E. Diokno, of the
Department of Budget and Management, in his letter dated
February 22, 1999, the employees of METRO are not entitled to the
government amelioration assistance authorized by the President
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 37 for government
employees, because the employees of METRO are not government
employees since Metro, Inc. "could not be considered as GOCC as
defined under Section 3 (b) of E.O. 518
Even if petitioner LRTA eventually purchased METRO in 1989, both
parties maintained their separate and distinct juridical personality
and allowed the agreement to proceed.
EBRO III VS NLRC 216 SCRA 399 (1996)
FACTS: Private respondent International Catholic Migration
Commission (ICMC) is a non-profit agency engaged in international
humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United
National Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys
Consultative Status, Category II. It was one of the agencies accredited
by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing
center at Sabang, Morong, Bataan.
On June 24, 1985, private respondent ICMC employed petitioner Jose
G. Ebro III to teach "English as a Second Language and Cultural
Orientation Training Program" at the refugee processing center. The
employment contract provided in pertinent part:
Salary: Your monthly salary for the first 6 months probationary period
is P 3,155 inclusive of cost of living allowance. Upon being made
regular after successful completion of the six (6) months probationary
period your monthly salary will be adjusted to P3,445 inclusive of cost
of living allowance
If either party wishes to terminate employment, a notice of two (2)
weeks should be given in writing to the party.
After 6 months, ICMC notified petitioner that effective Dec 21, 1985,
the latter's services were terminated for his failure to meet the
requirements of
1. Classroom performance…up to the standards set in the Guide
for Instruction;
2. Regular attendance in the mandated teacher training, and in
the schedule team meetings, one-on-one conferences with
the supervisor, etc.;
3. Compliance with ICMC and PRPC policies and procedures.
On Feb 4, 1986, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair
labor practice, underpayment of wages, accrued leave pay, 14th
month pay, damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation.
Petitioner alleged that there was no objective evaluation of his
performance to warrant his dismissal and that he should have been
considered a regular employee from the start because ICMC failed to
acquaint him with the standards under which he must qualify as such.
He prayed for reinstatement with back wages; P3,155 for
probationary and P3,445 for regular salary adjustments; value of
lodging or dormitory privileges; cost of insurance coverage for group
life, medical, death, dismemberment and disability benefits; moral,
and exemplary, and nominal damages plus interest on the above
claims with attorney's fees.
ICMC claimed that petitioner failed to qualify for regular employment
because he showed no interest in improving his professional
performance both in and out of the classroom after he had been
periodically evaluated; that petitioner was paid his salary up to Dec
31, 1985, two weeks pay in lieu of notice, and 14th month pay pro-
rata; and that his accrued leave balance already been converted to
cash.
After the parties had formally offered their evidence, private
respondents submitted their memorandum on July 31, 1989 in which,
among other things, they invoked ICMC's diplomatic immunity on the
basis of the MOA
signed on July 15, 1988 between the Philippine government and
ICMC.
LA held that ICMC's legal immunity under the Memorandum could
not be given retroactive effect since "[that would] deprive
complainant's property right without due process and impair the
obligation of contract of employment." LA ordered ICMC to reinstate
petitioner as regular teacher without loss of seniority rights and pay
him 1 year back wages and other benefits.
On appeal, NLRC rendered in favor ICMC and dismissed the case on
the ground that under the MOA, ICMC was immune from suit.
ISSUE: DOES THE MOA, EXECUTED ON JULY 15, 1988, GRANT ICMC
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT?
HELD: The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly
necessitated by their international character and respective purposes.
The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by
the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction
by DOLE in these instances would defeat the very purpose of
immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations,
in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or
control by the host country to the prejudice of member State of the
organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their
functions. (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja)
The grant of immunity to ICMC is in virtue of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations adopted by the UN General Assembly on Nov 21, 1947, and
concurred in by the Philippine Senate on May 17, 1949. This
Convention has the force and effect of law, considering that under
the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
The scope of immunity of the ICMC contained in the Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations is instructive. Art. III, §4 of the Convention provides
for immunity from "every form of legal process." Thus, even if private
respondents had been served summons and subpoenas prior to the
execution of the Memorandum, they, as officers of ICMC, can claim
immunity under the same in order to prevent enforcement of an
adverse judgment, since a writ of execution is "a legal process" within
the meaning of Article III, §4.
Art III §4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations requires that the waiver of
the privilege must be express. There was no such waiver of immunity
in this case. Nor can ICMC be estopped from claiming diplomatic
immunity since estoppel does not operate to confer jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over a cause of action.
Finally, neither can it be said that recognition of ICMC's immunity
from suit deprives petitioner of due process. As pointed out in ICMC
v. Calleja, petitioner is not exactly without remedy for whatever
violation of rights it may have suffered for the following reason:
Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides that "each
specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of
settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes
of private character to which the specialized agency is a party."
Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement
between ICMC and the Philippine Government, whenever there is any
abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the
privileges and immunities accorded.

Exception: If there’s abuse or any injustice created due to this

exemption from suit, the remedy of the employee is to ask the CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE V CA (NLRC, CALAYLAY, AQUINO,
Philippines to withdraw the grant of immunity from suit. Then the GACUTAN, BELO)
legal process and provisions of law in the Philippines will apply. 437 SCRA 171
DAVIDE, JR; August 24, 2004

FACTS: In 1992, Ms. Diana Belo, a teacher of Chiang Kai Shek College
since 1977, applied for a leave of absence for the school year 1992-
1993. Upon submitting her application, she was informed of the
school policy that if she takes a leave of absence, she is not assured of
a teaching load upon her return. She was likewise informed that only
teachers in active service may enjoy the privilege and benefits
provided by the school, such as free tuition for the teachers’ children.

- Ms. Belo, nonetheless, took her leave of absence. In May 1993, she
attempted to return to CKSC and signified her readiness to teach for
the coming school year. However, she was not allowed to return.
Hence, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, among others,
against CKSC.

- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but the NLRC disagreed.
The Court of Appeals upheld the NLRC’s ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON private respondent was constructively dismissed

