Legal Profession Additional Cases
9067\ January 31, 2018
Contents
Legal Profession Additional Cases......................................................1
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018......1
Enriquez v. De Vera..........................................................................5
Spouses Nunilo and Nemia Anaya v Alvarez, Jr., AC No. 9436, August 1 2016
Belo-Henares v Guevarra, AC No. 11394, December 1, 2016..........9
De Leon v Pedreña, AC No. 9401, October 22, 2013.....................13
Legal Profession Additional Cases
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
A.C. No. 9067. January 31, 2018. * in his professional actions. His duty and responsibility in that
 
MARJORIE A. APOLINAR-PETILO, complainant, vs. ATTY.
ARISTEDES A. MARAMOT, respondent.
Attorneys; Lawyer’s Oath; Every lawyer before entering his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Supreme
Court (SC), professes as a natural course the promises contained in the
Lawyer’s Oath.—Every lawyer before entering his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court,
professes as a natural course the promises contained in the Lawyer’s Oath,
to wit: I do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients, and I
impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. The letter and spirit of
the Lawyer’s Oath are oftentimes forgotten or taken for granted in the
course of the lawyer’s practice of law. To give teeth thereto, the Court has
adopted and instituted the Code of Professional Responsibility to govern
every lawyer’s relationship with his profession, the courts, the society, and
his clients.
Same; Same; Dishonesty; At the time of his preparation of the
document, he actually knew that Princess Anne was a minor; hence, his
claim of having then advised that her parents should represent her in the
execution of the document; Nonetheless, he still indicated in the deed of
donation that the donees were of legal age. His doing so, being undeniably
dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer not to utter a falsehood.—
The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At the time of his
preparation of the document, he actually knew that Princess Anne was a
minor; hence, his claim of having then advised that her parents should
represent her in the execution of the document. Mommayda was likewise a
minor. His awareness of the latter’s minority at the time was not disputed
because he was also representing Mommayda in the latter’s adoption
proceedings aside from being Mommayda’s neighbor. Nonetheless, he still
indicated in the deed of donation that the donees were of legal age. His
doing so, being undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer
not to utter a falsehood. He thereby consciously engaged in an unlawful
and dishonest conduct, defying the law and contributing to the erosion of
confidence in the Law Profession.
Same; As a lawyer, he should not invoke good faith and good
intentions as sufficient to excuse him from discharging his obligation to be
truthful and honest in his professional actions.—The respondent justifies
himself by stating that the persistence of the donor Margarita prevailed
upon him to prepare the deed of donation as he had done; and adverts to
the donor’s assurance that she would herself procure the signatures of the
parents of Princess Anne on the document. He also submits that the
execution of the deed had redounded to the advantage of the minors; and
that there was no law that prohibited the donation in favor of minors. The
respondent cannot be relieved by his justifications and submissions. As a
lawyer, he should not invoke good faith and good intentions as sufficient to
excuse him from discharging his obligation to be truthful and honest
535242984.docx
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No.
8
406
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
regard were clear and unambiguous. In Young v. Batuegas, 403 SCRA 123
(2003), this Court reminded that truthfulness and honesty had the highest
value for attorneys.
Civil Law; Donations; The names of Princess Anne and
Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors, should have been included
in the notarial acknowledgment of the deed itself; and, in view of their
minority, the names of their respective parents (or legal guardians)
assisting them should have also been indicated thereon. This requirement
was not complied with.—The respondent’s denial of having employed any
falsity or dishonesty, or of making untruthful statements in executing the
notarial acknowledgment does not necessarily save the day for him. There
is no question that a donation can be accepted in a separate instrument.
However, the deed of donation in question was also the same instrument
that apparently contained the acceptance. The names of Princess Anne and
Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors, should have been included
in the notarial acknowledgment of the deed itself; and, in view of their
minority, the names of their respective parents (or legal guardians)
assisting them should have also been indicated thereon. This requirement
was not complied with. Moreover, Princess Anne and Mommayda should
have also signed the deed of donation themselves along with their assisting
parents or legal guardians. The omission indicated that the deed of
donation was  not complete. Hence, the notarial acknowledgment of the
deed of donation was improper.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Consenting, Abetting
and Participating in Falsifying a Public Document; Violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath and Violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and
Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
BERSAMIN, J.:
 
A lawyer is a disciple of truth because he swore upon his admission to
the Bar that he would do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court, and that he would conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best
of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to his clients. His violation of the Lawyer’s Oath through the
commission of falsehood can be condignly sanctioned.
 
Antecedents
 
In her complaint-affidavit,1 complainant Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo
(Marjorie) alleges that the respondent consented to, abetted and
participated in the illegal act of falsifying a public document in violation of
Article 171(4) in relation to Article 172(2) of the Revised Penal Code; and
that he thereby violated the Lawyer’s Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon
1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The public document in question was the deed of donation 2 executed
in favor of Princess Anne Apolinar-Petilo (Princess Anne) and Ma.
Mommayda V. Apolinar (Mommayda) who were only 12 years old and 16
1/2 years old, respectively, at the time of its execution. 3 Asserting that the
respondent had known of the minority of the donees, Marjorie insists that
he was thereby guilty of falsification first in his capacity as a lawyer by
preparing the deed of donation and indicating therein that both donees were
then “of legal age”; and as a notary public by notarizing the document. She
claims that he, being Mommayda’s counsel in the latter’s adoption case,
1 Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Legal Profession Additional Cases
was aware of the untruthful statements he made in the deed of donation
because he thereafter submitted the deed of donation as evidence therein. 4
In his answer, the respondent states that Margarita Apolinar
(Margarita) and her sister-in-law Justina Villanueva-Apolinar (Justina)
went to his law office sometime in 2000; that Margarita was a grandaunt
who owned a parcel of land in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro that she wanted
to donate to Princess Anne, Marjorie’s own daughter, and Mommayda, the
adopted daughter of Justina; that upon learning of Princess Anne’s
minority, he advised that she had to be represented by either parent; 5 that
not one to be easily turned down, Margarita persisted, and prevailed over
him; that he thereupon prepared the deed of donation but left the date, the
document number and page number blank; that he reserved the notarization
for later after the parties had signed the document; that he allowed
Margarita to bring the deed of donation to Manila where she was
supposedly proceeding in order to procure the signature of Princess Anne
thereon and as a way of avoiding additional travel expenses; and that
Justina had mentioned to him at the time that Margarita was then suffering
from colon cancer and had only a little time to live.
The respondent recalled that a month afterwards Margarita and Justina
returned to him with the signed deed of donation; that he then noticed that
the document did not bear the signatures of Princess Anne’s parents; that
Margarita again offered to procure the signatures on the document; and that
Margarita and Justina did not anymore return with the document until the
time when he had to enter the instrument in his notarial book for his
monthly report.
Margarita eventually died on April 13, 2003. Later on, with issues
about her properties left unresolved, the relationship among her relatives
quickly turned sour, and the deed of donation again came to the fore. In
2004, Justina and her husband Tomas went to see the respondent and
confided to him that they were entangled in a court battle with Marjorie,
their niece, over Margarita’s properties, including the apartment in Manila
where they had been occupying since 1980. They then learned from the
respondent that because Mommayda’s birth certificate had been simulated,
they needed to legally adopt her in order to enable her to inherit from them.
Hence, they filed a petition for the adoption of Mommayda, which did not
sit well with Marjorie.
Claiming that her successional rights as a niece or heir to Tomas vis-
à-vis would be adversely affected by the adoption of Mommayda, Marjorie
vigorously opposed the petition for adoption, and argued for its dismissal
on the basis that Tomas and Justina were not morally capable of adoption
as shown by their simulation of the birth of Mommayda. Marjorie also
brought several criminal cases in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on
the ground of the simulation of the birth and falsification of the birth
certificate of Mommayda in violation of Articles 347, 359, 183 and 184 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Marjorie’s opposition to the petition for adoption and her criminal
charges were dismissed. Also dismissed were her opposition to the petition
of Tomas and Justina for the correction of entry in Mommayda’s birth
certificate, as well as Marjorie’s motion to recall the social worker for
cross-examination in the adoption case. The respondent claims that
Marjorie — exasperated and dissatisfied with the outcome — then turned
against him and instituted the complaint for his disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law.6
The respondent submits that there was nothing illegal in the deed of
donation; that as the sole owner of the donated land, Margarita had an
absolute right to dispose of her property by donation; that no law
prohibited donations to minors; and that the filing of the petition for
judicial partition was an express if not implied ratification of the defect in
the donation; and that in regard to the submission of the simulated birth
certificate in evidence, the purpose of filing the petition for adoption was to
rectify the simulation and to convert the relationship between Mommayda
and her adopting parents into a legal one.7
During the mandatory conference set by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, Marjorie admitted that a
petition for judicial partition involving the donated land was meanwhile
filed; that a compromise agreement8 was reached; and that Princess Anne
sold her share to Mommayda.9
In his position paper,10 the respondent asserts that the complaint was
pure harassment calculated only to besmirch and malign his reputation; and
that the complaint was also a premeditated tactic to prolong or preempt the
adoption case considering that a favorable ruling thereat would adversely
affect Marjorie’s rights as an heir of Mommayda’s parents.
In his resolution dated May 22, 2008, 11 the IBP Commissioner
recommended that:
535242984.docx 2 Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
undersigned Commissioner finds respondent Atty. Aristedes A.
Maramot to have violated the Notarial Law, his act having
undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents;
and, respectfully recommends his suspension from notarial
practice for a period of one (1) year while the other complaints
against him are recommended dismissed for lack of merit.12
 
