rI .) ßt..^t.tit(,t, ( tt.t,l,.ti..

tt
ll
rcslc ttttc tlcrltii'rc.hsc't'vlttiort r'r u.i.Lrlcr.
Au tlclir rlc l.rrle lirr.rrrle tlrr'.rr
lr,rtrrlrril t'ltrrrsir. lir elpitt.itti irrlrrrrissiblc.l" lli",, quc
dtrrrt Augustin purre crans le De 7'rini/ate,est l\)\\c(l(, lu rtrt.rt.t ittrrt.qt,.tl
scmbrable ir urr s.uvcnir.cachd ir rrr
c<lttscietlce claire; ce souvenir particulier
s'exerce tanI
comnre garantic clc c«lrrrr.is
sance q.uecomme apper ä un mouvement
cJe ret.uren sai et de tra,scencJancc.
souvenir de Dieu peut <ionc 6tre entendu Lc
cl'une faEcln doubre: iii.i.rr.
,nu,,i,
implicite donr l'origine r6s.ide pour t'".p.iiaun,
et donc dans sa capacitd. de Dleu;
te iait qr,ir .* ),i;;;;
de Dicu.
(ii).o-*"
sagesse qui actualise le souvenir
latent en perfectionnant l'image. rorrir'"rr.
ae.öle dans sa nature la nature divine.
ou' pour utiliser une expressit'rn cre saint paul,
rorsqu,ele voit Dieu-Trinit6 dans rc
miroir constitu6 par elle-m6me dans ses pulrrun..,
: la mt,mnritr,l,inrellegentiu.
Intellectual Self-Knowledge in Augustine
la trttluttlu.t (.\tti et Dei)ttt
(De Trinitate 14.7-14)
Beatrice CILLERAI
Universitä di Padova
ln De Trinitote 14.1-14. Augustine tries to explain the thesis of De lrür. l0 thut
the human rziens always remernbers itself, always kr.tows itself, and always lovcs
itself-a thesis I will abbreviate to ".rirft" (pronounced "slurk").1 But it rcnurirts
unclear what the thesis amounts to. as we can see tiom contelnporary sclt«rlius'
disagreernents about the significance of Augustine's doctrine of intcllccturrl scll'
knowleclge.2 Is it part of a lvider Augustinian claim about the transparettcy ol
"the mental"?3 Or a thesis about a primitive arrd essentially inarticulatc lirrrrr ol
self-awareness?a Or just a relatively sirnple claim about the mind's pcltcntialily lirr

L Sce Auctrst'tNt,. De Tritt. 14.7.10: "lf rve refer to the inner memory of the irrlcllett. b1
which it remembers itself, and the inner understanding, by lvhioh it intellects itself. arrtl llrt' inrtr'r
will. by rvhich it loves itself-the case in lvhich thcse three are ahvays together, and alrvu-vs Irrvr'
been sincc the mornent they bcgan, rvhether they were thought or not ..." (Nrlrr si no.s r, li'rtttttrrt
acl interiorem mtntis ntemorittm qntt sui nteminit et inlerioretn intellegentiarn quu .st' itrlrllr'rltl
et interioren uoluntatt,nt quu se diligit, ubi haet tria sintul sunt et siüru1 s(n1pcr.[ucrLutt <.\ tlilt,
ess(coepcnott.siuecogitarentursiLte nontogilurentur...)Cf.DeTrin. 14.13 &e.g. 10. ll.l'1.()
& t4.tt.
2. For brief introductions 1o the wider context of Augustine's projcct in De T'riniktt' l0 & l,l.
seeG.J.PO'DALv, Augustittc'sPhik»oplryof Mind, Bcrkeiey, l987,chapter7,esp.pp.207 ll.
and J. RIST, Aul4ustine: Ancient T'h.ought Ba.pti:.ed. Cambridge. 1994. pp. 8.5-91 & lzl5 -47.'l'rvo
rnore general works on the De Trin. are cited in n. I I belorv. A cletailed revierv o1'thc plrilr
sophicaf literature cn De Trin. is given in R. K,cNv, Augustins Trinittitsdenkcn. Bilan... Kritik ttrtrl
Waiterfilhntng tlcr nut,ltrnen l-orschung:.u .,De Trinituta", Tübingcn.2007. csp. pp.246 6.1 fi
219 91.
'l
J. This rvas thc vierv chanrpioned by the late Gary Matthervs; sce G. M,ql"t Ht,ws. ltttrr,gltt .s

Ego in Augustine urul Descartes. Ithaca, 1992, pp.39-41, and his zlrrgrr.rtirc. Oxlirltl. l(X)5.
chapters 5 6. esp. pp.3942 & 5l 2. This approach derives to somc extcr)t fronr thc (or)rl)iui\r'l
bctr,vecn Augustine and Descartes, pursued by Gary with characteristic clarity arttl petrt'lr:r
tion through the last three decades. For a detailed analysis o1'thesc thcntcs itt ,l)r' 7)irt. X. st't'
Il. BERN,loN, Lc cogito dans la pensle dt :uint Augusriri. Paris. 2001.
4. This is the standard vicw arnongst modcrn Augrrstiniarr scltolirrs, \lurtin! lrr)nt rl l(ltsl
108. Cf. De Trin. Xy,8, 14;9, l5; 20,39: 23,43;24.41
M. S('ilNl,\trs. [)it psv-chologi:irh( Triilitiitsl('hn'lrs ltl. Arr.qtr.:titttrr, Miittslct', I())l (rr'Pr ttrtr'rl
 l"
1l\
t'til )( ; tt t N At I ( ; I t S' I' I N
i t.l ( lt.vil t,,\ tilil t-l.llN t N' I tit.t,t'.(''t'Ll Al' S t" t t' K N ( )W

a1 cntit' in viltttc ot wltich wc cirrr

sclf-knorvlcdge'?5 Sincc I disaglcc rvith irll tlrcsc vic,,vs.('rr11':rirrr irr llris prr1,1'1 15 strictly speaking, as a simple intellec,t' 1'.e
to reconsiderAugustine's thesis by asking a basic cxcgcticrrl (lucs(i()n irlxru( .r/r'Ä ltavcaccesstointelligibleobjects-albeitonewhic"hgivcsriscttltltctlcl.ivlttivc
what exactly does Ar.rgustine meeln rvhen he says that thc arcl,r' alrvays ft,ntt'tulx'r.t crrpite ities ol'reastln'7 is rtrtl
itself, always ftnows itself, aud always /ole.r itself'l My lircus rvill be ()n thc w;ry ur two tn rplications' First' sillec s/r'A
is right, the first constraint has
lf this is n mystcry t()
*,hich he explains and det'ends the first tlvo claims concerning the intcllect's scll' ttul'''-' uuouithe "1" (egn) that
a thesis about "the -i'd,:;;;;;oiu tt ttt(tt\
memory and self-knorvledge in De Trin. l4.l-14 (rather than its self'-love, which is
itself in Confessiotts 10;t;;;;
*" t"utn is the subject ^"d 1',:'i'11-']^:l:l'1'"
's tl.re.r'y .l
treated in l4.l -5-261. My hope is that rvorking through his arguments in del'encc ol f :.iä.'ffri, is vital to
the coherence of Augustine
ir.t De Tri,.l5.l1 & orrlv
these trvt'l claims rvill elucidate some centlal irnplications of Augustine's doctrirre of De'[rinitulg, because he is not
mind. r think, as *"I ui?"'.änrister"y lhc
crf intellectual self-knowledge fbr his model of the truman nrcns. But I rvill start
profoundly aware of t"tpf"-ity of human psychologyälsoelservhere-c'g'
comrnittcLl i. tlris
by addressing the meaning of slrk head on, befbre turning to the arguments in 1)r' 'r'ä of u.iirr,y- but
nrin(r.s rrrenr desrres.;l;;i;pl. lävels that rule out s['l as il thcsis
Trin. 11.l-14 in sections 2 & -1. memory and attentiän
work to theories of perception, lhrrt
(He argues in De Trin.11'15' for instatlcc'
about the mind or oui*u, u"such. when rapt t' tn"li']:'
I. - GENERAL CONSTRAIN'IS oN THE MEANING OF SLRK one can perceive ;;;; *i,troui rational attention any ].1 l:.1.
further cognllrvc ircec\s
"".1
lows. he thinks, ttrat onl äia
,o, and can't later have nol ittrlrlv
We can get some iclea about the meaning of s1rfr, I suggest, by looking at somc Hcnce lconcluäe that s/rk docs
at all to those psychofog'iJiup"*tions';
;;;;;;;;i,f..i'v or tf;" "transparencv .r the
gencral constraints on a plausible interpretation of the formulation itself. The first
mental'"
is that the subject of the thesis in De Trin. 14, the mens, is the human intellect.
Thesecon<limplicati<lnolAugustine'Sconstfllaloftltemensasirtlirrtcllct.lis
entity thitt illrv:rvs
ratlrer tlran the "mind" or rational s<»ul (uninut.s) as such. This constrair.rt is onc r"r;"meraphysical st:rtus of the
that is easily overlooked given the flLridity of psychological terms in Ar.rgustine's that we know somerhü;;;; Book 10' for instancc' tlurt it is
We know.fron"I
loves, rememU",', unitio*s itself' that the inte lle e I
work. But in Book 10, where s/rk is first introduced, Augustine already explicitly
an immateriaf ,uUr,on.ä,'rir..
ä-g*.,i"ethinks that his argument imtnatctirrl
restricts the reference of me ns k) what he calls "the rational intelligence," i.e. the 10'5;) shows thät it is both
has complete r"rt-rtnä"äi" tiir'i"' He spclls (his
mincl mlnus its non-ratiotral representational faculties of memory and perceptiorr tti";"ä:;';; ;;ä t substance of some sort'8
(because perfectlv 'n' constittrlcs ir
(De Trin. 10.7). The thesis is thus not supposecl to apply to the subject of our
his rer.narks i, ir,r. io. ro a 10.13 that it accordingly
witlr that tlrt
by these Platonist terms is' first'
our.
ordinary rational experience as such, since ordinary thoughts are constituted in
"nature" and a "life'" WIut't'" *"ans
d;il::: ::ili::: l[li
part by some fcrrm of reprcsentatkrnal content (as Augustine shows in De Trin.
U-9 and explains in detail in Books I l-13). This restriction is further qualitied in i,,'"u.., is n ot " in"
*=i*::i :X*f lS;::lXl'
:T,::H:"TI;:ll"il :[äT::.äi'i];ü il;;trul in Books
De l-rin. 12.l-3, where we learn that a "rational intelligence" should be regarded. ;i"*' - which-draw'lr,,'( r':c