HELD: YES. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, for a
private school teacher to acquire a permanent status of
employment and, therefore, be entitled to a security of tenure, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the teacher is a full-time
teacher; (b) the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years
of service; and (c) such service must have been satisfactory. Since
Ms. Belo has measured up to these standards, she therefore enjoys
security of tenure.
- Constructive dismissal is defined as a cessation from work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or
unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay or
both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
- Ms. Belo was constructively dismissed when the petitioners, in
implementing their policies, effectively barred her from teaching for
the school year 1993-1994. The three policies are:
(1) the non-assurance of a teaching load to a teacher who took a
leave of absence;
(2) the hiring of non-permanent teachers in April to whom teaching
loads were already assigned when Ms. Belo signified in May 1993 her
intention to teach; and
(3) the non-applicability to children of teachers on leave of the free
tuition fee benefits extended to children of teachers in service.
- Ms. Belo was definitely singled out in the implementation of a future
policy (i.e., the policy that employees not in service are not entitled to
any benefit extended by the school). The petitioners did not take
heed of the principle enshrined in our labor laws that policies should
be adequately known to the employees and uniformly implemented
to the body of employees as a whole and not in isolation.
- The continued employment of Ms. Belo was also rendered unlikely
by the insistence of the petitioners in implementing the alleged policy
that a teacher who goes on leave for one year is not assured of a
teaching load. While this alleged policy was mentioned in Mr. Chien’s
letter of 9 June 1992, it was not included in the school’s written
statement of policies dated 13 March 1992. Hence, it was then a non-
existent policy. When a non-existent policy is implemented and, in
this case, only to Ms. Belo, it constitutes a clear case of
discrimination.
- Petitioners’ invocation of the third policy – that of giving teaching
assignments to probationary teachers in April – to justify their refusal
to provide Ms. Belo a teaching load is a lame excuse that rings of
untruth and dishonesty. Patently clear is the illegal manner by which
the petitioners eased out Ms. Belo from the teaching corps.
- Likewise, we do not find merit in petitioners’ assertion that the
Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the illegality of the
school policy of non-assurance of a teaching load, since the alleged
illegality was never raised as an issue before the respondent court or
in the forums below. As pointed out by the private respondent, that
policy was part of the defense invoked by the petitioners in the
Arbiter level, in the NLRC, and in the respondent court to the charge
of illegal dismissal; and, hence, it must necessarily be passed upon
and scrutinized. Besides, that policy is intimately intertwined with the
main issue of whether Ms. Belo was illegally dismissed.
- This case is an exception to the general rule that the factual findings
and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter are accorded weight and respect
on appeal, and even finality. For one thing, the findings of the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter are contrary to each other; hence, the
reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the
questioned findings.
Disposition The Petition is DENIED.
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION V. SAN ILDEFONSO
COLLEGE 299 SCRA 24 (1998)
NATURE: Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside an NLRC decision
and resolution denying a motion for reconsideration
FACTS: National Mines and Allied Workers’ Union is the certified
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of respondent
College. Petitioner Juliet Arroyo was the president of the San
Ildefonso College Association of Faculty and Personnel, an affiliate of
NAMAWU. Private respondent Lloren is the directress of the College.
In February, 1991, ARROYO, a “tenured teacher” who later became a
part-time teacher, asked that she be allowed to teach on a full-time
basis. The COLLEGE denied her request for her failure to “make use of
the privilege” of her study leave in the two years she was allowed to
do so. The next month, the other individual petitioners, who were
issued yearly appointment, were informed of the non-renewal of
their respective contracts.
In April, 1991, the SICAFP was formalized into a labor union affiliated
with NAMAWU.
The petitioners and NAMAWU filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practice, forced resignation, harassment, underpayment
of wages, non-payment of service incentive leave pay, and violation
of Waeg Order No. IV-1. They demanded reinstatement and payment
of back wages.
The Labor Arbiter held private respondents guilty of illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practice interfering with the organization of the labor
union. The contracts of employment were not bilateral agreements,
but letters of appointment. When the College opted not to renew the
appointments it merely invoked the expiration of the period fixed in
the appointments without giving any other reason or granting the
teachers concerned an opportunity to explain their side. The
probationary employees were not even informed of their
performance rating when they were denied renewal of their
appointment. The non-renewal was timely made while individual
petitioners were in the process of organizing themselves into a union.
These acts of the College amounted to union busting.
The Office of the Solicitor General moves for the dismissal of the
petition except as to ARROYO; that all petitioners except ARROYO
were legally dismissed. The reason why she failed to complete her
master’s degree could not be solely attributed to her. She initially
requested a leave of absence, but the COLLEGE suggested that she
teach on a part-time basis because it was in need of teachers at that
time. Also, her dismissal was without due process.
ISSUE
1. WON ARROYO was legally dismissed
2. WON the other petitioners were permanent employees
HELD
1. NO. It is undisputed that Arroyo had been teaching in the COLLEGE
since 1965 and had obtained a permanent status; she became a part-
time teacher, however, from June 1988 to March 1991.
She did not lose her permanent status when she requested to teach
on a part-time basis. The reason for the request was that she wanted
to pursue a master's degree. The COLLEGE approved the request, and
the study leave was extended for another year. It would have been
unjust and unreasonable to allow ARROYO to pursue her master's
degree, from which the COLLEGE would have also benefited in terms
of her higher learning and experience, and at the same time penalize
her with the loss of permanent status. It would as well be absurd and
illogical to maintain that by teaching on a part-time basis after
obtaining the permission to take up a master's degree,
ARROYO relinquished her permanent status. When ARROYO
subsequently requested that she continue teaching on a full-time
basis, private respondents in its letter of 27 March 1991 refused,
citing as reason her failure "to make use of the privilege granted [her]
by the administration regarding [her] study leave in the past four
semesters." This letter served as notice of ARROYO's termination
from employment. No further notice was served. It must be
emphasized that the letter did not indicate that a master's degree
was necessary for ARROYO to continue her service, as now claimed by
the COLLEGE. In fact, apart from its mere allegation, the COLLEGE
failed to prove that a master's degree was a pre-requisite for
ARROYO's teaching position. ARROYO, a permanent teacher, could
only be dismissed for just cause and only after being afforded due
process, in light of paragraph (b), Article 277 of the Labor Code.
Arroyo’s dismissal was substantively and procedurally flawed. It was
effected without just cause and due process. Thus, her termination
was void. She is therefore entitled to reinstatement to her former
position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, full
backwages inclusive of allowances, and other benefits computed
from the date of her actual dismissal to the date of reinstatement
2. NO. On the issue of whether the individual petitioners were
permanent employees, it is the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, and not the Labor Code, which is applicable. This was settled
in University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, where we explicitly ruled that for
a private school teacher to acquire permanent status in employment
and, therefore, be entitled to security of tenure, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the teacher is a full-time teacher; (2) the
teacher must have rendered three (3) consecutive years of service;
and (3) such service must have been satisfactory.
Eleven of the individual petitioners were full-time teachers during the
school year 1990-1991, but only two, namely, Odiste and Buan had
rendered three consecutive years of service. There is no showing,
however, that the two were on a full-time basis during those three
years and that their services were satisfactory. Evidently, not one of
the said teachers can be considered to have acquired a permanent
status.
Disposition the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
in NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-4-3710-91-RI is AFFIRMED, subject to the
modification that private respondent San Ildefonso College is
DIRECTED to (1) reinstate petitioner JULIETA ARROYO to her former
position at the time of her dismissal, or to any equivalent position if
reinstatement to such position is no longer feasible, without of loss of
seniority rights and benefits that may be due her; and (2) pay her
back wages from the date of her actual dismissal to the date of her
actual reinstatement.

AUSTRIA VS NLRC 312 SCRA 410 (1999)
FACTS: Pastor Dionisio Austria worked with the Central Philippine
Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) for
28 years from 1963 to 1991. n Jan 1991, he was transferred to
Bacolod City. He held the position of district pastor until his services
were terminated on 31 October 1991.
On various occasions from Aug to up to Oct, 1991, Eufronio Ibesate,
the treasurer of the Negros Mission asked him to admit accountability
and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his
wife, Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10,
and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. Petitioner reasoned out
that he should not be made accountable for the unremitted
collections since it was Pastor Gideon Buhat and Ibesate who
authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was
very sick to do the collecting at that time.
On Oct 16, 1991, petitioner tried to persuade Pastor Buhat to
convene the Executive Committee for the purpose of settling the
dispute between him and Pastor David Rodrigo. Pastor Buhat denied
the request of petitioner since some committee members were out of
town and there was no quorum.
On Oct 17, 1991, petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife
to attend the Executive Committee meeting. Subsequently, petitioner
received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of
denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct,
gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense
against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as
grounds for the termination of his services.
ISSUES:
1. DOES LA/NLRC HAVE JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE THE
COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER AGAINST THE SDA?
2. IS THE TERMINATION OF THE SERVICES OF PETITIONER IS AN
ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIR?
HELD: An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed or
form or worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement
within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the
government of the membership, and the power of excluding from
such associations those deemed unworthy of membership.
Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the
relationship between the church and its members and relate to
matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the
congregation. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its
religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious
significance. Simply stated, what is involved here is the relationship of
the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is
purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines of the church.
Aside from these, SDA admitted in a certification issued by its officer,
Ibesate, that petitioner has been its employee for 28 years. SDA even
registered petitioner with the SSS as its employee. The worker's
records of petitioner have been submitted by private respondents as
part of their exhibits. From all of these it is clear that when the SDA
terminated the services of petitioner, it was merely exercising its
management prerogative to fire an employee which it believes to be
unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the case.
The issue being the legality of petitioner's dismissal, the same must
be measured against the requisites for a valid dismissal, namely: (a)
the employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be given an
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself, and; (b) the dismissal
must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code.
Without the concurrence of these twin requirements, the termination
would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.
As to Due Process
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code further require the employer to
furnish the employee with 2 written notices, to wit: (a) a written
notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity
within which to explain his side, and, (b) a written notice of
termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established
to justify his termination. Noncompliance therewith is fatal because
these requirements are conditions sine quo non before dismissal may
be validly effected.
SDA failed to substantially comply with the above requirements. With
regard to the first notice, the letter dated 17 October 1991, which
notified petitioner and his wife to attend the meeting on 21 October
1991, cannot be construed as the written charge required by law. A
perusal of the said letter reveals that it never categorically stated the
particular acts or omissions on which his impending termination was
grounded. In fact, the letter never even mentioned that he would be
subject to investigation.
As to Just Cause
Settled is the rule that under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, the
breach of trust must be willful. A breach is willful if it is done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the
employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the
employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer.
Private respondents try to pin on petitioner the alleged non-
remittance of the tithes collected by his wife. In
the absence of conspiracy and collusion, which private respondents
failed to demonstrate, between petitioner and his wife, he cannot be
made accountable for the alleged infraction committed by his wife.
After all, they still have separate and distinct personalities. Thus, the
allegation of breach of trust has no leg to stand on.
PENARANDA V. BAGANGA PLYWOOD CORP 489 SCRA 94 (2006)
FACTS
Petitioner’s Claims
 Petitioner Charlito Peñaranda alleges that he was employed
by respondent [Baganga] with a monthly salary of P5,000.00
as Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer
  His services were terminated without the benefit of due
process and valid grounds.
 He was not paid his overtime pay, premium pay for working
during holidays/rest days, night shift differentials and finally
claims for payment of damages and attorney’s fees having
been forced to litigate the present complaint.
- Respondents’ Claims
 Respondent [BPC] represented by its General Manager
HUDSON CHUA, allege that complainant’s separation from
service was done pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor Code.
 BPC was on temporary closure due to repair and general
maintenance and it applied for clearance with the DOLE,
Regional Office No. XI to shut down and to dismiss employees.
 Peñaranda was not terminated from employment much less
illegally. He opted to severe employment when he insisted
payment of his separation benefits.
 Furthermore, being a managerial employee he is not entitled
to overtime pay and if ever he rendered services beyond the
normal hours of work, there was no office order/or
authorization for him to do so.
- The labor arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and that
petitioner’s complaint was premature because he was still employed
by BPC. The temporary closure of BPC’s plant did not terminate his
employment.
- Nevertheless, the labor arbiter found petitioner entitled to overtime
pay, premium pay for working on rest days, and attorney’s fees in the
total amount of P21,257.98.
- NLRC deleted the award of overtime pay and premium pay for
working on rest days for the petitioner was not entitled to these
awards because he was a managerial employee.
- CA dismissed Peñaranda’s Petition for Certiorari and held that he
failed to:
1) attach copies of the pleadings submitted before
the labor arbiter and NLRC; and 2) explain why the filing and service
of the Petition was not done by personal service.
- In its later Resolution, CA denied reconsideration on the ground that
petitioner still failed to submit the pleadings filed before the NLRC.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to overtime pay and premium pay
for working on rest days
HELD: NO
- Article 82 of the Labor Code exempts managerial employees from
the coverage of labor standards. Labor standards provide the working
conditions of employees, including entitlement to overtime pay and
premium pay for working on rest days.
- Under this provision, managerial employees are “those whose
primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in
which they are employed or of a department or subdivision.”
- The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code state that managerial
employees are those who meet the following conditions:
“(1) Their primary duty consists of the management of the
establishment in which they are employed or of a department or
subdivision thereof;
“(2) They customarily and regularly direct the work
of two or more employees therein;
“(3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower
rank; or their suggestions and
recommendation as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion
or any other change of status of other employees are given particular
weight.”
- The Court disagreed with the NLRC’s finding that petitioner was a
managerial employee. However, petitioner was a member of the
managerial staff, which also takes him out of the coverage of labor
standards. Like managerial employees, officers and members of the
managerial staff are not entitled to the provisions of law on labor
standards. The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code define
members of a managerial staff as those with the following duties and
responsibilities:
“(1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly
related to management policies of the employer;
“(2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent
judgment;
“(3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a
managerial employee whose primary duty consists of the
management of the establishment in which he is employed or
subdivision thereof; or
(ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or
technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; or
(iii) execute under general supervision special assignments and tasks;
and
“(4) who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked
in a workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related
to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1), (2), and
(3) above.”
- Petitioner’s duties and responsibilities conform to the definition of a
member of a managerial staff under the Implementing Rules.
Petitioner supervised the engineering section of the steam plant
boiler. His work involved overseeing the operation of the machines
and the performance of the workers in the engineering section. This
work necessarily required the use of discretion and independent
judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the steam plant boiler.
As supervisor, petitioner is deemed a member of the managerial staff.
- Noteworthy, even petitioner admitted that he was a supervisor. In
his Position Paper, he stated that he was the foreman responsible for
the operation of the boiler. The term foreman implies that he was the
representative of management over the workers and the operation of
the department. Petitioner’s evidence also showed that he was the
supervisor of the steam plant. His classification as supervisor is
further evident from the manner his salary was paid. He belonged to
the 10% of respondent’s 354 employees who were paid on a monthly
basis; the others were paid only on a daily basis.
Disposition Petition was DENIED

