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Conflict Management and Peacebuilding - Strategic Studies (PDFDrive)
Conflict Management and Peacebuilding - Strategic Studies (PDFDrive)
and Peacebuilding:
Pillars of a New American
Grand Strategy
Editors:
Volker C. Franke
Robert H. Dorff
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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
AND PEACEBUILDING: PILLARS OF A
NEW AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY
Volker C. Franke
Robert H. Dorff
Editors
October 2013
*****
*****
*****
*****
ii
Jeffrey D. McCausland, Distinguished Visiting Professor of Re-
search and Minerva Chair at SSI; Mr. Doug Brooks, President
Emeritus of the International Stability Operations Association;
and Dr. Akanmu Adebayo, Professor of History and Director of
KSU’s Center for Conflict Management, for their skillful modera-
tion of the panels. We appreciate the assistance of Mr. Edward
L. Mienie, INCM Ph.D. Candidate who, as graduate assistant for
the symposium, helped coordinate the conference logistics and
co-authored the conference brief; and INCM staff, including Pro-
gram Administrator Rose Procter, Program Coordinator Chelsea
van Bergen, and Student Assistant Audrey Adams, whose tire-
less efforts and great dedication ensured the successful organiza-
tion and effective implementation of the symposium. Finally, our
thanks go to the INCM Ph.D. students, all of whom volunteered
to serve as program liaisons and campus guides to the panelists.
ISBN 1-58487-583-6
iii
CONTENTS
Foreword ..................................................................... vii
v
8. Thinking Globally, Acting Locally:
A Grand Strategic Approach to Civil-Military
Coordination in the 21st Century ..................... 193
Christopher Holshek
vi
FOREWORD
vii
Grand Strategy,” and “Conflict Management, Peace-
building, and a New American Grand Strategy: Views
from Abroad.”
The symposium discussions ranged from the
conceptual to the practical, with a focus on the chal-
lenges and desirability of interagency cooperation in
international interventions. Invited panelists shared
their experiences and expertise on the need for and
future of an American grand strategy in an era char-
acterized by increasingly complex security challenges
and shrinking budgets. Panelists agreed that tak-
ing the status quo for granted was a major obstacle
to developing a successful grand strategy and that
government, the military, international and nongov-
ernmental organizations, and the private sector are all
called on to contribute their best talents and efforts to
joint global peace and security efforts. The panelists
engaged the audience in a discussion that included
viewpoints from academia, the military, government
agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and indus-
try. Despite the broad range of viewpoints, a num-
ber of overarching themes and tentative agreements
emerged. The reader will find them in the chapters of
this edited volume.
KSU and SSI are pleased to present this book, and
we hope that readers will engage us further in the
kinds of issues and debates that surfaced during the
symposium and that are captured and extended in the
pages that follow. In the interest of both national and
international security, we must continue to debate is-
sues pertinent to strategy and strategic decisionmak-
viii
ing and develop effective tools for the implementation
and coordination of strategies of peacebuilding and
conflict management.
ix
CHAPTER 1
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
AND PEACEBUILDING: PILLARS OF A
NEW AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY
Volker C. Franke
Robert H. Dorff
INTRODUCTION
1
Treaty (START) with Russia1—that presented a sharp
turn-around from the George W. Bush administra-
tion’s “go-it-alone” approach to fighting a global war
on terror (GWOT) that had turned away allies and
friends and angered public opinion worldwide.
Indeed, Obama’s embrace of diplomacy and coop-
eration made him popular abroad and revived Amer-
ica’s image, eventually leading to him being awarded
the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize. The prize committee cele-
brated President Obama “for his extraordinary efforts
to strengthen international diplomacy and coopera-
tion between peoples” and for giving people around
the world hope for a better future “founded in the
concept that those who are to lead the world must do
so on the basis of values and attitudes that are shared
by the majority of the world’s population.”2
Despite obvious differences between the Obama
and Bush administrations’ foreign and national secu-
rity policies, both Presidents seem to share one com-
mon conviction: that other countries long for U.S.
leadership and that U.S. policies ought to manifest
America’s leadership position in the world.3 Not-
withstanding mounting global criticism of American
unilateralism and straining transatlantic relations, the
Bush administration was convinced that friends and
allies would eventually come around and rally to the
side of the United States, even if they bristled at its
actions, because they shared America’s goals and val-
ues and had faith in its motives. But flexing Ameri-
can muscles in Iraq and Afghanistan not only turned
Washington’s partners away, it also led to nuclear sa-
ber rattling by Iran and North Korea and left the U.S.
Government with a mounting deficit.
2
As the 2008 election neared, it had become clear
that the United States could no longer afford the Bush
practice of “bullying other countries to ratify changes
we hatch in isolation.”4 Instead, President Obama ad-
vocated “a strategy no longer driven by ideology and
politics but rather one that is based on a realistic as-
sessment of the sobering facts on the ground and our
interests in the region.”5 Obama believed that a United
States that listened more to others, stressed common
interests and favored multinational action would com-
mand followers. In practice, however, Obama discov-
ered that in a globalized world, where power has been
more widely dispersed, many countries are indiffer-
ent to American leadership. In the same vein, describ-
ing the political and economic ascendance of countries
such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, or South Africa,
Fareed Zakaria has argued that the world is shifting
from the hostile Anti-Americanism that characterized
much of the Bush presidency to a post-Americanism
where power is far more diffuse and dispersed across
a wider array of countries.6 But not only that, nonstate
actors are becoming increasingly important players in
the geopolitical terrain as well.
“Even if Washington led wisely and sympatheti-
cally,” James Lindsay has argued, “others might not
follow. Consultations could not guarantee consen-
sus.”7 Given these new global realities, how are U.S.
interests to be promoted in a world in which others
no longer blindly follow the single most powerful and
influential country? What are the prospects for Ameri-
can leadership, and what are appropriate strategic re-
sponses to emerging security threats? What principles
should inform the development of those responses?
What, in other words, should be the elements of a new
grand strategy guiding the formulation of American
foreign and national security policy?
3
Since the end of World War II, U.S. policies have
been informed by changing and at times compet-
ing ideas about America’s role in the world, shift-
ing among visions promoting “neo-isolationism,”
“selective engagement,” “cooperative security,” and
“primacy.”8 None of these visions, however, are suf-
ficient to address the rapidly changing nature of to-
day’s global security context and provide a coherent
and comprehensive organizing framework to protect
and promote U.S. national security at home or abroad.
Unless the President—irrespective of party or politi-
cal persuasion—finds a way to align foreign policy
prescriptions with evolving global trends, Lindsay
warns, “the gap between American aspirations and
accomplishments will grow, and the prospects for
successful US global leadership will dim further.”9
In an effort to discuss visions and ideas for a future
U.S. grand strategy based on diplomacy and coopera-
tion, on February 24, 2012, a number of leading civil-
ian and military experts came together at a sympo-
sium held at Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw,
GA, to evaluate the usefulness and practicality of con-
flict management and peacebuilding as key pillars to
the development of a new American grand strategy.10
The 2012 symposium built on the results of a success-
ful 2011 symposium that examined the utility of the
U.S. Government’s whole-of-government approach
for responding to the challenging security demands of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.11
This volume presents the central arguments and
key findings of the 2012 symposium, tracing the central
plans and policies that ought to comprise Washing-
ton’s efforts to harness political, military, diplomatic,
and economic tools together to advance U.S. national
interests in an increasingly complex and globalizing
4
world. Authors contributing to this volume tackle
strategic choices for effectively addressing emerg-
ing security threats, integrating conflict management
approaches into strategic decisionmaking, sharing
the burden of peacebuilding and stability operations
between military and civilian actors, strengthening
civil-military cooperation in complex operations,
and enabling the timely scaling-down of military
deployments.
The first part of this volume lays out some of the
specific threats, challenges, and opportunities of the
emerging strategic global security environment and
offers some more general recommendations for stra-
tegic responses to those challenges. In Chapter 2, for-
mer Chief-of-Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Frederick W. Smullen III, presents a comprehensive
overview of the challenges that characterize the global
national security landscape—ranging from terrorism
and piracy to hunger and humanitarian issues, to pan-
demics, climate change, energy and resource security,
and the global economic crisis. Facing this plethora of
challenges, Smullen advocates that the United States,
as the remaining single global superpower, can and
should lead by example, taking strategic advantage of
a moment in history that offers the opportunity to heal
America’s global image, strengthen its influence with
like-minded nations, and (re)earn respect as a solid
citizen nation of the world.
Focusing specifically on challenges to transatlan-
tic relations, in Chapter 3 former German Defense
and Economics Minister Karl-Theodor zu Gutten-
berg warns of the danger of “disconnection through
connection,” i.e., that new and intertwined global
challenges and shifts of power risk marginalizing
traditional partnerships and multinational institu-
5
tions. Identifying the paradox that the circumstances
requiring better global governance—e.g., conflicting
interests and incentives, divergent values, or differ-
ing norms—are also the ones that make its realization
incredibly complex and often unpleasant, Guttenberg
calls for a bold and long-term strategic vision that rein-
vigorates the transatlantic relationship by promoting
a global democratic political culture based on respect
for cultural differences. Any new American grand
strategy, Guttenberg argues, ought to move beyond
short-term thinking and ad hoc procedures to change
the transatlantic narrative so national populations can
understand the complexities and dilemmas within
which institutions from the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) to
the European Union (EU) operate and reach out past
the “old West” to bring emerging powers such as Bra-
zil, Russia, China, or India into the global dialogue, so
they will shoulder greater global responsibility while
recognizing the limits of their own power.
Although acknowledging the many and varying
threats to U.S. national security in the years and decades
to come, Robert Kennedy argues in Chapter 4 that per-
haps the greatest challenge for the United States will
arise from a continued relative shift in power from the
world’s predominant political, economic, diplomatic,
and military superpower to primus inter pares in world
affairs. Thus, to meet the challenges ahead including
its readjustment in status, Kennedy argues, Wash-
ington must wisely apply the instruments of national
power—political, economic, psychological, and mili-
tary. Chapter 4 addresses specifically the origins and
nature of national power: its sources and the means by
which those are transformed into preferred outcomes
in the international arena and the instruments states
6
use to do so, and examines the likely demands arising
from soft and hard power to be molded into what is
fashionably called “smart power.“
Presenting an overview of the origins, present
state, and prospects of the international security or-
der, Michael Lekson and Nathan Wilson conjecture in
Chapter 5 that traditional peacebuilding in the sense
of stabilization, institution building, and democratiza-
tion, while remaining an active and important com-
ponent of international relations, will decrease in im-
portance to a future American grand strategy and an
even smaller part in actual practice. Instead, Lekson
and Wilson argue the need for conflict management,
understood as a mix of defense and diplomacy, will
increase in the future. As a result, both diplomats and
the military will have to place a premium on flexibility
and practice selective engagement, especially in an en-
vironment where threats and challenges are multifold
and resource allocations remain tight. The adage “do-
ing more with less,” Lekson and Wilson criticize, not
only serves as a guide to policy but also as a conve-
nient pretext to avoid prioritization. In short, the au-
thors conclude, “There will be no shortage of conflicts
to manage, and we will all need to keep getting better
at it if we want this story to have a happy ending.”
Given the enormous cost in casualties and resources
in America’s post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) wars,
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. argues in Chapter 6, the United
States needs to consider alternative approaches—to
include especially peacebuilding and conflict manage-
ment—to accomplish its strategic goals. Dunlap con-
jectures that it is incumbent upon the Armed Forces to
develop methodologies to accomplish these missions
in a way that is supportable by the American public.
To achieve this, Dunlap proposes an “off shore” ap-
7
proach based on a light military footprint that lever-
ages America’s asymmetric advantages in high tech-
nology as a means of addressing emerging security
challenges without necessarily putting large forces on
the ground. Off-shore peacebuilding and conflict man-
agement will not work in every instance, but can serve
as a starting point when the next challenge arises. At
the end of the day, however, Dunlap concludes, any
off shore strategy must recognize that the central task
of peacebuilding and conflict management must be
developing local capabilities.
International peacebuilding, William Flavin argues
in Chapter 7, is at its heart a host nation challenge and
responsibility, and national factors will shape its pace
and sequencing. As a result, Flavin contends, the U.S.
military will always remain an outsider to the peace-
building process and the country it is trying to assist.
Irrespective of what the military will try to do to shape
the outcome, the host nation has its own objectives and
ideas and, as the influence of the military force wanes,
local imperatives will take over. Flavin cautions that
the military can never have sufficient knowledge
about the host country and the other international
actors because of its own institutional processes and
the temporary nature of its involvement. Neverthe-
less, its unique ability to plan, organize, respond, and
mobilize resources ensures that the U.S. military will
continue to undertake a wide variety of tasks beyond
its basic combat skills, making short-term security the
sine-qua-non and peacebuilding a secondary function
of military operations in the future.
Given the grand strategic imperatives of the 21st
century, Christopher Holshek contends in Chapter 8,
the civil-military nexus of conflict management and
peacebuilding is more relevant to international en-
8
gagements and American grand strategy today than
ever before. However, America’s current civil-mili-
tary approach to foreign policy and national security
remains largely based on an outdated national secu-
rity paradigm, itself predicated on Cold War thinking,
that has been revitalized since 9/11. Instead, Holshek
calls for a more enlightened approach to civil-military
coordination that is not based on a tradeoff between
idealism and realism, but one where those who bring
democracy serve as true ambassadors of the concept
and exemplify its tenets in their daily interactions
with local populations. Such applied civil-military co-
ordination must mirror the civil-military relationship
in democratic societies and the actions of uniformed
personnel must be consonant with the values of the
democratic societies they represent. When Americans
think globally and act locally, make their actions con-
sonant with their core values, and embrace a new ethos
of engagement, they can transform both their environ-
ment and themselves. However, failure to recognize
this, he warns, risks further deterioration of Ameri-
can global leadership and the security and prosperity
resulting from it.
Examining the strategic challenges at the intersec-
tion between peacebuilding, development, and secu-
rity, Melanie Alamir argues in Chapter 9 that strategic
thinking that tends to treat actors and societies in de-
veloping countries as mere objects in pursuing their
own countries’ national interests, contradicts the key
development tenet of local ownership. Strategic think-
ing that is marked by a general confidence in instru-
mental rationality that for the most part disregards
the relevance of perceptions, emotions, identities,
and beliefs, and is characterized by an “engineering”
mindset based on hierarchy, predictability, order, and
9
sequence cannot be applied to planning for peace-
building and development. Instead, it tends to take
political decisions for granted, focusing on how to
implement them rather than to question their wisdom.
Peacebuilding and development, however, require
permanent monitoring, evaluation, and the flexibility
to question not only tactics, but also goals, if needed.
Alamir concludes that strategic thinking needs more
flexibility, making the likelihood of delay, setbacks,
detours, or failure integral elements of any effective
future grand strategy. The main challenge, she conjec-
tures, is to reconcile dominant top-down approaches
along with their “engineering logic” with the ambigu-
ity, unpredictability, and uncontrollability of contem-
porary security threats and challenges.
Heeding Alamir’s call for a more flexible and sen-
sitive strategic approach to peacebuilding, Michael
Ashkenazi argues in Chapter 10 for greater nuancing
in the strategic discourse particularly by recognizing
how interactions between low-level actors—individu-
als and small groups—can have major impacts on
the outcomes of strategies. Ashkenazi examines his
claim by developing a concept of security providers
encompassing different types of more or less struc-
tured formations that engage in security. Using iden-
tifiable rewards—cash, emotional gratification from
association, legal support, and ideology—Ashkenazi
contends that variations in the relative strength of
these rewards over time cause formations to move
in the mapped space toward one or another of the
four ideal types. Ashkenazi concludes that identify-
ing these rewards and manipulating them over time
must be incorporated into strategic thinking. Where
an international actor such as the United States has a
strategic interest in ensuring stability, peace, develop-
10
ment, democracy, and other social goods, it is crucial
to identify and resolve micro-level problems that, in
the aggregate, can cause a strategy to fail.
Examining America’s strategic efforts specifically
in the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide,
Dwight Raymond reviews in Chapter 11 the policy
formulation contained in the government’s recent
Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options
(MAPRO) planning process.12 Raymond criticizes that
competing national interests oftentimes dissuade ac-
tion, that risk-averse bureaucracies tend to support
status quo approaches, and that the complex nature of
security problems may not be conducive to clear-cut
decisions in the interest of stopping perpetrators and
protecting innocent victims. Reviewing the recently
released MAPRO Handbook, Raymond provides an
outline for effective interagency cooperation to help
policymakers wrestle with MAPRO decisions and as-
sociated risks—although much of the Handbook is
also applicable to other complex situations involving
conflict—by providing a rational yet feasible process
for contingency planning as well as crisis response.
The final part of this volume examines how Amer-
ica’s strategic choices are perceived from abroad.
Evaluating Washington’s reorientation away from
the Atlantic to the Pacific, especially with China and
India as rising competitors, Liselotte Odgaard con-
tends in Chapter 12 that any future world order will
be dominated by America’s pursuit of an integration-
ist world order and China’s pursuit of a coexistence
world order. The different U.S. and Chinese versions
of international order give rise to an international
system without clear rules because of the lack of one
coherent set of principles of international conduct.
In this in-between system, she argues, India and Eu-
11
rope will be takers rather than makers of that future
order, facing the challenge of carving out a position
in-between these two competing world orders, and
security threats will be addressed primarily through
ad hoc frameworks of conflict management.
Turning to Africa, Kwesi Aning and Festus Aubyn
examine in Chapter 13 the history of U.S. engagements
in Africa, especially in the peace and security arena
and juxtapose America’s grand strategic calculations
with Africa’s own perceptions of and responses to its
security challenges. In addition, Aning and Aubyn ex-
plore how in the face of common challenges both the
African Union (AU) and the United States can identify
and respond to their security challenges in a manner
that makes this relationship a win-win one instead of
the present one driven by suspicion, competition, and
outright hostility. Unfortunately, Aning and Aubyn
conclude that U.S. policy toward Africa has remained
largely intact under the Obama administration, still
pursuing that same militarized and unilateral secu-
rity approach toward Africa policy employed by the
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. It
is important, Aning and Aubyn conjecture, for the
United States not to see Africa at the periphery of its
foreign policy engagements but rather to devote re-
sources to strengthening the operational and tactical
components of AU peace support operations, focus on
bolstering the civilian capabilities for the AU’s conflict
management activities, increase its economic support
to bridge the AU’s bureaucratic and institutional ca-
pability gaps in conflict management, and reconcile
its interest with African human security needs such
as poverty, unemployment, access to clean water, and
the HIV/AIDs pandemic.
12
Dove-tailing on the geopolitical challenges out-
lined by Odgaard and the African context presented
by Aning and Aubyn, Abel Esterhuyse examines in
Chapter 14 specifically the role of South Africa as a key
partner in the pursuit of U.S. strategic interests in Af-
rica. Reviewing the historically rather limited involve-
ment in African security by either country, Esterhuyse
contends that perceptions in South Africa about the
United States and, specifically how the United States
prefers to conceptualize and respond to perceived
threats, have been shaped predominantly by the ki-
netic-driven U.S. involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan
and, more recently, Libya. The creation of U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM) further reinforces this percep-
tion. South Africans view their own military involve-
ment in Africa as human security-related and that of
the United States as military security-orientated. For
the current Action Council of Nigeria (ANC) govern-
ment, U.S. military involvement in Africa is seen as
a force of destruction shaped largely by conventional
warfighting applications, while South African mili-
tary involvement is driven by the human security and
peacetime applications of military force. As a result,
as long as these perceptions remain, strategic coopera-
tion between both countries will be difficult to achieve.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
13
3. See Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the
Future of US Global Leadership.”
14
CHAPTER 2
Frederick W. Smullen
15
of many threat lists is terrorism, something that shook
our national sense of invulnerability on September
11, 2001 (9/11) and captured our call to action so as
to protect the homeland from the likes of al-Qaeda,
which is evolving. Our thinking needs to evolve too.
Even before the killing of Osama Bin Laden, al-Qa-
eda had changed. Their operational planning capabili-
ties, including the attack on the USS Cole, the World
Trade Center bombing, and the subsequent 9/11 at-
tacks, bruised and rallied a nation. Once a formidable
terrorist organization with a media wing, it is now
more of a media organization with a terrorist wing.
Yet grave threats remain: lone wolf attacks, such as
the so called “underwear bomber” on Christmas Day
2009, the attempted Times Square bombing in 2010, an
attempted bombing in 2011, and an attempted bomb-
ing of the U.S. capital in 2012 by a Moroccan citizen
who had been living in the United States illegally for
the past 12 years. These threats loom and will stay
with us. There has been a rise in prominence of al-Qa-
eda inspired and affiliated groups, such as al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). We cannot be lulled
into thinking that these groups are only concerned
with local and regional grievances. The package bomb
plot emanating from Yemen in 2010 is proof that this
force can be projected. We must strive to understand
these groups better, and work toward the eradica-
tion of the root causes of extremism that give rise to
these groups. Ironically, before his death last year, the
spiritual leader of AQAP was Answar Al-Awlaqi, an
American of Yemen descent, who inspired Islamic ter-
rorists to take action against the West. Make no mis-
take about it, Osama Bin Laden may be dead, but his
legacy lives on.
16
Global piracy is a swiftly moving threat. Piracy
threatens and slows down commercial shipping, has
a chilling effect on world trade, increases commodity
prices, and contributes to regional insecurity. Pirates
have thrived in recent years, maintaining a high level
of attacks for the fifth straight year. In 2011, pirates
attacked 439 ships and took 802 people hostage. The
threat continues in 2012, as 37 attacks took place in
January alone. Pirates currently hold hostage 10 ships
and 159 crew members of various nationalities. So-
mali pirates remain the biggest threat accounting for
54 percent of all global attacks. But the dangers of
piracy were brought closer to home in January 2012
when an American citizen was rescued in Somalia by
U.S. Navy Seals after being held captive by pirates
for 3 months. The ransoms are also growing bigger.
In mid-November 2010, a South Korean supertanker
anchored for months off the city of Hobyo in central
Somalia fetched a $10 million ransom. Raids by South
Korean and Malaysian commands in January 2012
have taught us that we need to deal differently with
these pirates, and what do I mean by that? We need to
take, in my view, the fight to them before they reach
the high seas. We need to get them where they live,
where they grow, each and every day. It is a growing
problem, and one that we need to be concerned about.
Hunger and humanitarian issues do not seem as
threatening but do pose problems. The humanitar-
ian concerns of the so-called “bottom billion,” those
people living on less than $1 a day, and the plight of
internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as
those suffering from hunger, lack of clean water, and
basic medical care are concerns. The nearly two billion
undernourished people in the world call for urgent
government action to ensure the future sustainability
17
of the world’s food supply. If you think about it, the
Middle East is a classic case. A related concern is the
rising price of food, which is increasingly in shorter
supply. It is a historical truth that when food prices
rise, conflict increases. Many of these issues create the
conditions that are fertile breeding ground for danger-
ous ideologies.
Pandemics pose an entirely new set of challenges,
and ones that evolve constantly. The threat posed
by pandemics, be they naturally occurring or hu-
man caused through the use of a weaponized bio-
logical agent, is astronomical. The speed with which
naturally occurring crises may be evolving may be
directly related to the speed of travel and mobility
of people in today’s world. The severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in China in 2003
illustrated that.
In this increasingly interdependent world, the ef-
fects of climate change and the persistently slow re-
sponses to it are a concern. Even if the current pace
of emissions reductions continues, the earth will be at
least 3 degrees Celsius (5.4 degrees Fahrenheit) warmer
at the end of this century than at the start of the in-
dustrial revolution. The devastating effects of climate
change do not just bring humanitarian crises to the de-
veloping world, they affect how humans live and will
live in the future. Natural disasters around the world,
like the powerful tsunami in Japan, the earthquakes
in New Zealand, the floods in Thailand, and the hur-
ricanes and tornadoes in America were very visible
reminders, yet again, that the concerns of the world’s
people are often interconnected. Those global calami-
ties in 2011 alone caused an estimated $350 billion
in damage.
18
There will be other threats, less bellicose but
threats nevertheless. Demands for highly strategic
resources including energy, food, and water outstrip
available supplies. Our quest to develop new sources
of energy, even as we continue to exploit existing
ones, is certainly not without challenges. There will be
a predictable transition away from oil toward natural
gas, coal, and other alternatives. Demand for food will
increase as populations rise. Stable supplies of water,
especially for agricultural purposes, will reach criti-
cal proportions. Will we mobilize a global economy
to ensure energy sustainability through renewable re-
sources and transition away from oil toward natural
gas, coal, and other alternatives?
A crippling cyber attack on our nation’s electronic
infrastructure could have devastating consequences;
cyber warfare and cyber espionage threaten privacy
and personal security, economics, governments, and
businesses. Our reliance upon these systems has
grown exponentially over the years, and security must
keep up with the new challenges presented every day
as, increasingly, government and corporate internet
sites are being hacked.
The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), such as nuclear, chemical, and biological, is
unthinkable. Nation states must work diligently and
work together to decrease proliferation of these arms.
The imperative is to prevent these materials from fall-
ing into the hands of nonstate actors whose irrational
actions could truly jeopardize our way of life and
place other international actors, ally, and adversary
alike, in catastrophic situations.
19
PRESERVATION OF THE FORCE
20
generator of wealth, but it becomes threatening when
systems become unhealthy. The economic downturn
has strained relations with some close allies, and care
must be taken to work cooperatively to meet global
economic challenges.
DISAFFECTED YOUTH
21
dan? Should others like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates be concerned about the unrest
spilling across their borders? The U.S. Government
needs to invest now in rigorous strategic thinking to
determine how our vital national interests will be af-
fected and how we can protect them. Whether these
countries lean toward or bend away from democra-
cies and favorable relations with America and the
West can have an enormous influence on our strategic
ties to nations of the region.
China, a country that currently has 115 billionaires
and can erect a 15-story building in 6 days, has expe-
rienced meteoric economic growth in recent years and
has seen its ability to affect and influence, both region-
ally and globally, increase. Some economists suggest
China could become the world’s largest economy by
2027, if not before. Our economies persist in requiring
each other to cooperate. Meanwhile, China’s military
is growing stronger with time. It has constructed the
world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, has developed
a stealth fighter plane, and has launched its first air-
craft carrier; impressive toys to accompany a new
assertiveness. As China builds up its military, other
nations in the region—India, Japan, South Korea,
Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia—are amassing
weapons of their own at a frenzied pace, causing a
shift in the world’s military balance and altering secu-
rity concerns in the Asia Pacific region.
Russia, too, has attempted re-emergence on the
world stage as evidenced by some of its actions, ac-
companied by the return of fierce nationalist senti-
ments expressed by Russia’s government. As Russia
enters an uncertain period of new leadership, head-
lined by the return of Vladimir Putin to the presi-
dency this year, we can expect Russia to take a more
22
hard-line position toward the United States. Problems
continue in its restive border regions and could place
the country on a collision course. We share with both
China and Russia a mutual need for the world’s re-
sources, so we must cooperate, or compete. Can we do
so responsibly?
Israel and Palestine are nagging problems. When
Secretary of State Colin Powell and the author went to
the State Department in 2001, the Israel-Palestine situ-
ation was at the very top of our list. We knew it had to
be resolved, and we worked very hard to contribute
to that resolution. Our very first trip overseas was to
both Israel and the Palestinian territories to see if we
could broker a dialogue and a relationship between
those two forces. We failed, and we have been failing
dramatically ever since. Peace in the Middle East re-
mains an elusive dream. Ensuring security for all peo-
ples living in this region, while preventing extremism,
must continue to be a focus moving into the future.
The threat of failure is simply too great.
Far to the east, North Korea just experienced a
rapid change in its leadership, with Kim Jong-il unex-
pectedly dying of a heart attack and the reins handed
to his youngest son, Kim Jong-un. New leadership can
often be a time of muscle flexing and that has already
begun with not totally unexpected hostile rhetoric
spewing from Pyongyang. Missile tests and border al-
tercations such as those in 2010 must not be repeated
and allowed to drag this region back into conflict, nor
decrease the security of our allies. Interestingly, when
we sat down in Beijing with our representative to
North Korea and the North Korean representatives to
talk about common concerns, one of which was their
need for food, we expressed our desire to have non-
proliferation be a prominent way of life. This desire
was not considered at that time.
23
The world stage has also welcomed new powers:
nations such as Turkey, and Brazil, who both project
influence. The privileges of this newfound power must
always be balanced with responsibilities. New pow-
ers must act as agents of cooperation and prosperity,
rather than increasing polarity and tension. Pakistan,
at the heart of a region that has experienced so much
conflict, remains a key player. Tactics used against
extremist ideologies can work against our tenuous re-
lationship. The aftermath of a recent NATO airstrike
that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and increasing efforts
by Congress to decrease aid to Pakistan continue to
threaten an already precarious situation. Neighboring
India has grown into an economic powerhouse, yet
tensions remain on the border with Pakistan. This re-
lationship grew more tense after 2008 when Pakistani
extremists attacked Mumbai with devastating results.
The world remains watchful of Iran as it contin-
ues to develop its technologies and flexes its muscles
toward the West. We must keep a careful watch with
respect to its nuclear agenda, its provocative actions
in the straits of Hormuz, and its apparent willing-
ness to conduct an attack against the United States. A
recent assessment by James Clapper, the Director
of National Intelligence, suggests the Iranians have
“changed their calculus and are more willing to con-
duct an attack in the United States as a response to
real or perceived actions that threaten the regime.”1 It
further shows Iran’s hostility toward the United States
and its interests in this hemisphere. Questions remain
about Iranian ambitions. Can international coopera-
tion in the form of sanctions keep this situation from
jeopardizing international security?
Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have contin-
ued to weigh us down. For all intents and purposes,
24
a complete redeployment of troops from Iraq took
place at the end of 2011. Yet Iraq is a nation struggling
to find its identity, and the 1,000-person embassy in
Baghdad will be challenged. Meanwhile, our strategic
attention has turned now to the situation in Afghani-
stan where there were 90,000 troops, although a draw-
down to 68,000 by the fall of 2012 began in July 2012.
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has declared that
by mid- to late-2013, our combat mission will decline.
Nation-building continues in these two laboratories.
We remain committed to the mission required of the
United States and the international community. The
consequences of failure are too great.
Closer to home on our own border with Mexico,
drug-related violence and crime continues to escalate
significantly. Confronting this spillover of violence
only treats the symptom. The root causes remain and
must be addressed. In September 2010, when asked
“What is the greatest threat or concern that keeps
you up at night?” Admiral James A. Winnefed, Jr.,
Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, replied
“Drugs.” We have not done a very good job with the
Mexican military and the Mexican government. They
blame us for demand, and we blame them for sup-
ply. Unfortunately, we have not been talking to one
another. We have not been creating an atmosphere
where we can solve this problem.That is a growing
concern, and one that we must attack.
I have created a picture of gloom here; however,
I would say there is cause for hope. Interesting times
have always inspired new thinking, and we must re-
main dedicated to constantly challenging our assump-
tions to ensure that the uncertainties of the future can
be met. America can and should take a lead role in
projecting the kind of global thinking and leadership
25
that garners respect. That means being ready and will-
ing to make decisions that are courageous. America
needs to stand out as a beacon of what is right in and
for the world. Call it a grand plan or a grand strategy,
but Obama must be always looking at the world as it
exists yet have a vision of what it is likely to look like
in the following years.
That starts with a coherent strategic planning pro-
cess and the will to devise and follow through on a
strategic plan that prioritizes challenges and responds
over time to meet them successfully. Rigorous stra-
tegic planning can help avoid preventable crises. As
he does the people’s business, the President needs to
define our vital national interests and resources avail-
able, establish our objectives, and develop a set of for-
eign and domestic policies that will advance Ameri-
ca’s interests and ideals.
The broadest objective of any such strategy should
be to make an honest appraisal of where the world is
today, and what it is likely to look like tomorrow. I call
it looking beyond the horizon for potential destina-
tions. Incumbent in this appraisal process, there needs
to be a serious and vigorous national debate about the
ends or the means or the exits in places of commit-
ment like Pakistan and Afghanistan. I have been very
critical of our government. Did we have this debate
before we went to Afghanistan? No. Did we have this
debate before we went to Iraq? No. We did not have
this in Congress. We did not have it in the media. We
did not have it among the American people who have,
and should have, a voice.
The goal of any grand strategy should be to stabi-
lize the current world order and create mechanisms
through which change can occur. Ideally, this grand
strategy would be for the greater good of America
26
and the like-minded nations of the world by having
a framework that promotes the global system and
betters the prospects for trade, commerce, diplomatic
contact, pluralism, and liberty. To succeed, it will
need the active support and participation of many of
the other 195 countries of the world and would seek
involvement of others in a collaborative effort to deal
effectively with a whole host of problems. One of the
fundamental tenets of this grand strategy must be that
the United States cannot protect every sea lane, broker
every deal, or fight every terrorist group alone. The
age of unilateralism is past.
The United States can do a lot but can do even more
with willing partners. Speaking at the West Point grad-
uation in May 2010, President Obama said, “America
has not succeeded by stepping outside the current
of international cooperation. We have succeeded by
steering those currents in the direction of liberty and
justice.” But the United States can and should lead by
example. It remains the single global super power, one
that can have a unique role in this emerging world or-
der, one that has enormous convening, agenda-setting
and leadership powers. For the world, the challenges
and consequences of the moment are enormous. For
the United States, this moment offers the opportunity
to bind the wounds to our reputation with decisions
that can heal our image and strengthen our influence
with like-minded nations. Doing so can responsibly
contribute to making the world a better place and at
the same time earn respect as a solid citizen nation
of the world. It is a watershed moment that cannot
be squandered.
This is a rare and unprecedented time in history.
It holds unparalleled importance with respect to the
opportunity to help stability, prosperity, and dignity
27
to billions around the world by making good leader-
ship and management decisions. The same is true for
companies with respect to their research, their devel-
opment, and the technologies they advance for the
good of their clients and customers. They need to be
willing to explore new partners and adjust to the ever
changing economic climate and dynamic national se-
curity environment. If history is any indicator, which
I believe it is, then perhaps the most important peo-
ple, places, and events that will shape our future are
things we cannot know in advance; only prepare for.
In the age of exploration, a saying that described these
unknown factors was inscribed at the edges of their
maps: here there be monsters.
ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 2
28
CHAPTER 3
Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg
29
Some refer to these developments as moving from
a symmetric world order to a new age of asymmetry
and to the consequence of seeking ad hoc solutions.
Others refuse to bear the burden of a comprehensive
and methodical stocktaking (or evaluation)—not only
of current and forthcoming global challenges, but
also of their interdependencies. Therefore, the funda-
ment for any long-term assessments or solutions is al-
ready porous, and the basis of any pillars of so-called
“Grand Strategies” that we are discussing is of limited
firmness. One slogan could be: Disconnection through
Connection—new, intertwined global challenges and
global shifts of power imply the risk of a marginal-
ization of traditional partnerships and multinational
institutions. Or: As the world grows together, it is also
growing apart.
Four major developments—global governance
failures, the global shift of powers, global political
awakening, and economic disparity (within and be-
tween countries)—influence the evolution of a variety
of other global risks, and, ironically, a considerable
number of those risks can further magnify the four
overarching developments.1
What are the risk scenarios that have emerged or
will evolve beyond the four cross-cutting global de-
velopments? We face at least five major risk clusters
that are tightly connected to each other, intertwined,
and often overlap into other clusters.
1. Geopolitical risks: We have been talking for
years about fragile, failing, and failed states and the
consequences, ranging from terrorism, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illicit trade,
and organized crime, to piracy or corruption. Fur-
thermore, this cluster includes all sorts of geopolitical
conflicts besides classic scenarios to even such areas as
space security.
30
2. Economic risks: As the results of fiscal crises (we
have not seen the last one) or as to their reasons, one
could name asset price collapses, extreme currency,
and price volatilities (on energy, commodities, or
consumer prices), liquidity and credit crunches, infra-
structure fragility, regulatory failures, etc. Let us also
not underestimate a certain retrenchment from global-
ization going along with these phenomena—and a re-
surgence of nationalism and populism. In this regard,
Europe is not the only union of countries that serves as a
shining example.
3. Societal risks: here we have to take into account
all challenges that are linked to demographic devel-
opments and their effects like energy, food, and wa-
ter security as well as chronic, infectious, and—in
our hemisphere—so-called lifestyle diseases (public
health expenditure in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development [OECD] countries has
risen at twice the rate of economic growth). Western
society has already undergone a dramatic change in
its age structure. Some call it the “age-quake.” The
World Health Organization (WHO) uses the phrase “a
silent social revolution.” This silence echoes (yes, even
silence has an echo!) political shyness and inabilities.
We must not forget migration and the subsequent ur-
ban development (in the future, intercontinental mi-
gration will become increasingly important).
4. Societal risks lead us to environmental risks. I
am still surprised about the degree of ignorance—or
let’s put it more mildly: unawareness—in high level
political circles in this country when it comes to the
question and aftereffects of climate change. Topics like
biodiversity loss, melting of the polar ice-caps, flood-
ing, air pollution, waste management, and a growing
number of storms and cyclones also merit mention.
31
5. Technological risks: cyber war is as much a real-
ity as threats from new technologies (including the in-
visible threat of immaterial environmental pollution,
e.g., by electromagnetic radiation). All of this is no lon-
ger a “Buck Rogers” fantasy. The chances of a critical
information infrastructure breakdown have not been
reduced during the last couple of years (the success-
ful cyber attack on Estonia in 2007 should have been
a wakeup call). Online data and information security
is a mega-topic nowadays, and so are the paradoxa
that go along with the call for freedom of the Internet
on one hand and the criminal misuse of the net on the
other. We see the triumph of open networks—with
major complexities that are almost impossible to con-
trol responsibly, for those who want to.
