41.

US vs Go Chico
G.R. No. 4963, September 15, 1909

Facts: Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of the show cases of his store a number of
medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of
Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands
to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. Go Chico had purchased the
stock of goods at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. Go Chico was
arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public and in so doing placed in his
showcase and in one of the windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the
existence of a law against the display of the medallions in question and had consequently no corrupt
intention. The facts above stated are admitted.

Go Chico rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:

First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the
accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or
emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United
States.

Issue: Whether or not criminal intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws?

Held: Yes, A law punishes the display of flags “used during” the insurrection against the US may not be
so construed as to exempt from criminal liability a person who displays a replica of said flag because
said replica is not the one “used” during the rebellion, for to so construe it is to nullify the statute
together. Go Chico is liable though flags displayed were just replica of the flags “used during”
insurrection against US.

The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and
comprehensive. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden
act shall be done knowingly or willfully, and if it did, the designed purpose of the act would be
practically defeated. The intention of the legislature is plain, that persons engaged in the traffic so
engage in it at their peril and that they cannot set up their ignorance of the nature and qualities of the
commodities they sell, as a defense.

It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend that a
criminal intent should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense
embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully. The wording is
plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the interpretation.

Care must be exercised in distinguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the
intent to perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend
to commit an act, and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself — intent and all. The
wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused
intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is required to commit the crime.

42. Solid Homes vs. Tan

G.R. Nos. 145156-57. July 29, 2005

Facts: On April 7, 1980, petitioner Solid Homes, Inc., sold to the spouses Joe Uy and Myrna Uy a
subdivision lot with an area of 1,069 square meters at petitioner’s Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision,
Quezon City. Thereafter, the lot was registered in the name of the Uys under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 280963/T-1409 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

Sometime in February, 1985, the spouses Uy sold the same lot to herein respondents, the spouses
Ancheta K. Tan and Corazon de Jesus-Tan, by reason of which the former title covering the lot was
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. RT-14465 (327754) in respondents’ name.

In a letter dated December 18, 1995, respondents demanded on petitioner to provide the needed utility
systems and clear the area of squatters and other obstructions by the end of January, 1996 to enable them
to start the construction of their house and to allow other lot owners in the area a full access to and
peaceful possession of their respective lots, conformably with P.D. No. 957 which requires an owner or
developer of a subdivision project to develop the same within one year from the issuance of its license.

Having received no reply from petitioner, respondents filed with the Field Office of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), NCR a complaint for specific performance and damages therein
praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to provide the needed facilities in the premises and rid the
same of squatters; or, in the alternative, for petitioner to replace respondents’ property with another lot in
the same subdivision where there are facilities and sans squatters.

After due proceedings, the Housing and Land Use Arbiter, in a decision dated September 17,
1996, rendered judgment for the respondents and dismissed the complaint against petitioner’s co-
defendant, Purita Soliven.

Dissatisfied, petitioner went on appeal to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which, in a decision
dated April 16, 1997,4 affirmed that of the Arbiter. From there, petitioner elevated the case to the Office
of the President (O.P.).

In a decision5 dated June 3, 1999, the O.P., thru then Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, affirmed
with modification the appealed decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.

On June 25, 1999, respondents filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the aforementioned decision,
praying for the deletion of that portion thereof giving petitioner the option of merely paying them
the purchase price with interest in the event petitioner "fails to replace subject lot with a lot of similar
size and with available facilities located in the subdivision, because it had already sold or transferred all
of its properties in the subdivision." Respondents argued that it would be more in accord with equity and
fair play if they will be paid the fair market value of the lot in question and not merely its purchase price,
should there be no available lot with facilities in the area.

However, in a resolution dated September 22, 1999, O.P. denied respondents’ motion.

Issue: Whether or not respondents’ right to bring the instant case against petitioner has already
prescribed?

Held: No, the period of prescription of any action is reckoned only from the date the cause of action
accrued. And a cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which
should not have been done is done. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action that determines the
starting point for the computation of the period of prescription. In fine, the ten-year prescriptive period is
to be reckoned from the accrual of the Appellee’s right of action, not necessarily on the very date of the
execution of the contracts subject of the action.
it was only on December 18, 1995 when respondents made a written demand upon petitioner to construct
subdivision roads, put up utility facilities and rid the premises of squatters, obligations which are
unquestionably in the nature of an obligation to do. And under Article 1169 of the Code, a party who is
under obligation to do something incurs delay only from the time that the obligee demands, either
judicially or extrajudicially, for the fulfillment of the obligation.

A literal application of any part of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd
results, or contradict the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole. Unlike the CA, we find that the
literal application of the aforesaid sections of the Tax Code and its implementing regulations does not
operate unjustly or contradict the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole. Neither does it lead to
absurd results. Indeed, our courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to absurd or
unreasonable consequences. We have repeatedly held thus:

Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so
as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.

