Case 1:21-cv-01321-JEB Document 7-1 Filed 07/30/21 Page 1 of 19

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)
BRANDON POPE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:21-cv-01321-JEB
)
THE OFFICE OF )
CONGRESSMAN DOUG LAMBORN, )
)
Defendant. )
____________________________________)

DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

ITS MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
 Case 1:21-cv-01321-JEB Document 7-1 Filed 07/30/21 Page 2 of 19

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..…………………………………………………………………….ii

INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND…………………………………………..1

LEGAL STANDARD……………………………………………………………………………..3

ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………………………...4

I. Mr. Pope could have brought this case at home, in the District of Colorado…………4

II. The public and private interests favor transfer to the District of Colorado,
where Mr. Pope—and virtually all, if not all, other likely witnesses—resides
and where Mr. Pope worked for the Office …………………………………………...5

A. Private-Interest Factors …………………………………………………………....5

1. Parties’ Choice of Forum………………………………………………………5

2. Where the Claim Arose………………………………………………………..6

3. Convenience of Parties, Witness Convenience,

and Ease of Access to Proof……………………………………………………7

4. Brief Conclusion as to Private-Interest Factors………………………………10

B. Public-Interest Factors …………………………………………………………...10

1. Familiarity with Governing Law……………………………………………..11

2. Congestion of Courts…………………………………………………………11

3. Local Interest in Controversies…………………………………….…………13

4. Brief Conclusion as to Public-Interest Factors……………………………..…14

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………..15

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Aishat v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

288 F. Supp. 3d 261 (D.D.C. 2018)…………………………………………….4, 6, 7, 8, 11

Claros v. Cowan, Civ. No. 21-609 (JEB),

2021 WL 1820209 (D.D.C. May 6, 2021)……………………………………..3, 4, 5, 8, 11

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cephalon, Inc.,

551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008)………………………………………………………8, 9

Ike v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Civ. No. 20-1744 (CRC),
2020 WL 7360214 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2020)………………………………………………..8

Jimenez v. R&D Masonry, Inc., Civ. No. 15-1255 (JEB),

2015 WL 7428533 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2015)……………………………………..5, 6, 10, 13

M & N Plastics, Inc. v. Sebelius,

997 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2013)………………………………………………...6, 8, 9, 11

Ngonga v. Sessions,
318 F. Supp. 3d 270 (D.D.C. 2018)…………………………………………………..3, 4, 6

Pres. Soc’y of Charleston v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

893 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2012)………………………………………………….8, 11, 13

Sheffer v. Novartis Pharms. Corp.,

873 F. Supp. 2d 371 (D.D.C. 2012)…………………………………………...4, 8, 9, 11, 12

Tower Labs., Ltd. v. Lush Cosmetics Ltd.,

285 F. Supp. 3d 321 (D.D.C. 2018)…………………………………………….3, 4, 7, 8, 11

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)……………………………………………………………………………….4

28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)…………………………………………………………………………….4

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)…………………………………………………………………………….1, 3

RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)………………………………………………………………………………9

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OTHER AUTHORITIES

Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Table N/A—U.S. District Courts—Combined Civil &
Criminal Federal Court Management Statistics (March 31, 2021), United States Courts,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0331.2021.pdf
(last visited July 30, 2021, 12:55 p.m. EDT) ……………………………………………………12

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/judges

(last visited July 30, 2021, 12:46 p.m. EDT)…………………………………………………….12

U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado,

http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/JudicialOfficers.aspx (last visited July 30, 2021,
12:51 p.m. EDT)…………………………………………………………………………...…….12

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INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Office of Congressman Doug Lamborn (the “Office”) respectfully requests

that the Court transfer this matter to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado per 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a). Essentially, this case is about a Colorado resident challenging why he was

fired from his job in Colorado. Not surprisingly, all parties and most, if not all, likely witnesses

call Colorado home—specifically, in or near Colorado Springs, which is some 1,700 miles from

the District of Columbia. Most of the salient facts (actual and alleged) occurred there. As

detailed below, not only is the District of Colorado an appropriate forum, but it is also the more

appropriate one. This case should be transferred there.