32
of many has changed or is at least in an evolutionary
phase. In contrast to the second half of the 20th cen-
tury, many young, even influential Americans have
never been based or stationed in Europe. A growing
number has an Asian or Latin American heritage.
Think about the students of today in Europe.
Many of them were born after 1989. They have never
had the existential experience of what it meant to live
in a surrounding that urgently needed a functioning
transatlantic partnership—imagine their upbring-
ing and environment. A good number come from the
former Eastern Europe, others are second or first gen-
eration Europeans originating from Turkey or North
Africa, with different cultural roots. All this is not
problematic at all—on the contrary, it is enriching and
a source of inspiration—but it has to be understood
and accepted when it comes to a new definition of
transatlantic ties.
Second, among the younger generation, pragma-
tism seems to replace emotions—superficially, this
finding is not a political disaster, but rather influ-
ences the value-driven approach to the relationship.
Ask someone younger about these values, and you
will still get the answer: democracy, human rights,
rule of law, etc.—but ask the same person how these
principles correspond across the Atlantic or to what
extent they are implemented at home, and you may
get a fascinating, wild mixture of imprecise semi-in-
tellectual sound bites. A clear response would have
to imply uncomfortable considerations like aspects of
a democracy crisis now faced in certain parts of the
Western world. Additionally, negative emotions seem
to function quite properly across the ocean; positive
sentiments are rarely expressed routinely, if at all.
33
The last outstanding transatlantic hope and ex-
pectation from the European side was connected to
Barack Obama (but it was tied to a character and not
to a traditional political and cultural construct). Today
it seems that many Europeans turned their hope into
disillusion. When it comes to the current President,
some parts of the European foreign policy community
draw the conclusion that an internationally celebrated
political rockstar turned out to be a one-time Grammy,
respectively Nobel prize winner, at least on the
diplomatic platform.
Nevertheless, with respect to foreign affairs ca-
pacities, I do not see many auspicious alternatives
right now. The range of knowledge in international
matters among the remaining Republican presiden-
tial candidates is currently only beaten by the overall
quality of the TV debates. It is, by the way, an excep-
tional experience for a European to be bashed again
and again by such a spectrum of arguments. All in
all, this is a very promising outlook for a flourishing
transatlantic perspective.
What is left of the myth of existing transnational
institutions? What is left of a creative transatlantic in-
fluence on the substance and structure of other inter-
national organizations?
First, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has been struggling to adapt to the new se-
curity challenges for years and has only selectively
widened its scope. Cyber war or energy scarcity may
serve as examples, though they have not efficiently
been implemented yet. National interests perform as
impressive road blocks. The Libya Operation, by the
way and despite all songs of praise, is not a NATO
success, if you take the decisionmaking behavior of
important member states into account. NATO can
34
never win in Afghanistan, and the remaining chance
of not losing will probably be sacrificed to accommo-
date the mood of the voters at home. If I had to define
cynicism to my children, I would start with our cur-
rent Afghanistan policy.
Second, certain structures of the United Nations
(UN) remind me of an iceberg drifting into waters with
unpredictable warm currents, while the journey of the
iceberg started in 1949. However, beneath the iceberg,
a rather stable raft appears, unfortunately with only
five admittedly quite comfortable seats. The only rec-
ognizable transatlantic structural attempts to expand
the raft are monuments of standstill and stagnation,
artistically inspired by France, the United Kingdom
(UK), and the United States and knowingly attracting
China and Russia as well. It is not only desperate Syr-
ian hands that slide off the slick side planks of the raft.
Third, I do not want to elaborate in detail on the
European crisis, which is worth its own conference.
But the current crisis—which is not only a debt cri-
sis or fiscal crisis, but also a crisis of understanding
and therefore still a crisis of political leadership—is
destabilizing the core concept of the EU as well. I am
deeply concerned about the future of the achieve-
ments of the EU—achievements that too many people
in Europe take for granted. Needless to say, such a
crisis has spillover effects for the transatlantic part-
nership. It strengthens our ominous culture of mutual
finger-pointing.
Finally, even organizations of more limited, though
significant, scope are struggling, just to name the Or-
ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and the World Trade Organization (WTO),
not to mention the Doha development round. Some-
how logical, looser concepts like the G20 are gain-
35
ing ground, even though the last meeting in Cannes,
France, reminded me more of the Film Festivals that
usually take place there. So some traditional multi-
or transnational frameworks and concepts are on the
verge of decay. Does the transatlantic community of-
fer any viable answers? I doubt it. Do we understand
the paradox that the circumstances that make better
global governance imperative—be they conflicting in-
terests and incentives, divergent values, or differing
norms—are also the ones that make its realization so
incredibly complex and often unpleasant? I doubt it
as well.
Eventually, what are the consequences for Europe
and the United States? Will the transatlantic relation-
ship remain a core element of Western political influ-
ence or is it in agony because of a “Pacific and Asian
21st Century”? Can the undoubtedly growing trans-
Pacific importance be an excuse at all? By no means.
It may be one out of many more or less good reasons,
but it is also a cheap plea.
So what to do? What are possible steps to avoid a
sidelining of the Atlantic perspectives?
• Accepting a new dynamic of multipolarity may
sound difficult, but is essential.
• The same is true for the understanding that
global stability can be promoted and pro-
gressed only through larger scale cooperation
and not through imperial behavior or domina-
tion (Zbigniew Brzezinski).2
• In any case, Europe has to accept trans-Pacific
ambitions and should enlarge its own strategic
scope. On the other hand, the United States
could acknowledge the possibilities of closer re-
sponsible European-Russian relations. Both do
not necessarily weaken transatlantic relations.
On the contrary, they could offer opportunities
36
for stronger common strategic approaches and
for revisions of certain, sometimes archaic, in-
struments or strategies (EUSS [Eastern Europe
Security System]).
• In a mid- to long-term perspective, a broader
cooperation between the so-called “old west”
and the “new east” does not have to be a day-
dream any longer. We could mutually benefit
from respective impulses and experiences by
fostering a regional cooperative model in a
multi-polar and increasingly complex geopo-
litical setting.
• In addition, a bold and long-term strategic vi-
sion for the transatlantic community needs to
reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship by
promoting a global democratic political culture
(that respects specific cultural aspects). But
we also have to engage in a self critical debate
about the state of democracy—led by demo-
cratic countries! Existing rifts in this context are
not insurmountable.
• Regarding the risk clusters described, we
must confront the respective publics with the
truth, and not with shimmering party and
election programs.
37
To be fair, governments will probably never re-
solve the dilemma between short-term thinking and
the obligation to think in longer strategic terms and to
firmly undergo explanatory work. They usually have
to concentrate on the more immediate conflicts and
disagreements. But this doesn’t exclude the willingness
to form groups and initiatives that include knowledge
and experience, but also young ideas that range from
academia to culture, and to those people who tend to
see themselves in a complementary role. All this can
only happen if traditions continue to develop and con-
tribute to diversity instead of seeking a uniform global
culture. I call it “the expansion of tradition.”
Some thoughts that such groups or initiatives
would have to cover are more than obvious for me:
• Regarding the span of the global risks and
challenges, a well-informed and well-mobi-
lized global public opinion, sharing values
and norms of a “global citizenship” (but not a
“uniform global culture”), would be certainly
desirable, but is still closer to Utopia than to re-
alization. Notwithstanding, in this context the
modern means of digital communication could
be used much more creatively.
• By accepting the differences, we need to work
on our cultural ties. We tend to underestimate
them, and they have significantly changed.
• Two rather banal aspects are essential. First, we
need to bridge the existing uncertainty among
rising powers to shoulder a greater share of
global responsibilities. Second, the established
powers have to surmount their reluctance to
recognize the limits of their own power.
• We have to reach out way past the “old west.”
Engaging China, Russia, as well as Brazil, In-
38
dia, or South Africa and Indonesia and others
is key. Some European governments still have
credibility in areas where the U.S. reputation
is—let’s say it diplomatically—at least strained.
•
Not only does the transatlantic relationship
need a new narrative (as a first step toward re-
vised concepts), but so do institutions such as
the EU, NATO, UN, etc., because we will not
achieve any long-lasting changes without giv-
ing our population the opportunity to under-
stand and accept certain obvious complexities
and dilemmas.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3
39
CHAPTER 4
Robert Kennedy
41
Today the United States produces about 20 per-
cent of the global economic output, with predic-
tions that soon its economy will fall second to that of
China. While the United States and Russia remain the
predominant nuclear powers, there are three other
so-called “declared” nuclear weapons states under
the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT)—China, France, and the United Kingdom
(UK); three additional states that have tested nuclear
weapons—India, Pakistan, and North Korea; Israel
(believed to have nuclear weapons); and Iran (an NPT
state) that is believed to be seeking to develop nuclear
weapons.4 Though U.S. military forces measured in
total manpower remain second only to those of China,
with India in a close third, economic pressures are
likely to force a reduction in the overall size of U.S.
Armed Forces in the years ahead. U.S. military forces
can neither be everywhere all of the time nor resolve
all conflicts without the assistance of others. Thus, to
meet the challenges ahead, including its relative read-
justment in status among nations, the United States
must wisely apply the instruments of national power
(political, economic, psychological, and military). This
chapter addresses the nature of national power: its
sources, the means by which the sources of a nation’s
power are transformed into preferred outcomes in
the international arena, the instruments states use to
do so, and what is demanded if soft and hard power
are to be molded into what is now fashionably called
“Smart Power.”
ON POWER
42
generally considered to be the ability of a nation-state,
group of states, or nonstate entities to impose its/
their favored outcome on a given situation or prevent
another state, group of states, or nonstate entity from
doing so. It has a deliberate, active connotation. For
example, French philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel,
writing over a half century ago, noted: “When Power
addresses itself to a foreign state, the weight behind
the words is proportional to its ability to make itself
obeyed and win from that obedience the means of ac-
tion.”6 It is in getting one’s way, in “making” others
conform to one’s will, in its active, deliberate sense
that power is most often understood.
Yet power has always had a much broader conno-
tation. It is true in one sense, as de Jouvenel argued,
that power “turns on obedience,” and he “Who knows
the reasons for that obedience knows the inner nature
of power.”7 Indeed, history is marked by states em-
ploying their power to force other states to their will.
However, there is more to the essence of power than
can be gathered under the umbrella of obedience. Obe-
dience, or to put it more directly, an action undertaken
by Party B that is favorable to Party A is not always
the result of active efforts on the part of Party A to
seek obedience from Party B. A painting can have the
power to produce a series of thought patterns or emo-
tions or move the viewer to action. The picture is pow-
erful. It has power so-to-speak. But it has not made or
commanded the viewer to obey. The power it has on
the viewer is often noncognitive, frequently related to
the emotive aspect of a viewer’s personality, though
there can be cognitive, rational components based
on the attitudes and/or beliefs or on the physical or
psychogenic needs of the viewer. Similarly, in inter-
national affairs, for example, though an individual,
43
say from Nation B, may risk his life providing intelli-
gence to Nation A because of bribe or threat, that indi-
vidual may well do so for quite different reasons such
as respect for Nation A’s objectives or perceptions of
shared values, a commonality of ideals, beliefs, and/
or interests. He does not obey or comply, rather he
volunteers. Of course de Jouvenel recognized this as-
pect of power in his exploration of the nature of obedi-
ence.8 Moreover, it is this aspect of power, the power
of attraction or seduction (particularly in its passive
sense), that Joseph Nye, Jr., first introduced in 19909
as “soft power” and further developed in 200410 and
2011.11 As Nye put it in 2004 in answering the ques-
tion, “What is soft power?”
44
Sources and Means of Power.
45
tion may inhibit or sap the ability of a nation to trans-
late its natural resources into power. A nation with a
strong economy may not be able to translate its eco-
nomic strength into a tool for pressuring another state
to action or inaction through the use of economic sanc-
tions without effective diplomatic efforts to garner the
support of other nations to join in sanctions. The most
technologically advanced army with poor leadership
or faulty strategy may fall to a less advanced army
with good leadership and a sound strategy.
Success in translating the sources of power into
preferred outcomes in the international arena de-
pends in large measure on a nation’s ability to influ-
ence, persuade, coerce, deter, and/or compel the ac-
tions/behavior of other international actors. Power
measured in resources does not necessarily equate
to power measured in preferred outcomes.16 An un-
derstanding of these means or methods reveals es-
sential differences between what is meant by soft and
hard power.
Influence.
46
UK, with a culture, language, traditions, values, and
institutions similar to those of the United States, has
an influence on U.S. behavior beyond that of the UK’s
military or economic power. Had the UK not sided
with the United States in going to war against Iraq, it
is questionable whether the administration could have
gained the support of Congress for that effort. Simi-
larly, a sense of shared values and similar, if not iden-
tical, democratic institutions between most European
nations and the United States affords the United States
an influence in Europe beyond its military might. Of
course, America’s economic strength and military
capabilities played a major role during the Cold War
confrontation with the Soviet Union and continue to
do so today. This fact, however, in no way detracts
from the general affinity that affords the United States
and the democratic nations of Europe influence over
each other’s actions.
Indirect or passive influence can also have nega-
tive effects. Where values, institutions, cultures, etc.,
diverge, a nation’s influence in a given situation may
be negative. The late Samuel P. Huntington postu-
lated a “Clash of Civilizations: The great divisions
among humankind and the dominating source of con-
flict will be cultural,”17 thus signaling that differences
of culture can trigger not affinity but dislike, rejection,
even hatred.
Influence can also be direct or active. For example,
a nation can use public diplomacy in order to promote
its image. Treaties, alliances, and executive agree-
ments also can provide a nation with direct influence
on the behavior of others.
47
Persuasion.
48
Coercion.
Deterrence.
49
circumstances. For example, a state might be deterred
from acting because of the existence of countervailing
nuclear or conventional forces, as a result of potential
economic or other sanctions, or because it perceives
the potential loss of some promised or extant benefit,
any and all of which might suggest costs in excess
of benefits. Of course, the classic case of deterrence
took place during the Cold War when presumably
the Soviet Union was deterred from using its nuclear
weapons against the United States because the United
States possessed countervailing nuclear capabilities.
Deterrence also can be active, for example, by
promising a desired good to another state for its inac-
tivity. Here the line between deterrence, coercion, and
persuasion becomes somewhat blurred. In one sense,
it could be argued that in offering a desired good for
inactivity, one is attempting to use the soft power of
persuasion to convince the other party that it is in its
interest to act accordingly by altering perceptions of
interest. It also could be argued that one is using the
promise of a benefit as a hard power bribe in order to
place pressure on political decisionmakers in the tar-
get country in order to coerce them into not taking ac-
tion. It perhaps could be equally argued that one state
is deterring another from an action that it might oth-
erwise take by altering their cost benefit calculations.
Like coercion, deterrence usually requires actual
power, or the perception on the part of an opponent,
that one has the power—political, economic, and/
or military—and the will and determination to bring
about the undesired consequences or to provide a de-
sired good. Generally speaking, deterrence relies on
hard power. This is not to say that deterrence per
se is an exercise in hard power. Extant political, eco-
nomic, or military power affects perceptions. As such,
50
others may be deterred from acting, for example, not
because Country A deployed a naval force to a region
to discourage some particular activity, but because the
very existence of that force in that region has struc-
tured perceptions that serve to discourage actions by
others. In such a case, there is no hard power threat.
The threat, if any, exists in the perceptions of others.
They may perceive the existence of the deployed force
as a threat, as an exercise in hard power. But the ex-
istence of military forces, per se, does not constitute
an exercise in hard power. Indeed, deploying military
forces for humanitarian purposes is an exercise in
soft power.
Compellence.
51
army to halt. If Country A threatens to destroy Coun-
try B’s army if it fails to stop, it is attempting to coerce
it to stop its advance. Both examples, of course, are
examples of uses of hard power.
Instruments of Power.
Political-Diplomatic.
52
elements in the various agencies of government help
set the tone and tenor of relations between states and
other international actors. They wallow in soft power.
Their success and the success of their mission often
rely on knowledge and understanding of the culture,
history, traditions, norms, values, and language of
their assigned country, as well as that country’s po-
litical processes, players and their personalities, and
the issues they are confronting. Political-diplomatic
power need not be exercised directly with those who
make decisions. It often functions effectively through
an understanding of the milieu surrounding those
making decisions and by focusing on those who exer-
cise influence over decisionmakers in a given polity.
Success in employing the political diplomatic in-
strument of power also relies on a thorough under-
standing of the objectives and concerns of the country,
countries, or other entities involved, and the capabili-
ties those entities have to meet their objectives and al-
leviate or mitigate their concerns. For example, prior to
Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the George H. W. Bush
administration misread, with the help of some Arab
allies, Saddam Hussein’s intentions and sent mixed
signals to him that may have helped pave the way for
Hussein’s final decision to invade—an evident diplo-
matic failure on the part of the Bush administration.
Following the invasion, the Bush administration suc-
cessfully used the political-diplomatic instrument of
power to build not only a supportive domestic coali-
tion, but also an international coalition supportive and
contributing to the ultimate use of hard military power
to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Knowledge of the
predispositions of the audiences involved played an
essential role. In that immediate post-Cold War envi-
ronment, the Bush administration built a domestic as
53
well as European coalition for action by equating Sad-
dam Hussein to Hitler and evoking concerns over ap-
peasement and further conquest. Appealing to those
same audiences, as the price of a barrel of crude oil
jumped nearly 50 percent during the month following
the invasion, members of the administration also were
quick to point out the potential economic implications
should a significant amount of Middle East oil fall un-
der the control of one man.
On the other hand, to Arabs, unlikely to be moved
by the Hitler analogy, and with some perhaps happy
to see higher prices for their crude oil and with many
not greatly enamored by what they perceived as a
generally haughty attitude on the part of Kuwaitis,
the naked aggression of one Arab state against
another played well.
The political-diplomatic instrument of power can
also have a hard power coercive face. The withdrawal
of the American diplomatic mission to Syria in Feb-
ruary 2012, for example, was an effort to coerce the
Syrian government to step down or alter its policy of
killing those who oppose the rule of Bashar al-Assad.
Leaks to the press, statements by policymakers, com-
ments by diplomats, official demarches, and such
that suggest the possibility of economic sanctions or
military action fall under the hard power rubric of
political coercion.
Political-diplomatic power originates at the high-
est offices of government, flowing through a variety of
agencies and their representatives that deal with other
nations, international organizations, and nonstate ac-
tors. As noted above, the political-diplomatic instru-
ment is often significantly augmented by affinities
that exist between the peoples and governments of
the entities involved. In that sense political-diplomat
power begins at home.
54
Economic.
55
for example, is the case in U.S. efforts to get Iran to
cease activities the United States and others consider
are aimed at producing nuclear weapons.
Of the instruments of power, the successful use of
the economic instrument has a checkered past. First,
because it can have a damaging effect on a target na-
tion’s economy and thus result in the suffering of
innocents, the economic instrument applied by one
state can be used by the target state to unite its citi-
zenry against those who reduce economic assistance
or impose sanctions or embargoes. Another impedi-
ment to the successful employment of the economic
instrument is the negative consequences it can have
on the initiating country or countries and their allies.
Employing the economic instrument seldom comes
without pain. For example, attempting to coerce Iran
into meeting its obligations under the NPT by plac-
ing an embargo on Iranian oil, if effective, is likely
to result in a painful increase in the price of crude
oil with potentially serious negative implications for
the world economy. Despite such potential undesired
consequences, the economic instrument has become
an aspect of hard power that often for political and
psychological effects must be employed. States need
to believe that everything that could be done has been
done before agreeing to the use of military force.
Psychological.
56
factors and activities.20 For example, in the aftermath
of the industrial revolution, the theories of Karl Marx,
two world wars, strong economic growth at home,
and Soviet support internationally for those seek-
ing to break the bonds of colonialisms, among other
things, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
and its communist model enjoyed wide psychological
appeal. The psychological impact of Soviet successes,
by military or other means, certainly played a role in
President Dwight Eisenhower’s espousal of the “fall-
ing domino” principle.21 Similarly, the psychology of
people was on his mind in a 1955 letter to Sir Winston
Churchill in which he noted that any further victories
for communism would have an adverse impact on the
minds of neutrals.22
In the post-Cold War era, the glaring success of the
U.S. military in defeating in 100 hours what was then
the world’s fourth largest army had an enormous im-
pact on the perceptions of America’s military might.
Though affecting the perceptions of others may not
have been the driving force behind the U.S. use of
force in the 1991 Gulf war, perceptions of a techno-
logically dominant, militarily powerful America will-
ing to stand up to aggression and committed to a new
international cooperative system emerged. Such per-
ceptions surely contributed to America’s soft power
ability to influence other players in the international
arena. Today, by virtue of such factors as size, popu-
lation, and expanding economy, China has affected
the perceptions of others about its current and future
power and its appropriate place in the world hierar-
chy of nations. Thus nations are becoming more def-
erential toward China than in years past.
57
On the other hand, the psychological instrument
of power includes deliberate efforts to manipulate
the attitudes, beliefs, and emotions of others to cre-
ate favorable impressions. This is the active aspect of
the psychological dimension of power. Since it relies
on perceptions, it finds its roots in both hard and soft
power. Thus there can be, and usually is, a psycho-
logical aspect to efforts to influence, persuade, coerce,
and compel the behavior of others. For example, just
before the end of the Vietnam War, the Four Party
Joint Military Team, established under provisions of
the January 1973 Paris peace accords, met in Hanoi.
At that meeting, Colonel Harry Summers, Chief of
the Negotiations Division of the U.S. Delegation, in
a conversation with Colonel Tu, Chief of the North
Vietnamese Delegation, remarked: “You know you
never defeated us on the battlefield.” Colonel Tu re-
sponded: “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.”23
It was irrelevant because the war was fought not just
at the military level, but also at the soft power psycho-
logical level. General Vo Nguyen Giap’s forces may
not have defeated the Americans on the Vietnamese
battlefields, but they won on the psychological battle-
grounds in Washington, DC, on college campuses,
and in the streets of America and thus, in a sense,
compelled a change in U.S. behavior.
Similarly, as Iraqi troops broke ranks, withdrew,
and surrendered en masse during the 1991 Gulf War,
they did so not only because they were defeated in
battle, but also because of the psychological effects of
America’s superior technology. When in the middle of
a quiet night, the tanks to left and right explode under
attack from seemingly nowhere, the psychology is not
to stay in your tank and fight, but to abandon the next
obvious target and run. That is the ultimate in hard
power battlefield coercion.
58
On the soft power side, the official diplomatic corps
as well as a nation’s public diplomacy play major roles.
The diplomatic corps not only help shape perceptions
of one’s nation among a target nation’s leaders, but
also play a role in public diplomacy, the task of which
is to help shape perceptions among leaders and the
populace in target countries through the provision of
information. Mary K. Eder, an authority in strategic
communications, writes:
59
However, both the passive and active aspects of
the psychological dimension of power can be fleet-
ing. For example, as the Soviet economy began to
wane under the weight of its own contradictions in
the late 1960s and early 1970s and as the repressive
nature of the Soviet system became more clearly vis-
ible to others, the psychological appeal of the Soviet
system diminished. Similarly, when the United States
and its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Asso-
ciation (NATO) attacked Yugoslavia from March to
June 1999, the favorable image that many Russians
had of the United States following the end of the Cold
War soured. One observed a similar phenomenon in
other parts of the world when the United States in-
vaded Iraq in 2003, without United Nations (UN)
authority, with a justification unsatisfying to many,
and against the recommendation of many of its allies
and friends. As a result, American soft power was
significantly diminished.
Similarly, public diplomacy caught in a deliberate
lie can raise suspicions and undermine years of ef-
forts. To highlight the difference between truth and
propaganda, Edward R. Murrow, the U.S. Informa-
tion Agency (USIA) director from 1961-64 said:
Military.
60
clearly operates in the realms of deterrence, coercion,
and compellence. In a world of independent sovereign
states, perpetually in competition for scarce resources
in an environment where there is no acknowledged
higher authority, military power is seen as the Ultima
Ratio Regum.27
One has little difficulty understanding hard power
aspects, for example, of allied military forces compel-
ling the surrender of Nazi Germany during World War
II; or the hard power value of U.S. strategic nuclear
forces as deterrents to a Soviet nuclear attack on the
United States during the Cold War; or, for that matter,
the hard power used to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait
in 1991.
However, there are other dimensions to the mili-
tary instrument of power. Today, the purely “kinetic”
(a word in modern military parlance as used by Bob
Woodward in his Bush at War) aspects of the military
instrument—killing and/or destroying if you will, is
often seen as increasingly less useful in solving many
of the security problems nations and peoples confront.
Even during the height of the Cold War, there were
those who believed that the forces amassed by the
superpowers had markedly limited utility. In 1968,
Harvard professor Stanley Hoffmann wrote that the
superpowers:
61
With the Cold War now more than 2 decades be-
hind us, further questions have arisen concerning the
utility of military forces. Many argue that the inter-
national environment is less dangerous today than it
was during 4 1/2 decades of Soviet-American con-
frontation. Gone are the massive Soviet military forces
threatening Western Europe. While there are signifi-
cant policy differences between the United States and
Russia and China, war with either seems highly un-
likely. Of course, the United States does face dangers
that could have devastating consequences, particularly
should terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) or from states such as North Korea or Iran,
should they acquire nuclear weapons and associated
delivery systems. However, none of these dangers or
their potential consequences is likely to be anywhere
near the same magnitude as those that existed during
the Cold War. Thus today, many question the need for
large nuclear and conventional military forces. They
see the primary value of nuclear weapons as resi-
dent in their utility as a deterrent. They contend that
since they fail to meet just war criteria, their use, even
threatened use, is not credible during lesser conflicts
or confrontations. Raymond Aron once noted:
62
inversely proportional to their destructive potential,
with strategic nuclear forces as least useful and special
operations conventional forces as most useful. More-
over, with such conflicts in mind as Algeria in the late
1950s, Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and perhaps in
such contemporary conflicts as those in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, those who question the utility of military
power are quick to note that even a preponderance of
conventional forces cannot always or easily be trans-
lated into political victory. Indeed, in ideological, eth-
nic, and sectarian quarrels, as well as in dealing with
terrorism, the military instrument may be the least ap-
propriate, though sometimes necessary, instrument.
Ideas, it is said, cannot be defeated by force of arms.
There is much truth in such arguments. Neverthe-
less, the military instrument of power cannot be un-
derstood in its entirety simply as the employment of
hard power. Rather, it is a multifaceted instrument
that can play a role in advancing a nation’s interests
from soft power influence to hard power coercion and
compellence. As Michael Howard, speaking about
military power, noted some years ago:
63
and is further nurtured by the acquisition of military
systems; both of these are often seen as statements
of future intent as well as capabilities. Soft power
psychological aspects of military power also are of-
ten advanced by the temporary, as well as relatively
long-term deployment of forces abroad. Perceptions
of highly competent and effective military forces
deployed to a region can help shape (influence) the
views of others. For example, in December 1907 Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt dispatched an armada of 16
battleships of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet on a 14-month
trip around the world. The purpose of the voyage
was to showcase America’s growing military power,
particularly its newly acquired blue-water navy, its
industrial prowess,31 and its ability and determination
to protect American interests around the globe. Belch-
ing black smoke, this steam-powered, steel armada,
later dubbed the “Great White Fleet” because the
ships were painted white with gilded scrollwork on
their bows, traveled 43,000 miles and visited 20 ports
of call. Save for a donnybrook in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
the voyage was generally a diplomatic success, with a
Chilean cruiser guiding the fleet through the Straits of
Magellan, a 9-day celebration of George Washington’s
birthday in Callao, Peru, and with more than 250,000
people staying up all night so as not to miss the fleet’s
arrival in Sydney, Australia. Perhaps the most dra-
matic success came with the Great White Fleet’s visit
to Yokohama, Japan. A flimsy arch set up to honor the
arrival of the Fleet caught fire. Atop the pole on the
arch was mounted a Japanese flag. Before the flames
could reach the flag, a U.S. Marine from the Fleet,
climbed up the side of the arch that had yet to catch
fire and dramatically rescued the flag. The observing
Japanese crowd went wild, hoisting the Marine onto
their shoulders and parading through the streets.32
64
Roosevelt also dispatched these great dread-
noughts to impress upon the Japanese, who were in
an expansionist mood, still chafing over their failure
to get all they wanted out of the Roosevelt-mediated
1906 Treaty of Portsmouth that ended their triumphant
war with Russia, and irritated over anti-Japanese riots
that were sweeping California, that the United States
could protect its interests in the Pacific Ocean even
though the bulk of its blue-water naval assets were
located in the Atlantic Ocean. Shortly after the fleet’s
October 18-25, 1908, visit to Yokohama, the Japanese
ambassador in Washington, DC, received instructions
to reach an agreement with the United States that
would recognize the Pacific Ocean as an open avenue
of trade, and promise equal opportunity in China. The
ensuing Root-Takahira agreement was signed on No-
vember 30, 1908.33 This was a classic exercise in the
soft use of the military instrument of power to win
friends and influence people. There was no threat, no
bribe, and no effort to compel.
During the Cold War, the United States deployed
hundreds of thousands of land, air, and sea forces to
Europe. Those military deployments eased security
concerns among Western Europeans and freed them
to focus their efforts on post-war economic recovery.
Both directly, through close military collaboration and
the political collaboration that such military collabo-
ration spawned, and indirectly, through the feeling
of security U.S. military forces provided, the United
States and Western European states and peoples
forged close relationships. Psychologically comforted
by the U.S. military presence, Europeans were often
willing to let the United States take the lead on secu-
rity matters, even in some cases on foreign political is-
sues. Thus, the United States influenced the behavior
65
of these states simply by virtue of the presence of its
military forces.
Similarly, deployments in the Persian/Arabian
Gulf and elsewhere provide a sense of security and
stability that often serves as the glue of civil relations
among states in those regions and accrues influence to
the United States. Admittedly, however, in some cases
one or more states (e.g., Iran in the Persian/Arabian
Gulf) or nonstate actors (e.g., Somali pirates) will see
such deployments as coercive in nature. Thus deploy-
ments can serve simultaneously as instruments of
both the soft power of influence with friends and hard
coercive power with adversaries.
Perhaps an important additional benefit to the de-
ployment of U.S. military force abroad is the apparent
direct effect on growth. A 2007 study of U.S. military
presence in 94 countries from 1950 to 2000 revealed
that putting U.S. forces in a country over time was as-
sociated with an increase in the per capita growth rate
of that country by an extra 1.8 percentage points per
year. Perhaps more interesting, the study found that
military, economic, or social aid was not a good sub-
stitute. The authors found “more troops predict more
growth, but more aid does not.” Furthermore, the
study revealed that usual explanations for this phe-
nomenon—the multiplier effect of spending by U.S.
forces on the local economy have a short-term effect,
but robust long-term growth correlates more with the
exemplar effect. When locals saw how the U.S. mili-
tary did business, it changed the business culture and
courts, with salubrious effects on commerce.34
The soft aspect of military forces is also evident
in such activities as the U.S. training and education
of foreign militaries whether in the United States or
abroad, as well as other forms of security assistance,
66
including U.S. participation in joint exercises, and U.S.
involvement in peacekeeping operations, humanitar-
ian assistance, and disaster relief. In each of these cases
the U.S. military is often seen as providing a good
that meets the needs of others and thus helps shape
the views of those directly assisted, as well as others,
about the nature of American society and its values.
Vision.
67
Investing in the Sources of Power.
68
could result in economic gains up to as much as $103
trillion.37 The report further notes that the quality of
education depends on several factors. First, an ac-
tual rather than rhetorical commitment to education
as weighed against other commitments, for example,
as expressed in terms of pay versus the pay of other
highly skilled workers, or as expressed in terms of
how education credentials are weighed against other
qualifications when people are considered for jobs.
Second is “clear and ambitious standards that are
shared across the system, with a focus among other
things on higher-order thinking skills.” Third is high
quality teachers and principals—“student learning is
ultimately the product of what goes on in the class-
room.” Last, but not least, world-class education sys-
tems deliver high-quality learning outcomes consis-
tently across the entire education system.38
The United States may not be in as precipitous
decline in technology and innovation as Thomas L.
Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum suggested in
That Used to Be Us. According to one recent study, it
still ranks first in patents per capita. It is sixth in eco-
nomic output devoted to research and development
investment and seventh in scientific and engineering
researchers per capita. Combining all three measures
in a broad assessment of the technological and in-
novative capabilities of the world’s leading nations,
the United States ranks third. In each category, the
so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and
China) fall far behind.39 Nevertheless, future competi-
tiveness in a globalized world economy demands that
the United States vigorously encourage and support
technological innovation. In many ways, America’s
technological future is highly correlated to its educa-
tional system at all levels. While the U.S. university
69
system remains the best in the world,40 the university
product remains dependent on inputs from primary
and secondary schools. According to the World Eco-
nomic Forum (WEF), the United States is ranked 48th
in the quality of mathematics and science education.
Though there are significant questions about the va-
lidity of WEF opinion-based ratings, nevertheless, the
ratings are generally in line with OECD rankings. This
does not bode well for the future.
Re-examining the educational processes for U.S.
diplomats and military leaders is also warranted.
Once inducted into the Foreign Service, U.S. diplomats
find the educational opportunities somewhat limited.
There is nothing comparable to the through-career
educational programs available to advance the profes-
sional skills of military officials. On the other hand, in
an increasingly complex world where the demands on
military personnel go well beyond battlefield skills,
the military educational system has become increas-
ingly focused on operational issues, often providing
little time for education and training on issues associ-
ated with the broader aspects of national strategy, na-
tional military strategy, and the military’s role in soft
power projection.
Finally, when viewed from afar, what appears to
many Americans as a dysfunctional political system
is likely to be taken by proponents of more authoritar-
ian models of governance as an example of the failings
of democracy style government. On the other hand,
other non-Americans may simply take it as the rough
and tumble of democratic (republic style) politics. In
either case, the long-term effects of apparently disap-
pearing concepts of compromise within the American
political system may well undermine the domestic
effectiveness and efficiency of the United States and,
70
in turn, the ability to use its soft and hard power in
pursuit of American interests abroad. Political parties
had yet to be formed when the U.S. Constitution was
written and debated. However, in Federalist Paper #10,
James Madison warned of the dangers of “faction.” By
faction, he meant:
71
tected and perhaps advanced in the future, it will
need to continue the development of a norms-based
rather than interest-based international community.
As World War II was drawing to a close, the United
States established itself as the preeminent advocate
of a norms-based international environment, with its
efforts to establish such organizations as the UN, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (World Bank), and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Following the war, it played a major role
in the formation of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade
Organization (WTO). In the drafting of such docu-
ments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
modeled in part after the U.S. Bill of Rights, the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and in advancing
global guidelines for land use and property rights, the
United States also has played a key role in advanc-
ing international law, an essential basis for a norms-
based international community. Norms set by these
institutions have served the United States very well.
They have established mechanisms for dialogue on
issues of international concern. They have provided
for economic stability and development. They have
advanced America’s long-standing preference for free
and open trade among nations, as well as concepts of
human rights in peace and war.
However, for much of the first decade of the 21st
century, it appeared to many that the United States,
now the world’s most powerful nation, was drawing
back from its commitment to international norms as
guides to the behavior of states. The United States
failed to join such internationally favored agree-
ments as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the
72
International Criminal Court, and the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention. This, coupled with the Neo-
conservative harangues against the UN, multilater-
alism, evident preference for unilateral action, and
perceived willingness to interpret international law to
suit U.S. purposes regardless of commonly accepted
understandings, led some to conclude that the United
States had come to prefer a self-interest-based interna-
tional community, where to quote Thucydides, “the
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what
they must.”41
In an increasingly interdependent world, where
achieving one’s objective will almost always require
the assistance or as a minimum the acquiescence of
others, policies fundamentally guided by self-interest
will win few friends, gain influence among few na-
tions or peoples, do little to advance the nation’s
soft power, raise concerns about America’s ultimate
aims, heighten perceptions of the abuse of its power,
undermine its ability to use hard power when it may
be necessary, and thus be largely counterproductive.
Joseph Joffe, publisher-editor of the German weekly
newspaper, Die Zeit, writing about the United States
over a decade ago, correctly noted:
73
Indeed, for most of the post World War II era, “the
United States has acted as the foremost producer of
global/regional public goods.”43 By shaping its for-
eign policy agenda to advance not only its own in-
terests but also those of others, it was able to grow
its soft power global influence. By holding the value
of the dollar currency artificially high following the
war, Americans would be encouraged to buy foreign
products, helping others get their post-war econo-
mies going again. By providing them a security shield
and money through the European Recovery Program
(Marshall Plan), the United States freed Western Euro-
pean nations from the burden of heavy defense expen-
ditures and thus allowed them to focus their limited
resources on economic and social recovery. Moreover,
many of the institutions the United States advanced
not only helped establish norms for international be-
havior, but also provided for the common good. The
World Bank provided loans for post-War reconstruc-
tion and development. The IMF stabilized exchange
rates, making trade among nations more predictable.
GATT lowered barriers, encouraging greater trade
among nations and stimulating economic develop-
ment. The WTO continues the processes set in motion
by GATT.
Such efforts have built a better world and have
contributed greatly to America’s stature in the past.
Continued investment in the common good is essen-
tial if the United States hopes to retain its primacy in
the international community. But as Joffe has said:
74
sis added]. Their labor is the source of their authority.
And so a truly great power must not just prevent but
pre-empt hostile coalitions—by providing essential
services. Those who respect the needs of others engage
in supply-side diplomacy: They create a demand for
their services, and that translates into political profits,
also known as “leadership.”44
Knowledge.
