Balding - Donnelly 1995 J Royal Stat Soc - Inference in Forensic Identification 2

J. R. Statist.Soc.
A (1995)
158, Part 1, pp. 21-53
Inferencein ForensicIdentification
By DAVID J. BALDINGt and PETER DONNELLY
Queen Mary and WestfieldCollege, London, UK
[Read beforeThe Royal StatisticalSocietyon Wednesday,April 13th,1994,

the President,ProfessorD. J. Bartholomew,in the Chair]
SUMMARY
Theproblem ofquantifying theweightofevidence inforensic is addressed.
identification
Theessenceoftheproblem is abstracted
ina simpleparadigm, theanalysisofwhichyields
valuableinsights
andhighlights important A specialcaseofthisanalysis
distinctions. gives
a resolution
oftheso-calledislandproblem.Theparadigm is extendedtoassesstheeffects
ofseveralfeatureswhichmaybe important inpractical situations,suchas possiblealibis,
heterogeneous populationsof potentialsuspectsand informative protocolsforfinding
Theanalyses
suspects. ofthepaperclarifyseveralissuespertainingtotheweight ofevidence
withmatching
associated acid(DNA)profiles
deoxyribonucleic andraisesomenewconcerns.
In addition,established
concerns regarding theincorrect interpretation
of probabilistic
evidencebyjuriesare discussedin theDNA profilecontext.
Keywords:BAYES RULE; DEOXYRIBONUCLEIC ACID PROFILES; FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION;
ISLAND PROBLEM; WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE
1. INTRODUCTION
A generalproblem
inforensic ariseswhena suspectis observed
identification tohave
of traits,also knownto be possessedbythe
raretrait,or combination
a particular
Theproblemis to quantify
criminal. theevidential strength,forthesuspect'sguilt,
of suchan observation. For example,thetraitmightbe a physicalcharacteristic
describedby an eye-witness,a deoxyribonucleicacid (DNA) profileor perhapsa
weaponofthetypeusedin thecrime.An infamous case focusing
on suchevidence
is People versus Collins (California Reporter, 1968). Here, a robberywas committed
by a black man with a moustache and a beard and a blonde woman with a pony-tail,
and the getaway car was yellow with an off-whitetop. A couple were later charged
with the crime, essentiallythe only evidence being that they and their car fittedthis
description.In the course of the trialand subsequent appeal, several distinctstatistical
analyses of the weight which should be given to the evidence were presented.
In Sections 2 and 3 we consider these issues in the contextof a simplifiedparadigm.
The original version of this, the so-called 'island problem', has been the subject of
several different analyses, with distinct solutions. We describe and resolve a
formulationof the problem which is more general and more realisticthan that usually
considered. Along with additional insights, the general formulation raises some
important practical issues which seem not to have previously been appreciated.
The firstimportantpracticalconsideration,introducedin Section 4, concernspositive
correlations in trait possession. The effectof any such correlations is to reduce the
tAddressfor correspondence:School of MathematicalSciences,Queen Mary and WestfieldCollege, Mile End

Road, London, El 4NS, UK.
? 1995 Royal Statistical Society 0035-9238/95/158021
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
22 BALDING AND DONNELLY [Part 1,
probability ofguilt.Correlations canariseformanyreasons.In somesettings, such
as correlations due to sharedinheritance of genetictraits,theymightbe modelled
explicitly, as discussedin Section7. Moregenerally, theywillariseas a resultof
uncertainty abouttheprobability of bearingthetrait.
In Section5,weexamine particularfeatureswhicharerelevant insomeapplications.
Themostimportant ofthesemaybe inhomogeneities in theunderlying population.
Wealsoconsider theeffect ofrestrictedaccess,possiblealibisandinformative search
protocols.
It is vitalthata juryis awareofthecorrect methodofincorporating thescientific
evidencewiththe otherevidence.Thereis a dangerthattheprobability of trait
possessionmaybe misinterpreted as a probability of innocence, whichcouldlead
to seriouserrors.Section6 considerstheseissues.
Therehasbeenconsiderable controversy overmethods forquantifying
theevidential
strength ofmatching DNA profiles. Thegeneralframework developedherecanhelp
to clarify someof theseissues.Important pointsdevelopedin Sections4, 5 and 6,
suchas populationsubdivision and correlationsin traitpossession,arediscussedin
theDNA contextin Section7.
Throughout, we shalluse the term'suspect'to referto the individualwhose
innocence orguiltis inquestion, eventhoughtheterms'accused'or 'defendant' may
be moreappropriate in somesituations. Theterm'evidence'willin generalbe used
to includebackground information, notnecessarily incriminating.
Wecouldconsider thequestion eitherfrom theperspective ofa disinterested
observer
or fromthatof a criminal court.The generalissuesare similarin bothcases. One
important distinctionis thatsomeevidencewhichan observer mightuse maynot
be admissiblein court.A further distinction concernsanyapproximations to the
probability of thesuspect'sguilt,or attempts to maketheanalysismoretractable
by introducing simplifying assumptions.In the criminallegal contextsuch
are mostappropriateiftheyare conservative,
approximationsor simplifications i.e.
oftheprobability
theydo notleadtoan overstatement ofguilt.Throughout
thepaper
we considertheissuesfromthecourt'sperspective.
2. ORIGINAL ISLAND PROBLEM

We shallbeginthediscussion intermsofwhatEggleston (1983),appendix3, calls
theislandproblem. SupposethatthereareN+ 1 possiblesuspects, ofwhichprecisely
oneis guilty,and eachis a prioriequallylikelyto be thecriminal.Supposefurther
thateveryone involvedhasprobability p ofhavinga particular traitT, and thatthe
individuals
T-statesof distinct areindependent. The evidenceis thatthecriminal is
knowntohaveT anda suspectis apprehended andobserved to haveT. Thequestion
ofinterest
ishowtoevaluate P(G), theprobabilityofguiltgiventheavailableevidence,
where
G_ 'suspectis thecriminal'.
Thisproblem
hasattracted
attention 'solutions'
andthreedistinct havebeenproposed.
2.1. MethodI
is knownto haveT and thenumberX of
Yellin(1979)notedthatthecriminal

1995] FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 23
innocentT-bearers has thebinomialdistribution withparametersN andp. In the
event thatXtakesvalue0,thesuspect isguilty,whereasifX= 1thenthere
isprobability
2 thatthesuspect is guilty.In general,conditional
on X=x, theprobability
ofguilt
is 1/(1+ x). Averaging
overthedistribution ofXgivestheprobability
ofthesuspect's
guilt:
=
Z()
I
PG I'NXN
1+ xKx)(I p)Nx
1X=0
E(1iX)~~~~~~~~~~~~1
1-1_p)N+ 1(1
(N+ I)p
2.2. Method 2
thetotalnumberZ of
Kingston(1965)and Cullison(1969)arguedthatinitially
T-bearers,
innocent ornot,hasthebinomialdistribution
withparameters N+ 1 and
p. Afternotingthatthecriminalhas T, weknowthatthetotalnumber ofT-bearers
is non-zeroand hence
P(G) =E( I Z>0 (2)
forwhichtheredoes notappearto be a simpleexpression.
2.3. Method 3
Lindley(seeEggleston
(1983),p. 244)proposed
incorrespondencetheuseofBayes's
rule.Thelikelihood
thatthesuspectandcriminal bothhaveT isp underhypothesis
G andp2 underGc 'not G'. The priorprobabilities of G and Gc are respectively
1/(N+ 1) andN/(N+ 1). UsingtheoddsformoftheBayesrule,theposterior odds
ratio against G is
O()=EN/(N+ 1)
p 1/(N+1)
=Np, (3)
and hence
P(G)=lI * (4)
1+Np(4
Eggleston examplein whichN= 100andp = 0.004. In thiscase
gavea numerical
thethreeformulae
forP(G) give0.826,0.903and0.714respectively.
WhenNis large,

p is smallandNp<< 1, approximationsto equations(1), (2) and (4) arerespectively
1-Np/2, 1-Np/4 and 1-Np.
Egglestonarguedthatmethod1 is correct.Lenth(1986)also advocatedmethod1
and,although method
rejecting
implicitly 3, claimedthattheBayesian approachyields
approximately thesameresultsand 'has theadditionaladvantageof beingeasily
explained (providedthatweavoidtheapproachusedinmostelementary probability
textbooks!)'.
In Section3 we describea moregeneralformulation of theislandproblem.In
general,inference dependson thenumberof suspectsobservednotto haveT. In
the specialcase in whichthefirstsuspectexaminedhas thetrait,we arguethat
method3 is correct fortheislandproblem.A morecarefulanalysisalongthelines
of method1, whichaccountsforsize biasingeffects, is also correct.Method2 is
incorrect.Thisresolutionoftheislandproblemhas beenreachedindependently by
Dawid (1994).
3. GENERALIZED ISLAND PROBLEM

We continuewiththe conceptualsimplification of a populationof possible
perpetrators of fixedknownsize. In fact,we shallsee thattheensuinganalysisis
rathergeneral.Let thepopulationof theislandbe labelledfrom0 to N and letXi
denotetheindicator variablewhichtakesvalue1 ifindividual i has thetraitT and
value 0 otherwise,for i =0, 1, . . ., N. In the originalisland problem,the Xiare
independentBernoullirandomvariableswithP(Xi= 1) =p, fori= 0, 1, . . ., N and
knownp. A weakerassumption whichis appropriate in somesituations is that(xo,
Here,we do notmakeanyassumptions
Xi, . . ., XN) is exchangeable. aboutthe
of (xo, xl, .
distribution . *, XN).
betweenthecase in whicha suspectis apprehended
It is possibleto distinguish
andsubsequently searchismadeofpotential
notedtohaveT, thatinwhicha sequential
suspectsuntilan T-beareris foundand thatin whicha databaseis examinedand
foundtocontainprecisely oneT-bearer. weshalltreatthesecasesseparately.
Initially
3.1. Non-sequential
Case
LetS and C denotetherandomvariableswhosevaluesarethelabels(or 'names')
and lets denotetheobservedvalueof
thesuspectand thecriminal
of respectively
odds againstG are
S. The posterior
P(GcIXc=Xs1= S=s)
P(GXc=X,=1, S=s)
P(XC=X,=1, S=sIC?s)P(C?s)
P(Xc=Xs=1, S=s1C=s)P(C=s)
_P(xc=x,=11C?s, S=s)P(C?sIS=s)
P(X,=1IC=S=S) P(C=sIS=s) (5)
it does notrequirethatthenumberof
Equation(5) is verygeneral.In particular,
possibleperpetratorsN be known.It also appliesin settings in whichthereis

uncertainty
aboutwhether or notthecriminalhas T. Notethatthereis an implicit
conditioning
on otherevidenceintheprobabilities
inequation(5) andequations
which
followfromit.
We nowmaketwosimplifying assumptions.
1. The probability
Assumption thatanyparticular
individualis thecriminalis
unchangedbyknowledgeof thelabel of thesuspect:P(C = i IS = s) = P(C = i) fori = 0,
1, . . .,IN.
Assumption 2. The T-statusofall theindividuals is independent
of theidentities
of thesuspectand thecriminal:(xo, xl, . . *, XN) is independent
of (S, C).
Theseassumptions areimplicitin theoriginalislandproblem.Assumption 1, with
i = s, implies
thatthecourt'sbeliefintheguiltofa particular individualis notchanged
bythefactthattheindividualhas beenidentified as thesuspect.A disinterested
observer maygiveinferential weightto thisfact,e.g. on thebasisof confidence in
thelaw enforcement authorities.As Dawid (1994)argues,it is inappropriate fora
courtto modify itsbeliefin theguiltof a particular individual simplybecausethat
individual hasbeenbrought totrial.In addition,assumption 1 withi?s requires that
theidentity ofthesuspectdoesnotprovideinformation abouttheguiltorinnocence
ofotherindividuals. Thiswillbe reasonable inmanycases.In Section5.5wedescribe
situations in whichit maybe inappropriate.
Assumption 2 impliesthattheknowledge thata particular pairare suspectand
criminal doesnotaffectthedistribution oftheT-status in thepopulation.Thiswill
notholdforcertaintypesof trait,as discussedin Section5.2. Itsvalidity willalso
dependon thebackground knowledge availableto thecourt.For example,search
protocols basedon a characteristiccorrelatedwithT mayinvalidate thisassumption;
see Section5.5.
Inviewofassumptions 1 and2, weshallintheremainder ofthissubsection suppress
theexplicit conditioningon theevent[S = sJ.It nowfollowsfromequation(5) that
0(G)-= P(Xc=ys= 1 1C?s) P(C?s)

P(C=s)
P(xS=1)
P(Xc=Xs= 1 Ic=i) P(C=i)

i,ds P(XS= 1) P(C=s)
=
= ZP(xi= I IXr=1) P(C i) (6)
P(C=s)
Thereis an alternative,
butequivalent,
expressionforO(G) in whichwe condition
on xc= 1 ratherthany,= 1. Conditioning on the suspect'sprofileclarifiesthe
subsequent discussion.
As in theoriginalislandproblem,we assumeherethat
I i=O, 1, .. ., N.
P(C=i)=1 (7)
of guilt,but notethattheyare
We referto theP(C=i) as 'prior'probabilities

26 BALDING AND DONNELLY [Part1,
conditional
ontheotherevidence.NotealsothatN onlyentersintotheanalysisthrough
thepriorprobabilities.
We discussthecase of non-uniform priorsin Section6. In
realistic itmaybe helpfulto thinkin
in whichthereis littleotherevidence,
settings
termsof thesize of thepopulationof possibleperpetratorsin formulating prior
probabilities.
Fromequations(6) and (7) we have
O(G)= E P(xi= 1I X= 1), (8)
i?s
or, equivalently,
P(GIxc=X= 1)=
1+ ZP(X1=1Ix'=1)
i?s
In theoriginalislandproblem,sincetheXiare assumedto be independent and

identically
distributed,we haveP(G IXc= Xs= 1)= 1/(1+ Np), as in method3. More
ifP(Xi= I Ix,= 1) is constantoveri and s withi?s then
generally,
O(G)=NP(Xj = I Ixo=1). (9)

