PERRY: OUTLINE OF KEY POSITIONS AND CRITICISMS

 Let X and Y be persons at different times, where X exists at an earlier time than Y.
 Read ‘X = Y’ as: “X is (numerically) the same person as Y”.
 Let Z be a person who exists at the same time as Y, such that Y ≠ Z.

P1 X = Y iff Y has the same soul as X.

But how do we know that Y has the same soul as X?
Response 1: same body → same soul
Question: But how do we know this correlation?
Response 1.1: We know it by observation (not a priori).
Objection: We can’t observe both sides of the correlation (unlike: same swirl → same filling).
Response 2: same body → same psychological characteristics → same soul
Objection: For all we know, we could have: same psychological characteristics → different souls.
Response 3: The correlation same body → same soul is confirmed in my own case, so I generalize to all bodies.
Objection: I can’t observe both sides of the correlation even in my own case. For all I know, I
could have: same body → different souls.
In sum: (1) If personal identity consists in sameness of soul, judgment of personal identity is mysterious.
(2) Judgment of personal identity is not mysterious (can judge without observing soul).
(3) Therefore, personal identity does not consist in sameness of soul.

P2 X = Y iff Y has the same body as X.

Objection 1: I can judge sameness of person in my own case without observing sameness of body.
Response: Sameness of soul makes no sense, but sameness of body does (b/c we can observe the latter).
Objection 2: I can judge sameness of person even when I imagine having different bodies.
Objection 2.1: Body (or brain?) transplant case: the person seems to go where the brain goes.
Response: No, the person stays where the body is, and has false apparent memories.

P3 X = Y iff Y remembers X’s experiences.

Reid’s Objection: P3 violates transitivity of identity.
P3.1 X = Y iff Y can remember X’s experiences.
Question: What distinguishes actually remembering from merely apparently remembering?
Answer: Y can actually remember X’s experiences if X = Y, but cannot if X ≠ Y
Butler’s Objection: Then P3.1 is circular and the r.h.s. cannot define/explain/constitute the l.h.s.
P3.2 X = Y iff (i) Y can apparently remember X’s experiences, &
(ii) Y’s apparent memory is caused in the right way by X’s experiences.
Objection: Duplication argument based on fission cases, showing that P3.2 violates transitivity of identity.
P3.3 X = Y iff (i) Y can apparently remember X’s experiences,
(ii) Y’s apparent memory is caused in the right way by X’s experiences, &
(iii) there’s no Z whose apparent memory is also caused in the right way by X’s experiences.
Objection 1: P3.3 (iii) makes personal identity dependent on extrinsic factors (i.e., existence of competitor).
Objection 2: How can a double success become a double failure (death by competition)?
Objection 3: P3.3 (iii) seems purely ad hoc, added only to save a sinking ship.
Objection 4: …and all the other absurd consequences flowing from P.3.3 (iii) (see Perry, pp.35~6).
P3.4: X = Y iff (i) Y can apparently remember X’s experiences,
(ii) Y’s apparent memory is caused in the right way by X’s experiences, &
(iii) Y has the same brain as X, thereby ensuring (ii) [i.e., the right kind of cause].
Advantages of P3~P3.4: (a) explains how it is possible to judge sameness of person without observing
one’s own body, and (b) explains the importance of personal identity.
Objection: Duplication argument based on fission cases (e.g., brain rejuvenation); P3.4 violates
transitivity of identity, and moreover, the two advantages of P3~P3.4 are lost.