SONZA V ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION
FACTS
 ABS-CBN signed Agreement with Mel and Jay Management
and Devt Corp (MJMDC), which agreed to provide Sonza’s
services exclusively to the network as talent for radio and TV.
 Sonza resigned and filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before
the DOLE that the said network didn’t pay his salaries,
separation pay, service incentive leave pay, etc.
 ABS filed Motion to Dismiss because there was no employer-
employee relationship. ABS continued to remit Sonza’s
monthly talent fees through his account.
 Labor Arbiter dismissed complaint because of lack of
jurisdiction. It stands to reason that a "talent" cannot be
considered as an employee. NLRC affirmed Arbiter’s decision.
Sonza filed certiorari action with CA, which dismissed the case.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE
WON there was an employer-employee relationship between ABS-
CBN and Sonza?
HELD
NO
This is the first Court resolution on nature of relationship between a
station and a talent. There is no case law stating that a radio and
television program host is an employee of the broadcast station.
There are 4 elements of employer-employee relationship:
1. The selection and engagement of employee
- if Sonza didn’t possess his skills, talents and celebrity status, ABS-
CBN would not have entered into agreement with him but would
have hired him through personnel department just like any other
employee.
2. Payment of wages
- whatever Sonza received arose from the contract and not from the
employer-employee relation
- If SONZA were ABS-CBN’s employee, there would be no need for
the parties to stipulate on benefits such as "SSS, Medicare, x x x and
13th month pay" which the law automatically incorporates into every
employer-employee contract.
- and the talent fee is so huge that it indicates more a contractual
than an employment relationship
3. Power to dismiss
- Even if the network suffered severe business losses, ABS-CBN could
not retrench SONZA because ABS-CBN remained obligated to pay
SONZA’s talent fees during the life of the Agreement. This
circumstance indicates an independent contractual relationship
between SONZA and ABS-CBN.
4. Control on employee on means and methods (also called control
test; most important to determine relationship)
- First, SONZA contends that ABS-CBN exercised control over the
means and methods of his work.
- To perform his work, SONZA only needed his skills and
talent.
- How SONZA delivered his lines, appeared on television,
and sounded on radio were outside ABS-CBN’s control.
- SONZA did not have to render eight hours of work per
day.
- ABS-CBN could not dictate the contents of SONZA’s
script.
- Sonza contends that ABS exercised control in providing equipment
and crew.
- Court said these are not tools needed by Sonza. What
he needed were his talent, skills, costume.
- Second, Sonza contends that ABS subjected him to rules and
standards.
- The code of conduct imposed on SONZA under the
Agreement refers to the "Television and Radio Code of
the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster sa Pilipinas (KBP),
which has been adopted by the COMPANY (ABS-CBN)
as its Code of Ethics."
- The KBP code applies to broadcasters, not to
employees of radio and television stations.
Broadcasters are not necessarily employees of radio
and television stations. Clearly, the rules and standards
of performance referred to in the Agreement are those
applicable to talents and not to employees of ABS-CBN.
- Lastly, Sonza said his exclusivity is a form of control by ABS.
- Court said exclusivity is a widespread practice in
entertainment industry, as protection of investment in
“building up” a talent. Besides, the huge talent fees of
an exclusive talent compensates for exclusivity.
- SONZA argues that Policy Instruction No. 40 issued by then
Minister of Labor Blas Ople on 8 January 1979 finally settled the
status of workers in the broadcast industry. Under this policy, the
types of employees in the broadcast industry are the station and
program employees.
- Policy Instruction No. 40 is a mere executive issuance which does
not have the force and effect of law. There is no legal presumption
that Policy Instruction No. 40 determines SONZA’s status. A mere
executive issuance cannot exclude independent contractors from
the class of service providers to the broadcast industry. The
classification of workers in the broadcast industry into only two
groups under Policy Instruction No. 40 is not binding on this Court,
especially when the classification has no basis either in law or in
fact.
- Difference in tax treatment also showed that there’s no employer-
employee relation.
- Under the NIRC, talents and broadvasters are subject
to the 10% value-added tax ("VAT") on services they
render. Exempted from the VAT are those under an
employer-employee relationship
- Sonza’s claim is based on their agreement. Therefore, action
should not be based on Labor Code but on breach of contract.

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP VS NLRC 150 SCRA 565 (1987)
FACTS: In August 1977, Coria was hired by Rizal Empire Insurance
Group(REIG) as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day.
Jan 1, 1978 – Coria was made a regular employee, having been
appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300. Being a
permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner
company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules
and Regulations."
In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was
transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to
P450 a month.
In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his
salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance,
until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk.
In July 1983 he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a
monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.
Oct. 15, 1983 Coria was dismissed from work, on the grounds of
tardiness and unexcused absences. Coria filed a complaint with MOLE
March 14, 198 LA reinstated him to his position with back wages.
REIG appealed to the NLRC but was dismissed on the ground that the
same had been filed out of time.
ISSUE: W/N IT IS STILL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF SC
HELD: Under the provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision
appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no
longer be subject to appeal. Administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great
respect.
The record shows that REIG received a copy of the decision of the LA
on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the
Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985.
Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the NLRC on appeal, provides that
decisions or orders of a LA shall be final and executor unless appealed
to the Commission by any or both of the parties within 10 calendar
days from receipt of notice and that no motion or request for
extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be
entertained.
NLRC correctly dismissed REIG’s appeal pursuant to said rules. The
NLRC didn’t commit GAD amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
arbitrarily dismissing petitioners' appeal on a technicality. SC need
not interpret the Revised Rules of the NLRC as they are clear and
explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Even on the merits, the
ruling of the LA appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in
rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been
a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional
lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be
demanded.

CBTC EMPLOYEES UNION V CLAVE

141 SCRA 9 January 7, 1986

FACTS

- Commercial Bank and Trust Company Employees' Union lodged a

complaint with the Department of Labor, against Comtrust Bank for
non-payment of the holiday pay benefits provided for under Art 95 of
the Labor Code in relation to Rule X, Book III of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.

- Failing to arrive at an amicable settlement at conciliation level, the

parties opted to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. The
issue presented was: "Whether the permanent employees of the
Bank within the collective bargaining unit paid on a monthly basis are
entitled to holiday pay effective November 1, 1974, pursuant to
Article 95 (now Article 94) of the Labor Code, as amended and Rule X
(now Rule IV), Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code. "

- In addition, the disputants signed a Submission Agreement

stipulating as final, unappealable and executory the decision of the
Arbitrator, including subsequent issuances for clarificatory and/or
relief purposes, notwithstanding Article 262 of the Labor Code.
- In the course of the hearing, the Arbitrator apprised the parties of
an interpretative bulletin on "holiday pay" about to be issued by the
Department of Labor.
- The Union filed a Manifestation stating that in the event that said
Interpretative Bulletin regarding holiday pay would be adverse to the
present claim union respectfully reserves the right to take such action
as may be appropriate to protect its interests, a question of law being
involved. An Interpretative Bulletin which was inexistent at the time
the said commitment was made and which may be contrary to the
law itself should not bar the right of the union to claim for its holiday
pay benefits
- Voluntary Arbitrator stated that, there is more reason to believe
that, if the Bank has never made any deduction from its monthly-paid
employees for unworked Saturdays, Sundays, legal and special
holidays, it is because there is really nothing to deduct properly since
the monthly, salary never really included pay for such unworked days-
and which give credence to the conclusion that the divisor '250' is the
proper one to use in computing the equivalent daily rate of the
monthly-paid employees; that “both the decree itself and the Rules
mentioned enumerated the excepted workers. It is a basic rule of
statutory construction that putting an exception limits or modifies the
enumeration or meaning made in the law. It is thus
easy to see that a mere reading of the Decree and of the Rules would
show that the monthly-paid employees of the Bank are not expressly
included in the enumeration of the exception.”
- Voluntary Arbitrator directed the bank to pay its monthly paid
employees their “legal holiday pay.”
- The next day, the Department of Labor released Policy Instructions
No. 9 which clarifies controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid
employees. The new determining rule is this: If the monthly paid
employee is receiving not less than P 240, the maximum monthly
minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to
December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal
holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on
account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still
entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays.
- Bank appealed to NLRC but appeal was dismissed because it was
filed way beyond the ten-day period for perfecting an appeal and
because it contravened the agreement that the award shall be final
and unappealable.
- Acting Secretary of Labor reversed NLRC decision and ruled that the
appeal was filed on time and that a review of the case was inevitable
as the money claim exceeded P100,000.00.
- Presidential Executive Assistant affirmed DOJ ruling, relying heavily
on the Manifestation and Policy Instructions No. 9.
Petitioner’s Claim
The legal presumption established in Section 2, Rule IV, Book 111 , of
the Rules and Regulations (SECTION 2. Status of employees paid by
the month -Employees who are uniformly paid by the month,
irrespective of the number of' working days therein with a salary of
not less than the statutory or established minimum wage, shall be
presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.
For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than
the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days divided by
twelve.) implementing particularly Article 94 (formerly Article 208) of
the Labor Code, is merely a disputable presumption