Method1 is incorrectbecauseit ignoresa sizebiasing:theobservation
thatthe
suspecthas T stochastically
increasesthedistribution Moreformally,
of T-bearers.
notethat
N
P(GIxc=x = 1)= E P(GIX=x, Xc=Xs= 1) P(X=xIxc=x 1).
X=O
In the originalislandproblem,we have P(GIX=x, XC=Xs=1)=1/(1+x) and
P(X=xIxc=xS= 1)=P(X=xIxs= 1). Method 1, however,incorrectly equates
P(X =x IXs= 1) and P(X= x). Takingthissizebiasingeffectintoaccountleadsto
a correctanalysis.
Method2 contains twoimpliciterrors.Thefirst is, as formethod1,to ignorethe
effect.
sizebiasing Morefundamentally,as notedbyEggleston (1983)andLenth(1986),
conditioningon therebeingat leastone individual havingT is notthesameas the
correctconditioning,thata specificindividual(thesuspect)has T.
Severalworkers, forexampleSampsonand Smith(1985)and Lenth(1986),and
theCaliforniaSupreme CourtinPeopleversus Collinshaveconsidered theprobability
P(UI Xc= Xs= 1), whereU is the eventthatthe criminalis the onlyindividual
withT. SinceU c G, reporting P(UI xc= x,= 1) is conservative:P(UI xc= x,= 1)<
P(G IXc= Xs= 1). However,previousresearchers have calculatedP(UI Xc= Xs= 1)
becausetheyhaveignoredthesizebiasingeffect.In fact,
incorrectly
P(UI xc= Xs= 1)=P(UI G, xc= xs= 1) P(G Ixc= xs= 1)
P( Z xi=IXs= 1)
I+ sP(Xi=IIXs= )
ios

underassumptions prior(7). In theoriginal
1 and2 andtheuniform islandproblem,
forexample,
P(UI Xc = Xs= 1)- ( P)N

Il+Np
Not only does P(UIXc= y=1) addressthe wrongquestion,also it is more
to evaluate.Use of equation(10) requiresP(G IXc= X=1) in any case.
difficult
Further,
calculationofP(UI G, Xc= Xys=1) requiresan assumptionaboutthejoint
distribution withtheevaluation
ofall theXi,in contrast ofP(G IXc X = 1), which
=
dependsonlyon thepairwisemarginals.
3.2. SequentialCase
Nowsupposethata searchhasbeenconducted inthepopulation
amongindividuals
untilone,thesuspect,is foundto haveT. Supposethatthelabels,in order,of the
individualssearchedare IO, II, . . ., I.. The orderof the searchmay be fixedor
random.We introduce
thenotation
A-[Xi,, = Xil = 0, Xi,= lI}

Xiy_l
B=_ IO= io I = ilg . . . ,V=VI 9
10,I . . .,IM\1i09 ill . . .,9ix}.
J_tO
The posterior
odds againstG afterthesearchare
= . = XI = 0, XI = Xc= 1, B I C?4I) P(C?hI)

.P I = XIY_,
=0, XI =Xc=1, BIC=IY)P(C=IY)
= P(Xi= 1, AI C=i, B) P(C= iIB)
iEJ P(A IC= iygB) P(C=iy|B) (1
Notethatthesequential casewithy = 0 is equivalent

to thenon-sequentialcase,i.e.
theanalysis casedoesnotdependonwhatwouldhavehappened
ofthenon-sequential
ifthesuspectdidnothaveT. Thisis a consequence of theso-called'stoppingrule
principle'(see Bergerand Wolpert(1988),p. 74).
We nowmakeassumptions whichare theanaloguesof assumptions 1 and 2, in
thecontextof thesequentialsearch.
Assumption 3. Giventhe otherevidence,the probability thatany particular
is thecriminal
individual is unchanged byknowledge ofthelabelsoftheindividuals
searched:P(C=iIB)=P(C=i) for i=0, 1, . . ., N.
Assumption 4. The T-statusof all theindividuals is independent of theidentities
oftheindividuals searchedand ofthecriminal: is
(xo,Xl, . . X,XN) independent of
(IO 9 Il . . .,9Iyg C).
We continue priorprobabilities
to assumetheuniform (11) for
(7). The expression
to
theodds againstG simplifies

O(G)= P(Xi=1, A) P(C=i)

i EJ P(A) P(C= iy)
E
ieJ
P(xi= lxi,, = x .=* =Xi, =O0xi = 1). (12)
of (Xo,Xl, . X., XN)is exchangeablethenequation (12) simplifies

If thedistribution
further
to give
O(G) = (N-y) P(xy+1 = 1I xo = x1 =Xy-1= 0, Xy= 1). (13)
In theoriginalislandproblemequation(13) becomes
O(G) = (N-y)p
whichcoincideswithequation(3) withN replacedbyN-y. In thiscase thesearch

decreasesthenumberof possiblesuspectsbutgivesno further information. This
observationjustifiesthe methodused by Eggleston(1983) to accountfor the
informationin thelengthofthesearch.Ironically, hisargument againstthecorrect
solution,method3, is thatit does nottakeintoaccountthefactthatif a suspect
notto haveT thenthesearchwillbe resumed
is observed untilan T-bearingsuspect
is found.Lindley(personalcommunication) and Dawid (1994)haveindependently
shownthatmethod1 is correct inthecasethata sequentialsearchhasbeenconducted
butthelengthofthesearchisnotrecorded. Sucha procedure is guaranteed
toproduce
an T-bearing suspectand hencethereis no size biasingeffect.
Thefollowingresultshowsthat,inthegeneralized islandproblem, ifT-possession
is exchangeablethentheposterior guiltprobabilityis non-decreasingin thelength
of thesearch.We note,however, thatthisconclusion maynotholdifassumptions
3 and 4 and uniform do notobtain.
priorguiltprobabilities
Proposition islandproblem,
1. In thegeneralized underassumptions 3 and4 and
withuniform priorguiltprobabilities, thenthe
if(Xo,Xi, ...., XN) is exchangeable
probability
posterior ofguiltisnon-decreasing
inthelength ofthesearch.Equivalently,
Oy(G)fortheposterior
writing oddsagainstguilt(13) aftera searchoflengthy+ 1,
Oy1 (G) > Oy(G) (14)
fory=1,2 . . . N such thatP(xy=Oxo= 1, xi =. . .=Xy-l =0)>O.

Proof.DenotebyA theeventxo=I , Xl = X2 . Xy-1= O}. (Wheny= 1, A is
Ixo= 1J.)Notethat,by equation(13) and exchangeability,
0y- (G)= (N-y+ 1) P(xy= 1IA).

Observethat

ConditioningonA leavestherandomvariables Expansion
Xy,. ., xNexchangeable.
of inequality
(15) thengives
(N-y)[P(Xy=Xy+1=01A)-P(Xy A A) -P(Xy A 0. (16)
Now,
P(XY=OIAfOy1(G)- Oy(G)J
=P(xY=OIA)f(N-y+1)P(xy= IA)-(N-y) P(xy+= lIA, xy=O)]
=(N-y+ 1)[P(xy=OIA)-P(xy=OIA)2A-(N-y)P(xy=O xy+lIA)
=(N-y+ 1)P(xy=OIA)-P(xy=O A)2 -AN-y)fP(xy=OIA)
-P(xy=xy+i=OIA)j
= (N-y)fP(xy=Xy+i =0IA) -P(xy= 0A)2 +P(xy=0IA) -P(xy= IA)2
>0,
byinequality (16), as required. ?

The propositionrelieson the exchangeability of the T-statusof unsearched
conditional
individuals, on theT-statusofthesearched We remark
individuals. that
thisconditional also holds,forexample,foranyjointdistribution
exchangeability
of (xo,X1,... , XN) ifthesearchorderis a uniformrandompermutation on t0, 1,
.. ., NJ,independentof (xo, X1, . **, XN)
Although theposteriorprobabilityofthesuspect'sguiltincreases withy,ignoring
thelengthofthesearchis unimportant ifNis largeandy<<N. In anycase,provided
thatassumptions 3 and4 arevalidandtheuniform apply,failure
priorprobabilities
to reportthelengthof thesearchis conservative.
Equalityis achievedin inequality(14) if and onlyifX, thenumberof innocent
individualswhohaveT, is known,whichis unlikely to occurin practice.We shall
discussin Section4 a wideclassof exchangeable modelsforwhichinequality (14)
can be improved to
Oy_(G)>Oy(G)+P(Xy= 1IA). (17)
(17) in theoriginalislandproblem.
Equalityis achievedin inequality
3.3. Database Search

Consider nowthecaseinwhicha collection ofy+ 1 possiblesuspectsis investigated
and preciselyone foundto have T. For example,a databaseof sizey+ 1 maybe
inspectedfora matching fingerprint or DNA profileand a singlematchis found.
Wecontinue toassumetheuniform priorprobabilities(7). Theassumptions analogous
to thosein theprevioustwosubsections are as follows.
Assumption 5. Giventhe otherevidence,the probability thatany particular
individual
is thecriminalis unchanged byknowledge ofthelabelsoftheindividuals
investigated.
Assumption 6. The T-statusof all theindividualsis independentof theidentities
of theindividuals and of thecriminal.
investigated

An analysisshowsthatthelikelihoods
of thedata underhypotheses G and GCare
thesameas inthesequential
searchcase,andthereforeequation(12) also holdsfor
a database search,withtheobviousreinterpretation
of thenotation:io, il, .. ., iy-
indextheindividuals in thedatabasefoundnotto haveT and iyis thelabelof the
T-bearer.
A trawlthrough a databaseincreasestheprobability offindingan T-bearer.It has
beensuggested (e.g. Morton(1993),p. 175)thatintheeventofa singlematchfrom
a groupof suspectstheappropriate probabilityto reportto thecourtis thatof at
leastonematchinthegroup.Underindependence assumptions thisis approximately
(y+ l)p. Ouranalysisshowsthatthisprobability is irrelevant.
Indeed,itssuggestion
thatinthiscasetheevidenceagainstthesuspectis 'y timeslessconvincing' thanhad
thesuspectbeentheonlyindividualexaminedis misleading. The strength of the
evidenceagainsttheT-bearing suspectdependsonlyweaklyony wheny<<N and,
in thesetting
of proposition 1, thestrengthincreaseswithy.
4. EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT p

Oneimportant difference betweentheoriginal islandproblem andthegeneralized
problem considered aboveisthatinthelatter theposterior probabilityofguiltdepends
on morethanjust themarginalprobabilities of T-possession, P(Xi= 1), i =0, 1,
. N. In the non-sequential case, it also dependson thejoint probabilities,
P(Xi= x,= 1), i?s, thattwodistinct individuals, one of themthesuspect,willboth
haveT. If therearepositivecorrelations in traitpossessionthenthesimpleformula
(4) overstates theposterior probabilityof guilt.In thesequential case,theposterior
probability ofguiltdependson higher dimensional jointdistributions.Correlations
due to relatedness and coancestry in thecase of a genetictraitare describedin
Section7. Herewe proceedmoregenerally.
For ease of exposition we focushere,and in theremainder of thepaper,on the
non-sequential case. We continue to makeassumptions 1 and 2 and to assumethe
uniformprior (7). We also assume in this section that (xo, xi, . ., XN) is .
exchangeable. Fora fixedlabellingofthepopulation, thisassumption requires a certain

degreeof homogeneity withrespectto T-possession. We notethatexchangeability
can alwaysbe artificially achieved,possiblyat thecostof someinformation, by
labellingthepopulationuniformly at random,independently of (xo,X1, * * *, XN)
The exchangeability assumption willbe weakenedin Section5.1.
Onenatural wayofmodelling thepopulation isto supposethatthere is an unknown
probability p and that,conditional on thevalueofp, thexi are independent with
P(Xi= 1)=p, i=O, 1, ..., N. Indeed,inthiscontext sucha modelis rather general.
In practice, thevalueof thepopulationsizeN willnotbe knownexactly.Further,
thestructure ofa realisticmodelshouldnotdependstrongly on thevalueofN. Thus
it is naturalto insistthat the random variablesxo, Xi, . ., XN formpart of an
infinite
exchangeable sequence[xi'i o. By de Finetti'stheorem(see, forexample,
Billingsley
(1979),p. 425),themostgeneralsuchdistribution is exactlythatwhich
wehavejustdescribed: itconsists
ofchoosinga random p E [ 0, 1 ] and,conditional
on thevalueofp, thexi are independent withP(Xi= 1)=p. Sucha representation
guaranteesnon-negative correlation,
P(Xi= x = 1)>, P(Xi= 1) P(W= 1), (18)

i?s. Therewillbe equalityin expression(18), in whichcase equation(4) holds,
ifandonlyifp is knownexactly.Thepositivecorrelations whichariseininequality
as beingdue to uncertainty
(18) can be interpreted aboutthevalueofp. Unlessp
is fixedandknownexactly, probability
theposterior thanthevalue
ofguiltis smaller
about p is non-conservative.
givenby equation (4). Ignoringuncertainty
Wearguethata courtshouldcometoa viewabouta distribution whichencapsulates
case,P(G IXc= Xs= 1)
itsbeliefsaboutthepossiblevaluesofp. In thenon-sequential
dependsonlyon thefirsttwomoments IfwewriteE(p) = 0 and
ofthisdistribution.
var(p)=a2, forsome0< U2< 0(1 - 0), thentheodds againstG are
O(G) =N -NOi1 + 02. (19)