In January 2007, upon joining the U.S. House of Representatives, Rep. Lamborn

established the Office. Exhibit 1, Declaration of Dale Anderson (“Anderson Decl.”), at ¶ 4.

Since then, the Office has been privileged to represent, in Congress, the 820,000-plus residents

of Colorado’s Fifth Congressional District. Anderson Decl. at ¶ 5.

The Office has two physical sites—one in Colorado Springs, Colorado (the “District

Office”), and another in Washington, D.C. (the “DC Office”). 1 Anderson Decl. at ¶ 6. Both

Rep. Lamborn and Chief of Staff Dale Anderson reside in Colorado with their families.

Anderson Decl. at ¶ 7. They split their in-office time between the District Office and the DC

Office. Anderson Decl. at ¶ 8. While Chief of Staff Anderson oversees all Office personnel, the

Office’s District Director directly supervises the District Office staff. Anderson Decl. at ¶ 9.

The District Director heads the District Office and is based in Colorado Springs full-time.

1
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado’s courthouse in Colorado Springs is about
ten miles from the District Office.
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Anderson Decl. at ¶ 10. During Plaintiff Brandon Pope’s employment, the District Director was

Joshua Hosler. Anderson Decl. at ¶ 11.

Over the past nearly fifteen years, dozens of Coloradans have worked in the District

Office. Anderson Decl. at ¶ 12. District Office staffers have paid state and local taxes in

Colorado and have otherwise contributed to the local economy there. The District Office has

also provided direct constituent services to thousands of Colorado residents. Anderson Decl. at ¶

13. Those services include assisting with: applying for federal grants, navigating federal agency

bureaucracy, seeking admission to U.S. military academies, and more. Anderson Decl. at ¶ 14.

From August 2019 until December 2020, Mr. Pope worked in the District Office. ECF

No. 1, Complaint, at ¶¶ 5, 25, and 61. According to Mr. Pope, the Office fired him for raising, to

Mr. Hosler et al., COVID-19-related safety concerns, including as to several District Office

staffers. Complaint at ¶¶ 26, 62. Based on Mr. Pope’s allegations, Mr. Hosler, multiple current

and former District Office employees, and other Colorado residents are likely witnesses in this

matter. 2

Additionally, Mr. Pope seeks to recover for “substantial economic damages” from lost

income and for “emotional pain and suffering, fear, embarrassment, humiliation, inconvenience

2
See generally Complaint at introductory paragraph 5 (identifying the District Director and
Communications Director), ¶¶ 27 (identifying “Female Colleague 1” and “Male Colleague 1”),
29 (identifying Mrs. Lamborn, Rep. Lamborn’s wife, as a frequent visitor to the District Office),
30 (identifying “District Office staff” having meetings with Rep. Lamborn and his wife), 33-34
and 38 (identifying events related to Female Colleague 1), 44 (identifying unnamed witnesses to
a conversation between Rep. Lamborn and the Office of Attending Physician while in Colorado),
50 (identifying “other District staffers” who allegedly witnessed a conference call from Chief of
Staff Anderson), 51 (identifying “District Office Staff” who allegedly witnessed statements by
Chief of Staff Anderson), 52 (identifying “a top-level employee in the District Office” who
allegedly received a positive COVID-19 test), and 55 (identifying “two additional staffers” who
had tested positive for COVID-19 and participated in a Space Force planning meeting in the
Colorado Fifth).
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and feelings of depression and feelings of anxiety.” Complaint at 15-16 (including at ¶¶ 68-69).

Because he lives in Colorado, see Complaint at 1, presumably Mr. Pope is experiencing any

effects of his termination there. It follows that witnesses—e.g., healthcare providers, prospective

employers, actual employers, etc.—and other evidence related to his purported damages can be

found there, too.

Mr. Pope contends that the Office advised him that his termination was due to his “lack

of professionalism and abrasiveness toward his colleagues and supervisors.” Complaint at ¶ 59;

see also Anderson Decl. ¶ 15. Instances of those failings occurred in Colorado, were witnessed

by Colorado residents, and were reported to Office management by persons in Colorado.