Respondent’s Comments
- The Bank maintains that, since its inception or start of operations in
1954, all monthly-paid employees in the Bank are paid their monthly
salaries without any deduction for unworked Saturdays, Sundays,
legals and special holidays. On the other hand, it also maintains that,
as a matter of fact, 'always conscious of its employee who has to
work, on respondent's rest days of Saturdays and Sundays or on a
legal holiday, an employee who works overtime on any of said days is
paid one addition regular pay for the day plus 50% of said regular pay
- The Bank further maintains that the holiday pay is intended only for
daily-paid workers.
- The question submitted for arbitration is now moot and academic.
ISSUE
WON the permanent employees of the bank are entitled to holiday
pay
HELD
YES
- In excluding the union members of herein petitioner from the
benefits of the holiday pay law, public respondent predicated his
ruling on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement Article
94 of the labor Code promulgated by the then Secretary of labor and
Policy Instructions No. 9.
- In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union(IBAAEU) vs.
Inciong, 7 this Court's Second Division, speaking through former
Justice Makasiar, expressed the view and declared that the
aforementioned section and interpretative bulletin are null and void,
having been promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor in excess of
his rule-making authority. It was pointed out, inter alia, that in the
guise of clarifying the provisions on holiday pay, said rule and policy
instructions in effect amended the law by enlarging the scope of the
exclusions.
- The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules
and the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. 9 add another excluded
group, namely, 'employees who are uniformly paid by the month'.
While the additional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption
that all monthly paid employees have already been paid holiday pay,
it constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must be in the law
if it is to be valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes
the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or
withholds is obviously ultra vires.
Disposition The questioned decision set aside and the award of the
arbitrator reinstated.
Manaya v Alabang Country Club (525 SCRA 144)
Indeed, there is no room for liberality in the instant case “as it would
render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is
adopted.” As so rightfully enunciated, “the liberal interpretation in
favor of labor stems from the mandate that the workingman’s
welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.”
This Court has repeatedly ruled that delay in the settlement of labor
cases cannot be countenanced. Not only does it involve the survival
of an employee and his loved ones who are dependent on him for
food, shelter, clothing, medicine and education; it also wears down
the meager resources of the workers to the point that, not  Respondent filed a Petition for CERTIORARI before the Court
infrequently, they either give up or compromise for less than what is of Appeals.
due them.
 The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ordered the
FACTS: NLRC to give due course to respondent’s appeal of the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision.
 Petitioner alleged that in1989, he was hired by the respondent
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
as a maintenance helper. Then, he was later designated as
denied by the Court of Appeals
company electrician. He continued to work for the
respondent until 1998 when he was informed that his services
Hence, this petition.
were no longer required by the company.

 Petitioner alleged that he was forcibly and illegally dismissed

without cause and without due process. Hence, a Complaint
WAS FILED before the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
 The Labor Arbiter held that Manaya is a regular employee of
WON THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR
respondent Alabang Country Club, Inc and his dismissal from
WHEN IT ORDERED THE NLRC TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE
the service is declared illegal.
APPEAL OF RESPONDENT EVEN IF THE SAID APPEAL WAS
FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF TEN (10)
 Respondent filed an Appeal with the NLRC which dismissed
DAYS FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL
the same for failure to perfect appeal within the statutory
period of appeal. The Decision is now final and executory.
 The NLRC found that respondent’s counsel of record
HELD: YES
received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision on or
before 11 December 2000.
When a client is represented by counsel, notice to counsel is
 Said counsel did not file a withdrawal of appearance.
notice to client. In the absence of a notice of withdrawal or
 Instead, a Memorandum of Appeal was filed by the
substitution of counsel, the Court will rightly assume that the
respondent’s new counsel.
counsel of record continues to represent his client and receipt
 The filing of the Memorandum of Appeal by its new
of notice by the former is the reckoning point of the
counsel on 26 December 2000 was clearly made
reglementary period. As heretofore adverted, the original
beyond the reglementary period.
counsel did not file any notice of withdrawal.
 The appeal having been belatedly filed, the Decision of
the Labor Arbiter had become final and executory.
It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status and
progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect that
all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the
case
On this score, we hold that the notice to respondent’s
counsel, on 11 December 2000 is the controlling date of the
receipt of the decision.
Of relevance is Section 1, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of
the NLRC —
Section 1. PERIODS OF APPEAL. – Decisions, resolutions
or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof; and in case
of decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Director of
the Department of Labor and Employment pursuant to Article
129 of the Labor Code, within five (5) calendar days from
receipt thereof. If the 10th or 5th day, as the case may be, falls
on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the last day to perfect the
appeal shall be the first working day following such Saturday,
Sunday or holiday.
No motion or request for extension of the period within which
to perfect an appeal shall be allowed.
The rules, particularly the requirements for perfecting an
appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law,
must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for
orderly discharge of judicial business.
Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory.
In this particular case, we adhere to the strict interpretation
of the rule for the following reasons:
Firstly, in this case, entry of judgment had already been made
which rendered the Decision of the Labor Arbiter as final and
executory.
Secondly, it is a basic rule that in carrying out and in
interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should
be the primordial and paramount consideration.
This Court has repeatedly ruled that delay in the settlement
of labor cases cannot be countenanced.
Without doubt, to allow the appeal of the respondent as
what the Court of Appeals had done and remand the case to
the NLRC would only result in delay to the detriment of the
petitioner.
Thirdly, respondent has not shown sufficient justification to
reverse the findings of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the
NLRC.
Pertinent provision of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 223. APPEAL. – Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such
appeal may be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion
on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through
fraud or coercion, including graft an corruption;
(c) If made purely on question of law; and
 (d) If serious errors in the finding of facts are raised which
would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant.
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION VS GLAXO WELLCOME 438 SCRA 343 (2004)
FACTS: Petitioner Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome as
medical representative after Tecson had undergone training and
orientation. Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment
which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by
existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or
future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies and should management
find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to
resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an
employee is expected to inform management of any existing or future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a
conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship
and the employee’s employment with the company, the management
and the employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to another
department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation for
employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson
entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of
Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was
Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. Even before they got married,
Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager
regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy
might engender.
Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise
to a conflict of interest. Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he and
Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs,
although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as
possible because he was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against
entering into a relationship with an employee of a competitor
company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to
merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning
to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra. With
Bettsy’s separation from her company, the potential conflict of
interest would be eliminated. At the same time, they would be able
to avail of the attractive redundancy package from Astra.
Tecson was subsequently transferred to another area. He sought
Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter
to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its
decision and gave Tecson time to comply with the transfer order.
Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid
his salary, but was not issued samples of products which were
competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also
not included in product conferences regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance
machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration.
The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its
Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its
employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and
affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Upon appeal, CA held that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees
from having personal relationships with employees of competitor
companies is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.
ISSUES: IS THE GLAXO POLICY AGAINST ITS EMPLOYEES MARRYING
EMPLOYEES FROM COMPETITOR COMPANIES VALID; W/N
PETITIONER TECSON WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED
HELD: Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry. The
prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees
of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed
company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the
possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets
and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests
cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right
of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right
to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.
Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional
policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean
that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The
law also recognizes that management has rights which are also
entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a
settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause
are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its
authority.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the
policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not
impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its
employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are
free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own
choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of
interest between the employee and the company that may arise out
of such relationships.
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary
resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes
impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in
rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility
or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
None of these conditions are present in the instant case. The record
does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly discriminated
upon by reason of such transfer. Glaxo properly exercised its
management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City
sales area. When the problem could not be resolved after several
years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales
area different from that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, Glaxo
did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him
to another area where his home province, Agusan del Sur, was
included. In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo even considered the
welfare of Tecson’s family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion
of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.
 Cortez: 1979-1988 as carpenter/forklift operator Samulde: 1982-1989
as lubeman/stationary operator

- Complaints (separate but consolidated by the LA): illegal dismissal

- Petitioners’ Claim: They had been covered by a number of contracts

renewed continuously, with periods ranging from five (5) to nine (9)
years, and they performed the same kind of work through out their
employment, and such was usually necessary and desirable in the
trade or business of the respondent corporation; and their work did
not end on a project-to-project basis, although the contrary was
made to appear by the employer through the signing of separate
employment contracts.