E(p)02
Recallthatwithp known0(G) = NOsincep 0 inthiscase.Theeffect ofuncertainty

aboutp depends Theposterior
ofvariation.
onitscoefficient oddsagainst guiltincrease
of variationincreases.
as thecoefficient
Onesourceofuncertainty aboutp is sampling Oftenp willbe estimated
variability.
ofT-bearers
as theproportion ina samplefrom thepopulation. Ifp is assumed initially
tohavethebeta(oa, fromn arethenobserved
andx individuals
O)distribution tohave
T, thenthedistributionofp becomesbeta(a+ x, a + n - x). In thiscase
O(G) =N a +x+ 1 (20)
In thespecialcase in whicho = = 1, so thatp is initially

assumedto be uniform,
theodds(20)arethesameas thosegivenbyequation(5) withp = (x+ 2)/(n+ 3). These
areapproximatelytheoddswhichwouldbe obtained ifp wasassumedtobe a constant
equal to thesampleproportion of T-bearers, buttreatingcriminal and suspectas
distinct,additional,members of thesample.
Theremaybe important sourcesof uncertainty otherthansampling variability.
Inthecaseofcompound inparticular
traits, DNA profiles,p mayhavebeenestimated
as theproductof therelativefrequencies of eachof theproperties whichmakeup
thecompoundtrait.In thissetting theremaybe uncertainty aboutthevalidityof
theindependence assumption whichjustifiesthisestimation procedure.Another
possiblesourceof uncertainty is thattheavailabledatabasemaynot constitute a
random sample, maybedrawnfrom
and,further, a populationwhichdoesnotcoincide
withthepopulationof possibleperpetrators of thecrime.
In viewof theneedto deal withtheuncertainty aboutp, one possibleapproach
is to replacethe distributionwhichsummarizes thisuncertainty by the trivial
distributionwhichplacesunitmassat a constant valuea, believedto be largerthan
p in somesense.Thisapproachwillbe conservative whenever a> E(p2)/E(p), i.e.
whenever
var(p)<E(p)fa - E(p)J. (21)
A necessaryconditionforinequality(21) is thata>E(p). This conditionis not,

however, andthemoreuncertainty
sufficient thereis aboutp forfixedE(p) thelarger
a willneedto be to ensureconservativeness.
Particularlyin thecontextof several

sourcesofuncertainty
aboutp, valuesofa whichareclaimedinsomecurrent
practice
to be 'overestimates'
ofp maynotbe conservative.
5. EXTENSIONS TO ISLAND PROBLEM

5.1. Inhomogeneous Populations
Manynaturalpopulations areinhomogeneous, in whichcasetheexchangeability
assumptionmadein Section4 maybe unrealistic. Here,we shallsupposethatthe
isdivided
population intoa collection
ofsubpopulations
whicharemorehomogeneous
withrespectto T-possession. We continueto assumea uniform priorand to make
assumptions 1 and 2. Let S1denotethesetof labelsof individuals,
excludingthe
suspect,in thejth subpopulation,j = 1, 2, ..., K. We also assume that
P(xil= Ix1
X= 1)=P(xi2= 1I x = 1) il, i2E Sj, j= 1, 2, . .,K. (22)
We shallwritex(i) fora genericXi,iE Sj, so that,forexample,P(x U)= I X,s=1)
denotesthe commonvalue of the conditionalprobability, givenx,=1, of T-
possessionby individuali E Sj:
P(x(i) = I I Xs= l)--P(xi= I I Xs= 1) i E Sj.
Fromequation(8) it thenfollowsthat
K
O(G)= ZNj P(x(j) = 1I X,= 1), (23)
j=1
in whichNj= Sj1.
Let 0 denotetheprobability
thatan individual
chosenuniformlyrandomly inthe
population(excluding hasT. An alternative
thesuspect) analysis
ofequation(8) gives
O(G)= Z P(xi= 1)+ cov(x, Xs)

i;ds i;dsP (Xs= 1)
N+LK cov(xi) , Xs)
=NO+ZA?N
j= P(xS= 1)
In manycases,forexamplewhenT is a genetictraitandthesubpopulations reflect
preferential
mating,itwillbe reasonableto assumethatthecovariance
cov(x(j),Xs)
wheni is thelabel of thesuspect'ssubpopulation.
is maximized In thiscase
O(G)?NO+Ncov(XiX xS) (24)

P(xS=1)
wherei is thelabel of an arbitrary in thesuspect'ssubpopulation.
individual
5.2. NecessaryTraitsand Contingent Traits

Sometimes T maybe suchthatthecriminal ismorelikely thanan innocent
individual
to have it. In such cases P(Xi = 1IC = i) > P(xi = 1), so thatassumption2 is invalid.
For example,thetraitmaybe associatedwithphysicalstrength and thecrimemay

havebeensuchthatphysicalstrength wouldhavefacilitated
itscommission.In the
extreme case,T maybe essentialto committhecrimeand hencethecriminal must
haveit,e.g. ifT is 'had accessto a weaponof thetypeusedto committhecrime'.
We shall use the termnecessaryto referto traitssuch thatP(Xj= 1 1C = i) = 1;
otherwise thetraitis contingent.
If assumption 2 is violatedin thiswaythentheargument leadingto equation(8)
is invalid.In somecasesequation(5) maystillbe simplified.An exampleinvolving
a necessary traitwillbe discussedin Section5.4.
5.3. Restricted Access

Supposethatthecrimewascommitted on an uninhabited atollneartheislandand
circumstances (perhapsa limitednumberof boats) are suchthatat mostN'<N
individualscouldhavebeenpresent on theatollat thetimeofthecrime.If itis not
knownwhichsubsetof theinhabitants visitedtheatollat thattimethenit is easy
to verifythattheposteriorprobabilityof guiltis againgivenbyequation(5), as in
thegeneralized islandproblem.The factthatonlya limited numberofpeoplewere
nearthesceneof thecrimeis irrelevant unlessthereis information aboutwhich
individualstheywere.If, however,it is verifiedthatthesuspectdid visittheatoll
at therelevanttimethenthisfactshouldincrease P(C = s) andhencetheprobability
of guilt.
5.4. PossibleAlibis
Now considerthesituation in whichindividuals maybe able to provethatthey
didnotvisitthesceneof thecrimeat thetimethatit was committed. We shalluse
thetermalibito denoteanyvalidproofof innocence otherthannon-possession of
T. Notethatthisdefinition differsslightlyfromcommonusage.In thissense,non-
possessionof an alibiis a necessarytrait:thecriminal cannothavea validproofof
innocence.We introduce additionalindicator randomvariables,fi, i= 0, 1, . . ., N,
where4j= 1 iftheithindividual doesnothavean alibi,otherwise fj= 0. Notethat
possessionof T and non-possession of an alibican be regardedas possessionof a
singlecompoundtraitand equation(5) gives
cX =c I IC#s,
V = Cs
O(G)=P(X S=s)P(C?sIS=s)
P(Xs=A=11C=S=s) P(C=sIS=s)
If assumption
1 and theuniform
priorremainvalidthen
O(G)= Z P(xi=X>=C=1IC=i, S=s)

i4s P(Xs= 1 1 C=S=S)
Undertheadditionalassumptions is independent
thatT-possession of(S, C), thealibi
statusof anyindividualotherthanthecriminalis independentof (S, C) and alibi
statusis conditionally
independentof T-possessiongiven(S, C), thisbecomes
?
O(G)=E P(6si = 1) P(xj= 1 xs
i-7s

Thepossibilityofalibisthusincreasestheposterior ofguilt,evenwithout
probability
determining whichindividualshavealibis,otherthanthesuspect.Wenote,however,
thattheconsequences ofpossiblealibisaredifficultto quantifyin practicebecause
of thedifficultyin evaluating
P(4' = 1). In our sensethevalidityof an alibiis not
an issue.We do notdirectly addresstheissueof thecourt'sbeliefin an apparent
alibi,as thisformspartof theotherevidence.
5.5. InformativeSearch Protocols

Thecourtshouldconsider thepossibilitythattheidentity ofthesuspectmaygive
informationaboutwhothecriminal mightbe underthealternative hypothesisGC.
Thebackground information whichledtotheidentification ofthesuspect maysuggest
that,iftheywereinnocent, theirrelatives, orneighbours
associates maybe morelikely
to be thecriminal thanwouldotherwise be thecase. In thiscase, forsomei?s,
P(C= iIS=s) ?P(C= i) andassumption 1 wouldbe invalid.As an example,suppose
thatthesuspectis apprehended on thebasisof a witness'sdescription. Individuals
whofitthedescription aremorelikelyto be relatedto thecriminal thanwouldbe
a randomly chosenmember of thepopulation.It followsthat,iftheoriginalprior
wereuniform, thenoncetheidentity ofthesuspectis knownthepriorprobabilities
associatedwithsomeof thesuspect'srelatives willbe increasedand thatof some
unrelatedindividualswillbe decreased.(Thisargument presupposes thatinformation
aboutthephysicalappearanceof otherindividuals is notavailableto thecourt.If
theeffect
itwereavailable, ofthewitness's couldbe incorporated
description directly.)
If assumption 1 is violatedin thiswaybutassumption 2 remainsvalidthen
O(G)= E P(Xj= 1 JX 1) P(C=iIS=s) (25)

i;4s ~ P(C=SIS=S) (5
It is difficult
to assessthemagnitude of theerrorwhichresultsfromignoring this
effect ingeneral, butitmayoftenbe important. In manycases,inappropriatelymaking
assumption 1 willbe non-conservative. SupposethatT is a genetictraitand that,
underGc,thecriminal is morelikelyto be oneofthesuspect'srelatives, orto belong
to thesuspect'ssubpopulation. In thiscase theeffectis to increasetheweights in
thesum(25) forthosei forwhichP(Xi= 1IXs=1) tendsto be largerand henceto
decreaseP(G IXc= xs= 1, S = s).
Information in the searchprotocolmay invalidateassumption2 as well as
assumption 1. Thiscouldoccurifthesearchprotocolwerebasedon characteristics
correlated withT. Intuitively, ifthesearchprotocoltendsto favourT-bearers then
thefactthatthesuspectandthecriminal thanitwould
sharethetraitis lesssurprising
otherwise be. For DNA profilesthe extremely largedifference betweenmatch
probabilities forcloselyrelatedand thoseforunrelated can makethis
individuals
effect substantial. In one actualcase,thecriminal was knownto haveredhairand
greeneyesand to havea particular genetictrait.The searchconcentrated on red-
haired, green-eyed individuals.
Redhairandgreeneyesarecorrelated withothergenetic
traits.Thismaybe due directly to linkageof theappropriate genes,or indirectly,
sinceredhairandgreeneyesaremorecommon insomesubpopulations. Theadditional
information thata particular pair(s, i) ofindividualsare and
suspect criminal, and
and
henceredhaired greeneyed,may thusincrease the that
probability both share
theothergenetictrait.

6. INCORPORATINGOTHER EVIDENCE
In thegeneralized islandproblemwe assumethatthepriorprobabilities of guilt
areuniform overtheislandpopulation.In practice, theotherevidencewillusually
besuchthatnon-uniform priorsareappropriate. Assumptions 1 and2 maystillobtain,
in whichcase theposterior odds againstG are givenbyequation(6). Further, the
population ofpossibleperpetrators may includea verylargenumber ofindividuals,
formanyofwhomthepriorprobability ofguiltisverysmall.Grouping ofindividuals
intocategories witha commonvalueof P(Xi= 1Ix,= 1) mayeffectively reducethe
sum(6) to a smallnumberof terms.
Thereis a seriousdangerthattheprobability ofT-possession maybe misinterpreted
as a posterior probability. Thisistheso-called'prosecutor's fallacy'(Thompson and
Schumann, 1987).In a casewhichrestson DNA evidence alone,forexample,a very
smallprobability ofT-possession maycorrespond to a posterior probabilityofguilt
thatis consistent withacquittaliftherewerea largenumber ofpossibleperpetrators
ofthecrime.Manyjurieswillbe unaware oftheneedtoincorporate priorinformation.
Eveniftheprosecution is carefulto avoidexplicitlymakingtheprosecutor's fallacy,
thejurymightmakeitinadvertently. A verysmallprobability of T-possession may
in itselfbe takenas proofof guilt.
Thereisevidence (e.g.Tversky andKahneman (1974))thatuntrained intuitiondoes
notgivedueweight tobackground information. A secondconcern is,then,thateven
if thejuryis awareof theneed to incorporate the otherevidenceit maydo so
incorrectly. Therehas beena debateabouttheroleof probabilistic reasoning and
Bayes'sruleintheinterpretation ofall forensic evidence (e.g. FinkelsteinandFairley
(1970),Tribe(1971)and Tillersand Green(1988)). We do notaddressthisdebate
here,butnotethatif probabilities are presented to a courtthentheissueof their
correct interpretation is unavoidable.
It is important thatthecourtis madeawareof thefactthattheDNA evidence
shouldbe interpreted in conjunction withpriorbeliefsbasedon theotherevidence.
Itmayassistifthejurywerepresented withillustrativeexamples, fora rangeofprior
beliefs.Simplemodelssuchas theoriginalislandproblemmayhelpto elucidatethe
importance of, forexample,thenumberof possibleperpetrators of thecrime.
Finally, weremark thatthemagnitude ofthesizebiasingeffect, discussed inSection
3.1,is relatedto thepriordistribution. Intuitively,theeffect occursbecause,under
thehypothesis of innocence, twodistinct T-bearers havebeenobserved.Such an
observation stochastically increasesthenumberof T-bearers, thusdecreasing the
strength of theevidenceagainstthesuspectand decreasing theprobability of guilt.
Decreasing thepriorprobability of guiltincreasesthechancethatthesuspectand
criminal are distinct,henceincreasing theeffectof size biasing.
7. APPLICATION TO DNA PROFILING