75
sonalities involved. This places an enormous task on
the intelligence community, not only on their ability
to directly gather information needed to make appro-
priate judgments, but also to analyze that intelligence
along with information garnered from the wide range
of academics who have engaged in such efforts. Where
efforts to affect the behavior of others is long-term and
likely to involve the use of public diplomacy, an un-
derstanding of attitudes, beliefs, predispositions, and
emotive aspects of not only the proximal, but also
distal environment of the target country is required.
In democracies, such a distal environment includes
a wide range of groups and, of course, the public in
general, upon whose consent the government often
relies. In authoritarian regimes, the scope of the distal
environment is likely to be more circumscribed.
Investments in education and intelligence are
among the most valuable investments a nation can
make if it wishes to use its soft and hard power wisely.
It is the basis upon which one chooses which instru-
ment or combinations of instruments of national power
(political, psychological, economic, and/or military)
to use in a given situation, as well as over time, and
which means or combination of means (influence, per-
suasion, coercion, deterrence, and/or compellence) to
employ on which international actors when and how.
76
addressed. This will require cooperation and coordi-
nation across the agencies of government involved,
particularly between the departments of State and
Defense, but also others such as Homeland Security,
Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Justice. It also
will require the cooperation of Congress: at minimum
a Congress knowledgeable enough and determined
enough to serve as a check on executive actions, while
acting in an efficient, nonpartisan manner to support
executive branch efforts when warranted.
More than a decade ago, the Hart–Rudman Com-
mission signaled the need for “strategic fusion of all ap-
propriate instruments of national power:”
77
I have attempted to identify elsewhere.48 In particu-
lar, it will require the education of a wide range of
government professionals, as well as diplomats to
manage the processes at home and abroad. Such an
education may require a Goldwater-Nichols DoD Re-
organization Act of 1986 style professional education
for selected nonmilitary, as well as military officials.
78
the culture, languages, and perspectives of other peo-
ples and nations, but also advance an understanding
of American culture, traditions, values, and, perhaps
above all, concepts of freedom and openness to others
around the globe.
Public diplomacy can be a powerful tool in ad-
vancing the interests of the nation. In the media age,
with the emergence of a multiplicity of communica-
tions means, where news and entertainment are often
merged and news blurred, and competing and some-
times misleading information has become increasingly
common, a strong investment in public diplomacy is
essential. It is in such an environment that the battle
of ideas and thus the battle for the hearts and par-
ticularly the minds of others take place. If the United
States is to be successful, it will need to do a better job
coordinating its efforts among the various agencies
of government. This neither means that all those who
venture abroad on U.S. programs receive indoctrina-
tion on U.S. policies, nor does it mean that there needs
to be one truth on all issues. Rather, there needs to be
a greater unity of effort in communicating to foreign
peoples those issues of strategic importance and sus-
tained education of those civilian and military officials
in regular contact with the media that provides them
with the tools necessary to be effective communica-
tors via the various instruments of the modern media.
As Mary K. Eder has written: “At issue is the concern
that America does not communicate clearly with the
world. It often seems that the U.S. government sends
‘mixed messages’ or fails to clearly and consistently
communicate policy.”50
79
Humility.
80
in health and primary education.55 The United States
also is ranked 49th in infant mortality and 50th in life
expectancy, lagging behind all Western European
states, except Turkey.56 While one may take exception
to one or more of the rankings, this is the way many
others see us. Indeed, according to Johnson:
81
Smart power not only requires an understanding
of such elementary truths, but also the knowledge
needed to differentiate among the challenges and the
wisdom to act only where the available resources,
means, and instruments of power are likely to yield a
reasonable probability of success. Humanitarians and
hawks sometimes join hands advocating interven-
tion where authoritarian regimes abuse their power
and inflict gross violations of human rights on their
people, recently, for example, in Libya and Syria. In
such situations, if the United States is to use its power
wisely, good counsel suggests caution. Quick action,
without a well-thought-through plan that promises a
reasonable end game and a reasonable probability of
politically desirable outcomes, can spell disaster.
Furthermore, efforts to act everywhere or near ev-
erywhere are likely to be met with suspicion followed
by pushback from others. There always exists within
the international community the concern that the
“strong are always inclined to abuse their strength.
The more obvious their superiority, the more suspect
they become.”58 The obvious military strength and
past history of U.S. involvement makes it an especially
prominent target for such suspicion.
Thus the United States must choose carefully
where, when, and how it will become involved, par-
ticularly in the use of its hard power. An intemper-
ate America wears out its own reputation and hence
its ability to influence others. Moreover, efforts to act
everywhere all of the time are costly in terms of a na-
tion’s economic, military, and human resources. Fur-
thermore, if ever there was an axiom of state behavior,
one that can be counted on 90+ percent of the time, it
is that if one state is always ready and willing to do
what is difficult and costly, other nations will let that
82
state take care of the dirty laundry, saving themselves
from the economic, military, and political costs.
83
was on efforts to stimulate the economy. On the other
hand, engaging in two wars without raising taxes to
cover costs has surely affected the U.S. resilience in
recovering from the great recession and contributed to
perceptions both at home and abroad of an American
decline. U.S. soft power potential has been weakened,
and with the economic recession its future hard power
capabilities will surely be reduced.
84
panying forces that compose a carrier strike group—
usually one or two guided missile cruisers, at least
two destroyers and/or frigates (for example, Zumwalt
Class approximately $6.5 billion and the Burke Class
approximately $2 billion), and, on occasion, subma-
rines.62 The United States also has:
• Ten large-deck amphibious ships that can op-
erate as sea bases for helicopters and vertical-
takeoff jets. No other navy has more than three,
and all of those navies belong to U.S. allies or
friends. The U.S. Navy can carry twice as many
aircraft at sea as all the rest of the world com-
bined.
• Fifty-seven nuclear-powered attack and cruise
missile submarines. More than the rest of the
world combined.
• Seventy-nine Aegis-equipped combatants that
carry roughly 8,000 vertical-launch missile
cells. In terms of total missile firepower, the
United States arguably outmatches the next 20
largest navies.
• A battle fleet displacement—a proxy for overall
fleet capabilities— that exceeds, by one recent
estimate, at least the next 13 navies combined,
of which 11 are U.S. allies or partners.
• A 202,000-strong Marine Corps, which is the
largest military force of its kind in the world
and exceeds the size of most world armies.63
• Arguably the finest air forces in the world, with
an estimated 160-200 flying hours per year for
tactical crews, compared to 100-150 for China
and 25-40 for Russia.
• A tactical aircraft inventory of about 2,650 Air
Force, 900 Naval, and 371 Marine combat air-
craft and including today about 140 F/A 22s
85
with a final purchase of 183—one of the finest,
if not the finest, aircraft in the world. It is in the
process of acquiring about 2,400 F-35 aircraft as
a replacement for its older aircraft at a fly-away
cost of over $200 million per copy.
• The best equipped Army in the world.
86
and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), including Overseas Contingency Operations
to support the extraordinary and temporary costs of
civilian-led programs and missions in Iraq, Afghani-
stan, and Pakistan is $51.6 billion.65 That’s less than
1/10 of the Defense budget. Looking to the future,
among the most important military investments are
those made in the research, development, testing, and
evaluation (RDT&E) of military hardware, in military
training, and, increasingly today and in the future,
in cyber security. Investments in RDT&E permit the
United States to remain technologically superior to
potential adversaries. Military training and use of ad-
vanced cyber techniques are force multipliers, so-to-
speak. Such force multipliers often permit the United
States to operate successfully against larger militaries,
as was the case in Iraq in 2003.
It is instructive to note that President Eisenhower
cut the defense budget by 27 percent. However, he
also doubled funding for RDT&E in order to maintain
the U.S. technological edge over the Soviet Union.
President Richard Nixon also reduced defense spend-
ing, but ushered in the “Total Force” concept, which
gave a significant role to Reserve and National Guard
forces in times of conflict.66 This would suggest that the
question of military funding in terms of smart power
is what is the appropriate balance between funding for
forces in being versus RDT&E. That is to say, should
forces in being be sized downward while keeping the
R&D base hot? It also raises questions as to how much,
more or less, should be borne today by Reserve and
National Guard forces? However, the larger question
is: What is the proper balance of expenditures not only
among the various foreign and security policy institu-
tions, but also between expenditures on those institu-
87
tions and expenditures on securing and improving
U.S sources of national power?
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
88
substantially in R&D, in the education of its people
in general, and in the education of its diplomats and
military leaders. The latter may require a Goldwater-
Nichols DoD Reorganization Act style specialized
professional education for select nonmilitary, as well
as military officials engaged in foreign and security
policymaking. Perhaps above all, the future of U.S.
power—both soft and hard—will depend on effective
governance. Democracy eschews absolutes. Rather,
it demands compromise among competing interests
in order to achieve a consensus for advancement. A
“my way or the highway” attitude among competing
political factions is a prescription for decline, both at
home and abroad.
Internationally, the wise application of the instru-
ments of American power will depend, among other
things, on cooperative efforts on the part of those
agencies of government involved in foreign and secu-
rity affairs in order to integrate effectively the instru-
ments of American power. It will demand an unwav-
ering investment in the intelligence community and
in developing an understanding of the motivations of
other international actors, a commitment to a norms-
based international community, investments in the in-
ternational common good and public diplomacy with
a touch of humility, and a recognition of the limits of
the ability of any single nation to solve all the world’s
problems and of the need to work with others within
the limits of available resources. The application of
smart power to protect U.S. interests abroad will also
demand that the United States maintain sufficient mil-
itary hard power to deter and, if necessary, defend its
vital interests, as well as the ability to protect Home-
land infrastructure and U.S. military forces from crip-
pling cyber attacks. However, many of the challenges
89
that lie ahead are likely to be more effectively ad-
dressed through the use of soft power than through
the application of hard power. Thus America’s stature
in the global arena and its ability to protect and ad-
vance its interests and those of its allies and friends
demands a proper balance of expenditures among the
various U.S. foreign and security policy institutions,
especially those that strengthen America’s soft power.
Indeed, it is worth keeping in mind that it was not
hard power that brought about the collapse of the So-
viet empire. To be sure, hard military power played
an important role. Nevertheless, Eastern European
peoples did not toss the yoke of communism because
of American military efforts in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. Mikhail Gorbachev didn’t seek to reform the
Soviet system because he had been defeated militarily
or because the United States had halted the expansion
of communism through the use of its military might. In
fact, with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the United
States lost the very military conflict in which it had
invested most heavily during the Cold War period.
Rather, it was the inability of the communist system
to deliver to its peoples the promises made of a better
life, juxtaposed against the success of the West. It was
the inherent attractiveness of the West and America
and its soft power that won the day—the strength of
its economy, the attractiveness of its political system,
its commitment to international institutions and inter-
national law, and its inherent vitality. Thus while hard
power will remain a must, in the decades ahead, smart
power demands significant investments in America’s
soft power.
90
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
91
5. For example, see Kenneth E. Boulding, Three Faces of Power,
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989, pp. 15-18.
7. Ibid.
10. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World
Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004.
11. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Future of Power, New York: Public
Affairs, 2011.
13. Ibid, p. 5.
15. Ibid.
92
19. For example, see “Compellence” available from
en.citizendium.org/wiki/Compellence.
24. Mary K. Eder, Leading the Narrative: The Case for Strategic
Communications, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 2011, p. xi.
93
31. Eleven of the 16 battleships had been constructed in U.S.
shipyards between 1904 and 1907. See JO2 Mike McKinley, “The
Cruise of the Great White Fleet,” Washington, DC: Department of
the Navy; Naval History and Heritage Command, available from
www.history.navy.mil/library/online/gwf_cruise.htm.
32. Ibid.
94
40. See for example, “World’s Best Universities: Top 400,”
U.S. News, 2011, available from www.usnews.com/education/worlds-
best-universities-rankings/top-400-universities-in-the-world.
42. Joseph Joffe, “Who’s Afraid of Mr. Big,” The National In-
terest, Summer 2001, available from findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_
m2751/is_2001_Summer/ai_76560814/pg_10/?tag=content;col1.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
52. See John Winthrop, City upon a Hill, 1630, available from
www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/winthrop.htm.
95
53. Important Believers & Quotes, available from www.
originofnations.org/books,%20papers/quotes%20etc/quotes.htm.
62. For cost data, see “Analysis of the Fiscal Year 2012
Pentagon Spending Request, Feb 15, 2011,” The Cost of War. avail-
able from costofwar.com/en/publications/2011/analysis-fiscal-year-
2012-pentagon-spending-request/.
96
65. “State and USAID—FY 2013 Budget,” Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of State, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2012/02/183808.htm.
97
CHAPTER 5
Michael Lekson
Nathaniel L. Wilson
99
time of this writing, with the second longest sustained
overseas conflict in U.S. history still underway3 and
facing record budget shortfalls, American attitudes
are decidedly not oriented outward. A January 2012
Pew Research Center poll on public priorities noted:
“The public’s concerns rest more with domestic policy
than at any point in the past 15 years.”4 Nonetheless,
the world shows no signs of going away.
This chapter first defines the terms and delineates
the contours of the concepts described. The subse-
quent section briefly describes some of the ways in
which U.S. strategy has been formally articulated.
Since strategies need to be forward-looking, the prob-
lems inherent in predicting the future are explored,
and the present state of affairs is described. The penul-
timate section argues that although American power
has been the common thread tying together the global
governance institutions and regimes since the end of
World War II, their institutional effectiveness is fray-
ing and the post-World-War-II security order is in
unprecedented trouble. Finally, the conclusion specu-
lates on the respective places of conflict management
and peacebuilding in a future grand strategy at a time
when prioritization will be a grim reality rather than a
rhetorical aspiration in managing U.S. relations within
a world that will continue to be very much with us.
100
produced by the United States Institute of Peace), and
adopts a standard definition of the third.
Conflict Management:
101
jectives. Grand strategy provides the linkage between
national goals and actions by establishing a deliber-
ately ambiguous vision of the world as we would like
it to be (ends) and the methods (ways) and resources
(means) we will employ in pursuit of that vision. Ef-
fective grand strategies provide a unifying purpose
and direction to national leaders, public policy makers,
allies and influential citizens in the furtherance of mu-
tual interests [emphasis added].7
102
best of our knowledge and recollection (supplemented
by some research), these national security strategies
have not been truly strategic, but rather have tended
to become laundry lists (or policy compendia, if that
sounds better). While we express some uncertainty
about the art of prediction, we feel fairly safe in pre-
dicting that this pattern will continue.
The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy identifies
four “enduring national interests”: security, prosper-
ity, values, and international order.9 At that level of
generality, there probably would not have been much
dispute that our strategy sought to preserve, protect,
and defend those interests during the past 30 years, or
even the 30 years before that. It is tempting to predict
that this consensus will continue for the next 30 years,
as well, although, as will be seen, we are less confident
that there will continue to be an international order
to preserve.
In any case, while these post-1986 strategy docu-
ments have had varying degrees of influence over
how the executive branch organizes itself and justi-
fies budget requests, their actual strategic content is
hard to pin down. The justifiable concern that security
not be too narrowly defined provides entrée to almost
anything for which there is a need, an argument, or
a constituency to be presented as promoting national
security. Bureaucratic, institutional, budgetary, and
political constraints conspire to create a document
that may identify a large number of goals, and a num-
ber of things to do that may have some bearing on
trying to achieve each of them, but does not actually
describe the way from here to there.10 In addition, the
messiness of the outside world, domestic political re-
ality, and the interagency clearance and coordination
process combine to elevate everything into a priority,
103
even when these priorities are mutually incompat-
ible for reasons of policy, resources, or both. In these
circumstances, we should be grateful for what does
ultimately emerge from this process, which is by no
means without its utility, and should resist the temp-
tation of critiquing these documents too harshly from
the armchair strategist’s perspective. But, on those oc-
casions when it does appear that for a time the United
States actually had a grand strategy and actually fol-
lowed it, that strategy has generally been most clearly
articulated in memoirs after its protagonists had
left office.
104
gizing. He asks what were the threats, challenges, and
opportunities that they faced, and that they devised
their strategies to confront. Almost invariably, what
they were concerned with was either misconstrued or
faded either into the background or away altogether,
while problems that did not loom large, if they were
noticed at all, became central to international security
within the 2-decade time tranche. Of course, there
were some positive surprises as well as the many
negative ones.13
Looking even 2 decades ahead is quite a stretch
for contemporary strategists. But the world may be at
a point where much longer trends are about to have
a decisive impact. At the conclusion of Why the West
Rules—for Now, a 663-page analytical survey of world
history from the days of the Neanderthals to the pres-
ent, British archaeologist Ian Morris considers existing
trends and outlines three possible futures, one main-
stream and two outliers: More of the same, only with a
richer China; the Singularity; or Nightfall. To expand
just a little on his mainstream prediction, the method-
ology that Morris follows over the millennia to mea-
sure “social development” suggests that, no later than
2103 (and probably earlier), the East (especially China)
will surpass the West.14 On the simpler metric of total
economic output, he cites various experts as putting
the point where China surpasses the United States at
2016, 2020, 2025, 2027, and 2036. If that is, in fact, the
shape of things to come, it should serve as a basis for
developing and implementing a grand strategy.
However, the other two alternative futures which
he presents as serious possibilities are stark con-
trasts, both to the mainstream projection and to each
other. “The Singularity” as a term derives from the
concept of gravity established in Albert Einstein’s the-
105
ory of general relativity; to quote Stephen Hawking,
it is “a place where the classical concepts of space and
time break down, as do all the known laws of physics
because they are all formulated on a classical space-
time background.”15
In the analogous sense that it is used by Morris,
it pertains not to fundamental physical properties of
the universe, but rather to the advance of human tech-
nology. In this context, it is a concept long familiar in
science fiction (it is said to have been coined by author
Vernor Vinge,16 but the underlying idea antedates
him) and is perhaps most closely associated now with
Ray Kurzweil,17 a futurist whose particular vision of it
sees machine-based intelligence as growing so rapidly
that within a few decades, it will absorb and redefine
humanity, transcending biology, and thus effectively
invalidating all that we know and can project from
history or the social sciences.18
“Nightfall” is also a science fiction reference, in
this case to a story by Isaac Asimov in which, due to
developments beyond its control or understanding, an
advanced civilization on another planet goes mad and
destroys itself.19 While the particular trigger for night
to fall in the story would not apply in our solar system,
Morris devotes 15 pages to exploring some of the very
down-to-earth ways that Nightfall could come about
for us (including disease pandemics, famine, nuclear
war, and the negative consequences of rapid climate
change, among other potential catastrophes).20
Both Nightfall and the Singularity are presented as
serious possibilities, and while we are less confident
than some that the latter would be benign, we believe
they should be treated as such. Nonetheless, trying to
develop a grand strategy that can encompass dealing
not just with the mainstream “rise of China” prospect,
106
but also with the actual advent of these much more
cosmic prospects, is not likely to produce anything
that in bureaucratese, would be considered “action-
able.” However, serious thought needs to be given to
the issues they raise, even as grand strategies are de-
veloped that assume, rightly or otherwise, that we are
not headed for such discontinuous developments.
Retreating from the cataclysmic, it would still seem
that any responsible grand strategy needs to take into
account not just the projection of China’s outpacing
the United States, but also the very real possibility that
China will instead fall victim to a failure to surmount
its governmental, demographic, and environmental
problems, or will fall short of the heights to which it
now aspires for some other concatenation of not fully
foreseeable factors. Whatever happens with China, the
consequences for U.S. national security will be huge.
With all due respect to both Morris and Friedman,
we would personally give more weight than they re-
spectively do to contingent developments that can,
albeit rarely, make a major difference (two examples
important to the context of this chapter would be
Adolf Hitler’s decision to declare war on the United
States after Pearl Harbor, and the Democrats’ 1944
decision to replace Henry Wallace with Harry Tru-
man).21 Morris is doubtless correct that the vast major-
ity of what we see as decisive turning points in history
are more accurately understood as slight twists and
turns in a river which is going to keep on running to-
ward the sea, even if, like the mighty Mississippi, it
may take the long way around.22 But for the purposes
of would-be grand strategists, as for General Ulysses
Grant trying to take Vicksburg, those bends in the
river are often exactly what they need to be concerned
with, even while keeping the long-term direction of
107
flow in mind. Some of these happenstance events are
not the freely-made decisions of great leaders, but
are intrinsically not predictable for other reasons.
This is well articulated by none other than Sir Harry
Flashman:
The key point is that even if one can see a trend and
project from the past where history seems to be head-
ing, human developments can, not always but some-
times, be altered by small but significant events. But
taking a step back from the occasional accident (most
of which do not have the kind of ramifications that
resulted from whatever Flashman did or did not do at
Gettysburg), there is a major problem for devising any
kind of strategy, let alone a grand one: the strong ten-
dency for human beings to take things for granted.24 We
are not aware of anyone, ourselves included, who is
free of this trait, although levels of awareness do vary.
Of course, this propensity is in effect the downside of
a positive capability—the ability to generalize, to learn
from experience, and to extrapolate from present per-
ceived reality—the absence of which is certainly not
going to produce a useful grand strategy, or much of
anything else.
108
THE END OF AN ERA?
109
In line with this assessment, the authors of Bend-
ing History contend that the United States is well
situated as the preeminent global power. Moreover,
it can remain so even in a precarious time on the
international scene:
110
ments of good intentions over the years. Similarly, an
unprecedented U.S. political commitment to Europe
in the immediate aftermath of the war grew into an
economic commitment with the Marshall Plan and a
security commitment with the North Atlantic Treaty,
which in turn gave rise to a real military alliance
with forward-deployed American troops as part of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). All
this gave rise to a genuine feeling—at least, most of
the time, among a majority of the political leadership
in Europe and North America that took an interest
in such matters—of a joint transatlantic community,
confronting a common danger and sharing not just a
common purpose but common values. This transat-
lantic alliance was focused on, but not limited to, the
military dimension and to countering the threat posed
by the Soviet Union. On neither side of the Atlantic
was this in keeping with historical tradition, but by
now we all think of it as normal.29
This chapter will also refrain from documenting
the roles of the Bretton Woods System, or the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), two
other global structures that have played a major role
in the post-World War II order. Meanwhile, the end
of (primarily European) imperialism and colonialism
brought well over 100 new nations into the UN and
other political, security, and economic systems and
structures that had not been designed with their mem-
bership in mind. It also helped alter both the econo-
mies and aspirations of the European states them-
selves, which began an unprecedented continental
process of unification based on free decisions rather
than conquest, leading from the modest coal and steel
communities to the European Union (EU), whose in-
tegrated economy is larger than that of any country in
111
the world. A general move in the direction of increas-
ingly open world trade and globalization has brought
the “creative destruction” of free markets to all quar-
ters of the globe, with the aggravation of those feeling
the pain often much more acute than the satisfaction
enjoyed by the usually greater numbers enjoying the
gain. While globalization had happened before, the
end of colonialism made it much more a world-wide
reality than the early 20th century precedent, which
was supposed to make general war impossible, but
came to a bad end in 1914 and suffered further indig-
nities following 1929.
Perhaps the single deadliest challenge emerg-
ing from World War II—the threat posed by nuclear
weapons—has been handled successfully so far,
though only in part by the sort of institutional arrange-
ments outlined above. After it became clear that there
was not going to be any kind of international author-
ity managing them30 and with the end in 1949 of the
American nuclear monopoly, the solution ultimately
developed was deterrence—direct deterrence for both
the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics (USSR), plus extended deterrence provided by
the United States for its NATO and Pacific allies. The
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), concluded in 1968,
provided a basis both for slowing the spread of nu-
clear weapons to other states, and for a gradual pro-
cess of negotiated limits and then reductions of both
American and Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals.
One thing all these developments and more had
in common was a strong American hand in bringing
them about, followed by a continuing U.S. commit-
ment to their success. One could argue that this was
motivated by a combination of idealism, realpolitik,
and enlightened self-interest, plus whatever other fac-
112
tors the reader might wish to ascribe.31 Whatever else
may be said (and much has been and will be), in the
immediate period following the end of World War II,
the United States dominated the world both economi-
cally and militarily—in a way that it had not before,
that it has not since, and will not likely happen again—
and chose to demobilize its military and to create
multilateral institutions to share the task of preserv-
ing the peace. Another thing that all the institutions
mentioned in the preceding three paragraphs have in
common, from the UN to the NPT, is that they are in
serious trouble. The difficulties are both financial and
institutional; the problems that the key organizations
confront include not having the ability to achieve or
in some cases even define their very mission and pur-
pose. To add a further complication, without delving
deeper into economic/energy/environmental issues,
the conventional view of trends on those fronts would
seem to suggest a range of major challenges to world
order and international security.32
113
The fiscal facts speak for themselves. America’s fi-
nancial house is not in order. Even “smart power” is
not free, and the military component that makes smart
power possible comes with a price tag whose figure is
more than the market will bear.
As for the political situation, judging both from
historical trends and current realities, the argument
being made here is that it is highly unlikely that there
would be sufficient support for the kind of world role
the United States has been playing even if the money
to do so had not run out. There has to be a politically
compelling reason for any democratic country, and
certainly for the United States, to wish to play the sort
of role that it has taken on since 1945. The U.S. unity of
purpose of World War II was unprecedented—start-
ing with 1776, no other foreign or domestic conflict
has ever enjoyed such solid support among the Amer-
ican people. The international order outlined above,
whose foundations were laid during World War II
and which was constructed in the immediate post-war
years, helped to lock in that support in a way that so
conspicuously did not happen after World War I. This
was possible in large measure because Americans saw
themselves facing a post-war threat from a hostile and
expansive Communist ideology embodied in a nu-
clear-armed, continent-sized superpower. The result
was an acceptance of continued international commit-
ments and engagements alien to American tradition.
But even at its height, the unity of American purpose
during the more than 40 years of Cold War was never
comparable to that of the 4 years of World War II. It
frayed badly during the Vietnam War and never fully
recovered. It nonetheless proved sufficient to the task,
until a confluence of underlying trends and what
were called earlier in this chapter “contingent events”
114
produced a peaceful and successful outcome of that
global conflict.
The unifying theme of American foreign policy in
the 1990s was to do some good in the world, politi-
cal support for which was never very strong or deep
once the various price tags were attached. Following
September 11, 2001 (9/11), there was a brief period of
unity of outrage, but there has been very little lasting
unity of purpose. Whatever else they have achieved,
the two major military conflicts that the United States
fought in the past decade have neither strengthened a
sustainable international security order nor bolstered
any sense by American voters and taxpayers that they
want to make any further sacrifices in pursuit of such
an order. In the latter case, the result has been very
much the reverse.
“Present at the Creation” moments are very rare,
and usually follow the sort of destruction that is an-
nounced with a bang, not a whimper. Two of the best
known such instances—the Congress of Vienna and
the period from 1945 to roughly 1952—each came at
the end of a major armed struggle, with clearly de-
fined victors and vanquished, with the former in a po-
sition to establish structures, such as the 1815 Concert
of Europe and the 1945 UN Security Council, which
are by no definition “fair.” Following World War I,
the effort at Versailles to replicate the success of Vi-
enna a century earlier failed for a number of reasons,
including in part that what seemed fair to one party
did not seem so to others, and in particular that the
vanquished were not resigned to that fate and that the
principal victor with a vision did not stay the course—
precisely because what was being called for was so
alien to the U.S. sense of its role in the world.
115
Whether the end of the Cold War offered a lost op-
portunity for the establishment of yet another endur-
ing security order is debatable but doubtful. As with
Versailles, though for very different reasons, the na-
ture of the victory was not conducive to reinventing
a sustainable and effective international system. Nor
(and in this case, the post-World-War-I situation is a
closer analogy) was the American body politic recep-
tive to the idea of new overseas entanglements, and
neither Japan nor Europe had the means to play an
appropriate role, even if on some occasions they were
not without motivation. The much less ambitious
idea that did emerge, of a “new world order” based
on an empowered UN and an increased reliance on
principled multilateralism, can hardly be said to have
enjoyed more than an occasional success.
The record of effectiveness of the much less struc-
tured components of “global governance” that have
grown up in the penumbra is even less impressive.
The failure of global governance was taken as a given
in Chapter 3 authored by Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg
in this volume. A stern but not unfair assessment of
this concept is offered by Professor Randall Schweller:
116
meeting the challenges that appear to be overcoming
the current one: that the international organizations
and institutions that are depicted above as faltering
and potentially on the verge of mission failure can be
replaced by new ones, better attuned to current real-
ity, or that as America does less to sustain whatever
international order there is, others will do more. Nei-
ther seems likely.
As suggested above, the sort of circumstances that
would offer the prospect of a serious Creation mo-
ment—on the order of 1815 or post-1945—are simply
not in existence now, nor is there any reason to expect
(though as noted more than once above, accidents will
happen) that they will come about in the time that a
new grand strategy needs to address. It is easy to argue
that major changes are desperately needed. It is next
to impossible to imagine how they can actually come
about, at least in a positive direction. A reinvented UN
would need to be established by the same countries
that have failed to make the current UN work. If there
is a politically feasible way to reform the UN Secu-
rity Council to make it more fair, no one has found
it. Making it more effective is even further out of the
question.
The need to reform both the structure as well as
the operational effectiveness of the UN has been
recognized for decades, as documented in and dem-
onstrated by the bipartisan 2005 UN Task Force. An
excerpt from the foreword to its report (written by
co-chairs Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell) sets
the tone:
117
The Task Force cited a long string of reports calling
for reforms in UN management dating back to the late
1940s, but achieving little or nothing, being bogged
down under the weight of the institution’s enormous
inertia, a record that reinforces the point that real re-
form is not going to happen. The values that underlay
the UN charter were not universally shared at the time
that it was written, nor are they today. “Responsibil-
ity to Protect” may have found its high-water mark
in Libya, along with the overall concept of “brother’s
keeper” internationalism as an actual practice rather
than a noble aspiration. The very role of the UN, the
importance of the P-5 (the five veto-wielding perma-
nent members of the UN Security Council), and the
unique standing of the Security Council in legitimiz-
ing force or other hostile actions against recalcitrant
states are all part of the post-World War II order. This
is not the way that international conflict was managed
at any time before 1945. The UN is not working ef-
fectively for its primary purpose. For varying reasons,
those in a position to make it less ineffective by paying
the bills and providing the other resources (including
but not limited to military ones) appear by their ac-
tions to have concluded that it costs more than they are
willing or able to provide. In some cases, they feel that
they are being asked and expected to pay at a level that
ought to but does not grant them the corresponding
status in the structure that they believe they merit. It
would be surprising if the UN itself does not continue,
but its ability to be a practical rather than symbolic
center of an international security order, which never
really took hold in the Cold War years, has continued
to deteriorate following a brief period of better times
in the early 1990s. It would be even more surprising if
that trend does not continue.
118
Like the UNSC, the NPT is the product of the situa-
tion at the time of its creation (the NPT came into being
when there were five nuclear-weapons states, which
happened to be the same as the UN Security Coun-
cil’s P-5 victors of World War II). Both the UN Security
Council and the NPT can be logically portrayed as in-
trinsically unfair. But, as with the UN Security Coun-
cil, the same countries that find fault with the NPT,
whether members or not, will be the ones that have
to create any plausible amended or successor treaty
regime, which will also need to be satisfactory to those
who are not unhappy with the current arrangements.
While it is not difficult for experts to imagine a revised
or replaced NPT regime that would be both fairer and
more effective, it is virtually impossible, for us at least,
to imagine how to reach universal agreement to any
change that would actually strengthen it.
One assumption implicit in all of the above is
the continuing centrality of the nation-state. Despite
the importance of issues that regularly cross borders
(which is one of the major reasons for having multi-
lateral organizations in the first place), and of transna-
tional belief systems, both religious and ideological,
which can inspire both states and nonstate actors, the
fundamental security structures continue to be states,
and, in some special cases (NATO being the most
prominent and most successful), assemblages thereof
that scrupulously respect their members’ sovereignty.
For a time, there was a feeling that an ever deeper EU
might invalidate this observation. The Euro crisis is
a strong counterargument. Whether nation-states
are here to stay, they will retain their central role in
international security for at least as long as any new
grand strategy remains relevant, and probably much
longer. It is more difficult to predict the nature of the
119
structures in which states will aggregate themselves
in quest of security. Survival is a core interest. Thus,
over a finite period of time, in the presence of a clearly
defined threat or threats, a collective security arrange-
ment can continue, if the cost is not too high. In the case
of NATO and the EU, among others, shared values
also have strengthened the bonds among their found-
ing states and thus of the organizations themselves,
and the accession process has fortified those values in
many of the states that sought to join both organiza-
tions over the years. But both have now reached the
point where further expansion is decreasingly plausi-
ble, and the bruised feelings of unsuccessful aspirants
to membership will be reflected in new geopolitical
fault lines.
Although NATO and the EU have never been im-
mune to a similar failing, the UN’s concept of uni-
versal membership soon made it impossible to con-
ceal the disjunction between noble aspirations and
frequently ignoble reality, especially as related to the
conduct, both internal and external, of member states.
Moreover, while actually acting on the basis of shared
values can in many circumstances increase the attrac-
tiveness of such organizations, both the costs and risks
of doing so, the many incomplete successes, and the
painful reality that good deeds are rarely done consis-
tently can undercut internal cohesiveness, especially
with respect to perceived “free riders,” including
those in positions of authority. Institutional inertia
and clever efforts at reinvention can keep organiza-
tions going much longer than many might have pre-
dicted, but such measures can sometimes conceal the
fact that the organizations themselves are hollowing
out. The League of Nations did not formally disband
until 1946, but beginning with the Japanese invasion
120
of Manchuria in 1931, it had ceased to be a serious part
of the security landscape.
Looking forward, global power is realigning itself,
and not in a peacebuilding-friendly way. Even more
than was the case in the 1990s, neither Europe nor Ja-
pan has the resources or the domestic political base
to take on additional international burdens, either to
maintain or reinvent the international security order.
None of the newly aspiring powers of the 21st cen-
tury, even China, is going to achieve the level of global
dominance that, combined with an attractive set of
political, economic, and cultural ideas, made possible
America’s post-1945 creation moment and sustained
it thereafter. Even in the unlikely event that some
partial, and probably fragile, successor order were to
emerge, anyone expecting that it would be based on
the values that have underlain the post-World War II
order as described above should examine the reasons
for making such an assumption.
QUO VADIMUS?
121
actual practice. Peacebuilding in this sense is simply
not an endeavor which there is any good reason to ex-
pect that the American body politic can be persuaded
is a good investment of scarce discretionary resources.
With the possible exception of Bosnia, popular sup-
port for serious and sustained efforts in this regard has
come about only when they have been seen as an ele-
ment of the active conduct of a specific kind of armed
conflict (primarily Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan)—the
sort of conflict for which popular support can be guar-
anteed to wane over time, with a consequent collapse
of support for the peacebuilding supplement to the
military mission. But in the coming years, this sort of
peacebuilding is not likely even to be given a chance
to have the rug pulled out from underneath it, since
for political, economic, and military reasons—and in
the expected absence of anything comparable to the
Cold War “containment of Communist expansion”
argument that underlay Vietnam, or the 9/11-related
rationales for Iraq and Afghanistan—the political and
economic barriers to American entry to another con-
flict of that sort are now so high as to be almost insur-
mountable, and are likely to remain so for the life of
any potential new grand strategy.
Nonetheless, peacebuilding will remain an active
and important component of international relations.
This is particularly true with regard to work done by
NGOs around the world. A wide range of organiza-
tions specialize in different facets of peacebuilding.
Much of their funding comes from U.S. agencies, or
counterparts from other developed countries, as well
as from various parts of the UN family. This will likely
continue, although probably at reduced levels. There
is a vibrant peacebuilding community, which has
developed increasing and impressive coherence and
patterns of collaboration.35 This kind of peacebuilding
122
work will continue to be noted in future National Se-
curity Strategies of the United States, along with many
other important endeavors. But to the extent that
these documents actually reflect a governmentally
crafted and executed grand strategy to which major
government resources are devoted, peacebuilding is
not likely to be a central element of it.
Humanitarian relief (as distinct from humanitarian
intervention) will continue to enjoy popular support,
to a much greater extent than traditional develop-
ment efforts. However, for either relief or develop-
ment, both the executive and especially the legisla-
tive branches are likely to be increasingly tight-fisted
with funding, and ever vigilant against being drawn
down the slippery slope into stabilization, let alone
counterinsurgency. This will almost certainly mean
that many dangerous situations threatening Ameri-
can interests will not be directly addressed, and that
the hard-learned lessons of how to do these jobs right
will not get a chance to be applied. Failed, failing, and
fragile states are not conducive to international sta-
bility, but from a cost-benefit standpoint, Americans
(or Europeans, Japanese, Australians, or Canadians)
are not likely to devote much beyond token resources
to trying to address this problem. To put it mildly,
peacebuilding success stories are scarce, at least on a
strategic scale, and money is even more scarce. When
it comes to peacebuilding, we should thus expect to
see a lot less of the same.
“Conflict management,” however, was defined in
a broader way. Conflict itself is not going away, and
there will be an abiding U.S. concern to protect, and if
possible advance, its own interests and equities. For
reasons of self-interest (enlightened or otherwise), it
will wish to try to help keep such conflicts from turn-
ing violent, particularly (perhaps almost exclusively)
123
between and among states. Conflicts of particular con-
cern as of this writing would include the nuclear pro-
liferation-generated standoff between Israel and Iran,
the perennial enmity between India and Pakistan, and
Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the South China
Sea. More could be added to the list even now, and if
the argument outlined above about the potential end
of the post-World-War-II security order is valid, other
sources of conflict, including some problems long
thought resolved or even forgotten, could well join
the list in coming years. Economic and resource con-
flicts—not always violent, though often having that
potential, but in any case directly threatening domes-
tic prosperity in the United States and elsewhere—
also loom on the horizon.