Anderson Decl. at ¶ 16. In fact, the Office fired Mr. Pope primarily because of observations

made, and information communicated from those located, in Colorado. Anderson Decl. at ¶ 17.

As an example, Mr. Hosler alerted Chief of Staff Anderson to various times when Mr. Pope

lacked professionalism and/or acted abrasively toward others. Anderson Decl. at ¶ 18. Rep.

Lamborn and Chief of Staff Anderson discussed that information, including while in the DC

Office, and it factored into the termination decision. Anderson Decl. at ¶ 18. For these reasons,

witnesses apt to testify about why the Office terminated Mr. Pope’s employment can also be

found in Colorado.

LEGAL STANDARD

Even when venue is technically proper, a court may grant a motion to transfer to a more

fitting forum if the movant shows two things. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also Claros v. Cowan,

Civil Action No. 21-609 (JEB), 2021 WL 1820209, at *1 (D.D.C. May 6, 2021). “[T]he movant

must first show that the plaintiff could originally have brought the case in the transferee district.”

Ngonga v. Sessions, 318 F. Supp. 3d 270, 274 (D.D.C. 2018) (Boasberg, J.). Second, the movant

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must “show that ‘considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh in favor of

transfer . . . .’” Tower Labs., Ltd. v. Lush Cosmetics Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 3d 321, 325 (D.D.C.

2018) (Boasberg, J.). When assessing whether transfer or retention will better serve convenience

considerations and the interest of justice, courts balance various private and public interests. See

Aishat v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 288 F. Supp. 3d 261, 268 (D.D.C. 2018) (Boasberg, J.).

Note that courts may “consider undisputed facts outside the pleadings when deciding a motion to

transfer.” Sheffer v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 873 F. Supp. 2d 371, 380 (D.D.C. 2012).

ARGUMENT

Transfer is warranted here because: (1) venue lies in the District of Colorado, and (2)

both convenience considerations and the interest of justice favor transfer.

I. Mr. Pope could have brought this case at home, in the District of Colorado.

Venue is proper in the District of Colorado. Because the Office is a United States

governmental entity, the venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) apply. See Ngonga, 318 F.

Supp. 3d at 274. Per that section, venue can be where “the plaintiff resides if no real property is

involved in the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). With no real property at issue, and since Mr.

Pope lives in Colorado, see Complaint at 1, “this preliminary hurdle is easily cleared.” See

Claros, 2021 WL 1820209, at *1. Venue also lies in the District of Colorado because the Office

resides there, see Complaint at ¶¶ 5, 25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). And venue is appropriate

given that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in that

district, see Complaint at 7-14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). Simply put, this case could be

litigated in the District of Colorado.

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II. The public and private interests favor transfer to the District of Colorado, where Mr.
Pope—and virtually all, if not all, likely witnesses—resides and where Mr. Pope
worked for the Office.

Not only could this matter be litigated in Colorado, but it also should be litigated there.

Why? Because witness convenience considerations and the interest of justice weigh on the side

of transfer. To assess that proposition, “courts examine a series of private- and public-interest

factors.” Jimenez v. R&D Masonry, Inc., Civil Action No. 15-1255 (JEB), 2015 WL 7428533, at

*2 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2015). Here, most factors cut transfer’s way. The rest are neutral. None

supports retention.

A. Private-Interest Factors

Given the applicable private-interest factors, this case should proceed in the District of

Colorado. Those “[p]rivate-interest factors include (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the

defendant’s choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the

parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof.” Id.

“Although there are technically six private-interest factors, [this] Court [has] combine[d] them

into three categories for ease of analysis.” Id. at *3. When doing that, the Court has considered

the first two factors together (parties’ choice of forum), the third on its own (where the claim

arose), and the fourth through sixth as a group (convenience and access to proof). See, e.g., id.

Below, the Office uses that approach.