In his motion for reconsideration, 13 the respondent submitted that he
did not employ any falsity because it was only Margarita — the donor —
who had in fact attested to the execution of the deed of donation in the
notarial acknowledgement of the deed of donation; that it was
inconsequential even if Princess Anne had signed the deed of donation not
in his presence; that in conveyances, only the person encumbering or
conveying needed to personally appear, sign and acknowledge the deed
before the notary public; and that Princess Anne and Mommayda’s names
were placed in the document merely for them to accept the donation.
The respondent pleads for the mitigation of his liability considering
that he has exhibited candor in admitting his offense. He represents that his
act was not gross enough as to justify suspension; that the complainant had
thereby suffered no damage, but had actually benefitted from the act; that
he had notarized in good faith; and that with this offense being his first in
his 12 years as a law practitioner and as notary public, humanitarian
considerations should be considered in his favor because he had children to
support and had been his family’s sole bread winner.
In her comment on the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration,14 Majorie avers that Princess Anne could not have signed
the instrument in Manila because her daughter was then studying in
Victoria, Oriental Mindoro.
In Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, but modified the penalty by recommending
the immediate revocation of the respondent’s notarial commission and his
disqualification from reappointment as a notary for two years, thus:15
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent’s violation
of the Notarial Law, Atty. Aristedes Maramot is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year, immediate Revocation of his Notarial Commission if
presently Commissioned and Disqualified from reappointment as
Notary Public for Two (2) years.16
 
The IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration through Resolution No. XIX-2011-424 dated June 26,
2011,17 thus:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent’s Motion
for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial ground or reason to
disturb it, the Board of Governors’ Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
337 dated July 17, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.18
 
On September 6, 2011, the respondent filed in this Court his Comment
on the IBP Board of Governor’s Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 and No.
XIX-2011-424 dated August 16, 2011.19
In its Report dated June 27, 2012,20 the Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended to treat the comment as a petition for review.
On February 15, 2012, the respondent filed an amended comment
dated December 5, 2011.21
On July 23, 2012, the Court resolved: (1) to direct the respondent to
furnish the IBP a copy of his amended comment and submit proof of its
service within ten (10) days; and (2) to require the complainant to file her
comment thereon within 15 days from receipt.22
Accordingly, the complaint submitted her comment on November 9,
2012, opposing the respondent’s prayer for reconsideration and asking the
Court to uphold the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.
 
Ruling of the Court
Legal Profession Additional Cases
We affirm the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.
 
A.
As a Lawyer
 
Every lawyer before entering his duties and responsibilities as a
member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, professes as a natural
course the promises contained in the Lawyer’s Oath, to wit:
I do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients, and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
The letter and spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath are oftentimes forgotten or
taken for granted in the course of the lawyer’s practice of law. To give
teeth thereto, the Court has adopted and instituted the Code of Professional
Responsibility to govern every lawyer’s relationship with his profession,
the courts, the society, and his clients.
Pertinent in this case are Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1; and
Rule 10.1 of Canon 10, which provide:
CANON 1 – x x x
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.
CANON 10 – x x x
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
 
The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At the time of his
preparation of the document, he actually knew that Princess Anne was a
minor; hence, his claim of having then advised that her parents should
represent her in the execution of the document. Mommayda was likewise a
minor. His awareness of the latter’s minority at the time was not disputed
because he was also representing Mommayda in the latter’s adoption
proceedings aside from being Mommayda’s neighbor. Nonetheless, he still
indicated in the deed of donation that the donees were of legal age. His
doing so, being undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer
not to utter a falsehood. He thereby consciously engaged in an unlawful
and dishonest conduct, defying the law and contributing to the erosion of
confidence in the Law Profession.
The respondent’s explanation that it was only Margarita who actually
acknowledged that the deed of donation was her own free act and deed
does not extricate him from responsibility. The deed of donation, whether
or not acknowledged by the donees, should not bear any false statement
upon a material fact. The ages of the donees were material because they
bore on their capacities to render the donation efficacious. That neither
Princess Anne nor Mommayda acknowledged the deed of donation did not
cure the defect.
The respondent justifies himself by stating that the persistence of the
donor Margarita prevailed upon him to prepare the deed of donation as he
had done; and adverts to the donor’s assurance that she would herself
procure the signatures of the parents of Princess Anne on the document. He
also submits that the execution of the deed had redounded to the advantage
of the minors; and that there was no law that prohibited the donation in
favor of minors.
The respondent cannot be relieved by his justifications and
submissions. As a lawyer, he should not invoke good faith and good
intentions as sufficient to excuse him from discharging his obligation to be
truthful and honest in his professional actions. His duty and responsibility
in that regard were clear and unambiguous. In Young v. Batuegas,23 this
Court reminded that truthfulness and honesty had the highest value for
attorneys, thus:
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to
535242984.docx 3 Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear
in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case
and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.
The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and plead-
ing before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend
his client’s rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in
defense of his client’s cause, his conduct must never be at the
expense of truth.24
 
The respondent posits that a donation could be made in favor of a
minor. Such position was not a factor, however, because whether or not a
minor could benefit from the donation did not determine the merits of the
complaint for his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Neither was his claim that the filing of the petition for judicial partition
amounted to the ratification of the deed of donation a factor to be
considered in his favor. The decisive consideration is whether or not he
committed a falsehood in his preparation of the deed of donation. Sadly for
him, the answer is in the affirmative.
Relative to the respondent’s submission of the false birth certificate of
Mommayda in the proceedings for her adoption, we adopt with approval
the following findings and recommendation made by the IBP
Commissioner absolving the respondent, viz.:
The Certificate of Live Birth of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva
Apolinar is certainly a simulated one where it was made to appear
that she was the biological child of Spouses Tomas V. Apolinar
and Justina P. Villanueva when she was not. It was not shown,
however, that respondent has a hand when its contents were given
to the employee of the Local Civil Registrar of Victoria, Mindoro
Oriental. From the face of the document, it appears that Tomas
Apolinar himself gave the details and he signed the Certificate of
Live concerned.
When the respondent used the document in the adoption case
of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva Apolinar by the Spouses Tomas
and Justina Apolinar (docketed as Spec. Proc. No. R-04-5396,
RTC, Branch 40, Calapan City,
Mindoro Oriental), the respondent did not misrepresent that Ma.
Mommayda V. Apolinar is the biological daughter of the
petitioners. In fact, there was nothing that was misrepresented in
the allegations in the petition. This led to the filing of another
case for the correction of entry in the birth certificate of the same
Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar docketed as Spec. Proc. CV-05-
5445. It was alleged therein that Leini Villanueva Guerrero and
Johnny Ortega are the biological parents of Ma. Mommayda
Apolinar.25
B.
As a Notary Public
 
The respondent is also being hereby charged with having executed the
notarial acknowledgment for the deed of donation despite Princess Anne
not having actually appeared before him.
The respondent explains that he did not employ any falsity or
dishonesty, and that he did not make untruthful statements in executing the
notarial acknowledgment.
In this respect, the IBP Commissioner observed that:
It cannot be denied that the respondent violated the Notarial
Law when he, by his own admission, notarized the Deed of
Donation which was signed by at least one of the parties, namely:
the donee, Princess Anne Petilo, who signed not in the presence
of the Notary Public but somewhere in Metro Manila. This fact
the respondent has admitted in his Answer (Records, p. 22
Statement of Facts, par. 3). For this reason, notaries public are
once again reminded to observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should
not notarized a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein (Serzo v. Flores,
A.C. No. 6040 [formerly CBD 02-972, July 30, 2004]
citing Fulgencio v. Martin, 403, 403 SCRA 216, 220-221).26
Legal Profession Additional Cases
The IBP Commissioner obviously rendered his foregoing observations
on the assumption that Princess Anne had herself acknowledged the
instrument not in the presence of the respondent as the Notary Public. But,
as borne out by the acknowledgment, only Margarita’s name was indicated
as the person appearing before the respondent during the notarization of the
instrument, to wit:
BEFORE ME, on the date and at the place afore-cited
personally appeared Margarita V. Apolinar with her CTC
indicated below her name and signature, issued at Victoria,
Oriental Mindoro, all known to me the same person who executed
the foregoing instrument and she acknowledged to me that the
same is her own free act and deed. (Emphasis supplied)27
 
Nonetheless, the respondent’s denial of having employed any falsity
or dishonesty, or of making untruthful statements in executing the notarial
acknowledgment does not necessarily save the day for him. There is no
question that a donation can be accepted in a separate instrument.
However, the deed of donation in question was also the same instrument
that apparently contained the acceptance. 28 The names of Princess Anne
and Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors, should have been
included in the notarial acknowledgment of the deed itself; and, in view of
their minority, the names of their respective parents (or legal guardians)
assisting them should have also been indicated thereon. This requirement
was not complied with. Moreover, Princess Anne and Mommayda should
have also signed the deed of donation themselves along with their assisting
parents or legal guardians.
The omission indicated that the deed of donation was not complete.
Hence, the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation was improper.
Rule II Section 1 of the Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—“Acknowledgment”
refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents
an integrally complete instrument or document.
x x x x
 
We cannot approve of the recommended penalty of suspension for one
year. The circumstances peculiar to the complaint call for lenity in favor of
the respondent, but who must nonetheless be sternly warned against a
repetition of the offense at the risk of suffering a more stringent penalty.
We hold that the penalties commensurate to the offense is suspension from
the practice of law for six months.
WHEREFORE, the
Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. ARISTEDES
MARAMOT guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Rules on Notarial Practice; SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for six months effective from notice of this decision,
with revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from being
reappointed as Notary Public for two years effective upon receipt; and
warns him of a more stringent penalty upon repetition of the offense.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonen and  Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Martires, J., On Official Business.
Atty. Aristedes Maramot suspended from practice of law for six (6)
months for violating the Lawyer’s Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1
and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Rules on Notarial Practice, with revocation of his notarial
commission and disqualification from being reappointed as Notary Public
for two (2) years, with warning against repetition of similar offense.
Notes.—The Attorney’s Oath mandates a lawyer, among other duties:
(a) to do no falsehood; (b) nor consent to the doing of the same in court;
and (c) to conduct himself as a lawyer to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity to the court. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Miranda,  720 SCRA 1 [2014])
 A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended
from his office as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). (Foster vs. Agtang, 744 SCRA 242
[2014])
Enriquez v. De Vera
A.C. No. 8330. March 16, 2015.*
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Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, complainant, vs.  ATTY. TRINA DE VERA,
respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyer’s Oath; Code of Professional
Responsibility; Bouncing Checks; In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De
Vera did not only violate the law, but she also broke her oath as a lawyer
and transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).—In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only
violate the law, but she also broke her oath as a lawyer and transgressed the
Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating
Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera violated the following provisions:
Cannon [sic] 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 – A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated
Bar. Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In De Jesus v. Collado, 216
SCRA 619 (1992),   this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious
misconduct for issuing postdated checks that were dishonored upon
presentment for payment.—In De Jesus v. Collado, 216 SCRA 619 (1992),
this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for issuing
postdated checks that were dishonored upon presentment for payment: In
the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been
obtained against respondent Collado. We do not, however, believe that
conviction of the criminal charges raised against her is essential, so far as
either the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment charge
against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the checks when
she did not have enough money in her bank account to cover the total
amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid that the acts with which she was
charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We consider
that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22
constitutes serious misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar.
Same; Same; A lawyer is required to observe the law and be
mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private capacity.
—A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her
actions whether acting in a public or private capacity. The Code of
Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. . . . . CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. . . . . Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Same; Same; Disbarment; A lawyer “may be removed or otherwise
disciplined ‘not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but
also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer to him.’”—Membership in the bar
requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or
professional capacity. “Any transgression of this duty on his part would not
only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s
faith in the Legal Profession as a whole.” A lawyer “may be removed or
otherwise disciplined ‘not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him.”’
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment or
Suspension.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or
suspension filed by complainant Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina
De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious
Legal Profession Additional Cases
misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and
dishonor of several postdated checks.
Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit 1 on June
26, 2009 before this court. The Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera’s
(Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension in relation to the latter’s issuance
of worthless checks and nonpayment of a loan.2
According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building
cell site towers. She is acquainted with Atty. De Vera through the business
by subcontracting the cell site acquisition to Atty. De Vera.3
Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from
Teresita with interest of P20,000.00 per month until fully paid. 4 However,
Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De Vera persuaded her to
borrow the amount from a common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary
Jane), by mortgaging her property located in Lucena City. 5 Atty. De Vera
issued IBank6 Check No. 310571 postdated July 31, 2006 for P500,000.00.
Atty. De Vera also issued at least two more checks to cover the interest
agreed upon.7
Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another
loan from Teresita’s sister in the amount of P100,000.00. Teresita
guaranteed the loan. Atty. De Vera issued IBank Check No. 317689
postdated July 14, 2006 for P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that
she paid her sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De Vera.8
Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for
payment. However, the checks “bounced” for being drawn against
insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks for a second
time. However, the checks were dishonored because the account was
closed.9
Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed
to settle her obligations, prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty.
De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.10
The Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office issued the Resolution dated
March 4, 2008 finding probable cause for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. On the
same day, an Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued by the trial
court.11
In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be
disbarred or suspended for violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court.12
On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to comment on
the Complaint.13
Atty. De Vera filed her Answer 14 dated June 24, 2010. She presented
her version of the facts.
According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita awarded a
Site Acquisition and Permitting Project to Atty. De Vera’s group. The
project involved twenty-nine (29) Globe Telecom sites across Northern and
Southern Luzon.15
Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required 15%
down payment per site. Thus, they agreed that Atty. De Vera would
advance the costs for mobilization and survey, while Teresita would cover
the costs for application of building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her
P195,000.00 per site.16
Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the down payment by March
2006.17 At that time, Teresita had to deliver at least five (5) cell sites to
Globe Telecom.18 However, Teresita did not have the funds required for
the application of building permits that costs around P100,000.00 for each
cell site.19
Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary Jane.
Subsequently, Teresita approached Atty. De Vera and asked that the latter
lend Teresita checks to guaranty the loan. The main reason Teresita gave
was that she had been frequently arguing with her husband regarding the
loan.20
Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita’s
sister.21 She only lent Teresita another check as “additional guaranty for the
five sites[.]”22
Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and
delivered to Teresita for value. The checks were not meant to be
deposited.23
Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case
is baseless. She points out that the proceedings before the Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office were under reinvestigation since she did not have the
opportunity to answer the criminal complaint.24
535242984.docx 5 Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
Moreover, “nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22
and the administrative complaint was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De
Vera] had in any manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or] abused her
position against the interests of the complainant.”25
Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused. 26 In
addition, “[a]ll the bare allegations that [Atty. De Vera] was the one who
enticed [Teresita] to mortgage her property and that the checks issued by
[Atty. De Vera] will be honored upon maturity do not constitute deceitful
conduct on the part of [Atty. De Vera].”27
On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera’s Answer and
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for “investigation,
report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from
receipt of [the] records[.]”28
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines scheduled mandatory conferences where the parties defined the
issues, stipulated on facts, and marked exhibits. 29 Upon the termination of
the mandatory conferences, the parties were “directed to submit their
respective verified position papers within a period of thirty (30) days from
receipt of the Order.”30
Both parties failed to file their position papers.31
The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found Atty. De Vera
administratively liable for serious misconduct and recommended the
penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law. 32 The
Investigating Commissioner ruled:
Respondent’s assertion that the checks she issued to complainant were
not security for the loans she obtained but mere guaranty checks and not
for deposit deserves no credence; it is contrary to the ordinary experience.
....
. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows [sic]
that indeed respondent incurred monetary obligations from complainant,
and she issued postdated checks to the latter as security for the payment of
the loans.
Assuming . . . that respondent’s version of facts were [sic] true, she is
still guilty of serious misconduct.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of
making and issuing . . . worthless check[s]; that is, a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of
worthless checks. . . . A check issued as an evidence of debt — though not
intended to be presented for payment — has the same effect as an ordinary
check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
....
As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B.P.
Blg. 22. By issuing checks in violation of the provisions of the law,
respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.
. . . [A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in
connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct outside of his
professional capacity[.]33 (Citation omitted)
 
In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the
law, but she also broke her oath as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 34 The Investigating Commissioner
found that Atty. De Vera violated the following provisions:
Cannon [sic] 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.35
 
The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner’s Report
and Recommendation36 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of serious
misconduct and it is recommended that she be suspended for a period of
one (1) year from the practice of law.37
 
In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-612 38 dated May 11, 2013,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors resolved to adopt
the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation:
Legal Profession Additional Cases
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex “A,” and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering that Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by issuing a worthless
check, the Attorney’s Oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.39 (Emphasis in the original)
 
Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration 40 dated
September 17, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of
Governors’ Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the Motion for
Reconsideration41 dated September 21, 2013.
In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-241 42 dated May 3, 2014,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors denied the
parties’ respective motions:
 
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of
Complainant and Respondent, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, they
being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed
out and taken into consideration. Moreover, respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration was filed out of time pursuant to his Motion for Extension
of Time which is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B of the Rules and
resorted to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus, Resolution No.
XX-2013-612 dated May 11, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.43 (Emphasis in
the original)
 
The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious
misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and
dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of this case,
we resolve to adopt and approve the recommendations of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors.
Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she
did not incur the loans alleged by Teresita, and the checks were issued
merely as a guaranty and not as payment for the loan. She also raises the
prematurity of the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of the
criminal proceedings considering that “the allegations of deceitful conduct
[are] intimately intertwined with the criminal acts complained of.”44
This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that the
lawyer’s act of issuing worthless checks, punishable under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct.
In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer guilty of
serious misconduct for issuing postdated checks that were dishonored upon
presentment for payment:
In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as
yet been obtained against respondent Collado. We do not, however, believe
that conviction of the criminal charges raised against her is essential, so
far as either the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment
charge against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the checks
when she did not have enough money in her bank account to cover the total
amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid that the acts with which she was
charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We consider
that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22
constitutes serious misconduct on the part of a member of the
Bar.46 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Misconduct involves “wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment”;47 it is serious or gross when it is flagrant.48
We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 in relation to an administrative case against a member of the bar:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the
interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account
users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 . . . is the act of making and issuing a worthless check,
or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and
putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether
eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with
insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a
public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
....
535242984.docx 6 Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the objectives and
coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless
presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and
application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly
violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards
the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order.
He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s Oath that enjoined him to support the
Constitution and obey the laws.49 (Citations omitted)
 
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her
actions whether acting in a public or private capacity. 50 The Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:
 
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
....
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
 
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera incurred
monetary obligations from Teresita. Atty. De Vera admitted issuing the
checks to Teresita. She refused to answer for her liabilities by denying the
existence of the loan and claiming that the checks were mere “show
checks.”51 However, she failed to present evidence to prove those
allegations.
 
The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita civilly liable to
Mary Jane for P540,000.00,53 and on which Atty. De Vera relies upon, is
not sufficient evidence to hold that there was no separate transaction
between Teresita and Atty. De Vera. The Decision involved the postdated
checks issued by Teresita to Mary Jane only. 54 Mary Jane merely claimed
that she had no personal knowledge of any transaction between Teresita
and Atty. De Vera.55
The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De
Vera’s allegation of “lending” her checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary
human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed to know the
consequences of her acts. She issued several postdated checks for value
that were dishonored upon presentation for payment.
Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws
whether in a private or professional capacity. “Any transgression of this
duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but
would also erode the public’s faith in the Legal Profession as a whole.” 56 A
lawyer “may be removed or otherwise disciplined ‘not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer to him.”57
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. Let a copy of
this Resolution be entered in Atty. De Vera’s personal record with the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
 Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Atty. Trina De Vera suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.
Notes.—The possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar
and to retain membership in the legal profession; Any errant behavior on
the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which
tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment. (Abella vs.
Barrios, Jr., 698 SCRA 683 [2013])
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended
from his office as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for
Legal Profession Additional Cases
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). (Foster vs. Agtang, 744 SCRA 242
[2014])
Spouses Nunilo and Nemia Anaya v Alvarez, Jr., AC No. 9436, August 1
2016
 
SPOUSES NUNILO and NEMIA ANAYA, complainants, vs. ATTY.
JOSE B. ALVAREZ, JR., respondent.
Attorneys; Practice of Law; The practice of law is a privilege
granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of a lawyer.—The practice of law is a privilege
granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualification required of a lawyer. As vanguards of our legal system, they
are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard
of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the CPR.
Same; Same; Disbarment; The deliberate failure to pay debts and
the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct.—Indeed, the
deliberate failure to pay debts and the issuance of  worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct. In Moreno v. Atty. Araneta, 457 SCRA 329
(2005), the Court disbarred a lawyer for issuing two (2) checks despite
knowledge that the said checks were drawn against a closed account. It
found the said act “abhorrent and against exacting standards of morality
and decency required of a member of the bar.”
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Jose L. Alvarez, Sr. for respondent.
 
MENDOZA, J.:
 
Before the Court is a Complaint 1 for disbarment filed by complainants
Nunilo and Nemia Anaya (Spouses Anaya) against respondent Atty. Jose
B. Alvarez, Jr. (Atty. Alvarez) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for fraudulent and deceitful
conducts.
 
The Antecedents
 
In their Complaint, Spouses Anaya alleged that: (1) Atty. Alvarez
prepared and notarized the deeds of sale of the three (3) properties they
sold; (2) Atty. Alvarez asked them for cash in exchange for his four ( 4)
Allied Bank checks with the assurance that the checks would be honored
upon presentment to the drawee bank once they fell due as they would be
fully funded on due date; (3) they eventually agreed to give cash to Atty.
Alvarez in exchange for the said checks relying on his assurance and
professional stature; (4) they withdrew from their Philippine National Bank
account the amounts corresponding to the four (4) checks issued by Atty.
Alvarez, as follows: [a] P50,000.00 for Allied Bank Check No.
35836,2 dated December 6, 2011; [b] P95,000.00 for Allied Bank Check
No. 35835,3 dated December 20, 2011; [c] P50,000.00 for Allied Bank
Check No. 35838,4 dated January 8, 2011; and [d] P200,000.00 for Allied
Bank Check No. 35837,5 dated January 15, 2012; (e) the said checks,
except Check No. 35838, which appeared stale due to an erroneous entry
of the date, were dishonored by the drawee bank by reason ACCOUNT
CLOSED; (6) they made repeated verbal and written demands on Atty.
Alvarez but these remained unheeded; and (7) after receipt of the second
demand letter, Atty. Alvarez went to spouses Anaya and offered the
amount of P20,000.00 as partial payment but they refused to accept the
same as they wanted the return of the full amount due.
In his Answer,6 Atty. Alvarez admitted his obligation but claimed that
the cash he obtained from spouses Anaya was a simple loan with an
interest of two percent  (2%) per month and that, at the very outset, they
knew that the checks were issued mainly as a collateral for the loan and
that the checks were not funded. He asserted that he had no intention of
defrauding them and, in fact, he went to their residence and offered to pay
the loan at P20,000.00 plus 2% interest a month but his request was not
535242984.docx 7 Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
granted. Atty. Alvarez reiterated his request to settle his obligation on a
monthly basis plus the 2% monthly interest.
In its June 10, 2015 Report and Recommendation, 7 the IBP-CBD
found that Atty. Alvarez violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and recommended that he be reprimanded and be
reminded to settle and pay his obligation to spouses Anaya.
In its Resolution No. XXI-2015-611,8 dated June 30, 2015, the IBP-
Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and recommended the
suspension of Atty. Alvarez, Jr. from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess
the strict intellectual and moral qualification required of a lawyer. 9 As
vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing.10 Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the CPR. 11
Time and again, this Court has repeatedly held that the act of a lawyer
in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover them or, worst, drawn
against a closed account, constitutes willful dishonesty and unethical
conduct that undermines the public confidence in the law and the members
of the bar.12 It shows a lawyer’s low regard to his commitment to the Oath,
which he swore to uphold and respect when he joined the legal
profession.13
Without a quibble, Atty. Alvarez’s failure to pay his debts despite
several demands, and his act of issuing numerous checks which were
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account, puts his moral
character in serious doubt. It demonstrates his lack of reverence to the
lawyer’s oath, and seriously and irreparably tarnished the image of the
profession he promised to hold in high esteem. 14 Atty. Alvarez’s contention
that he offered to pay his debts on a monthly basis but was refused by
Spouses Anaya fails to persuade. He should have known that a mere offer
to pay a debt is insufficient unless accompanied by an actual tender of
payment. Moreover, the Court notes that the loan was obtained by Atty.
Alvarez in 2011 but up to date, no payment has been made. Likewise, his
defense that he merely issued the checks as collateral to the loan is
untenable. They could not have been used to secure a loan as it was not
only unfunded, but the account to which these checks were drawn was also
already closed.
Indeed, the deliberate failure to pay debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct.15 In Moreno v. Atty.
Araneta,16 the Court disbarred a lawyer for issuing two (2) checks despite
knowledge that the said checks were drawn against a closed account. It
found the said act “abhorrent and against exacting standards of morality
and decency required of a member of the bar.” Thus, the Court explained:
Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless
checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the effect transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the
circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing
Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately
reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner
contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty
or good morals.
Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing
at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in,
or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.
 
Nonetheless, in Co v. Atty. Bernardino17 and Lao v. Atty. Medel18 the
Court suspended the respondent lawyers for a period of one (1) year for
their failure to pay just debts and for issuing worthless checks as there was
no showing of restitution on their part. In line with these, the Court finds
the suspension of one (1) year warranted.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Jr. is hereby found guilty of
gross misconduct and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year, effective upon his receipt of this decision, with the WARNING that a
repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more
severely.
Legal Profession Additional Cases
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in respondent’s record as a
member of the Bar, and notice served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., On Leave.
Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Jr. suspended from practice of law for one (1)
year for gross misconduct, with warning against repetition of similar
misconduct.
Note.—To practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill. (Olazo vs. Tinga, 637 SCRA 1 [2010])
535242984.docx 8 Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
Belo-Henares v Guevarra, AC No. 11394, December 1, 2016
MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, complainant, vs. ATTY.
ROBERTO “ARGEE” C. GUEVARRA, respondent.
Social Media; Facebook; Words and Phrases; Facebook is a
“voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit
information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends to share
information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one
another.”—Facebook is currently the most popular social media site,
having surpassed one (1) billion registered accounts and with 1.71 billion
monthly active users. Social media are web-based platforms that enable
online interaction and facilitate users to generate and share content. There
are various classifications of social media platforms and one can be
classified under the “social networking sites” such as Facebook. Facebook
is a “voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit
information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends to share
information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one another.”
Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who
they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages, including
automatic notifications when they update their profile. A user can post a
statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to
anyone, depending on the user’s privacy settings.
Same; Same; Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or
her online social networking activity — in this case, Facebook — it is first
necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or
to limit its visibility.—To address concerns about privacy, but without
defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile, as well as
information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High
Court of Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa recognized this ability of
the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but with the cautionary
advice that although Facebook, as stated in its policies, “makes every effort
to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are however not
foolproof.” Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in
his or her online social networking activity — in this case, Facebook — it
is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or
to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through
the utilization of Facebook’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of
these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user’s
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Same; Same; Restricting the privacy of one’s Facebook posts to
“Friends” does not guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of
another user who does not belong to one’s circle of friends.—Restricting
the privacy of one’s Facebook posts to “Friends” does not guarantee
absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not
belong to one’s circle of friends. The user’s own Facebook friend can share
said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the
former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was
tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.”
Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent’s claim of violation of right
to privacy is negated.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; The constitutional right of
freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-
truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into
disrepute.—Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech
and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. While
the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are
among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every person
exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. As such, the
constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to
broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation
or bring them into disrepute. A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook
remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with
malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and
BMGI. Calling complainant a “quack doctor,” “Reyna ng Kaplastikan,”
“Reyna ng  Payola,” and “Reyna ng Kapalpakan,” and insinuating that she
has been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and
Legal Profession Additional Cases
reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of complainant,
as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon
complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured (“binaboy”)
his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a “Frankenstein Factory,” and calling out
a boycott of BMGI’s services all these despite the pendency of the criminal
cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even
threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence
and estafa — which is contrary to one’s obligation “to act with justice.”
Same; Same; By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed
at complainant and Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), respondent
disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper
decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life.—By posting the
subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI,
respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe
proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He
overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer
of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted
inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the
law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and
maligning complainant’s and BMGI’s reputation.
Same; Same; That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity
and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to criticism does not
justify respondent’s disrespectful language.—That complainant is a public
figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed
to criticism does not justify respondent’s disrespectful language. It is the
cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent’s
remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the
former must be administratively sanctioned.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyers may be disciplined even for any
conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct
reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being
an essential qualification for the admission to the practice  of law and for
continuance of such privilege.—“Lawyers may be disciplined even for any
conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct
reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an
essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the
reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, which — albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
profession — would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.” Accordingly,
the Court finds that respondent should be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, as originally recommended by the IBP-
CBD, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Rivera, Santos & Maranan for complainant.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
 
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 for
disbarment filed by complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto “Argee” C. Guevarra
(respondent) for alleged violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1; Rule
7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
 
The Facts
 
Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the
Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws2 and engaged in the specialized field of
cosmetic surgery.3 On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain
Ms. Josefina “Josie” Norcio (Norcio), who filed criminal cases against
complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks in
2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009.4
In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a
popular online social networking site, insulting and verbally abusing
complainant. His posts include the following excerpts:
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to
get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My Client’s Ass, Belo. Senator Adel
Tamano, don’t kiss Belo’s ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong
535242984.docx 9 Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will launch a national
campaign against Plastic Politicians — No guns, No goons, No gold — IN
GUTS I TRUST!
Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio’s Big
Bang on Friday — You will go down in Medical History as a QUACK
DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS,
BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in the
U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :) (September 22 at 11:18 p.m.)5
Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against
me through her office receptionist in Taytay, Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok
at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng
Payola ang kaso. . . si Imelda Marcos nga sued me for P300 million pesos
and ended up apologizing to me, si Belo pa kaya? (September 15 at 12:08
p.m.)6
Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may ‘extra-legal’
budget yon. Kaya lang, bistado ko na kung sino-sino ang
tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng
gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at 10:31 p.m.)7
Argee Guevarra
ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO AKO
KUNG MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA MADIIN AKO
HA???? I just [want] to know how much she hates me,
ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into tens of millions. . . .
(September 15 at 3:57 p.m.)8
Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki
belo killed the news of a picket demonstration in front of the Belo
clinic. I wonder how television, print[,] and radio programs can kill the
story when the next rallies will have the following numbers – 100, 200,
500 and 1000. Kung magkaasaran pa, 10,000 demonstrators will be
assembled in front of the Belo Medical Clinic at Tomas Morato on July 27,
2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17 at 7:56 p.m.)9
Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10 milyon pa budget. . . [I] didn’t
know that my reputation is worth that much. Aba ako kaya magdemanda
sa kanila :) Ikot-ikot daw ang mga P.R. ni Belo trying to convince
editors to pin me down with something  eh alam ko na wala naman
akong sex video!!! Adik talaga sa botox si Aling  Becky at may tama na
sa utak — eh kung gagastos ka lang ng  10 milyon para sa tirang-pikon
laban sa akin at to protect your burak na reputasyon as a plastic
surgeon, i-donate mo na lang yon sa biktima ni Ondoy,
Pepeng at Ramil! Yung mga homeboys ko sa Pasig na nilimas [ni]
Ondoy ang kukubra sa yo! (October 23 at 5:31 p.m.)10
Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio’s courageous act of showing
her face on national television to expose the Reyna ng Kaplastikan, Reyna
ng Kapalpakan. Inspired by shock nevertheless by the fact that the much
needed partial restoration of her behind would cost a staggering $500,000-
$1,000,000 Stanford Medical Hospital and she will still remain
permanently disabled for the rest of her life. . . (July 11 at 2:08 a.m.)11
Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U
THE LURID UNASSAILABLE FACTS ABOUT VICKI BELO’S
QUACK DOCTORING. (October 27, 2009)12
Argee Guevarra yeah. . . actually the issue is simple and you will
easily see which side you’ll be taking — just pay Ms. Josie Norcio a visit
at St. Luke’s at talagang binaboy siya ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan. (July 10
at 12:08 a.m.)13
 
The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his
Facebook account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI’s medical
personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees
for no fair or justifiable cause,14 to wit:
Argee Guevarra yup. . . [I’ll] even throw the kitchen sink at her.
Enjoy nga ito, we will paralyze the operations of all her clinic and seek
out her patients and customers to boycott her. [So] far, good response
— 70% decrease in her July sales. . . (August 9 at 10:29 p.m.)15
Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI’s] 6
clinics after Ms. Josie Norio’s tell-all. With only 2 surgeons of BMGI
certified by PAPRAS, there is real-and-present danger that surgeries like
liposuction, nose lift, boob jobs which have been performed by [BMGI’s]
physicians, every patient runs the risk of something going wrong with the
procedures they have undergone under [BMGI’s] hands :( (July 12 at 12:21
a.m.)16
Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without
licensed and trained doctors, they nearly killed a client of mine, medical
malpractice, use of banned substances/fillers on patients. just recently, in
flawless clinic, a patient who had a simple facial landed in the hospital . . .
(August 9 at 10:04 p.m.)17
Legal Profession Additional Cases
Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask
comrades and friends in Cebu to greet Vicki Belo with a boycott once she
visits there on Oct. 20. Cebu’s royal set already knows that she is not a
certified plastic surgeon: Boycott Belo, Flawless
Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at 6:23 p.m.)18
Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its
money-making machines, dapat convert them into public health
clinics!!! instead of pandering to the vanities of those who want to look
like Dra. Belo. (July 11 at 2:16 a.m.)19
Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients
who will tell all too!!!!! Grabe pala ang mga kapalpakan niyan. So did u
leave Belo Clinic because it has become a Frankenstein Factory? (July
11 at 2:30 a.m.)20
Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS
RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I’ll be gone for a week to a place
where there will be no facebook so please, add Trixie Cruz-Angeles if you
want to find out more about our anti-quack doctor campaign! (September
24 at 3:00 p.m.)21
Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan?
— BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS
RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at 12:17 a.m.)22
Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday — I will go to the hearing
with a placard — BOYCOTT BELO!!! FLAWLESS
RECKLESS!!! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I will vote for Adel Tamano
(La Salle-Ateneo lower batch sa akin at mabuti ang pamilya niyan). . .
BUT WOULD YOU??? (September 23 at 1:50 a.m.)23
Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients’ boycott of the Belo
Medical Group. To all my friends and comrades, please stay away from
Belo’s clinics. I have 2 cousins and 3 friends already who have canceled
their lipo from belo. Please help me shut down the Belo Medical Group
until they perform their moral and legal obligation to Ms. Josie
Norcio. . . (July 17 at 2:12 p.m.)24
Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks
that allegedly threatened complainant with criminal conviction, without
factual basis and without proof,25 as follows:
Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year — GMA will no longer be
president and she will be jailed for plunder;
Vicky Belo will no longer be a doctor and she will be in the middle
of a criminal prosecution. The General Surgeon of France will have a
Philippine version. By October and November, some congressmen I have
spoken with will be issuing summons to Vicky Belo for a congressional
inquiry; the subject - legislation regulating the practice of cosmetic
surgery! (September 22 at 11:31 p.m.)26
Argee Guevarra Celso delos Angeles can still get medical attention in
prison — from Vicky Belo after she gets convicted too for criminal
negligence and estafa (July 15 at 10:05 a.m.)27
Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo
Medical Group for its criminal negligence which nearly killed Ms. Josie
Norcio over a botched butt augmentation procedure. He found out that
the Dr. Belo herself marketed the product to Ms. Norcio, the operation was
carried out by her doctors who were not licensed by the Philippine
Association of Plastic Reconstructive and Aesthetic
Surgeons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . (July 9 at 8:54 p.m.)28
 
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent’s Facebook
posts were sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of women,29 to wit:
Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who’s the
hottest cebuana chic chick there nowadays? haven’t been there for quite
some time. . . pa-chicks ka naman!!! I’m sure marami kang 25-and-
below na prends diyan. (August 10 at 8:36 p.m.)30
Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how’s the gayest lawyer in cebu? our
forces will soon picket the belo clinic there, can u tell me where that
is? balato ko na sayo si hayden, promise! (August 10 at 12:23 a.m.)31
Argee Guevarra joseph, i can’t say i love u too — baka belo’s team
will use all sorts of attacks na against me. to thwart them, being the gayest
gay in the philippines, can u issue a certification that i am so not like your
type? at yung preferred ko lang ay thin, thalino and thisay? (September 23
at 12:01 a.m.)32
 
Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made
with the object to extort money from her, as apparent from the following
reply made by respondent on a comment on his Facebook post:33
Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time :) (July 11 at 2:37 a.m.)
535242984.docx 10
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo. . . at saka sabi mo
naman, maibagsak ko lang ang kaplastikan ni belo, quits na tayo . . . (July
11 at 2:38 a.m.)34
 
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language,
were designed to inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close
BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million
from her as evident from his demand letter 35 dated August 26, 2009,
complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against
respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as
CBD Case No. 09-2551.
In defense,36 respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in
violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy,37 asserting that
the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private
account on Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle of friends of
which complainant was not a part.38 He also averred that he wrote the posts
in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint
was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had filed
against complainant.39 He denied that the remarks were vulgar and
obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred against
complainant.40 He likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from
her, explaining that he sent the demand letter as a requirement prior to the
filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case for damages
against her.41 Finally, respondent pointed out that complainant was a public
figure who is, therefore, the subject of fair comment.42
After the mandatory conference had been terminated, 43 the parties
were directed to file their respective position papers. 44 Thereafter, the IBP,
through the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), set the case for
clarificatory hearing.45 Upon termination thereof, the case was deemed
submitted for report/recommendation.46
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation47 dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-
CBD recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one (1)
year from the practice of law, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. 48 It held respondent
liable for violation of Rule 7.03, 49 Rule 8.01,50 and Rule 19.0151 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for having posted the above quoted
remarks on his Facebook account, pointing out that respondent cannot
invoke the “private” nature of his posts, considering that he had at least
2,000 “friends” who can read and react thereto. Moreover, the IBP-CBD
maintained that the criminal cases he had filed against complainant on
behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for insufficient evidence; therefore, he
can no longer campaign against complainant whose alleged crimes against
Norcio had not been established.52
In a Resolution 53 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the August 13, 2013 Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,54 arguing that there was no
specific act attributed to him that would warrant his suspension from the
practice of law. He also averred that the libel cases filed against him by an
employee of BMGI had already been dismissed, without prejudice, for lack
of jurisdiction.55
In a Resolution56 dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors
partially granted respondent’s motion, reducing the penalty from one (1)
year to six (6) months suspension.
The Issue Before the Court
 
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable based on the allegations of the
verified complaint.
 
The Court’s Ruling
 
The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the
IBP’s findings, except as to the penalty imposed on respondent.
At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he
posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant and
BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes his right
to privacy, claiming that they were “private remarks” on his “private
account”57 that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when
complainant accessed the same, she violated his constitutionally
guaranteed right to privacy.
Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Legal Profession Additional Cases
The defense is untenable.
Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having
surpassed one (1) billion registered accounts and with 1.71 billion monthly
active users.58 Social media are web-based platforms that enable online
interaction and facilitate users to generate and share content. There are
various classifications59 of social media platforms and one can be classified
under the “social networking sites” such as Facebook.60
Facebook is a “voluntary social network to which members subscribe
and submit information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends to
share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one
another.”61 Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open
book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages,
including automatic notifications when they update their profile. A user
can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made
visible to anyone, depending on the user’s privacy settings.62
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user’s profile, as well as information uploaded by the
user. In H v. W,63 the South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg, Republic
of South Africa recognized this ability of the users to “customize their
privacy settings,” but with the cautionary advice that although Facebook,
as stated in its policies, “makes every effort to protect a user’s information,
these privacy settings are however not foolproof.”64
Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or
her online social networking activity — in this case, Facebook — it is first
necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or
to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through
the utilization of Facebook’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of
these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user’s
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.65
The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning
and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to
private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he
utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to
protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore,
without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject
posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his
circle of friends, respondent’s statement is, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.66
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent’s allegation
that his posts were limited to or viewable by his “Friends” only, there is no
assurance that the same — or other digital content that he uploads or
publishes on his Facebook profile — will be safeguarded as within the
confines of privacy, in light of the following:
(1) Facebook “allows the world to be more open and connected by giving
its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way”;
(2) A good number of Facebook users “befriend” other users who are total
strangers;
(3) The sheer number of “Friends” one user has, usually by the hundreds;
and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can “share” the former’s post, or “tag” others
who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible
only to his or her own Facebook friends.67
 
Thus, restricting the privacy of one’s Facebook posts to “Friends”
does not guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user
who does not belong to one’s circle of friends. The user’s own Facebook
friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post
or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set
at “Friends.”68 Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent’s claim of
violation of right to privacy is negated.
Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks
were written in the exercise of his freedom of speech and expression.
Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute.69 While the
freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among
the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every person
exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. 70 As such, the
constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to
535242984.docx 11
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation
or bring them into disrepute.71
A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of
disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and
tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a
“quack doctor,” “Reyna ng Kaplastikan,” “Reyna ng Payola,” and “Reyna
ng Kapalpakan,” and insinuating that she has been bribing people to
destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to
besmirch the name and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI.
Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon complainant and
BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured (“binaboy”) his client
Norcio, labeling BMGI a “Frankenstein Factory,” and calling out a boycott
of BMGI’s services all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases
that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even threatened
complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa — which is
contrary to one’s obligation “to act with justice.”
In view of the foregoing, respondent’s inappropriate and obscene
language, and his act of publicly insulting and undermining the reputation
of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in
complete and utter violation of the following provisions in the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
 
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant
and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to
observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He
overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer
of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted
inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the
law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and
maligning complainant’s and BMGI’s reputation.
That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a
public personage who is exposed to criticism 72 does not justify
respondent’s disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety.73 In this case, respondent’s remarks against
complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be
administratively sanctioned.
“Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their
private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity
or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the
admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege.
When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks
of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one’s behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional
duties, but also covers any misconduct, which — albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of their profession — would show them to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest
in them.”74 Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as
originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto “Argee” C. Guevarra is
found guilty of violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Respondent Atty. Roberto “Argee” C. Guevarra suspended from
practice of law for one (1) year for violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01
Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Legal Profession Additional Cases
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with stern warning against
repetition of similar acts.
Notes.—Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. No. 10175
is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet
users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression,
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the
cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. (Disini, Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice, 716
SCRA 237 [2014])
The Supreme Court (SC) cannot order respondent to return the money
he borrowed from complainant in his private capacity; In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the
court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. (Foster
vs. Agtang, 744 SCRA 242 [2014])
Guevarra v Eala, AC No. 7136, August 1, 2007
A.C. No. 7136. August 1, 2007.*
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE
EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
Legal
Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment;  Immorality; Adultery; Pleadings and
Practice; Negative Pregnant; Words and Phrases; Adultery is defined
under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that “committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to
be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void”; A
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse
party—it is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts
alleged in the plead-ing.—From respondent’s ANSWER, he does not deny
carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, “adultery” being defined
under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that “committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to
be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.” (Italics
supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he
maintaining that it was “low profile and known only to the immediate
members of their respective families.” In other words, respondent’s denial
is a negative pregnant, a denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely
denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at.
Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of
the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Evidence; Quantum of
Evidence; Clearly preponderant evidence—that evidence adduced by one
party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party
and, therefore, has greater weight than the other—which is the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.—Without
doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been
sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence—that
evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than
that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other—
which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against
a lawyer. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases. . . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal
case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case
for disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that
is required.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Words and Phrases;  Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides the grounds for
disbarment or suspension uses the phrase “grossly immoral conduct,” not
“under scandalous circumstances.”—The immediately-quoted Rule which
provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase “grossly
immoral conduct,” not “under scandalous circumstances.” Sexual
intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code reading: ART. 334.Concubinage.—Any husband who
shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his
wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished
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by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. x x x x, an
element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual
intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not
his wife—it is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
—“Whether a lawyer’s sexual congress with a woman not his wife or
without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as ‘grossly
immoral conduct’ depends on the surrounding circumstances.” The case at
bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman
who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  A lawyer, in carrying on an
extra-marital affair with a married woman prior to the judicial declaration
that her marriage was null and void, and despite such lawyer himself
being married, showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law
—he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.—That the marriage between
complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was
declared null and void. As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed,
unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and
despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Adultery is a private offense
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio; Administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own—they are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.—It bears emphasis
that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and
thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant’s motion to
withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to
be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed
in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative
complaint. Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 (1981), viz.:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a
bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession
are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment
proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which
courts assume in trying criminal case (Italics in the original), this Court
in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, 315 SCRA
406 (1999), held: Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of
their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Atilano S. Guevarra, Jr. for complainant.
     Sayuno, Mendoza and San Jose Law Offices for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee
on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli
Eala (respondent) for “grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation
of the lawyer’s oath.”
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant’s)
then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend
who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled “Mary Ann”) Tantoco
with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed
that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from
respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read “I love
you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.”
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at
night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not
go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied
Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Legal Profession Additional Cases
that she slept at her parents’ house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy
with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them
following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family
and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal
house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and
her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master’s bedroom, a folded social card
bearing the words “I Love You” on its face, which card when unfolded
contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you’ll be moments away from walking down
the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what
you’re about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find
fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a
true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there’s a bigger plan for
the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done
everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your
vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I
laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of
your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is
gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough
memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my
heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO! BE MINE . . . .
AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS
ALONE!
* Not even your piece of paper with the man you chose to walk down
the aisle with will stop me from loving you forever. I LOVE YOU
FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I’M LIVING
MY TWEETIE YOU’LL BE!”2
Eternally yours,           Court.”11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
NOLI                     To respondent’s ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, 12 alleging that
Complainant soon saw respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked
at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn
sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still
later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together
with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card
on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
“14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR
ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the
couple attended the launch of the “Wine All You Can” promotion of
French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong
City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila
Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene
were photographed together; their picture was captioned: “Irene with
Sportscaster Noli Eala.” A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex
“C.”4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the
phrase “flaunting their adulterous relationship” supplied),”
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
“4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted  an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the
truth of the matter being that their relationship was  low profile and known
only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that
Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to
be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.”5 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
“15. Respondent’s adulterous conduct with the complainant’s wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his
gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership
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Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it
a “piece of paper.” Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to
complainant’s bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue
his love for her “until we are together again,” as now they
are.”6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
“5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the
Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Re-spondent’s relationship
with Irene was not  under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his
relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful
relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally
meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent’s special
friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of
paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to
Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper
was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage
contract.7 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
“18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and
obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social
institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).”9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
“19. Respondent’s grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the
Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In
pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant’s wife, he mocked
the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the
complainant’s marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the
legal profession.”10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
“7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of
Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for
disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of
Live Birth as the girl’s father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as
Annex “A,” a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth 13 bearing Irene’s signature
and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene
Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke’s Hospital.
Complainant’s REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO
DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied
having “personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainant’s Reply.”15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to
the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his
marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent
and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant’s
Complaint-Affidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his
testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent’s counsel did not cross-
examine complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros
V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 18 dated
October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred
for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading:
“Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Italics supplied),”
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
“Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
(Italics supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly
Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Legal Profession Additional Cases
dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:
“RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND
SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
to APPROVE the  DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.”20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition 21 of complainant before this Court, filed
pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the
case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word
Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment 23 on the present petition of
complainant, that there is no evidence against him. 24 The contention fails.
As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
“While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. “C”)
and the news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. “D”), even
taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an
adulterous relationship with complainant’s wife, there are other pieces of
evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against
respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,
respondent through counsel made the following statements to
wit: “Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the
truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and
known only to immediate members of their respective families . . . , and
Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the
respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship
with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to
grossly immoral conduct . . .”
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission
that there is indeed a “special” relationship between him and
complainant’s wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of
Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex “H-1”)
sufficiently prove that there was  indeed an illicit relationship between
respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child
“Samantha”. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be
noted that com-plainant’s wife Irene supplied the information that
respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent
admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe
that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the
paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not
categorically denied that he is  the father of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje.”25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent’s ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an
adulterous relationship with Irene, “adultery” being defined under Art. 333
of the Revised Penal Code as that “committed by any married woman who
shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man
who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the
marriage be subsequently declared void.” 26 (Italics supplied) What
respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that
it was “low profile and known only to the immediate members of their
respective families.”
In other words, respondent’s denial is a negative pregnant,
“a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an
admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse
party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts
alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
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circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.”27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and italics supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent’s denial of having “personal
knowledge” of Irene’s daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje’s Certificate
of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent—a “lawyer,” 38
years old—as the child’s father. And the phrase “NOT MARRIED” is
entered on the desired information on “DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE.” A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they
were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the
Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the
father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke’s Medical
Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the
witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of
Live Birth that the child’s father is “Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala,” who
was 38 years old and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and
Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant
evidence—that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive
and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight
than the other32—which is the quantum of evidence needed in an
administrative case against a lawyer.
“Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evi-dence” is all that is
required.”33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, reading:
“SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis and italics supplied),”
under scandalous circumstances.34
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for
disbarment or suspension uses the phrase “grossly immoral conduct,” not
“under scandalous circumstances.” Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, follow-ing Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code
reading:
“ART. 334. Concubinage.—Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the
conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her
in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,”
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual
intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
“Whether a lawyer’s sexual congress with a woman not his wife or
without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as ‘grossly
immoral conduct’ depends on the surrounding circumstances.”35 The case
at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married
woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried
out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court
in Vitug v. Rongcal:36
“On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an
extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which
Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Legal Profession Additional Cases
act is not “so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree” in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual
relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect
to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-
marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.” 37 (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
“The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the
respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the
records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e.,
that indeed respondent has been carrying on an  illicit affair  with a
married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This
detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon
him.”39 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer’s oath he took before
admission to practice law which goes:
“I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in
the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority
of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.”
(Italics supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family)
of the Constitution reading:
“Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.”
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which
echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife “to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support.”40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
“unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,” and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
any “conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.”
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the
investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a
Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
complainant’s petition for nullity of his (complainant’s) marriage to Irene
had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court,
and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against
respondent and Irene “based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant
case,” which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ),
on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant,
withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice’s Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainant’s Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
“Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of
the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to
Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which
provides that “notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner
may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which
case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been
taken.”42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently
declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took
place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer,
respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have
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Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extramarital
affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being
married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law.
And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant’s withdrawal of his petition for review before the
DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed
his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the
DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22,
2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office of
complainant’s complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor’s
Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
“Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in
the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements
of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on,
respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates
with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her
about Eala’s frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant
also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be
married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another
woman. Moreover, Moje’s eventual abandonment of their conjugal home,
after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to
confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes
all the more apparent by Moje’s subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th
Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the
church where she had exchange (sic) marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited.
Especially since Eala’s vehicle and that of Moje’s were always seen there.
Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala
asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in
that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm
that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said
address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed
all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both
respondent’s love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out
there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl  at the
nearby hospital of St. Luke’s Medical Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth
of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This
speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the
adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant’s supposed illegal
procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point
for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any
categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene
Louise Moje.”45 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant
complainant’s motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the
Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been
a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz.:
“x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a
bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession
are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment
proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which
courts assume in trying criminal case”47 (Italics in the original), this Court
in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:
“Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06
passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DIS-BARRED for
grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made
part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Legal Profession Additional Cases
SO ORDERED.
     Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, T
inga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 dated January 28,
2006 by Board of Governors of Integrated Bar of the Philippines annulled
and set aside. Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala disbarred for grossly immoral
conduct, violation of his oath of office and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of Conduct of Professional Responsibility.
Notes.—A judge’s actuation of cohabiting with another when his
marriage was still valid and subsisting—his wife having been allegedly
absent for four years only—constitutes grossly immoral conduct. (Abadilla
vs. Tabiliran, Jr., 249 SCRA 447 [1995])
A person’s engaging in premarital sexual relations with another,
making promises to marry, suggests a doubtful moral character but the
same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct—a grossly immoral act
is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
(Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr., 276 SCRA 445 [1997])
De Leon v Pedreña, AC No. 9401, October 22, 2013
A.C. No. 9401. October 22, 2013.*
JOCELYN DE LEON, complainant, vs. ATTY. TYRONE PEDREÑA,
respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Gross Immoral Conduct; It bears
stressing that immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.—The records
show that Atty. Pedreña rubbed the complainant’s right leg with his hand;
tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and
forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her
private part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts
were not merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and
grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In
this regard, it bears stressing that immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous
or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.
Same; Same; Same; The possession of good moral character is
both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the Legal Profession.—
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain
membership in the Legal Profession. Members of the Bar are clearly duty-
bound to observe the highest degree of morality and integrity in order to
safeguard the reputation of the Bar. Any errant behavior on the part of a
lawyer that tends to expose a deficiency in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities,
is sufficient to warrant the lawyer’s suspension or disbarment. Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides that a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended for grossly immoral conduct, or violation of his
oath as a lawyer. Towards that end, we have not been remiss in reminding
members of the Bar to live up to the standards and norms of the Legal
Profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Same; Same; Same; Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by
the fact that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal
service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that De Leon was then such a
client.—Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was
then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal service to indigent
litigants, and by the fact that De Leon was then such a client. He also
disregarded his oath as a public officer to serve others and to be
accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of her
vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance.
Same; Penalties; The determination of the penalty to impose on an
erring lawyer is within the Supreme Court’s discretion.—Verily, the
determination of the penalty to impose on an erring lawyer is within the
Court’s discretion. The exercise of the discretion should neither be
arbitrary nor despotic, nor motivated by any animosity or prejudice
towards the lawyer, but should instead be ever controlled by the imperative
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Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the Bar and to
exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the Court, to his
client, to his brethren in the profession, and to the general public.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Sexual Harassment.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Rosemarie Carmen Veloz Perey for complainant.
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who commits overt acts of sexual harassment against a
female client is guilty of reprehensible conduct that is unbecoming of a
member of the Bar, and may be condignly punished with suspension from
the practice of law.
Antecedents
Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
a complaint for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law against
Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, a Public Attorney. She averred in her complaint-
affidavit that Atty. Pedreña had sexually harassed her as follows:
1. On January 30, 2006, at about 10:00 in the morning, I
went to the Public Attorney’s Office in Parañaque City, in order
to inquire from ATTY. TYRONE PEDREÑA about the status of
my case for support for my two minor children against my
husband, which case is being handled by Atty. Pedreña;
2. At that time, said Atty. Pedreña was at a court hearing,
so I waited at his office until he arrived at about 11:45 a.m. Atty.
Pedreña told me to go ahead to Tita Babes Restaurant so we could
take our lunch together and to talk about my said case;
3. While we were eating at the said restaurant, he asked me
many personal matters rather than to discuss my said case. But
still, I answered him with respect, for he was my lawyer;
4. After we took our lunch, he told me to just go back on
February 1, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. because according to him, my said
case was quite difficult, that he needed more time to study;
5. Since Atty. Pedreña was also already going home then,
he told me then to ride with him and he would just drop me by the
jeepney station;
6. Although I refused to ride with him, he persistently
convinced me to get in the car, and so I acceded to his request so
as not to offend him;
7. Right after we left the parking lot and not yet too far
from the City Hall, Atty. Pedreña immediately held my left hand
with his right hand, insisted me to get closer with him and laid me
on his shoulder;
8. I immediately responded by saying “AYOKO HO!” But
he persisted in trying to get hold of my hand and he also tried
very hard to inserting (sic) his finger into my firmly closed hand.
Thus, I became very afraid and at the same time offended for his
lack of respect for me at that moment;
9. Despite my resistance, he continued rubbing my left leg.
I was then attempting to remove his hand on my leg, but he
grabbed my hand and forced it to put (sic) on his penis;
10. Because I was already really afraid at that moment, I
continued to wrestle and struggle, and as I saw that we were
already approaching the 7-Eleven Store, the place where I was
supposed to get off, Atty. Pedreña made another move of pressing
his finger against my private part;
11. I thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the car’s door and
told him categorically that I was getting off the car. But because
the traffic light was on green, he accelerated a bit more instead,
but sensing my insistence to get off, he stopped the car, and
allowed me to get off. He then reminded me to see him on
February 1, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. for the continuation of hearing of
my case;
12. That on February 1, 2006, I had to come for my case,
but this time, I brought with me my five-year-old child to avoid
another incident. I was not able to see Atty. Pedreña then, so I just
signed some documents;1
In his answer, Atty. Pedreña averred that De Leon’s allegations were
unsubstantiated; that entertaining such a complaint would open the gates to
those who had evil desires to destroy the names of good lawyers; that the
complaint was premature and should be dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping because De Leon had already charged him with acts of
lasciviousness in the Parañaque City Prosecutor’s Office; and that he had
also filed a complaint for theft against De Leon.2
Attached to Atty. Pedreña’s answer were his counter-affidavit in the
criminal case for acts of lasciviousness and his complaint-affidavit for
Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Legal Profession Additional Cases
theft. In his counter-affidavit, Atty. Pedreña admitted giving a ride to De
Leon, but he vehemently denied making sexual advances on her, insisting
that she had sat very close to him during the ride that even made it hard for
him to shift gears, and that the ride had lasted for only two to three
minutes.3 He claimed that De Leon was allowing herself to be used by his
detractors in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) after he had opposed the
practice of certain PAO staff members of charging indigent clients for
every document that they prepared. In his complaint affidavit for theft, he
stated that he had another passenger in his car at the time he gave a ride to
De Leon, who did not notice the presence of the other passenger because
the ride lasted for only two to three minutes; and that the other passenger
was Emma Crespo, who executed her own affidavit attesting that she had
witnessed De Leon’s act of taking his (Pedreña) cellphone from the
handbrake box of the car.4
Only De Leon appeared during the hearing.5 Hence, Atty. Pedreña was
deemed to have waived his right to participate in the proceedings.6
Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Pedreña and the striking off of his name from the Roll
of Attorneys.7 Holding that a disbarment case was sui generis and could
proceed independently of the criminal case that was based on the same
facts; and that the proceedings herein need not wait until the criminal case
for acts of lasciviousness brought against Atty. Pedreña was finally
resolved, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Pedreña had
made sexual advances on De Leon in violation of Rule 1.01 8 and Rule
7.039 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-83 dated September 19, 2007, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, and
imposed upon Atty. Pedreña suspension from the practice of law for three
months.10
Atty. Pedreña filed a motion for reconsideration with the IBP, 11 which
adopted and approved Resolution No. XX-2012-43 dated January 15,
2012, denying the motion and affirming with modification its Resolution
No. XVIII-2007-83 by increasing the period of suspension to six months.12
On February 28, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted to the
Court Resolution No. XX-2012-43 and the records of the case for final
approval.13
In the Resolution dated April 24, 2012, the Court noted the IBP Board
of Governors’ notice of Resolution No. XX-2012-43.14
Ruling
The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
stated thusly:
There is no doubt that Complainant was able to prove her
case against the Respondent. During the clarificatory hearing, she
was straightforward and spontaneous in answering the questions
propounded on her. Her account of the incident that happened on
30 January 2006 was consistent with the matters she stated in her
Complaint and Verified Position Paper.
On the other hand, Respondent’s defenses are not credible
enough to rebut the claims of Complainant. His defenses are
replete with inconsistencies and his actuations in the entire
proceedings show lack of integrity in his dealings with both the
Complainant and this Commission.
x x x x
We find no merit at all in the defenses put forth by
Respondent. The Theft case filed by Respondent is a mere
afterthought on his part. We note that such criminal complaint
hinged on a claim that there was another person during that
incident who allegedly saw Complainant stealing Respondent’s
mobile phone. Yet, in Respondent’s Position Paper and in his
Counter-Affidavit to the Acts of Lasciviousness case, which was
executed after the institution of the criminal complaint for Theft,
Respondent never mentioned anything about a third person being
present during the incident. If the presence of this third person
was crucial to prove his case against herein Complainant, there is
no reason why this allegation would be omitted in his Position
Paper and Counter-Affidavit to at least support his defense.
Furthermore, Respondent’s contention that Complainant is
being used by his detractors is self-serving. His memo regarding
the amount of RATA he receives is a relatively harmless query to
a higher authority, which could not possibly motivate his
colleagues to prod other people to file cases against Respondent. 15
535242984.docx 17
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
We adopt the findings and conclusions of the Investigating
Commissioner, as sustained by the IBP Board of Governors, for being
substantiated by the evidence on record.
The records show that Atty. Pedreña rubbed the complainant’s right
leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand;
grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his
finger against her private part. Given the circumstances in which he
committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but
repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct
on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, it bears stressing that immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency.16
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent
and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain
membership in the Legal Profession. Members of the Bar are clearly duty-
bound to observe the highest degree of morality and integrity in order to
safeguard the reputation of the Bar. Any errant behavior on the part of a
lawyer that tends to expose a deficiency in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities,
is sufficient to warrant the lawyer’s suspension or disbarment. 17 Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides that a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended for grossly immoral conduct, or violation of his
oath as a lawyer. Towards that end, we have not been remiss in reminding
members of the Bar to live up to the standards and norms of the Legal
Profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was
then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal service to indigent
litigants, and by the fact that De Leon was then such a client. He also
disregarded his oath as a public officer to serve others and to be
accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of her
vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance.
Yet, even as we agree with the findings of the IBP, we consider the
recommended penalty of suspension for six months not commensurate with
the gravity of the offensive acts committed.
Verily, the determination of the penalty to impose on an erring lawyer
is within the Court’s discretion. The exercise of the discretion should
neither be arbitrary nor despotic, nor motivated by any animosity or
prejudice towards the lawyer, but should instead be ever controlled by the
imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the
Bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the
Court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession, and to the general
public.18
In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed on Atty.
Pedreña, therefore, we take into consideration judicial precedents on gross
immoral conduct bearing on sexual matters. Although most of the judicial
precedents dealt with lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs, or
cohabited with women other than their wives, 19 they are nonetheless
helpful in gauging the degree of immorality committed by the respondent.
In Advincula v. Macabata,20 the Court held that the errant lawyer’s
acts of turning his client’s head towards him and then kissing her on the
lips were distasteful, but still ruled that such acts, albeit offensive and
undesirable, were not grossly immoral. Hence, the respondent lawyer was
merely reprimanded but reminded to be more prudent and cautious in his
dealings with clients.
In Barrientos v. Daarol,21 the respondent lawyer was disbarred, but
the severest penalty was imposed not only because of his engaging in illicit
sexual relations, but also because of his deceit. He had been already
married and was about 41 years old when he proposed marriage to a 20-
year-old girl. He succeeded in his seduction of her, and made her pregnant.
He not only suggested that she abort the pregnancy, but he also breached
his promise to marry her, and, in the end, even deserted her and their child.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,22 the Court adjudged the respondent lawyer,
a married man with children, highly immoral for having taken advantage of
his position as the chairman of the College of Medicine of his school in
enticing the complainant, then a student in the college, to have carnal
knowledge with him under the threat that she would flunk in all her
subjects should she refuse. The respondent was disbarred for grossly
immoral conduct.
Without diminishing the gravity of the complainant’s sad experience,
however, we consider the acts committed by Atty. Pedreña to be not of the
same degree as the acts punished under the cited judicial precedents.
Neither did his acts approximate the act committed by the respondent
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Legal Profession Additional Cases
lawyer in Calub v. Suller,23 whereby we disbarred the respondent lawyer
for raping his neighbor’s wife notwithstanding that his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt in his criminal prosecution for the crime. We
further note that, unlike in Barrientos where there was deceit and in Delos
Reyes where there were threats and taking advantage of the respondent
lawyer’s position, Atty. Pedreña did not employ any scheme to satiate his
lust, but, instead, he desisted upon the first signs of the complainant’s firm
refusal to give in to his advances.
In view of these considerations, the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two years is fitting and just.
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS ATTY. TYRONE
PEDREÑA from the practice of law for two years effective upon receipt
of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,
Peralta, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., On leave.
Atty. Tyrone Pedreña suspended from practice of law for two (2)
years, with stern warning against repetition of similar acts.  of First Instance, and on the same day he was duly arraigned and plead not
Notes.—Possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and
to retain membership in the legal profession; Admission to the bar does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any
question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he
became a lawyer. (Garrido vs. Garrido, 611 SCRA 508 [2010])
Respondent’s act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of
his former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants
sanction. (Ventura vs. Samson, 686 SCRA 430 [2012])
In Re: Tagorda, 53 Phil 37, March 23, 1929
[No. 12880. October 25, 1917.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. BENITO LAO
CHUECO, defendant and appellant.
1. 1.ALIENS; FULL, FREE, AND FAIR HEARING.
—When a defendant, in deportation proceedings
under Act No. 702, is forced to trial on the day the
complaint is presented against him without an
opportunity to call his witnesses and when he
himself is too ill to declare as a witness, he is not
given that opportunity to a full, free, and fair
hearing contemplated by the law and a new trial
will be ordered.
1. 2.ID.; BAIL.—Chinese ens, during the pendency
of proceedings for deportation un Act No. 702, are
entitled to bail during the pendency of such
proceedings. (U. S. vs. Go-Siaco, 12 Phil. Rep.,
490.) Chinese aliens under the Chinese exclusion
law, seeking admission into the territory of the
United States, are not entitled to bail during the
pendency of the proceeding. (Collector of
Customs vs. Harvey and Co Puy, 34 Phil. Rep.,
503; Tan Puy vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil.
Rep., 586.)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Surigao.
Borromeo, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Emilio Pineda for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
535242984.docx 18
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018
The important question presented by this appeal is whether or not the
defendant had been given a fair and full hearing in the court below.
The purpose of the action was to deport the defendant from the Philippine
Islands under Act No. 702, upon the theory that he was a Chinese laborer
and had not registered in accordance with the provisions of said law.
The first complaint against the defendant was signed by an officer of
the Philippine Constabulary and was presented in the court of the justice of
the peace of the municipality of Surigao on the 28th day of February, 1917.
While the records fails to show that the defendant had been arrested it does
show that he appeared in said court on the 27th day of February, the day
before the complaint was presented, and gave a bond for his liberty in the
sum of P600. On the 16th day of March, 1917, the defendant appeared in
said court and renounced his right to a preliminary examination; and on the
same day the justice of the peace found that there were reasonable grounds
for believing that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged in the
complaint and ordered him to be held f or trial in the Court of First
Instance. The record further shows that a notice was issued to the
bondsmen of the defendant to present him in the Court of First Instance for
trial upon the 14th day of April, 1917. The record further shows, without
any explanation whatever, that on the 25th day of April, 1917, the
prosecuting attorney of the Province of Surigao asked that a warrant of
arrest be issued for the arrest of the defendant. On the 27th day of April,
1917, a new complaint was presented against the def fendant in the Court
guilty. Immediately after the arraignment the cause was set down for trial.
Thereupon the defendant, through his attorney, asked that the trial of said
case be postponed upon the ground, first, that he was sick, and second,
because his witnesses were not present and that he had been unable to
obtain them because of his sickness. Said motion for a continuance of the
trial was immediately denied by the court and the court ordered the trial to
proceed. Two witnesses only were presented by the prosecution. At the
close of the presentation of the proof by the prosecution the defendant
renewed his motion for a continuance of the hearing, basing his motion
again upon the fact that he was sick and had been unable to bring into court
his witnesses. Said motion for a transfer of the hearing was again denied.
The defendant then notified the court that he was unable, by reason of his
sickness, to declare as a witness in his defense. Thereupon the court
immediately entered an order deporting the defendant from the Philippine
Islands. Immediately thereafter the defendant gave notice of his intention
to appeal to the Supreme Court and requested his liberty during the
pendency of the appeal under bond, which motion was denied by the court.
The appellant in this court makes the following assignments of error:
1. "1.The court erred in compelling the accused to try
his case in spite of the fact that it was impossible
for him to do so on account of illness.
2. "2.The court erred in refusing to postpone the trial
of the cause, as the accused had applied for, that is,
in not granting him a reasonable time within which
he could gather his witnesses and evidence and
prepare for his defense.
3. "3.The court erred in ordering the deportation of
the accused without giving him an opportunity to
defend himself."
Said assignments of error present but one question, to wit; Did the
defendant have a fair trial in the court below, and was he permitted to
properly defend himself against the charges contained in the complaint?
The Honorable Quintin Paredes, in answering the brief of the
appellant, admits that the defendant did not have a fair trial in the court
below and was not given an opportunity to present his witnesses, and
recommends that the record be remanded to the trial court for a new trial
The Attorney-General further observes that the evidence adduced during
the trial of the cause was objectionable upon the ground of hearsay and was
purely speculative in character.
An examination of the record shows the following facts with reference
to the opportunity which the defendant had to defend himself:
First. That the first complaint was not presented by a person who was
authorized, under the law, to present a complaint. (U. S. vs. Lee Chiao, 23
Phil. Rep., 543; U. S. vs. De los Santos, 33 Phil. Rep., 397; U. S. vs. Li
Choy, 34 Phil. Rep., 910.)
Second. That the defendant was arraigned and forced to trial on the
very day when the complaint was presented in the Court of First Instance,
being then and there himself unable to declare as a witness by reason of
Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon
Legal Profession Additional Cases Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067\ January 31, 2018

sickness, and without having had an opportunity to bring his witnesses into
court.
The lower court, in refusing to give the defendant an opportunity to
have his witnesses brought to court by proper process and in forcing him to
trial when he was too ill to declare as a witness, clearly denied the
defendant a full, fair .and adequate opportunity to defend himself, (U.
S. vs. Tur la, R. G. No. 12633 ;1 Loo Sing vs. Collector of Customs, 27
Phil. Rep., 491.)
While it is not important for the decision of this case we deem it
proper at this time, in view of the fact that the lower court denied the
defendant his liberty under bond, to call attention to the fact that in
proceedings for the deportation of Chinese aliens under and by virtue of
the provisions of Act No. 702 the defendant is entitled to his liberty under
bond. (U. S. vs. Go-Siaco, 12 Phil. Rep., 490.)
A different rule, however, applies to Chinese aliens who are seeking
admission into the territory of the United States. Under the Chinese
Exclusion Law, Chinese immigrants who are seeking admission into the
territory of the United States and are denied that right and thereafter appeal
to the court are not entitled to bail during the pendency of such appeal.
(Collector of Customs vs. Harvey and Co Puy, 34 Phil. Rep., 503; Tan
Puy vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. Rep., 586.)
We agree with the Attorney-General that the cause should be
remanded to the court whence it came for a new trial. And without any
finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C. J.,  Araullo,  Street, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.
Cause remanded for new trial.

535242984.docx 19 Compiled by: John Glenn Lambayon