5-7 and applrctl

Augusline set
Dost-Aristotetiuntuttgt"ical theory ir & 12.-r th.t tlre
i"
to the inrerecr e.3_ä _;;;;;;i'^ir";*prain the crainrs 10.7

1967t, esp. pp.230-8-5. Classic iirrms of it havc bccn proposed by J. BRACHTENottRT-, "Dcr intellecthascausalp*"..'i.e.thatitcung"n*,atethe..derivedcapacitics''suclr
nreurehlichc Ceist als Bikl dcs lrinilarjselren G()llc\ - Alrrrlichkeitcn urrd Unähnlichkeiten." irr aSreason'perception,and'-"*o.ythatconstitutetheanimus.Butwhatlrvatttttt
C)ott utttl sein Bild, J. Brachtendorf (ed.). Paclerborn, 2000. pp. 155-70, and in his book, I)ll argueinthispaperistlrattheyShowthatweshouldn,tSuccumbtothetcnrptatt«ltt
slrlr to a thesis about mere
potentiality-the inlellec-l's^'self-knowlctlge
Struktur d<'s nens<'hlithttt Gt'i,stes n«clr Augustiuu^r. [Iarnburg, 2002, csp. pp.218-29: and b1' to reduce
permanent i.e. what Augustine calls rr Äirrrl
C. H()RN. "Selbstbczüglichkeit des Geistes bei Plotin und Augustinus," in Gott und sein Bild. seems rather to constitute its ^"tiriiv,
pp. 8l 103. A nrore phenonrenological version is found in L. Höt-scHER, The Realitt of tlte lllittl:
Arrl4trstine',r Philosophital Arguntents.fitr the Humtn Soul «s o Spirituul Suhslrrlt e. London. I 9ll(r.
chapters 3-4.

-5. This is a vicrv suggested by the distinction betueen habitual and actual knorvledge applicrl conte nt as suclt irrtc ll rf i
T.Thislaterrestrictionofthesenseofthetermlttansalltlrvsforsotlleambigrrity()\,e1.|(SIl\(.lll
sorts. of contert: intellectual
to Augtrstinc's vierv o1'the lsrr I soul by THoNIAS AQtltNAS. De ucritute Q.l0 a.8: as a result. il is Dc Trin.10. where it leaves space for two
very familiar to historians of medieval philosophy. tts rtt 1)t' /i'irr' l l ltr &
b]es-anclnon-representationalrationalcontent-e.g.irnmerliaterationalawarcltessrll.tttttsclr't.s
14, since Augttstine tells
But the ambiguity shoutd ,].ä.;;;;it;;e Tr.in.
ll'rrrrtl
A fullher vier.v is the inl'luential thesis of A.C. Lt-ctyo, "No.ste teipsunr itnd «ttt.sL'it,rttitt."
6.
l4.l(cf. DeTri.n.l4.l0-l),f]uii"äu,rtherationalcapo.',ytändits.§(l(''rtl(rlttr1)''liirr
''iäif..ir",.apacity
Archiv Iiir GcsLhi<ltte der Philo.tophie. 4612. 1964. pp. lSlt-2«), that the trnclurily rhorrl
,n. (and its sdpientio) h De Trin ll'
Augustine's intcntions dcrives from his conllation of trvo discrete philosophical projccls. rvhit lr
correspcrntl roughly to the first and thitd proposals above; c1'. 1,. GtiRSoN. "Epistropltt lt't)\ lt(uu i'subst,rncc" it l)c't't'itt ' scc I< 'l l'sKl'' "Att!ttsltttt'
8.Seet,.HÖLSCHER,TheRrulitytlfthcMilll,Lontlorr'l9lJ6.chaptcr4.pp.lt{)]l]...,|,lterrrrrtll s

lon: Histor_y and Meaning." I)ot:wnenti (. studi sullu tr«li:.ione .lilo.sofitu rrtdicvult'.1{. l1)()7. as a spiritrraI subsrance.., ;',h"';äi;;-,rf
pp. t-32. esp. pp. 26-8. Usctrt',srtb,ilrrrllirr'inSpeakingabott(Cltrcl"'7'haMtxltrtts'htutlttttttt'(rl'l()Xi'1rPl'l-/(r\
 ll7
( tIt\tit.t,,\ tN't't,.t,t.t,.( ttt.tt.,\'t'.1.t' KNOWI'tiDoh: lN ALIGt'ls't'tNti
1 lrr lttiI l'l"\tN

urr.tch lirr tltc ('irs( coustrairtt,()n (llc suh.icc( ol s/rÄ:1hc rrrcrrs llurt lrlrvays
ttl lilt'.So se[t-knowle<lge.Somuchfbrthesecondconstraint,onthemeaningofthetrinitar'
in 'r/rk'
rcrllcrnbcrs, knclws, and lovcs itself, is an intellcct, narrowly construc(|. antl thus iu,r to.*ufutiän of the intellect's self-knorvledge
an irnmaterial substance constituted by its essentitrl activity. Thethirdconstraifltconcernsthefinalelementinthethesisslrk'i'e'theper-
There seem to be two ways
The sec:ond constraint concerns the ftifiitarian fbrmulation of slrl-i.e. thc manence of the intelle.,lt t"lllpf"t" self-knowledge' (a) by
said dwäys to know itselt: either
rcnrernbering, knowing, and loving of itself the thesis ascribes perrnanently to in which the intellect -igr'i pi^'.tiul! ue or disposi-
its current acts, states
knowing at every gir"rr-tl'Ä'auring its existence
the mens. This formulation derives from the general assumption Augustine makes
i["v i"pp"n to be' or (b) by knowing' at all times
tions at that time' *t
about the basic structure of cognition, such that any cognitive act can be analyzed "tä,"' its essence or substance or nature
during its existence itself, that is, I 'suppose'
into three elements or aspects: its content, the entertaining ofthat content, and the in De lrlrr' )' But I think that De
will or desire involved in the cognitive agent entertaining that content then. In (Augustine uses these ,h*; i;;*t intt'c'hang"ablv
*t are told tn De Trin' 14'6
accordance with this model, Augustine feels entitled to draw s/r[ directly from his Trin. l|gives us u.f"ut'un'*"r on this qu"'Iion' 'i""
thatmanisanirnmortalimageof goclinvirtue
oiii''in'*o"n/-ie'permanentand
argument in De Trin. 10.5-6 that the mens always has con'rplete self-knowledge claim in De
capacities. For he justifies this
(see 10.7, 10. ll & 10.19).e(Thesuccessof thisargumentisnotatissuehere; but unchanging_rational
^rälit"["'.tral aloneheets the set of require-
it is roughly that prior self-knowledge is presupposed by the possibility of self- Trin. 14.1I-3 by showing that the intellect or.'s1rk sorts of human
ments tbr permanence ill-I"g"' rhese are that it' unlike the other
i''ä" nor
inquiry and that partial self-knowledge is incoherent in the case of the men.s.) Thus I l-13, i; neither caused externally'
Augustine takes our question about the meaning ,r/rk tcl be a more precise form of thought or cognition .onriä.r"A"in Books
an investigation of the intellect's self-knorvledge, because its knowing itself eo temporallyadventitious,-,.,t,"*,betbreitisremembered.l0Thecrucialf-eature
which^Augustine
lpso involves its having itseif to hand (remembering itself) and the requisite will here tbr our purpose ;;i]; ;;t on temporal aclventitiousness'
mental
uses in both passage, t; ;; o'i t'",, and non-representational
'tuuil firith ot., ih" gro'nds that they
to know itself (loving itself). 'uittChristian
dispositions as one's ;l;;i"g p"rsonal Thus
and will be altered in the afier-life'
Now we might have some questions about the plausibility of Augustine's gen- were formed after the inär".i, .."ation as falling
eral rnodel and his specific applications of it to the metts and its knowledge in De other than its own structure
if Augustine regarcls anf intelligibfe objects
they can only be onesthat it
knorvs
Trin. 10. But I want to stress here just two points about Augustine's claims there in the scope of tn" lrt.ii"tt's se-lf-knowledge' accepted innate
that tell immediately on our interpretation of s/rt. First, a central idea in Book I 0 is
connately, or as part oi i" o*n nature'
I äon't think A'guttine
that, although the sort of activated or conscious self-knowledge enjoined on us by
knowledgeatthetimehewfoteDeTrin.BtltevenifthiswereAugustine'svierv,
the Delphic oracle presupposes that the intellect already and always knows itself (b) is correct: what the intellect always
it would still mea, tt ai tt,e second option
is something strictly unlhlgns'
not any
knows. loves, and ."membtts of iß;lf
in some other sense, we still can and should exercise this knowledge consciously:
rise to'
that is, our own intellect should "think" itself, and do so intellectually. i.e. by its permanenl activity may give
changeabre acts, states or dispositions
isolating itself from any material or representational rrccretions we are prone to
Takentogether.then'thethreegeneralconstraintsonaninterpretationofthe
conflate with it (De Trin. 10.1-13). But that means that.s1rfr cannot be primitive in itself' always knows itself' and
the sense of essentially inarticulate: it is rather an intellectual activity that can be thesis that the human '??ens alw.ys ""tU"" means that
realized in a conscious thought or episode of intellection. always loves itself, tö; äitl''C like this' First' that the thesis remernbers)'
tl.rat knolvs (loves and
the human intellect is in''immateriai substance
Secondly, and more controversially, I think that Augustine assumes that there is
atalltimesduringitsexistelrce,itsessence.secondly,thattheessenceitalways
and apparently contentless'
some causal connection betrveen the permanent activities of slrk anil the general
knows (loves and remembers; just is its pennanent, that thisperma-
faculties of memory, will, and understanding involved in any case of conscious
activity of knowing tl""i'g temembering) itself' And' thirdly'
"'O iray be realizecl in a temporal
self-directed trinitarian acrivity "u, in ,oÄ.
intellection. The idea seems to be that the complete reflexivity of the intellect's also
permanent self-knowledge shows that the activities involved in this knowledge are 'ent
act of conscious self-intellection'
(exhaustively) identical with the intellect: if they weren't, the intellect's knowledge
I,mnotsurehowplausiblethatwillstrikeyouasapreliminaryinterprctati()n()l
of itself would be partial. So if the intellect has furlher capacities-for instance
Augustine,s formulation of s/rft. Ilut one
*uy ,n incäase its plausihility' I thirrk'
the capacity to come to knorv mathernatics, or to have conscious intellection of tt''" *ott as a whole Augustirrc's
itself-it seems that these must somehow depend on and be derived from sirft, its is to look at its function in the economy oi that lits thc
un i*og" of God in man
philosophicat uim ln Soots S-tS is to flnd