1. Parties’ Choice of Forum

The Office’s forum choice should trump Mr. Pope’s. While “[c]ourts generally defer to

plaintiffs’ choice of forum[,]” such “deference is not always warranted . . . .” Jimenez, 2015 WL

7428533, at *3. In various opinions, this Court has recognized that “‘when the forum preferred

by the plaintiff is not his home forum,’ and the defendant prefers the plaintiff’s home forum, then

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there is little reason to defer to the plaintiff’s preference[,]” id. See, e.g., Claros, 2021 WL

1820209, at *2 (giving plaintiff’s choice “no deference[,]” affording deference to defendant’s

chosen forum, and transferring the case); Ngonga, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 275 (same). And when a

defendant chooses a plaintiff’s home forum, that “typically cuts in favor of transfer.” Aishat, 288

F. Supp. 3d at 269 (giving “little weight” to plaintiff’s choice, some weight to defendant’s, and

granting motion to transfer). Moreover, there is a “‘strong inclination’ of courts to favor transfer

‘when all of the parties are residents of the proposed transferee district.’” Jimenez, 2015 WL

7428533, at *3 (transferring the case to the District of Maryland, where all plaintiffs, corporate

defendants, and individual defendants reside). On balance, because all parties and essentially all,

if not all, likely witnesses reside about 1,700 miles away in the District of Colorado, the choice-

of-forum factors favor transfer.

2. Where the Claim Arose

Because of how many relevant underlying events took place in Colorado, this factor

supports transfer. As this Court has recognized, one place where a claim arises is “‘where most

of the significant events giving rise to the action occurred . . . .’” Id.; see also M & N Plastics,

Inc. v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24 (D.D.C. 2013) (determining that the claim, a challenge to

the Affordable Care Act, arose in Michigan “because all plaintiffs are in Michigan and the

effects of the contraceptive mandate on the plaintiffs will be felt in Michigan”). Here, “most of

the significant events [and alleged events] giving rise to the action occurred” in Colorado. Those

events include the following.

• While employed by the Office, Mr. Pope worked in the District Office in Colorado

Springs, where he lived and still lives (and which, again, is home to a federal

courthouse).

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• According to Mr. Pope, the Office fired him for raising COVID-19-related safety

concerns about the District Office, and on behalf of District Office staffers.

• Also according to Mr. Pope, the Office advised him that his termination was due to his

“lack of professionalism and abrasiveness toward his colleagues and supervisors[,]” in

Colorado.

• The Office terminated Mr. Pope’s employment based on, notably: personal observations

made in Colorado and communications with District Office personnel, including the

then-District Director.

• Mr. Pope seeks “substantial economic damages” and damages for “emotional pain and

suffering, fear, embarrassment, humiliation, inconvenience and feelings of depression

and feelings of anxiety.” Presumably, Mr. Pope is experiencing any purported effects of

his termination—and pursuing any related medical and/or psychological treatment—at

home in Colorado.

To summarize: (1) a Colorado resident says that he was unlawfully fired by his former Colorado

employer for things that happened in Colorado; and (2) that Colorado employer insists that it

lawfully fired that Colorado resident, also for things that happened in Colorado. Against this

backdrop, it seems impossible that the District of Columbia could have hosted more “significant

events giving rise to the action” than Colorado. As a result, the where-the-claim-arose factor

favors transfer.

3. Convenience of Parties, Witness Convenience, and Ease of Access to Proof

Party convenience, the convenience of witnesses, and access to proof all back transfer.

To start, litigating at home is inarguably convenient for all parties. Time and again this Court

has found that a party ‘“cannot reasonably claim to be inconvenienced by litigating in [his] home

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forum.’” See Aishat, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 270 (citing Tower Labs, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 326). That

is true even when the parties’ attorneys are based in the original forum. Claros, 2021 WL

1820209, at *2 (“To the extent Plaintiffs complain that their counsel is not admitted in the

[transferee district], courts have held that ‘the location of counsel is not a consideration.’”); Pres.