The need to manage such conflicts is likely to be
much more compelling, and the prospects of success
to appear at least somewhat less unpromising, than
on-the-ground peacebuilding. Not long after the fall
of the Berlin Wall, one of the few American diplomats
who foresaw that development told one of us that the
coming years would bring a return to traditional diplo-
macy, by which he meant a much more complex set of
international interactions than those which had been
governed by the structure that the East/West divide
had provided during the Cold War. For those who ex-
perienced it, the Cold War was complex enough, and
the risks of getting it wrong were sometimes quite
high. It took a bit longer than the diplomat anticipated
for what he predicted to come about, with much of
one decade taken up with efforts at what was referred
to above as “brother’s keeper” internationalism, and
much of another focused on trying to solve problems
in and emerging from the Islamic world. Neither of
these two attempts at a unifying principle has proved
a satisfactory basis for an international security order,
124
and neither is likely to provide a central principle for
any U.S. grand strategy.
What we are likely to see instead is the need for
even more conflict management, if this is understood
as a mix of at least two of the three D’s (defense and
diplomacy—as indicated above, we are less sanguine
about the role of development). Recalling the con-
cerns explored above both about the dangers of taking
trends for granted and the possibilities of contingent
events having disproportionate consequences, both
the diplomats and the military will have to place a
premium on flexibility.36 They will also need to prac-
tice selective engagement, since the threats and chal-
lenges will be multifold and all elements of national
power are going to be on tight rations for some time
to come. “Doing more with less” is a fine phrase, but
as a guide to policy, it is too often used as a pretext to
avoid prioritization.
While keeping in mind the precursors to the
“Nightfall” threats noted above, as well as the rise of
China (see Chapter 12 by Liselotte Odgaard in this
volume) and, the decline and possible fall of the post-
World War II security order, challenges that a U.S.
grand strategy will need to address include aggres-
sive nonstate actors of all kinds (including, but by no
means limited to, terrorists); the possible end of the
taboo on the actual use of nuclear weapons, which,
paradoxically coupled with the extended deterrence of
the U.S. nuclear guarantee, has been a key element of
the post-World War II order; revolutionary develop-
ments in technology; the vulnerability of Information
Technology (IT)-centric infrastructure; and continuing
uncertainty over whether economic growth can be re-
stored, sustained, and made more widespread, as well
as how to manage access to vital and sometimes scarce
natural resources. (The reasons why a would-be grand
125
strategy becomes just another policy compendium are
all too apparent.) Recalling the comments earlier in
this chapter about the difficulties of prediction, there
will be many developments that in retrospect may ap-
pear obvious, but which to those who have to discern
them looking forward are not obvious at all. In short,
there will be no shortage of conflicts to manage, and
we will all need to keep getting better at it if we want
this story to have a happy ending.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5
126
5. Dan Snodderly, ed., Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Con-
flict Management and Peacebuilding, Washington, DC: Academy for
International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, United
States Institute of Peace, 2011, p. 15.
11. Andrew Roberts, ed., What Might Have Been: Leading His-
torians on Twelve ‘What Ifs” of History, London, UK: Phoenix, 2005,
p. 8. Roberts takes the quote from “a framed letter written by Al-
dous Huxley in 1959” which he has “by my desk at home.”
13. George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st
Century, London, UK: Allison & Busby, 2010, pp. 1-13. In pp. 1-3,
Friedman looks back at the 20th century. The remaining 10 pages
of the “overture” look forward.
127
14. Ian Morris, Why the West Rules—For Now: The Patterns of
History, and What They Reveal About the Future, New York: Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux, 2010, pp. 582-583. His “social development”
metrics are explained in an appendix, pp. 623-645. See also pp.
591 and 608.
See also Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Tran-
scend Biology, New York: Viking Penguin, 2005, p. 7.
128
professional association voted it “the best science fiction story of
all time,” where “story” means short story and “all time” means
1929-64, following which the SFWA began making annual awards.
Together with the other stories that were selected, “Nightfall” can
thus be found in Robert Silverberg, ed., The Science Fiction Hall
of Fame, Vol. I, New York: Tor Books, 2003 [orig. 1970]). Morris’s
bibliography cites Isaac Asimov, The Complete Short Stories I, New
York: Bantam, 1990).
129
Most human beings have an almost infinite capacity for taking
things for granted. By the mere fact of having come into exis-
tence, the most amazing novelty becomes in a few months, even
a few days, a familiar and, as it were, self-evident part of the
environment.
130
30. Accounts of the efforts to put atomic energy and associat-
ed weaponry under international control include John H. Barton
and Lawrence D. Weiler, eds., International Arms Control: Issues
and Agreements, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976, p. 70;
United Nations Department of Political and Security Council Af-
fairs, The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970, New York:
United Nations, 1970; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My
Years in the State Department, New York: W. W. Norton & Com-
pany, 1969, pp. 149-156.
131
commitment to open markets. Our initial assessment is that while
there are many reasons to welcome a possible future of U.S. “en-
ergy abundance,” in and of itself such a development is not likely
to remedy our economic woes, nor to turn back the receding tide
of political support for maintaining the post-World War II inter-
national security order as described below. In any case, even the
cursory treatment of this footnote illustrates the importance of
carefully considering what one is taking for granted when think-
ing about the future.
132
CHAPTER 6
INTRODUCTION
133
a discussion of the threshold questions, the ones that
will provide the necessary context for the proposal:
What is grand strategy? Does America have one?
134
With that understood, the Duke program defines
American grand strategy as:
135
dent judiciary, and other attributes that help to avoid
the kinds of pressures that can manifest themselves in
violence when individuals and groups feel hopelessly
subjugated by governments who simplistically cater
to an undifferentiated version of “popular” will.
Yet it is nevertheless true that these concepts—free
enterprise and liberal democracy—when tempered
by the considerations just discussed, provide the best
hope of reconciling mankind’s inherent impulse to act
in its own best interests, with a parallel need to act col-
laboratively in a complex and interconnected world.
Certainly these values have imperfect characteristics,
but overall, they have proven superior to other con-
cepts of human organization.
136
religion, ideology, cultural identity, and more—they
can rationalize a sense of entitlement of superiority for
themselves. Such perceptions can translate—however
illogically—into a belief that those so disposed pos-
sess the power to achieve their ends by force. Efforts
to dissuade such conclusions can be effective, but have
their limits simply because intransigence can also be a
feature of the human mind, and one that can contami-
nate the thinking of entire societies, to include those
who are otherwise cosmopolitan and even generally
pacific.
Plato reportedly adroitly observed that “only the
dead have seen the end of war.” Thus, we must accept
that the nature of the human condition is such that
for the foreseeable future—irrespective of any grand
strategy—the vagaries of the human condition—not to
mention humanity’s aggressive impulses—will con-
tinue to challenge the success of an American grand
strategy as I defined it.
Yet the inevitability of human conflict does not
mean we should abandon efforts to avoid it. Every
instance of success represents lives saved and futures
preserved. Even where violence cannot be avoided,
efforts to ameliorate and limit its effects are patently
worthy endeavors because they readily encourage a
minimization of human suffering, as well as help cre-
ate a space, so to speak, for liberal democracy and free
enterprise to take root and prosper.
The question then is how best to create those
spaces in an era of the ever present risk of violence? In
an interesting article in the March/April 2012 issue of
Foreign Affairs entitled “A Clear and Present Safety,”
the authors Micha Zenko and Michael A. Cohen as-
sert that America is safer and more secure than ever
before, and faces no great power rival and no serious
137
threats.5 According to Zenko and Cohen, the United
States needs a foreign policy that reflects that reality.
138
may cheer but, unfortunately, many are not necessar-
ily the friends of peace.
The real value of U.S. military power is that its mere
existence in many instances permits—and gives gravi-
tas to—the very civilian/nongovernmental organiza-
tion (NGO) soft power concepts Zenko et al. endorse.
To be sure, it is quite true that many successes in the
past were the product of diplomatic, humanitarian,
economic, and other distinctly nonmilitary efforts, but
they were accomplished in a world where enormous
American military power was always lurking in the
background. The reality, as uncomfortable as it may
be for many, is that the U.S. military is the irreplace-
able peace enabler in today’s world.
There is little reason to assume that the same kind
of soft-power victories that Zenko and others celebrate
would be possible if the military equation is altered
in a serious way. Should the overwhelming U.S. con-
ventional—and unconventional—capability recede,
adversaries may see opportunity, perhaps not today,
but in the foreseeable future. Once a capability is dis-
mantled—as has been done by the United States with
the F-22 manufacturing line9—it is very difficult, if not
impossible, to resurrect it. We must never forget that
U.S. military power takes the military option off the
table for many competitors. Economic, social, politi-
cal, etc., competitions remain, but creating an environ-
ment where the military option becomes conceivable
is hardly a desirable outcome.
To be clear, one might rightly agree that U.S. mili-
tary spending must come down to some degree in or-
der to help get our economic house in order, and that
the nonmilitary elements of American power need to
be better brought to bear in the execution of Ameri-
can grand strategy in the years to come. Yet, some still
139
believe that U.S. military might must remain the fun-
damental—if not central—element of American grand
strategy for as long as we can imagine.
140
dayeen to achieve some tactical success against sup-
port troops poorly prepared for infantry combat. This
became something of a “proof of concept” for Iraqi
insurgents that U.S. troops were, in fact, vulnerable.
It would have been far better to have exercised
more patience and allowed American air and artil-
lery to progressively devastate Iraq’s elite military
formations. Instead, they were allowed to melt away
and form the core of the insurgency, which was never
really crushed in nearly a decade of occupation. The
Iraqi people—to include especially those who became
the resistance—never internalized the shattering sense
of defeat that enabled the Germans and Japanese at
the end of World War II to abandon their deeply em-
bedded militaristic, racist, and totalitarian ideologies.
Despite the experience with Japan and Germany,
American leaders do not seem to fully comprehend
what it takes to truly transform entire societies in a
timeline shorter than several generations. Curiously,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin
Dempsey admitted that the aim of purging Afghani-
stan of the Taliban could have been achieved militar-
ily, since the United States:
141
on the destruction of the enemy—the Taliban in this
instance—invariably involves the wholesale oblitera-
tion of civilians and their property, he underestimates
the revolutionary capabilities of a technological revo-
lution that allows force to be applied in a discrete
way that is fully lawful and moral. That technologi-
cal revolution has, according to retired General Barry
R. McCaffrey, “fundamentally changed the nature of
warfare” by allowing the rise of persistent, long-term
reconnaissance and precision strikes.14
It is becoming increasingly clear that force—par-
ticularly in counterinsurgency (COIN) situations—is
the proven solution, especially when rapid results are
needed. As Professor Anna Simons of the Naval Post-
graduate School contends:
142
COIN theorists who disparage the efficacy of force.
In April 2011, the Washington Post reported that in
Afghanistan, the:
143
ate local populations, succeed less and cost more.”22
More recently, John Brennan, Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,
pointed out:
144
expense of deploying one American Soldier to Af-
ghanistan for 1 year has ballooned to $1.2 million,26 a
figure to which planners must be especially sensitive
now that the U.S. public is supporting substantial cuts
in defense spending.27
While it does seem that it might be cheaper to
deploy civilians to accomplish many of the nation-
building tasks currently performed by the military,
the viability of that option is suspect.28 As a Congres-
sional Research Service report dated February 2, 2012,
entitled Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Mis-
sions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress, re-
veals, the U.S. Government’s ability to conduct such
missions remains deeply flawed, if not in disarray.29
In any event, there is a tyranny of numbers involved,
as even the most optimistic assessments do not con-
template many more than 2,000 experts would be
involved, even if resources outside of government
were tapped.30
Just as problematic is the sheer difficulty of peace-
building and conflict management in deeply flawed
societies under circumstances where, as indicated
above, the political decision has been made not to use
force to the extent that has proven successful in past
situations, even if it can be applied in a way that is
fully lawful and moral. Still, in conflict management
situations, force will necessarily have to be employed,
but likely not via large numbers of American ground
forces. The models for the future are more likely to be
along the lines of the Kosovo intervention of the late
1990s and Libya in 2011. As the New York Times put it:
145
ons fired from sea and air with the heaviest load car-
ried by partner nations—in the case of Libya, European
allies and even some Arab states. 31
146
trainer. As of this writing, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) lost 19 soldiers to such attacks
in 2012 alone.35
A FRESH ENVIRONMENT
147
and deploying skilled and experienced civilians to
remote and dangerous locales would be markedly
eased, especially if facilities could be located in the
United States. Importantly, there are models already
existing in the U.S. military of such programs working
successfully. For example, the U.S. Air Force operates
the Inter-American Air Forces Academy at Lackland
Air Force base in San Antonio, Texas, where techni-
cal courses are taught, “in Spanish and in English, to
students from more than 22 countries every year.”37
To be successful, the scope of such schools and
other educational facilities must be large and diverse.
Even for a country the size of Afghanistan, this could
involve tens of thousands of individuals each year.
While certainly costly, it can hardly compare with
the $1 million plus cost of sending a U.S. person to
Afghanistan for a peacebuilding operation. Creating
such a structure within the United States (or, perhaps,
another country) may not be practical, but it may be
possible to build a dedicated program within the ex-
isting American educational structure. For example,
a program for advanced education might be con-
structed under the aegis of Kennesaw State’s Program
in International Conflict Management, where interna-
tional students are given the opportunity to learn in
the relative safety and security of an authentic Ameri-
can setting—and evaluate for themselves the potential
application to their native country.
An important element of such an “off shore” ap-
proach would be the availability of training and edu-
cation in the native language of the students, while
at the same time making English-language instruction
available. Further, opportunities could be crafted for
the students to learn about American culture and val-
ues. This is, emphatically, not intended to displace the
148
culture and values of the students’ home countries, but
rather to help dispel the misperceptions of the United
States that can arise in nations needing peacebuilding
and conflict management.
This educational process can be supplemented by
in-country and online programs (in the indigenous
language) by means of equipment and facilities sup-
plied by the United States but manned by local nation-
als. Moreover, mentoring relationships can be built
and maintained through daily interactions via Skype
or similar technologies, to include social media for-
mats. Again, the physical presence of some U.S. per-
sonnel cannot (and, likely, should not) be eliminated,
but the numbers could be reduced to the level that re-
alistically can be accommodated by programs such as
the Civilian Response Corps.
CONCLUSION
149
supported by extractive political institutions that im-
pede and even block economic growth.”38 This cannot
be offset merely by digging wells, building clinics, or
even economic development projects; it may necessi-
tate dramatic changes in attitudes among leadership
and other elites. Indeed, without appropriate institu-
tional leaders, any physical assets provided become
yet one more cause for conflict as corrupt power bro-
kers scramble for control of anything of value.
It is a mistake to underestimate the difficulty of
rooting out venality writ large in less than a genera-
tion. This is one reason our efforts in Afghanistan
remain stymied. As General David Petraeus said in
2010, “there’s no question that corruption has been,
for however long this country has probably been in
existence, been part of the–literally the culture,”39 a
point reiterated recently by former Secretary of De-
fense Leon Panetta.40 Indeed, “too much corruption,”
along with “too many Afghan deserters” and “too few
NATO trainers,” has been reported as a key obstacle
to training Afghans to take over security duties once
NATO departs.41
Even those disposed to be optimistic about the
outcome in Afghanistan have no illusions about the
depth of this societal flaw and what it will take to over-
come it. Major General H. R. McMaster, who led a task
force to root out corruption, was recently reported as
saying that:
150
large influx of international assistance that came into a
government that lacked mature institutions.’42
151
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6
3. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 81.
7. Ibid., p. 91.
9. John Tirpak, “The F-22 and Clout Deficit,” Air Force Mag-
azine, July 23, 2012, available from www.airforce-magazine.com/
DRArchive/Pages/2012/July%202012/July%2023%202012/TheF-
22andCloutDeficit.aspx, quoting Air Force Chief of Staff Norton
Schwartz as saying there is “no chance” of restarting the F-22
manufacturing line.
11. Ibid.
152
12. A Conversation with General Martin Dempsey, Washington,
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 1, 2012,
available from carnegieendowment.org/files/050112_transcript_
dempsey.pdf.
13. Ibid.
153
ignated by Headquarters Marine Corps Development Command,
Department of the Navy, as Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
No. 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, December 15, 2006, p. 1, available
from www.scribd.com/doc/9137276/US-Army-Field-Manual-FM-324-
Counterinsurgency.
154
24. Fox News Poll (conducted by Anderson Robbins Research
(D) and Shaw & Company Research, April 22-24, 2012, available
from www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm.
155
32. Thomas X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strat-
egy,” Infinity Magazine, Spring 2012, p. 10, available from www.in-
finityjournal.com/article/53/Offshore_Control_A_Proposed_Strategy.
34. Scott Wilson and Jon Cohen, “Poll Finds Broad Support
for Obama’s Counterterrorism Policies,” Washington Post, Febru-
ary 8, 2012, available from www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-
finds-broad-support-for-obamas-counterterrorism-policies/2012/02/07/
gIQAFrSEyQ_story.html.
156
3, 2012, available from www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=5025:
157
CHAPTER 7
ALWAYS AN OUTSIDER:
U.S. MILITARY ROLE
IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING
William Flavin
159
the host country and the other international actors be-
cause of its institutional processes and the temporary
nature of its involvement. The military will be asked
to undertake a wide variety of tasks beyond its basic
combat skills because of its ability to plan, organize,
respond, and mobilize resources. It is an institution
noted for seizing the initiative, taking action, and get-
ting results. Those are the qualities that will be most
needed initially in stabilizing a situation and allowing
peacebuilding to proceed.
This chapter will consider just what can be known
by the U.S. military about another society, its struc-
tural issues, its resilience, its long-term grievances,
and its vision for the future. What can the military re-
alistically be expected to understand about the other
international and regional actors? By its actions, the
military will have an effect on the host nation but is
it capable of understanding and controlling what that
effect will be? How much is the military self-aware of
the consequences of its actions in supporting peace-
building? Does the military have institutional inhibi-
tors that proscribe what it can reasonably be expected
to do? It is an organization whose main focus is on
finding, fixing, fighting, and finishing an enemy. How
does this institutional bias advance or retard peace-
building? Does the military’s culture prevent that
level of collaboration that is needed within the whole
of U.S. Government and with the nongovernmental
organization (NGO) and international government
organization (IGO) community to support successful
peacebuilding missions?
In many instances the military will be necessary, so
the chapter will propose a way ahead, building upon
the strengths of the military institution. It will look at
the knowledge, skills, and abilities that the military
160
can and should possess and how to address the gaps
that will exist.
UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS
161
local economics and landowners, hazy about who the
powerbrokers are and how we might influence them,
incurious about the correlations between various de-
velopment projects and the levels of cooperation of
villagers, and disengaged from people in the best posi-
tion to find answers—whether aid workers or Afghan
soldiers—U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do
little but shrug in response to high level decision-mak-
ers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information
they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency2
162
Visitors Are Only Told What the Host Wants
Them to Know.
163
for information. The source of their information was
to be the former Japanese occupiers, Koreans who had
collaborated with the Japanese, and Korean elite who
possessed an excellent grasp of English. Each of these
groups had an agenda, and the military force was not
able to clearly understand to what extent they were
being manipulated. The U.S. military government
formed their initial ideas about Korea during the first
months of occupation on the 350 separate memoranda
drafted by Japanese officials. Based on this biased
input, the U.S. occupational command looked upon
Korea as “hopeless as a society,” and this informed
future planning and decisions. Many of the crises and
problems faced by the United States during the occu-
pation, and their approaches to those problems, were
based on questionable local sources of information,
each of which had an agenda.4
There are symbols, rituals, behavior models, and
linguistic practices that take many years to master,
and the military just does not have the time to develop
such an understanding. Additionally, the military
must depend on sources that may be hostile to military
forces in general. Many times, external sources must
be relied upon that may not be telling the complete
story. It is also in the host nation’s interest to maintain
the initiative so that the outcomes can be shaped in ac-
cordance with its agenda and therefore will shape the
information provided. The host nation knows that the
U.S. military will not be there forever and therefore
must continually shape its environment for life when
the U.S. military departs.
164
Policymakers Develop Goals Based on this
Inadequate Understanding and Wishful Thinking.
165
possible in exporting the U.S. model of civil military
interaction to another country. There are differing cul-
tural reference points between the U.S. military train-
ers trying to impart a concept of a military in a demo-
cratic society to another country that has a different
historical perspective. It will not be enough just to
professionalize the host nation’s military force. Millet
has recorded how the United States professionalized
several militaries in Central America, only to see them
impose military rule.7
166
and provided requisite authorities and funding that
reinforce separation. Over time, the U.S. bureaucracy
has grown into a maze of overlapping, redundant,
and conflicting structures that has compounded the
challenge. A study of complex contingency operations
found that:
167
hired. But the result was that they left their traditional
clan areas and the influence of the clan elders and
became the unemployed, shiftless, and desperate ele-
ments in the city. Here, war lords such as Mohammad
Farah Aidid could prey upon them. The U.S. military
force was unaware that the presence of their support
base was destabilizing the social contract within So-
mali society and that the lure of filling contracts was
having a destabilizing social impact.9
The problems can be even more subtle and can in-
fluence ideas and attitudes and affect the legitimacy of
the operation. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, rumors
were started at various times that the U.S. command
was contracting local men to work in the dining fa-
cilities, forcing these devout Muslims to handle pork.
Many of the workers that were actually employed
were third country nationals, some of whom were
indeed Muslim. Additionally, many Muslim contrac-
tor employees who were secretaries and support staff
ate at these dining facilities where forbidden fare was
served. The “All American Food” served at the din-
ing facilities by the contractor not only provided fare
for the propagandist, but also failed to build the local
capacity that the mission was all about.
None of the succulent tomatoes or the crisp cu-
cumbers grown in Iraq made it into the salad bar.
U.S. government regulations dictated that everything,
even the water in which hot dogs were boiled, was to
be shipped in from approved suppliers in other na-
tions. Milk and bread were trucked in from Kuwait,
as were tinned peas and carrots. The breakfast cereal
was flown in from the United States, made in the USA.
Fruit Loops and Frosted Flakes at the breakfast table
helped boost morale.10
168
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is
substantially engaged in development activities en-
abled by a significant funding tool, the Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP). Over 60 per-
cent of the U.S. funds supporting reconstruction in Af-
ghanistan are allocated via the Department of Defense
(DoD). The effects of this funding on Afghanistan are
significant. Yet by all accounts, in both Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, there has been an inability to determine
just what effect this spending has had in the long term
on accomplishing the overall U.S. objectives. The Spe-
cial Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR)
has conducted over 370 audits and inspections, five
lessons learned reports, and hundreds of investiga-
tions, and has had problems connecting programs
with outcomes. There have been repeated calls to bet-
ter monitor these programs so as to understand the
connections between the actions of the U.S. military,
who are addressing the drivers of conflict, and oth-
ers, who are building the appropriate local capacity to
reach sustainable peace.11
169
attempted to address. Sebastian Junger, in his book
“War,” records these stereotypes, prejudices, and the
effects they have on the relationships with the people
and the ability to gain valuable information from the
people. This also relates to the ability to use the lan-
guage. Again, the need for interpreters also isolates
the Soldier. The interpreter creates his own reality,
manipulating both sides of the engagement, either
intentionally or unintentionally. There are many ex-
amples of this happening. The U.S. military has at-
tempted to deal with this issue by arranging training
sessions with interpreters, but usually only for staff
and commanders and not for the infantryman who is
in contact with the locals.12
Members of the U.S. military will come with an un-
derstandable cultural bias about how a military force
should be organized and the relationship of that force
to the democratic organs of government. That bias will
inform their approach toward the security force assis-
tance mission. The recipient military may come from
an entirely different tradition with an entirely differ-
ent outlook. Unless that bias can be overcome and a
workable solution reached, skills can be transferred,
but transformation will not be achieved.13
INSTITUTIONAL REALITY
170
The Military Is Used as a Stop Gap Because of Its
Response and Resources.
171
Military Designs Measurements to Meet Its Needs
and End States.
172
Military Focus Is on Short-Term Security as the
Sine-Qua-Non, and Peacebuilding Is Secondary,
Supporting, and of Lesser Importance.
173
plan was not being implemented properly because
structurally and procedurally units are optimized for
combat. The S-3 Operations section focused on secu-
rity, and other parts of the civil/military approach
were run out of the civil military operations (CMO)
section that was separated from the operational sec-
tion. In traditional military staffs, the S-3 runs the
operation and has primacy, so naturally, security in
a military sense takes priority. How a unit organizes
and assigns responsibilities for security and peace-
building functions does not reflect current Army doc-
trine as found in Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability, or
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, but reflects the structures
that were developed post-World War II where CMO
became a separate but subordinate staff section.17
The military focus on the security sector tends
to force the other sectors to a secondary status, and
this can influence other actors’ approaches with un-
fortunate long-term results. Javid Ahmad and Lousie
Langeby of the German Marshall Fund make this very
observation about Afghanistan. They conclude that the
focus on security has placed economic development
secondary, and the development that was done was
based around the international security presence.18
Similarly, reports from some members of the Hu-
man Terrain Teams support the observation that, in-
stitutionally, military forces focus on short-term sta-
bility rather than long-term peace building. Mathew
Schehl, who ran a Tactical Human Intelligence Team
in Central Iraq during 2003-05, wrote in his blog that
commanders he dealt with were focused on the imme-
diate, and not the long-term, transformational aspects
of the mission:
174
“Success” is defined in the short term . . . specific objec-
tives are pursued without necessary regard for long-
term implications.
175
accepted to finish the enemy and is sanctioned under
international law. Police framework is to protect civil-
ians and property, while bringing violators of the law
into the justice system. Collateral damage is not ac-
ceptable, and the focus is not on finishing an enemy,
but arresting a suspect and allowing a rule of law sys-
tem to process that suspect.
Information is handled differently in each system.
In the military, intelligence is developed to find and
fix the enemy so that enemy can be defeated. In the
justice system, information is gathered to prosecute a
suspect. That information must meet the criteria of the
rule of law system to be admissible.
The military has often been required not only to
perform police duties, but also to train and equip po-
lice. This is caused either by a lack of civil police assis-
tance or frustration of the military with the progress of
police development. The results have not always been
successful. Based on the frameworks above, police
trained by the military tend to resemble mini-infantry
units. In Afghanistan, they were designed to supple-
ment the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. Police
trained solely by the military, and not as part of a com-
prehensive security sector reform package, tended not
to be responsive to local controls, and they exhibited
centralized control outside of state controls. Order and
security often trumped justice and the development of
a rule of law system. It sought to increase the power of
the central government to provide security but ended
up supporting nondemocratic processes.20
176
Reality of Long-Term Development Clashes with
Short-Term Reality of Military Engagement.
177
ghanistan and Iraq armies. The initial approach was a
quick fix to get into the field forces capable of handling
the insurgent threat. Both programs went through
growing pains requiring restarting the programs with
more realistic objectives and longer lead times.
When the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
for Iraq was established in 2003, it had neither the time
nor the resources to plan and execute effectively. The
CPA was asked to provide results immediately but re-
ality overcame the enterprise, and the largest rebuild-
ing program in history grew far beyond what was
envisioned. Between May and July 2003, planned U.S.
expenditures had increased nine-fold over what was
anticipated. The story of the mismatch between goals,
time, and resources in both Afghanistan and Iraq has
been described by many SIGIR reports and in other
books and journals.22
178
tion and expectations of programs that are, in essence,
development programs take many years to be proven
successful.23
179
Pacification, the second component, presented the real
challenge . . . it was benevolent government action in
areas where the government should always have been
benevolently active . . . doing both was necessary if
Vietnamization were to work.
WHAT IS POSSIBLE
180
Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). It was based
on USAID’s conflict assessment framework that bor-
rowed from the World Bank’s tools. It was the basis for
the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF)
and the subsequent District Stability Framework used
in Afghanistan. Its purpose was to develop a common
understanding among all agencies of government of
the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict.
Although approved by the Deputies Committee and
written into the stability doctrine of the military, it has
not found universal application. It has been used in
support of embassies over 35 times since its inception,
but there is neither systemic application nor training
in the U.S. military on its application. This initiative
needs to be continued and improved.25
Leader education is key and essential to under-
standing. The Center for New American Security’s
February 2010 report, Keeping The Edge: Revitalizing
America’s Military Officer Corps, concludes that the
education for officers is inadequate to address the cur-
rent and emerging security concerns, and an overhaul
of the education programs is essential.26
181
There are other calls for action along with several
recent articles to institutionalize proper education at
all levels of military officers that address full spec-
trum operations. The Winter 2009-10 issue of Param-
eters, U.S. Army War College, devoted a major section
toward developing the strategic leader. The articles
have identified the challenge in the past in institution-
alizing such subjects as cross-cultural understand-
ing that are critical for full spectrum operations and
recommending solutions. Additionally, the House of
Representatives Report on Professional Military Education
examined to what extent the U.S. military services are
incorporating irregular warfare and stability into their
curricula. It concluded that although there has been
some progress, it is not enough. It stated that the:
182
That doctrine stresses the need to understand how your
unit and its actions appear to the enemy before you
can hope to manipulate the enemy’s perceptions. The
same concept of understanding yourself and the con-
sequences of your actions should be applied concern-
ing peacebuilding. The most basic question should be
asked: What are the indirect effects of conducting op-
erations like running a fire base? Just the presence of a
large logistical military footprint in a country can alter
the operational environment. If the command has not
completed an in-depth assessment as the framework
requires, then it will be operating in the blind and ex-
ecuting support contracts that will counteract what
the comprehensive development programs are trying
to achieve. Displacement of local capacity or alteration
of the social economic factors needs to be considered
when building a large U.S. footprint in a country. This
understanding of the force must include contract sup-
port. Direct contracting affects the host government,
the elites, and the people of the country and there-
fore can have immediate and long-term impact. The
purpose of this contracting is to interact directly with
the locals to produce an effect that supports mission
accomplishment. Examples are training, educating,
and advising host nation military, paramilitary, and
police forces; training, educating, and advising all
ministries of the government, both national and lo-
cal, on conducting security sector reform that includes
reform of penal, judicial, and legal codes as well as
disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating into civil
society; assisting in intelligence operations to include
interrogations, providing security forces, both static
and mobile, in support of the movement and delivery
of people and goods; and establishing and managing
command, control, and communication centers. These
183
are the contractors that are most likely to be armed
and the most likely to use deadly force. All of these
activities directly advance the U.S. mission in theater.
This effort must focus foremost on building effective,
legitimate, and resilient states. The ultimate responsi-
bility for the stabilization and reconstruction process
belongs to the host nation. This means all efforts of
both the U.S. Government and their contractors must
assist the host nation government and civil society
to ensure that they lead and participate in both plan-
ning and implementation. Utilization of host nation
processes and structures, both formal and informal,
builds ownership. The key issue is how to meet imme-
diate needs, yet also build long-term capacity. There
is a tradeoff between relying on private contractors
or U.S. governmental agencies to meet the immediate
needs of the population and thereby reduce the risk
of instability; while laying the more time-consuming
groundwork for state institutions to deliver essential
services and strengthen the legitimacy and effective-
ness of a nascent democracy. The other concern is de-
termining what tasks should be contracted and what
tasks need to remain in the hands of U.S. governmen-
tal agencies. The tendency in Iraq and Afghanistan has
been to use the United States or third country nations
as an immediate solution to obtain stability. As of June
2009, nearly 88 percent of the contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan were third country nationals, only 8 per-
cent were local, and the rest were US nationals. What
are the implications of using third country nationals?29
The division between what should be a U.S. Gov-
ernment face versus a contractor face must be deter-
mined by the outcomes. The U.S. objective is to instill
a concept of democratic governance that is responsive
to the needs of the people. A U.S. governmental face
184
in key advisory positions sends a different message
from a contractor face, even if that contactor is a sub-
ject matter expert. There must be a collaborative ap-
proach and a determination as to what messages need
to be sent to achieve the effect desired. A combination
of current federal employees and contracted person-
nel providing expert assistance can work well to in-
still the ideas of democratic control. It becomes dif-
ficult to convince local governors, chiefs of police, and
politicians in Afghanistan not to hire their own illegal
and unlicensed private military companies (PMCs)
when the United States leads by example in its de-
pendence on such organizations. Dennis Keller made
the following evaluation of the U.S. role in foreign
police training:
185
[International Criminal Investigative Training As-
sistance Program] somewhere behind it in this arena,
neither of these offices nor any other USG agency has
assumed a definitive lead role for foreign law enforce-
ment assistance to coordinate the diverse, multi-agency
array of foreign police training that has slowly grown
as a result of institutional creep to fill a police train-
ing void created by the U.S. Congressional cutoff of
USAID police training activities in 1974. The lack of a
lead agency with overall responsibility for foreign po-
lice training, similar to DoD’s responsibility for foreign
military training, carries with it a number of conse-
quences. The USG has no International Military Educa-
tion and Training (IMET) Program-equivalent to sys-
tematically bring police officers to the U.S. for training,
such as DoD has for foreign military officers. The USG
does not have a comprehensive assessment program,
though one is in development, to identify the state of
law enforcement and police in a foreign country. The
USG has not developed what the military would call
“doctrine,” or agreed upon procedures and principles,
to integrate State INL’s emphasis on the enforcement
aspect of police training, with USAID’s community
policing and overall justice sector and ministerial
reform programs.30
186
capstone doctrine states under the Peacebuilding
Activities section:
187
the whole of the U.S. governmental approach and the
host nation itself so that at the end of the day, the host
nation will have ownership with the ability to deal
with drivers of instability.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7
188
understand local issues. If the Kenyans would just adopt the U.S.
model, all would be OK. Kenya rejected this recommendation.
189
15. William Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, Car-
lisle, PA: Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute, March 23,
2004, pp. 20-21; Captain Devin Flavin, artillery office, 173rd Af-
ghanistan, 2007, interview by author in Carlisle, PA, 2010.
18. Javid Ahmad and Louse Langeby, “Can the Afghan Econ-
omy be saved?” Foreign Policy, February 3, 2012, e mail message to
author dated February 5, 2012.
190
25. Caroline Earle, “Taking Stock: Interagency Integration in
Stability Operations,” Prism, Vol. 3, No. 2, March 2012, pp. 41-42.
26. Dr. John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton, ed., Keeping The
Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps, Washington DC:
Center for a New American Security, February 2010.
27. Ibid., p. 6.
191
CHAPTER 8
Christopher Holshek
193
come to bear unless: first, civil-military coordination
is seen as strategic rather than merely operational or
tactical; and second, that civil-military coordination
must essentially be the application of the democratic
civil-military relationship—and thus military action is
through, and in support of, civilian organizations and
local government entities. This is in the best interest
of all stakeholders, especially the military. To attain
such economies of effort, cost, and risk at all levels,
the actions of uniformed state instrumentalities must
be consonant with their own societal values. In policy
and practice, civil-military coordination has to walk
the talk.
This is actually good news for the United States, for
no other nation is better suited to lead this transforma-
tion, given its dynamic, multicultural civil society and
its democratic national values and tremendous social
capital, as well as the U.S. military’s extensive insti-
tutional experience in civil-military coordination—
if, of course, the United States makes the necessary
adjustments.
This strategic opportunity requires exploring: first,
how the grand strategic context for civil-military co-
ordination has changed between the 20th and 21st
centuries; second, the U.S. civil-military relationship
over this time; third, understanding civil-military co-
ordination strategically—i.e., “thinking globally”; and
fourth, understanding civil-military coordination in
application—i.e., “acting locally.”
194
century are less relevant than the emerging, values-
based, bottom-up human security actualities gain-
ing ascendency in a now hyper-connected, global-
ized world—in other words, the referent for security
is increasingly the individual or community rather
than the state.3 The constraints of this transformed
international environment, along with the restraints
of growing resource scarcity and capital shortages
for the United States, other Western countries, the
United Nations (UN), and the wider donor commu-
nity form the two grand strategic imperatives of our
times. These have correspondingly transformed the
functioning paradigm for security, humanitarian re-
lief, and development across the full range of conflict
prevention and management as well as for peace op-
erations, with associated changes in the approach to
the civil-military nexus as a whole.
From a broader perspective, the fundamental shift
in the international order between the 20th and 21st
centuries has been more inflective than intrinsic, par-
ticularly in the balance and interplay between what has
been called “soft” (coercive) and “hard” (persuasive)
power. National power in both its source and applica-
tion is characterized by an industrial-era, state-centric,
top-down, zero-sum, empirical, and calculable game
of war and peace played largely by diplomats and sol-
diers, interest-driven, and manifested mostly in hard
currency and armies. It reached its zenith in the 20th
century. What is now beginning to hold greater sway
is influence, derived from national, societal, and orga-
nizational strengths, rather than state-centric power—
post-industrial, bottom-up, and values-based involv-
ing myriad nonstate and intrastate actors across an
ambiguous spectrum (or cycle) of conflict and peace
and associated complexities. In this new “ecosystem,”
195
Napoleon’s observation that “in war, the moral is to
the physical as three is to one” takes on an even more
appropriate meaning.
Concentrated military, financial, and other forms
of coercive power are the ultimate expression of a
state-centric international order. But what now in-
creasingly characterizes that order is the warp and
woof of a struggle for sociopolitical and economic or-
ganization in the spaces beyond and between states,
amplified and accelerated by the 24/7 media and so-
cial networks that make “the narrative” predominant.
In the 21st century, coercive power is losing both its
dominance and appropriateness. Hard power is more
threats-based, resource-intensive, zero-sum, reactive,
and short-term (i.e., tactical). It is, however, faster-
acting, more controllable, and more measurable. Soft
power, in turn, is more suitable to collaborative, hu-
man security settings. It is community-based, largely
resident in civil society and the private sector, and is
more adaptable, economical, renewable, engaging,
synergistic, and durable (i.e., strategic). It is normally
slower to take effect across a broad, unpredictable
front, although social networking technologies as of
late have had accelerating and amplifying effects.