9.'Ihis is the model that Augustine deploys throughout Books 8 10, and goes on to apply to
perccption and memory in Book il, and to rational and intellectual knowledge in Brxrks ll & 14.
10. See Dr Trin. l4.l0.lJ,cited in n l7 bclorv
r-cspcctivcly.
Ilt (' I I A ti I .t..,\ ß li I I t .,\t N
"
tN l'1,;t,l,t"(' t t t,\t'\'l l t' hNOwttit)c;r: IN ALJ(;Ils l lNl
trccitttst tltc lttItttttt'ttlrtltvr'
facts about God to the extent that they are ascertainable in othcr ways. ll Wlr:rl rvc It is harr,l t0 scc Augustine wants to respond to this' 'l'ltc
h«r,"v
itrgtttttc:ttt is tlcvt'l.,etl
structure ir-rDa Trin. l4 7:;;;t o*fr"* -ä
aialectical'
are sure of about the archetype is that it is a trinitarian substancc. which is ctcrrral scll krt.rvlctlgr"
the intellect's perrllarrc,t
and unchanging, and whose internal structure is appropriately conceived by anal in three stages: (l ) The ti.ri airtirgriishe^s scll-krrorvlctlgc
(1; 8). (2) The seconcl cxplains its
ogy rvith a self--directed act of thouglrt (a uerbum). The human image that he has fror.r.r its episodic ."rr-tninr.ing designed ttr
(14'lt-10)'
by a complex analogy ;il ilt disciplinary
knowleclge
identified and elaboratedin De Trin. l0.l-14.14 comes in two variants. The first
to more than just self-memory lcspil:-lls
is the in'educible nature of our intellect, constituted by slrk, a trinitarian substance, show how self-knowledge coulcl amount
(3) And the third argues that thc asstgn-
rvhich is immortal (though created) ancl unchanging. The second is in the intellect's not being exercised * .ä"tio" thought'
episodic and conscious act of self-intellection, which is a self-directed thought mentoftheintellect,sself-knowleclgetomemoryissulg-ener.isbecauscitisn't
the intelleci's self-presence shoulcl
with a trinitarian structure. If I have identified them correctly, these images have first lea,.red or knorvn ;;;;i;; remämberecl:
as a unique form of memory
(14' I l-13)'
the merit of identifying essential features of the intellect (as we would expect f" rrä"^,.od
given Gertesis 1.26). But they are inadequate rvith respect to the analogy because Iletbreturningtothesearguments'how.ever'weshouldnotethatAugustinc's
it looks at.first as if his
the human case yields crläer something permanent that is not 'thought' (slrk) or final answer (as outlineJab;ve) is a bit disconcerting: of dispositional metn«lry
a form
basic respons" i, to .o"ttu" *"if-kno*ledge
a self-directed thought that is not permanent. So in De Trin. 14.15-26 he turns as
self-knowledge
to another image, which depends on the perf'ection of the hunran intellect: the (stage 2); but hisu.,,uitontfusion seems tä be that the intellect's
saints' perfect contemplation of god, r,vhich provides for a permallent thought of a ismanifestedinitspermanentself-presence,whichinturn<-onstitutesitsscll-
this is a wav of vindicating the permarlcnt
permanent object (which is also the intellect's ground and cause). memory (stage 3). Ir i, ;;;i;;.,rhet'her
of neutätizing it as.merely a fornr.l'
At any rate. the way to test this intelpretation of slrk is trt look at Augustine's activity of self-knorvr"ägl-"r-i^tfrer a way jt of course' but it
should ctaiitv this'
elaborate analysis in De Trin. 14.7-14 of the thesis of the intellect's self- memory. Examining,#:;s'*;;;t in" viä1a
in which one might sutn up tht:
knowledge, which he established in Book 10. When we turn to the argumenrs in may help to start .ff b; Jeä;; iiy " 'i-pt" -oy
Ärgrttine's answer to the first question is too
easy'
De Trin. 14.1-14 it is clear that their purpose is to confl'ont two problems irbout ;i;i;i
the relation between slrk and its realization in a conscious thought in the human ThesimpleinterpretationisjusttoreduceAugustine,ssolutiontoadistinctitllt
and'^consciotrsly
irr-rage of god: between potential-i'el'p"t-""""-and actuai-i'e' ep-isoclic
aboutihis t"qi.:::1".'' althouglt
( I ) What is the sense ln which there can be permanent (self-)knowle dge x,ithout thought- selt-t no*teägJi1"t! lt som3thinsf q.ht trl'
cornpiicatecl argumentative structurc
its realizalion in a consc:ious thought? Is it properly self -knowledge when it is just it,s hard to see how it does justice to the is
"in the memory"'/ the passage. rn" -nin!"'olÜ;i;' it' I think"is th",t:-sTt]l:,1:t1'that
even
'r1rrl
if ottr
experience,
in some way activelv #;[;ii in our'ordinary
(2) If it is, how should we understand the precise relation between these trvo conscious
sorts of (self)-knorvledge, i.e. between permanent self--knowledge and its episodic .,think, ril"ii:' This is why he srresses its continual presence to
intellect never
conscic'rus realization? With luck, his ansrvers to these questions will help us to itself,arrdwhyDeTrin.l4.l820,forinstatlce,insiststhattheintellect,sself-ltlvc
life even if it is never "thought"l ancl
determine the role of the activity of self-knowledge in Augustine's model of the has ineliminable etecis on nr. "*p..iential cfl'ccts
has actual
human intellect. why De Trin. inai.ui", ir-,"t t'he intellect's selt'-knowledge
14.g
3)' So what he finds attractivc
in our ordinary conscious thoughts (see^section I suggest, is not thc
disciplines,
about the analogy *iit ou. f.noirt"ag.
of afis or
call at /l't'
IL - Srnr AND MEMoRY simple distinction uUor"", üui .uttrer ire
idea that they äre what we can
activ€ diSpositions that continuously
fiamc tlttr
In this section, I look at the arguments on the first question (l)
above, and the secondpotentialities, 1.". *,'arv t'r.trg'
to address
main one, as Augustine conceives it: in what sense can s/rk involve pennanent self- experie,ce. ff tfris is ,.i'ii"tf," .1r",1 difflulties he needs
o, rrin. 14.8'114are two fundamental tlis-analogics
knowledge-as opposed to self-ntemory-if it is only permanent "in memory"?12 the multiple quatiricatlo'n.s äf
between disciPlines and s/rft:
is due.t<t the proccss ol'
l)The clisposition^i ."*r.r efficacy of the disciplines
learningthem,whiles/rkisnotlearnedbutstillretainsasimilarlyactiveproscltcc
ll. Scee.g. J. SUt.Lt\AN. Tlrc Inttgt,OJGod.The Doorinc oJSt.Augustinc antl Its Irtfluenr:e.
^" our exPerience.
in in our mcrlory'
Dubuque, Iowa, 1963. or L. AYRES, Argustine and the Trinitr-.Cambridge,2010, for. respectively,
lucid philosophical and theological analyses ofAugustine's general ainrs 1in English).
il-oriu..ess to the disciplines is mediated by representations
wt iie ttre intellect is present to itself immediately'
I 2. Thc passage has received little explicit commentarv in recent years, except for two detailc.l
The dialectical investigation of slrft begins
i! D.e Tritt' l^4' tt]ll] ttrc <tbvitrtts
arralyses by J. BRACHTENDoRF, Die Struktur des mensthlichen Geiste.s. Hamburg, 2002, chap-
objection posedby tt"."?".tinfants:
it iihard to believc, Augtrstirrc tlri,ks' t'rrl
tcrVII[,esp.pp.2l8 29.andbyL.HöLSCHtR,TheRealiryoftlrcMind.l-ondon, l986,chapter.l, (t tt.t'ilt'trt
or can "think thcir inncr thirrgs"
csp pp. 133 42. infants have conscious self-knowledge
 32{) "il t.v,,\' t
('l ltllll,l,.,\' lllil l't,ttN t N'l' 1,.1.t.1.;( u. LN olv l,l,:l )( ; 1,; l N AIJ( i l /.\"1't N li |]I
sua interiora). 13 This shorvs, as he hacl aheady
notecr in De T.r.in. r0.7. tturt rvc that the analogy might wrongly impty-since slrk is not in läct acqr.rilcd by (ir.sl
need to distinguish the. intellect's pennanent särf-knorvredg"
fr1r,, it, c,,urci,,u, becurning known and then remembered-that the intellect only "remcnrbers itscll''
self-thought, since the latter is episodic-and, worse,
as Arigustine arguecr in 1)c pennanently, i.e. that it doesn't know or Iove itself befbre it is exercisecl in tlrouglrt.
Trin. 10, often contused. 14
So he uses the objection that rnerely remembering something can't amounl t()
. After clarifying the mechanisrn of serf-thought-which I wirr reserve knorving or loving it to distinguish the case of an ordinary memory-tracc-thc
tbr sec_
Augustine,s initial ."rponr" ro rhe firsr objecrion: s/rt capacity to recall a simple fact, fbr instance, about American history-fnun thc
!:.":^?,-*?:
rs lrin.,ru.!.gives
actlve even when it is not consciousry thought, in the way that relevant f-eatures of acquired disciplines in virtue of which it makes sensc to say
ouräisciplinary
knowledge is active in memory: that their possessor still actively knor.vs and loves thern when she isn't cxercisirrg
But when it is not thinking itself. it's true that it is them. The feature Augustine singles out is their ready availability tbr imrncdiltc
not in its own view and that its
gaze isn't infclrmed liom itself, but it nevertheless knorvs itself exercise. But I take it that we're supposed to see that acquired disciplines havc
as if it ruere it" .,*n
memory of itself. It's like the case of someone skiiled
in many discipriner, *ir, rr. further permanent causal effects on our experience: they make things rvithin thcir
knorvs is conrained in his an, part of it is in the vieiv of his interect onr1, ambit salient to us and hence liable to elicit our active exercise of the relevant
lvhen he's thinking about it,.memory,
while the rest is stored in some ,".r", g.u.p_i.. *lro, discipline, fbr instance, and un-consciously structure our memories of particular
we cail his "memory.'' (Thar's rvhy we adverted
[in Book r r ] ro rh;ir;ry in *t,i.r., events that fall rvithin their competence. If this is ri-qht, the revised suggcsti()n
the object from rvhich the gaze of the thinker is infbrmed
rvas located in *.-u.y, is something of the sort I alluded to above: slrk can bc considered to pertain t()
rvhile the informing itself was rike an image impressed
from it. and §,hat.ioins rhe two memory in the rvay that irn acquired discipline does. i.e. as an "active secontl
together was love or rvill.) so when the i;tellect
conres into its orrn uieiv