Theanalysisaboveextends to thecaseinwhichthexitakemorethantwovalues,
andto thecase in whichtheyarecontinuous butmeasured witherror.We omitthe
details.Thereareimplicationsofthisanalysisforallaspectsofforensic
identification.
Herewe further considerDNA profiles.
A DNA profileconsistsof lengthmeasurements of thetwoallelesat each of k
chromosome loci. The traitT is thesetof profiles
which,becauseof measurement

error,cannotbe distinguished fromthecriminal'sprofile(forfurther detailssee
Robertson et al. (1990)). One approachin current forensic practiceis to reportan
estimateof ir,theprobability thata personchosen'randomly'fromamongthe
suspect'sbroadracialgrouphas T. Thisprobability is estimated fromsampleallele
frequencies(Buffery etal., 1991)togetherwiththe'product rule':therelative frequency
oftheprofile is estimated fromtheproductoftheallelerelative frequencies. In some
casesa likelihood ratio,calculatedas 1/7r, is reported. An alternative analysiswhich
dispenses withtheconceptof 'match'andgivesa likelihood ratiowhichvarieswith
theclosenessof thetwoprofileshas also beenproposed(Berryet al., 1992).
The independence assumption justifying theuse of theproductrule,and other
aspectsof DNA profileanalysisforforensic identification, has beencriticized on
severalgrounds(see Lewontinand Hartl(1991),Lander(1991)and thediscussion
of Berryet al. (1992)). Concernswerealso expressed in thereportof theNational
ResearchCouncil(NRC) oftheUSA (1992).Forresponses to someofthecriticisms,
see Chakraborty and Kidd (1991) and Weir (1992). Even if the independence
assumptions werevalid,theproduct ruleestimator hasundesirable sampling properties:
althoughunbiased,withhighprobability it willunderestimate theparameter value
(Balding,1994).Someof thecontroversies in theuse of DNA profilescan nowbe
clarifiedin thelightof our analysisof thegeneralized islandproblem.
The NRC reportadvocatesthe'ceilingprinciple'as a conservative approachto
theproblemof populationsubdivision. It recommends that,insteadof estimating
therelativefrequency of a profileas theproductof theallelerelativefrequencies,
eachfactor inthisproduct shouldbe replaced bythemaximum ofthatallelefrequency
acrossa largenumberof ethnicgroups,and further thateach factorshouldbe at
leastlOWo(tobe decreased to5Wo whendatabasesofmoreethnic groupsareavailable).
Use of the ceilingprincipleeffectively ignoresany positivecorrelations in trait
possession. Whenpositive correlationsarepresent, andwearguebelowthattheyare
important forDNA profiles,thereis no guaranteethatthe ceilingprincipleis
conservative. (Further, in othercontexts in whichT-possession is independent, the
ceilingprinciple seemsundulyconservative.)
Therehas beensomeconfusion abouthowto quantify theevidenceof matching
DNA profiles whenthesuspectis identified froma searchthrough a database.The
NRC report, whichviewsthisissueintheframework ofmultiple hypothesis testing,
discussesassociatedproblems.The analysisof Section3.3 applieshereand shows
thatthehypothesis testing approachis inappropriate.
It hasbeenarguedintheDNA context (Weir,1993)thatthesubpopulation ofthe
suspectis irrelevant to inference. This argument is based on an independence
assumption thatdoesnotseemappropriate. Equation(6) obviates theneedfora general
discussion.Whatis requiredin each case is an assessment, foreachindividual, of
theprobability basedon theotherevidencethattheycommitted thecrimetogether
withtheirconditional probability of havingthesuspect'sDNA profile.Knowledge
ofthesuspect'ssubpopulation will,ingeneral, affectboththesefactors. Theanalysis
leadingtoinequality (24)givesa simplifiedcalculation whichislikely tobeconservative.
Further, theright-hand sideof inequality (24) onlyrequiresinformation aboutthe
populationfrequency of T and thecorrelation structure and marginalfrequency
of T in the suspect'ssubpopulation. Frequenciesof T-possessionin the other
subpopulations are notneeded.
Ouranalysis alsoraisessomenewconcerns inconnection withDNA profile evidence.

In Section6 wearguedthatjuriesmaygivesuchevidence undueweight. Particularly
incasesin whichthereis littleor no otherevidence, thismaylead to inappropriate
convictions. The prosecutor's fallacy,of ignoring a smallprior,seemsespecially
dangerous here.Further, in situationsin whicha uniform prioron a largenumber
ofindividuals is appropriate,changesofoneortwoordersofmagnitude inp could
meanthedifference betweenacquittaland conviction. We thusdisagreewiththe
widespreadview,implicit in,forexample, Chakraborty andKidd(1991)andBrookfield
(1992),thatconcerns abouttheweight to be givento DNA evidencemaybe ignored
becausetheireffect wouldbe to increasea verysmallvalueofp by at mosta few
ordersof magnitude.
The failureto allowforviolationsof assumptions 1 and 2 is likelyto lead to a
non-conservative errorforDNA evidence.In Section5.5 we gavean exampleof a
searchprotocolwhichmaytendto favourcloserelatives of thecriminal. In many
casesthesearchwillfavourmembers of thecriminal's subpopulation. Becauseof
thepositivecorrelationsdiscussedbelow,conditional onthecriminal having theprofile,
thiswillincreasethechancethatan individualfoundbythesearchwillalso have
theprofileand hencedecreasethesignificance of sucha match.
A further seriousconcern withmostexisting analysesis thatthecorrelation effects
discussedin Section4 are ignored.Thereare severalsourcesof correlation which
shouldbe considered intheDNA context. Theseincludetheeffects ofcloserelatives,
sharingofancestry on an evolutionarytimescale anduncertainty overtheprobability
of havingtheprofile.
In thecaseofa genetically inheritedtrait,humanpopulations areinhomogeneous.
Oneobviousfactoristhatcloserelatives aremuchmorelikelyto shareDNA profiles
thanunrelatedindividuals are. In the settingof thegeneralized islandproblem,
this means that for some collectionof labels the conditionalprobabilities,
P(Xi= 1 1y,= 1), will be much largerthan the unconditionalvalue P(Xj = 1). Much
current practiceexplicitly
excludescloserelativesofthesuspect.Thisleadsto a non-
conservative errorand theeffectcan be substantial (Donnelly,1992,1994).In a
particularcasetheremaybe information aboutthesuspect'scloserelatives.
Theeffect
ofthosewhocannotbe excluded on othergrounds canbe quantified
byusingequation
(8). Baldingand Nichols(1994),Table 2, illustrate
matchprobabilities forvarying
degrees fora hypothetical
of relatedness four-locusDNA profile.In theirexample,
theprobability thatthebrotherofan accusedmanmatches hisprofile
is about1/100.
Forotherprofiles, dependingon thelevelof populationsubdivision,itcouldbe as
highas 1/50.If thereis no evidenceotherthanthesuspect'sDNA profilethenhe
shouldhavethesamepriorprobability ofguiltas anyofhisnon-excluded brothers.
In thiscase, withn non-excluded brothers,an upperbound(whichignoresother
possibleperpetrators) on theposteriorprobabilityof guiltwouldbe (1 + n/50)-.
DNA evidence alonemaythusnotsuffice fora satisfactory
conviction.
Otherevidence
tending to incriminatethesuspector to exonerate hisbrothers maybe needed.
We advocatedealingexplicitlywiththetermsofthesum(8) forthoseindividuals
i whoarecloselyrelatedtothesuspect.Theassumption (22),andalso equation(24),
maythenapplyto theothermembers of thepopulation.In thiscase,
O(G) < Z P(Xi= 1I Xs= 1)+NO +N cov(Xi, l') (26)

iER P(x,= 1)

38 BALDING AND DONNELLY [Part1,
where R isthesetofcloserelatives ofthesuspect,0 istheprobability
thatan individual
(otherthanthesuspect)selected at randomfromthepopulation willhavetheprofile
and i is thelabelof an individual fromthesuspect'ssubpopulation. (Mostcurrent
analyses effectively
ignorethefirstandthirdterms ininequality
(26).Thesewillusually
be substantialcompared withNO.)Equation(26)canbe extended toincorporatenon-
uniform priorsand violationsof assumptions 1 and 2.
Considerthe finaltermin inequality(26). As in the discussionof sampling
uncertainties in Section4, theexpectations involvedare implicitlyconditionalon
availableinformation aboutallelefrequenciessuchas mightbe heldin a database.
We shallcontinue to suppressthisconditioning in thenotation.Letp' denotethe
(unknown) relativefrequencyofT inthesuspect'ssubpopulation. We assumethat,
fori in thesuspect'ssubpopulation,
E(XiIp') and E(XiIp', X5=1) do not depend on i. (27)

It followsthat
E(Xilp')=p' and cov(xi,xslp')= -pI(1-p')/(N'-1),
in whichN' is thesize of thesuspect'ssubpopulation.
Thus
COV(Xix,)=Efcov(Xi,XsIP')j + cov[E(XIP'p),E(Xs Ip' )

= -Ep'(1 -p')/(N'- 1)J+var(p')
< var(p').
Sincep' is small,theaboveinequality
willbe almostexact.Also,
P(Xs = l) =E(p'1).
Thus,
O(G)< Z P(Xi= 1 WXs=

1)+NO+N var(p').
iER E(p'1)
ThecalculationofO(G) thusrequires theevaluation
ofvar(p')/E(p'), thevariance-
to-meanratiooftherelativefrequency oftheprofileinthesuspect'ssubpopulation
(conditionalon populationdatabases).
In manycases thepopulationof possibleperpetrators is not the same as the
populationfromwhichthedatabaseis drawn.Forexample,theformer population
maybe a subsetofthelatter,whilestratification
maybe deemedunimportant. Now,
writingp' fortherelative
frequency of T inthepopulationofpossibleperpetrators
and assumingexpression (27),
O(G) < E P(Xi = 1 IXs= 1) + NE(p ') + N v )) (28)

iER E(p'1)
Thefinaltwotermsininequality
(28)arecloselyrelated
toequation(19)wherestronger,
exchangeability,
assumptionswere in force.

The variabilityin subpopulation frequenciesof the profileis due in partto
uncertaintyaboutpopulationfrequencies as a consequence of sampling effects and
concerns abouttheindependence assumption underlyingtheproductrule.However,
muchofthevariability is duetothesharing ofancestryon an evolutionary timescale,
whichmaybe important forhumanpopulations. Information aboutvar(p')/E(p')
maythusbe availablefrommodelsof humanevolutionat theloci in question.
However,thereare difficulties herebecauseneither humandemography through
historynorthemutation mechanisms attheselociareyetfully understood (Marjoram
andDonnelly,1994;Jeffreys et al., 1990).Undercertainsimplifying assumptions,
thisapproachis pursuedin Baldingand Nichols(1994).
Information about var(p')/E(p') may also be obtainedfromdata on allele
frequenciesindifferenthumangroups.Although moredataarebecoming available
onvariation attheselociacrossnationalandethnic groups, thismaynotbeardirectly
on the issue. In settingsin whichstratification is important, the appropriate
maybe finer
stratification thanthatonwhichdataarecurrently available.Similarly,
inthesetting whichleadsto inequality (26),dataat finerlevelsofstratificationmay
also be needed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
WethankProfessor A. P. Dawidforfirstmakingus awareoftheoriginalisland
problem. D. V. Lindley,Dr N. G. PolsonandDr R. A. Nicholsalso
He, Professor
providedhelpful
comments on an earlydraftofthispaper.Theworkwassupported
inpartbytheUK ScienceandEngineeringResearch GR/F98727,
Councilundergrants
GR/G 11101and B/AF/1255.
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Robertson, J., Ross,A. M. and Burgoyne, L. A. (eds) (1990)DNA in ForensicScience:Theory,
Techniques andApplications. NewYork:Horwood.
Sampson, A. R. andSmith,R. L. (1985)Aninformation theory modelfortheevaluation ofcircumstantial
evidence.IEEE Trans.Syst.Man Cyber.,15, 9-16.
Thompson, W. C. andSchumann, E. J.(1987)Interpretation
ofstatistical
evidenceincriminal trials.
Law Hum. Behav.,11, 167-187.
Tillers,P. and Green,E. (eds) (1988)Probability and Inference in theLaw of Evidence:theLimits
and Usesof Bayesianism. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Tribe,L. (1971)Trialbymathematics: precisionand ritualin thelegalprocess.HarvardLaw Rev.,
84, 1329-1393.
Tversky, A. andKahneman, D. (1974)Judgment underuncertainty: heuristics
andbiases.Science,185,
1124-1131.
Weir,B. S. (1992)Populationgenetics intheforensicDNA debate.Proc.Natn.Acad. Sci. USA,89,
11654-11659.
(1993)Forensicpopulation geneticsand theNationalResearchCouncil(NRC). Am. J. Hum.
Genet.,52, 437-440.
Yellin,J. (1979)Reviewof Evidence,Proofand Probability (byR. Eggleston).J. Econ. Lit., 583.
DISCUSSION OF THE PAPER BY BALDING AND DONNELLY

C. G. G. Aitken(University ofEdinburgh): It givesmegreatpleasureto proposethevoteofthanks
forthispaper.Theauthorsareto be congratulated on tackling,andproviding sucha clearresolution
to, theislandproblem, a problem whichhas beenof considerable interest
to a groupof statisticians
andlawyers fora longtime.However, therearetwowiderissuesconcerning theroleof statistics
and
evidence, whichare raisedbythispaperand requirefurther debate.
The firstconcerns theassessment of thevalueof evidence. The secondconcerns thedetermination
of theprobability of theguiltof a suspect.The twoproblems havenotalwaysbeenseparated. This
hasledtoconfusion suchas aroseintheCollinscase.Theislandproblem refers tothesecondsituation,
theprobability of guiltof a suspect;DNA profiling is partof thefirst.
Consider first
theassessment ofthevalueofevidence. Thiscanbe donebyusinga two-stage approach
(Evett,1991),similarto thatproposedbythesupporters of matchbinning in DNA profiling. In the
firststage,a statistic comparing thecrimeand suspectsamplesmaybe derived.If thevalueof this
statistic
is greater
thansomethreshold thenitis concluded thatthesamples comefromdifferent sources.
If thevalueof thestatistic is lessthanthethreshold a matchis declared.The secondstageestimates
theprobability of a coincidental match.The smallertheprobability, thegreater theevidentialvalue
of thematch.However,theinterpretation of theresultof sucha two-stage approachis difficult,as
is exemplified bythecurrent problems withtheinterpretation of DNA evidence.
Forthosewhofindthetwo-stage approachdifficult,someconsiderable lightisthrown ontheproblem
of theassessment of evidencebya paperbyLindley(1977)whichadvocatedtheuse of a likelihood
ratio.Thisis theratiooftheprobability Pr(EIG&I) ofevidence E giventhatthesuspectis guilty (G),