This is not to say that hard power is obsolete—just
no longer as overriding. In truth, this rebalancing is a
return to a historical American grand strategic equilib-
rium predating the Cold War. Despite National Secu-
rity Council (NSC)-68’s emphasis on diplomacy’s con-
tinued lead in American grand strategy and George
F. Kennan’s refrain to “first use moral authority,” the
“militarization” of applied American power in the lat-
ter half of the 20th century had soft power (in policies,
programs, and budgets) functioning more as a “com-
bat multiplier.” In form as well as function, the face of
196
U.S. foreign policy has been a military one. In truth,
what brought down the Berlin Wall was the tipping
point of rising expectations of Eastern Europeans (not
unlike the social unrest seen in many places today),
while allied military power contained the Soviets. In
other words, hard power was the holding—or con-
taining—action, while soft power was the offensive
dynamic. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
(NATO) vast arsenals enabled what NSC-68 called the
“corrosive power of freedom” to go to work on the
self-contradictions of the Soviet state over time. Self-
determination, an ideal first socialized on an interna-
tional scale by President Woodrow Wilson in the wake
of World War I, became a prime security mover. With
the collapse of that order, the recontextualization and
rebalancing that should have taken place as far back
as 1989 is now more obvious a quarter-century later.
This epochal reality is truer for the United States
than any other country, as the world’s only global
power for the last generation. But its national strategic
style goes much further back in history. Since the Civil
War, the United States has looked to win its wars, de-
ter its adversaries, and assure its allies through over-
whelming industrial and technological superiority
predicated on an abundance of cheap resources, cheap
labor, cheap energy, and cheap capital—it could af-
ford a wasteful, surplus mentality. Since 1945, it had
been the dominant power in the world—it could af-
ford its own interpretation of “exceptionalism,” while
everyone else was internationalizing.
Of equal importance to the grand strategic impera-
tive of environment constraints are resource restraints.
For the first time in centuries, the United States is enter-
ing a newfound era of relative strategic scarcity. It can
no longer take an abundance of resources for granted.
The economic and financial basis of traditional state-
197
centric power is diminishing through a globalization
process that the United States itself has largely set in
motion. Beyond reducing America’s throw-weight in
general, it is translating into an end of unilateral free-
dom of action. “Asymmetric” threats and the rise of
regional powers have already been mitigating long-
standing U.S. advantages, while global competitors
can now better bankroll their own agendas. Perhaps
most importantly, information and social networking
technologies and low-cost socio-cultural enterprises
now present inexpensive equalizers to older, more
costly, and more centralized industrial-era forms of
power. The moral, or psychological, is now plainly
overtaking the physical.
In the 21st century, there is no dominant power as
seen in the prior century. Although the United States
will remain the premier world power for decades to
come, its ability to wield especially more traditional
forms of power will be much more constrained and
restrained by factors less and less within its span of
control. Indeed, the heyday of state-centric power
per se in the new international arena is diminishing.
Power is dissipating into more distributed forms. As
the upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa are
demonstrating, the dynamic is now more about the
strength, influence, and reach of ideas, globally arche-
typical but community-based. More importantly, it is
about how these ideas communicate and work in peo-
ple’s lives—in a word: innovation. In fact, the power
of nation-states alone is becoming less relevant than
the influence of people and organizations networked
outside of and within governments. These are almost
entirely civilian.
In the much more chaotic, unpredictable, and un-
controllable international order of the 21st century,
198
the United States no longer dominates. It can still lead,
albeit with a more strategic, rather than tactical, lead-
ership style. You can use a more coercive and direc-
tive style when you dominate; but when you do not,
you have to lead more persuasively—from behind as
well as the front—as will be explained later.
Along with the changed context for national and
international power is the changed nature of secu-
rity. Security has become more than globalized; it
has also become more humanized, civilianized, and
democratized. Waves of popular unrest in response
to everything from jobs, food prices, public pensions,
poor educational and job opportunities, wealth dis-
parities, and energy and the environment evince a
groundswell of discontent with the inability of elites
to deliver on socioeconomic fundamentals and essen-
tial public services. Security, prosperity, and social
welfare are increasingly intertwined, making it every-
body’s business. In the American psyche, security was
something someone else in a uniform did somewhere
“over there.” But in an intricate, hyper-connected
global ecosystem where minor disturbances can have
worldwide ripple effects in a matter of hours, this is
all changing.
In Africa, for example, home to the bulk of security,
development, and civil-military challenges for de-
cades, “human security”—termed “civilian security”
by the U.S. State Department in predictably exception-
alist fashion—and civil society problems such as pov-
erty and food security, rule of law and justice, gover-
nance, economic development and job creation, and
public health have long defined the security problem,4
calling for approaches going well beyond “whole of
government” to “whole of society.”5 Comprehensive
and collaborative approaches to conflict prevention
199
and post-conflict operations in multilateral, human
security settings are everyday for civil society organi-
zations working there and elsewhere. They stress the
long-term, legitimacy, and relationship-building char-
acteristics of development. In this more normative
paradigm, development, appropriately done, is there-
fore not a component of security, it is security. This
is vital to understanding the difference from security
in the 21st century not as simply an expansion of the
state-centric national security paradigm into social
disciplines—which seems to be the current interpre-
tation in the United States government. Rather, U.S.
development policy is seen more as an instrument of
foreign policy, serving national (security) interests
and aimed at the proliferation of the American model
of political order.
Given the growing limitations of hard power com-
mensurate with the rise of soft power, increasing
interconnectivity of global communities, the integra-
tion of security and development, and burgeoning
resource restraints—all driving more comprehensive,
collaborative, and coordinated approaches, the recon-
textualization, rebalancing, and proper alignment of
the civil-military nexus remains at the locus of inter-
national intervention, whether for humanitarian, de-
velopment, or reasons of state interest.
Yet, the instrumentalities featured in the Ameri-
can approach to the world—indeed, the entire for-
eign policy and national security apparatus of the
United States—remain predicated on a 20th century
paradigm for which “national security” concerns have
trumped all other prerequisites. This national security
paradigm, which has pervaded practically all aspects
of applied U.S. foreign and national security policy,
is itself predicated on an interpretation of the funda-
200
mental civil-military relationship in American society
that was forged under the exigencies of the Cold War
era and revitalized since 9/11. (The last major over-
haul of the organization of U.S. national security was
the National Security Act of 1947.) It should therefore
be no wonder that most U.S. civil-military approaches
to applied foreign and national security policy are cor-
respondingly out of synch.
Beyond Eisenhower’s prescient warning about the
“military-industrial complex,” Americans are now ac-
customed to a vast national security state that, with
the war on terrorism, permeates life at home and not
just in policies abroad:
201
based, fear-driven, and enemy-centric, embedded in
American culture:
202
principle of the American tradition of civil-military re-
lations. U.S. military officers take an oath to uphold the
democratic institutions that form the very fabric of the
American way of life. Their client is American [civil]
society, which has entrusted the officer corps with the
mission of preserving the nation’s values and national
purpose. Ultimately, every act of the American mili-
tary professional is connected to these realities [that] he
or she is in service to the citizens of a democratic state
who bestow their trust and treasure with the primary
expectation that their state and its democratic nature
will be preserved.9
203
which suspended the traditional consensus and bal-
ance of the American civil-military relationship, made
more sense under the conditions of the Cold War and
the international order it maintained. Once those con-
ditions changed and that order began to break down,
however, first with the fall of the Berlin Wall and then
resuming with the difficulties of applied American
power in the post-9/11 years (as explained above),
the inherent flaws of Huntington’s model became in-
creasingly obvious: “the most significant shortcoming
of Huntington’s construct was its failure to recognize
that a separation between political and military affairs
is not possible—particularly at the highest levels of
policymaking.”11 In other words:
204
can values, American society should change its values
to serve the interest of military effectiveness. Only the
existence of an existential threat would seem to justify
such a proposition.12
205
This decoupling and distortion of the traditional
American democratic civil-military relationship is not
only manifest in the horizontal dysfunctions of inter-
agency and civil-military coordination, it has also con-
tributed to a vertical imbalance with an overemphasis
on operations and tactics, leading to what strategist
Colin S. Gray has called “a persistent strategy deficit”
in the United States, pointing out that:
206
The vertical disparity between policy and opera-
tions is thus very real, underscoring the connection
between the global and the local, between the strategic
and the tactical:
207
With respect to the first insight, when looking from
the more global, human security vantage point of the
21st century, a more comprehensive and collaborative
understanding of civil-military engagement becomes
possible. As such, context takes precedence over con-
tent, partnership more than predominance, strategy
more than operations and tactics, and human more
than organizational enterprises. In the information
age, legitimacy and credibility—expressed through
and conveyed in “the narrative”—preponderates.
This is no doubt especially true in the culturally
charged Muslim world, where the United States, hav-
ing broken the eggs of autocracy in Iraq, can perhaps
help Arab civil society make the omelet of self-gover-
nance, albeit in a more indirect and limited way. Ironi-
cally, a good example of the moral over the physical is
how the United States is currently paying for its less
than credible image on the Arab Street earned over
the years, especially in its inability to be an agent of
change in Egypt. In this sense, therefore, the most
important lesson of the war in Iraq is not that better
planning, operational approaches, and tactics may
have changed its outcome. “Instead, the real solution
is re-thinking American grand strategy.”19 This insight
may be leading the Obama administration, for exam-
ple, to shift delivery of aid and technical assistance
through international civil society organizations, the
UN, and other partners rather than directly from U.S.
Government run programs—in a sense, “leading from
behind” in fostering peace as it did in supporting the
war in Libya. The Middle East and North Africa In-
centive Fund proposed for Fiscal Year 2013 will also
work much this way.
It is also true, as the United States shifts its global
geopolitical priorities away from its near-obsession
208
with the Middle East and Central Asia to East Asia
and the Pacific: “When the only global power be-
comes obsessed with a single region, the entire world
is unbalanced. Imbalance remains the defining char-
acteristic of the global system today.”20 The growing
competition between American and Chinese models
in Asia-Pacific societies and bodies politic will define
the real, ongoing challenge there, as opposed to the
latent contingency of some kind of great showdown
between U.S. and Chinese forces. In fact, civil-military
coordination as a “strategic enabler” for the U.S. Pa-
cific Command took place more than a half-dozen
years before the Obama administration. Within the
context of its theater engagement strategy, the Pacific
Command has long been conducting “civil affairs
projects” to help secure basing rights and, conversely,
deny them to potential adversaries such as China.21
The relevance of human security is most apparent
in the weak and fragile states of Africa—more impor-
tant than a lower-level U.S.-Chinese competition than
in the Asia-Pacific region. Africa, where the nation-
state is hardly the established operating organizing
principle of governance (and in some places may never
be), is where the majority of conflicts, fragile and fail-
ing states are concentrated globally.22 Particularly in
Africa, security is as much a socio-psychological issue
as it is a power political issue:
209
children. Its ranks are filled with brainwashed boys
and girls who ransack villages and pound newborn
babies to death in wooden mortars. In Congo, as many
as one-third of all combatants are under 18. Since the
new predatory style of African warfare is motivated
and financed by crime, popular support is irrelevant to
these rebels. The downside to not caring about winning
hearts and minds, though, is that you don’t win many
recruits. So abducting and manipulating children be-
comes the only way to sustain the organized banditry.
And children have turned out to be ideal weapons:
easily brainwashed, intensely loyal, fearless, and, most
importantly, in endless supply.23
210
wording of academics and policymakers (such as
concerted action, integrated approach, ‘3D’, holistic
approach, security-development nexus) seldom find
their way into the concrete conduct of applied civil-
military relations—or civil-military coordination.25
The problem with the “militarization of foreign
policy” and the “securitization of aid,” of course, is
that the U.S. military’s chief focus is security, so its
relief and development activities emphasize winning
the ‘hearts and minds’ of a population, not the human-
itarian imperative of saving lives, doing no harm, and
ensuring local ownership of reconstruction efforts.26
This largely explains the rub with humanitarian
organizations. Yet, size or assignment should not mat-
ter—with the possible exception of major combat op-
erations, the Department of Defense (DoD) is not (nor
should ever be) the lead agency. Even then, beyond
Carl von Clausewitz’s famous dictum that “war is
merely an extension of policy by other means,” strate-
gist B. H. Liddell Hart reminds us that “the aim in war
is to achieve a better peace.”
Yet, “bad-guy baiting” has long been the way
for congressional appropriation of national security
driven security assistance or foreign aid funding. U.S.
operations abroad thus remain threats-based and
command-and-control managed. They are primarily
operational and tactical in their focus, and rarely rep-
resentative of regional let alone grand strategy. It is
not only that such “legacy” approaches to security and
civil-military coordination are less and less effective—
witness the growing realization of the inefficacy and
ephemeral effects of “winning hearts and minds”—
they are no longer affordable.27 Civil-military coordi-
nation and other engines of 21st century collaboration
must be more strategic from the outset. In fact, Sol-
diers themselves must become “post-modern.”28
211
The potentialities and economies of effort, cost,
and risk at all levels of the central civil-military nexus
of international engagements cannot, therefore, reach
fulfillment unless this nexus is understood from a fun-
damentally strategic perspective:
• Civil-military coordination is inherently com-
prehensive and collaborative. Like strategy it-
self, it is holistic, cumulative, and convergent in
ends, ways, and means. It is best suited to man-
age the seams of power and the gaps between
organizations and processes.
• Civil-military coordination inherently bridges
(state centric) whole of government with the
whole-of-society/community. It leverages all
forms of power and inflections of influence
at all levels in order to create conditions for a
transition to greater civilian lead and control
and promote self-sustained civil society. In
doing so, it keeps hard power more implied
than applied at best; or at worst, minimizes
or mitigates its costs and risks when it must
be applied.
• Civil-military coordination is inherently in-
formational—a human search engine that
evaluates and offers a coping mechanism for
uncertainty and complexity. As such, it helps
minimize fog and frictions existing in seams,
gaps, and transitions, as well as facilitates col-
laborative decision cycles—a key strategic and
operational advantage over competing entities.
• It is synergistic, innovative, and persuasive—
enabling, moderating, and balancing. It pro-
motes unity of purpose and economy of effort
while managing change, risk, and expectations.
Like “Generation Flux,” it draws together dis-
212
parate players across “stovepipes” toward a
medium of cooperation and crowd wisdom
largely through brainstorming and co-cre-
ation—but for which information transparency
and sharing is absolutely vital.
• Civil-military coordination is inherently socio-
cultural. Because it is a human enterprise, it is
in essence about relationship-building, which
is how things get done in human security en-
vironments. Because it involves engagement of
the local populace, it demands cultural aware-
ness, helping the credibility and legitimacy of
the whole effort.
• By enabling a more proactive use of civilian and
soft power, it elicits the military principle of of-
fense. By enabling more effective leveraging of
less costly and more sustainable civilian power
over more costly and risk-laden hard power, it
evokes the military principle of economy-of-
force (or economy of effort, cost, and risk).
• Civil-military coordination is inherently an-
ticipatory (and less reactive) due to the need to
collaborate in advance in order to reach desired
common objectives or manage disparate inter-
ests. It calls for an approach more like Hall of
Famer Wayne Gretzky, who observed: “A good
hockey player plays where the puck is. A great
hockey player plays where the puck is going to
be.” In other words, it induces its practitioners
to think and act with greater foresight.
• Applied civil-military coordination involves a
strategic, enabling style of leadership, invoking
persuasion, political bargaining, collaboration,
consensus and relationship-building. Another
way to describe the strategic leadership style
213
is “leading from behind”—creating conditions
for the success of others so the full menu of op-
tions may be brought to bear (and blood and
money spared). Moreover, it should emphasize
managing expectations all-around.
•
Finally, it is adaptive and co-creative, more
characteristic of learning organizations,29 as it
is inherently a learning activity, constantly con-
scious of situation and environment.
214
Civil-military coordination in local action must, in
turn, be reflective of and conducive to this strategic
conscientiousness. The focus here is thus on the na-
ture of the relationship between civil and military ele-
ments and players.
This is where one aspect of Huntington’s analysis
of the civil-military relationship is constructive:
215
self-sustained development along civil-military
lines, with the aims of “civilianizing” external
assistance and “localizing” essential internal
public services and governance functions.
216
with respect to the security sector. More appropri-
ate civil-military approaches are thus an application
of Liddell Hart’s strategy of the indirect approach,
demonstrably placing the military in a supporting
and not supported role. They are less concerned with
“winning hearts and minds,” which is a tactic and not
a strategy:
217
far from a given in most developing countries. Yet,
“civilian control means more than the absence of a
military coup. As long as the military possesses au-
tonomous decisionmaking power, the democratically
elected authorities’ power to govern and the quality
of democracy remain limited.”35 Harmonized with the
democratic civil-military relationship, civil-military
coordination as explained in this chapter is an appli-
cation of democratic values, a way to an end and not
an end in itself. More importantly, it helps to close the
“say-do” gap that has bedeviled especially American
applied foreign and national security policy for de-
cades. It also reduces the image of U.S. domination
and strong-arming and facilitates internationalizing
the overall effort, thus giving it greater cumulative
power, persuasiveness, and influence and making it
much more difficult to counter. Moreover, it helps
promote a democratic culture in general in which the
military itself becomes a civil society organization:
218
authority—will ensure that the civilianization of se-
curity occurs more than the militarization of aid and
development. The idea of “third-generation” civil-
military coordination is intriguing, and deserves fur-
ther examination. The Focused District Development
(FDD) program in Afghanistan, as an example of this
approach, is certainly more collaborative, partnering,
and “broadens the civil-military relationship contact
face to local governance and political authorities.”
However, “the FDD is a military-driven police men-
toring program.”37 Thus, precisely because the distinc-
tion between military and civilian work practically
vanishes under this concept, the supreme qualifier of
civil authority becomes even more vital:
219
best practices, including the author’s own experience
as Chief of Civil-Military Coordination for the UN
Mission in Liberia:
220
handouts and services while ignoring the complexity
of the local context, and the unintended consequences
of injecting resources into conflict-affected communi-
ties. NGOs have been working for many years to erase
the handout mentality, emphasizing the importance
of ‘ownership,’ involvement and empowerment of
beneficiaries.41
221
ternal assistance and “localizing” essential internal
public services and governance functions by gradu-
ally placing the military to the rear of the assistance
chain (behind civil society organizations and local
government structures) and taking on an increasingly
indirect and enabling role do not apply just to post-
conflict transition management. Indeed, it could apply
to conflict prevention and “building partner capacity”
efforts such as in the Horn of Africa and the Trans-
Sahel. U.S. involvement, for example, in low-level
counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines after
9/11 eventually took the approach of following local
lead in civil action programs. “Filipino doctors, den-
tists and veterinarians come in to provide free care. Of
utmost importance . . . is putting a Filipino face on all
these operations.”42
Perhaps even more illustrative of the shifting para-
digm is the U.S. civil-military response to the earth-
quake in Haiti, where the military clearly played a
supporting role, and the U.S. Government sought to
work within multilateral frameworks rather than ex-
pend the resources to create a parallel structure, exem-
plifying a prepositional term that has gained currency
among U.S. civil affairs and other special operations
personnel—”by, with, and through”:
222
to support U.S. efforts in Haiti to mitigate near-term
human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facili-
tate transition to the Government of Haiti, the UN, and
USAID. The military possesses significant capabilities
that are useful in emergencies, but long-term plans for
relief and reconstruction are best left to nonmilitary
government agencies.43
223
under the rubric of the country team, can only im-
prove the strategic effectiveness of “comprehensive
engagement” as defined in the 2010 National Security
Strategy. This is because by walking the talk, closing
the say-do gap, and leading through civilian power,
U.S. civil-military practitioners would then be doing
abroad what they do at home, clearly connecting strat-
egy with operations and the whole-of-society with the
whole of government.
It does more than this. With respect to build-
ing partnership capacity, demonstrating the demo-
cratic civil-military relationship helps address the
concern expressed by former Secretary of Defense
Robert Gate’s admonition that, beyond the tradi-
tional national security centric tendency to focus al-
most exclusively on operational development of the
armed forces:
224
Trans-Sahel, are based on a counterterrorism model—
the coup in Mali being only the latest example of a
problematic approach to U.S. security sector reform
focused almost entirely on operational rather than
institutional capacity building and with almost total
disregard of the civil-military relationship:
225
paramilitary, and police forces and encourages them
to maintain an appropriate balance between Hunting-
ton’s imperatives in their own security sector, having
seen that example in foreign forces. Beyond helping
external militaries work their jobs, it helps achieve a
more sustainable security sector reform process and a
more secure and stable environment for both the civil
society organizations and the emerging government
institutions long after those forces leave.
Thus, both kinds of entities need to employ a qual-
itative blend of realism and idealism, respecting and
accommodating, as best as possible, particular prin-
ciples and equities. This can only come through estab-
lishing relationships, dialogue, and even rule-sets for
operational civil-military interaction in order to learn
about comparative advantages as well as limitations:
226
at best, difficult to obtain once the operation begins.
This is a common, yet still underappreciated, lesson.
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP
227
Figure 8-2. Great Seal of the United States.
228
tion. In yet another example, there should be a more
strategically-driven synchronization of programs such
as DoD’s DIRI program and the State Department’s
Global Peace Operations Initiative and Africa Contin-
gency Operations Training & Assistance program in
order to build partnership civil-military teaming ca-
pacity and confidence in the civil-military relationship
in democratic societies.
There are many more changes to mention. More-
over, their scope and extensiveness spell implications
for U.S. foreign policy and national security are pro-
found and far-reaching. This runs not just from Wash-
ington to the field, but from the field to Washington.
Locher remarks that:
229
ship role, “It leads best when it’s true to its values and
when it works with others.” Additionally:
230
democracy and capitalism, and there is no guarantee
that their success will outlast the powerful nations
that have fought for them. Democratic progress and
liberal economics have been and can be reversed and
undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the
republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more power-
ful forces or through their own failings. The evolving
liberal economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s
and 1930s. The better idea doesn’t have to win just
because it is a better idea. It requires great powers to
champion it.51
231
tion is not a tradeoff between idealism and realism, it
is a fusion of both. It is a fusion of art and science that
combines practical critical thinking with an imagina-
tive synthesis of the most appropriate methods. It is
at the heart of American grand strategy for the 21st
century. Failure to recognize this risks further deterio-
ration of American global leadership and the security
and prosperity that comes with it.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8
4. Mahbub ul Haq.
232
5. For a detailed explanation, see Lisa Schirch, “Where Does
Whole of Government Meet Whole of Society?” Franke and Dorff,
eds., Conflict Management, pp. 127-152.
233
12. Suzanne C. Nielson, “American Civil–Military Relations
Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington’s The
Soldier and the State,” International Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 2, 2012, pp.
372-373.
13. Barack Obama, “The 2012 State of the Union,” January 25,
2012, available from www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-theunion-2012.
17. See Richard Weitz’s blog on Locher’s April 11, 2012, key-
note presentation at the U.S. Army War College annual strategy
conference, in “The U.S. Strategy ‘Deficit’: The Dominance of Po-
litical Messaging,” Second Line of Defense, available from www.
sldinfo.com/the-u-s-strategy-%E2%80%9Cdeficit%E2%80%9D-the-
dominance-of-political-messaging/. Quote obtained from Mr. Lo-
cher’s personal notes for his April 11, 2012, presentation provided
to the author.
234
19. Stephen M. Walt, “Top 10 Lessons of the Iraq War,” For-
eign Policy, March 12, 2012, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2012/03/20/top_ten_lessons_of_the_iraq_war?page=full.
235
Kleinman, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship
between Aid and Security in Kenya, Medford, MA: Feinstein Inter-
national Center, April 2010.
236
34. Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, “Democracy and
Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look,” The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, August 2004, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 525-546.
237
tenant Colonel Jennifer L. Kimmey, and Commander Joseph Alt-
house, “Relationships Matter—Humanitarian Assistance and Di-
saster Relief in Haiti,” Military Review, May-June 2010, p. 8.
238
52. Christopher Holshek, “Over There Matters Over Here,”
The Huffington Post, March 22, 2012, available from www.huffing-
tonpost.com/christopher-holshek/us-super-power_b_1362816.html.
239
CHAPTER 9
PROBLEM STATEMENT
241
character and principles of development policy can be
simply subsumed under this header.
It goes without saying today that peacebuilding ef-
forts and development policy should be key elements
of an up to date grand strategy. The question remains
however, whether the approaches and cognitive prem-
ises of strategic thinking6 are capable of capturing and
embracing the characteristics of peacebuilding and
development as policy domains sui generis.
This chapter argues that peacebuilding and devel-
opment policy elude traditional presumptions and
patterns of strategic thinking in numerous ways and
analyzes why. Following a brief sketch of the cogni-
tive premises of modern strategic thought, I will dis-
cuss how strategic thinking is challenged by several
distinctive features of peacebuilding and develop-
ment processes. The concluding section summarizes
the findings with regard to adjustments required by
strategic thinking.
242
gic environment tends to be captured in elementary
categories of risks, threats, power structure, allies, or
adversaries. This neglects the complexity, dynamics,
inconsistency, and ambivalence of social and political
challenges relevant in peacebuilding and develop-
ment contexts. However, scholars of strategic studies
often stress that military power is but one means to
achieve political ends and howsoever sophisticated
and differentiated the categorical grid of assessing
strategic environments, the major interpretation pat-
tern in strategic thinking for locating phenomena in
the strategic environment remains the power balance
and risk-threat scheme.8
Moreover, derived from military professional self-
conceptions, the major point of reference of strategic
thinking is the question of whether and what action is
required. This action orientation implies another key
characteristic of strategic thinking, namely the prem-
ise of unlimited feasibility as long as—given political
determination—it is technically and physically fea-
sible. This, in turn, compounds a focus on those phe-
nomena, which can be influenced by the given means
and instruments, at the expense of those that cannot be
immediately influenced or are not fully understood.
In addition, it abets a widespread but false conclu-
sion that those with high operational skills must also
be good strategists, or, in other words, that strategy
development can be handled in the same manner as
operational management.
Another feature of strategic thinking that has been
assigned by military thinking is the general confi-
dence in instrumental rationality. It disregards the
relevance of irrational elements in politics, is inclined
to take political decisions for granted, and focuses on
how to implement them rather than to question their
243
wisdom. In the same vein, strategic thinking depends
on clear goal formulation in order to derive strategy-
driven action, even if the exact goals are not known.
In consequence, blurred ends tend to be substituted
by a focus on ways and means. A good example to
demonstrate this is the prominence of the WoG/CA
debate. While WoG/CA are useful concepts to im-
prove how we implement policies, they do not reflect
whether we are pursuing the right goals. However,
both concepts have gained the status of almost strate-
gic paradigms, indicating, in fact, a roll back of strate-
gic thinking.9 Furthermore, it is the military’s need for
hierarchy, predictability, order, simplicity, precision,
and sequence—all derived from military operational
requirements—that can be traced in strategic thinking,
too. The military approach to compartmentalize pro-
cesses and to break the processes down to hierarchical
command and control patterns can also be found in
the “engineering” mindset of strategic thinking. Last,
but not least, strategic thinking is prone to focusing on
hard facts and figures rather than on soft factors like
will, perceptions, and emotions, thereby underrating
the tremendous power the latter might engender.
Eventually, although it does not describe a cogni-
tive premise but rather a condition, strategic thinking
suffers from the same circumstance as military rea-
soning about ends, ways, and means, which is that it
does not enjoy great popularity among policymakers.
Having said this, it should be emphasized that stra-
tegic thinking is regarded from a cognitive-structural
perspective without claiming to do justice to specific
products of strategists. Moreover, there is no criti-
cism in stating that strategic thinking has been coined
by military thinking. On the contrary, it is acknowl-
edged that strategic thinking has historically evolved
244
in a military context, and that it naturally had to take
account of military operational planning and execu-
tion requirements. The question is, however, whether
peacebuilding and development objectives can be
adequately pursued on the basis of these cognitive
premises.
245
tween peacebuilding and good governance; human
rights; and political, economic, and social develop-
ment as ingredients of sustainable development.12 In
other words, peacebuilding and development are in-
extricably linked. The Journal for Peacebuilding and De-
velopment13 mirrors this understanding in its very title.
Peacebuilding in poor and conflict prone societies is
not feasible without a broader development frame-
work, although peacebuilding and development are
distinct policy domains. Whereas peacebuilding fo-
cuses on establishing mechanisms of peaceful conflict
resolution, development creates the social, political,
and economic conditions that enable and sustain
them. While peacebuilding is a thoroughly civil-
military endeavor with prominent contributions to
be made by the military, the role of military actors in
development is marginal and limited to military roles
in security system reform. Peacebuilding can be seen
as the element linking peacemaking, stabilization, and
peacekeeping efforts as primarily military tasks to the
broader development efforts. Regarding our ques-
tion, however, peacebuilding and development pose
a common set of challenges to strategic thinking and
will therefore be dealt with in tandem.
246
contrast, peacebuilding and development rely on in-
digenous actors and societies as their principal acting
subjects. The notion of local ownership and legitimacy
(not in the eyes of the international community, but in
the eyes of local constituencies) as core development
principles and precondition claims the right of self-
determination of concerned polities on the one hand,
while reminding them of their responsibility on the
other. Moreover, it implies that external actors need
to accept taking a backseat. In scenarios where exter-
nal actors have not only spent human and technical
resources to intervene in a crisis militarily, but have
also sacrificed lives and are under political pressure
to make the engagement a success, the temptation to
impose policies is high. Combined with the often dis-
played unwillingness or incapacity of local actors to
agree on peaceful conflict resolution and to manage
basic stabilization requirements, it is not hard to imag-
ine why principles of local ownership and legitimacy
are easily abandoned and cause international donors
to either impose conditions and/or rely on bridge-
heads. Yet, ownership and legitimacy are necessary to
ensure sustainability and to avoid the peril of getting
trapped in long-term engagements abroad.
Second, due to the state-centric bias of strategic
thinking, the dynamics of awakening civil societies,
the peace potential of opposition groups, the influence
of individuals beyond the official political system, or
socio-cultural sensitivities, tend to be overlooked. As
external actors often lack knowledge and understand-
ing of societies alien to their own cultural context, they
tend to interpret phenomena within the parameters of
their own system of meanings. For example, our re-
liance on documents in political and administrative
processes in the form of policy papers, memoranda
247
of understanding, contracts, reports, etc., is not neces-
sarily shared in other parts of the world. People there
have learned that signing a document is necessary to
receive material benefits, but a signature may have a
less binding character to them than a gift, a handshake,
or a word of honor. In addition, the state-centric per-
spective abets a focus on actors who are in power, or
at least in command of armed forces, without asking
too many questions on how they came to power or
how they use their power. This is in conflict with the
general people-centered orientation of development
policy and its human security approach where the
conventional instruments of power encounter their
limits. This applies even more so when it comes to the
particular concern of development policy for vulner-
able groups such as the poor, women, children, dis-
abled, or other minorities.
Strategic thinking will not be able to overcome the
limits of its state-centric and status quo oriented bias
unless it opens up for civil societies and organized
groups beyond the official political system as poten-
tial partners in creating stability and peace. This also
requires more careful and more critical examination
of the roots, background, power base, goals, methods,
ideological reference, and possible future profile of
those who receive backing or support.
248
ing are the physical environment, the national char-
acter, the interplay between states, balance of power
considerations, and the nature of conflict.15 Although
Colin S. Gray highlights the necessity of a skeptical
mindset and creative thinking for strategists,16 in prac-
tice it tends to be neutralized by the requirements of
operational command, which hardly leave space for
lengthy reflections or thinking out of the box. Hence,
although clear-sighted scholars suggest otherwise, the
process of strategy-related knowledge development
in actual practice is at best stuck in limited concep-
tual frameworks or, more often than not, overshad-
owed by short-term constellations and interests which
rather blur than enlighten the view.
Moreover, as data collection, collation, and inter-
pretation in general cannot be “neutral,” products of
analysis always mirror underlying premises, hypoth-
esis, interests, and cultural parameters of the analyst.
Apart from general epistemological problems that are
not going to be reflected here and that are not specific
to strategic analyses, the methods and approaches to
gaining awareness and understanding of the strategic
environment face particular challenges, namely the
problems of complexity, dynamics, and bias.
As strategic thinking is preoccupied with risks,
threats, and power structures, it tends to neglect the
complexity, dynamics, inconsistency, and ambiva-
lence of social and political processes and phenom-
ena, which characterize peacebuilding and devel-
opment processes. Since they are all but consistent,
linear, simple, and definite, the methods of analyzing
and understanding peacebuilding and development
issues through the lens of strategic thinking require
modifications.
In order to better grasp complexity and under-
stand the interdependencies, linkages, and cumula-
249
tive effects, systemic analysis will yield better results
than conventional approaches. To capture dynamics,
knowledge development should be a concomitant
process throughout the different stages of strategy
development and implementation. Effects achieved
should be under recurrent review and reappraisal as
to whether the overall objectives are still valid and
whether the general approach is still appropriate.
The integration of periodic assessment and evalua-
tion loops has long been established in developmental
project management methods. If we want to minimize
bias, misinterpretations, or false conclusions, we need
to include experts and actors with genuine insider
perspectives into the very process of analysis and un-
derstanding. This is where the inclusive, cooperative
approach of development policy comes in. This ap-
proach may not be immediately transferrable due to
security regulations, but it calls for the development
of new formats and procedures that enable more di-
rect involvement of subject matter and first-hand ex-
pertise into strategy development processes.
250
tain tension between policy and strategy, this tension
increases when it comes to formulating peacebuilding
or development goals.
In most recent international crisis management sce-
narios, peace arrangements were highly volatile and
foresaw specified goals only for the relatively short
immediate stabilization period. The reasons were
manifold. In Kosovo, for example, the major bone of
contention, namely the question of status, had been
deliberately excluded because the Dayton Accord
could otherwise not have been signed. The Pretoria
Accord, signed by warring Congolese parties to end
the fighting and establish a government of national
unity, was flawed from the outset as none of the con-
flict parties had been sincerely interested in the estab-
lishment of a stable central state, and as fighting was
ongoing in the East. Major conflict parties had been
excluded from the process that led to the Petersberg
Agreement for Afghanistan and international post-
conflict reconstruction efforts.
These examples should suffice to point out that
strategic goal formulation in the immediate aftermath
of war is almost impossible. In most cases, peace agree-
ments are nothing but a respite, a door opener under
more or less conducive conditions for potential future
comprehensive conflict solution and reconciliation.
Realistic political visions, and the road thereto can
hardly be anticipated in the face of destroyed econo-
mies, humanitarian catastrophes, socio-psychological
legacies of war, and a fragile truce with armed factions
about to regroup, just waiting for the spark that reig-
nites the fire. As conflict parties are not able and often
also not willing to formulate political visions, external
actors are in an even weaker position to do so as long
as they do not intend to fully take over responsibility.
251
With regard to goal formulation as a precondition
for strategy development, peacebuilding and devel-
opment leave us in a very uncomfortable position.
The subject, and our role as external actors, deny the
development of clear and realistic strategic political
goals. But how can external actors who claim to be
strategy-driven engage under these circumstances?
What happens, in fact, is that the long-term strategic
horizon is often curtailed and, lacking political vi-
sions, is replaced with short-term objectives. The sup-
posedly top-down approach of strategy-driven policy
is turned upside down and replaced by a bottom-up
approach with open ends. This is understandable
and, given the structural conditions of international
politics, to a certain extent inescapable. However, for
external actors this bears high risks of long-term en-
gagement without a clear exit, mission creep, or politi-
cal entanglement, which make pro-active moves ever
more difficult.
Strategic thinking cannot really overcome this di-
lemma. But it should not surrender the claim for polit-
ical vision all too easily. The very existence of a vision,
even if it does not find the necessary political support
and may seem rather academic than politically real-
istic, might positively shape the debate. Moreover,
strategic thinking can install systematic and perpetual
risk assessment as an integral element of the strategy
development and implementation process. Since we
seem to be doomed to bottom-up approaches to a cer-
tain extent, we should at least conduct recurrent re-
view loops to early identify those effects that may un-
dermine what has already been achieved or that may
increase risks and vulnerabilities of the peace process.
In this context, the systematic use of simulation meth-
ods to anticipate possible effects and outcomes might
provide added value.
252
How Should Guidance be Given to Actors
That Cannot Be Guided?
253
donor funds, can be controlled to a limited extent via
budgetary instruments. The bulk of the remaining ac-
tors, however, can at best be controlled via indirect
levers (bilateral voluntary agreements, public pres-
sure, voluntary adherence to norms, etc.), or not at all
since they do not operate within common structures
or rules of political hierarchy and accountability.
Against this background, the very idea of any kind
of comprehensive strategy for civilian programs and
activities in peacebuilding and development processes
seems to be forlorn. This, in consequence, makes it
very difficult for implementing any broader strategy.
We lack institutional or procedural levers to trans-
late political goals into strategic guidance beyond the
traditional diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic instruments of power. Being aware that the
better part of activities able to support and/or induce
sustained peace and development do not fall into this
category of instruments, means to accept that we lack
direct steering mechanisms for many relevant peace-
building and development activities.
This does not mean, however, that there are no
possibilities of improving political coherence among
the multiple actors and agencies. But it should be
clear that we might at best get closer to assembling
NGOs, CSOs, or private business actors under the
banner of a unified effort, whereas we may never
achieve any organizational setting similar to a uni-
fied command. As this cannot be imposed upon
independent actors, the only way to gain better po-
litical coherence is to build long-term institutional
relationships and mutual trust. We can do so by im-
proving mutual knowledge and common situational
understanding, by including actors and building
consensus early on, and by developing institution-
254
alized formats of consultation and cooperation in
all phases.