Soc’y of Charleston v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 893 F. Supp. 2d 49, 56 (D.D.C. 2012)

(Boasberg, J.) (“While Plaintiffs note that [Defendant] is represented by attorneys based in

Washington, D.C., other district courts within this circuit have held this to be irrelevant to the

transfer inquiry.”). All parties call Colorado home. That means party convenience cannot justify

retention by a court sitting some 1,700 miles away from the parties’ own backyards. 3

It is hard to fathom how transfer would not be more convenient for witnesses. And “[t]he

convenience of the witnesses has been described as ‘the most critical factor’ to examine when

deciding a motion to transfer.” Sheffer, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 377. Unsurprisingly, when most or

all presumed witnesses reside in the transferee forum, courts are apt to transfer. In fact, this

Court did just that in Aishat, after determining that “[a]s the only apparent witnesses at this point

all reside in [the transferee forum], this factor also tilts toward transfer.” Aishat, 288 F. Supp. 3d

at 271 (transferring to the Eastern District of Texas); see also Ike v. U.S. Citizenship &

Immigration Servs., Case No. 20-cv-1744 (CRC), 2020 WL 7360214, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 15,

2020) (transferring to the Northern District of Texas, having decided that “to the extent that

resolving this case might require any witness or documentary evidence, those witnesses and

documents are most likely to reside in Texas”); M & N Plastics, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d at 25

(transferring to the Eastern District of Michigan, where corporate party’s “witnesses and

3
The U.S. District Court for Colorado in Colorado Springs is located approximately ten miles from
the District Office, and just about five miles from Mr. Pope’s home.
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evidence will likely come from” and “are all located”) (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cephalon,

Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21, 28 (D.D.C. 2008) (transferring to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,

where corporate party’s witnesses, “who are likely to comprise a large portion of the fact

witnesses in this case[,]” are located)).

Here, witnesses will almost certainly include Mr. Pope, Rep. Lamborn, Chief of Staff

Anderson, Mr. Hosler, multiple current and former District Office staffers, as well as Mr. Pope’s

healthcare providers, prospective employers, and actual employers. Each, or essentially each,

anticipated witness likely resides in Colorado. To appear at trial in the District of Columbia, the

Colorado-based witnesses would need to travel about two-thirds of the way across the country.

They would then incur expenses related to transportation, lodging, meals, missing work, family

needs arising from multi-day absences, etc. For potentially all witnesses—including Mr. Pope,

who lives about five miles from the federal courthouse in Colorado Springs—the District of

Colorado could not be much more convenient.

Finally, the access-to-proof factor favors transfer. In Sheffer, the court recognized that

“[c]ompulsory process over witnesses is often ‘essential’ to getting a ‘full and true disclosure of

the disputed facts.’” Sheffer, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 378. For that reason, the Sheffer court dismissed

the plaintiffs’ attempt to downplay live witness testimony’s import. Id. (granting motion to

transfer to the Southern District of Ohio, plaintiffs’ home forum). In this case, almost all (if not

all) witnesses reside in Colorado. That means most are beyond this Court’s subpoena power.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c). So, for instance, the Office could not compel Mr. Hosler, a former

employee who was Mr. Pope’s direct supervisor, to appear at trial in the District of Columbia.

That could disadvantage the Office when trying to refute Mr. Pope’s claims about why he was

fired. Similarly, this Court’s subpoenas cannot reach Colorado-based witnesses with knowledge

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about whether Mr. Pope has satisfied his mitigation obligations. That, too, could hamper the

Office’s ability to defend itself. At bottom, the Office cannot mount as robust a defense in this

district, compared to the parties’ home forum. Yet, litigating in the District of Colorado would

help, not hurt, Mr. Pope, whose witnesses are more likely to be in Colorado than in the District

of Columbia. 4

4. Brief Conclusion as to Private-Interest Factors

The private-interest factors favor transferring the case to Colorado. This Court need not

afford any deference to Mr. Pope’s forum choice. That is because all parties and nearly all (if

not all) likely witnesses live in Colorado. And most significant events underlying his claim

occurred there. As the home to all parties and basically all, if not all, likely witnesses, litigating

in the District of Colorado would also be more convenient than proceeding in this district.

(Again, witness convenience is the “most critical” private-interest factor.) Trial in the District of

Colorado would, additionally, provide greater access to sources of proof, including would-be live

trial witnesses whom this Court could not compel to appear.

B. Public-Interest Factors

The applicable public-interest factors, too, support transfer. Those factors are: “(1) the

transferee district’s familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the

calendars of the transferor and transferee courts; and (3) the local interest in having controversies

decided at home.” Jimenez, 2015 WL 7428533, at *2.

