1. G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005 EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR.

, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES,
Petitioners, vs.MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.

Facts: On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of
₱10.5 million, stock investments worth ₱518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, and
interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor
children. petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He
prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate
be divided among the compulsory heirs. Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein
respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an
administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of "paraphernal properties."

Petitioner alleged that respondent has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a
compulsory heir. Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because
she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them "would undertake
whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners." In her omnibus
motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special
administrator

Issue: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership
involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate

Held: No. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of
deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during
the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.16

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and
pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should
be included in the inventory.

The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence
teaches us that:

"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."22
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The
intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over
properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

2. G.R. No. 177066 September 11, 2009 JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno),
Petitioner, vs. PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by JESUSA PUNO, Respondent.

Facts: Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises,
Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated
a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the
deceased with the latter’s common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to
the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that
respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it
entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to
the shares of Carlos L. Puno. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not
have the legal personality to sue because his birth certificate names him as "Joselito Musni Muno."
Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that "Joselito Musni Puno" and "Joselito Musni
Muno" were one and the same.

The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that petitioner’s certificate of
live birth was no proof of his paternity and relation to Carlos L. Puno. Petitioner submitted the corrected
birth certificate with the name "Joselito M. Puno," certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila,
and the Certificate of Finality thereof. RTC allowed the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books but this
was dismissed by the CA stating that petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of and his
filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the
participatory acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno.

Issue: whether or not the petitioner was able to establish his paternity and be allowed to inspect the
corporate books.

Held: The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect respondent
corporation’s books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by Carlos L. Puno. A certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is
no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil
registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third
person.10 As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioner’s mother supplied the data in the birth
certificate and signed the same. There was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as
his son.

As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not of the veracity of the entries with respect
to the child’s paternity.11

In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons who are entitled to the
inspection of corporate books, thus —
Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. — x x x.

The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting shall be open
to the inspection of any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours
on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or minutes, at
his expense.

xxxx

Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. — Within ten (10) days from receipt of a written request of any
stockholder or member, the corporation shall furnish to him its most recent financial statement, which
shall include a balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable year and a profit or loss of statement for
said taxable year, showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result of its operations.12

The stockholder’s right of inspection of the corporation’s books and records is based upon his ownership
of shares in the corporation and the necessity for self-protection. After all, a shareholder has the right to
be intelligently informed about corporate affairs.13 Such right rests upon the stockholder’s underlying
ownership of the corporation’s assets and property.14

Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the corporation, a
right inherent in the ownership of the shares.

3. G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996 THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ,
Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR
RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and
THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.

Facts: Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private
respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The
testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
executor of his estate.2

Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among
Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons,
Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will.

Four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will
and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz,3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the
petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence. On November 2, 1992, one of
the properties of the estate was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons. the probate court ordered
Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling
P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, Edmond
turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting
P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate. petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario
Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the
release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed
the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for
Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent
payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the
testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance
with the provisions of the holographic will.the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of
funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered
the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery
of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and
respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.

Issue: whether or not the grandchildren are entitled to provisional support/allowance.

Held: No. Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased
person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court,
such allowance as are provided by law.

It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or
incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive
law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.14 The law is rooted on
the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the
age of majority.15

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.16 It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the
testator pending settlement of his estate.

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after
all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond
in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.19

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the
Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment
of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had
not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be
paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond
or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.