For strategic thinking, again this requires learning
from approaches and procedures that are common
in development policy. Nevertheless, we face clear
limits to what can be achieved in this respect from a
strategist’s point of view. Apart from security consid-
erations, conflicting policy and institutional interests
between actors and agencies involved will most likely
impede more than temporary coalitions of the will-
ing. Hence, if more control is wanted, international
donors would have to dedicate significantly more
governmental resources, and by the same token take
over extensively more political responsibilities in in-
ternational conflict and crisis management: But this
would very likely exceed existing capacities and polit-
ical will. Otherwise, whether we like it or not, we will
have to live with the fact that only a limited number
of activities (and thereby outcomes) can really be sub-
jected to (grand) strategy-driven action and steering
mechanisms, i.e., we will have to learn to live with a
considerable extent of anarchy.
255
soft factors in politics such as perceptions, emotions,
identities, and beliefs.
Peacebuilding and development, on the contrary,
are primarily about setting up opportunities, about
creating ownership and encouraging political will
to reform, whereas influencing the activities of local
actors is of secondary importance. Peace and devel-
opment cannot be simply engineered by combining
a blueprint with resources, instruments, and man-
power. They rely to a large extent on hopes and fears,
on the capacity and credibility of local stakeholders to
mobilize, lead and convince people, on the strength of
identities, the willingness to tolerate frustrations, on
the belief that the future holds better prospects.
But can ownership and political will to reform be
created by external actors at all? The instrumental logic
of strategic thinking clearly reaches its limits when it
comes to creating opportunities and incentives for
local ownership and reform-oriented political inten-
tions. Development policy has been dealing with the
challenge of creating local ownership and engaging
local stakeholders for many years, but has not come
to satisfactory conclusions yet. Practical levers are
limited to participatory methods of program planning
and implementation.19 Empirical analyses have shown
that despite efforts to improve inclusive methods, the
relationships between donors and local stakeholders
often remain asymmetrical and, moreover, participa-
tory approaches often exclude civil society.20
Can the soft factors in politics be influenced by the
traditional instruments of power? Public information,
intelligence, cyber operations, psychological and in-
formation operations—all of which can be subsumed
under the information instruments of power21—would
be considered the most suitable levers to tackle per-
256
ceptions, beliefs, and emotions of people. Indeed, their
potential impact should not be underestimated as long
as the following conditions are met: messages are un-
derstood in the local context, messages are credible in
the local context, and messages are consistent with the
behavior of the sender. However, perceptions, beliefs,
and emotions are inextricably linked to expectations,
and if expectations are not met, they easily reverse
to the opposite. That means, in a peacebuilding and
development context, traditional information instru-
ments of power can and should be utilized, but need
to be handled with particular care. If they are not, they
are likely to produce rather short-term effects, whereas
influencing soft factors of politics also require instru-
ments with more long-term effects such as basic and
political education, societal discourses, reconciliation
processes, or the like.
In consequence, it seems strategic thinking has
to cope with the dilemma of investing resources and
sacrificing lives in international crisis management,
while not being able to fully control processes. We are
often forced to take a backseat, particularly when tak-
ing account of the frequently witnessed unwillingness
or incapacity of local actors to make peace or manage
peace processes. This dilemma cannot be overcome.
This means that strategic thinking requires more sys-
tematic risk analysis, and either more courage to non-
action if we cannot estimate the risks, or more courage
to name and face the possible negative effects.
257
simplicity, precision, and sequence—all derived from
military operational requirements. Consequently,
the process from strategic planning to actual imple-
mentation breaks the complexity of reality down to
operationally manageable levels, units, and activities.
Although the operational and tactical level may con-
siderably shape the situational picture generated at the
strategic level through the data they provide, strategic
planning essentially remains a top-down process.
In stark contrast, peacebuilding and develop-
ment processes can by no means be compartmental-
ized and broken down to hierarchical command and
control relationships of a military operation. Because
more often than not, it is uncertain who the stakehold-
ers are and what goals they pursue, i.e., the level of
contingencies is very high and can be compared only
to counterinsurgency operations in urban terrain in
military terms of complexity of the operational envi-
ronment. Most peacebuilding and many development
scenarios lack an established common set of norms
and rules, a precondition for reliable command and
control mechanisms. The simultaneous challenges of
maintaining peace, diminishing humanitarian crises,
creating viable institutions, alleviating poverty, en-
couraging economic recovery, fostering reconciliation,
and allowing for better overall living conditions evade
any attempt to fit peacebuilding and development
processes into any setting of sequential steps. Orderly
top-down planning and implementation procedures,
particularly if we take into account the diversity and
huge number of actors involved, are not applicable
under the given circumstances.
Peacebuilding and development processes take
place in multilevel, multiactor, and multinational con-
texts that lack all preconditions to apply top-down,
258
hierarchical, orderly, sequential, or precise unified
command and control. This forces strategic plan-
ning ambitions to confine themselves to giving guid-
ance to those actors who are willing and able to act
in a concordant effort. Realistically, in most cases this
will be governmental actors representing one donor
state only.
259
In particular, progression of political attention in
donor countries does not conform to the needs of re-
cipient peacebuilding or developing countries. In the
immediate aftermath of conflict, political attention
and acceptance levels of home constituencies are high,
but rapidly wane, be it due to a “normalization” of
conditions, due to fatigue, or simply due to the emer-
gence of new crises on the international agenda that
overlap the images of the former. But peacebuilding
and development processes require political atten-
tion at a constantly high level by international donors
for much longer periods than those shaped by mass
media and election cycles. When it comes to early
recognizing and reacting to negative dynamics that
may imperil what has already been achieved, political
mechanisms to readjust strategic guidance are slow.
In addition, expectation management, pertaining to
home constituencies as well as the populace of recipi-
ent countries, is often neglected in strategic thinking.
For strategic thinking, political and procedural
time frames of the political system in general and
the particular administration in charge have to be
taken as a given, i.e., there is little room for realistic
changes with regard to domestic political and proce-
dural conditions for strategy formulation and strate-
gic planning. Therefore, the scope of adjustments to
strategic thinking so as to better cope with conflicting
time frames is limited. Certainly, systematic expecta-
tion management can and should be improved. The
dynamics of political attention and levels of accep-
tance of domestic audiences can be anticipated to a
large extent and should therefore be more systemati-
cally included as a potential constraining factor that
requires systematic coping strategies. The expecta-
tions of audiences in recipient countries can be better
260
managed by unanimous and honest communication.
Unanimous communication can best be assured by
making strategic communication an integral part of
not only the military, but all strands of international
crisis management activities.22 Particularly, messages
to recipient country audiences have to be unanimous
among national and international donor nations and
organizations.23 Honesty in strategic communication
is about caution with regard to what we promise to
audiences in recipient countries and how we explain
our own motives of engagement, but even more so it
is about congruence between what we say and what
we do.
CONCLUSION
261
adherence to the norms and principles we intend to
foster, and it should be more carefully examined to
show whether they are part of the solution rather than
part of the problem. After all, backing elites, who are
not interested in peace and pursue only self-seeking
interests, not only imperils the peace process, but also
calls into question the credibility and legitimacy of in-
ternational engagement as a whole.
Procedures for gaining awareness and understand-
ing of the strategic environment can be improved by
systematically applying systemic analysis approaches.
Knowledge development should be a concomitant
process throughout the different stages of strategy
development and implementation. Moreover, the
volatility and dynamics of peacebuilding and devel-
opment processes require recurrent review processes
of the effects achieved and open-ended political reap-
praisals on whether the overall objectives are still valid
and whether the general approach is still appropriate.
Last, but not least, knowledge development, as well
as monitoring and evaluation, require more and sys-
tematic inclusion of subject matter experts from many
disciplines and actors with genuine insider perspec-
tives in order to minimize bias and avoid misinter-
pretations or false conclusions. Promising approaches
of improving knowledge development as a distinct
method and perpetual process, accompanying stra-
tegic and operational planning, have been developed
and tested within the military domain,24 but have to
date never gained attention in the interagency arena.
The challenges of formulating strategic goals per-
taining to a highly contingent and volatile subject like
peacebuilding and development processes can, if not
fully tackled, at least be addressed by strategic think-
ing via systematic and perpetual risk assessments.
262
The latter should be integral elements of strategy de-
velopment and implementation. Combined with re-
current review loops to early identify effects that may
undermine the intended direction of the peacebuild-
ing or development process, this will help avoid the
wrong path, dwelling on the wrong path for too long,
or quickly adjusting strategy. In this context, the sys-
tematic use of simulation methods to anticipate pos-
sible effects and outcomes—not only at the military
strategic and operational planning levels, where it has
been established for decades, but also at the political
strategic level—might provide added value.
When it comes to the political and structural con-
straints of unifying diverse actors behind a common
strategic guidance, one of the very premises of stra-
tegic thinking has to be questioned. More control of
a peacebuilding or development scenario for interna-
tional actors requires more donor resources, and by
the same token, the political will to take more political
responsibilities. Otherwise, we will have to live with
the fact that external actors can be subject only to a
limited number of activities (and thereby outcomes)
and to some form of political steering mechanisms.
In consequence, we will have to say good-bye to
the strategic premise of “anything goes” and learn
to live with a considerable extent of anarchy and
uncontrollability.
Another cognitive premise of strategic thinking
that requires adjustments is the instrumental logic.
We cannot overcome the dilemma that one of the
main challenges of peacebuilding and development
processes, i.e., the creation of political will on the side
of local elites, is not feasible with the conventional in-
struments of power. One conclusion is to reconsider
the DIME concept of instruments of power and re-
263
lated concepts.25 Another conclusion is that we will
have to live with a backseat role in many cases, even if
local actors display unwillingness or incapacity to act.
The only lever for strategic thinking, therefore, is—
again—to include more thorough and more system-
atic risk analysis prior to a political decision to engage.
Political decisionmakers need more courage to decide
either not to engage if risks cannot be estimated or are
too high, or more courage to face and prepare for the
possible negative effects.
By the same token, the engineering logic of stra-
tegic thinking and planning needs a review when it
comes to peacebuilding and development processes.
If we acknowledge that multilevel, multiactor, and
multinational contexts lack all preconditions to apply
top-down, hierarchical, orderly, sequential, or precise
unified command and control, strategic planning am-
bitions will have to be confined to giving guidance to
those actors who are willing and able to act in a con-
cordant effort. This limits the scope of actors that can
be subjected to any form of coordinated planning and
implementation to governmental actors represent-
ing one donor state. The recent debate on WoG ap-
proaches in international conflict and crisis manage-
ment shows, however, that the concept does not meet
the high expectations connected to it when it comes to
practice. 26 Hence, the limits of achieving greater co-
herence even among the governmental actors of one
donor country remind us to be realistic and humble.
Finally, the range of options for adjustment in stra-
tegic thinking is also limited with regard to conflicting
time rhythms between domestic political decision-
making processes and dynamics of peacebuilding and
development processes. As political and procedural
time frames of the domestic political system in gen-
264
eral and the particular administration in charge are a
given, there is little room for realistic changes. How-
ever, much can be improved with regard to systematic
expectation management. The dynamics of political
attention and levels of acceptance of domestic audi-
ences should be anticipated and more systematically
taken into consideration as a potential constraining
factor requiring coping strategies. Audiences in re-
cipient countries can be better addressed if coordi-
nated strategic communication is an integral part of
all strands of international crisis management activi-
ties. In addition, strategic communication should be
carefully designed with regard to what we promise to
audiences in recipient countries and how we explain
our own motives of engagement. Most importantly,
the gap between what we say and what we do must
not widen under all circumstances, as this undermines
our credibility.
In a broader perspective, we may need to accept
that there are things we will never understand, and
that many people may not want to share our norms
and values. Having said this, strategic thinking in
general needs increased flexibility regarding basic
assumptions and cognitive patterns, making the pos-
sibility of delay, setbacks, detours, or even failure, in-
tegral elements of our thought. The main challenge is
to reconcile top-down approaches and the instrumen-
tal/engineering logic of strategic thinking with the
ambiguity, unpredictability, and uncontrollability of
peacebuilding and development processes. We may
also have to reconsider our understanding of feasibil-
ity in international politics in general and learn to bet-
ter live with contingency and risks. All in all, strategic
thinking would be well advised to adopt more humil-
ity in its outlook on the world.
265
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9
266
4. U.S. National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White
House, May 2010, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
267
9. Fouzieh Melanie Alamir, “Security System Reform in Weak
or Fragile States Implemented Through a Whole of Govern-
ment Approach: A Threefold Challenge,” Franke and Dorff, eds.,
pp. 153-184.
268
19. See, for example, Handbook on Stakeholder Consultation
and Participation in ADB Operations, Tunis-Belvedere, Tunisia:
African Development Bank, 2001, available from www.afdb.org/
fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Handbook%20
on%20Stakeholder%20Consultaion.pdf.
269
have influenced NATO and NATO member-state approaches to
gaining situational awareness and understanding, but have not
been taken up by civilian agencies.
26. Franke and Dorff, eds., see especially chaps. 4, 5, 6, and 10.
270
CHAPTER 10
Michael Ashkenazi
INTRODUCTION
271
that these specialists actually provide and to whom,
has been an enduring issue (Krahmann, 2008; Shear-
ing & Wood, 2007). No less crucially, it is these same
security specialists—security providers in the terminol-
ogy used here—that have been at the core of insecurity
in two related ways. On the one hand, toward “non-
members” however defined, historically, the military
(a type of security provider) have at all times been the
major threat to individuals’ lives, bodies, and prop-
erty. On the other, internal security providers—police,
the military, and guerillas—have been major forces
threatening the integrity of individual bodies, rights,
and property within many polities.
The recent concept of conflict management im-
plies, sometimes is even predicated, on the presence
of individuals and groups who will, following some
principle, effectively provide this security (Berco-
vitch & Jackson, 2009; Elde et al., 2005; Miall et al.,
1999). This chapter will demonstrate that this percep-
tion—that security providers will automatically be
positive vectors in conflict management—needs some
serious rethinking. The features of security providers
will be described and characterized, notably those in
less-developed and fragile states (LDFS). Varied and
sometimes unexpected interests of these security pro-
viders help “manage” conflict, albeit in ways that the
theoretical genitors of the concept might not like. Both
the terms “security” and the nature of the security
providers need to be approached from a different
perspective.
Much of the data is derived from studies by myself
and others in less-developed and post-conflict coun-
tries. From 2009 to 2011, I conducted field studies on
security providers in several countries in Asia and
Africa. Some of the issues arising from those studies
272
are raised here. For the rest, I rely on the vast mass
of publications on the militaries, traditional defense
organizations, and commercial security formations
in LDFS.
MANAGING CONFLICT
273
that most violent conflict management requires some
form of executive force in potentio.
While all the elements of conflict management are
worthy of study, this chapter addresses the issue of
individuals and groups that are able to bring force to
bear to ensure that conflict parties actually abide by
the rules, whatever they may be, for conflict manage-
ment in the society concerned. At the lower levels of
organization—inter-individual and community lev-
els—these enforcers may be neighbors, kin, bystand-
ers, village elders, or groups assigned to this role by
custom and local law (e.g., Evans-Pritchard, 1949;
Barth, 1959). At higher levels of organization—tribe,
ethnic organization, and nation-state—the role is as-
signed to organized formations: police, military, and
international peacekeepers. In other words, all conflict
management depends, to some degree or another, on
security providers. Reorienting the discussion of con-
flict management in this way forces us to consider the
point that security providers are a multi-faceted and
compound category that dispense both security and
insecurity. Understanding how such organizations
and individuals shift their “output” between some de-
gree of security and some degree of insecurity is nec-
essary if we are to ensure that conflict management
goes beyond theory and planning into the realms
of practice.
It is useful to recognize and accept some basic be-
havioral statements as framing conditions to help in
understanding security providers:
• People make conflict. Conflicts are not created,
sustained, or carried out by abstractions such
as states, but by real people.
• People manage conflict. Managing conflict is
something that all primates, including humans,
274
engage in. If they do not, they stand likely to
suffer as a community (or troop, in the case of
primates, Aureli & De Waal, 2000).
• Conflict management depends on culturally
defined roles. We can identify several generic
roles that are expressed culturally in all con-
flicts among humans: the conflict parties, me-
diators and enforcers, and onlookers.
275
trolled by its governing bodies, to provide security.
Commercial security providers are formations who are
involved in security activities in return for monetary
payment. Traditional security providers are mandated
by the social and cultural systems of pre-modern
and local social organization. Finally, Out-law1 secu-
rity providers encompass a wide range of formations
that either engage in negative security (they actually
threaten physical, social, and material integrity), or
conditional security (“us or no one”).
276
Commercial Security Providers.
277
wakamono-kai in Japan, elmorani in East Africa) where
young men of given age cohorts are expected to per-
form public service, performance-based groups (dog
soldiers among the Cheyenne), or voluntary societies
(so-called “Secret Societies” in many West African so-
cieties) are common bases for recruitment and orga-
nization of traditional security providers. Typically,
such formations’ authority is based on community
consensus bolstered by ritual (that is “appeal to tradi-
tions and practices encoded by remote, often moot be-
ings”) (Guthrie, 1980). Traditional security providers
provide a community service: those outside the com-
munity, physically or socially, may not benefit, and
may even suffer, from their activities.
278
neighbors, albeit with excuses (the Maoist insurgents
in Nepal gave out formal receipts for extortion money
“valid against extractions by other units of the PLA”2).
Out-law service is opportunistic and situational.
To the degree the state actually owns a monopoly
on violence, out-law security providers largely pro-
vide negative security. However, where the state does
not have an effective, substantive monopoly, out-law
providers become one of a mass of commercial and
even traditional security providers.3
279
Afghanistan and elsewhere. With the emergence of
post-Soviet states, the position of the police as secu-
rity providers changed radically. Their secure posi-
tion as guardians of the state’s interests was replaced
by a variety of arrangements in which the police were
either heavily politicized (in Albania, for instance)
or were forced to become entrepreneurs, using their
privileged position as security providers to engage in
economic activities (as in Georgia). In the latter form,
internal security services typically “rent” areas of ac-
tivity—traffic control, border control, and issuance of
licenses—by paying a tribute to a superior (leading
all the way to the presidency). They finance this, and
themselves, by extracting fees for activity in their “as-
signed” areas. Lucrative positions are competitively
sought after.
Kabul airport is an example in miniature. Formal
security practices are set in place: security check of
luggage and of persons, border control (exit permit
and exit stamp), and customs. This is part of local and
international security provisions with which we are
all familiar. At Kabul airport, however, one can hire
an armed individual policeman as a security provider:
that individual will whisk the client through all the
security checks in 10 minutes flat, rather than the 2
hours that are not uncommon.
In both cases, the issue here is not corruption, how-
ever defined. What is important is how a particular
type of security provider—a state provider—assumes,
for whatever environmental or structural reasons, a
posture that would be located more closely to com-
mercial and out-law security provision than the uni-
versalistic state mode.
280
Traditional Security Providers: Mafias and Chiefs.
281
attack others, so long as the community-first principle
is maintained. The groups do so through providing
the threat and actuality of force, as well as through
ensuring social and even economic support to groups,
households, and individuals within the community.
282
lieved themselves to be a supplementary part of the
state security forces. In a third direction, there is evi-
dence that some of the neighborhood youth groups in
Dili are adopting a security posture that brings them
closer to the fourth corner of potential security forma-
tion postures.
Out-laws Want To Be . . .
283
supply limited. Some of the young men have started
pressuring local merchants to give them jobs as guards.
There have been cases of minor irritation—throwing
stones and so on—but also cases of major intimidation.
If the government wants to ensure peace and law, it
should channel some of the money through the suco
structure. I know who these young men are, I know the
merchants, and I can ensure that the young men do not
behave like criminals, and the merchants get the good
protection they need for their goods and shops.6
284
ments to ensure the particular formation is assisting
in transforming the conflict in a particular direction.
Given that there are often many players in a particular
conflict (not all of them security providers, of course),
this is a daunting task. To add to the problem, a par-
ticular organization can easily morph from one type
to another: from state to commercial, for example, or
vice versa.
285
Legalistic State Commercial
Ideology Cash
Posture.
286
tions, but in practice, there is some degree of mix even
at the poles.
The dynamics—how an organization changes its
posture toward one or another of the poles, depends
on what influences the particular organization. “In-
fluenced” in this case means that the organization
(or individual) receives rewards in one of those two
dimensions. The rewards—which are the equivalent
of behaviorist positive reinforcement (Skinner, 1978)
may be in cash or in social esteem, authority, services,
goods, etc. As the formation accrues more positive re-
inforcements of one or another of those two variables,
its posture (its location on the notional plane) will tend
toward one or another of those four types.
Timorese neighborhood defense group A can serve
as an example. ‘A’ essentially has four models to fol-
low. One is that of a pure neighborhood defense group
(rewarded by social esteem, some handouts, and wide
social network support). The other is as a commercial
company (rewarded by cash, and by social and pre-
sentation benefits). The third is out-law, in which cash
rewards and individual machismo constitute the ma-
jor rewards. As a state mandated group, the rewards
are access to power, public ideological support (“de-
fenders of the nation”), job security, and potential pro-
motion. We can examine the group’s options in terms
of the kinds of reinforcement they receive and can
foresee receiving. In practice, a neighborhood youth
group receives a certain amount of social recognition
and support. However, this is diffuse, highly condi-
tional (on their being trouble-free), and does not solve
the major problem of most members: making a living.
The possibility of becoming a state group is nonexis-
tent: the state is poor, and state security formations
have been filled by former guerillas (in the army, po-
287
lice, and gendarmerie). This particular neighborhood
in the center of Dili, does have, however, a resource:
a commercial sector of small and larger retail shops.
Cash reinforcement can be manufactured by offering
security services to local merchants, and when these
do not agree to pay the (nominal) fee, incidents can
be arranged to demonstrate that security by the local
youth group is really necessary. Now, this would be
simply a tale of extortion (that is, the traditional group
is changing its posture to out-law) except for the inter-
vention of the xefe da suco and his council. These have
argued against both the merchants and the youth group
that the youth group has a traditional role to play in
neighborhood security, and that the merchants must
pay for this service, via the traditional neighborhood
administration. Community members, on the whole,
agree with this formulation (and indeed, so do the
merchants). The youth group is on the verge of becom-
ing an extortionate network. However, by reasserting
the authority of the suco, the xefe offers them a lower
income but additional social reinforcement. Had he
not done so, the youth group would have become an
extortionate gang, (as have others in Dili).
Conflict management depends highly on being
able to offer combatants or opposed sides reinforce-
ment for appropriate behavior. Reinforce aggression
and violence, and groups will become more aggres-
sive and violent, and other groups, too, will become ag-
gressive and violent. Moreover, contemporary conflict
management is highly reliant on an assumption that
the four types of security providers will act as they do in
Western societies, including the United States; that is, that
they are close to their Weberian ideal type. This is not
necessarily the case. Professional commercial security
organizations in Timor and in Liberia see themselves
288
as an informal, but nevertheless essential, part of the
state security apparatus. The Lou Nuer White Army
see themselves as protecting traditional privilege and
activity, not as out-laws. Indeed, both of these types of
security provider (as well as others such as the police
in Georgia and Albania) have multiple reinforcements
and consequently multiple roles.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
289
the time and resource dimensions need to be assessed.
To ensure that security providers have a posture that
supports the goal of conflict management, one needs
to ensure that resources can be allocated for the long time;
that is, not years, but decades. This implies, in the in-
terests of continuity, that these resources are gener-
ated from inside the system (the state or community)
and not gifted from the outside, since the latter will,
inevitably, end. Second, working on that basis, we can
look at how security providers can be induced to par-
ticipate in conflict management. Conflict management
is a practice that emerges from and reflects internal
dynamics, while also affecting them. The situation
will remain dynamic and unstable, unless underlying
issues, which push potential security providers into
other profiles, are dealt with society-wide. While ex-
ternal reinforcements may be necessary, what is desir-
able are internally generated reinforcements that will
ensure a more-or-less homeostatic situation of low or
no conflict.
290
REFERENCES
291
Franke, Volker C. 1997. “Warriors for Peace: The
Next Generation of U.S. Military Leaders.” Armed
Forces & Society, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 33–57.
292
Mandel, Robert. 2001. “The Privatization of
Security.” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 28, No. 1,
pp. 129 –151.
293
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10
294
CHAPTER 11
Dwight Raymond
BACKGROUND
295
Policy Planning Handbook, which is intended to help
policymakers address these issues comprehensively.
After providing an overview of mass atrocities, it
identifies guidelines, a proposed framework for policy
formulation, interests, how elements of national influ-
ence can be employed, and the risks and challenges
associated with efforts to prevent or respond to mass
atrocities.
One of the prominent themes of mass atrocity lit-
erature is that national governments and the rest of
the international community are disposed toward in-
action.3 This is due to several factors, such as compet-
ing national interests that dissuade action, risk-averse
decisionmaking and bureaucracies that support status
quo approaches, and the often-complex context of po-
tential problems that may not be reducible to a clear-
cut case of stopping identifiable evil perpetrators and
protecting innocent victims. As described in one mas-
terpiece of political satire, governments often appear
to follow a four-stage approach to crisis management:
• Stage 1: We say that nothing is going to
happen.
• Stage 2: We say that something may be going to
happen, but we should do nothing about it.
• Stage 3: We say that maybe we should do
something about it, but there is nothing we can
do.
• Stage 4: We say that maybe there was
something we could have done but it is too late
now.4
296
Resistance Army (LRA) activities in Uganda and
elsewhere, and others. In part because of these crises,
and the checkered results of the international com-
munity in addressing them, an expanding community
of interest has developed on the Protection of Civil-
ians (PoC) in general and mass atrocity prevention in
particular. This community of interest includes past
and present representatives of national governments,
human rights advocates, scholars, international orga-
nizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and the media. The United Nations (UN) and some
national governments have created focal points to
coordinate collective efforts regarding mass atrocity
prevention and response. Other developments have
also contributed to improving the international com-
munity’s will and capacity to address mass atrocities.
Despite continuing harsh criticism of the UN, to
include from some of its staunchest advocates, that
institution has been steadily pursuing peacekeeping
reform initiatives since the 2000 Brahimi Report on UN
Peace Operations, which essentially concluded that
without marked transformation, the UN would recede
into irrelevance. Subsequent related efforts include the
“New Horizons” report, the Considerations for Mission
Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,
and emphasis on PoC and robust peacekeeping.
In 2001, the International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released The Re-
sponsibility to Protect,5 a study that changed the terms
of the debate about when outside actors have the right
to intervene in a sovereign country’s internal affairs.
The ICISS report concluded that sovereignty implies
responsibility and, in the case of serious harm when
the state is unwilling or unable to protect its popu-
lation from extreme harm, the principle of noninter-
297
vention yields to the international responsibility to
protect. The report developed a three-stage approach
for the responsibility to protect, including prevention,
reaction, and rebuilding.
The Responsibility to Protect concept (also known
as R2P or RTP) was subsequently endorsed at the 2005
UN General Assembly Summit and, within the UN,
later evolved into a framework of three “pillars:”6
• Pillar 1: Protection Responsibilities of the State.
• Pillar 2: International Assistance and Capacity-
Building.
• Pillar 3: Timely and Decisive Response.
298
Mass atrocity mitigation is also included in mili-
tary references including the Guidance for the Em-
ployment of the Force (GEF) and the Army Operat-
ing Concept. The 2010 publication of the unofficial
Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) military
planning handbook was followed by a MARO ap-
pendix in the new Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3 Peace
Operations.8 These documents are intended to as-
sist military commanders and staffs in the planning
and conduct of operations to prevent and respond to
mass atrocities.
The MAPRO Handbook9 was published in March
2012 as a reference for members of the policy commu-
nity. It is intended to support recommendations from
the GPTF report and to assist with the implementation
of PSD-10’s intent by supporting informed and struc-
tured policy formulation. The Handbook addresses
considerations for mass atrocity situations, describes
a policy formulation process, and provides templates
that can be adjusted as necessary. While it primar-
ily addresses mass atrocity situations (arguably the
worst-case threats to peace and development), much
of the Handbook is also applicable to other complex
situations involving conflict because many of the na-
tional interests, actors, policy processes, potential lines
of effort, and potential elements of national influence
are similar. Indeed, mass atrocity situations will often
have to be addressed as a part of the wider context
within which they occur, such as insurgencies, civil
war, or interstate conflict.
299
MASS ATROCITY PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE OPTIONS
300
MAPRO may be defined as:
MAPRO Guidelines.
301
avoided. The second reason is that the resources re-
quired for prevention are likely to be modest in com-
parison to those required for a major intervention
and post-crisis reconstruction. Finally, prevention
precludes the requirement to obtain political and in-
ternational support that could prove elusive when
a controversial response is contemplated. Preven-
tion, however, poses its own challenges; it requires
a pre-crisis investment of attention and resources
that must compete with other issues that may be
more immediate.
302
Policymakers Must Understand the Complete
Context of the Situation.
303
Multilateral Efforts Are Preferable to Unilateral Action.
304
regarding post-crisis roles, responsibilities, and au-
thorities. Situations and plans are likely to change,
but policymakers ideally should shape these changes
rather than merely watch them occur.
305
• Escalation or resumption of violence is
prevented.
• Conflict spillover into the wider region is
avoided.
• Effects on transnational issues such as terror-
ism are minimized.
• Timely and effective humanitarian aid is pro-
vided to save lives and alleviate suffering.
• Rights of refugees, displaced persons, and vul-
nerable populations are protected.
• Political stability and good governance are sup-
ported.
• Economic interests are secured by promoting
stability and rule of law, or by averting crisis.
• U.S. citizens and property are protected.
• U.S. actions do not have unacceptable adverse
impact upon relations with allies, regional
countries, or other nations.
• The international community, (particularly the
UN or relevant regional organization) takes
appropriate action in concert with the United
States.
• The United States acts in accordance with its
values and maintains its credibility and legiti-
macy.
• Refugee/Internally Displaced Persons/hu-
manitarian crisis is avoided.
• U.S. willingness to protect civilians and support
international laws and norms is demonstrated.
• Perpetrators are delegitimized.
• Human rights violators are brought to justice.
• Terrorist threats are reduced.
• The anticipated costs (including money, per-
sonnel, and other resources) of U.S. actions are
acceptable.
306
A MAPRO plan may be structured in accordance
with Figure 11-1. A key inference is that thoughtful
advance planning may result in effective prevention
measures that preclude any need to implement the
later stages of the plan.18
Phase I: Prevention
• Stage IA: Steady-State Engagement
• Stage IB: Targeted Prevention
• Stage IC: Crisis Management
Phase II: Response
• Stage IIA: Stop Mass Atrocities
• Stage IIB: Stabilization
Phase III: Transition
• Stage IIIA: Build Host Nation Capacity
• Stage III B: Transition to Steady-State Posture
307
APPLYING THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL
INFLUENCE
308
Figure 11-2. Diplomatic, Informational, Military,
and Economic (DIME) Tools.20
309
The MAPRO Handbook discusses several “cross-cut-
ting considerations” when policy is formulated and
DIME tools are applied. These are:
• Host Nation Ownership and Capacity;
• Political Primacy;
• Legitimacy;
• Unity of Effort;
• Security;
• Conflict Transformation;
• Regional/International Engagement;
• Strategic Communication.21
310
• Whether to intervene without a clear exit
strategy.
• Whether to develop or implement a branch
plan.
• Whether and to what extent to accommodate
concerns expressed by other actors.
• How to gain/sustain domestic and interna-
tional support.
• Whether to sacrifice political goals, such as
bringing perpetrators to justice, to stop conflict
or maximize humanitarian benefit.
311
• Negative Second-Order Effects.
• Risks of Inaction.
312
cea for effective government action to prevent and re-
spond to mass atrocities. It can support the necessary
fusion of three governmental groups: those in govern-
ment who are experts about a particular country or
region, those who focus on transnational functional
matters (such as international law, financial sanctions,
war crimes, military operations, or peacekeeping), and
those who make policy decisions within an extremely
diverse portfolio.
Effective policy planning requires a modest com-
mitment of resources, perhaps not quite “a level of
governmental organization that matches the methodi-
cal organization characteristic of mass killings,”23 but
the resources are needed nonetheless. The rudimen-
tary requirements include dedicated planning space,
a handful of dedicated planners with senior leader
access and clearly delineated authorities (particularly
necessary when mass atrocities are but one dimension
of a complex situation and multiple department and
intergovernmental agencies are stakeholders), and the
active participation of other “part-time” planners who
contribute their expertise when needed.
More importantly, planning’s effectiveness hinges
on senior leader involvement. Senior leaders must de-
vote the time to understand the planning process and
plans (shaping both as they so desire), provide guid-
ance, approve planning products, make decisions,
and ensure that their organizations are providing ad-
equate support and participation. If senior leaders are
not involved in policy planning and do not seriously
expect a high quality process, they in effect are saying
that they do think that planning is really that impor-
tant. If they do not think it is important, it will not be.
313
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11
314
10. The text of the Genocide Convention is available from
www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html.
12. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 84. See pp. 84-120 for a brief description of each of
the tools.
315
CHAPTER 12
Liselotte Odgaard
INTRODUCTION
317
annual economic growth rates of 8-9 percent.1 This de-
velopment has raised the issue of whether India might
gradually overtake China as the main rising power.
This chapter makes the argument that the U.S.
pursuit of an integrationist world order and China’s
pursuit of a coexistence world order will dominate
the future world order. India and Europe will be tak-
ers rather than makers of order, facing the challenge
of carving out a position in-between these two com-
peting world orders. The remainder of the chapter
first outlines the characteristics of the integrationist
value-based order pursued by the United States. Sec-
ond, I describe the characteristics of the coexistence
interest-based order pursued by China.2 Third, I argue
that India’s rise is limited and does not translate into
growing strategic influence on the future world order.
Fourth, I discuss the implications for Europe of an or-
der dominated by two incoherent alternatives.
318
GDP in 2050, if current economic growth rates con-
tinue to apply.4 Although this time frame is too long to
predict that Washington will lose its status as a global
great power, these prospects influence Washington’s
concern to consolidate the existing world order. In
particular, the United States is concerned to preserve
its influence on right and wrong international conduct
beyond its position of dominant power.5
The United States took the lead in formulating
Western political aspirations as a program aiming at
enhancing international integration.6 The world order
pursued by the United States is based on liberal val-
ues, and its central principles are well-known. These
are, first, that market economic structures form the ba-
sis of international integration because they engender
transnational links, which allegedly promote greater
wealth for all. The liberal idea of the market entails
that economic growth is the road to prosperity. This
economic philosophy implies that the state plays a mi-
nor role in the economy, which allows the decisions
of market agents to engender the most effective use
of resources. A second principle is that democracy
engenders peace and stability by virtue of its reliance
on popular opinion and checks and balances on politi-
cal authorities. The liberal idea of democracy declares
that the people are sovereign and that the will of the
people is respected by means of the right to elect rep-
resentatives for the management of political authority.
In essence, the liberal democratic model implies that
political structures are established that allow adult
members of society to pursue their interpretation of
the good life and how it is realized. A third principle
is that the interpretation of the United Nations (UN)
Charter should be revised so as to allow for compro-
mises with absolute sovereignty in the event of seri-
319
ous breaches of individual civil and political rights.
In other words, states may intervene in the internal
affairs of each other if incumbents managing sover-
eignty fail to provide basic security for their citizens,
even if the regime in the target state has not endorsed
intervention from external parties. Liberal state-soci-
ety relations take the individual rather than the state
as the fundamental unit whose rights are to be pro-
tected. This requires the protection of civil rights by
means of law to ensure the right to life and property
as well as the obligation to respect agreements. No
entity, not even the state, ranks above the law, and,
as such, the state apparatus itself is also obliged to re-
spect the law. A fourth principle is that the U.S. align-
ment system based on liberal democracy and civil and
political rights defines the states that form the core of
world order. In other words, U.S. allies subscribing to
the liberal economic and political integrationist values
are entrusted with primary responsibility for promot-
ing and securing world order.
The United States considers itself to have a mis-
sion to build and preserve a community of free and
independent nations with governments that answer
to their citizens and reflect their own cultures. Thus,
the 2012 Strategic Guidance for the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) states that the United States seeks:
320
democratic peace, meaning that international peace
is best engendered by democracies governed by law.
Such states are less likely to go to war against each
other because they consider each other legitimate en-
tities behaving in accordance with common rules of
state conduct.8 Democracies committed to the rule of
law are less likely to go to war against each other since
democracies are seen as entities that play by the rules.
They are considered less legitimate targets of enforce-
ment strategies by default because it is not merely
the government, but the people represented by the
government, whose decisions and activities are con-
sequently called into question, since, in democracies,
governments are answerable to their citizens.9 The
U.S. goal of spreading democracy may be traded in
for stability in the short term, but it remains the long-
term goal of the U.S. Government. This is the case
even for the Barack Obama administration, which
inherited the problems of peacebuilding emerging in
the Afghanistan operations and has tended to priori-
tize stability rather than democratization. On the basis
of the logic that peace and international stability are
most reliably built on a foundation of freedom defined
as democracy, the United States has been heavily en-
gaged in fighting terrorism and rogue regimes such
as Gaddafi’s rule in Libya. Military means are applied
with the intention of creating the preconditions for the
spread of liberal democracy in the long run.
One core element in Washington’s program for
international order is the U.S. alliance system. It origi-
nates from the Cold War threat of Sino-Soviet expan-
sion and does not merely encompass the customary
understanding of alliances as pacts of mutual military
assistance. Rather, the United States developed an ex-
tensive system of alignments of which the actual mili-
321
tary alliances formed the iron core. Initially, the Soviet
Union was surrounded by a virtual power vacuum
along its entire periphery, from Scandinavia and the
British Isles, along the rim lands of Eurasia, to Japan
and Korea. The United States therefore established
and maintained a substantial military presence in and
close to the chief Eurasian danger areas, projecting U.S.
power across the water barriers.10 After the Cold War,
the U.S. alliance, or perhaps more precisely, alignment
system, has remained in place. One of the core strate-
gic objectives of U.S. national defense is to strengthen
the country’s security relationships with traditional
allies and to develop new international partnerships,
working to increase the capabilities of its partners to
contend with common challenges. The U.S. overseas
military presence operated in and from four forward
regions: Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian Litto-
ral, and the Middle East-Southwest Asia. The United
States has embarked on a comprehensive realignment
of the U.S. global defense posture to enable U.S. forces
to undertake military operations worldwide, reflect-
ing the global nature of U.S. interests.
