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DharmaandMoksa
THIS PAPER is meantto providesomehistorical background
on thequestionof thedistinction betweendharmavaluesand moksavalues
in Indianthought.The Indiancontext requires thatwe view"moralvalues"
-I shallhereafter avoid theterm-first in relationtodifferent eschatologies.
we
Veryroughly, maydistinguish two.
First,theconception of an "after-life" which,thoughinterrupted byinter-
vals of heavenand hell,remainson thesamelevelas thepresentlife,and,
although itsvarying degreesof"spirituality" (caitanyaandrelatedterms)en-
compasstheentirerangefromwormto Brahmi,cannotbe regarded as essen-
tiallydifferent fromhumanlife. This is samisara, "transmigration," usually
involving thedoctrine thata certain"soul"continues fromlifeto lifein an
embodiedexistence, thefactsofhisbodyandhislifebeinglargelydependent
on whatactstheindividual hasperformed in former suchlives,yetaffording
limitedscopeforgradualself-perfection-but on thesamelevel-by meri-
toriousacts.
Second,the assumption of moksa,"release,"fromthe above "bondage"
(bandha) to continued embodiedexistence.Takenbyand large,all Indian
systems acknowledge thata supreme effortofconsciousness, a totalisolation
of a person'sawareness ofhis"soul,"representing a "supreme soul,"fromall
thatis non-soul is themeansto achievethisrelease.Buddhism doesnotposi-
tivelystartfroma conceptof soul,butnegatively fromthatwhichis non-
soul, preferring to describethe self-recognition of the soul as nirvina,the
extinction of theflameof life-thirst, andtheindescribable thatremainsafter
theextinction as beingvoidof all worldlydescription.
Whenwe inquireintothehistory of theseconceptions, much,of course,
mustremainobscure;still,thereis sufficient evidenceto justify certaincon-
clusions.
Examining theoldesttexts,we find,insteadof transmigration, a hopeful
prospect of heavenly joysin an after-life. Accessto thisabodeis afforded by
theperformance of ritualacts,whichare not infrequently discouraging in
and
complexity expenditure. But it soon becomes clearthatthe obtaining of
heavenis farfromtheoverriding concernof sacerdotal circles,that,in fact,
theirprimeconcern is to control andmaintain theuniverse as itis. Suchcon-
troland maintenance are soughtand foundin theperfectknowledgeand
33
2
If it is possible to "wish away" the karmaphala (fruit of the act) while doing the act, this means
that the act is deprived of its finality, and its performerof his motivation, so that other motivations
have to be discovered for the agent, e.g., as the Gitd proposes, a sense of social responsibility. Rimi-
nuja, keenly realizing that the Gitd's doctrine of the renunciation of the rewards of the acts always
envisages ritual acts, explains, in his Gitdbhdsya, that among the three categories of acts (nitya, "daily
recurring,"; naimittika, "occasional"; and knamya,"inspired by desire") the last category alone must
be given up. This follows naturally from the Mimmrihsitheory, since in the kdmya acts (type svarga-
kAimojyotistomena yajeta) the performer's desire-for-heavenis his qualification (adhikara), and unless
he desires the phala (e.g., heaven) he cannot even perform the act; the nitya acts, on the other hand,
have no phala.