1995] DISCUSSIONOF THE PAPERBY BALDINGANDDONNELLY 41
and the probabilityPr(EI G&I) of E giventhatthe suspectis innocent(G), whereboth probabilities
are conditionalon backgroundinformation I. Withtheuse of likelihoodratios,theartificialdichotomy
introducedby thethresholdof thetwo-stageapproach is dissolvedand theinterpretation is clarified.
Thisratiois the factorwhichconverts,throughmultiplication, priorodds of guiltintoposteriorodds
ofguilt.Moreparticular problemsremainregarding thedetermination of thelikelihoodratioin particular
situations.Theseconcernstandardstatistical mattersrelatingto distributionalassumptions, forexample,
and also contextualmatters,such as populationsubstructure in DNA profiling,as mentionedby the
authors.
The second problemis the determination of the probabilityof guiltof the suspect,thataddressed
by theisland problem.Here the statisticianhas to treadverycarefully,if at all. The likelihoodratio
includesa dependenceon 'backgroundinformation I', withoutspecifying whatthismightbe. Much
ofthisbackground information is notquantifiable. If thestatistician
wereto attempt to do so bysuggesting
a probabilityof guilthe would have to be verycarefulindeed.A verygood discussionof thisproblem
in thecontextof interpreting theevidenceof a blood stainhas beengivenbyEvett(1983). He separated
out the scientist's(or statistician's)role fromthat of the investigator.The investigatoris concerned
withquestionsof thekind'whatis theprobabilitythattheblood at thescenecame fromthissuspect?'.
The scientist(or statistician)is concernedwithtwo questionsof a completelydifferent type: 'what is
theprobabilityof thisblood groupingresultifthesuspectleftthecrimestain?'and 'whatis theprobability
of thisblood groupingresultif the suspectdid not leave the crimestain?', the leavingor not of the
crimestainreplacingthe hypothesesof guiltand innocence.Scientistsand statisticiansshould not be
concernedwithprobabilitiesof guiltor innocence.
However,theprosecutor's fallacy(Thompsonand Schumann,1987),referred to bytheauthors,remains
a veryreal danger.The prosecutor'sfallacyis fallaciousbecause it makes an implicitassumptionthat
thepriorodds ofguiltare even.Thisis a figurethatis considerably removedfromtheconceptof 'innocent
untilprovenguilty',a conceptwhichmaygivea value of 1/(N- 1) to thepriorodds in favourof guilt,
whereN is the size of some relevantpopulation.However,thereare variousotherfactorswhichmust
be takeninto accountas mentionedby the authorsin Section6, whichmake a value of 1/(N- 1) too
simplisticforpracticaluse. For example,therecentpaperbyWalsh et al. (1994) discussesgeographical
issuesassociated withthe estimationof priorodds of guilt.
The likelihoodratio,by avoidingthe explicituse of a probabilisticargument,is a considerablehelp
towardssurmountingthese difficulties.There are two ways, apart froma simple statementof the
numericalvalue,in whichit could be used. The firstis throughtheuse of a verbalscale (Jeffreys, 1983;
Evett,1987), the second throughtheuse of a table whichconvertspriorodds, providedby the court,
intoposteriorodds (Evett,1983). This secondprocedurehas theriskattachedto it thatthecourtmay
not be verygood at quantifying its priorodds. For thisreason, I preferthe firstprocedure.
Briefly,withreference to DNA profiling,I have one query.The problemsrelatingto correlationand
populationsubstructure are of obviousinterest butis theinterest purelytheoretical?Are thedifferences
in thelikelihoodratiobetweenaccountingforcorrelation and populationsubstructureand notaccounting
forthemsignificantly different, in the contextof a trial?How oftenare possible familyrelationships
relevant?
I wishto congratulatethe Royal StatisticalSocietyforprovidinga forumin whichtheseimportant
issuescan be discussedand theauthors,once more,formakingsuchan importantcontribution. It gives
me greatpleasurein proposingthe vote of thanks.
Ian W. Evett (ForensicScience Service,Birmingham):The authorsare to be congratulatedforan

elegantsolutionto theislandproblem.We shouldbe clear,however,thatthisis a highlyidealizedand
abstractproblem-the conceptof a pool, of preciselyknownsize, of suspectswho have equal priors
is never,to myknowledge,realizedin practice.Althoughthisshouldnot discourageattemptsto solve
theproblem,itis necessaryto be aware of thedangerof drawingunrealisticinferences fromtheelegant
algebra,forgetting thatthe originalmodel is unrealistic.The authorshave falleninto thistrapwhen
theyclaim thattheirwork providesfreshperspectiveson DNA evidence.It does not.
The authorsdisplaya lack of balance whentheytalk about theindependenceassumptionunderlying
the widelyaccepted practiceof multiplying band frequencies.They cite threereferencesagainstthe
practice,includinga hiddenself-citation in the discussionto Berryet al. (1992), and two in response.
Theyfail to mentionthatthereis now an extensivebody of literatureon the subjectand, in contrast
withthetheoreticalnatureof theirpaper, manyinvestigations carriedout on real data whichsupport
the robustnessof the independenceassumption.Recent balanced reviewsof the issues are givenby

42 DISCUSSIONOF THE PAPERBY BALDINGANDDONNELLY [ Part 1,
Devlin(1993), Kaye (1993) and Roeder(1994). The authorsalso citeconcernsexpressedbytheNational
ResearchCouncil of the USA. It is worthquotingfromthe relevantsectionof the report:
'Although ofthecontroversy,
mindful haschosentoassumeforthesakeofdiscussion
thecommittee
may exist' (italics added).
thatpopulationsubstructure
The authorsclaim thattheiranalysisraises 'new concerns'in relationto DNA profilingand go on
to discussthe 'prosecutor'sfallacy',theprospectthatthetruecriminaland an innocentsuspectbelong
to thesame subpopulation,close relatives,coancestryand 'uncertainty overtheprobabilityof having
the same profile'-which I take to mean the considerationof samplingeffects.None of theseissues
are new.
The prosecutor'sfallacyis, of course,no morethanthefallacyof thetransposedconditional-a pitfall
whichlies in wait forall, lawyers,laymenand even statisticians in verymanyfields,not just thelaw.
It is not a 'new concern'. Explainingthe distinctionbetweenthe correctand incorrectprobability
statements at courtis excruciatingly difficult(and I speak fromexperience).But whethertheeffectof
thetransposedconditionalis 'serious' or 'extremely dangerous'withinthereal worldis morea matter
of psychologythan statistics.
The matterof whetheror not it is reasonableto considerthe suspectand perpetratoras belonging
to a subpopulationwill depend on the circumstances of the case. Correctionsare available foruse in
sucheventualities: Nicholsand Balding(1991); Roeder(1994); Weir(1994). Brookfield(1992) has shown
theoretically thatthe forensicimpactof subpopulationsis not important.Experimentson data have
shown(Evettand Gill, 1991) thatthe practicaleffectsof artificially highlevelsof substructuring are
negligible.It has also been shown,again fromexperiments on data, as describedin Evett(1992a), that
thepracticaleffectsof usinga completely unrepresentative reference data collectionare minimal.Again,
thisis not a new issue.
The issue of close relativesis not expresslyexcludedin currentcase-workas the readermay infer
fromtheauthors'assertion.The authorscould have referred to myown writingon thissubject-Evett
(1992b). There is also an excellenttreatmentby Brookfield(1994a).
The matterof coancestry effectsis also notnewand ithas beendemonstrated fromdata thatcoancestry
coefficients in humanpopulationsare verysmall: Morton (1992); Weir (1994); Roeder et al. (1994).
Finally,thematterof dealingwithsamplingeffectshas had so muchtreatment thatit is unnecessary
to givecitations.Sufficeit to say, thisis not a new concernand theislandproblemshedsno new light
on the issue.
The foregoingis not intendedto detractfromthe eleganceof the authors' treatment of the island
problem.Theyhave made an interesting contribution to thestudyof forensicinference forwhichthanks
arein order.It is disappointingthattheyconsidereditnecessaryto blemishtheirworkwithan unbalanced
view of DNA statistics.
The vote of thankswas passed by acclamation.
R. N. Curnow (Universityof Reading): Dr Balding and ProfessorDonnellyare to be thankedfor

presentingin a formalstructurethe correctapproach to assessingthe strength of the evidencebased
on a sharedattributeof a suspectand thecriminal.Many mistakesin thisassessmenthave been made
by lawyersand by scientists who shouldknowbetter.Unfortunately, theproblemtackledis, withvery
fewexceptions,too idealizedto be of verymuchdirectuse. The evidencefromsharedattributesneeds
to be amalgamatedwithand influenced byotherformsof evidenceincludingevidencethatwillinfluence
our beliefsabout theeffectivenumberof possiblesuspects,N. Thereare,I suggest,seriousconsequences
of overestimating thevalue of N throughtoo muchseparationof thesharedattributeinformation and
the otherevidence.
My second pointis related.The authorscorrectlyemphasizethe need forconservativeestimatesof
the probabilityof guilt,i.e. makingapproximationsor simplifications thatare always to the benefit
of theaccused. In some civilcourtcases, such as thoseinvolvingpaternity, thereclearlyare two sides
to thedispute.In thesecases theidea of a conservative
assessmentof odds is oftennotapplicable.Even
in criminalcases, and I am bound to be misunderstoodhere,thereare two sides. The acquittalof a
murdereror a rapisthas potentiallyseriousconsequencesin additionto the feelingsof those closely
involvedand the public's respectforjustice. The acquittalof an innocentaccused is clearlyof great
importance butso is theavoidanceof futurecrimesbya releasedcriminal.Justiceand thelaw are eternally
concernedwiththisbalance. I am worriedthattheauthors'emphasison sharedattributeevidenceand

largepopulationsof possiblesuspectsundiminished in sizebytheotherevidence maytiltthebalance
too farin favourof thecriminal accused.
Theproblems oftraining
lawyers andjuriesintheevaluation evidence
ofprobabilistic andarguments
remain.Myviewis thatin mostcasestheintegration of evidenceof variouskindsmustand should
member
be leftto theindividual of thejuryassistedwherepossiblebya quantitative of
assessment
theseparatepiecesfora rangeof assumptions abouttheunknown parameters of theuncertainty.
databasesearches,
In discussing I amsurprised thattheauthorsdo notintroducea furtherparameter
representing thatthecriminal
theprobability is amongthoseindividuals listedin thedatabase.
N. E. Morton(University ofSouthampton): Therearethreeapproaches topopulation structure:

the
classicalcombination of genefrequencies, kinship and likelihood ratiosbasedon Wright (1921)and
Neyman andPearson(1928),andtwoeclectic procedures withno theoretical foundation or empirical
support (Lewontin andHartl,1991;NationalResearch Council,1992)thathavegenerally beenrejected
(Devlinetal., 1993;Morton,1993;Weir,1993).BaldingandDonnellyfollowtheclassicalapproach,
although in itsBayesianform.
Theislandmodelwithparameters N andp and randomvariableZ givesequation(4) underthree
assumptions. Closuresignifies thattheculprit isincluded inN+ 1 withprobability 1.Equivalence means
thatno evidence distinguishestheN+ 1 possiblesuspects, fromwhomthesuspect wastherefore drawn
atrandom. Negligence signifiesthatthepoliceneglected toascertainwhichoftheotherpossiblesuspects
had T and therefore replacedthe exact matchprobability for culpritand innocentsuspect
Z(Z - 1)/(N+ 1)N byitsbinomialexpectation p2 to givelikelihoodratiop insteadof themoreexact
value(Z- 1)/N.Thisisnotrealistic whentheprosecution deniesequivalence andnegligence orthedefence
deniesclosure.Evenif negligence wereavoidedbyusingZ, closurewouldbe arguableand random
accusation onthebasisofa priorprobability as smallas 1/(N+ 1)wouldbe unacceptable. In anyevent,
themodelcannotapplyto trawling a databasethatmayor maynotcontaintheculprit. Forexample,
theculprit couldbelongto ethnicgroupk butthedatabasebe composedof groupk, or theculprit
maybe a firstoffender and thedatabasecomposedof previousconvictions. In eithercase theprior
probability is 0 andtheconditional probability ofaccusing an innocentsuspect is 1- (1 -p)y+1.Strong
support requires p<< 1/yand subsequent evidence(Morton,1993).
Similarcautionsapplyto 'uncertainty aboutp', whichassumesthatsuspectand culprit aredrawn
from thesamepopulation, interpretable witharguableplausibility as a village,regionorethnicgroup
andU2= 0(l -0)F (Wright, 1951),whereF is kinship. Thereis muchevidence on valuesofF indifferent
populations (Morton, 1992;Morton etal., 1993).Uncertainty isgreatly
reduced bydistinguishing between
thehypotheses ofinclusion, coincidence,kinship andidentity andbyusingmeanmatching probabilities
insteadof genotype-specific probabilities(Collinsand Morton,1994).Equation(20) is a specialcase
oftheDirichlet distribution,whichappliesto an arrayof independent populations of thesamesize,
subjecttothesamelinearsystematic pressures,andobserved after
thesamelargenumber ofgenerations
(Wright, 1931).Thisis nota good description of a realarray.
Completeagreement cannotbe expectedas longas DNA evidenceis noveland evolving rapidly.
However, thispaperreflects and contributes to theconsensus thatlikelihood ratiosand theclassical
approachto kinshipare mostappropriate forDNA in court.
D. V. Lindley(Minehead): TheuseofBayes'sruleinlegalsituations caninvolvedelicatearguments.

Thispapergivesus a wayofproceeding thatbothclarifies thesituation andproducesimportant new
work.I shouldliketo settheargument familiar
in a generalsetting to statisticians, withan
beginning
anecdote.
In thelate 1970s,whenYellinand I produceddifferent solutionsto theislanderproblem, I spent
a longtimetrying tofinda flawinoneofthemethods, butwithout success.Onlylaterdidtherealization
comethathe and I wereassuming slightlydifferentformsof evidence.WhereYellinwas supposing
thattheevidence 'S hasT' camethrough a randomsearch,mysolution wasbasedonchanceknowledge
that'S has T'-for example,becauseS had beenin a roadaccident.Thisexperience taughtmethat
it was necessary notonlyto considerwhatyouknow,butalso howyoucometo knowit.
A generaltreatment proceedsas follows.Therearetwopiecesof matching evidence,x andy. For
example, x is 'C has T' andy is 'S has T', neither
of whichis informative, on itsown,aboutguilt.
In additiontheremightbe evidence z abouthow(x, y) was obtained.In theislandercase,z might
distinguishbetween thesearchandtheroadaccident; butitmight also includeevidenceofhowitwas
knownthat'C has T'. In thelikelihood ratio,oneneedsto consider p(x,y, zIG) (andalso givenGc).