43. Sarcos vs. Castilo

G.R. No. L-29755, January 31, 1969

Facts:   Domingo N. Sarcos, the duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, running as an
independent candidate in the November 14, 1967 election, was charged with misconduct and dishonesty
in office by respondent Recaredo Castillo, the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur.  The act
constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in petitioner allegedly conniving
with certain private individuals to cut and fell timber and selling the timber or logs within the communal
forest reserve of the Municipality of Barobo, Province of Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of
the public and of the government.  It was on the basis of the above administrative complaint that
respondent Governor ordered the "immediate suspension of Domingo from his position as Mayor of
Barobo, Surigao del Sur; the same Administrative Order containing the immediate designation of Vice-
Mayor Brigido L. Mercader of the same town as Acting Mayor.  There was an urgent necessity to order
the immediate 'preventive suspension' of the petitioner, in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, of
Republic Act No. 5185, otherwise known as the 'Decentralization Act of 1967'.

Issue:  Whether or not it is the power of preventive suspension of a municipal mayor against whom
charges have been filed still vested in the provincial governor?

Held:   No, Under Section 5, of Republic Act No. 5185no such authority is vested in the provincial
governor. Instead, the statutory scheme, complete on its face, would locate such power in the provincial
board. There would be no support for the view, then, that the action taken by the provincial governor in
issuing the order of preventive suspension in this case was in accordance with law.

It may be noted parenthetically that earlier, the United States Supreme Court was partial more to the term
"objective" or "policy" rather than "purpose." So it was in the first decision where this fundamental
principle of construction was relied upon, the opinion coming from Chief Justice Marshall. Thus: "The
two subjects were equally within the province of the legislature, equally demanded their attention, and
were brought together to their view. If, then, the words making provision for each, fairly admit of an
equally extensive interpretation,and of one of which will effect the object that seems to have been in
contemplation, and which was certainly desirable, they ought to receive that interpretation." 

  So, too, with his successor, Chief Justice Taney. Thus: "This construction cannot be maintained. In
expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to
the whole law, and to its object and policy."  It should not escape attention that the above excerpt was
quoted with approval by the present Chief Justice Warren as late as 1957. 
  What is the purpose of the Decentralization Act of 1967? It is set forth in its declaration of policy. It is
"to transform local governments gradually into effective instruments through which the people can in a
most genuine fashion, govern themselves and work out their own destinies." In consonance with such
policy, its purpose is "to grant to local governments greater freedom and ampler means to respond to the
needs of their people and promote their prosperity and happiness and to effect a more equitable and
systematic distribution of governmental powers and resources." 

The construction here reached, as to the absence of power on the part of provincial governors to suspend
preventively a municipal mayor is buttressed by the avoidance of undesirable consequences flowing from
a different doctrine. Time and time again, it has been stressed that while democracy presupposes the right
of the people to govern themselves in elections that call for political parties contending for supremacy,
once the election is over the equally pressing and urgent concern for efficiency would necessitate that
purely partisan considerations be ignored, and if not entirely possible, be restricted to a minimum.

  The present litigation gives rise to the suspicion that politics did intrude itself. Petitioner Municipal
Mayor, an independent candidate, and thus of a different political persuasion, appeared to have been
placed at a disadvantage. It would be a realistic assumption that there is the ever present temptation on
the part of provincial governors, to utilize every opportunity to favor those belonging to his party. At
times, it may even prove irresistible.

  It is desirable therefore that such opportunity be limited. The statutory provision then should be given
such a construction that would be productive of such a result. 

44. People vs. Almuete

G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976

Facts: Wenceslao Almuete Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a
violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that in
December, 1963, in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her
riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests
of five (5) cavans of palay each to her damage in the amount of P187.50 at P12.50 a cavan. Upon
arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. They filed motion for a bill of particulars as to the exact date
of the commission of the offense charged. The lower court denied their motion because they had already
entered their plea.

Thereafter, they -filed a motion to quash the information on that grounds

(1) that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged;

(2) that there is no law punishing it, and

(3) that the court has, no jurisdiction over the alleged time The fiscal opposed the motion.

The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the information in its order of August 11, 1966. It held
that the information is basically deficient because it does not describe the lie circumstances under which
the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date
agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants'
possession exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last normal harvest.

The prosecution appealed from the order of dismissal. The Solicitor General argues in his brief that the
information in this case alleges all the elements of the offense defined in section 39 of Republic Act No.
1199, as amended of Republic Act No. 2263. Sections 39 and 57 of the same law reads as follows:
SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. — It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or landholder, without
mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for its
threshing- That if the tenant n food for his family and the landholder does not or cannot furnish such and
refuses to allow the tenant to reap or thresh a portion of the crop previous to the date set for its threshing,
the tenant can reap or thresh not more than ten percent of his net share in the last normal harvest after
giving notice thereof to the landholder or his representative. Any violation of this situation by either
party shall be treated and penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the general provisions of
law applicable to that act committed.

SEC. 57. Penal Provision. — Violation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine and forty-nine of this
Act shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or both, in the discretion of the Court

Issue: Whether or not the prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is punishable?

Held: No, Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no, more raison d'etre
because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in section 34 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389 which took
effect on September 10, 1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason
for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this case.

The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without
notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that, as already noted, the Code of Agrarian Reforms did
not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the
basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.

The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of
the old penal law prior to its repeal