The means used by Washington to pursue the con-
solidation of this liberal world order are to expand the
role of the liberal world order as the basis of interac-
tion in Asia. This strategy encompasses entering into
free-trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership with Asian countries strengthening economic
and military cooperation with Asian democracies, re-
structuring the U.S. alignment system so as to place
the U.S. Pacific Command at the center, and involv-
ing Asian countries in peacemaking operations where
grave breaches of civil and political rights are seen
to engender threats to international peace and stabil-
ity. Liberal economic globalization is, by and large,
322
accepted around the world, including in China, as a
role model for other states and nations to imitate. The
United States considers China’s intentions, with its in-
tegration into global economic market structures, to be
potentially disturbing; however, Washington’s liberal
understanding of international relations encourages it
to entertain the hope that China’s economic integra-
tion will socialize the population into adopting a posi-
tive view on the political ideas of liberalism. Therefore,
the United States adopts a positive attitude toward the
fact that contemporary China is fully integrated into
the international economic system. Thus, the element
of market economic structures is not at the top of the
U.S. security agenda, although issues of contention re-
main, such as Beijing’s reluctance to include the Chi-
nese currency, the renminbi, in a system of floating ex-
change rates. By contrast, liberal democracy and legal
globalization have yet to take root and hence remain
a long-term goals of U.S. Governments. The U.S. aim
to spread democracy across the world is, however, not
necessarily pursued by peaceful means. The war on
terror was principally conducted by military means,
but they are considered an element in creating the pre-
conditions for the spread of liberal democracy and the
rule of law in the long run. In the U.S. Defense Strategic
Guidance dated 2012, it is formulated as the belief that:
323
the rule of law, the protection of minorities, and
strong, accountable institutions that last longer than a
single vote. In general, the eradication of terrorism is
one of several ways by which stability at the domestic
and international level is promoted. Stability is seen as
a precondition for democratization since it is difficult
to bring about lasting changes in governmental and
legal practices without some measure of predictability
in the basic political and military structures. Stability
may entail working with authoritarian political estab-
lishments in the short run to pave the way for long-
term liberal political and legal reforms. The enhanced
prioritization of the Asia-Pacific in the U.S. military
force posture testifies to the fact that this region is of
primary significance to U.S. interests. As such, it is
pivotal for the United States to assure partners, dis-
suade military competition, deter aggression and
coercion, and be able to take prompt military action
in this region. The continued U.S. ability to perform
in these capacities constitutes the structure that aids
Washington’s attempt to implement the other aspects
of its program for international order.
The U.S. world order is called integrationist be-
cause it is based on values. The drawback to this type
of order is that it is fairly rigid in its definition of legiti-
mate and illegitimate conduct, and it excludes numer-
ous states from becoming core members due to the
economic, military, and political structures that form
the basis of state-society relations. The strength of
this order is that the limits of acceptable behavior are
clearly defined. Only democracies subscribing to mar-
ket economic principles can form part of the core of
the liberal world order. It is also clear that the agenda
of this world order is extensive in the sense that inte-
gration toward a community of states operating on the
324
basis of the same values is the long-term objective. The
liberal basis of world order also clarifies the purposes
of the U.S. use of its great power since the objectives
and values are clearly defined and have already been
pursued for decades, especially after the implosion
of the Soviet Union in the post-Cold War era. Conse-
quently, the standard by which U.S. performance is
measured is well-defined. Washington may often fail
to live up to its standard of free economic competition,
democracy, and civil and political rights, but the stan-
dard itself is clearly defined and well-known.
325
exercises influence at global great power level. After
the implosion of the Soviet Union, China seemed like
the best bet for a great power successor, and China
has been skillful at filling this role without having
the capabilities basis to play the role of a global great
power. Beijing has done this by gradually developing
a coexistence type of world order that has emerged
as an alternative to the U.S.-led world order. It is a
coexistence type of proposal in the sense that it aims
at limited cooperation to avoid great power conflicts
that jeopardize international order. This type of order
is designed to avoid China losing its current global
political great power status and descending into sec-
ondary power status rather than continuing its rise
to full-blown great power status. In view of China’s
numerous domestic social and economic challenges,
Beijing sees it as imperative to spend the bulk of its
resources to this end.
The world order pursued by China is based on
the common interest of numerous developing states
in peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence encom-
passes noninterference in the internal affairs of others,
mutual nonaggression, equality and mutual benefit,
and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity. These principles correspond to the rules of the
game of the UN system. China’s concern to limit the
use of force in the international system and to dem-
onstrate its commitment to international law means
that the UN system has become an important factor in
China’s attempt to revise the existing international or-
der to suit Chinese interests and world views. China’s
numerous domestic socio-economic problems prompt
Beijing to promote peace and stability and try to avoid
the use of force in external relations. Instead, China
focuses on the common responsibilities between con-
326
tending states to produce peaceful conflict manage-
ment that respects the Cold War principles of absolute
sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs
of other states. For example, after the Cold War, Bei-
jing has been reasonably successful in its attempts to
avoid zero-sum contests and the use of force over rela-
tive territorial and maritime gains in negotiations on
border disputes.13
Peaceful coexistence at a more practical level of
implementation involves four types of practices. One
practice is to aim for compromises between conflict-
ing positions when there is a risk of use of force that
involves the United States and China. Due to China’s
modest economic and military capabilities, Beijing
cannot afford to end up in a great power conflict that
involves the use of force. For example, in the case of
Taiwan, China reserves the right to use force against
what it considers to be a province under the jurisdic-
tion of mainland China. However, Beijing stops short
of exercising this alleged right in practice. Instead, in
the post-Cold War era Beijing has gradually adopted
a pragmatic approach of policy coordination and ne-
gotiation to avoid using force against an entity that
is likely to be defended by the United States. Second,
China requires consent from host governments to
accept peacemaking operations unless the UN sys-
tem and its affiliated institutions present evidence of
threats toward international peace and security. For
example, China has accepted Chapter VII operations
in the case of Sudan when irrefutable evidence has
been presented by the UN or by UN-affiliated institu-
tions that regime behavior engenders threats to inter-
national peace and security. At the same time, China
has succeeded in limiting the number and scope of
UN-approved punitive actions by insisting on con-
327
sent from the government in Khartoum. Third, China
pursues equality and mutual benefit as a top-down
principle that involves treating states rather than indi-
viduals as legal equals and promoting social and eco-
nomic development. For example, China’s involve-
ment in activities in Sudan such as building schools
and a new presidential palace and in reducing import
tariffs contrasts with the U.S. calls for punitive actions
directed against excluding the Khartoum regime from
international relations. Also, China supports the ef-
forts of regional and functional organizations of the
UN system to help with conflict management and to
determine when threats to international peace and
stability require intervention. For example, in the
run-up to the UN Security Council vote on establish-
ing a joint UN-African Union (AU) hybrid force in
Darfur in July 2007, China’s special envoy to Darfur,
Liu Guijin, commented that “It is not China’s Darfur.
It is first Sudan’s Darfur and then Africa’s Darfur.”
According to Guijin, peace negotiations need to be
prioritized over peacekeeping efforts to ensure that
real and long-lasting peace could be restored to the
region.14 Fourth, China defends the fundamental sta-
tus of absolute sovereignty in international law. For
example, in the case of Myanmar China has accom-
modated the concern of developing countries about
the regime’s violations of civil and political rights
by endorsing nonbinding presidential statements on
the unsolicited domestic use of force. Such actions
strengthen China’s image both as a principled power
whose political practice corresponds to the principles
of international conduct that it promotes, and also as
a pragmatic and equality-oriented power that listens
to the demands of secondary and small powers. This
set of coexistence principles is a mixture of a conser-
328
vative defensive form of diplomacy based on old UN
principles and an offensive form of diplomacy, which
involves revisions of the old UN system. China’s ver-
sion of international order receives widespread sup-
port in non-Western regions of the world and justifies
China’s status as a maker rather than merely a taker
of international order. China’s influence is based on
its relations with secondary powers such as Indonesia
and Russia and its engagement in regional security
institutions all over the world such as the AU, the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). These
are used as a basis for exercising politico-strategic in-
fluence on a par with the United States. This network
of engagement in regional security institutions consti-
tute Beijing’s alternative to the global U.S. alignment
system. As a consequence, Beijing is able to participate
in defining the rules of the game of international poli-
tics and thereby determine the foreign policy choices
that are open to other international actors.
The advantages of China’s coexistence version of
world order is that it is inherently flexible because it
refrains from defining values requiring implementa-
tion of specific economic, military, and political state
structures to form part of the order. China’s world or-
der allows for a plurality of political systems and swift
adjustments to changes in the international context.
The drawback to this type of order is that it does not
involve clarifying Beijing’s long-term objectives. Inso-
far as China achieves full-blown global great power
status, we do not have substantial objectives compa-
rable to those derived from U.S. liberal standards that
can give an idea of what kind of global great power
China will be. China is undergoing a transition from
communism as the basis of legitimacy to a new ide-
329
ological basis that has yet to be clearly defined. The
Confucian concept of harmonious society remains a
rhetorical device without much practical applicability.
The idea has not been translated into essential politi-
cal structures, such as feedback mechanisms from so-
ciety to government agencies, or into processes, such
as the use of elections in facilitating political succes-
sion. The absence of a strategy at this level means that
in the interim, the Chinese Communist Party relies on
continued economic growth and improved standards
of living to secure its domestic legitimacy.
During this process, which is likely to take decades,
China’s identity as a great power is unknown, and we
have no standard by which to measure China’s perfor-
mance beyond pure Sino-centric national interests in
restoring what China defines as its motherland. Socio-
political transition, combined with Sino-centric inter-
ests, means that the majority of secondary and small
powers will not become loyal to China to an extent
that will allow Beijing to replace Washington as the
dominant power in the international system. The sec-
ondary and small powers are more comfortable with
the United States as the dominant power since it is the
devil they know compared to the enigmatic quality of
China’s great power ambitions.
330
five BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa), India’s share of GDP as a percentage
of the BRICS total in 2009 constituted 13.6 percent
against China’s 51.9 percent in 2010.15 Militarily, In-
dia proceeds with military modernization. In 2009,
the defense budget for personnel, operations, and
maintenance was $23.1 billion, and for procurement
and construction, $8.5 billion. In 2010, the budget for
personnel, operations, and maintenance had risen to
$25.3 billion, and for procurement and construction
$13.1 billion.16 This modernization process is predomi-
nantly intended to enable India to match the Chinese
and Pakistani military build-up, which is partly di-
rected against India. India’s long-standing border
dispute with Pakistan is more serious than ever fol-
lowing Pakistan’s engagement in Afghanistan with
the emergence of the Taliban as a political movement.
China has deployed medium-range ballistic missiles
in the Qinghai-Tibet plateau. In turn, this has caused
India to consider acquisition of an anti-missile de-
fense system. China spends over four times as much
on defense as India. In addition, China has established
strategic partnerships with states such as Pakistan,
Myanmar, Nepal, and Bangladesh along the rim of the
Indian subcontinent, which will allow China to move
down alongside India westwards in the Arabian Sea
and eastwards in the Indian Ocean. This has caused
India to draw closer to the United States, Southeast
Asia, and Japan for purposes of getting access to arms
and counter the political-strategic influence of China
in India’s backyard. Despite these efforts, China’s in-
fluence is growing, whereas India’s influence is wan-
ing. New Delhi’s rapprochement to states such as the
United States and Japan indicate that India becomes
less and less able to manage peace and stability on
331
the subcontinent on its own and has to look for part-
ners that can help India counter the growing Chinese
influence.17
Despite New Delhi’s recent rapprochement with
the United States and its continuous disagreements
with China over their mutual border and resentment
on both sides over issues such as Tibet and Pakistan,
India has an independent identity that will ensure that
the country maintains a distance to both great pow-
ers, much in the same way as Russia does although
by different means and for different reasons. India is
often seen as the exemplar of democracy in the de-
veloping world, being a secular democratic republic
with a parliamentary form of government.18 India has
had aspirations to cash in on this status not by moving
closer to the West, but by playing a leading role as a
representative of developing countries in forums such
as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the UN.
However, NAM never took off as a political force in in-
ternational relations, and India’s bid for a permanent
seat in the UN Security Council remains an aspiration
rather than a reality. India is a secondary power that
maintains relations with China as well as the United
States without choosing sides. Consequently, India
will remain a secondary power in the current world
order, predominantly playing the role of a taker rather
than a maker of order.
332
by means of ad hoc frameworks of conflict manage-
ment. The membership and rules of these frameworks
are defined on a trial-and-error basis. Also, in this sys-
tem secondary and small powers are quite influential
because the United States and China compete for their
backing and loyalty. This enables secondary and small
powers to maximize their influence by gravitating
toward both the U.S. and the Chinese order without
choosing sides.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO)
2011 intervention in Libya may provide clues as to the
consequences for Europe of the existence of two com-
peting international orders. Despite the difficulties
with contributing to civil and political rights regimes
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Western U.S.-led group-
ing continues to pursue a greater role for humanitarian
intervention. This implies that the United States and
Europe will continue to pursue liberal value-based
objectives as alliance partners. On the other hand,
European leadership in the military intervention in
Libya implies that the Western countries support the
calls for regionalization of UN Security Council se-
curity management that has formed part of China’s
program for international order for some time. Conse-
quently, the United States is not likely to take the lead
in this type of operation outside of the core of the U.S.
sphere of interest in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, Ger-
many’s agreement with China’s abstention regarding
UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on the grounds
of unwillingness to authorize the use of force in Libya
indicates that the dividing lines between those sup-
porting an integrationist order and those supporting a
coexistence-style order are becoming more and more
blurred. This development does not indicate a merger
between the U.S. and Chinese-led programs for inter-
333
national order. Instead, it indicates that increasing re-
gionalization is necessary in the absence of one coher-
ent set of principles that universally define right and
wrong international conduct.19
Germanys’ UN Security Council abstention also
implies that Europe is not a unitary actor. Europe ap-
pears to be in disagreement over the future direction
of cooperation at a time when two competing inter-
national orders are on offer. The United Kingdom’s
(UK) refusal in December 2011 to consider European
Union (EU) plans to tighten budget controls to fix
the Euro is an example of this problem. Moreover, as
indicated by Germany’s abstention on the UN Secu-
rity Council 1973 Resolution, individual countries in
Europe appear to align themselves in different ways
with respect to the U.S. and the Chinese version of
global order. Another example is the Greek decision
to assist China in its operation to lift Chinese nationals
out of Libya. The May 2012 election in Greece, putting
the country’s future in the Euro zone at risk, threaten-
ing to revive Europe’s debt crisis and forcing a new
election to be held in June 2012, testifies to the severe
problems facing European cooperation and the future
of the regional integration aspirations. The economic,
financial, and political challenges facing the region
point to the possibility of a disintegrating Europe of
individual countries that reorient themselves toward
Washington and Beijing on the basis of different in-
terests and values. In this environment, European
states may continue to engage in conflict manage-
ment in their near abroad in the Balkans, the Middle
East, and Africa to promote stability in the region’s
periphery. However, the days of major peacebuilding
efforts such as those undertaken in Iraq and Afghani-
stan appear to be over because a fragmented Europe
334
is becoming unable to muster the unity and long-term
commitments that such efforts involve.
The fundamental issue that is raised by develop-
ments in the post-Cold War global order is whether
the Western order can survive a disintegrated Europe
with different policies toward China. Will the United
States have faith in European countries that side with
China and oppose the United States on some issues?
Will Europe be able to remain sufficiently coherent
that Washington and Beijing will continue to see the
EU as a unit to be reckoned with in international poli-
tics? It remains to be seen to what extent Europe will
remain a unitary actor. However, by now it is already
clear that the principal challenge for Europe is to find
a place in the new international order on the basis of
a reconsideration of what Europe has to offer in the
economic, military, social, and political sectors that
addresses the interests of China without compromis-
ing Europe’s position as core member of the Western
liberal order. Despite China’s rising power, U.S. ideas
and ideals remain prominent in the global landscape
due to the innovative and problem solving qualities of
the U.S. economy and society.20 As a consequence, it is
pertinent for Europe to continue to remain an attrac-
tive partner to the United States at the same time as it
addresses the rise of China in a constructive manner.
Only in this way is Europe likely to position itself as
an independent voice in international politics that is
seen as important by the United States and China.
335
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12
3. GDP at MER (2009 USD bn), PWC World in 2050 & Gold-
man Sachs, and the Royal Danish Embassy in Beijing.
4. Ibid.
336
9. See, for example, Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic
Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1993.
12. For purchasing power parity estimate, see The Military Bal-
ance 2011, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Stud-
ies, 2011.
15. The data comes from the Royal Danish Embassy in Bei-
jing, which has based the calculations on data from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.
337
held in Beijing, People’s Republic of China, September 15-17,
2011, pp. 36-39.
338
CHAPTER 13
Kwesi Aning
Festus Aubyn
INTRODUCTION
339
in Africa, especially in the peace and security arena,
and juxtapose such grand strategic calculations with
Africa’s own perceptions of and responses to its secu-
rity challenges. Furthermore, we explore how, in the
face of common challenges, both the AU and United
States can identify and respond to their security chal-
lenges in a manner that makes this relationship a win-
win one instead of the present one driven by suspi-
cion, competition, and outright hostility.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first
section examines U.S. security policy toward Africa in
the post Cold War era, with particular emphasis on the
various training programs and initiatives. The second
section explores the present state of American grand
strategy and how the new U.S. Africa Command (AF-
RICOM) fits into it with respect to Africa.
To demonstrate how Africa is responding to its
own security challenges, the third section focuses on
the new AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
The fourth section assesses how AFRICOM is enhanc-
ing Africa’s emerging peace and security architecture
and the drawbacks. The chapter concludes that U.S.
interests in Africa would be best assured not by using
military means to check China or the terrorist activities
of al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab on the continent, but rather
by looking to meaningfully address and reconcile its
interests with the continent’s human security needs.
Africa is also advancing democratically, economically,
and developmentally and, as such, it is essential that
the United States engage the continent not as conflict-
ridden, but as a mutual partner in advancing global
peace and stability by pursuing long-term strategic
objectives that address both U.S. and African interests.
340
U.S. SECURITY POLICY TOWARD AFRICA
AFTER THE COLD WAR
341
where its interests were not directly at stake. But al-
though the horrors of the Rwanda genocide and the
subsequent crises in Burundi led to a partial reversal
of this policy, the United States did not revert to di-
rect military intervention in Africa even in the post-
September 11, 2001 (9/11) period.6 Instead, U.S. policy
shifted toward developing the capacities of African
countries to undertake peace operations under the
guise of “African solutions to African problems”—a
notion that some viewed as a convenient alibi for U.S.
inaction.7 These capacity-building initiatives centered
on bilateral-level engagements, with a limited focus
on the regional and sub-regional groupings. They in-
cluded several training programs meant to build the
capacity of individual African countries to participate
in multilateral peace operations.
The first of such training programs was the Afri-
can Crisis Response Force (ACRF) proposed by for-
mer U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. ACRF
was to consist of an African force that could be rapidly
deployed in a theater of conflict primarily to protect
civilians in designated areas. However, this training
program was not well received by most African states,
as some African Leaders like Nelson Mandela saw it
as a U.S. excuse to establish its foothold in Africa af-
ter the U.S. failure to intervene in Rwanda.8 In defer-
ence to African sensitivities, the Clinton administra-
tion launched the African Crisis Response Initiative
(ACRI), incorporating some elements of ACRF in 1996.
Unlike ACRF, ACRI was embraced by several African
countries and had the possibility of direct military as-
sistance to sub-regional bodies such as the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), al-
though it also operated at the bilateral level. The main
objective of ACRI was to train African contingents for
342
Chapter VI-style peacekeeping on the continent and
also to enhance their humanitarian relief capacity.
Although many African countries such as Mali, Sen-
egal, Ghana, Uganda, and Tanzania benefited from
this training program, others like Nigeria and South
Africa remained opposed to what they described as
a foreign initiative that did not address African con-
flicts.9 Other important programs initiated by the U.S.
Government include the International Military Educa-
tion and Training (IMET), the Enhanced International
Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program, and the
Africa Regional Peacekeeping (ARP) program.10 Col-
lectively, these initiatives contributed immensely to
building the military capacity of African states for
peacekeeping operations in accordance with Chapter
VI of the UN Charter.
In response to the growing trend toward robust
peacekeeping in Africa, ACRI was later transformed
in 2004 to African Contingency Operations Training
and Assistance (ACOTA) by the George Bush admin-
istration. According to the U.S. Department of State,
the mission of ACOTA is to:
343
lored to match the individual needs and capabilities of
each recipient country, an innovation that was missing
in the previous programs. Under ACOTA, the United
States also provided financial and logistical support to
the AU missions in Darfur, Burundi, and Somalia. The
regional economic communities, such as ECOWAS,
were also provided with training and other capacity-
building assistance through its member states.13 By
2008, a total of approximately 45,000 African soldiers
and 3,200 African trainers were educated under the
program and deployed to peacekeeping operations in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Burundi,
Cote d’Ivoire, Darfur, Somalia, and Lebanon.14 How-
ever, like all previous training programs, ACOTA suf-
fered from limited funding, which affected its depth
and sustainability.15 Another weakness was that pri-
vate security firms instead of uniformed U.S. person-
nel were used to implement the training program, and
most recipient states objected to this.16
In 2005, ACOTA became a constituent part of the
multilateral 5-year Global Peace Operation Initiative
(GPOI) program of the Bush administration, which
aimed at improving the supply of personnel for peace-
keeping operations.17 Although it was designed as a
program with worldwide reach, its emphasis was on
Africa. The primary purpose of the GPOI program
was to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a ma-
jority of them African, for peacekeeping operations.
One major innovation of the GPOI was its recogni-
tion of the strategic significance of developing the
capacities of regional and sub-regional institutions to
ensure “sustainability and self-sustainment.”18 GPOI
also supports efforts to operationalize the African
Standby Force (ASF) and regional and sub-regional
logistics depots. In the post-9/11 period, as a result of
344
the U.S.-led war on terror and concern about the po-
tential threats that can be posed by failed and fragile
states, the United States focused on strengthening in-
digenous capacity to secure porous borders and help
build law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure
to deny havens for terrorists.19 Various states such as
Mali, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger were provided
with equipment and training through the Trans-Saha-
ran Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) and the Pan-
Sahelian Initiative (PSI). The United States provided
weapons, vehicles, and military training to counter
terrorism in these countries.
345
Grand strategy is a term of art from academia and
refers to the collection of plans and policies that com-
prise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political,
military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to
advance that state’s national interest. Grand strategy
is the art of reconciling ends and means. It involves
purposive action—what leaders think and want. Such
action is constrained by factors that leaders explicitly
recognize (for instance, budget constraints and the
limitations inherent in the tools of statecraft) and by
those they might only implicitly feel (cultural or cog-
nitive screens that shape worldviews).22 But efforts
to identify and assess the state of current U.S. grand
strategy raise several questions. For example:
• Is there a new pragmatism that delineates U.S.
action in Africa since Barack Obama has taken
office?
• Is this reflected in a “new strategic isolation”
within a broader receding West characterized
by a United States beset by relative economic
decline and dysfunctional politics?
• To what extent does the Obama administra-
tion’s foreign policy vision of “leading from
behind” become evident?
• Is there a distinctive Obama approach begin-
ning to emerge? Can we speak of the “D” word,
the emergence of an Obama doctrine—namely
“a new form of high tech, low-budget, and po-
litically astute intervention that maximizes U.S.
influence while minimizing cost for a cash-
strapped government”?23 There seems to be an
emerging new approach described by Zbigniew
Brzezinski as “discriminating engagement,”24
which in practical terms refers to a new ap-
proach in dealing with trouble spots around
346
the world, characterized by U.S. economic and
political realism. If this new “discriminating
engagement” is implemented, then where does
the much-hyped new Africa Command fit into
this grand strategy with respect to Africa?
• To what extent does this approach focus on us-
ing other tools of national power to determine
and achieve outcomes that do not have a sole
focus on the use of military might, but also
use diplomatic tools to get others to pull their
weight? From the above, there is an indication
that recent discourse on such grand strategy
raises more questions and does not provide
clear-cut concrete answers. Previously, we
have attempted to raise some of these questions
and ideas.
347
Command will enhance U.S. efforts to bring peace and
security to the people of Africa and promote common
goals of development, health, education, democracy,
and economic growth in Africa.27
Other countries such as Nigeria, Morocco, South
Africa, Algeria, and Libya made policy statements
that AFRICOM will not be welcomed on their soil. Ni-
geria in particular, rejected AFRICOM because it was
believed to be counterproductive, unnecessary, and a
derogation of the sovereignty of African states.28 Many
African governments also feared that AFRICOM will
be used to destabilize and even overthrow regimes
that the United States does not approve.
Before the creation of AFRICOM, the adminis-
tration of U.S.-Africa military relations was divided
among three different commands: European Com-
mand (EUCOM) located in Stuttgart, Germany; Ha-
waii-based Pacific Command (PACOM), and Central
Command (CENTCOM) based in Tampa, Florida.29
This division of responsibility of Africa among these
three commands was reported to have posed some
coordination challenges for the DoD. Therefore, as
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued,
the establishment of AFRICOM was to enable the
United States:
348
Protect and defend the national security interests of the
United States by strengthening the defense capabilities
of African states and regional organizations and, when
directed, conduct military operations, in order to deter
and defeat transnational threats and to provide a secu-
rity environment conducive to good governance and
development.31
349
is a multinational security cooperation initiative that
aims to improve maritime safety and security in
Africa and focuses on addressing four primary ar-
eas: maritime professionals, maritime infrastructure,
maritime domain awareness, and maritime response
capability. OEF-TS also supports the U.S. Govern-
ment’s Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) program to help deter the flow of illicit arms,
goods, and people and to preclude terrorists from es-
tablishing sanctuaries in their countries.35 Ten African
countries are currently part of this program: Algeria,
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Ni-
ger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.
The institutional capacity building programs in-
clude Operation ONWARD LIBERTY (OOL), the
Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AM-
LEP) Program, the Pandemic Response Program, and
the PILOT-Partnership for Integrated Logistics Op-
erations and Tactics.36 While the OOL program sup-
ports the DoS broader Security Sector Reform (SSR)
program in Liberia, the AMLEP program on the other
hand addresses illicit transnational maritime activity,
such as drug interdiction and fisheries enforcement, at
the bilateral level. The programs designed to develop
human capital comprise the International Military
and Education Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET
(E-IMET), The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa (CJTF-HOA), and the Partner Military HIV/
AIDS Program (PMHAP).37 The IMET and E-IMET
are the most widely used military assistance pro-
grams in U.S. AFRICOM’s area of responsibility and
aim at professionalizing militaries and reinforcing the
democratic value of elected civilian authority.38 The
PMHAP aims at mitigating the impacts of the disease
on African military readiness. The CJTF-HOA located
350
at Camp Lemonnier also builds partner security ca-
pability, capacity, and infrastructure through regional
cooperation, military-to-military programs, civil-
military affairs projects, and professional military
education programs.
In Fiscal Year 2010, AFRICOM received $274 mil-
lion, and the Obama administration requested $298
million for the command for Fiscal Year 2011.39 As
of April 2011, AFRICOM had approximately 2,100
personnel, consisting of both military and civilian
personnel from DoD and non-DoD agencies of the
U.S. Government. In 2011, AFRICOM undertook its
first major military operation named Operation OD-
YSSEY DAWN during the Libya crises, in which the
AU became a mere observer, incapable of playing any
major role. Operation ODYSSEY DAWN was the U.S.
support to the multilateral military efforts to enforce
a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya in sup-
port of UN Security Council Resolution 1973.40 Before
NATO’s Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya,
AFRICOM also supported the U.S. humanitarian
response in Libya through the delivery of relief sup-
plies and the evacuation of foreign nationals fleeing
the violence.
351
independence, the proxy wars in which Africa got en-
tangled during the period of the Cold War resulted in
the diversion of attention from the core economic and
security challenges that the continent faced. By 1993,
there was political recognition that the rhetoric of eco-
nomic development could not be achieved if the con-
flicts that hounded the continent were not decisively
dealt with. Consequently, the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution was established
with the purpose to anticipate and prevent conflicts
on the continent. Therefore, 1993 became the decisive
year when the shift to the recognition of a need for a
structured security architecture started to take shape.
A decade later, with a Constitutive Act defining the
parameters of a new AU, a Protocol establishing a Peace
and Security Council (PSC) for the AU was promul-
gated in 2002 and eventually ratified by enough mem-
ber states to make it operational. At its launch in May
2004, the PSC was characterized as “marking a his-
toric watershed in Africa’s progress toward resolving
its conflicts and building a durable peace and security
order.”42 The AU’s new security regime is premised on
several norms and principles that are both old (based
on the Charter of the OAU) and new (emanating from
the Constitutive Act).43 They include:
• Sovereign equality of member states (Article
4a);
• Nonintervention by member states (Article 4g);
• African solutions to African problems;
• Uti possidetis (Article 4b);
• Nonuse of force/peaceful settlement of dis-
putes (Articles 4e, 4f, 4i);
• Condemnation of unconstitutional changes of
government (Article 4p); and,
• The AU’s right to intervene in a member state
in grave circumstances (Article 4h).
352
A combination of these values and norms plus
the institutional mechanisms has given the AU an
institutional vibrancy that creates opportunities for
proactive responses to some of the continent’s secu-
rity challenges.44 A case in point was the AU’s de-
ployment of peacekeepers to Burundi and the Sudan
Darfur region to prevent a situation it terms as posing
significant threats to legitimate order to restore peace
and stability.
In addition to the Constitutive Act, which is the core
document that defines the principle and objectives of
the AU security policy and the PSC protocol, a Com-
mon African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP)
was adopted in 2004. In particular, the PSC protocol
and the CADSP together form the critical pillars un-
derpinning the new AU peace and security architec-
ture. The fundamental philosophical idea underlying
CADSP was that of human security, based not only on
political values but social and economic imperatives
as well.45 This notion of human security embraces such
issues as: human rights; the right to participate fully
in governance; the right to equal development, access
to resources, and basic necessities of life; the right to
protection against poverty; the right to education and
health care; the right to protection against marginal-
ization on the basis of gender; and protection against
natural disasters and ecological and environmental
degradation.46 These issues represent Africa’s primary
security concerns that pose major threats to the stabil-
ity of states and not the excessive focus of AFRICOM
on terrorism and other transnational organized crimes
on the continent.
The CADSP also aims to address some of the com-
mon security threats facing the continent such as the
353
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, peace-
building, and peacekeeping as well as post-conflict
rehabilitation and reconstruction, terrorism, humani-
tarian issues, and diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuber-
culosis, malaria, and other infectious diseases.47 Its
objectives and goals include: ensuring collective re-
sponses to both internal and external threats, advanc-
ing the cause of integration in Africa; enhancing AU’s
capacity for, and coordination of, early action for con-
flict prevention, containment, management, and reso-
lution; and promoting initiatives that will preserve
and strengthen peace and development in Africa.
354
PSC are extensive, dealing not only with “hard” peace
and security issues, but also “soft” security or any as-
pects that influence human security. This enables the
PSC to monitor elections and address issues of food
security, natural disasters, and human rights viola-
tions.51 It is supported by the AU Commission, a Panel
of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an
African Standby Force (ASF), and a Special Fund.
Among other things, the objectives of the PSC are to
promote peace, security, and stability in Africa.52 It is
composed of 15 members, of whom 10 are elected for a
2-year term, while the remaining five are elected for a
3-year period on the principle of equitable representa-
tion of the five regions: North, West, Central, East, and
Southern Africa.
The critical peace and security decisionmaking in-
stitutions include the Assembly of Heads of State and
Governments (AHSG) of AU, the Executive Council,
the PSC, and the Commission of the AU. Although
the AHSG makes the final decisions on important
peace and security issues such as the intervention in
member states of the AU, the PSC is empowered to
take most decisions on security issues on behalf of the
AHSG.53 The Chairperson of the AU Commission also
plays an important conflict management role under
the new APSA. The Chairperson assisted by the Com-
missioner in charge of Peace and Security is respon-
sible for bringing issues to the attention of the PSC,
the Panel of the Wise, and other relevant stakeholders
and for ensuring implementation and follow-up ac-
tions.54 The chair of the Commission performs this ad-
visory role by relying on the information provided by
the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) which
aims to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of
conflicts (Article 12). The CEWS consists of a situation
355
room located at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, and is responsible for data gathering and
analysis. It is linked to the early warning mechanisms
of the RECs such as the ECOWAS, South African De-
velopment Community (SADC) and Intergovernmen-
tal Authority on Development (IGAD).
The Panel of the Wise, which is composed of five
highly respected African personalities selected on the
basis of regional representation, is tasked with advis-
ing the PSC and AU Commission Chair on any or all
matters relating to the promotion and maintenance of
peace and security in Africa. The Panel of the Wise
could also be deployed to support the efforts of the
Peace and Security Council (Article 11). Another im-
portant institutional mechanism of the APSA is the
ASF (Article 13). It is established to enable the PSC to
perform its responsibilities with respect to the deploy-
ment of peace support operations and interventions
pursuant to Article 4 (h) and 4 (J) of the AU Consti-
tutive Act.55 The ASF provides for five sub-regional
stand-by arrangements, each up to a brigade size of
3,000-4,000 troops, which will combine to give the AU
a total of 15,000 to 20,000 troops who will be trained
and ready to be deployed on 14 days notice.56
It was conceived to conduct, observe, and moni-
tor peacekeeping missions in responding to emer-
gency situations anywhere on the continent requiring
rapid military response. The AU Peace Support Op-
erations Division (PSOD) in Addis Ababa is the co-
ordination mechanism and is expected to command
an African-wide integrated communication system
linking all the sub-regional brigades. Although the
ASF was envisaged to be operational by 2010, chal-
lenges of coordination between the regional economic
communities, finances, logistics, and equipment have
356
prolonged its implementation.57 But without doubt,
the ASF represents a critical component of the APSA
that will enhance the AU’s capabilities to intervene to
protect people in grave circumstances and to provide
a prompt and robust response to manage and resolve
conflicts on the continent. There is also the Military
Staff Committee (MSC), which consists of senior mili-
tary officers from PSC member states. When called
upon, the MSC advises the PSC on questions relating
to military and security issues that are on its agenda.58
357
tactical dimensions of AU peacekeeping missions.
For example, AFRICOM provides bilateral support
to the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) of the AU
mission in Somalia (AMISOM) such as Burundi and
Uganda, through the provision of equipment, logistics
support, advice, and training.60 The AU/UN mission
in Darfur is also being supported by AFRICOM. Be-
tween 2005 and 2010, the United States provided more
than $940 million to support the AU missions in Dar-
fur and Somalia, as well as capacity building through
the ACOTA program.61 The United States is also pro-
viding counterterrorism training to some selected mil-
itary units in the Sahel and East Africa such as Mali,
Chad, Niger, and Mauritania through the TSCTI and
PSI programs.
AFRICOM is also supporting AU’s effort to opera-
tionalize the African Standby Force through capacity
building at the continental and sub-regional level, as
well as AU member states.62 These capacity building
initiatives are targeted toward strengthening the ca-
pabilities and interoperability of the African Standby
Force (ASF) and its sub-regional elements. Comput-
ers, software, and communication equipment have
also been provided to bolster the CEWS and commu-
nication between the AU and regional ASF brigades.
In order to build the capacity of the AU Secretariat to
plan, manage, and sustain peacekeeping operations,
the United States has provided a full-time Peace and
Security Advisor to the AU Peace Support Operations
division in Addis Ababa.
While all of these programs signify a significant
milestone in U.S. support to the implementation pro-
cess of the APSA, the limited nature of these training
programs makes it difficult to see a clear cause and
effect relationship between the training offered and
358
the actual performance of troops trained under them
in the field.63 Moreover, the disproportionate focus
on the training of U.S. allies at the expense of all AU
member states affects the rapid impact on African
peacekeeping. The nature of the relationship between
the AU and the United States has also not been clearly
defined. The relationship between the two has largely
been ad hoc and crisis-driven, partly due to the U.S.
failure to construct a coherent or sustained policy to-
ward Africa. This is actually reflected in the shifting
and changing nature of its security strategies toward
the continent. Instead of giving more substantial sup-
port to the AU, the United States has rather focused on
supporting individual countries that benefit its inter-
ests.64 This for example, has reinforced the perception
that AFRICOM is meant to serve U.S. interests rather
than Africa, and makes some Africans even question
the real motivations behind the creation of AFRICOM.
Moreover, despite the objectives of AFRICOM that sug-
gest that it will go beyond traditional security concerns
by addressing nontraditional security issues, it re-
mains essentially a military organization.
Like its predecessor programs, AFRICOM is also
threatened by inadequate funding and political com-
mitment, insufficient interagency coordination, as
well as a failure to harmonize activities with interna-
tional partners to achieve maximum impact and elimi-
nate duplication.65 In particular, the financial support
of AFRICOM has been vulnerable to raids from other
budget lines, and remains uneven from year-to-year.66
But this is not surprising, given the parlous state of
the economy inherited by President Obama and the
fact that his administration has to focus on the recov-
ery of the U.S. economy. The inconsistencies in U.S.
military engagement in Africa have also raised serious
359
concerns about its commitment to the attainment of
peace and stability on the continent. While the United
States was quick to intervene in the crisis in Libya, it
was largely absent when it came to the post-electoral
violence in La Cote d’Ivoire; again reflecting the domi-
nance of security interests in U.S. engagement with Af-
rica, including the removal of “out of favor” regimes,
in this case Muammar Gaddafi, and replacing them
with loyal governments with the aim of controlling
resources.67 Thus, though in Libya, the United States
adopted a military posture to oust President Gaddafi,
this was not the case in Cote d’Ivoire where the main
approach used was a combination of quiet diplomacy
and economic sanctions even when people were dying
from clashes between Alassane Ouattara’s supporters
and that of Gbagbo.