44 DISCUSSIONOF THE PAPERBY BALDINGANDDONNELLY [Part 1,
Thisisp(ylx,z, G)p(x,zIG). If thesecondtermis thesamewithGcforG, so that(x,z) on theirown
giveno information aboutguilt,we areleftwithp(yix,z, G). It is theratioof thistop(yix,z, Gc)
thatneedsconsideration.In statistical
terminology,z is an ancillary On itsownit provides
statistic.
no information abouttheparameter, hereguilt.In conjunction withtheevidence(x, y) it is vitally
important.Backin the1970s,z had beenforgotten.
Atfirstglance,tonight's
results withthelikelihood
appearto conflict as Dawid(1994)has
principle,
pointedout,in particular,
withtheirrelevance ofthesamplespaceto an inference. Thisis notso. In
thecasestreatedinthepaper,thelikelihoodofall thedata(including z) doesdependonz, eventhough
themarginal withz alonedoesnot.Although itteachesus muchmore,thepaperdoesemphasize the
dangersin discardingapparently irrelevant
data.
JohnF. Y. Brookfield (University of Nottingham): The modelbasesitsassessment of theprior
probability of guiltof a suspecton a numberN+ 1 of possibleperpetrators, and a principle of
exchangeability amongthem,suchthattheprobability thatthesuspect is thecriminal is 1/(N+ 1). This
numbercouldnotbe knownwiththecertainty impliedin thepaper.
To illustrate,considera case in whicha suspecthas DNA evidenceagainsthimyielding a match
probability of1 in1 million, andwhothedefence haveimplied isjustoneof500000possible perpetrators
withequal priorprobabilities. The jurywillrealizethatthisindividual's matchwithDNA fromthe
sceneof thecrimehas beendiscovered in a reasonably smallscreenof suspects thatwouldnothave
beenundertaken ifeachwasthought tohavea 1 in500000priorprobability ofguilt.Clearly, theforensic
scientistshave,on thebasisof otherevidence, notall ofwhichmaybe admissible, assessedtheprior
probability of guiltas considerably higher thanthis.Indeed,supposewe knowthattheyfeltthatthe
individuals thattheyscreened eachhad a 5% chanceofguilt.Suppose,also,thata matchwas found
withthefifth personexamined.
Now,itwouldbe foolish toconclude thattheforensic beliefabouttheprioroddsis certainly
scientists'
wrong, andthatour1 in500000figure is certainlyright.Letus,veryarrogantly, assume,forexample,
thattheyhavea 1N7 chanceofbeingright, andwehavea 9907 chanceofbeingright.If we knewfor
certain thatthe1 in500000figure wasright, thentheonlysignificance ofthematchhavingbeenfound
withonlythefifth suspectscreened is thatfourindividuals havebeenshownnottomatch.If,however,
it is notcertainthatourprioroddsarecorrect, thentheimportant aspectof thefinding of a match
withthefifth personscreened is thatthisobservation is about18000timesmorelikelyiftheforensic
scientists'interpretation oftheprioroddsis correct thanifourinterpretation is. Thismeansthatthe
posterior probability oftheirinterpretation beingcorrect andtheprobability
is 99.4%7o, thatthesuspect
is guiltyis 99.807o.Thiscontrasts withthetwo-thirds probability ofguiltwhicharisesifwe knowthat
ourprioroddsare correct.
R. A. Nichols(QueenMaryand Westfield College,London):
How largeare therelevant geneticcorrelations?
I welcomethisworkas providing a coherent framework fordealingwitha widerangeofissuesthat
havecausedconcern inforensic identification. In particular itwillhelpthepresentation andevaluation
of DNA evidence.Issuesincluding thesearchlength, thecriminal and suspect'spopulation of origin
andrestricted accessto thesceneofthecrimehaveeacharisenin recent caseswhereI advised.Atthe
heartof thepaperis equation(6). Thisapproach,in whichtheconditioning is on thesuspecthaving
thetraitin question(X,= 1) is especially helpful in clarifying thenatureof thedisagreement between
authorities whohaveargued thatthemagnitude ofhuman genetic differentiation
isinsignificantinforensic
work,and thosewhodiffer.
The valueof var(p')/E(p') in equation(28) thatquantifies coancestry is sometimes calledFSTby
population geneticists.Surveys ofhumangenetic variation atlargenumbers oflocihaveproduced many
estimates ofFSTthatareoftenlessthan10o (Morton,1993;NicholsandBalding,1991).Baldingand
Donnellyshowherethateventhesesmallcorrelations canbe veryimportant withsmallpriors.Small
priorprobabilities willbecomeincreasingly relevant as theuse of DNA databasesis extended.
It shouldbe recognized, however, thattheseclassicalpopulation genetics studieswereaddressing a
different questionfromthatspecified inequation(6), namely theprobability ofdrawing twomatching
allelesfroma population.Equation(6) is a sumoverthealternative possibleperpetrators. For each
alternative perpetrator thefrequency of matchesbetween theirlociand thesuspect'sdependson the
entire family history ofthepair.Thedegree ofcoancestry musttherefore be represented bya distribution
overpossibleperpetrators, and overtheirpossiblefamily histories.

19951 DISCUSSIONOF THE PAPERBY BALDINGANDDONNELLY 45
Correctionsforcoancestry at severallociinvolvehighpowersofthecoefficient FST;henceBalding
andNichols(1994)havepointed outthattheuppertailofthedistributionhasa disproportionateeffect.
Whatcircumstances are associatedwithvaluesin theuppertailof thedistribution? Firstly,evenin
a largecity,there
canbe alternativeperpetratorswithancestorsfromthesamegenetically distinct
region
as thesuspect.Becauseitis a distinct
history thatproducedthegeneticdifferentiation,
locithroughout
thegenomeareaffected. Secondly, at theextremesofthedistributionareclosebloodrelatives.As the
authorspointout here,it is notenoughto makecorrections onlywhentheyare
forcloserelatives
implicated by otherevidence.The impactof coancestry is hencemuchlargerthanrepresented by
traditional of FSTwhichreflect
estimates theexpectationof thedistribution.
DonaldA. Preece(University of Kent,Canterbury): publicdebateon manya socially
Intelligent
important issueis nowadays well-nighimpossiblebecauseof officialdom's use oftheword'evidence'
undefined, as in 'Thereis no evidencethatwatching activityX on videomakespeople(somepeople)
morelikely todoXthemselves'. Statementssuchas thismaymerely mean'Nobodyhaswritten a pompous
aboutit'orperhaps,
report alas,'Nobodyhasobtained significant
a statistically result
from relevantdata'.
Thisis one reasonforbeinguneasythatthispaperusestheword'evidence'without meticulous
definition.Another reasonis thatwecannotdeducehowtheauthorsmightaddresstheconcepts and
use of 'contradictory evidence'and 'false evidence',whether the falsityarisesfromdishonesty,
incompetent workorinnocent
scientific misunderstanding. Also,as theword'reliable'hasat leasttwo
fundamentally differentmeanings, theconceptof 'reliableevidence'needsto be unravelled.
Howhandyitwouldbe if'evidence'weremerely 'thatwhichis evident',butthisis nothowweuse
thewords. Also, whenwe say 'It is evidentthat . . .' we are likelyto be reportinga deduction,not
rawevidence.A further of 'evident(ly)'
arisesfromcommonacceptance
difficulty and 'seeming(ly)'
as synonyms.
In including 'backgroundinformation' as partof 'evidence',theauthorsinitially
omitto consider
theconceptof 'relevance'.Theymention it laterbutdo notindicatehowrelevance is to be assessed
in general,so theircomment (Section6) about'due weight'forbackground information is opaque.
Do theauthorshavea viewon whataccountshouldbe takenof theoutcomeof an identification
parade?Does theiranalysissuggest rulesforsuchparades,orindeedsuggest whether an identification
paradecan everbe a justprocedure?
Iflawyers haveprecisedefinitionsfortheconcepts thatI havementioned,
theauthors couldusefully
givethesedefinitionsintheirresponse.Butlawyers' arenotnecessarily
definitions theonlyoneswhich
thispaperand itsauthorsshouldconsider.
J.L. Hutton(University Itisgoodtoseea rigorous
ofLiverpool): discussion ofprobability
calculations
in legalevidence.Clearlytheadministration ofjusticedependson theabilityof witnesses, expertor
not,to explainthemselves to a judgeorjury,helpedor hindered bybarristers. The HomeOfficehas
published guidelinesforEnglandandWaleson interviews ofchildwitnesses forcriminalproceedings,
andmakingvideorecordings oftheseinterviews (HomeOffice,1992).However,a studydescribed at
a conference showedthatthereis substantialvariationin thecompleteness andaccuracy ofchildren's
accountsassociatedwiththestyleofinterviewers. A systematic approachto interviewing children has
beendevelopedbyclinicalpsychologists at theUniversity of Liverpool, and thevalueof themethod
described bytheHomeOfficeguidelines, andalternative approaches areas muchin needof studyas
forensic evidence.
Further, a consequence ofan adversarialsystem ofcourtexamination is divergenceoftheviewsof
expert witnesses.Theexperience ofappearing incourtis knownto be difficult formanychildren (Flin,
1990)and it is possiblethatan inquisitorial
system of examination is easierforwitnesses and better
at obtaining evidence.I am conducting a pilotstudyof theefficacy of themethodsof interviewing
childwitnesses, and adversarial
and of theinquisitorial methodsof courtroom examination.I hope
thata fullstudywillin duecoursebe ableto examinerigorously theseaspectsofthelegalprocedure.
Oneapplication ofBayes'stheoremisworth as beingtrivial
noting, yetimportant inpresenting
evidence
to a court:ifan individualhasa priorbeliefthatan eventis strictly
impossible, thenevidence willnot
affecttheirposterior beliefs.
GrahamCooke (Chambers of MichaelHill, QC, London):I am a barristerwhowas involvedin
actuarialwork,so I havesomeunderstanding of thebasisof thispaper.
MayI takeyouto therealworldin court,albeitwithartificial We findjurors
rulesof evidence?
whomaynotbe abletoreadtheoath,judgesandbarristers whothink andtherefore
thattheyarebright

46 DISCUSSION OF THE PAPER BY BALDINGAND DONNELLY [Part 1,
can understand youbutprobablydo notand forensic whoon paperand in courtproduce
scientists
theprosecutor's despiteDr Evett'spaper!
fallacy-still,
ProfessorDonnellyhastalkedaboutsomeoftheproblems in Deenin theCourtofAppeal.I have
an appealin whicha defendant and hisnaturalfather
werecodefendants. The forensic
scientist
was
noteventoldof thefather's allegedinvolvement,letalonethepotentialrelevance
to theson'sDNA
match.Thatis therealworldinwhichcasesareprepared andconducted. Butremember thattherules
of evidenceare artificial.
The principlesof thispaperapplyto all sortsof case, notjust to DNA cases. Let us thinkof a burglary
wherethepolicearetoldtheburglar's
heightand colourand thathe is left-handed.
The reality
may
be thattheylook throughtheirlistof local burglarsand selectthe firstwho matchesthe information.
The juryare notgenerallyallowedto knowthatthedefendantis a burglar.Whatis theprobativevalue
of thematching Thisepitomizes
evidence? of therulesof evidence.Everybody's
theeffect thinking
mustbe adjusted . . . it mustbe done.
We havehad a suggestion thattheadversarialsystem be changed.Let us changethelaw as well!
We can go to Parliament and changeit but,untilit is changed,we haveto livewithit.
We needyourhelpas probability experts,
notas statisticians(a rudeword,I am afraid,in court).
As expertsinprobability andlogic,youcanmakea vitalcontribution, butyouarenotexperts insaying
whether thedefendant is guilty.You cannotknowall theevidence; thatis thejury'sfunction.
Your
expertiseis in explaininghowtheprobative valueof certainpiecesof evidencecan be relatedto the
centralissuesin thecase.
E. F. Harding(University
ofManchester ofScienceandTechnology):
Institute I wouldliketo follow
whatMr Cookehas said,to takeone of hispointsto an extreme (buta realisticone),addinga piece
to onecornerof thejigsaw.Thiscorneris calledarbitrary
arrest, whichoccurswhen,in caseswhich
showsuchcharacteristics,thepolicealways arrestJoeBloggs.
Undertheassumptions ofrandomcriminality andrandom possession as statedinthepaper,
oftraits,
theresulting
probabilitythatthearrested is stillthesameas theauthors
personis thecriminal calculate.
Itsinterpretation different.
is, however, It is nowtheprobabilitythatitis JoeBloggswhodiditthis
time,ratherthantheprobability thatthearresting processwilldetermine thecriminal.
A. P. Dawid(University CollegeLondon)andJ.Mortera (Universit'adiRomaIII, Rome):Wewelcome
thisgenerallycareful analysisofthe'islandproblem'anditsgeneralizations. As theauthorsandDawid
(1994)note,theseemingly simpleproblemof probabilistic inference forforensic identification
holds
manytrapsfortheunwary. Unfortunatelythepresent authorshavenotentirely escapedsuchpitfalls
in theirSection3.2.
In analysingthe sequentialcase, we musttake fullaccount of the factthatthe set X= (io, . . ., iy)
of individualseventually observedarisesfroma processdepending, eitherdeterministically or
on thevaluesof x= (Xo,X1,. . *,XN). It is thustherealization
stochastically, of a randomset,A say,
dependent on X. Theevent'A= X' is partof thedata and mustbe conditioned on. At firstglanceit
seemsthatthisis donein equation(11), in theformof conditioning on B. ButB is notthesameas
'A= X',sincethelatterspecifies, in additionto B, thevalueofy, itselfa randomoutcomedepending
on x. Thusequation(11) is incorrect.
Nowconsider theassumptions inSection3.2. Ifassumption 4 is toholdforanyrealizable y,itrequires
thatXbe independent of (X, C), and hencethatXbe independent of X. However,thiswillnotbe so
inthesequential searchscenario described,
so thatwecannotimposesuchan assumption. Assumption 3
is equallyuntenable whentherandomnatureofy is takenintoaccount:if,forexample, wefindy= N,
it becomescertainthatC= N.
Remarkably, theerrors inequation(11) andintheassumptions madecancelout,andequation(12)
is indeedcorrect undermorerealistic andweakerassumptions (as in DawidandDickey(1977))made
on theoperation of thesearchprocedure. Full details,withgeneralizations, aregivenin Dawidand
Mortera (1994),whichalsoanalyses casesinwhicha correction
certain tothe'facevalue'formula (12)
is required.
The followingcontributions
werereceivedin writingafterthe meeting.
SeymourGeisser(UniversityofMinnesota,Minneapolis):I shallrestrict
mycomments to DNA profiling
in the USA. The suspectand crimescene profileswill consistof probes on 2-5 loci and an arbitrary