it intellects ancl recognizes itself, and firr that reason this intellection in thrught, potentiality" that permanently modifies our experience, irrespective of its exercisc
or knou,leclge
comes to be. After ail, an.inimateriar thing comes
into vielv when it is intelrectect and in conscious thought.
is known by intellection. 15 '
Augustine is dissatisfied with this suggestion, however, as we can see fiom
The initial suggestion here is that srrk is always present his introduction of a second example in the third paragraph of De Trin. 14.9 (thc
in the same way as
one's acquired knowledge of e.g. gramrnatical thäory
is .,i, ;.;;r/i'ih", ur. reading case):
isn't exercising it. But in the first trio paragraphs of
öe Trin.1a.9 Augustine notes But when r,,,e haven't thought of something for a long time and aren't able to think
of it rvithout being reminded, in some odd rvay we don't knorv that rve know it (if
one can put it like that). Then the person reminding the other person can rightly say:
"You know this but you don't know that you knorv it. I'll remind you and you'll
13' De Trin' 14 5 7: "So what should rve say find yourself knowing rvhat you thought you didn't knorv." Books do the same, whcn
about the intellect of infants r,vho are still tiny and
immersetl in srrch ignorance of things that the darknes.s they're about things the reader finds are true through his reason-i.e. not rvhen thc
of their intellects horrifies the intellect of
a person that does know something? Should reader merely believes the rvriter's statement that such and such is true (as rvhen one
we believe that evcn such an inteilect kr.rolvs itself,
but that, because it's so intent on the things it has reads a history), but when thcy're about things the reader himself finds are true as
begun to perceive through the bodily sense (an<i
r"'ith a delight increaseci by their novelty to i,), rvell, rvhether he fintls thenr in hirnself or in the truth itself through his intellect.l6
lt Jun knorv itself but cin,t think itself?,. (e,2/
itaqu,e dicerulum est de infantis mente ita'otlhut:
p,ruuli et in ktm ntugna dt,mer5i rerum ignor.ntia The example makes it clear, I think, that the direct source of his dissatisfacliorr
Lrt illius mentis tenebra.s »ten.s lutminis quae
uliquil nouit erh.rieat? An etiant'ipru rr,rn.r* with the revised suggestion is that slrk is not immediately available fbr ctlnscious
trt'lendu (.\t. :cl int(ntd ni
t'ocpit d.tectttrione s(,nrire,'::;';,::;"::',XT:,:::,:';::;::,,:":,':;::';:,:,i,iorc
quanto nouirtre exercise by most people-in fact, very few of us ever seenl to attain it. Augustinc
meets this objection by correctly pointing out that we are often unaware of knowirrg,
14. Both defects of conscious self{hought exprained by the same mechanism: the lower,
ar-e
represeJrtationar, capacities of rhe animus.*".
u fascination o, rh" og;;i;;hich hi.ders
the self-conscious use ofthe intellect in the young"u.io*
anti leads adults to credit-materialist philoso-
phies of nrindl see De Trin. 14.7 . lO.1-ll
-cf 16. De Trh. 14.7.9: "Hinc admonemur esse nobis in abdito mentis quarundam rerurn tlLlrstl:rrrr
15 De Trin. 14.6.8: "Curn uero non se cogitat, non sit
quidem in conspectu suo nec cle ilra notitias, et tunc quodam modo procedere in medium atque ir) conspectu mentis uelul apcr'lirrs
sttus fbrmetur obtutus, sed tamen nouerit se ta-rnquam
ipsa sibi sit memoria sui. Sicut multarum consritui quandtr cogitantur: tunc enim se ip:a ntens et meminisse et intellegerc ct ilrnilr'('inu('nlt
disciplinarum peritus ea quae nouit eius memoriä
contin"ntul nec est inde aliq,icl in conspectu etiam unde non cogitabat quando aliunde cogitabat. Sed unde diu non cogitaucrinrus cl rrrrrlt'
mentis eius rrisi unde cogirar: cerera in arcana quacram
notiria su.r recorrdita q,,ä. r"rori, nrn_ cogitare nisi commoniti non ualemus, id nos nescio quo eodenrque miro mcldo si potcst tlici scrrr'
cupatur' Ideo trinitatem sic commendabamus ut illud
unde formatur cogitantis äurr,r. i, memoria nescimus. Denique recte ab eo qui commenrorat ei quem comnremorat dicitur: 'Scis hoc sctl scrrr'
poneremu's, ipsam uero contbrmationem tamquam
imaginem quae inäe i.primiirl nt iilud qu. te nescis; commemorabo et inuenies te scientem quod te nescire putaucras-' ltl agunl cl lillrr;re
utrumque coniungitur amorem seu uoluntatem.
Mens igilur quando cogitatione se conspicit, intel- quae de his rebus conscriptae sunt, quas res duce ratione ueras essc irrucnit lectrlr, norr (luirs u('r:ls
legit.se et recognoscit: gignit ergo.hunc intelrectum
et".ogniiion.m stä-. Res quipp" ,n..rrpu..n esse credit ei qui scripsit sicut legitur historia. sed quas ueras essc ctiarn i1.rsc inucrril sirrt' ;rprrtl se
intellecta conspicitur et intellegenclo cognoscitur.,,
siue in ipsa mentis duce ueritate."
 l.).) (.1l.,ltit,t..,\. lililt"ttllN lN il,;t.t,t,,( l u,V,\t"t.l..KNowt,l.:t)(;ti tN AIt( ;(/s'l'tN t: lll
llrirlgs tll:rl ()lll-l)cllilvi()ttt' lirt irrstirrrcc. sll()ws
tlral
r,vc /,///.r/ know. (Arr ex,r,,lc
irrvrrlvittg il skillortliscilllinc rniglrt [rc thc in Conf. l0.ltJ. The suggestion that lve "learn" abstract objects by "collecting"
knorvleclgc ol'l-atin nrctri.]s l,arry,.l-us
rrct;uircd ar Prirlrary scho«ll: this clirectly rnocrifies rvhat is already there in nleulory is rrot an appeal to Platonic innatism. The clairu
,,rr r.tu"t
i,r)' sc,tcllcc .1' Latin, but nray weil be something r.vc "^p"r.,*'." .r rcading is rather that lve come to know a theorem like "There are three kinds of rhetorical
berieve ou.serves tcl be questions" by a process of structuring our empirical experience of actual speeches.
crrtircly ignorant of or at best krhave completely
fbigotten.)
So what rve already knorv isn't the abstract theorem, but rather that the set of
But the rnclrc seri.us probrem the reading case
is supp.sed t. defuse is the tirst individual speeches or fragments of thern that we have heard and rernember. We
ol'the two ccntral <Jis-anarogies between aJquired
crisciprines and slrk:the current assent to our teacher's claim that there three kinds of question on the basis of a set
availability.f an acquired clisc.iprine in any äegree-and
so its presence in us and of representational items constituting our memory of particulzrr speeches. It's not
ctlntinuous causal efT'ect on us imespective of
our awareness of it is derivecl frorr, unreasonable for Augustine to point out that our assent in this or the reading case
the prior process of rearning to exeicise it (consciously). -
The rr.tu. oitt. reacli.g is a matter of "recclgnizing" something already "in ourselves." But the abstract
cxample is thus that it.offers an expranation
of our otitity ," an active item that rve recognize is something radically clifferent in kind to what we already
scc.nd potentiarity withour u p.o..i, of conscious ".qrä"we find
rearning, b";u;; it knew: it is not a case of renewed or re-cogrtition. So the anakrgy betr.veen s/rk
somehow alreody present in our memory,
as srrk is. we can äir.;aui" augustine,s and the disciplines fails: since they must be known or learned before they are
example by recalling his.expranatio n in-Confessions
r0.r7_.g of the way in r.vhich remembered, they are temporally adventitious (as rvell as caused externally in the
wc learn the theorems of riberar a.ts such as rhetoric:
tne abstracli objJcts of such rvay just described).
disciplines don't e,ter our memory through perception
or experience, but rather The second problem for the analogy is that by the time he r.vrote De Trin. 14
seem to pre-exist at some deeper level
of memory. To learn the theorem ..There are
three kinds of rhetorical qu"siion"- ur ro Augustine had rejectecl the tlresis of Conf. l0 that the c'urrent availability of
have t-hat abstract ou;..i ii."rr ovairabre
and in your memory-is a mauer of "collecring', acquired disciplines to the artist should be explained by the immediate preserrce
or srru*uri;t;ir;; is arreaay of tlre rcs ipsa in n'lemory (ho»'ever jt carne aborrt). Fclr Au-eustine argues in De
reading case rhus. ailows Augustine to conclude
*:* .!o- !h"
Trin. 14.10 that the analogy with the disciplines
provisionalry in De Trin. 12.23 (cf . De Trin. 14.21), as a prelude to his well-known attack on Platonic
suggests how .s/rÄ courd involve
self-knowledge and yet still "pertain to mämory," innatisnr in De Trirt. 12.24, that such abstract or intelligible objects never actually
i.e-. fail to ever be consciously
exercised: like the discipline of rhetoric (so unclerstood), reside ''ln the memory." What we retain in memory while we are not exercising
second potentiarity "in" our memory (even
it courd be an active our knorvledge is rather a set of representational "traces" (ue.stigitt elservhere in
if one that isn,t acquire<l through a Atrgustine, logoi in Plotinus) in virtue of r'vhich the intcllect can easily return to the
process of learning something external
or previously unknorvn).
object it grasped imrnecliately in intellection.ls lf so, the analogy between .s/r,t and
It's clear fiom De Trin. r4.ll-3, however, that
Augustine doesn.t think this the disciplines fails in a more basic way: a second potentiality is the wrong sort
dis,girljna|y.model is going to work. since he insists
thäre that serf.-k,owleclge is ol anakrgue lirr thc intellcct's sell:knorvlcclge becausc its pcrlrranent rctention irl
radically difl'erent from ail the other sorts of cognition
he has consicrered in the the mind is ultirnately explained by its artist's possession of representational items
r'vork: whatever we can say about acquired
disciplines, only s/rk actuaily meets stored in the lorver faculties <tf the unimu,i. Augnstine can't accept that n.urdel
the requirements of being neither .urr.d externariy,
noi t.,rpo.uitf aJventitious.
nor known before it is remembered.17 we can
see part of the probrem, r think,
by looking a bit more closely at his expranation
foiour ability to i"urn.t"tori.