- LA: Dismissed petitions on the ground that the petitioners are

project employees are project employees whose work contracts with
AG & P indicate that they were employed in such category;

that they have been assigned to different work projects, not just to
one and that their work relation with AG & P, relative to termination,
is governed by Policy Instruction No. 20 (rule governing project
SALINAS V NLRC (ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC CO) employees).
319 SCRA 54 November 24, 1999 - Appeal to NLRC: Affirmed LA’s findings
FACTS

- Petitioners were employed with Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (AG & ISSUES
P):
1. WON the petitioners are project employees
Salinas: 1983-1988 as carpenter/finishing carpenter

Alejandro: 1982-1989 as bulk cement operator, bulk cement

plant/carrier operator & crane driver Procedural

2. WON this petition for certiorari was proper

HELD
1. NO
- The petitioners are regular employees.
- The mandate in Article 281 of the Labor Code, which pertinently
prescribes that the 'provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties,
an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee
has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer' and that ‘any employee who has
rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such actually exists,' should apply in the case of
petitioner.
- Failure to report the termination to Public Employment Office is a
clear indication that petitioners were not and are not project
employees. (PI No. 20 requires reports of terminations)
- It is basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and interpreting
the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations,
the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. The interpretation herein made gives meaning and
substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law
enunciated in Article 4 of Labor Code that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code
including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in
favor of labor".
- It is beyond cavil that petitioners had been providing the respondent
corporation with continuous and uninterrupted services, except for a
day or so gap in their successive employment contracts. Their
contracts had been renewed several times, with the total length of
their services ranging from five (5) to nine (9) years. Throughout the
duration of their contracts, they had been performing the same kinds
of work (e.g., as lubeman, bulk cement operator and carpenter),
which were usually necessary and desirable in the construction
business of AG & P, its usual trade or business.
- Undoubtedly, periods in the present case have been imposed to
preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by petitioners, and must
be struck down for being contrary to public policy, morals, good
customs or public order.
2. YES
- Anent the issue that the petition should have been brought under
Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this rule
is not inflexible. In the interest of justice, often the Court has
judiciously treated as special civil actions for certiorari petitions
erroneously captioned as petitions for review on certiorari.
- With regard to the issue on non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the Court hold that the failure of petitioners to interpose a
motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision before coming to this
Court was not a fatal omission. The exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine is not a hard and fast rule and does not apply
where the issue is purely a legal one. A motion for reconsideration as
a prerequisite for the bringing of an action under Rule 65 may be
dispensed with where the issue is purely of law, as in this case. At all
events and in the interest of substantial justice, especially in cases
involving the rights of workers, procedural lapses, if any, may be
disregarded to enable the Court to examine and resolve the
conflicting rights and responsibilities of the parties. This liberality is
warranted in the case at bar, especially since it has
been shown that the intervention of the Court is necessary for the
protection of the herein petitioner(s).
Disposition The questioned Resolution of the NLRC is SET ASIDE and
another one is hereby ENTERED ordering the respondent corporation
to reinstate petitioners without loss of seniority and with full
backwages.
ACUÑA v. CA
It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a worker and
his employer, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the
interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the
worker’s favor. The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree
to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under
the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State
to give maximum aid and protection to labor.
FACTS:
 Petitioners are Filipino overseas workers deployed by respondent Join
International Corporation (JIC), a licensed recruitment agency, to its
principal, 3D Pre-Color Plastic, Inc., (3D) in Taiwan, under a uniformly-
worded employment contract for a period of two years.
 Sometime in Sept 1999, petitioners filed with respondents
applications for employment abroad.
 After their papers were processed, petitioners claimed they signed a
uniformly-worded employment contract with private respondents
which stipulated that they were to work as machine operators for a
period of two years with a monthly salary of $15, 840 exclusive of
overtime.
 In December 1999, petitioners left for Taiwan. They were made to
sign another contract which stated that their salary was only
NT$11,840.00.
 They were likewise informed that the dormitory which would serve as
their living quarters was still under construction. Petitioners also
claim they were made to work twelve hours a day, from 8:00 p.m. to
8:00 a.m.
 Petitioners alleged that they were brought to a "small room with a
cement floor so dirty and smelling with foul odor". Forty women were
jampacked in the room.
 The petitioners averred that on December 16, 1999, due to
unbearable working conditions they booked a flight home, at their
own expense.
 Before they left, they were made to sign a written waiver. In addition,
petitioners were not paid any salary for work rendered on December
11-15, 1999.
 Upon arrival in the Philippines, petitioners went to private
respondents’ office, narrated what happened, and demanded the
return of their placement fees and plane fare. Private respondents
refused.
 Private respondents offered a settlement and petitioners received
their quitclaim
 Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment/underpayment of salaries or wages, overtime pay, refund
of transportation fare, payment of salaries/wages for 3 months,
moral and exemplary damages, and refund of placement fee before
the NLRC.
 The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners did not resign
voluntarily from their jobs.
 Private respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission.
 The NLRC partially granted the appeal and ordered that the received
under the quitclaim be deducted from their respective awards.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint of
petitioners.
ISSUE:
whether petitioners were illegally dismissed under Rep. Act No.
8042, thus entitling them to benefits plus damages
HELD: No. They were not illegally dismissed, but respondents are
liable for the petitioners overtime pay.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioners admitted they
resigned from their jobs without force, coercion, intimidation and
pressure from private respondents’ principal abroad.
There isa no malice by private respondents nor do they show the
principal’s intention to subject petitioners to unhealthy
accommodations. Under these facts, we cannot rule that there was
constructive dismissal.
Regarding the claim of the respondents that petitioners were not
entitled to overtime pay, since they had offered no proof that they
actually rendered overtime work.
On this matter, we rule for the petitioners. The claim for overtime pay
should not have been disallowed because of the failure of the
petitioners to substantiate them.
The claim of overseas workers against foreign employers could not
be subjected to same rules of evidence and procedure easily
obtained by complainants whose employers are locally based.
While normally we would require the presentation of payrolls, daily
time records and similar documents before allowing claims for
overtime pay, in this case, that would be requiring the near-
impossible.
To our mind, it is private respondents who could have obtained the
records of their principal to refute petitioners’ claim for overtime
pay. By their failure to do so, private respondents waived their
defense and in effect admitted the allegations of the petitioners.

It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a worker and

his employer, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the
interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the
worker’s favor. Accordingly, we rule that private respondents are
solidarily liable with the foreign principal for the overtime pay
claims of petitioners.

On the award of moral and exemplary damages, we hold that such

award lacks legal basis. Moral and exemplary damages are
recoverable only where the dismissal of an employee was attended
by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORP VS CA 425 SCRA 478 (2004)
FACTS: DOLE, through Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, issued
an Explanatory Bulletin dated March 11, 1993, wherein it clarified,
that employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9,
1993, which, apart from being Good Friday, and, therefore, a legal
holiday, is also Araw ng Kagitingan, which is also a legal holiday, even
if unworked.

Said bulletin was reproduced on January 23, 1998, when April 9, 1998
was both Maundy Thursday and Araw ng Kagitingan. Despite the
explanatory bulletin, petitioner opted to pay its daily paid employees
only 100% of their basic pay on April 9, 1998.

Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU)

protested. In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of
the existing CBA between petitioner and BATLU, the controversy was
submitted for voluntary arbitration.

On July 31, 1998, the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a

decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees "200% and
not just 100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked April 9,
1998.
Subject of interpretation in the case at bar is Article 94 of the Labor
which was amended by Executive Order No. 203 . In deciding in favor
of BATLU, the Voluntary Arbitrator held that Article 94 of the Labor
Code provides or holiday pay for every regular holiday, the
computation of which is determined by a legal formula which is not
changed by the fact that there are two holidays falling on one day;
and that that the law, as amended, enumerates ten regular holidays
for every year, and should not be interpreted as authorizing a
reduction to nine the number of paid regular holidays "just because
April 9 (Araw ng Kagitingan) in certain years, like 1993 and 1998, is
also Holy Friday or Maundy Thursday."
CA upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, holding that the
CBA between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing the relations
between them, clearly recognizes their intent to consider Araw ng
Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, on whatever date they may fall in
any calendar year, as paid legal holidays during the effectivity of the
CBA and that "there is no condition, qualification or exception for any
variance from the clear intent that all holidays shall be compensated.
In the absence of an explicit provision in law which provides for [a]
reduction of holiday pay if two holidays happen to fall on the same
day, any doubt in the interpretation and implementation of the
Labor Code provisions on holiday pay must be resolved in favor of
labor
ISSUE: W/N DAILY PAID EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO BE PAID FOR 2
REGULAR HOLIDAYS WHICH FALL ON THE SAME DAY
HELD: Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the
Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to
labor. Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the monthly
income of the workers on account of work interruptions. In other
words, although the worker is forced to take a rest, he earns what he
should earn, that is, his holiday pay." It is also intended to enable the
worker to participate in the national celebrations held during the days
identified as with great historical and cultural significance.
As reflected above, Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, afford a
worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays. The provision is
mandatory, regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly
or daily basis. Unlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative,
holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law. Since a
worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the
fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to
reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to
receive.
It is elementary, under the rules of statutory construction, that when
the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, there is
nothing in the law which provides or indicates that the entitlement
to ten days of holiday pay shall be reduced to nine when two
holidays fall on the same day.
In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor. For the working man’s welfare should be the primordial and
paramount consideration.
Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules to
Implement the Labor Code provides that "Nothing in the law or the
rules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or reducing any
benefits, supplements or payments for unworked regular holidays as
provided in existing individual or collective agreement or employer
practice or policy.

ABELLA V NLRC (QUITCO, DIONELE)
152 SCRA 140 July 20, 1987
FACTS
- Petitioner Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land in Ponteverde,
Negros Occidental, known as Hacienda Danao- Ramona, for a period
of ten (10) years, renewable, at her option, for another ten (10) years.
She did renew for another ten years. During the existence of the
lease, she employed private respondents. Private respondent Ricardo
Dionele, Sr.
has been a regular farm worker for 33 years while . On the other
hand, private respondent Romeo Quitco started worked for 14 years.
Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed
private respondents and turned over the
hacienda to the owners thereof, who continued the
management, cultivation and operation of the farm
ISSUE
WON private respondents are entitled to separation pay
HELD
YES
- The closing wasn’t due to serious losses or financial reverses. The
Court cited Article 284 (this should be 283) which says:
"Art. 284. Closure of establishment and reduction of
personnel. — The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of laborsaving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the
closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a written notice
on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of
termination due to the installation of laborsaving devices or
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a
separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at
least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or
cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay
for every year of service whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
(6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year."