matchcriterionemployed.Two fragmentlengthswithin507 of one anotherare considereda match
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Studieshave indicatedthatthe standarddeviationof repetitivemeasurementson the same sample
is 0.575%o(Devlin et al., 1992) of the fragment lengthso thatthestandarddeviationof the difference
is largerbyVJ2.The 5% toleranceyieldsa difference of at least six standarddeviations-an enormous
window.Ratherthan a match-non-match criterion,it would be farmore sensibleto assign a graded
likelihoodor probabilityof a match(Berry,1991). Hence each of theprobabilitiesfora locus would
be in (0, 1). Since all forensiclaboratoriesassume linkageequilibrium(mutualindependenceamong
loci), the overallmatchprobability(a productof values all less than 1) will declinewiththe number
of loci used. This runs counterto the view thatthe more loci employedthe better.
Once a matchhas been declared,the relativefrequencyof thatprofileis estimatedfromdatabases
sampledfrom'self-defined'populations.None of theseare randomsamplesof unrelatedindividuals
fromwell-specified populations.In mostcases, potentiallybiased samplesof inadequatesize are used.
The methodused forestimating therelativefrequencyof a pair of fragment lengthsis based on the
mucharguedassumptionof mutualindependence of valueswithinand betweenloci. However,simulation
resultsreadilyattestto theauthors'remarkregardingthehighprobabilitythatthiswillunderestimate
thetrueprofileunderindependence.This probabilityincreaseswiththenumberof loci used and with
decreasingestimatesfor each locus. Moreover Geisser and Johnson (1992, 1993) indicated that
independenceis invalid for manyof the loci for the various databases that are used.
The National Research Council reportproposed a ceilingprinciplethat was devised to ensure
conservativeestimates.Subsequentlyit was demonstratedthat this was not the case (Cohen, 1992;
Slimowitzand Cohen, 1993) but could lead to underestimates for particulargenotypes.
The use of independencewillyielda profilerelativefrequencywhichmonotonicallydecreasesas the
numberof loci increases-whichappeals to forensiclaboratoriesand prosecutors.This is in contrast
withthepreviously mentioneddeclinein probability of theprofilematchas thenumberof loci increases.
Littlehas beendone to calculatethefrequency of falsepositivesor negatives,althoughone laboratory
decidedthattheirmatchcriterionwas so good thattheywould scour a blood bank database to purge
allegedrepeatdonors,whethertheywere or not. This database cleansingwas uncoveredby a public
defender(Sullivan, 1992).
JonathanJ. Koehler(University of Texas, Austin):The weightthatshouldbe givento probabilistic

forensicidentification evidenceis a problemworthyof the seriousattentionprovidedby Baldingand
Donnelly. They correctlynote that the frequencyof matchingtraitsmay be misinterpreted and
overweighted byjurorsevenwhentheprosecutioncarefully avoids committing the'prosecutor'sfallacy'
(Thompsonand Schumann,1987).Althoughsomepeoplemayequatetraitfrequency withtheprobability
of innocenceof thesuspect,it shouldnotbe difficult to convincethemthatthisis an errorby pointing
out thatit would effectively excludeall otherevidence(e.g. eye-witness reports,alibis, motive,etc.)
fromconsideration.
It may be far more difficult,however,to convincepeople not to equate traitfrequencywiththe
probability thata matchingsuspectis notthesourceof recoveredgenetictracematerial.Justas estimates
of priorprobabilityof guiltshouldinfluencejudgmentsabout a suspect'sguiltor innocence,estimates
ofpriorprobability of sourceshouldinfluencesuspectsourceprobability judgments(Koehler,1993a,b).
Thispointis loston manyforensicscientists-including thehead of theFederalBureauof Investigation's
LaboratoryDivision-who insistthattraitfrequenciesidentifythe probabilitythatthe suspectis not
the source of a recoveredtrace (see for example Hicks (1993)).
Baldingand Donnellypointoutthat,ifprobabilities are presented in thecourtroom, thenissuesrelated
totheirinterpretation mustbe addressed.Certainly thisis true.Perhapsthebestwayforcourtsto address
theinterpretative issuesis to includetestimonyfromcourt-appointed or logiciansat trial.
statisticians
Althoughmanyforensicscientists are qualifiedto conductDNA analysesand to providetraitfrequency
I suggestthatmost are not particularlywell qualifiedto interpret
statistics, the significanceof those
in open court.Such interpretation
statistics requiresan inferential expertisethat,I believe,theaverage
forensicscientistlacks. Althoughit is an empiricalquestion,I suggestthatstatisticiansare less likely
to fallpreyto elementary probabilisticerrorsand morelikelyto providecourtswithaccuratestatements
about the inferencesthat can and cannot be made fromforensicidentification evidence.
BernardRobertson(Massey University, PalmerstonNorth)and G. A. Vignaux(VictoriaUniversity

ofWellington):The authors'claimsthatthesuspect'ssubpopulationis generallyrelevantand thattheir

48 DISCUSSION OF THE PAPER BY BALDING AND DONNELLY [Part 1,
is generally
analysis usefularenotsupported inthepaper.We definethefollowing. El = el -analysis
of the scene samplerevealscharacteristics e 1; E2 = e2-analysis of the suspectsamplereveals
e2; Fl =f 1-the frequency
characteristics of thecharacteristics
observed in thescenesampleamong
the populationdefinedby whatis knownof the criminalis f 1; F2 =f2-the frequency of the
characteristics
observed in thesuspectsampleamongthepopulation defined bywhatis knownofthe
suspectisf2; I is all ourotherknowledge.
Conditioning onthesuspect's thestrength
profile, oftheevidenceis measured bythelikelihood ratio
P(El =el 1E2=e2, Fl =fl, F2=f2, C?s, I)
P(El =el 1E2=e2, Fl =fl, F2=f2, C=s, I)
betweenel and e2 and what

P(E1 =el 1E2=e2, Fl =f l, F2=f2, C=s, I) dependson thedifference
is known(includedinI) abouthowobservationsvarysupposinga common P(E 1= e 1 IE2 = e2,
origin.
F1 =f1, F2 =f2, C?s, I) dependsonfi andtheprecise
meaning ofC?s determined byotherevidence
availableaboutthecriminal. onlydependson f2 or e2 wherefi is derivedfrom
Thisprobability
E2 = e2-as withsiblings.
Conclusions
(a) Assessment oftheprobability thatA hasDNA profileYis notaffected byknowing thefrequency
of Y in B's subpopulation, exceptin thespecialcase above.
(b) Theauthors'analysiscannotgeneralize to measurements thatarecapableofalteration (e.g.hair
length)norto continuous measurements unlessan arbitrary is set.Matchor
'match'criterion
'Y-status'is an unnecessaryconceptas propositions El = el andE2 = e2 alwayssuffice. They
accommodate caseswheree 1 and e2 areidentical(e.g. bloodgroups),caseswithmeasurement
variations(e.g. DNA single-locusprobes)and casesof deliberate changeof appearance.
(c) An 'unknown probability'
p implies Anindividual
a 'trueprobability'. either
hasthecharacteristic
ordoesnot.Theassessedprobability dependsontheinformation considered(includingI). Given
thatinformation, there
is no uncertaintyaboutfiandf2.Theinformation istheresultofsurveys
andoftestsontissueorfluidsamples.Theestimator To saythatifwesurveyed
p is unnecessary.
theentirepopulation wemight finda differentfrequency to saythatifweknewmore
is simply
thanwe do we mightcometo a different conclusion.
AidanSudbury (MonashUniversity,Clayton):TwodaysbeforeI received thispaperI hadjustgiven
thefollowing inAdelaide:theevidential
advicetoa barrister valueofa DNA fingerprint withanestimated
frequencyof 1/850000when17 suspects hadbeenprofiled is thesameas thatof a DNA fingerprint
withestimated
frequency1/50000 whenonlyonesuspect hasbeenprofiled. I wastherefore
ratheralarmed
toreadinSection3.3thatthefactthata grouphadbeenprofiled wasirrelevant.I hadalwaysassumed,
inthepast,that,ifwefollowedtheorderoftheFrenchpolicechiefinthefilm'Casablanca'to 'Round
up theusual suspects',we wouldalmostcertainly be successfulin findinga matchforthecrime
characteristic
as longas we roundedup enoughpeople.
Assumethatwearestillinthesituation inwhichthecrimecharacteristic hasprobabilityp. We have
a groupsizey of suspectsand exactlyone of themhas beenfoundto havethecharacteristic. Let
E= exactlyone of thesuspectsmatchedthecrimecharacteristic,
G= one of thegroupis guilty.
Then,
O(G) =P(GC) P(EI GC) I1 -P(G) Jyp(1_p)yi

P(G) P(E G) p (G)(1 _p)Y-
1 - P(G)
P(G)
Thus,itis correct
thattheevidential y,butitis crucialtorealize
valueofa matchis reducedbya factor
thatthecorrectprioris fortheguiltof thegroupnot theguiltof theindividual.If we make thefurther
in thepopulation
thateachindividual
assumption beforetheevidenceis
is equallylikelyto be guilty

known, so thatP(G) =y/N,thenwearrive attheformula O(G) = (N-y)p thatappears justafter
equation
(13). So, I am pleasedto see thatI appearnotto be in disagreement withDavid Baldingand Peter
Donnellyon thismatter.
Method1 maybe thecorrect approachin thecase of a randomsearchforsomeonewiththecrime
characteristic.However,itis probably easiestto explainthematter to a jurybypointing outthat,if
thereare n peoplein thepopulationwiththecharacteristic (one of whomis thecriminal), thenthe
probability is l/n thatthefirstpersonfoundwiththecharacteristic is thecriminal.
I shouldliketocongratulate DavidBaldingandPeterDonnelly on providinga freshapproachwhich
has allowednon-standard versionsof thesetypesof problemto be analysed.
William C. Thompson (UniversityofCalifornia,
Irvine): Whenforensic evidenceshowsthata defendant
anda criminal perpetratorsharea commontrait,juriesoftenaretoldthatthefrequency of thetrait
in a reference populationreflects'theprobability thatan innocent personwouldmatch'(Thompson,
1989;Koehler,1993).Theanalysis presented byBaldingandDonnelly showsthatthischaracterization
maybe quitemisleading.
As BaldingandDonnelly discuss,theremaybe a positive correlationbetween thetraits ofthesuspect
and perpetrator. Theiranalysisshouldhelpto clarify themisdirected debateaboutwhether it is the
frequency of DNA profiles in thegeneralpopulation or in thesuspect'ssubgroup thatis relevant for
forensicinference (WeirandEvett,1992;Lewontin, 1993;Weir,1993).Therealquestionis whether,
ina givencase,thereis reasonto believethatthesuspect'sandperpetrator's traitsarecorrelated. The
assumption thatDNA profiles areuncorrelated is 'clearlywronginsomecasesandmaybe questionable
in most'(Thompson,1993).Hence,thefrequency of suchtraitsin thegeneralpopulation willoften
understate theprobability thatan innocent suspectwouldmatch.
A moreimportant concernisthepossibilityoferror indetermining therelevant In a proficiency
traits.
testinvolving approximately 100samples, oneforensic DNA laboratory hadtwosamplehandling errors
thatresulted in falsematches(Thompsonand Ford, 1991;Koehler,1993).For DNA evidence, the
probability of a falsematchthrough cross-contamination of samplesmaydwarftheprobability of a
coincidental matchas a factordetermining P(Xc = X,= C?s, S = s) in Baldingand Donnelly's
equation(5). Examiner biasin scoringof DNA patterns couldalso greatlyincreasethelikelihood of
a falsematch.In casesinvolving multiplecontributors to a sample,or aged and degradedsamples,
thescoring ofoneortwoambiguous bandsmaydetermine whether a particular
individual isincriminated
(Thompson andFord,1993).Despitecallsforblindand objectivescoring procedures (Lander,1989;
NationalResearchCouncil,1992),forensic laboratories persistin allowinganalysts whoarefamiliar
withtheidentity of thesamplesand thepolicetheoryof thecase to makesuchcalls subjectively
(Thompson,1993).
In thislight,itappearsdangerous andwrongto equatethefrequency ofa genetic traitina reference
population withtheprobability thatan innocent defendant wouldbe incriminated. Forensicscientists
mustrethink thewaythattheycharacterize theirfindings whentestifying in court.
B. S. Weir(NorthCarolinaStateUniversity, Raleigh):Theauthors havegivena valuablediscussion
oftheislandproblem inforensic calculationsbuthavebeenlessbalancedintheirtreatment oftheuse
ofDNA profiles. TheirobjectioninSection7 tomyassertion thatthesubpopulation towhicha suspect
belongsis irrelevant(Weir,1993)was takenoutof context and is inconsistentwiththeirownearlier
statements. As theauthorsstate,in Sections4 and 6, therelevantpopulationis thatof possible
perpetrators.The suspectmustbelongto thispopulation otherwise he or shewouldbe excluded.The
populationofpossible perpetratorsmaybedefined inseveral
ways,depending onthecrime,butisunlikely
to be definedbytheparticular ethnicityof thesuspect.Myassertion was madein responseto those
whowouldbase calculations on populations definedbya suspect'sethnicity.
Theauthors arecurrentlyleadingefforts(BaldingandDonnelly, 1994)tomodify conditional
profile
frequenciesto accommodate thecorrelation between frequenciesoftwopeoplewhoareeitherclosely
relatedor whosharea moredistantancestry on an evolutionarytimescale. In thatpaper,as in this,
theydo notreferto theoretical and empirical demonstrations(Brookfield, 1992;Morton,1992)that
suggest thatthelatterdegreeof relatedness is unlikely
to be of significance,or thateventheformer
degree canstillleadtoverysmallconditional andhenceconsiderable
frequencies tomatching
significance
DNA profiles.
Theelegant statistical
arguments inthispapertendtoobscurethepowerofDNA profiling forhuman
At theDNA sequencelevel,individuals
identification. areuniqueso thatsequencematches wouldbe

