Chemistry 2

Mr. Lewis
2nd Hour
Kassy Kressig and
Alex Guerrero
Tokaimura
On September 30, 1999 an accident happened that would change lives in the village of
Tokaimura, Northeast of Tokyo, where a small fuel preparation plant operated by Japan Nuclear
Fuel Conversion Co. aka JCO, where three workers were exposed to high levels of radiation. In
1988the Tokaimura plant was first commissioned by the STA to processes up to 3 tons per year
of uranium enriched up to 20% uranium-235 which is more than average plant made.

The process used was called a wet process that involved the approved IAEA nuclear fuel
conversion procedure. The important part of it being a wet process was that the water in the
solution provided neutron moderation, speeding up the reaction. The water makes the wet
process more dangerous compared to the dry process. The approved nuclear fuel conversion
procedure was the dissolution of uranium oxide powder in a dissolution tank, then its transfer as
pure uranyl nitrate solution to a buffer column for mixing, followed by transfer to a precipitation
tank. This tank is surrounded by a water cooling jacket to remove excess heat generated by the
exothermic chemical reaction allowing the reaction to speed up the reaction without exceeding
the criticality point. The prevention of criticality was based upon an approved amount of
substance, as well as upon the design of the process. A key part of the design was a column with
a criticality-safe that used narrow geometry as a way to control the amount of material
transferred into the precipitation tank.

However to speed up the process, they mixed the oxide and nitric acid in 10-liter stainless
steel buckets rather than in the buffer tank. The three men following the instructions that JCO
had written in its operating manual but this method had not yet been IAEA or the STA. They
added the bucket contents directly to the water-jacketed precipitation tank rather than to the
buffer tank. Only this was a big no-no, since the precipitation tank was not able to prevent
criticality which means the condition of being able to sustain a nuclear chain reaction. Only the
buffer tank could, due to its narrow geometry design that was certified to prevent criticality.
While filling the precipitation tank, the three men added seven buckets, which was 35 lbs of
enriched uranium, or seven times more uranium than permitted under the approved method.

When they did this around 10:35, the volume of solution in the precipitation tank reached
about 40 liters; containing about 16 kg uranium meaning critical mass had been reached. At the
point of criticality, there was no explosion like you might think only the excretion of intense
gamma and neutron radiation, sounding an alarm. The critical mass was continuously exceeded
for about 20 hours. It appears that as the solution boiled, voids formed and stopping criticality
and radiation, but being a wet process the water cooled the solution making the voids
disappeared allowing the reaction to resume. The reaction was stopped when cooling water
surrounding the precipitation tank was removed.

At least 439 people, including plant workers, firemen, and others who responded to the
accident, and 207 local residents were exposed to elevated levels of radiation. In October 2000
the total number of people who received some radiation exposure from the accident was revised
upward to 667. The only people reported injured due to radiation poisoning were the three
 Chemistry 2
Mr. Lewis
2nd Hour
Kassy Kressig and
Alex Guerrero
workers involved. They were all hospitalized, only two of them in a critical condition, later
dying. One died 12 weeks later, another 7 months later. The three had apparently received full-
body radiation doses of 10,000-20,000, 6000-10,000 and 1000-5000 millisieverts keeping in
mind that 8000 mSv is most likely to cause death.

All three workers who were directly responsible and contaminated by the accident were
inexperienced in handling toxic chemicals, and so did not realize the danger when they mixed
eight times the normal amount of this type of uranium. Two of these men had never previously
performed the dangerous task, while the third had done it only once. These men only following
company policy and knew no better. According to the IAEA, the accident "seems to have
resulted primarily from human error and serious breaches of safety principles, which together led
to a criticality event". The company, JCO, violated both normal safety standards and legal
requirements, and criminal charges are being laid upon them.

A year later in October of 2000, the Japanese police arrested six officials from the JCO
plant and charged them with "professional negligence." Police concluded that the plant workers
were not properly trained and that safety procedures were routinely violated but not following
the approved nuclear fuel conversion procedure. One of those who were arrested was Yutaka
Yokokawa, who was the technician supervising, that was the only of one of the three workers
who survived after being hospitalized for 3 months due to server radiation sickness. The other
two workers who were hospitalized would have also been arrested if they has no later died do to
radiation poisoning. Other charges were to be brought against the company and its leaders. The
Japanese later made the IAEA in alliance with STA inspect and enforce regulations so that it
would not happen again and if so they would have a set rule and guidelines how to go about
solving it in a more efficient and safe manner. As of January 1, 2001, oversight for all nuclear
facilities, except those confined to research, was transferred from the STA to a new Ministry for
Economy, Trade, and Industry.

The lack of supervision, expertise, and safety measures may someday harm the world when
experimenting with new technology. No cautions or guidelines should be over looked or ignored.
The most common constant in an experiment should be safety whether it is in a fancy lab or in a
classroom.

Sources:

Ryan, Micheal. "Case Studies in Science." The Tokaimura Accident. Department of Chemical
Engineering, 25/06/2001. Web. 7 Feb 2011.
http://ublib.buffalo.edu/libraries/projects/cases/tokaimura/tokaimura.htm

Wein, J. (2005, September 23). the Tokaimura accident. Retrieved from

http://www.joewein.de/tokaimura.htm

C. M. Hopper, B. Broadhead, An Updated Nuclear Criticality Safety Slide Rule, NUREG/CR-6504 Vol. 2; ORNL.TM-13322/V2.
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., April 1998.