4
Mr. Pope seemingly wants to litigate, or at least sling some mud by making, irrelevant claims
about the DC Office. See generally Complaint at 5-7. But those allegations relate neither to Mr.
Pope’s lone claim here (supposed retaliation for raising District Office workplace safety
concerns) nor to the Office’s defenses.
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1. Familiarity with Governing Law

This factor does not tip the scales in favor of either venue. Federal courts are presumed

to be “‘competent to decide federal issues correctly.’” See Pres. Soc’y of Charleston, 893 F.

Supp. 2d at 57 (D.D.C. 2012). Applying that principle in Claros, because it found that “as the

case solely involves federal statutes, [the transferee] court can more than capably handle this

case[,]” this Court concluded that the factor “does not point either way.” See Claros, 2021 WL

1820209, at *3. Here, Mr. Pope asserts just one claim—retaliation under the Congressional

Accountability Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., a federal statute. Complaint at 14-15. With only

federal law at issue, both courts can “capably handle this case.” So this factor does not move the

needle.

2. Congestion of Courts

Similarly, the congestion factor does not tilt either way. To assess relative congestion,

courts consider metrics including: (1) the number of pending cases per judge in each district, see

Aishat, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 271; (2) the average time between filing and disposition, see Sheffer,

873 F. Supp. 2d at 380; and (3) the average time between filing and trial, see M & N Plastics,

Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d at 25.

As an initial matter, average caseload data shed little light on the courts’ relative

congestion. For one thing, this Court has pointed out that those data “‘do not, for example,

reflect the differences in caseloads carried by individual judges in each district.’” Aishat, 288 F.

Supp. 3d at 271. In fact, this Court questioned general caseload data’s usefulness when the

Court “individually [did] not have a congested calendar and could proceed with reasonable

alacrity.” Tower Labs., 285 F. Supp. 3d at 327. Still, even if those data were not so flawed, they

would offer almost no help here. Calculating average caseloads based on all judges (active

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district, senior, and magistrate) 5, and assuming workload parity across all judicial categories, the

District of Colorado appears less congested—with 180 cases per judge to this district’s 242. 6

But the opposite is true if one counts only active district court judges (and thus assumes that

senior district judges and magistrate judges handle no cases), as the available data do—with 564

cases per judge there compared to 387 here. 7 Without knowing more about how the two courts

use senior judges and magistrate judges, the results are inconclusive.

Along similar lines, of the remaining two metrics one favors retention, the other transfer.

The District of Columbia has a filing-to-disposition time that is 2.5 months shorter than the

District of Colorado’s, but this district’s average filing-to-trial time is 5.9 months longer than the

District of Colorado’s. 8 As the Sheffer court observed, “[w]ith [these two] indicators pointing in

both directions, and a lack of certainty with regard to whether the case is headed for trial,

comparing the relative congestion of the courts is not very helpful.” Sheffer, 873 F. Supp. 2d at

380.

5
See U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/judges (last
visited July 30, 2021, 12:46 p.m. EDT) (showing 24 total judges in D.D.C.—13 active district
court judges, 8 senior judges, and 3 magistrate judges) and U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado, http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/JudicialOfficers.aspx, (last visited July 30, 2021, 12:51
p.m. EDT) (showing 22 total judges in D. Colo.—8 active district court judges, 5 senior judges,
and 9 magistrate judges).
6
See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Table N/A—U.S. District Courts—Combined Civil &
Criminal Federal Court Management Statistics (March 31, 2021), United States Courts,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0331.2021.pdf, at pp.
2, 79 (last visited July 30, 2021, 12:55 p.m. EDT) (showing 5800 pending cases in D.D.C. and
3951 in D. Colo.).
7
Id. (dividing D.D.C.’s 5800 pending cases by 15 active district judges and dividing D. Colo.’s
3951 pending cases by 7 active district court judges).

8
Id. (showing, as of March 2021, file-to-disposition times of 5.1 months for D.D.C. and 7.6
months for D. Colo.; showing, as of March 2020, the most recent data on this, filing-to-trial
times of 40.3 months for D.D.C. and 34.4 months for D. Colo.).