definitive, twinsexcepted.
identical Theremustbe somepoint,shortofa complete sequence,at which
theamountofDNA information is sufficient
to implyidentitybeyondreasonabledoubt.Atthatstage
therewillbe no needfortheanalysispresented hereor thealternative
analysesgivenbymanyother
researchers.The NorthCarolinaStateBureauof Investigation, forexample,nowhas eightvariable
number tandem repeatlociinuse.Evenwiththeunrealistic levelsofpopulation
substructure
advocated
bytheauthors, thechancethattwounrelated individualsina population
sharethesame16-alleleprofile
small,and evenforfullsibsthechanceis only1 in verymanythousands.
is vanishingly
The authorsrepliedlater,in writing,
as follows.
Severaldiscussants (Evett,Curnow, Morton, Brookfield) complain thatourmodelis 'highly idealized'
and'unrealistic' andhencenotgenerally useful.Theoriginal islandproblem is unrealistic.In contrast,
thegeneralized islandproblem, whichis thebasisforouranalysis, involves effectively no restrictions.
Thejointdistribution of traitpossessionis arbitrary. Concernthatitmaybe unrealistic to assumea
knownpopulation of possibleperpetrators is misplaced. Thiscan alwaysbe achievedbydefining the
'island'to be theentireplanet,so thatitspopulation is guaranteed to includethecriminal andN is
thepopulation oftheworld.Of course,a uniform prioris unlikely to be appropriate inthiscase,but
thegeneral analysis doesnotrequire a uniform priorandcanthusbe appliedtoany'realworld'situation.
For example,in thenon-sequential case equation(5) is quitegeneral,as notedin thepaper,as is the
morehelpfulequation(6) underassumptions 1 and 2.
In thecontext ofa criminal trial,thecentral questionis whether or nottheparticular individualon
trialis guilty.Failureto focuson thecorrect questionmayliebehindsomeof theconfusion, bothin
theliterature andinthediscussion, overtheappropriate analysiswhena suspectis identified through
a databasesearch.If theoneindividual whomatches is on trial,neither theposterior probability that
someoneinthedatabaseis guilty (Sudbury, butnotethathisG differs fromours)northeprobability
ofatleastonetraitbearerinthedatabase(Morton)is directly relevant.In thiscase,theevidence against
thesuspectis thatshe or he has thetraitand thatotherparticular individuals do not. Its correct
quantification is described in Section3.3. The evidential weightagainsttheindividual on trialis not
reduced bythedatabasesearch. No assumption about(Morton) orparameter for(Curnow) theprobability
thatthecriminal is in thedatabaseis neededforthelikelihood ratio.Of course,priorprobabilities
forthesuspect,and individuals notin thedatabase,are neededfortheposterior probability of the
suspect'sguilt.Databasesearchesmaygiveriseto casesin whichextremely smallpriorprobabilities
forthesuspect'sguiltareappropriate. (Notethatthepriorwilldependon theinformation aboutthe
suspect andthecrime.It is unlikely to dependonthesizeofthedatabasesearched.) Harding'sexample
of 'arbitrary arrest'also illustratestheimportance of knowing to whichquestiona 'solution'applies.
Preeceis correct inpointing outthatagreement overwhatcountsas evidence isnecessary forproductive
discussion. Thepaperfocuses onthesetting ofa criminal trialinwhichthe'evidence' effectivelyconsists
oftheinformation putbeforethejuryat trial.Legaldebateovertheadmissibility ofpossibleevidence
isthusnotrelevant. Brookfield suggeststhata jurymight giveweight toa beliefthattheforensic scientist
inthecasehasa non-trivial priorprobability ofthesuspect'sguilt,leadingto theiradoptionofa prior
probability whichis notextremely small.Suchreasoning bythejurywouldbe wrong, andakintogiving
evidential weight to thefactthatthesuspectis on trial.In general, theforensic scientist'sbeliefwill
be basedon someinformation whichis presented at trialandsomewhichis not.Theeffect of giving
weight totheirbeliefwillbe todouble-count theinformation presented and/orto allowevidence which
is notpresented, someofwhichmaybe inadmissible, to influence theverdict. Brookfield's argument
is phrasedin termsof usingthedatato decidewhether or nota particular prioris 'correct'.Thisis
misconceived, buthisimplication here,andhisargument elsewhere (Brookfield, 1994b),isthatextremely
smallpriorsareirrelevant to current criminal cases.We disagree, bothin principle and on thebasis
of someknowledge of particularcases.
Severaldiscussants havehighlighted practical errors in theDNA context. Ourexperience bearsout
Koehler'sconcernthat forensicscientists may be proneto errorsin statistical reasoning.His
documentation (Koehler,1993b)of errors in courtmakesdepressing reading.ThompsonandGeisser
both point to the importanceof possible laboratoryerrors.Since the paper was presented,the UK
Court of Appeal has quashed a second convictionbased primarilyon DNA evidenceand ordered
in thelightof concerns
a retrial, aboutanomaliesin theexperimental
evidence.Cooke'sexample,in
which a forensicscientistwas nevertold that the suspect's fatherwas a codefendant,is extremely
worrying.

WeagreewithCurnowthata slavishadherence toconservatism maybe unhelpful. Hisconcern about
'largepopulations of possiblesuspects undiminished in sizebytheotherevidence'is unwarranted in
a correct analysis.The effect of theotherevidencewillbe incorporated in theprior.
Lindley'sobservations on theanalysisof theislandproblemand ancillarity are characteristically
interesting.
The analysisof Section3.2 is correct in thecase of a pre-datadecisionto searchindividuals io,il,
.i. Its validityin thesequential searchcontext restson theappropriate versionof thestopping
ruleprinciple. We acceptthecriticism implicitinDawidandMortera's contribution that,although the
principle does holdhere,it is notself-evident and shouldhavebeenjustified.
The needto allowforcorrelations appearsnotto havebeengraspedby Robertson and Vignaux.
In theirlanguage,ourknowledge thatthesuspecthasthetraitincreases theavailableinformation and
ingeneral willchangeourassessment ofprobabilities.A particularconsequence is thattheconditional
probability thatmembers ofa subpopulation willhavethetraitischanged byknowledge thatthesuspect
is a member of thatsubpopulation. Thisis whysuchknowledge is relevant.In situations in which
assumptions 1 and/or2 areviolated,itmayalso changethepriorprobabilities forothermembers of
thesubpopulation. Robertson andVignaux'srelative frequencyf1 wouldnotbe knowningeneral, and
certainly is notknownin theDNA context, evenifthepopulation involved wereprecisely specified.
Writing theirlikelihood ratioas a sum(as in equation(6)) revealstermsthatarenotidentical, owing
to population heterogeneities, non-constantpriorsand theeffect of conditioning on thetraitof the
suspect,so thatit is notin generala function offl.
Robertson andVignaux assertthatouranalysisdoesnotextend tocontinuous characteristics.
Itdoes.
Let Xsand Xc nowdenotea measurement on a suspectand a criminal respectively, whichmaybe
discrete,continuous ormixed.Supposethattheidentification evidenceis XsEA1, XcEA2.In thenon-
sequential case,an analysisanalogousto thatin Section3.1 gives
O(G)= z P(XcEA2 xsEA1, C=i, S=s) P(xsEAI -C=i, S=s) P(C=i|S=s)

is P(XcEA2 IXsEAi, C=s, S=s) P(XSEAI1C=S, S=S) P(C=sjS=S)
Thisanalysisincludesall thescenarios describedbyRobertson and Vignaux.Assumptions similarto

our1 and2 willallowsimplification, as willmodellingassumptionsinparticular ForXsand
contexts.
Xccontinuous andA1andA2singletons, limiting
arguments leadto corresponding
densities
inthefirst
twofactors.
Thenovelty of potentialconcerns is of muchlessmoment thantheirvalidity. we are
None-the-less
unawareof,forexample, othertreatments ofthefullconsequences
oftheneedininferencetocondition
on the suspect'sprofile,of the logical errorin dismissingconcernsbecause of 'small' changesin an
already'small' matchprobability,or of theconsequencesforDNA inference ofviolationsof assumptions
1 and 2. In addition,thegeneralanalysis,whichwe believeto be noveland relevant,providesa unified
frameworkfor assessingexistingconcerns.
We are unconvincedby manyof thepaperswhichEvettand Weircitein arguingthatvariouseffects
can be ignoredin theDNA context.Our argument,criticizedas 'theoretical',pointsto thelogicalerror
describedabove. Analysesof 'real data' whichignorethisin claimingan effectto be 'unimportant'
or 'negligible'maybe misleading.These commentsapplyin particularto populationsubstructure effects.
Nichols's contributionpointsto some of the subtletiesinvolved.
Evettapparentlyignoresour Section4 (in particularthe paragraphbelow equation (20)) in taking
'uncertainty over the probabilityof havingthe same profile'to referonly to samplingeffects.Even
theseeffectsare ignoredin mostcurrentDNA analyses(see Geisser'scontribution). Morton's'cautions'
are misplaced; in facttheyhighlightone possible reason for such uncertainty.
We are aware thatEvett,among others,has repeatedlywarnedagainstthe prosecutor'sfallacy.It
is thusdisappointingthatscientistsin theUK ForensicScienceServiceand elsewherehave subsequently
made the error,at greatcost to the legal system.In addition,theycontinue,inappropriately in our
view,and contraryto theadvicein Evett(1983), to expressviewsabout theoriginsof forensicsamples.
Koehler's commentthat the prosecutor'sfallacyis not too difficultto explain is supportedby our
experience.Dr Evett may be unnecessarilymodest here. His report,and evidencefromone of us,
succeededin explainingthefallacyto theUK Courtof Appeal whichsubsequently quashed a conviction
and ordereda retrialin Regina versusDeen in whichthe scientisthad made the prosecutor'sfallacy
errorat the originaltrial.

Evettand Weir criticizeour 'unbalanced' treatmentof DNA evidence.It was not our aim to give
a reviewof thefield.We notethatthecontributions of Cooke, Nichols,Koehler,Thompsonand Geisser
also expressconcernaboutthecurrentuse of DNA profiles.We agreethatDNA profllestypically provide
powerfulidentificationevidence.However,theirpotentialpowerprovidesno justificationfora failure
to assessand presentsuchevidencecorrectly.Our view,based on experience,is thatthereis a substantial
minorityof cases in whichthe practicaleffectof the concernsthat we raise is important.
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Balding - Donnelly 1995 J Royal Stat Soc - Inference in Forensic Identification 2

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J. R. Statist.Soc.

[Read beforeThe Royal StatisticalSocietyon Wednesday,April 13th,1994,

tAddressfor correspondence:School of MathematicalSciences,Queen Mary and WestfieldCollege, Mile End

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2. ORIGINAL ISLAND PROBLEM

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P(G) =E( I Z>0 (2)

forwhichtheredoes notappearto be a simpleexpression.

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3. GENERALIZED ISLAND PROBLEM

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0(G)-= P(Xc=ys= 1 1C?s) P(C?s)

P(Xc=Xs= 1 Ic=i) P(C=i)

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In theoriginalislandproblem,sincetheXiare assumedto be independent and

O(G)=NP(Xj = I Ixo=1). (9)

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P(UI Xc = Xs= 1)- ( P)N

A-[Xi,, = Xil = 0, Xi,= lI}

= . = XI = 0, XI = Xc= 1, B I C?4I) P(C?hI)

Notethatthesequential casewithy = 0 is equivalent

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O(G)= P(Xi=1, A) P(C=i)

of (Xo,Xl, . X., XN)is exchangeablethenequation (12) simplifies

O(G) = (N-y) P(xy+1 = 1I xo = x1 =Xy-1= 0, Xy= 1). (13)

whichcoincideswithequation(3) withN replacedbyN-y. In thiscase thesearch

Oy1 (G) > Oy(G) (14)

fory=1,2 . . . N such thatP(xy=Oxo= 1, xi =. . .=Xy-l =0)>O.

0y- (G)= (N-y+ 1) P(xy= 1IA).

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byinequality (16), as required. ?

3.3. Database Search

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4. EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT p

exchangeable. Fora fixedlabellingofthepopulation, thisassumption requires a certain

P(Xi= x = 1)>, P(Xi= 1) P(W= 1), (18)

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O(G) =N -NOi1 + 02. (19)

Recallthatwithp known0(G) = NOsincep 0 inthiscase.Theeffect ofuncertainty

O(G) =N a +x+ 1 (20)

In thespecialcase in whicho = = 1, so thatp is initially

A necessaryconditionforinequality(21) is thata>E(p). This conditionis not,

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5. EXTENSIONS TO ISLAND PROBLEM

O(G)= Z P(xi= 1)+ cov(x, Xs)

O(G)?NO+Ncov(XiX xS) (24)

5.2. NecessaryTraitsand Contingent Traits

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5.3. Restricted Access

O(G)= Z P(xi=X>=C=1IC=i, S=s)

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5.5. InformativeSearch Protocols

O(G)= E P(Xj= 1 JX 1) P(C=iIS=s) (25)

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7. APPLICATION TO DNA PROFILING

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O(G) < Z P(Xi= 1I Xs= 1)+NO +N cov(Xi, l') (26)

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E(XiIp') and E(XiIp', X5=1) do not depend on i. (27)

COV(Xix,)=Efcov(Xi,XsIP')j + cov[E(XIP'p),E(Xs Ip' )

O(G)< Z P(Xi= 1 WXs=

O(G) < E P(Xi = 1 IXs= 1) + NE(p ') + N v )) (28)