- Petitioner then contends that the aforequoted provision violates the

constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and
contracts, because w hen she leased Hacienda Danao-Ramona,
neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation
to pay separation pay to workers at the end of the lease. The Court
said that this contention by petitioner is untenable. The law is clear
and to permit such an argument would mean that the years of service
given by the workers will mean nothing since there is no agreement CLEMENTE V GSIS
here

that the new management will be the one to shoulder the separation Doubt: resolve in favor of labor (liberal construction). There’s doubt
pay. The old management, pertaining to Abella in this case, should when the law is susceptible to 2 or more interpretations, both or all
give the payment. of which are correct.

- In any event, it is well-settled that in the implementation and

interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration (Volshel Labor Union v.
Bureau of Labor Relations, 137 SCRA 43 [1985]) It is the kind of
interpretation which gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New
Labor Code which states that `all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor." The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to a
greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the
law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to
give maximum aid and protection to labor.
FACTS
- Carolina’s husband, Pedro Clemente was a janitor for 10 years in the
DOH Dagupan City assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic.
- He was hospitalized for 12 days due to his ailment of nephritis, and
was also found to be suffering from Hansen’s disease (portal cirrhosis
and leprosy). Then, he died on Nov 14, 1976.
- Petitioner then filed with GSIS a claim for employees’ compensation
under the Labor Code.
This was denied by GSIS because the ailments of her husband are not
occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of his work
and were not causally related to his duties and conditions of work.
Under Art. 167(L) of the Labor Code and Sec. 1(b) Rule III of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, for the sickness and
the resulting disability or death to be compensable, sickness must be
the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the rules;
otherwise proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions.
 The major ailments of the deceased could be traced to
bacterial and viral infections. For instance, in the case of
leprosy, it is known that the source of infection is discharge
from lesions of persons with active cases.

- Petitioner claimed that the ailments were contracted in the course
of employment and were aggravated by his work since he was in
direct contact with persons suffering from different skin diseases and
was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other dirt.
- the GSIS forwarded the records of the petitioner's claim for review
by the ECC (Employees’ Compensation Commission).
ECC also dismissed the claim since there was no substantial evidence
of causal connection and there was evidence that deceased had
already contracted the Hansen’s before employment.
ISSUE
WON petitioner is entitled to the Employees’ compensation?
 Petitoner’s husband worked in a skin clinic and was exposed
to different carriers of diseases. As janitor, he was the
employee most exposed to the dangerous concentration of
infected material, and not being a med practitioner, least
likely to know how to avoid them.
GSIS’s conservative stand is not consistent with the liberal
interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee
embodied in the Constitution in favor of workers.
Disposition Decision appealed from is set aside and GSIS is ordered to
pay petitioner death benefits and attorney’s fees.

HELD
YES.

Strict rules of evidence are NOT applicable in claims for

compensation.

 The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence,

which means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ What the
law requires is a reasonable work connection and not a
direct causal relation.

Doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant-employee.


BONIFACIO VS GSIS 146 SCRA 276 (1986)
FACTS: Lourdes Bonifacio was a classroom teacher assigned to the
district of Bagamanoc, Division of Catanduanes, from August 1965
until she contracted carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the
gastrointestinal tract and lungs which caused her death on Oct. 5,
1978.
Thereafter a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as
amended, was filed by petitioner with the GSIS. The same was
however denied on the ground that the decedent's principal ailment,
carcinoma of the breast with metastases to gastrointestinal tract and
lungs, is not an occupational disease for her particular work as a
teacher, nor is the risk of contracting said disease increased by her
working conditions.
The Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), on appeal affirmed
the decision of the GSIS.
ISSUES: SHOULD THE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE AND IRR BE
INTERPRETED IN FAVOR OF THE LABORER IN THIS CASE
HELD: A compensable sickness means "any illness definitely accepted
as an occupational disease listed by the ECC, or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this
purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve
occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be
considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment."
[Art. 167(1) Labor Code as
amended by P.D. No. 1368, effective May 1, 1978].
Thus, for the sickness or the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an accepted
occupational disease listed by the ECC, or any other sickness caused
by employment subject to proof by claimant that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by working conditions. Carcinoma
of the breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs is
not listed by the Commission as an occupational disease.
The cancer which affected the deceased not being occupational in her
particular employment, it became incumbent upon petitioner to
prove that the decedent's working conditions increased the risk of her
contracting the fatal illness. This onus petitioner failed to
satisfactorily discharge.
The old law as embodied particularly in Section 43 of RA 772
amending Act No. 3812, provided for "the presumption of
compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness, which favor the
employee," and "paved the way for the latitudinarian or expansive
application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the
employee or worker." The presumption in essence states that in any
proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act "it shall be presumed in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary that the claim comes
within the provisions of the said Act, that sufficient notice thereof
was given, that the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention
of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself
or of another, that the injury did not result solely from the
intoxication of the injured employee while on duty, and that the
contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in
evidence by claimants for compensation are correct."
Thus, under the Workmen's Compensation Law, it is not necessary for
the claimant to carry the burden of proof to establish his case to the
point of demonstration It is not necessary to prove that employment
was the sole cause of the death or injury suffered by the employee. It
is sufficient to show that the employment had contributed to the
aggravation or acceleration of such death or ailment. Once the
disease had been shown to have arisen in the course of employment,
it is presumed by law, in the absence of substantial evidence to the
contrary, that it arose out of it.
While the court does not dispute petitioner's contention that under
the law, in case of doubt in the implementation and interpretation
of the provisions of the Labor Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations, the doubt shall be resolved in favor of the laborer,
the court finds that the same has no application in this case since
the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code leave no room for doubt
either in their interpretation or application.
BRAVO V EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
143 SCRA 101 July 22, 1986
FACTS
- Evelio Bravo was a supervising cartographer engineer at the Bureau
of Coast and Geodetic Survey. As litho-photo engraving supervisor
(another term for a supervising cartographer engineer?), he was
involved in drafting and plate printing, developing and processing
either dry or wet negatives, and supervising the formulation of
lightsensitive lithographic chemicals from reagent of nitric,
phosphoric, oleic acids, potassium ferricynamide, ammonium
hydroxide and ammonium dichromate in the kithographic laboratory.
- sometime in 1979, he complained of irregular bowel movement,
constipation and abdominal pain. In 1980 he was admitted to St.
Luke’s Hospital and was diagnosed with "adenocarcinoma sigmoid
(colon) Duke's C and chronic periappendicitis". He went through a
series of operations and incurred hospitalization expenses amounting
to P8,650.05.
- He did not return to work and retired at the age of 45 under the
provisions of RA 1616. He received P37,002.31 from GSIS. He filed a
claim for disability benefits in the GSIS.
- GSIS: Denied. His diagnosed disease were not occupational diseases
in his particular employment and his working conditions did not
increase the risk of contracting them.
-He sought reconsideration, claiming that his work exposed him to
chemicals. His MFR was denied on the ground that his exposure to
photographic solutions as litho-photoengraving supervisor had no
causal relationship to thedevelopment of his adenocarcinoma
considering thatsaid ailment is traceable to "familial multiple
polyposis, chronic ulcerative colitis, chronic lympho-
granulomavenereum, chronic granuloma inguinale and perhaps
adenoma”.
- He appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission, but died
pending the appeal. His widow, Angeles, pursued his appeal.
- Commission: affirmed GSIS deci. Bravo's ailments were"too remote
to be related causally to his work and working conditions" at the
Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey. His contention that his cancer
could be traced toexposure to photographic solutions was merely
supposition and devoid of medical support.
- Petitioner’s contention
> while the causes of colonic malignancy are as yet undetermined,
there is a "probability" that the fatal ailment of Bravo was work
connected as shown by the fact that he was exposed to various
chemicals which are generally considered predisposing factors of
cancer (relying on the decision in Panotes vs. Employees'
Compensation Commission where it was held that the very fact that
the cause of a disease is unknown creates the probability that the
working conditions could have increased the risk of contracting the
disease, if not caused by it) ; that the law merely requires reasonable
work connection because of the liberal interpretation accorded to
social legislation; that under the theory of increased risk, her
husband’s cancer of the colon is a compensable disease because his
exposure to chemicals and the "stressful demand" of his work
increased the risk of contracting said ailment; and that Commission
issued the Resolutions Nos. 2610 and 2677 which provides guidelines
for deciding on pending compensation cases regarding cancer.
Resolution No. 2610 approves the recommendation of the
Commission's Technical Committee on edical Matters that appealed
compensation cases "whose subject contingencies concern cancer
diseases shall be held compensable, in line with pertinent Supreme
Court Decisions, provided that such diseases shall duly confirmed by
formal reports on biopsies, or opinions of cancer specialists". That
resolution shall be pplied prospectively.
Resolution No. 2677 amends Resolution No. 2610 by adding to the
pertinent paragraph thereof the phrase "provided that certain
predisposing factors that are medically recognized or proven are
resent." It also approves the modified guidelines on cancer of the
breast, liver stomach (gastric), lungs and asopharynx. As regards
"other types of cancer diseases", the guideline states: "An employee's
prolonged exposure to chemicals may predispose him or her to
contract and develop other types of cancer diseases". For cancer
cases decided by the Supreme Court, the
guidelines states: "A claim must be resolved in favor of a claimant or
appellant if facts of his or her case on record indicate reasonable
work-connection of the disease, the disease belongs to borderline or
'twilight' cases, and if the cause of the cancer
disease is unknown".
- Solicitor General’s reply
> resolutions are just proofs that the Commission is continuously in
involved in its task "to initiate, rationalize, and coordinate policies of
the employees' compensation program." They do not imply that the
law merely requires reasonable work-connection because that
requirement which was mandated in the repealed Workmen's
Compensation Act is different from the present requirement of clear
medical basis "where before a mere aggravation or presumption of
compensability was sufficient."
ISSUES
WON cancer of the colon and peri-appendicitis which caused the
death of a former litho-photo engraving supervisor are compensable
diseases under the Labor Code
a. WON cancer of the colon and peri-appendicitis are listed under
compensable diseases under the Labor Code and Rule III, Section IV of
the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
b. WON petitioner could claim benefits through the increased risk
doctrine
HELD
NO
Ratio Article 167, paragraph (1) of the Labor Code and Rule III,
Section IN of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation
provide that for a sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the said sickness must be an occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of said Rules, otherwise, the claimant or employee
concerned must prove that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions
(increased risk doctrine)
a. NO
- Both cancer of the colon and peri-appendicitis are not listed as
occupational diseases for Bravo's kind of employment.
b. NO
- Petitioner failed to submit convincing proofs to entitle her to
compensation benefits.
Ratio A claimant who depends on the theory of increased risk must
present substantial proof to show that his ailment was contracted
during his employment. He or she must also submit proof that the
risk of contracting the ailment was increased by
the particular working conditions.
Reasoning
- On reliance on Panotes case: In the Panotes case and the Cristobal
case, both claimants presented conditions of their employment. In
the present case, the petitioner only enumerated the chemicals to
which Bravo was allegedly exposed as a litho-photo engraving
supervisor and rely on the "probability" that those chemicals caused
his cancer of the colon.
On interpretation in compensation cases
> Strict rules of evidence are not applied in compensation cases .
However, the present scheme and theory of employees'
compensation under the Labor Code requires a clear medical basis for
a claim for benefits to succeed. There are no more presumptions as to
what caused a particular illness because the determination of
compensability is medically and scientifically oriented.
On application of the resolutions by the Commission
> they were issued after the death of Evelio, and are applied
prospectively. Even if they were applied, the petitioner did not submit
formal requirements required by said resolutions.
On liberal interpretation due to social legislation
> “We are aware of the mandate that social legislation should be
applied in consonance with the principles of social justice and
protection to labor. However, we cannot adopt a sweeping
interpretation of the law in favor of labor lest we engage in judicial
legislation.”
Disposition
decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is hereby
affirmed.
PAL V. NLRC
Factual Considerations and Rationality
That there should be care and solicitude in the protection and
vindication of the rights of workingmen cannot be gainsaid; but that
care and solicitude cannot justify disregard of relevant facts or
eschewal of rationality in the construction of the text of applicable
rules in order to arrive at a disposition in favor of an employee who
is perceived as otherwise deserving of sympathy and
commiseration.
FACTS:
 This case treats of an employee of Philippine Airlines, Inc.
(PAL), who was dismissed from his work on August 23, 1967
on the basis of the findings and recommendations of a Fact
Finding Panel.
 The Fact Finding Panel recommended the criminal prosecution
of the employee, Oscar Irineo, together with four others,
namely: Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, Jacinto Macatol
and Jesus Saba, on account of complicity in irregular refunds
of international plane tickets. les virtual law library

Four of the PAL employees were prosecuted for estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents in the Court of First
Instance in 1968.
 The case resulted in the conviction after due trial of all the
accused on March 1, 1976.
 Ireneo then appealed. virtual law lib
 The Intermediate Appellate Court acquitted Irineo.
 17 years after the termination of his employment, Irineo filed
a complaint against PAL for reinstatement and back wages on
the claim that that termination was illegal.les virtual law
library
  The Labor Arbiter decreed his reinstatement to his position..
law library
 PAL appealed to the NLRC but failed to obtain reversal of the
Arbiter's judgment.
 The NLRC agreed with the Arbiter law library
 PAL is now before this Court, praying for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari to nullify and set aside the NLRC Resolution
ISSUE:
WON NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of the same - an exemplary example of
power arbitrarily exercised without due regard to the rule of law."
HELD: YES.
The NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
There should be care and solicitude in the protection and
vindication of the rights of workingmen that cannot be gainsaid; but
that care and solicitude can not justify disregard of relevant facts or
eschewal of rationality in the construction of the text of applicable
rules in order to arrive at a disposition in favor of an employee who
is perceived as otherwise deserving of sympathy and
commiseration. law library
The letter to Oscar Irineo of then PAL President, based evidently on
the investigation and report of the fact finding panel, leaves no doubt
that Irineo's employment was being ended; the language is plain and
categorical.
brary
The attempt to sustain the strained theory of dismissal-qua-
suspension by referring to a standing order by the Court of Industrial
Relations at that time forbidding the dismissal of any employee by
PAL without court authority, is equally indefensible. That
prohibition was imposed only in relation to a labor dispute then
pending before the Court of Industrial Relations.
That dispute however ended when the parties entered into a
collective bargaining agreement two (2) years or so before Irineo was
fired on August 23, 1967. In other words, when Irineo's employment
was terminated, the CIR injunction adverted was already functions
officio and could no longer have any relevance to that event. law
library
There is moreover, nothing in the record to excuse respondent
Irineo's omission to impugn his termination of employment by PAL -
in line with the respondent commission's theory, i.e., that under
existing PAL rules and the CIR injunction, he could only be placed
under preventive suspension and therefore his dismissal was illegal.
His assertion thereof after seventeen (17) years from his discharge
from employment can only mean that he slept on his rights or that
his counsel did not share the respondent Commission's belief in the
soundness of the theory. His claim must thus be rejected as time-
barred, as being unpardonably tardy. law library
Premises considered, it appears clear to the Court that the
respondent Commission's conclusions are flawed by errors so serious
as to constitute grave abuse of discretion and should on this account
be struck down.
MANNING INTERNATIONAL CORP VS NLRC 195 SCRA 155 (1991)
FACTS: Francisco Benedicto—a.k.a. Lazaro Benedicto, according to his
passport—was hired by a foreign firm, Abdulasis & Mohamed A.
Aljomaih Co., thru its Philippine representative, Manning
International Corporation, as a truck driver for its establishment in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Benedicto was engaged for a stipulated term of
two (2) years. He left for Saudi Arabia on Dec 1, 1980 to fulfill his
employment contract.
Some months before the expiration of his contract with Abdulasis,
etc., Benedicto was involved in a vehicular accident, was injured, and
in consequence, lost both his legs. From the date of the accident, Feb
2, 1982, he was confined at a hospital in Saudi Arabia until sometime
when his employment was terminated. He was repatriated to the
Philippines in Aug 1982.
Benedicto filed a complaint with POEA for the recovery of his salary
for the unexpired portion of his contract, insurance benefits and
projected cost of medical expenses amounting to P 25,000.
POEA dismissed Benedicto’s claim upon finding that “complainant
was legally terminated from employment” because of his disability.
However, Manning and Abdulasis were ordered to provide
compensation benefits for service connected illness, injuries or death.
NLRC affirmed the decision of POEA. Subsequently, the judgment
became final and executory. Benedicto moved for computation of the
amounts due him, and in substantiation, submitted receipts
evidencing his actual medical expenses. His former employers
opposed the motion on the ground that the medical expenses
referred to another person, Lazaro Benedicto but the Administrator
overruled the objection and pointed out
that the names Lazaro and Francisco Benedicto both referred to one
person, and directed the issuance of an alias writ of execution to
enforce payment of P12,000 as total and permanent disability
benefits and P19,450.00 as hospitalization and medical expenses for
120 days or a total of P31,450.
Benedicto filed a motion for reconsideration was filed to NLRC to
protest the limitation of the award to him of medical expenses to a
period of 120 days. NLRC set aside the POEA Order and on
considerations of equity and social justice as well as the theory of
“medical treatment should not be stopped until Benedicto’s injury or
disability is healed” and entered a new judgment increasing the
amount to be paid by employers.
ISSUES: IS THE NEW JUDGMENT OF THE NLRC VOID INSOFAR AS IT
ATTEMPTS TO VARY A DECISION THAT HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY; W/N THE CHALLENGED DECISION OF THE NLRC IS
WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS
HELD: When a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable, The judgment may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modifications is attempted to be made by
the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The only
recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the
making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void.
Considerations of equity and social justice” cannot prevail over
against the expressed provision of the labor laws allowing dismissal of
employees for cause and without any provision for separation pay.
The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person dismissed for
cause as defined therein is not entitled to separation pay. The cases
above cited constitute the exception, based upon considerations of
equity. Equity has been defined as justice outside law, being ethical
rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law.
It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction
of positive law. Hence, it cannot prevail against the expressed
provision of the labor laws allowing dismissal of employees for
cause and without any provision for separation pay.

RELIANCE & INSURANCE CO INC V NLRC (RELIANCE SURETY &
INSURANCE EMPLOYEES UNION)
193 SCRA 365 January 25 1991
FACTS
- The manager of Reliance Surety Insurance Co (RSIC) effected a
change in the seating arrangement of its personnel to avoid
productivity loss due to personal and non-work-related
conversations, calls and visits.
- Isagani Rubio, Rosalinda Macapagal, Glene Molina, and Severa
Cansino protested the transfer of their tables because said change
was without prior notice and was just to harass them as union
members. When the manager insisted, a heated discussion ensued,
during which Rubio and companions insulted the manager and
supervisors.
- The 4 employees were asked to explain within 48 hours why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for misconduct,
insubordination, and gross disrespect. Tension rose in the office as
Rubio continued to refuse to stay at his designated place, and Molina
and Macapagal still leveled insults to those who testified against
them. Hence, Rubio and companions were placed under preventive
suspension on 3 February 1987 and ultimately dismissed after
investigation on 3 March 1987.
- 6 March 1987, the Reliance Surety & Insurance Employees Union
(union) filed in behalf of the dismissed employees with the NLRC,
against the RSIC a complaint for illegal dismissal including the charge
of unfair labor practice.
- Union’s claim: The company was guilty of unfair labor practice
because it effected transfer and changes in the seating arrangement
to pressure or intimidate union members; because it interfered in
the union members' exercise of their right to self-organization by
forcing them to undertake overtime work even on a non-working
Saturday and in times when there were scheduled union meetings to
prevent them from attending the same; and because, thru its
manager and assistant managers, it caused the resignation and
withdrawal of union members from the union.
- Pending trial, the union filed with the DOLE a notice of strike
predicated on unfair labor practices by the company. RSIC was given
HELD
notice of strike and a telegram from DOLE for initial conciliation
conference both to be held on the same date. But even before the 1. YES
initial conference could take place, the union in the morning of 17
March 1987 struck and picketed the company premises, which - The strike in question was illegal, for failure of the striking personnel
obstructed the free ingress to and egress from its premises, thereby to observe legal strike requirements, to wit: (1) as to
preventing its officials and employees from doing their usual duties.
the fifteen-day notice; (2) as to the two-thirds required vote to strike
- RSIC them filed with the NLRC a petition to declare the strike illegal done by secret ballot; (3) as to submission of the strike vote to the
due to the defiance of the 30 or 15 day cooling-offperiod, disregard of Department of Labor at least seven days prior to the strike.
the legal requirement to furnish the department with the results of
- NLRC also found that certain strikers harassed non-striking
the strike vote at least 7 days before the strike and failure to furnish a
employees, called company officers names, and committed acts of
written notice of the meeting to declare a strike to the BLR or the
violence (as a result of which, criminal charges were brought with the
Regional Office
fiscal's office.)
- Labor Arbiter found the strike to be illegal. NLRC affirmed with
- The strike itself was prompted by no actual, existing unfair labor
modification upon appeal holding that although the strike was illegal,
practice committed by the petitioner. In effecting a
dismissal was not the proper penalty. It said that the strikers should
be reinstated without backwages due to the union’s belief that the change in the seating arrangement, the petitioner merely exercised a
company was committing unfair labor practice. (Ferrer v. Court of reasonable prerogative employees could not validly question, much
Industrial Relations 6 and Almira v. BF Goodrich Philippines, Inc) less assail as an act of unfair labor practice. Rearranging furniture
cannot justify a four-month-long strike. As

to the private respondent's charges of harassment, the Commission

- Petitioner’s claim: NLRC was guilty of grave abuse of discretion.
found none, and as a general rule, the Court is bound by its findings
of fact.

ISSUE 2. YES

1. WON the strike was illegal - The strike that was illegal in more ways than one, the reinstated
union officers were clearly in b ad faith, and to reinstate them
2. WON the petition should be granted without loss of seniority rights, is to reward them for an act public
policy does not sanction.
- The Ferrer and Almira cases did not involve illegal strikes. In Ferrer
was a defective strike, one conducted in violation of the thirty-day
"cooling-off" period, but one carried out in good faith "to offset what
petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair
labor practices [committed by] Management. What Almira on the
other hand declared was that a violent strike alone does not make the
action illegal, which would justify the dismissal of strikers.
- The Court reiterates that good faith is still a valid defense against
claims of illegality of a strike. We do find, however, not a semblance
of good faith here, but rather, plain arrogance, pride, and cynicism of
certain workers.
- WRT respondent, Isagani Rubio, what militates against his
readmission to the firm is the fact that he had accepted the
sum of P2,448.80 "in full satisfaction of the . . . Decision" (of the Labor
Arbiter).
- The sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not
only because the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the
one-sided relation between labor and capital. The Court must take
care, however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the
results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules. We will not
accomplish that objective here by approving the act of the National
Labor Relations Commission which we hold to constitute a grave
abuse of discretion.
Disposition petition is GRANTED.
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO V
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES INC
Balancing Conflicting Claims
The sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not
only because the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the
one-sided relation between labor and capital. The Court must take
care, however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the
results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules.
FACTS
 Petitioner Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative.
 Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which
stipulates,
o that he agrees to study and abide by existing company
rules;
o to disclose to management any existing or future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies
and should management find that such relationship
poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the
company.
 The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo provides that an
employee is expected to inform management of any existing
or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies.
 If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential
conflict between such relationship and the employee’s
 employment with the company, the management and the
employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to another
department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation
for employment outside the company after six months.
 Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
 Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship
with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a
competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in
Albay.
 She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra in that area.
 Even before they got married, Tecson received several
reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of
interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender.
 Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy.
 Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy
gave rise to a conflict of interest.
 Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should
decide which one of them would resign from their jobs.
 Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy
against entering into a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company.
 He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to
merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was
planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by
Astra. With Bettsy’s separation from her company, the
potential conflict of interest would be eliminated.
 Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking
that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential
conflict of interest would be eliminated.
 His application was denied and Glaxo transferred Tecson to
the Butuan City-Surigao City- Agusan del Sur sales area.
 Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer
and brought the matter to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee.
Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tecson
time to comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the
transfer order and continued acting as medical representative
in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
 During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson
was paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products
which were competing with similar products manufactured by
Astra. He was also not included in product conferences
regarding such products.
 Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance
machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary
arbitration.
 Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half month pay
for every year of servicebut he declined the offer.
 The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on
relationships between its employees and persons employed
with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to
transfer Tecson to another sales territory.

 Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision. The Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on
the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its
Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxo’s policy
prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships
with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of
its management prerogatives. Tecson filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the appellate court’s Decision, but the
motion was denied by the appellate court.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxo’s policy
against its employees marrying employees from competitor
companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution
2. WON petitioner was constructively dismissed
HELD
1. NO
- Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
- The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that
nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying
down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its
interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain
access to its secrets and procedures.
- That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests
cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right
of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right
to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.
Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional
policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean
that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The
law also recognizes that management has rights which are also
entitled to respect
and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
- The challenged company policy does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously
suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal
protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting
under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array
of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause
erects no shield against merely private conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful. The only exception occurs when the state
in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become
entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct. Obviously,
however, the exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the
company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the
employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the
policy was made in an impartial and even-handed
manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
- In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the
policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not
impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its
employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are
free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own
choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of
interest between the employee and the company that may arise out
of such relationships.
- The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company
policy which forms part of respondent’s Employee Code of Conduct
and of its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by Tecson,
was made known to him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore,
was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment
contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since
Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of
employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of
law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith.”
He is therefore estopped from questioning said policy.
2. NO
- Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary
resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes
impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in
rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case.
The record does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly
discriminated upon by reason of such transfer. Glaxo properly
exercised its management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the
Butuan City sales area. When the problem could not be resolved
after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign
Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for
Astra. Notably, Glaxo did not terminate Tecson from employment
but only reassigned him to another area where his home province,
Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo
even considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. Clearly, the foregoing
dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC VS NLRC 201 SCRA 687 (1991)
FACTS: On the basis of the findings and recommendations of a Fact
Finding Panel upon investigation, Irineo and 3 other PAL employees,
Damian, Rabasco and Macatol, were prosecuted and convicted for
estafa through falsification of commercial documents
All 4 filed motions for reconsideration and/or new trial. Only one of
them, Macatol, was absolved “for lack of sufficient evidence”. 12
years later, Macatol filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which was
dismissed by LA on the ground of prescription. The NLRC affirmed,
contending that the prescriptive period accrued from the time of his
dismissal and not the termination of the criminal case
A later appeal with the IAC resulted in the acquittal of Irineo and
Rabasco on grounds of reasonable doubt. 17 years after his dismissal,
Irineo filed a complaint against PAL for reinstatement and back
wages, claiming the termination was illegal. LA’s decision decreed his
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, payment of back wages
and moral damages of P300k. LA cited that since there was a PAL
circular which placed any employee charged with any crime inimical
to the company’s interest under preventive suspension, and a
standing order by the CIR forbidding the dismissal of any PAL
employee without court authority, Irineo’s dismissal merely
amounted to suspension.
PAL appealed to the NLRC but failed to obtain a reversal of the
Arbiter’s decision.
ISSUE: W/N IRINEO ET AL WERE MERELY SUSPENDED
HELD: To say, as both the Arbiter and the respondent Commission do,
that that declaration, "you are dismissed from the service effective
immediately," should be construed merely as a suspension, not a
dismissal, from employment, is illogical if not downright ludicrous.
They attempt to justify this conclusion by adverting to a PAL circular
dated June 15, 1966 to the effect that "(a)n employee charged with
any crime inimical to the company's interest shall be placed under
preventive suspension until the final adjudication of his case," and
construe this as a complete foreclosure or prohibition of any
alternative or concurrent action on PAL's part, such as the imposition
of administrative sanctions or penalties; in other words, any
disciplinary action against an erring employee was absolutely
dependent on the outcome of the criminal action against the latter,
no disciplinary measure of any nature being permissible against the
employee "until the final adjudication" of his criminal case. It is a
construction that has nothing to support it, is contrary to common
sense, and one certainly not justified by the recorded facts.

The attempt to sustain the strained theory of dismissal-qua-

suspension by referring to a standing order by the Court of Industrial
Relations at that time forbidding the dismissal of any employee by
PAL without court authority, is equally indefensible. That prohibition
was imposed only in relation to a labor dispute then pending before
the Court of Industrial Relations. That dispute however ended when
the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement 2 years or
so before Irineo was fired on Aug 23, 1967. In other words, when
Irineo's employment was terminated, the CIR injunction adverted was
already functus officio and could no longer have any relevance to that
event.

His assertion thereof after seventeen (17) years from his discharge
from employment can only mean that he slept on his rights or that his
counsel did not share the respondent Commission's belief in the
soundness of the theory. His claim must thus be rejected as time-
barred, as being unpardonably tardy.