GR NO 240124

ALARILLA V LORENZO
(Speedy Disposition)

FACTS:
Petitioner Alarilla was the Mayor of Meycauayan from 2007. Her husband Eduardo, the former Mayor she
succeeded. Served as a General Consultant of the city government.
Alarilla approved the disbursement of 41 checks of which all drawn from the account of Meycauayan and were
issued as payment to LC San Pascual, VSP Trading for the goods and services they delivered.
Respondent filed for grave misconduct and dishonesty, and malversation through falsification of public
documents to the Ombudsman alleging that from July 2007-August 2007 the spouse, with abuse of authority,
misappropriated and converted to her own use public funds by issuing checks as payment for goods and services delivered
by the LC and VSP. He accused Alarilla of receiving the proceeds of the said checks.
May 2008, OMB ordered the spouses to file their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence. July 2008, the
spouses filed their Joint Counter-affidavit denying the allegations. Subsequently, OMB directed the parties to file their
position papers. Eduardo passed away March 2009.
OMB ruled declaring the petitioner liable for grave misconduct and serious dishonesty but it dismissed the
complaint against Eduardo for lack of jurisdiction since his term as mayor had ended when the complaint was filed and in
view of his demise. Eduardo’s designation as “General Consultant” did not give rise to an employer-employee
relationship that would subject him to administrative liability.
Alarilla filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 to the CA, reiterating that she is not guilty of grave misconduct
and serious dishonesty and claimed that there was inordinate delay in the handling of her case.
CA affirmed the OMB’s ruling that Alarilla is guilty of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty. CA also rejected
the petitioner’s claim that her right to the speedy disposition of her case was violated, absent proof that the alleged delay
was vexatious and capricious.
March 2018, Alarilla filed for Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in the CA’s
resolution.
Alarilla then filed for Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether or not her right to the speedy disposition of her case was violated.

HELD:
Petition is granted.
Sec. 16 Art II of the Constitution guarantees every person’s right to the speedy disposition of his/her case. This
sacrosanct right Is not limited to criminal proceedings, but extends to civil and administrative cases and judicial-quasi
judicial proceedings. Any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials tasked with the administration
of justice.
For administrative cases, Sec 12, Art Xi of the Constitution requires the OMB to act promptly on all complaints
filed before it. The same constitutional mandate is further emphasized In RA No 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) where
the OMB is prompted to enforce administrative, civil, and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in
order to promote efficient service by the government to the people.
However, Sec 16, Art II; Sec 12, Art XI and Sec 13 of RA 6770 do not provide specific periods to measure
promptness or furnish criteria to determine delay in the disposition of complaints. Jurisprudence fills this and describes
how “promptness” may be gauged and how “inordinate delay” may be ascertained.
In Cagang vs Sandiganbayan, the court set comprehensive guidelines in resolving alleged violations of the right to
speedy trial or disposition of cases:
First, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. Right to speedy
disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is
that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of preliminary
investigation. The court acknowledges that the OMB should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due
regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The
period taken for fact—finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the
determination whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, Courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given
time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated
by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked If the delay
occurs beyond the given time period, and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the
delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only
politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the
prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; that the
complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and that no prejudice was suffered
by the accused as a result of delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of
the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
An EXCEPTION to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by
malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of
evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious
prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of
further analysis of the delay.
Another EXCEPTION would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right
to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be
invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed
by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or
the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are
deemed tto have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.