uclttt it't rttetnoriu ,ytttt tottslitututtt uidet, qua,ri nott ibi.fttcrit dillcqiltun .rt' ilt:unt t t)l:nt,.t(t,t'c!; t uilt
profe(to ex quo esse coepit, ntrtntlu,tnt sui tttr'tttitti.t.sL, nunuluunl se intelligera, nuntqudnt \c untdr('
11 DeTrin'14'10 13:"Butit'snotlikethatwiththeintelleo.Forit'srrota<iventitioust.itselt.
d c.v ti te r i t. si cut i um ostu ndint u,s. )
as if its o.'vn serf came to it (i.e. in something
that arreatly existed) from elsewhere. Nor as if
did,'t come from erservhere, but rather its orv"n serf ,*, to- it 18. We can spell this out crudell, as the idea that themerrory traces of prior rational thouglrts
in it (i.e. r, ,om"thing'tt.,at a1eady
cxisted), in rhe wav that a faith rhar didn'r (such as "Norv I sec that thcre arc three kinds ol rhetorical tluestion") allorv rrs to thirrk ol t;rlk
exisr arises ," iii*i,ii"l,i'ä,",ii"ä,nr,.o""0,
cxists)' Nor does it see itselfby recalling itselfafter uhout Lhis theolem, but this isn't the samc as the privilcged intcllecturl statc of actually' "conlenl
already corning to know itself. as if it sees
ilscll .rrr'e it has hecn ser in its ,n.rnu.y_lu, it ir nrAr.r plating" ordirectly understancling it. Thr'sort ofcascsAugrrstine allurt's to irr 1)c 7)iri. ll.ll.
ulr"räy f"."?f1..r.'ilä;; i.;r. ro knou.
itself. Far from it, since from th. hor'vcver. arc nlore cornplcx: there. perceiving some scnsiblc particLrlar triggcrs orrr nrcrrrory. rrrrtl
-u..rt it began to exist it has never stopped remembering. inter_
lccling anci loving itsell as I have already shoin." thc structure of our me morv that results from our- hzrvin,u acqrrirctl tlrt' rclci rrnt tliscilllirrc lclrrls us
1c:o,o,utetn in *r,ri" ,o, sic est: neque enin to "contcnlplatc" or clirectll' understand thc intellieible olr.ject that cx1;luins it. I lclr rrrg u sorrr,. lor
itdttctrtiti. sibi ips. e,tt, quusi ad se ipsim quae iam
er,t, uenerit ariunrre eturent ip.su quue non
( r(tt: uut rutn oliunde
uenerit, sttl in se ip'o quae iom erat, nata sit cxample. allorvs a musician to conlernplille an abstract ratio. rvhich shc clrr llrlcl re rrrt'rrrlrt'r cillrcr
ea ipsa quaa rton eftrt; si(ut
itt rrtt'trlt'tlLtttc iam crLt. oriturfide, quo, ,.or'"rot: by retairting tlie pzrrticulirl sound or by lt rationirl rc[)rc\L'l)t1lti()n. likt'lhe sort o( rrrit lrrrrrrrl:rtcri
aut post cognitionem sui rec,rtrand. ,tt, ilt.tttrtt
in rr ntrrsicological tcrt-
 tl.l
(' I t/vit,l,,\' tilit t"t,v N l N' l' lil.l.l';(' l l t t\ 1 .,\ l' t .l' KN OW l.l':l )( ; l', l N Al l(;l l,\'l' l N l'. lls
lirr 's/r/r' sirtcc (ltc siltglc daturrt hc insists on
thr.ughout FJ.,oks lo & l.l is tlrc
f)cüIiulcrlt arrd inirnediate_(or ncln-representatiorrali pr.sr,,tr.r,,,r that there üre two ways in which we construc the conclusicln that the intellcct allvitys
itscll: scc c.g. Dc Trin. 10.10. 10. l6 ui t+.A (secrion th" i,.,t"ll".t t., rcnrcmbers itself through its self'-presence. The first is reductive: all Augustine
3, belorv).
rneans here is that the intellect has the capacity to reflect on itself at any time just
IIencc, Augustine's emphatic re-endorsenrent
of the intellect.s pcrmanent scll- because all it needs to do that is to be itself-rt doesn't need a representation or
kntrrvlcrlge. as r'vcil as self-rrlve and self-memory,
at thc end of De.r.rin. r4.r3 process of learning. The second is metaphysical, and appeals to the Augustinian
sccms to me t. indicate that he eventuaily
rejects ihe anarogy with the irisciprincs: claims about.rlrA sketched in section 1. On this vierv, the presence of the intellect
its selt'-kn.rvleclge is not something *" .un
.t.,nracterize as merery .,in,. memory. to itself is a consequence of its essential activity of self-knorvledge: the presence
Unlbrtunately. thc arternative solulon he offers
is ,ot very .r.o., sin.. the ccln_ to itself crf an immaterial entity is erploined by the self-reflexive cognitive activity
nectio, betr.veen the nerv.,otion .t "nrem.ry of
the present,, that conclucres the that constitutes the entity. The advantage of the second construal, I think. is that
clialcctic in De Trin- 14.14 andslrt i.s nrr maäe
e*pricit. I t,ke it, tirough, that the it gives an appropriately non-material explanation for the intellect's being itself,
cilnclusion he wants us to.draw crepends cln
thc reration between the infellect,s and one rvhich is reflected in the way in which it is always causally active on our
presence to itserf and his hint at the
start of the dialectic, in De Trin. r4.g. that experience. whether we are thinking about it or not.
alrvays knows itserf "as if it rvere its own it
memory of itseH, (tamcl.tum ip.ttt .»ibi
sit ntenutrict sui). I'm not sure if this gives us a good answer to the ori-qinal question. But I think
that rvhat Augustine wants us to conclude is that we can't reduce self-knowledge
At any rate, De Trin. r4.14 starts r.vith.n ob.iection
to thc thesis that the inter_ to self-memory or vice versa, because these are two fäcets of the single trinitarian
lect's permancnr presence to i.tself is appropriaiely
called ..m.r;;;;;;.cau.se rhe activity that ls the intellect. So rvhatever we lvant to say about self'-thclught, we
fbrmer explains its remembcring itself. it.,e
ou.lection is tnat there'i. ,., ..r'ry shouldn't make the intellect inert. Perhaps that is disappointing, trlthough I hope
of present things' because.grory is aptly crefrned
ty cr.".o o.. itot'ly rut i.t., on" that consideralion of Augustine's treatment of the analogy with our memory of
can reccrllect sclmcthing. and so aiways irrotves
aconnecticln to the past (rvl.rether acquired disciplines is not otiose, because it shows us how something might be
.r not the object recalled -stiil exists). Augustine dispatches thc ci,argä
är ringuistic availablc to conscious thclught, and causally active on clur ordinary experience.
impropriety by an appeal to a.Virgilian-rrog",
to say that Lllysses'i,clidn,t firreet without being actually thought.
himscll'' is to inrply that he dicl icmember-himself;
bur r,vhat hc rernembers is
prcsurnably not his past experiences, but
r,vhat he is nclw. i.e. his cunning ano
couragc. "Hence," Augustinc concludcs: III. -.SI,R1( AND CoNSCIoUSNESS
... .iust as i,
the casc ot thincs that are past rvc cail ..rnem.ry'.
he recalletr (»'rec()ilL-ctcd. so i, trrc case
that by rvhich thcy can That's as feu as I can take the dialectical investigation of the intellect's permanent
.f scr.rcthinc that is present_which is what self:knowledge in De Trin. 14.7-14. So nolr' I rvant to turn to our seconcl problem
thc irrtellect is to itself_-s,e can rvilhout absurtlity,."ll..r.,",r,,.1,.,ttut
U5 ,uiri.t i, i, fiom scction I fit. above, about the relation betweett permanent sclf'-knorvled-qc
available to itselfso rhat it can bc intellectecl
b1, its'orvn thought rind the trvo conjoirrecl
by its lovc of itsell.l9 (.slrk) and its episoclic exercise in conscious intellcctual thought. Our aim herc'
A connccti., to the.Past is urnecessary firr mc,rclry is to identify the precise content of the intellect's self-thinking in Augustinc's
in this extc,ded sensc: treatnlent of this subjecl in De. Trin. 14.8. Givern that he construes the intellect's
all one needs is something present t,, orreself in virtue
"think" somerhing. Bur rhe inteilect's availability of rvhich one can rc.cail or conscious self--thinking as the activation of its pcrmanent self'-knor'vledge. if rve
to itself ri,, tni,riine, rust is its can figure out the sort of content Augustine ascribes to intellectual self-thought.
prcserce to itself: s. irs presence kr itserf
co.stitites ia, -.r,rf .ri'i,r"-ir. this should help us confirm or disconflrm our thesis about the nature of its yrc-trtrr
But how does this help rvith the original question. nent self-knowledge.
about thc status,f tlre intel-
lect's permanent seli-kn.w,leclge'/ Hcrw doc,
the resurt that the intelrcct i.r its I rvill start rvith a revie'uv of this rather dense passage. As you rvill recall. thc prob-
sclf'-mem.ry. rathcr than something slorecl ,.in
mcm()ry.,, herp to explain the thesis lem comes up here in response to the case of infants, rvho are incapablc o1'thinking
that the inteilect alrvays knows itsel*f, irrespective
of its consciorrit 'u[n,.,1 r ,nrrt about their minds, and the parallel situation of adults (cli. De Zriir. 10.7-17). wlro
do think about their minds. but very rarely achieve conscious self'-intcllccti«rrr. So
after rerninding us of his gcneral error theclry-the fascination with rcprescrttu(iott
that hinders or obscures thc intellect's consciclus self-thoLrght- Augustinc cxpluirts