CONCLUSION
360
as poverty, high levels of unemployment, access to
clean water, and the HIV/AIDs pandemic.69 These are
the issues that confront and threaten the survival and
the existence of most African states and make them
vulnerable to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.
It is also important for the United States not to see
Africa at the periphery of its foreign policy engage-
ments. Now opportunities for progress in Africa
abound due to rising regional institutions, expanding
economies, increasing democratization, and emerging
security institutions. For example, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that in 2011, against a
threatening global backdrop, most economies in sub-
Saharan Africa turned in a solid performance with a
growth rate averaging more than 5 percent.70 Most im-
portantly, the AU and the RECs, especially ECOWAS,
have developed very robust peace and security archi-
tectures to deal with African security challenges. It is
therefore imperative that Africa is not seen or engaged
by the United States as a conflict-ridden continent
but as a continent that is advancing democratically,
economically, and developmentally.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13
361
3. Alhaji Sarjoh Bah and Kwesi Aning, “US Peace Operation
Policy in Africa: From ACRI to AFRICOM,” International Peace-
keeping, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2008, p. 119.
7. Bah and Aning, 2008; Kwesi Aning, Thomas Jaye, and Sam-
uel Atuobi, “The Role of Private Military Companies in US-Africa
Policy,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 118, 2008,
pp. 613-628.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
13. Ibid; see also Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, “Peace-
keeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities,” Geneva, Swit-
zerland/Pretoria, South Africa: United Nations Institute for Dis-
armament Research, 2000, pp. 267–290.
362
15. For more information, see Sarjoh Bah and Aning, p. 122.
23. Anna Field and Geoff Dyer, “The ‘Obama Doctrine’ Be-
gins to Take Shape,” Financial Times, October 24, 2011, p. 6.
27. Ibid.
363
Security or Fostering African Development?” African Security Re-
view, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2008, p. 31.
32. Ibid.
35. See “OEF-TS Fact Sheet and the TSCTP Fact Sheet,” avail-
able from www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp.
364
37. See “IMET Fact Sheet and PMHAP Fact sheet,” available
from www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp.
40. Ploch.
41. On May 25. 2004 (Africa Day), the PSC was officially in-
augurated with fanfare to replace the “Mechanism on Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution,” which had been es-
tablished in June 1993 in Cairo, Egypt, under the umbrella of
the OAU.
44. Ibid., p. 3.
47. Ibid.
365
48. Paul D, Williams, “The African Union’s Conflict Manage-
ment Capabilities,” Working Paper, New York: Council on For-
eign Relations, October 2011.
49. Ibid., p. 6.
53. See PSC, Article 7; see also Kwesi Aning and Samuel Atu-
obi, “R2P in Africa: An Analysis of the African Union´s Peace and
Security Architecture,” Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 1, 2009.
366
58. Since its establishment in 2004, the MSC has been engaged
in providing advice on the PSC’s authorized peace operations in
Burundi, Sudan, Darfur, Comoros, and currently Somalia.
62. Ploch.
65. Ploch.
66. For more information, see Alexis Arieff et al., “U.S. Foreign
Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: The FY2012 Request,” CRS Re-
port for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Ser-
vice, May 20, 2011.
67. For more information, see “The Crisis in Libya: the Im-
perative of rushing the ASF,” available from www.currentanalyst.
com/index.php/opeds/158-the-crisis-in-libya-the-imperative-of-rushing-
the-asf.
367
69. Bah and Aning; Isike, Okeke-Uzodike, and Gilbert.
368
CHAPTER 14
Abel Esterhuyse
369
reigning African National Congress (ANC) govern-
ment in particular. In the second section, a brief analy-
sis is provided of U.S. involvement in African secu-
rity. The discussion concludes with a consideration of
possible cooperation and/or discord between South
Africa and the United States in Africa.
370
worldview of the South African (ANC) government
is shaped by the need for a so-called “National Demo-
cratic Revolution.” Linking the three words, national,
democratic, and revolution, is in itself of great signifi-
cance and provides at least some insight into the ANC
mindset. Like most South African political concepts,
the National Democratic Revolution is rooted in the
legacy of apartheid and, in this case, a revolution-
ary-oriented East-bloc approach to politics that was
formed during the Cold War anti-apartheid struggle.6
Today, the South African domestic political land-
scape is still colored by the legacies and realities of
apartheid. Apartheid defines the ANC’s view of the
country and the world. Apartheid is still the tool for
mobilization of the masses, on which the ANC as a po-
litical party relies. The ANC, as the government, thus
manages a unique paradox. On the one hand, they
need to cleanse the South African society of apartheid
and eradicate the legacy and influence thereof. On the
other, though, keeping the “fight against apartheid”
alive is an integral part of the ANC’s philosophy and,
more specifically, keeping the tripartite-alliance7 to-
gether. The fight against apartheid has always been
the central organizing concept for the ANC and the
reason for its existence. The ANC has to use the
structural legacy of apartheid to explain the dispar-
ity between what is, or what was, and what could
have been.
At present, the process to address the legacies of
apartheid is playing itself out predominantly in an
economic policy of black economic empowerment
(BEE) and the application of affirmative action (AA)
to ensure representivity8 and deal with the economic
inequalities in society. The National Democratic Revo-
lution, thus, needs to provide many who have been
371
excluded from the productive economy with a path-
way to, what in the West at least, would be considered
as development and life improvement. Representivity
and AA action have become important pathways in
making this happen for the masses. Of course, a small
number of so-called “black diamonds”9 have benefit-
ted from BEE. Certain elements within the ANC are,
however, increasingly calling for more drastic mea-
sures and, as a consequence, the debate on national-
ization is heating up in South Africa.10
As a matter of irony, the need for representivity
and AA have driven many experienced and capable
workers out of the public sector, leading to serious
service delivery problems for the ANC government—
especially in the rural areas.11 A growing bureaucratic
inefficiency increasingly underpins a view of govern-
ment as ineffective and incompetent. Many South
Africans thus tend to view the National Democratic
Revolution with skepticism and as a metaphor for
government inaptitude.12 The need for representivity
and AA, at the same time, developed into an attitude
of entitlement in the constituency of the ANC-led tri-
partite government. Of course, an attitude of entitle-
ment absolves people from action, while the service
delivery problems reinforce an attitude of powerless-
ness and victimhood.13
Why is this important? The need for a national
democratic revolution, AA policies, and the accep-
tance of inadequacies in many areas of government is
informed by the importance of Africa. It underpins a
government approach that highlights the need to em-
phasize the African dimension and identity in South
African society to the detriment of many consider-
ations that others may consider more important. The
ANC domestic political discourse and the domestic
372
political agenda of the ANC government are informed
by “Africa” and the need to emphasize the importance
of Africa. This orientation toward Africa in domestic
politics, by design, also informs the foreign policy
stance of the South African government. In a multi-
cultural and multiethnic society, this is an important
message from government to both its domestic and
foreign audiences.
A second consideration is geography. A previous
South African president, Thabo Mbeki, found it neces-
sary to deliver a speech on “I am an African” in the
South African parliament.14 He had to make the point
explicitly in the South African parliament that South
Africa is part of Africa! Why? From a geographical
perspective, South Africa is not only part of Africa,
but its position at the southern tip of the continent is
also a blessing and a curse. With some of the world’s
most important minerals, the country has very long
open borders to the north and has to police a coastline
of more than 3,000 kilometers (km) on one of the na-
val choke points of the world. The recent instabilities
in the oceans around East and West Africa, together
with subsequent increase in sea traffic around Africa,
highlight this reality.
Geopolitics dictate that the South African govern-
ment should commit itself to a prioritization of the
African continent in general and in strengthening of
the political and economic integration of the SADC in
particular. It is no surprise, then, that South Africa’s
foreign policy has a very explicit focus on Africa in
general, and the SADC in particular, in “consolida-
tion of the African Agenda.”15 The geographical em-
phasis on Africa, like the domestic political agenda,
also encases South Africa’s African identity. This
explicit alignment with Africa is in stark contrast to
373
the focus of the apartheid government that projected
itself as part of the European civilization. The apart-
heid government projected the South African sea lines
and minerals as important to the West. For the ANC
government, it is part of Africa’s rich reserve. Thus,
identity politics drive the South African geostrategic
orientation toward Africa.16
History is a third consideration in South African
foreign policy orientation toward Africa. The apart-
heid government never steered away from political,
economic, and military coercion in Southern Africa.
The ANC is inspired by the need to mend these in-
justices. Its history of resistance against apartheid (the
so-called struggle history) left the ANC with a respon-
sibility to repay many African countries for their ser-
vices as sanctuaries to ANC cadres during the anti-
apartheid struggle.
History, of course, also shapes South African stra-
tegic engagement with the rest of the world: from
support to controversial “underdogs” such as the
Palestinians and, more recently, Muammar Gaddafi,
to a very strong anti-American and anti-West stance
in general, and an emphasis on South-South relations
in particular.17 The South African orientation to the
West in general, and the United States in particular,
is driven by Africa’s colonial heritage and U.S. sup-
port to the apartheid government during the Cold
War. The very strong anti-American sentiments of
the South African government were clearly demon-
strated through the latter’s reactions to the creation
of the U.S. Africa Command18 (AFRICOM) and the
positioning of the Libyan crisis as American neo-colo-
nialism.19 In both cases, the South African government
furiously denounced the decisions and actions by the
U.S. Government.20
374
South African foreign policy therefore contains
a very explicit grounding in an Africanist and anti-
imperialist agenda. Greg Mills notes, for example,
“there is a visceral genuflection to interpret, label and
dismiss Western actions on the African continent as
imperialistically intended.”21 Thus, an Africanist and
anti-imperialist stance is, in essence, about being anti-
West. This foreign policy agenda contains an implicit
expression of both anti-Americanism and solidarity
with allies around the world from the period of na-
tional liberation. Liberation movement politics of sen-
timent and solidarity are also an important drivers of
the South African strategic orientation toward Africa
and its role on/toward the African continent.22
The nature of global governance is a fourth factor
underpinning the emphasis on Africa in South African
foreign policy. Liberation politics and the Africanist
and anti-imperialist agenda support the strong empha-
sis of the ANC government on a just global order and
an effort to change the international structure. South
Africa’s aggregate capabilities in terms of economic,
diplomatic, and military capacities in relation to other
African countries led to a view of South Africa’s role
in Africa as that of pivotal state, regional power, and
hegemonic state. Of course, each description contains
some truth about South Africa’s role in Africa. At the
same time, though, this also masks a constraint of
South African involvement in Africa: the possible per-
ception of South Africa as a big brother using bullying
tactics. The perception explains, at least partly, South
Africa’s cautious handling of the Zimbabwean crisis
in general and Robert Mugabe in particular.23 It is a
reality that the South African government deliberately
portrays a selective image of multilateral engagement
through political partnerships and (sometimes) re-
375
gional leadership. This self-imposed perceptual con-
straint is a reality of South Africa’s engagement and
role in Southern Africa.
South Africa, supported by others, mainly Nige-
ria, has become the key driver and competitor in the
reconstruction of Africa’s institutional architecture.
This specifically pertains to the creation of the African
Union (AU) and the hosting of the African Parliament
in South Africa. In July 2001, the Assembly of African
Heads of State and Government in Lusaka, Zambia,
also reached a decision on the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as an overarching vi-
sion and policy framework for accelerating economic
cooperation and integration among African countries.
This corresponded with the vision of the then South
African president Mbeki of an African Renaissance to
confront the challenges of the African continent. South
Africa was also the key actor in transforming the South
African Development Coordinating Conference into
the South African Development Community, which,
in August 2008, launched the Southern African free
trade area. These continental and regional institutions
became an important part of South Africa’s approach
of multilateral engagement in shaping its immediate
geostrategic environment. The country’s support for
and role in the establishment of regional and continen-
tal institutions, together with the substantial financial
support to the AU, the NEPAD Secretariat, and the
Pan-African Parliament, not only demonstrate South
Africa’s leading role in Africa, but also the country’s
commitment to the African agenda (identity politics)
and in helping Africa (enlightened self-interest).24
South Africa uses its geopolitical position in
(Southern) Africa as a means to popularize Africa’s
potential and challenges on global forums and insti-
376
tutions. As a result of South Africa’s efforts, Africa
features increasingly on the agenda of the United
Nations (UN), the G8 (France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom [UK], and the United States), the
World Trade Organizations (WTOs), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. The ex-
tent to which South Africa, for example, was willing to
give up or sacrifice reputation and respect outside of
Africa during its tenure at the UN Security Council in
its search for a mediated solution in Zimbabwe, once
again demonstrated South Africa’s commitment to the
African continent.25
Compassion and humanitarian considerations
may provide a fifth explanation for South Africa’s fo-
cus on Africa. There is no doubt that South Africa un-
der ANC leadership is committed in its search for an
end to conflict and violence and a move toward sus-
tainable peace on the African continent. Over the last
number of years, South Africa has provided consider-
able funding, military resources, and political energy
in places such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, and Sudan to create what can only be
considered fragile peace settlements. Conflict resolu-
tion and the utilization of its military in peace mis-
sions in Africa have come to symbolize South Africa’s
search for African solutions for African problems. The
military has become, specifically under the Mbeki re-
gime, the most prominent (and preferred) South Af-
rican foreign policy tool in Africa. With the decision
by the South African government to make the military
once again responsible for the safeguarding of South
Africa’s borders, the South African military presence
in Africa is set to decline. The South African military
is overstretched, underfunded, and, the Army in par-
ticular, in dire need of new equipment. The South
377
African government will continue its role as a peace
broker on the continent and to use the country’s con-
siderable political leverage as a means to stabilization.
In this regard, the South African military places a high
emphasis on so-called defense diplomacy.26
South Africa is without doubt a key state, not only
in the SADC region, but also on the Africa continent
as a whole. South Africa’s position in Africa is to a
certain extent comparable to that of the United States
in the global arena—if you act, you are in the wrong,
and if you do not act, you are also in the wrong. A
key strategic question pertains to the extent to which
South Africa has to prove its commitment to Africa—a
continent that is already suffering under the burden of
a continent-wide inferiority complex and bad leader-
ship in its interaction with the rest of the world. On
a continent that is in dire need of constructive lead-
ership, South Africa seems to offer itself as a will-
ing leader; often to the detriment of its own position
and image.
In the absence of clear identifiable interests and a
wide variety of factors underpinning South Africa’s
explicit commitment to the African continent, a lack
of focus is to be expected. It is thus no surprise that a
mixture of geopolitical and historic realities, domes-
tic and liberation politics, and Africanism and anti-
imperialism seems to drive the unpredictable and
inconsistent nature of the ANC government’s foreign
policy agenda in general, and on the African continent
in particular. Such an array of factors is responsible
for the description of South African foreign policy as a
“bit of this, bit of that.” Making sense of such a foreign
policy approach will always be difficult.
378
INTO AFRICA: THE U.S. (RE)DISCOVERY
OF AFRICA
379
Until the creation of AFRICOM in 2007, the U.S. ap-
proach to Africa was characterized by the promotion
of democracy and the development of trade relations
by means of initiatives such as the African Growth
and Opportunity Act.32 During most of these times,
two particular considerations shaped U.S. foreign pol-
icy toward Africa. First, the color line has always been
an important factor. Before and during the Cold War,
America predominantly identified with Europeans in
Africa.33 Second, economic factors reign supreme. The
question of how America will gain economically from
Africa has always directed its foreign policy toward
the continent.
The United States always experienced some diffi-
culty in developing a coherent policy toward Africa.
This difficulty is rooted in a number of realities. First,
before the eruption of the War on Terror, the United
States had few concrete, material interests in the con-
tinent.34 Africa is perhaps the only sizable inhabited
geographical region that has never really been vital
to U.S. security interests. While clear identifiable in-
terests provide policy with a solid foundation and co-
herence, a lack thereof normally leads to ambiguity,
debate, and vulnerability to changing political moods.
In the case of Africa, this particular reality linked U.S.
policy closely to global geopolitical developments. In
addition, U.S. African policies very often reflect an in-
difference to indigenous African political realities and
an inability to predict the probable impact of specific
policies on interstate relations among African states.35
Second, it is difficult for the average American
citizen to relate to the diverse, sometimes chaotic or
anarchic, and often depressing realities of the African
continent.36 The public idea of Africa, so successfully
sustained by Western media, is rooted in an image
380
of conflict, disaster, challenges, and hopelessness. In
the United States, no news is better than good news
from Africa. Thus, many Americans have a “National
Geographic” image of “Africa”—as if Africa does
not consist of different countries with a huge diver-
sity of nations and peoples, rich and poor, developed
and underdeveloped, who have a variety of interests,
opinions, and prejudices. U.S. involvement in Africa
is underpinned by media coverage of humanitarian
catastrophe and public pressure on the U.S. Govern-
ment to react to the human need. U.S. engagements in
Africa are mostly episodic, short-lived, and inconsis-
tent. Egregious suffering without media coverage will
most probably be ignored.37 Washington deals with
“Africa” as if it is a single country and search for “a
single African voice” to guide them in dealing with
this diverse continent. The search, of course, is both
futile and dangerous.38 Though hegemonic states such
as South Africa have tried to do this in the past, there
is nobody who speaks for or who can speak on behalf
of “Africans.”39
Third, there is an absence of a powerful and co-
hesive domestic constituency in the United States to
maintain pressure on Washington for an effective
policy toward different countries in Africa.40 This real-
ity has its roots in the lack of common personal and
professional commitments, interests, and linkages
between the civil societies of most African countries
and the United States. Many Americans refer to them-
selves as “Afro-Americans” as if Euro-Africans or
Arab-Africans do not exist and as if Afro-Americans
have closer ties with the African continent than their
fellow Americans.
Last, until the creation of AFRICOM, U.S. policy
toward the majority of African countries was, to a
381
large extent, the responsibility of the bureaucratic
middle echelons in Washington that practiced the art
of bureaucratic conservatism. These bureaucrats op-
erate within a framework of do not spend too much
money, do not take a stand that might create domestic
controversy, and do not let African issues complicate
policy toward other, more important, parts of the
world.41 This bureaucratic approach to U.S. policy
formulation led to a situation where the United States
had to “rediscover” Africa at several junctions during
the post- World War II era.42 U.S. engagement with
Africa has often reflected rather different approaches
and intensities between the Department of State, the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
and the Department of Defense (DoD). This very often
results in some confusion about U.S. interests, objec-
tives, and motives.43
Obviously, the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist
attacks, the consequent U.S. War on Terror, and more
specifically, U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan dramatically impacted the U.S. geostrategic
outlook. It is possible to argue that U.S. foreign policy
is shifting attention away from the Middle East to, in-
ter alia, Africa. There is a clear growth of U.S. interests
in Africa, and Africa is on the rise on the U.S. secu-
rity agenda. Different factors are driving current U.S.
interests in Africa: oil and global trade, maritime se-
curity, armed conflicts, violent extremism, and HIV/
AIDS.44 This growth in interests is rooted in two very
specific global geostrategic considerations: the con-
tinuing global economic meltdown that, specifically
in Europe and the United States, reached new heights
during 2011, and the power shift away from the north
Atlantic to the Indian Ocean rim with India and China
as the two main players. These two considerations are
382
closely interwoven in the competition for African re-
sources and markets.
There is no clearer indication of “ a more focused
strategic approach toward the continent”45 than the
creation of AFRICOM and, more specifically, the na-
ture of that command. The unique blending of the U.S.
military and diplomatic apparatus in AFRICOM is it-
self a reflection of the elevation of U.S. security and
other interests in Africa, a more aggressive U.S. for-
eign policy toward Africa, and, most importantly, a
new militarized approach in dealing with Africa.46
383
the United States, the emphasis in their engagement
with Africa is centered on security, in the case of South
Africa, it is on development.
Of course, it is quite easy for both the United States
and South Africa to identify Africa as a strategic prior-
ity. However, explaining why Africa is or should be of
vital strategic interest is not that easy. From an Afri-
can perspective, U.S. interests in Africa, irrespective of
what is said in the halls of politics, are rooted in access
to African oil and mineral riches, the need to pursue
the War on Terror in the African battlespace, and the
continued inroads into African markets by peer com-
petitors such as China and India. Identifying the inter-
ests of a fellow African country is a more sensitive and
complex issue. Not only is African politics sometimes
difficult to disaggregate, but South Africa is in many
ways Africa’s economic super power with a history of
destabilization on the continent. South African inter-
ests in Africa center on the history of the governing
party, identity politics, and geostrategic realities. The
South African government, very much like that of the
United States, is very cautious not to be seen as “ex-
ploiting” Africa for its own selfish economic interests.
Thus, South African economic interests in Africa (and
these are real vital interests!) are coated in the jargon
of socio-economic development since “socio-economic
development is critical for addressing the root causes
of conflict and instability” in Africa.48 This difference
(security vis-à-vis socio-economic development) may
provide an important first clue in understanding the
reluctance of the South African government in work-
ing with the United States in Africa.
The U.S. 2010 National Security Strategy stresses
the need to “embrace effective partnerships” and for
a consultative approach on the African continent to
384
facilitate access to open markets, conflict prevention,
global peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and the pro-
tection of vital carbon sinks.49 Similarly, the February
2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the
fact that American efforts in Africa “hinge on partner-
ing with African states . . . to conduct capacity-build-
ing and peacekeeping operations, prevent extremism,
and address humanitarian crises.”50 The need for part-
nerships is also highlighted in the most recent U.S. Na-
tional Military Strategy to preserve stability, facilitate
resolutions to political tensions that underlie conflicts,
and to foster broader development. The National Mili-
tary Strategy stresses the need to:
385
Strategic Partnership (NAASP), the Tokyo Interna-
tional Conference for African Development (TICAD),
and the Africa-India Forum and the Forum for China
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) are mentioned as key
pathways for development and cooperation in Africa.
This raises questions about South Africa’s perception
of the U.S. role in Africa. An outstanding feature of
South Africa’s involvement in Africa is the emphasis
that is placed on the role of SADC, the AU, and the
UN “to bring peace, security, and stability to the Afri-
can continent.”54 In the description of its relations with
the United States, the need is emphasized to maintain
the key U.S. role in the fight against communicable
and infectious diseases and to nurture and utilize the
U.S. commitment to Africa to promote peacekeeping,
post-conflict reconstruction and development, skills
development, capacity building, and trilateral coop-
eration.55 Nowhere is the need expressed to work with
the United States in Africa. From a geopolitical per-
spective, the South African disregard or indifference
toward the U.S. role in Africa is quite obvious. Clearly,
although the United States recognizes the importance
of South Africa on the African continent and the need
to work with South Africa in addressing African chal-
lenges, the same cannot be said of the South African
government. Partnering with the United States is not
only bad domestic politics for the ANC government; it
also does not resonate and correspond very well with
South Africa’s image in the rest of Africa.
There is no doubt that the current South African
ANC government has what the United States would
see as “a terrorist background.” The ANC, to be spe-
cific, not very long ago, was listed by the United States
as a terrorist organization.56 South Africa has not been
the most energetic partner in the U.S. War on Terror.
386
Concerns have obviously been raised—at least by the
U.S. intelligence community—about South Africa as a
possible recruiting and training area for international
terrorists. South African passports are relatively easily
available on the black market and have been found
in the possession of al-Qaeda suspects.57 Moreover,
while South Africa is not directly threatened with in-
ternational terrorist activity, it may well be a safe ha-
ven for international terrorists. The most important is-
sue concerning the U.S./South Africa terrorism nexus,
though, is the reality that South Africa does not share
the U.S. outlook on terrorism. In the ANC worldview,
at least, a sharp distinction is made between interna-
tional terrorism and the use of terror as a weapon in
the armed struggles of the anti-colonial and national
liberation movements. The use of terror in these
struggles for liberation is morally and legally just in
the ANC worldview. The ANC, thus, distinguishes
between international and revolutionary terrorism.
Terrorist violence is described as “indiscriminate, vio-
lent attacks on the civilian population.”58 According
to the ANC, these kinds of attacks are not being used
by armed liberation movements and run counter to
their ethos.
Thus, the ANC viewed the 9/11 attacks against
the United States as wrong but, at the same time, the
terrorist tactics of the Taliban and the revolutionary
forces against the United States in Afghanistan and
Iraq as justified. This also holds true for the support by
the ANC for terror tactics by the Palestinians against
Israel. There is no doubt that the ANC government
in South Africa, albeit tacitly, views the U.S. security
objectives in Africa in the War on Terror as imperi-
alist by nature.59 According to this view, the United
States used the events of 9/11 very cleverly to its own
387
advantage. Instead of focusing on those immediately
responsible for the attack, the United States used mili-
tary expansionism to strengthen its economy through
the acquisition of markets and oil-rich areas. The War
on Terror, according to ANC logic, has become a U.S.
excuse to gain control of strategic oil supplies and
markets in Africa.
The perceptions of the ANC are grounded in its
revolutionary background and experiences. Whether
those perceptions are rooted in reality is absolutely ir-
relevant. The ANC understands the notion that there
is always, at least, some truth in any perception. The
perceptions about the creation of AFRICOM are a good
example in this regard. To be more specific, the inter-
woven nature of the military and diplomatic instru-
ment within AFRICOM positioned the U.S. military
as the primary instrument of U.S. foreign policy on the
African continent. The U.S. military is thus seen as the
lead instrument of U.S. foreign policy in Africa—or it
is portrayed by the South Africans as the leading for-
eign policy instrument. The reaction from the South
Africa government to the creation of AFRICOM was
one of outrage. At its 2007 Polokwane Conference, for
example, the ANC accepted a resolution that “urges
Africa to remain united and resolute in the rejection of
the African Command Centre (sic) (AFRICOM).”
At the same time and as a matter of irony, though,
the South African National Defence Force became, for
all practical purposes, the leading South African for-
eign policy instrument in Africa during the Mbeki ad-
ministration.60 The human security paradigm is sup-
posed to inform South African military involvement
on the continent, and the South African armed forces:
388
have to be transformed from an instrument of aggres-
sion to an instrument of protection [in] the develop-
ment of the individual and the community.61
CONCLUSION
389
and alignment with the underdogs of the world, the
current imbalances in global governance, and a com-
mitment to end conflict and violence in a search for
peace and stability on the African continent. This con-
glomerate of factors makes the development of con-
sistency in the South African foreign policy toward
Africa extremely difficult and the policy itself very
complex and complicated. It is difficult to understand
and to predict future actions and reactions.
Until fairly recently, Africa did not feature very
strongly on the U.S. political agenda. That, though,
seems to be changing, and Africa is increasingly be-
coming a priority region for the U.S. Government. The
increasing prioritization of Africa seems to be rooted
in geopolitical changes and the rising interest of China
and India in African resources and markets in par-
ticular; the U.S. need to achieve its objectives in the
Global War on Terror in Africa; and to secure access
to Africa’s oil resources. Thus, both the United States
and South Africa seem to have limited but growing
interests in Africa. As a non-African country, the U.S.
approach to Africa is rooted in caution and a search
for key partners, South Africa being one. The military-
political nature of AFRICOM demonstrates the U.S.
caution toward and recognition of the uniqueness
of Africa.
South Africa, as an identified key partner in Africa,
has not always been very positive about U.S. military
involvement in Africa. South Africa is using its own
military as a key component of its own foreign policy
engagement on the African continent. Though South
Africa seems to be more open and accommodative of
U.S. economic involvement in and support to Africa,
U.S. security involvement in Africa is not very posi-
tively considered. More specifically, South Africa ap-
390
pears to look toward its own military use in Africa as
something positive that is contributing toward peace
and security in Africa. That is not necessarily its view
of U.S. military involvement in Africa—something
that is perceived as neo-colonial in nature.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14
391
6. This is clearly demonstrated through the ANC’s political
lingua franca, addressing each other, for example, as comrades.
10. The voice of the ANC Youth League and its leader, Juluis
Malema, has been very strong in this regard.
392
Assembly of The Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill 1996,
May 8, 1996, available from www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/orders/
new2002_mbeki.htm.
21. G. Mills, “SA’s ‘bit of this and bit of that foreign policy,”
Sunday Times, Times Live, November 27, 2011, available from
www.timeslive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2011/11/27/sa-s-bit-of-this-
bit-of-that-foreign-policy.
393
23. South Africa is often criticized for its preference to remain
silent on the controversial land distribution and other contentious
policies of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe.
The Mbeki Administration was known for its so-called “Silent Di-
plomacy” toward the Zimbabwe crisis.
27. See, for example, the United States Security Strategy for Sub-
Sahara Africa, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office
of International Security Affairs, August 1995. For a chronology
of U.S. involvement in Africa, see U.S. Africa Command, “Fact
sheet: U.S.-Africa relations chronology,” available from www.afri-
com.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1645.
31. See the Bureau of African Affairs, May 14, 2007, available
from www.state.gov/p/af/.
394
32. J. E. Frazer, “African affairs,” US foreign policy in the 21st
century: Regional issues, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
State, September 2006, pp. 4–5, available from usinfo.state.gov/jour-
nals/itps/0906/ijpe/ijpe0906.pdf.
36. Clough, p. 3.
37. E-mail correspondence with Dr. Dan Henk, U.S. Air War
College, July 30, 2007.
40. Clough, p. 3.
41. Ibid, p. 2.
395
46. M. Malan, AFRICOM: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? Wash-
ington, DC: Refugees International, Testimony before the Sub-
committee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, August 1, 2007, available from foreign.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/MalanTestimony070801.pdf.
48. Ibid., p. 8.
54. Ibid., p. 9.
56. BBC News, Mandela taken off US terror list, available from
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7484517.stm.
396
In South Africa, a clear line is not necessarily drawn between
what NATO is doing and what the United States is doing as part
of NATO. See, for example, the article in the influential Busi-
ness Day, available from www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.
aspx?id=156734.
397
CONTRIBUTORS
399
ing Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra, Ghana. His rich
experience in security issues has been tapped by a
number of organizations including the United Nations
(UN), where he wrote a Secretary-General’s report in
2008 for the UN Security Council on the relationship
between the UN and regional organizations on peace
and security, especially the African Union, leading
to the establishment of the Prodi Commission; the
African Union, where he served as its first Expert on
Counter-terrorism, peace, and security; and the Eco-
nomic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS).
Dr. Aning is currently a member of the World Eco-
nomic Forum’s Council on Conflict Resolution. He
has written numerous book chapters, monographs,
and articles in several international peer reviewed
journals. Dr. Aning holds a B.A. from the University
of Ghana, a Master of Philosophy (Cand. Phil) and a
Ph.D. from the University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
400
Education on Small Arms (TRESA) publications and
numerous courses across the world, including in Co-
lombia, Germany, Ghana, Mozambique, South Sudan,
and UN Headquarters. Audiences range from police
and military officers through nongovernmental orga-
nization (NGO) members to parliamentarians. Previ-
ous to working for BICC, Dr. Ashkenazi was professor
of anthropology, teaching graduate and undergradu-
ate students at universities in Canada, Israel, and
the UK. He has also served as infantryman, platoon
and company commander, and in staff positions. Dr.
Ashkenazi was educated in Israel, Japan, and the
United States.
401
ROBERT H. “ROBIN” DORFF is Dean of the College
of Humanities and Social Sciences (CHSS) and Profes-
sor in the Department of Political Science and Inter-
national Affairs. He joined KSU as Dean of CHSS in
July 2012 from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at
the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), where he was
Research Professor of National Security Affairs (2007-
12) and also held the General Douglas MacArthur
Chair of Research since 2009. Dr. Dorff held faculty
positions at Michigan State University and North
Carolina State University. He has served on the US-
AWC faculty as a Visiting Professor (1994-96) and as
Professor of National Security Policy and Strategy
in the Department of National Security and Strategy
(1997-2004), where he also held the General Maxwell
D. Taylor Chair (1999-2002) and served as Department
Chair (2001-04). Dr. Dorff has been a Senior Advisor
with Creative Associates International, Inc., in Wash-
ington, DC, and served as Executive Director of the
Institute of Political Leadership in Raleigh, NC (2004-
06). Dr. Dorff remains extensively involved in strate-
gic leadership development, focusing on national se-
curity strategy and policy, and strategy formulation.
His research interests include these topics as well as
failing and fragile states, interagency processes and
policy formulation, stabilization and reconstruction
operations, and U.S. grand strategy. He has published
and lectured frequently on these topics and has spo-
ken all over the United States and in Canada, Europe,
Africa, and Asia. Dr. Dorff holds an M.A. and Ph.D.
from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
402
curity. Prior to retiring as an Air Force major general
in June 2010, he assisted in the supervision of more
than 2,500 military and civilian attorneys worldwide.
His 34-year career included tours in both the United
Kingdom and Korea, and he deployed for military op-
erations in Africa and the Middle East. Totaling more
than 120 publications, General Dunlap’s writings ad-
dress a wide range of topics, including various aspects
of national security law, airpower, counterinsurgency,
cyber power, civil-military relations, and leadership.
General Dunlap speaks frequently at professional
conferences and at numerous institutions of higher
learning, to include Harvard, Yale, MIT, UVA, and
Stanford, as well as the National Defense University
and the Air, Army, and Navy War Colleges. He serves
on the Board of Advisors for the Center for a New
American Security. General Dunlap is a distinguished
graduate of the National War College and holds an
undergraduate degree from St. Joseph’s University
and a law degree from Villanova University.
403
tary operations and strategy (SWAMOS) of Colum-
bia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace
Studies. He holds an M.S.S. from Pretoria University
and a Ph.D. from Stellenbosch University.
404
and Public Affairs. Dr. Franke is the author of Prepar-
ing for Peace: Military Identity, Value-Orientations, and
Professional Military Education (Praeger 1999) and more
than 30 journal articles, book chapters, case studies,
and research reports on issues related to peace and
security studies, conflict management, civil-military
relations, development policy, and social identity. He
is also the editor of Terrorism and Peacekeeping: New Se-
curity Challenges (Praeger 2005), Security in a Changing
World: Case Studies in U.S. National Security Manage-
ment (Praeger 2002), and co-editor (both with Robert
H. “Robin” Dorff) of Conflict Management and “Whole
of Government:” Useful Tools for U.S. National Security
Strategy? (SSI, 2012). Dr. Franke holds an MA in po-
litical science and sociology from Johannes Gutenberg
University in Mainz, Germany; an M.P.A. from North
Carolina State University; and a Ph.D. in political sci-
ence from Syracuse University’s Maxwell School.
405
gether on a variety of security and economic related
issues to develop a bold, new strategic vision to re-
invigorate the transatlantic relationship and prevent
strategic drift. By exploring the global shift of power,
the increased global economic and market instability
and the challenge to multilateral institutions, the fo-
cus of the project will examine how the transatlantic
relationship can lead in this increasingly complex geo-
political setting.
406
of UN civil-military policy and training. In his final
tour as Military Representative at the U.S. Agency for
International Development for USEUCOM/SHAPE,
Mr. Holshek helped link security and development at
the national strategic level in an interagency setting as
well as stand up the National Response Center for the
Haiti earthquake.
407
MICHAEL LEKSON is director of gaming for the
Academy for International Conflict Management and
Peacebuilding, United States Institute of Peace. United
States Institute of Peace. He joined the Institute’s
Professional Training program in 2003 as a program
officer. He came to the Institute following a 26-year
career in the Department of State, where he was dep-
uty assistant secretary of state for arms control, over-
seeing all multilateral arms control negotiations and
treaty implementation. Prior to that, Mr. Lekson was
deputy to the special representative of the president
and the secretary of state for implementation of the
Dayton Peace Accords. He was also director of the Of-
fice of European Security and Political Affairs, where
he helped develop and implement policies to adapt
NATO to the post-Cold War world, and of the Office of
United Kingdom, Benelux, and Ireland Affairs, where
he worked intensively on the Northern Ireland peace
process. During his Foreign Service career, Mr. Lekson
served as a consular officer in Bilbao, Spain, and as a
political officer in U.S. embassies in Costa Rica, Peru,
and the United Kingdom. He was deputy U.S. repre-
sentative to the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE) during that organization’s
augmentation of its democracy building, conflict pre-
vention, and conflict management efforts in formerly
communist countries, especially in the Balkans and
Central Asia. Prior to joining the Department of State,
he served 2 years in the U.S. Army as a field artillery
officer. Mr. Lekson has a B.A. in English from Princ-
eton University and a master’s in linguistics from
Stanford University.
408
LISELOTTE ODGAARD is an Associate Professor at
the Royal Danish Defence College. Her most recent
international position was in 2008-09, when she was
a residential fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Interna-
tional Center for Scholars, Washington, DC. Her areas
of expertise include International Relations, Asia-Pa-
cific Security, and China Studies. Ms. Odgaard’s most
recent monograph is China and Coexistence: Beijing’s
National Security Strategy for the 21st Century (Wood-
row Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University
Press, May 2012). Ms. Odgaard has been selected to be
a contributor to the 2014 Nobel Symposium.
409
fessor of Public Relations. Prior to his appointment at
Syracuse University, he was the Chief of Staff to Sec-
retary of State Colin L. Powell beginning in January
2001. A veteran of 30 years in the U.S. Army, his last
active duty assignment was Special Assistant to the
11th and 12th Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Steven K. Metz
Editors
Dr. Volker C. Franke
Dr. Robert H. Dorff
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
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Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE