How The East Was Lost 6/26/19, 9(14 PM

How The East Was Lost

Ranajit Roy
The Illustrated Weekly of India, March 11, 1984
[This article by Ranajit Roy is relevant if one wants to understand the colonial
exploitation of Eastern India since 1947. Ranajit Roy starts the story from the
British days. I have scanned and put it on the web so that interested people may view
it and learn from it. I have placed the tables closest to their place of reference. This
makes Table II the first table to appear as you scroll down, then comes Table I and
finally Table III.]

India is a country of continental dimensions and is culturally and linguistically more varied than Europe. In
such a country relations between the central government and the Constituent units are bound to he a matter of
controversy and conflict.

We need not go into the distant past. Even in the modern epoch, the East India Company centralised the
administration of its establishments in this sub-continent in 1773 when the Bombay and Madras Presidencies
were made subordinate to Calcutta. All revenues were also centralised with the result that, as a British
administrator has recorded, "the distribution of public income degenerated into something like a scramble
(among the provinces), in which the most violent had the advantage, with very little attention to reason".

Although the imperialists kept the Centre strong until the very last, during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century minor doses of decentralization began being introduced. One of the important aspects of the national
movement was the demand for provincial autonomy. Under the British the farthest the country went in this
direction was when the Government of India Act of 1935 introduced limited provincial autonomy in 1937.

By that time, the Muslim League had made the demand for Pakistan, the plank of its agitation. The Congress
went on asking for independence as well as for more powers for the provinces. The issue of the nature centre-
state relations should take in independent India became a matter of political discussion.

In 1944.Jawaharial Nehru thought it 'possible' to grant the right of any well constituted area to secede from
the Indian federation or union and to propagate that 'the Congress in effect has agreed to it.' In 1945, the
Congress, in its election manifesto, said that: "in order to give the maximum of freedom to the constituent
units, there may be a minimum list of common and essential federal subjects". In January 1947, Nehru moved
and had a resolution passed in the Constituent Assembly that the constituent units 'shall possess and retain the
status of autonomous units, together with residuary powers.'

Once power passed into their hands, our national leaders forgot their past and became greater votaries of a
strong Centre than even the imperialists were. One of the baits that the British had offered to make the
Congress leaders accept 'vivisection of Mother India' was that they would have the privilege of inheriting a
'strong Centre.' Even Nehru's resolution to give the states residuary powers was revoked.

After three years of labour, our national leaders gave us a Constitution which, the Supreme Court has held, is

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based 'in fact, on the 1935 Act' - an Act which, a Congress member, Basanta Kumar Das told the Constituent
Assembly, "is an almost perfect mechanism for the smooth running of a police state". Biswanath Das, the
veteran Congress leader of Orissa, bewailed that the States had been turned into 'glorified municipalities'. In
the course of the past 34 years, through numerous Constitutional amendments, the Centre has further clipped
the power of the states. The more the Centre has acquired powers, the more has the sense of national unity
come under threat.

As a background to the development of Centre-state and inter-state and inter-regional relations in

independent India it may be useful to have a look at what the British. did during their rule.

Plunder of the Bengal Presidency, which comprised Bengal (west and east), Bihar and Orissa--Assam was
included in 1824--began after Palasi in 1757, Clive himself giving the lead. This was plunder by individuals
which continued for many years.

After the acquisition of the dewani of the Bengal Presidency in 1765, the Company began plundering the
Presidency's revenues, too. This plunder was not only for Britain but also for the Bombay and Madras
presidencies.

We find in Romesh Dutt's Economic History of India under Early British Rule, that from 1792-93 to 1837-38
(46 years), the Bombay Presidency had revenue deficits amounting to £42,304,439. The deficits in the
Madras Presidency totalled £7,720,787. What do there amounts mean in terms of today's exchange rate and
price level?

Sincece price indices were not compiled in those days, the movement of the price of the rice, may he taken as
indicative of the general movement of the price level. In those days the price of a quintal of rice in Bengal
was about Rs 3. Today, taking controlled and free market prices of different varieties of rice together, the
price is about Rs 400 a quintal. We shall be conservative and take it to be only Rs 300 a quintal. A pound
sterling is today worth more than Rs 15. On this basis, Bombay's deficits during these 46 years amounted, in
today's terms, to 42,304,439 multiplied by 15 (exchange rate) and multiplied over again by 100 (increase in
prices) or Rs 6345,66,58,500 (Rs 6345 crores, 66 lakhs and Madras's to Rs 1158,11,80,500 Rs 1158 crores).

The Company did not bring money from Britain to make up these deficits. The revenues of the Bengal
Presidency were utilised for the purpose. During the same 46 years this Presidency was made to produce a
surplus of £78,206,639. The bulk of what remained of the revenues, was invested to pay for the Company's
purchases in this subcontinent and in China and for financing its annexionist wars. The drain did not stop in
1838.

In 1861, the Bengal governor complained that it was "a practice handed down from the beginning of the
British empire in India to make Bengal Pay much more than her share Of Imperial (Central) revenue and to
give her in return not a quarter of her share of the Imperial 'funds granted for such objects as military
Protection, police, roads and other public works".

As a result, the Bengal Presidency area, now called eastern India, was deprived of the benefits of such vital
public works as irrigation and road building. From 1860 to 1947 (87 years), government expenditure for
irrigation in Punjab was 32.6 per cent of the total spent in the country on this account, in Bombay and Sind
20.7 per cent, in Madras 16.1 per cent and UP 17.3 per cent whereas in all the other provinces, including
Bengal and Burma, the expenditure was only 13.3 per cent. In road-building also the neglect of the needs of
the Bengal Presidency was a feature of the British administration. (The relevent figures are given in Table II).

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TABLE II

PROVINCE-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF

INVESTMENTS IN IRRIGATION AND

ROAD-BUILDING (1860-61 TO 1946-47)

Irrigation Road Building

% of India's
Rs.Crore % of India's Total Rs.Crore
Total
Punjab 104.0 32.6 46.5 12.2
Bombay & Sind 66.0 20.7 71.3 18.7
Madras 51.3 16.1 55.2 14.5
UP 55.3 17.3 31.9 8.4
Bengal (a) (a) 31.6 8.3
Burma (a), (a) 44.2 11.6
Others (b) 42.9 13.3 69.6 30.7
Total 319.5 100.0 380.7 100.0

Note: (a) For the columns under irrigation, 'others' include 'Bengal (West and East), Bihar, Orissa, Assam,
Central Provinces and Berar, and, up to 1936, Burma.

(b) 'Others 'cover all provinces other than Punjab (East and West), Madras, Bombay, Sind, United Provinces
(U P), and up to 1936, Burma.

Source:-Article in Social Scientist journal of the Indian Institute of Social Sciences, November 1972, by M J
K Thavaraj, Professor of the Institute of Public Administration, New Dwlhl.

In 1769 the Company's London Board of Directors formulated, and directed its Calcutta Council to carry out,
in Burke's words, "a perfect plan of policy, both of compulsion and encouragement, which must, to a very
considerable degree, operate destructively to the manufactures of (the) Bengal. (Presidency)." The object was
"to change the face of that industrious country, in order to render it a field for the produce of crude materials
subservient, to the manufactures of Great Britain".

In India's history this episode should go down as the beginning of 'planning'. A huge flow of treasure I decade
after decade from the Bengal Presidency hastened the industrial revolution in Britain. Fiscal freight and all
other conceivable measures were contrived to ruin Eastern India's industrial and commercial classes. Later,
other parts of India also suffered.

There are not many regions in the world which, in a comparable area, are as rich in basic industrial raw
materials as is Chotanagpur in Bihar, along with the contiguous areas. of Orissa, and West Bengal. No oil has
so far been found in Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa, but Assam is rich in it. In 1981, eastern India accounted,

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in value, for 47.72 per cent of the country's production of minerals, including oil, the contribution of Bihar
alone being 27.74 per cent. When planning began eastern India's share was much bigger. With very fertile
soil, this region is potentially rich agricultural land. The question is one of capital investment for
development.

British imperialist rule was such that by the time it ended. Bihar had been made by far the poorest province,
judging by per head income. Orissa's condition was only slightly less appalling. Because of tea gardens
Assam, was in a better position in this regard, and West Bengal, for reasons we shall presently discuss had the
highest per head income. Changes in per head incomes of the states since planning began are shown in Table
I.

TABLE I

GROWTH OF PER HEAD INCOMES (IN RUPEES) OF STATES SINCE 1950-51

(RANKS OF STATES IN BRACKETS)

Region & States

At 1960-61 prices At current prices
Region and States 1950-51 1960-61 1964-65 1975-76

(14 States) (14 States) (16 States) (16 States)

Eastern India:
Assam 334.6( 5) 328.4( 6) 441( 6) 848(11)
Bihar 180.6(14) 222.0(14) 299(16) 669(16)
Orissa 251.8(11) 267.9(13) 347(14) 834(12)
W Bengal 471.4( 1) 461.9( 2) 498( 5) 1100( 5)
Western India:
Gujarat 381.0( 3) 402.8( 4) 523( 3) 1236( 4)
Maharashtra 373.3( 4) 479.4( 1) 526( 2) 1455( 3)
Madhya Pradesh 235.(13) 293.4( 9) 373(12) 790(14)
Northern India:
Haryana* - 504( 4) 1514( 2)
Punjab* 404.4( 2) 441.3( 3) 575( 1) 1688( 1)
Rajasthan 256.3(10) 272.0(12) 356(13) 873(1())
UP 270.5( 8) 291.7(10) 374(11) 727(15)
J&K NA NA 341(15) 825(13)
Southern India:
Andhra 257.5( 9) 289.1(11) 438( 7) 897( 9)
Karnataka 286.8( 7) 313.2( 8) 420( 9) 1038( 6)
Kerala 303.9( 6) 326.2( 7) 393(10) 1000( 7)
Tamil Nadu 244.7(12) 343.8( 5) 434( 8) 907( 8)

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*For 1950-51 and 1960-61, Punjab includes, Haryana.

NA - Not available.

Source., For 1950-51 and 1960-61 figures, National Council of Applied Economic Research, New
Delhi, Estimates of State Income, 1967, p. 57.

For 1964-65 figures, Finance Commission, Report 1965, p. 128, and for 1975-76 figures, Prime
Minister's answer to unstarred question no. 285 in Lok Sabha on March 12, 1980.

West Bengal's pre-eminent position in British India was because of the Calcutta port and the growth of the
industry in Greater Calcutta and the Asansol area based on agricultural and industrial raw materials for which
these areas enjoyed locational advantage. North Bengal was the country's second largest tea producing area.
Jute and tea made eastern India by far the largest earner of net foreign exchange. Calcutta was the seat of
Company's Bengal Council since the closing decade of the seventeenth century and of the British Indian
government from 1773 to 1911. Whatever little investment there was in eastern India was confined to this
small area. Other parts of West Bengal were almost as backward as the most backward areas of the backward
provinces.

The strong Centre has since the dawn of independence been saying that its policy is to help the poorer states
more so that they might catch up with the richer ones. One of the instruments supposedly used to this end is
distribution of plan assistance among the states.

On this subject, Dr D R Gadgil, as deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, has recorded his findings
thus: "As a matter of fact, there was no correlation between (Central) grants and the need for them. I
discovered, when I examined the operations of the system in 1967, that the system worked the other way
round... the bigger brothers got away with more." He tried to bring about a change, but could not do much.
The system had got stereotyped. Table III gives figures of per head plan assistance from 1951-52 to 1984-85
(34 years).

TABLE III

PER HEAD PLAN ASSISTANCE IN RUPEES

FROM

1951-52 TO 1984-85

Total
Regions I Plan 1951-69 1969-85
1951-85
(16 States) (1951-56) (18 years) (16 years)
(34 years)
Eastern India.
Assam* 23 189 998 1187

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Bihar 14 107 436 543

Orissa 50 208 601 809
W Bengal 40 130 341 471
Northern India
Punjab (a) 152 343 472 815
Haryana (a) - - 532 -
Rajasthan 36 190 519 709
UP 13 106 467 573
J & K* 30 405 3853 4258
Himachal* - 2284 -
Western India
Gujarat 19 126 431 557
Maharashtra 14 97 346 443
Madhya Pradesh 22 155 455 616
Southern India
Andhra Pradesh 19 144 461 605
Karnataka 23 156 389 545
Kerala 17 155 432 587
Tamil Nadu 14 128 359 487
National average 24 141 -
Non-Special
category
States' average - 433
Special category
States' average 2069

Note: States marked with an * are in the special category. Others in the list are: Manipur,
Meghalaya, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura.

(a) For the period 1951-66, Punjab includes Haryana.

Source. Plannmg Commission's records for 1951-69, prepared in December 1970, and for 1969-
85, prepared in August 1983.

During the first plan Punjab-Haryana, which had the second highest per head income, was given a per head
plan assistance of Rs 152 compared with just Rs 14 for Bihar, Rs 23 for Assam, Rs 14 for Uttar Pradesh, Rs
40 for West Bengal. The national average was Rs 24.

Taking the 34 years (1951-85) of planning together, Punjab has got the highest per head plan assistance (Rs
815). Haryana, taken separately from Punjab has perhaps got more. Among other 'non-special category

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states', as some states are now described, Bihar has got no more than Rs 543 and West Bengal no more than
Rs 471. Orissa, too, has got less than Punjab has.

It is not that Punjab (including Haryana) has been (and is being) so generously helped because the state had a
serious refugee problem. 'Plan assistance' is apart from the measures taken by the Centre for refugee
rehabilitation. West Pakistan refugees numbered 47.40 lakhs and East Bengal refugees 41.17 lakhs in 1956
and 52.14 lakhs in 1970. The migration in eastern India was virtually one-way, from East Bengal to India,
and very little Muslim evacuee property was available in West Bengal, Assam and the small north eastern
states. In any case, the Centre, by law, took into its control all Muslim evacuee properties whereever in India
they were except in the states just named.

These properties included 70 lakh acres of farm land, 6½ lakhs of village houses, and 302,300 houses, shops
and industries in urban areas. To these were added 221,000 houses and shops built by, or at the cost of the
Centre. Delhi has plenty of refugee rehabilitation bazaars and colonies built by the government. All these
were distributed among the West Pakistan refugees as compensation for properties abandoned, or claimed to
have been abandoned, by them in Pakistan. A large number of them managed, in collusion with the union
rehabilitation ministry, to take compensation more than once. In Delhi where there were 60,000 families of
them, according to government records, 98,000 took compensation. Partition has made the West Pakistan
refugees, on an average, larger property-owners than original people of East Punjab. Many thousands of them
were recruited to the armed forces and, up to 1964, another 202,000 were employed. The West Pakistan
refugees were, moreover, given training, banking loans, machinery and raw materials on a top Priority basis
to set them up in industry and trade while the existing industries in West Bengal were starved for all these.

That Bengali refugees needed rehabilitation was recognised by the Centre in 1955, but no compensation for
properties abandoned in East Bengal was considered necessary for them. In 1959-60 the union rehabilitation
ministry claimed that it had virtually completed its task and proposed its own disbandment.

About a half of the Bengali refugee population never asked for any government aid. Thousands of those who
sought help were kept in camps on dole year after year. The rehabilitation projects in the Andamans and.
Dandakaranya were sabotaged by the union rehabilitation ministry itself. A small section of the Bengali
refugees got pittances as rehabilitation loans bearing interest.

The chief work of the rehabilitation ministry for the Bengali refugees was to let loose a vicious propaganda
campaign that they were a lazy lot unwilling to leave relief camps.

Contrary to their professions, as in other spheres, our national leaders continued to practise the imperialist
martial and non-martial race theory. Over the radio in 1972 Jagjivan Ram, then defence minister, lamented
that "it is a thing which has continued and is continuing". He tried to effect change, but failed. The
entrenched interests had become too powerful for him.

In 1944, Casey, the Governor of Bengal, noted that "the equivalent of £20,000,000 comes into the Punjab
each year by way of pay and pension for serving and retired members of the fighting services, which must
have an appreciable effect on the prosperity of the Punjab. Practically nothing comes into Bengal from this
source."

That year India's defence budget was Rs 363.18 cares of which £20 miffion or Rs 27 crores at that time's
exchange rate went into Punjab as pay and pension of serving and retired army men. The Centre's defence
budget now is about Rs 6,000 crores. The amount that goes into Punjab from this budget can be guessed.

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Hardly anything goes into West Bengal on this account.

The Bengali refugees flocked in millions to West Bengal and in lakhs to Assam and minuscule Tripura and
worsened the already grave problems existing in those areas. Many went also to Bihar and Orissa, fending for
themselves.

In 1936 the eastern provinces, after agitating for many years, earned the right to have a 62½ per cent share in
the proceeds of the export duty on jute and jute goods. Only these provinces produced these articles. On
August 15, 1947, the Centre reduced their share to 20 per cent and increased its own to 80 per cent. After
some time even this 20 per rent share was abolished. The Centre would not wait for a now Constitution to be
framed before taking this step and creating additional difficulties for the eastern states.

On August 15, 1947, again, the Centre slashed West Bengal's share of the proceeds of income tax from 20 per
cent of the amount available for distribution among the provinces to 12 per cent and increased that of some
others, including Madras, whose share went up from 15 per cent to 18 per cent, and Bombay, whose share
went up from 20 per cent to 21 per cent. The original shares had been fixed in terms of the Niemeyer award.
As a result of East Bengal' s secession to Pakistan, income tax collection in West Bengal had fallen by only
one-eigth.

These budgetary shocks to the eastern states were like minor shocks compared to what the Centre began
doing after the inauguration of planning. It began destroying the very basis of eastern India's economic
growth. The freight structure for coal was modified and restrictions were imposed on wagon allotment for
transport of coal by train with in specified distances. This obliged the coal producing states to get their coal
by truck which, a government committee reported in the early sixties, was five to six times more expensive.
Coal in the eastern states became as expensive as or more expensive than, in the coal importing distant states.

After pontificating that 'it is but natural that the actual cost of transport should be paid by the consumer so
that the growth of industries is based on sound economic considerations and the natural advantages of an area
producing a raw material is not destroyed by what can be regarded as a subsidy to distant consumers', the
Centre decided in 1956 that it had 'come to the conclusion that in regard to iron and steel a uniform price
would be in the best interests of the country'.

Not only were 'sound economic conkiderations' violated hut the iron and steel producing states, among them,
Bihar, were made to subsidise the distant states. At that time steel plants existed only in Bihar and West
Bengal. Other steel plants have come up in Bokaro (Bihar), Durgapur (West Bengal), Rourkela (Orissa) and
Bhilai (Madhya Pradesh)-all in what may be called Greater Chotanagpur. Consumers of iron and steel at
these producing centres have to pay the same freight as at any other place in the country.

How is one to characterise these decisions of the Centre regarding coal and iron and steel except that these
were taken in terms of 'a perfect plan of policy' in the East India Company's style to ruin the locational
advantages of eastem India for these vital raw materials?

But look at the same Centre's policy in relation to the natural,or artificially created locational advantages of
the other regions for raw materials they produce but eastern India does not.

In 1972, West Bengal, supported by Tamil Nadu (which produces less cotton than its needs),demanded
equalisation of cotton prices. The Centre rejected the demand on the plea that since in West Bengal and Tamil
Nadu workers' wages were less than in Maharashtra and Gujarat, mills in these cotton-importing states should

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be able to compete with the mills in the cotton-growing states. Perhaps even the British would have been
ashamed of putting forward such a plea.

In independent India the first - and very substantial- oilfields that were discovered were in Assam, where a
refinery had been processing local crude since 1901. That was in 1952-53. These fields were left unused and
gas was flared for a decade during which period the Centre, which proclaimed (and proclaims) self-reliance,
invited multinational corporations to set up two big refineries in Bombay and a medium one in
Visakhapatnam to process imported crude which, one may say, was to be paid for by foreign exchange earned
through export of Assam's tea.

The argument given by the Centre in justification of this decision was that American experience had shown
that 'the establishment of refineries at port towns away from crude oil production centres is now considered
an economic proposition'. Assam's right to have a new and big refinery based on local crude went by the
board. Calcutta was then the biggest port and Greater Calcutta the biggest consumer of refinery products. Dr
BC Roy's request for a refinery went unheeded. At Assam's cost (in foreign exchange) the Centre artificially
created locational advantage for refinery products in western India.

From the late 50's the demand was raised in several states for stabilisation of the prices of refinery products.
The Centre would not accept the demand on the plea that 'it may mean considerable hardship' to industries
which had grown in port towns because of the lower prices of petroleum products there, and that 'it would be
doing considerable violence to the price levels of the various manufactured goods in the country, if the cost of
fuel were to rise considerably as a result of introduction of a freight pool'.

What was declared to be 'in the best interests of the country' in respect of iron and steel was, in effect,
declared to be against the interests of the country in respect of refinery products. The Centre continued to
adhere to the price policy which the multinational corporations dictated. Under this policy, refinery products
were cheapest in western India, a little higher in Madras, materially higher in Calcutta, and the highest in
Dighboi, the oil town in Assam. This price policy was changed only in 1977 by which time western India had
established a monopoly in petro-chemical industries and industries for which refinery by-products are raw
materials.

In 1975 the Planning Commission set up a commitee of officials to go into the question of the freight policy
relating to raw materials. It reported in 1977, saying that there was no case for bringing any new article under
the freight equalisation scheme and that there 'would be a case for elimination of the existing freight
equalisation schemes', but that the time for it would come 'whenever total supplies in the country are
adequate'. The centre is sitting on the report presumably because eastern India's prospects have not been
totally ruined yet.

No less disastrous for eastern India is the Centre's policy in respect of pricing of agricultural products. Our
Central ministers at international conferences rightly protest against the adverse terms of trade that the
developed countries impose on the developing countries like India. But what is the Centre itself doing within
the country?

Eastern India's cash crop is jute primarily on the price of which depends the welfare of very large segments of
the farming community and whether the community can save any money for improvement of agriculture.
Relative prices of different commodities produced in different regions are of vital importance in a vast county
like ours. During the British period it was accepted, that in price a maund of jute should be equivalent to 2
maunds, and 10 seers of rice. This ratio was scarcely maintained under the imperialists, but it was never upset

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against jute, as it has been in independent India. Since a long time the semblance of a ratio not only between
jute and other agricultural produce but also that between raw jute and jute products has ceased to exist.
Except for jute eastern India is heavily dependent on the other regions for the commodities.

All policies of the Centre so far have been so devised as not merel to impoverish eastern India but also to
render the entire region unattractive to industrial entrepreneurs Many industries have moved out of West
Bengal. Not one of them has gone to any of the eastern states New and large industries are being set up in the
other regions for which the basic raw materials will be taken from eastern India at its own cost The British
imperialists did exactly this, first, in relation to eastern Indi and, then, in relation to the whole country. Even
bank deposits were being drained out of eastern India for investment in the other regions.

Every policy falls into a pattern The infrastructure, for instance. In 1973, the Assam governor complained to
the prime minister that when they requested the railway ministry to open new lines in the north-east they
were told that this could not be done because, in the absence of industries, there would not enough traffic and
the railway would suffer loss, but when they requested the economic ministries to start industries they were
told that this could not be done in the absence of a good communications system. Please save the north-
eastern states from this 'chicken and hen argument. the governor pleaded.,

The Calcutta port has been allowed to deteriorate on the plea of lack of water in the Hughli river. The Dum
Dum airport, the busiest in India in 1951, has become a sleepy one now. No one has so far argued that air has
become thinner over the airport. In power generation, West Bengal was at the top of all states and eastern
India at the top of all regions in 1951. Now, eastern India is very much at the bottom. About supplies of coal
for power stations, the Centre is guided by its view that 'poor quality coal is suitable for power generation
near pit-heads', which means that the coal producing eastern states are given the worst quality coal which
contains 20 to 40 per cent extraneous matters, such as, ash, stones and sulphur, which, as a Central official
has told a Parliamentary Committee, "cause havoc to thermal plants in the eastern sector". Eastern India
would not have atomic power plants because the region has coal, but, when the Centre decides to set up super
thermal plants, it chooses the other three regions first and only under heavy pressure from the eastern states
decides to set up the smallest one in this region.

The Calcutta port has been made to lose its importance. The Centre has displayed little interest in developing
Paradip in Orissa, the only port other than Calcutta in eastern India, and has arranged to take Assam's and
north Bengal's tea all the way to Kandla in Gujarat for export. The desert in Kandla was to the Centre, the
most Suitable place to locate the country's first free trade zone, which Dr.Gadgil has pointed out as an
instance of how "the politico-economic structure functions in the country". In 1957, after a visit to India,
Arnold Toynbee, the historian, wrote: "The Gujarati industrialist is, in fact, the British Sahib's principal heir;
and Bengal, with her wings broken by partition, may resign herself to being eclipsed."

Since the dawn of independence, the strong Centre has been relentlessly pursuing a policy to ruin eastern
India's economy on the plea that this region is an 'unsafe zone'. In 1959 an Allahabad University professor
wrote: "Partition affected the policy of the government on locational pattern of industries in India. Partition
rendered Calcutta an unsafe zone from the point of view of strategy. ... The industries, which were enjoying
locational advantages in the border provinces, experienced a decline in their superiority in respect of
proximity of raw materials or of markets or other advantages of transport, financial facilities, etc." This
unsafe zone theory has been put into practice not only in relation to Calcutta but in that of the whole of
eastern India.

Nearly three decades ago, Dr Gunnar Myrdal propounded the concept of 'circular cumulative causation' in the

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economic sphere. He explained that a town which had developed around a factory would suffer a downward
cumulative process if the factory got burned down and the entrepreneurs did not rebuild it. You can achieve
the same result, as the British imperialists showed in India, through economic, taxation and other policies.
The government of India has not burned any industry in eastern India but has only adapted imperialist
policies to build up the other regions with this region's resources.

To hide its crimes, the national leaders and the privileged linguisticgroups blame political unrest andlack of
local entrepreneurship of the people of the eastern states for lack of economic progress there. This,too, is an
adaptation of the imperialist colonial theory which propagated that 'the natives' tendency toward idleness and
inefficiency' stood in the way of their progress. One of the first tasks of our national movement was to combat
this imperialist propaganda against the Indians as a whole.

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