l\). l)c'li'irr. I'1 il'l4: "clurrsibicrsopraesonsesset,nullomoclosui rvhy it's so difficult:
r,eminissetnisi ctadres
l)rllcsclllL's lllcttltlria llcrlinerct. Quaprr4;ter sicut rn rebus pr.aeteritrs But such is the porver ofthought that. in a rvay. not cvcu the intellcct itsclI prrts itsell irr
ca nrenroria tlicitur qLr:r lit ut
ttlllcltttl lcc.li ol rettlrciitt'i. sie in re prari.crrti
qLrtxr sibri e:t nrcns mernoria sine abstrr.ditatc its vierv scrmeho\\' except rvhen it thinks itsclf: lrrd tirr (his rc:tson it's so riitrt lr tltr' t:r't'
t'sl tlttit silli l)rllcsto csl rrl srn e,rritationc tliccrrtlr that nclthing is in the vicrv ofthe intcllect c\cel)t \\,hat it's thirtkjrt.r irb()ul tlr:rl n()t r\( n
p,rssit irrtcllegi et utrlmq,e sui anr.re c.nirr,ui...
lhr. intellect itsell'-i-e. that bl rvhich \\'hul('\'cr is thrlrghl is llrorrlltt r':rrr lrt'tvillrirr
 J)(r (,tl,lliu,.\,tilit] l,ltN lNll,;l.l l,('il1\t .\t II hN()\yl.t,;l)(;1,; lN r\tt(ilt,\llNl,. l.) /
ils rit'*' itt itttY rrlltct uit-v lllrr h-l tlrinkirr.r: ilst'll. llirrrrllr
lr,rr il r:r, l:rrl l, lrr.r, rls
Itrt'll vicrv rvltt'tt il's rrot tltirrkilrg itscll. givcrr llrirl
it carr,e!(.r llc \\,rtll(),1 rtsell (irs rl il
(Dc 7)'in. 14.(r.li,l, by distinguishing between thc intcllcct's scll'-tltirrkirrg, rrrrrl sorrrr
\!'or(' one lhirtg. lrrrtl ils vicw itrx)lhr-1.). is sorrrcthing
I clrrr,l
tliscovel.l0 other states involving partial self-awareness that might be conlirscd with it. Orrc
'lo
sce r'vhat hc is doiru,he re, \'ve. rleed to begin kind of irrelevant state he might intend to single out herc is what we rnight call
with his gene rar nrocrcr of'thought "background consciousness": our implicit awareness of having this particular
(tttgitttritt) in the r'ork. The nroclel fbllows hii
basic anatisist,i'..,g,,iii,,n in icle,-
tifying three aspects to an occurent episode «rf thinking: object in view. ln a perceptual case, for instance, this may involve our awarcness
iir..,nt.nt],rn.,s thinking of there being e.g. a visual field in which we locate it. But something similar scems
or ertertniri.g that conterit, an<J trre wiil that enabres iris to
take fiace arthough to be true for all conscious thoughts, since Augustine stresses rn De Trin. 14.8,
the third elernent is not adciressed in De Trirt.
r4.g.Augusti'e ia"ntii", the first and more clearly tn De Trin. 15.16, that there is a certain sense in rvhich it is
elemcnt, thc content of thought, as a. object present
to the intellect i, virtue of impossible not to "see" or have in view one's own thought.2a I take it that this
the täculties of perception, iniaginationi*ä..rry,
reason or intellcction itself.2r He
construes the second eremerr, the rhinking itseri ret-ers to what we can call "rational awareness": the sort of awareness that we are
as a matter of th. ini.ti"., having
a content "in its vie,,v" (its t.onspectu.s heie norv having this particular thought, P, which can yield a subsequent second-order
Ä De Trin. 14.g).
thought such as "lt seems to rne that P" or "l knorv that it seems to me that P" (cl'.
This model looks rather.t.. sirnple t'or a general
analysis thought. Cont. Acud. 3.26). This is, I think, the kind of awareness in virtue of which wc
important to nofe trvo rcstrictions orr it. Fjrst]'despite
the'.ange 'f ;r"ä it But it,s
covers. can have apprehension or (con)scienlia of our own propositional acts or attitudes
it applies only to rationar a,d. inteilectual th.ught-contents: such as crur fäith (see De Trin. 13.5 & I 4.5). None of these states are relevant he re,
percc'ptior) or rremory as such, since those.apoiiti".
it is not a model of
can be.*...ire,r'in.repen«I_ horvever, because Augustine has identif.ied the content c»f a conscious thougl.rt as
ently.of rarionat thought (see e.g. De T.in. I L isl.z:4n6-
thinking as having something in vierv lirnits even
,.";;;ü, ;;;ronstrual of the first-order object the intellect has directlv in view, i.e. in this case, itself.
rational ancl inäilectLral thought
t.t the c.nscioru.'exercise of the capacity of inre.rregentia. So how cloes the intellect think itself directly'/ The sequel in De Trin. 14.8
understood, I think, as a moder of hiih-re;er c.nst:iousrt.,\s,
As,,";;l;. it is best explains, using the Platonist argurnents already set out in detail in De Trin.9.3-l
since rve (ancl perhaps & 10.6, that it does so neither by one part having another part in view, as if it
Augustine elser'vhere) may ."ve[ th;nl ttrat episoclic
rational or even intelectual could view itself externally, nor by doubling itself, as if it rvere two things. For,
thought can fakc place beror.v that threshord ,rionu"."n".r.:-r
he concludes:
,t
Dc Trin. 14.8, Augustine appries this nrocrer kr rhc case
of self_thinking,
rvhere the object of consciousneii i. in ,on.," lf you consult the tnrtll, it repl ies that none of these <explai ns self-thought>, since rvhen
sense iclenticar t., its subject. So we think like this rve are only thinking ot imaginative representations of bodies-and
horv does the intelrcct think itself'r Aueustine
starts, in the passage ,-lit".r ubou. it's qrrite ce,'tain to the few intcllects able to cr>nsult the truth about this cluestion that
the intcllect isn't sornething likL: that. So thc remaining option is that the intellect's
vieu, is something pertaining to its nature. and thart when the intellect thinks itsell its
view is recallecl to its nature. not spatially but by an immaterial conversion.25
2o' Dt liin' l4'6 3: "Tanta est tamen cogitetionis
uis ut nec ipsa mens quodam m.tlo sc in So the short answer is that the intellect's episodic capacity tbr self-thinking
conspectu silo ponat nisi quando se cogitat.
ac per hoc ita nihil in conspectu ."nti, ..t nisi
uncle is due to two things: first, its conspeüus, rational or intellectual consciousness.
c.gitatur ut ncc ipsa mens qtl, ergiratui tltriJqui.l ..,gitrtur
ariter possit ess. in .:.r.p".t, .u., niri belongs to its nature; and, second, it's imnraterial nature permits it to turn back to
cogitancr.. Qu.m.do autem quanclo'se norr'cogitat
i:'l:,-
rpsa Dumquam essc- possit cluasi arirrd sit ipsa.
in c.nspectu suo non sit curn sirre sc itself.
aiiutr conspcctus cius. inuenire ,,a,n por.u,r.,,
2l Atypical listol'thel'allseolcontentslirrour rttgitutiottc.sisgiven irtDeTrin. l5.l6.
22 1'heyzrrealso"tttonitolecl"byinnersense.although,{ugustinerarelyappealstothiscapac-
ity in Dc Trir.; see G.J.p. o'DAr-y. AttgLr.;tirte'.t Phirr'i4trt, 24. See Dr Trin. 15.9.16: "And this is a deeperenigma, that we don'tsee what we can't not
ltl Mirrcr.e.,i.r"y. 19s7, pp. t0:
anci c BRrr-r^rx. "N<rn-Rational perception in the Stäics ,,,J nrg,*i,*.i''r|ü'r.
-s see. For rvho doesn't see his own thought? And who does see his own thought (l mean u,ith tlrc
pp. 253-308. esp. 28t3-30 l. 22, 2u)2, inncr view itself, not by one's calnal eyes)? Who doesn't see it and yet who does? Yet a thouglrt
is a kind of seeing of the nrind <whatever its objects are>." (Et lnc est grandius aeni.gmu r.tt ttotr
23' That Augtrstinc is cliscussins high-level corsciousncss scerns to be confirnrecl by his uideamus quod non uidere non trx.tssumus. Quis eninr non uidet L'ogitationent suam? El t1ui.r uitlt t
renrarkable clescription trf tht ltatltre o| r'rrt.rpt'r'rtr.s
in Dc Tritt.15.1.5.25: it is th.l iirr>ssihilit' for t'ogitation.em suam In.on rx'ulis carrutlihtrs dicosel ipso interiore conspectu]? Quis nt,tt LLun
thinking," it "fbrrnable but not yet lirrrned rhing"
bclorrging kr rrur intelleq..'*n,.n *il'.11ri''ijXJ uitlet, et quis eam uidet? Quanfuquidem cogita.tio ltisio est anfitti quaedam ...)
arrd thcre in this flcxiblc moti()n. whon n,,r'thi-*,,,oru
rll-,rt.-i, thought. r, g.r.rai*c.r,,.e,tl or
"
strikcs us I ipsttm prt.ssihilit(tl(..».t ((tNirotiortis "ach 25. De Trin. I 4.6.8: "Nihil honrm nobis ueritas consulta respondet quondam quando islo nxxlr
.. . Sel tltid csr quo(l l)otcst (,.ysc uc,rhurn rt idc, itrnr
ligttttn csl ucrbi nr»ninc? Quitl tst, intlturnr. ttn,.1i,,:n,nbilr, cogitamus non nisi corporum fiotas imagines cogitamus, quod mentem non esse paueis ecrlis
trontlutntlut,.fitrt,rtttnt ni.\i quidlttnt simum est mentibus a quibus potest de hac re ueritas consuli. Proinde restat ut aliquid lirrlircrrs
iIItuI sit rrI itttrttrtun fLterit utI orlnrreriI t1,,qiturur? ad eius naturam sit conspectus eius, et in earn quando se cogitat non quasi pel krci spalrrrrr setl
)
i ncorporea conuersione reuocetur."
 ( ; l t'\' l l N l"
llt)
lll.i ('il,vit t,'\t,\ l"l't; hN ( )w t l':l )( ; l" t N At /
.1,.\' ltRl 1"1,.\lN N'.t' t"t.l.t"( l
"
t t

ol (hc rrrcchurrisrrr
So rnuch fbr Augustine's rathcr briel and cnigrnatic accor.u)l Theanswerlwanttoadvance,however,colnbinesthc-trvtlscetrtttltllllitltls.].,()lt involvcs /xrrlr
,.substantive,, view, i;;;r;ir;', iclea here i; that sclf-thinking
of the intellect's self-thinking. What exactly is the contcnt ol'scll-thirrking so this *r.'l.t' is it:elt'. ic s.rrtctlti,p likc
construed'? As Augustine has explained it, the intellect thinks itscll'whcn its vicw havins a direcr ,.u.0 oniltä,:iüi;l;;bj;., that it is fu/arri.rrl with
the esience of the intelle.,, rrrlr;"i"g
(self-reflexively)
is directly in its vielv, or it is conscious of its consciousness dircctly. What does what I havc
tt ougt'iiili;;i;;':tion vlelds "self-reversion"'or
that mean? Our ansr'ver depends, I think, on how we read two an.rbiguous f'eaturcs the c,ontent or its Ancl this means that the acc.unt trt
of the account. The first is the Platonist phrase "immaterial conversion," which earlier calred,.fu,y ,"fl;il;;rf.tir"*r"ag"."l about the content of self-thinking
c-laim
can ref'er either to self-reflexivity as such (the intellect knowing or thinking that De Trin.14.8 makes tt'"''"i""U'tuntive i,tellect grasps in self-thougltt'
sornetlring is the case obout itselt) or to intellectual self-reversion (the intellect that ir is the c.nspec.tu; ä]
ää; i"arrror"r
out to be its
enduri,g sÄcture' which turns
knowing or thinking itselfl.26 The second is the phrase "think itself," which we on this view, is it'"rt, i'a li' own it were' rvhosc
(an "empty" conscic.rusness' as
knorv from its context within the rvider clialectic of De Trin. l4.l*14 must mean being ll'r ls individual tÄ"i''u'n"'s
a conscious exercise in thought of the intellect's permanent self-knowledge, but contänt can vary through time)'
by noting that
which might ref'er either to the exercise of a theorem (or part) of that knowledge or viervs can be captured' I think'
The clift'erence between the trvo rvhich expresses a proposl-
of the disposition or activity that constitutes it. "narrow" self'-thinkinglt'" tp"ti"t of rational thought' ii a special case of
*t if" tne "suUsianfivi' ,crsion
The standard, "narrol" answer is, I think, to combine the first option in either tion about ttie intellect,s ,ä,ri*, latter couldr-r't bc
case.27 On this view. the intellect thinks itself in the relevant sense when it has a intellection or it, nutu.". i'iris-
ätern't m"an ttrat itre content of the substan-
But lf it were, given Augustine's
self-reflexive thought whose content is a theorem of its self'-knowledge - when represented uy tt e toräui;:il;iir;." becausc
it thinks a thought such as "I'm alive," "I know that I'm alive" or "I want to truu" to be identical wiih the <-onspecttts'
tive claim, ttris tfrougni:;iuiO intellect to be alive' And'
is rvhat it.ir'io. an
be happy" (see De Trin. 15.21 & 15.25).28 Such thoughts are self-reflexive in being ar.r individuat .;il;;;";;s of its thinking "I',m alive"
;hL intellect, the content
the same way as my thought that I have the impression that P or the intellect's siven the trinitaritrn .,.;;;;;;f by "I know
airtin.t (atl se) from rhe content expressed
thought that it knows geometry or a geometrical theorem. But they differ in that In this rvay or *ortan,iiä
t"tu"" being an individual conscrousness rs
.t
they are both wholly intellectual-unlike the impression case, which involves ['m alive" or "l want t; ;;;ffiy'-
and desiderative activity or
life'
representation-and asseft a proposition that pertains to the permanent nature of ;;il*r.
the intellect.
and psychology' I wttn'(
Sincethechoicebetweenthesetwoviews.restsonsystenraticdiff-erencestlvcr
the correct in,".pttto'io'iä Ä'gu'tint'' "pltt"Ätogy
pt"f"t"näfot the "substantive" view
of *y
Dretend to offer u ty'ä-utit def'änce a few rcasons why it might
be
irere. lnstead. I *ill t;;;t;; t]""ri*itr' 'näniioninc provides an appro-
of inreflectuat ,."ett-ttrintdng
worlh consid..i"g. Fi;;:;;^i,; to Augusttnc
26. On the connections between these two notions, see L. GgnsoN,"Epistrophe prcs heau- priately conscious t*#";;" k;lo Jt::'.1*'l:wledge I have ascribed
jisr is the exercise or lif'e of att
c.onscro"n"t'
ton: History ancl Meaning," Docurnenti e studi sulla trudi:ione filosoJit:ct medievule, S, 1991 ,
in section 2' For, one might think' consciousness' iust
pp. t-32. self-presence i. tü" gtouno of
intellectual nature: ,t irätt".t'.
"
is the ground for its self-thinking'
27. This is explicit in the detailed analyses of the passage by J. Bn,+cureNDoRF, Die Struktur *fi-r"rwing
Lles menscltlichen Geistes, and L. Hölscnup., T'he Realitv- oJ the Mind, cited in n. l2 above. The "r'i"
viesr errdorsed by the stholrrs lrsted in nn. 3 4 above also seenr to presupp()se an irrterpretalion Secondly,thisinterpretationseemstometobeacontextuallynaturalreadingtll. is the z/irur I
the claim ln p, rii'''fi]ää;h"
;;"Iüthinks itself wh"" l::.",:Ygeneral covct'
of this sort. view must in
tth.ie<r inits vierv'^lt's true
that having something in
2tl. See De Trin. 15.15.25. "The same is tnre even of things that are known in such a rvay irr. object in view' so tlne r»iglrt
the whole range ot ,r-l"rgr-l,. ...-.un
fr'uu. uuou,
that they can never be lost, given that they are present and pertain to the nature of the mind
rrärr,Lrra.or". är, sort of self-reflexivitv'
itself, such as our knowing that we are alive (for this knowledge stays <in the mind> for as long think that having,n"';;ä:il.,;;;;; out in De Trln' l4'tt thc
as the mind exists, and since that's for ever. it stays fbr ever too). Even in this case and in any including "narrow" 'äii-it't'gi"''
u't-e''g"ti'e has rule<i
ittttl
y-rrr.t1-u., background consciousness
other such examples rve can find-i.e. the sort ol'case that we should look fcrr the image of God standard narrow f.inä, of serlreflexivi
in-although they are always known, still. since they are not ahvays thought, it is hard to see how
they could constitute an eternal 'word', given that our 'rvords'are constituted by our thoughts."
(llla eti«nt cpme ita sciuntur, ut numquan ercitlere possint, quoniant pruesettia sunl, et ad ipsius
animi naturam pcrtinent, ut est illud quod ruts uiuere scünus lmanet enitn lutc qutmdiu ctnimus
nnnet, et quia riemper ntanet animus, et hoc semper manetl: id ergo et si tlua reperiuntur similiu, 18. t97tt. pp lxs 22 l' cslt
2g.Somethinglikethisviewisperhapsintimatcd,byl].Boo1.H,..St.Augustinc's.11()[lttilSlll
in quibus irrutgo Dei potius intuenda e.st, etiomsi sentper scittntur, totnen quio nott sentp(,' (lidtn relared to Arisrotre*d th" ;;l;"Ni;-piutonirt, IV," Ar.r3rsriniano. of ()ur tc\t itr this l.ttg :trrtl
colliktntur, qLtomodo le his dit'atur uerhum sentpiternilm, cum uerltum nostrunt noslro r(tNitLtlit'ttt zl.T20,although it is har<t ää"
ffi;ä.'rp".,r. l"i"ipretati()n

di«ilur, inuenira diflitile est.) witlc-ranginu set of studies'

 t 1() (' I l.\til l,,\ ßliI t"t.\I N

t'tl(i()tlttl lrwilrctlcss lvlticlt arc irtvolvctl irt «rrtlirlrr-y tlrotrgltls. Arrtl tlris lcslrrtliorr
irt ctrntcttI to the ob.jcct its such is whlt lve sltoulcl cxl)cct in l)c'liitr. l.l arryltorv,
since Augustirte's gcneral project irr this book is to in",cstigutc thc intcllcct as suclr,
i.c. the imtttortal image ttf god in virtue of which ,uve have access to ittttlligiltlt
objects, such as tlre intellect itself and god, through r/irer:l intellection.
And finally, though I don't have space to argue for this here. I think it otll.rs
the basis fbr a causal explanation for "narrorv" self-thinking and the other dcrivctl
cognitive powers Augustine assigns to the intellect.
Let me instead try to draw the threads together by re-stating four conclusions I
have ascribed to Augustine. (l) The intellect's permanent activity of self-knowl-
edge explains its self--presence. (2) Since s/r,( explains the permanent presence or
availability to itself of the intellect, it is the source of consciousness. (3) S/rk is
accordingly the ground fbr the intellcct's conscious exercise of self-knowledge INDICES
in self-thinking. (4) ,S/rÄ is an active second potentiality because it is reflected in RrnLrocn,q'PHtB
ordinary consciousness by less complete kinds of rational self'-awareness. I allorv
INDEX BIBLIQUE
that this still leaves the relation between the intellect's self-knorvledge and self-
thinking rather mysterious; but perhaps you'll agree that this is not unparalleled in IN»RX DES (EUVRI.]S D,AUGUSTIN
the trinitarian context, since it mirrors, in solne degree, the relationship between lN»rix DES AuTEURS ANCIENS E'r MfDIfvAUx
the lst and 2nd persons in the divine trinity.

CoNct.usroN

I will tinish with a brief historical conclusittn of nty own. lf Augustine's theory
of the intellect was anything like the sketch I have offered, it was a radical revision
of the Platonist theories he drerv on. The central notion of Platonist psychology is
that the metaphysical core of the human soul is a knowledge of reality, whether
through its own unconscious connection to the Forms of the divine intellect (as
Plotinus believed), or in virtue of its being constituted by the set of 'ratios' (or
logoi) that reflect the Forms (as other Platonists thought). To replace this with a
purely self-directed and so effectively contentless activity that finds its expression
ir.r an originally empty consciousness is to strip the human intellect of its divinity.
But that of course is what Augustine intended.-10
Charles BRITTATN
Cornell University

30. I am very gratetul to audiences of earlier versions of this paper, given at Cornell. Toront().
and London. and especially to Ernmanuel Bermor.r, Tad Brennan, Scott MacDonald, and Jennilcr
Whiting, whose help and encouragement was invaluable. I am also particularly glad to acknowl-
edge the generosity of the School ofAdvanoed Studies at London for their support of nr1, rcsearch
on Augustine through the S.T. Lee Professorial Fellou,ship for 2010-l t.
 ('ollt't lrorr tlt's lrlrrtlt's Atrltrslirrir'rrnt's

.\t;t'it Arrtitluiti - 192

Collection des Etudes Augustiniennes

I,E DE TRINITATE DE SAINT AUGUSTIN
Fondateurs : I-.-. CnynE t et G. FOLLIET t Ex6göse, logique et no6tique
Ancien Directeur : Jean-Claude F'REDOUII-t.E t
Directer-rr : Fre<d6ric CHAPOT

Ct]nsciI scientifitlue : M. ALEXANDRE, N. BERIoU. A.-I. BOUToN.TOUBOULIC, N. DL]\AL

J. FONTAINE, CI. LEPELLEY. P. PETITMENGIN. V. ZARINI Actes du colloque international de Bordeaux, 16-19 juin 2010,

6dit6s par Emmanuel BBRnroN et Gerard O'Da.ly

Pr6face de Rowan Wtlr,rams

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