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In short, the existing data on court congestion paint a partial picture. For that reason,

treating relative congestion as neutral factor seems most fair.

3. Local Interest in Controversies

At its core, this is a Colorado case, so it should proceed there. “[T]he local interest in

having local controversies decided at home” is “‘arguably [the] most important’ of the public-

interest factors . . . .” Pres. Soc’y of Charleston, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 57. When considering the

proposed transferee forum’s interest, this Court has reasoned that, if “a defendant has substantial

business engagements in a particular district, that district has a strong local interest in resolving

that controversy.” See Jimenez, 2015 WL 7428533, at *4. As well, after finding that “‘a clear

majority of the operative events’ took place within the” would-be transferee district, the Court

has deemed the matter local to that district and thus ripe for transfer home. See Pres. Soc’y of

Charleston, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 57. Another local interest in adjudicating the conflict stems from

its effects: “Because any potential impacts are to be felt locally, the controversy is truly local to

the” transferee district. Id. at 58. As detailed below, given (1) the Office’s strong ties to it, (2)

that most key events occurred there, and (3) the fact that it is where this case’s effects will be felt

most keenly, the District of Colorado has a compelling interest in deciding this controversy.

To start, the Office’s roots in Colorado run wide and deep. Since Rep. Lamborn first

joined the U.S. House of Representatives in 2007, the Office has employed dozens of Colorado

residents in its District Office (individuals who pay state and local taxes in Colorado and

otherwise contribute to the local economy there). Mr. Pope is, of course, one of them. And for

nearly fifteen years, the District Office has provided direct constituent services to thousands of

Colorado residents, by assisting them with: applying for federal grants, navigating federal agency

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bureaucracy, seeking admission to U.S. military academies, and so on. One cannot credibly

deny that the Office has “substantial business engagements” in Colorado.

Many of the “operative events” took place in Colorado. Throughout his tenure with the

Office, Mr. Pope worked and lived in Colorado. Mr. Pope claims that he was fired for voicing

safety concerns about his and his coworkers’ workplace. That workplace is in Colorado. Mr.

Pope also claims that the Office advised him that his termination was due to his “lack of

professionalism and abrasiveness toward his colleagues and supervisors.” Those failings

occurred in Colorado. Additionally, the Office primarily based its termination decision on

observations made, and information communicated from those located, in Colorado. Colorado

features prominently in the most salient underlying facts and allegations. By comparison, the

District of Columbia does not.

Finally, it is self-evident that the effects of this lawsuit will be felt in Colorado. How

could they not, given that all parties reside there?

Colorado’s more compelling local interest in resolving this case supports transfer.

4. Brief Conclusion as to Public-Interest Factors

Taken together, the public-interest factors fall on transfer’s side. The most important of

those factors—the local interest in deciding local controversies—favors transfer. After all, at

issue here is a Colorado resident’s claim against his former Colorado employer, the head of

which also represents 820,000-plus Coloradans in the U.S. House of Representatives. One

would be hard pressed to find a more local interest. As a result, because the remaining factors

(on familiarity with the law and court congestion) are in equipoise, transfer serves the public

interest.

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CONCLUSION

This case can, and should, be litigated in Colorado. It can be litigated there because

venue lies in that forum. In light of the applicable private- and public-interest factors—none of

which favors retention—this dispute should be litigated in the U.S. District Court for the District

of Colorado for convenience considerations and in the interest of justice. Based on these reasons

and those set forth above, the Office’s motion to transfer should be granted.

Respectfully submitted by,

DEFENDANT OFFICE OF
CONGRESSMAN DOUG LAMBORN

By:
/s/ Ann R. Rogers
/s/ Joel J. Borovsky
/s/ Trevor S. Blake
Ann R. Rogers, D.C. Bar # 441622
Joel J. Borovsky, D.C. Bar #974812
Trevor S. Blake, D.C. Bar # 974319
U.S. House of Representatives
Office of House Employment Counsel
4300 O’Neill House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-7075 `
Ann.Rogers@mail.house.gov
Joel.Borovsky@mail.house.gov
Trevor.Blake@mail.house.gov

Defendant’s Counsel

Date: July 30, 2021

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