Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 2015, volume 33, pages 1501 – 1517

doi: 10.1177/0263774X15614700

Multilevel governance and urban climate change

mitigation

Taedong Lee
Department of Political Science, Yonsei University, 309-2 Yonhee Bldg, Yonsei Ro 50,
Seodaemun Gu, Seoul, Korea; e-mail: tdlee@yonsei.ac.kr
Chris Koski
Department of Political Science, 3203 SE Woodstock Blvd, Reed College, Portland, Oregon
97202, USA; e-mail: ckoski@reed.edu

Abstract. Cities worldwide have taken the lead in addressing climate change; however, this
does not tell the full story in understanding the puzzle of local climate action. Rather
than in isolation, city actions occur in the context of a complex of other government
arrangements. Whereas the majority of the literature concerning subnational responses to
climate change in the US is addressed in the literatures of federalism and diffusion, we offer
an explanation of climate actions through a multilevel governance approach. Multilevel
governance allows us to consider the horizontal city-to-city influences on climate action
while also considering the vertical influences of state-to-local action. We conduct a large
quantitative study of climate actions in all US cities with populations greater than 50,000
people. We find that cities’ and states’ climate action efforts are complementary, rather
than attenuating; however, we note that horizontal influences are generally stronger than
vertical influences in motivating climate action at the local level. We conclude that, in spite
of the potential for an increased role of federal and state governments in climate action in
the United States, city-to-city networks are likely to remain important in motivating cities
to mitigate climate change.

Keywords: multilevel governance, transmunicipal networks, mayors’ leadership, climate

change policy, mitigation

Introduction
Climate change policies occur in a policy milieu in which governments at the local, subnational,
national, and international level make decisions to motivate mitigation (Allen et al., 2009;
Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Sharp et al., 2011) and, more recently, adaptation efforts (Amundsen
et al., 2010; Kates and Torrie, 1998; Lutsey and Sperling, 2008, Rosenzweig et al., 2010; Van
Well and Lange Scherbenske, 2014). These decisions are at once the independent product of
local political demands and the interdependent product of the opportunity structures created
by a lack or excess of other government actions. Specific to climate actions, the literature on
multilevel governance offers an understanding of local decisions as a product of horizontal
and vertical influences. The multilevel governance literature has made great contributions
to understanding climate as a function of these influences—particularly research on the role
of transnational organizations in providing horizontal influences on local decisions makers’
policy choices (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009).
Our research asks the next question that is less well addressed in the multilevel
governance literature: Rather than influences over policy decisions, what is the role of
horizontal and vertical influences found in multilevel governance in motivating actions
to mitigate climate change? Our research additionally responds to a gap in the broader
literature on local climate policy found in Millard-Ball (2012, 2013) discouraging findings
1502 T Lee, C Koski

regarding the relevancy of local policies to make meaningful contributions to climate

change mitigation.
Multilevel governance studies largely focus on policies of the European Union; in
this paper, we look at the case of multilevel climate governance in the United States.
Specifically, we examine the determinants of city level actions in the context of horizontal
influences from transnational municipal climate networks and vertical influences from
state policies. The policy environment in which US cities make climate change decisions
is largely dependent upon the states in which they are situated (Constantelos, 2010; Engel,
2009; Rabe, 2011; Scheberle, 2004)—cities are empowered via state constitutions and
statutes. In addition, states make their own climate change policies which become a part
of the calculus of city-level decision-making. Much of this discussion of state and local
climate action has occurred in the literature on federalism—our research reaches out to both
literatures in an effort to understand the global, national, and local forces that influence
city-level climate actions.
We characterize climate actions as the mitigation milestones cities reach in the
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives’ (ICLEI) Cities for Climate
Protection Program (CCP); ranging from measurement, commitment, planning,
implementation, and monitoring. Our city-level analysis focuses on transnational municipal
commitments to climate change; specifically examining the US Conference of Mayors
Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA). Our multilevel analysis uses a hierarchical
model to examine state policy tools in the context of local factors. We find that horizontal
influences—particularly in the form of transmunicipal climate networks—are integral
in producing stronger city-level climate change mitigation actions. Further, we find that
vertical factors such as state climate action plans (CAPs), renewable energy standards,
and an independent energy agency also influence city-level mitigation actions. Overall,
the strongest horizontal forces are more powerful in influencing climate mitigation actions
than vertical forces—particularly for climate mitigation actions that require the greatest
commitments from cities.

Multilevel governance to address climate change

A consequence of what Bae and Feiock (2013) refer to as a “lacuna” of federal policy in
the United States on climate change is a vacuum in leadership on climate change issues.
Most of the scholarly community investigating climate change is well aware of this void
and has followed in Rabe’s “odyssey” to investigate the emergence of a diverse portfolio
of climate change policies (Rabe, 2008). There is an extensive literature documenting
the innovations subnational governments use to fill a void in climate action planning left
by national governments (Bomberg, 2012; Partin, 2008; Wellstead and Stedman, 2011).
A growing portion of this literature focuses on the interaction of multiple levels of
governance structures in understanding the policy choices specific subnational governments
(e.g. municipalities) make.
Multilevel governance is by no means unique to environmental policy discussions
(Anderson, 2006), but it is particularly well suited for a policy area where there is less
coherent emphasis from centralized governments (Selin and VanDeveer, 2009). In addition,
multilevel governance is a critical lens through which to examine a policy area that is
at once global in its causes and local in its effects (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009, 2011).
Multilevel governance generally is meant to understand policy actions as a function of
the interactions between varying levels of formal government structures, but also across
a variety of nongovernmental actors that occupy positions of authority and influence
(Schroeder et al., 2013).
Multilevel governance and urban climate change mitigation 1503

In broad strokes, the two categories can be thought of as vertical (Type I) and horizontal
(Type II) levels of governance (see Bulkeley and Betsill (2013b) and Lee (2014) for a
thorough review). Vertical governance in the case of subnational policy studies is akin to
studying federalism in state politics research or the relationship between the EU and member
states. The earliest writings in climate change policy at the subnational level largely focused
on elements of Type I diffusion—particularly the interplay between a lack of federal actions,
state actions, and some local actions (Gore and Robinson, 2009a; Rabe, 2004, 2009). The
emergence of international networks specifically targeting cities as a locus of climate action
called attention to horizontal governance as a source of influence over climate change policy.
Many scholars examined the relationship between these networks and climate policies and
actions related to mitigation (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004; Bulkeley, 2010; Gore, 2010; Lee
and Van de Meene, 2012; Pitt, 2010; Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007).
Studies that examine the multilevel governance structure of cities and climate change
are numerous, though typically focus on single or small N case study (Jaglin, 2013;
McGloughlin and Sweeney, 2011; Schreurs, 2010). Moreover, most studies that examine
either dimension of climate governance tend to focus specifically on policymaking rather
than on actions that result from this policy—though this is generally the case for the literature
on climate change at the local level. Thus, understanding city climate change actions
involves the investigation of a number of policies nested in different levels. The climate
governance regime of a city is a function of city-level preferences but can also be a function
of other cities by way of international networks (horizontal multilevel governance) or other
subnational and governmental units in which those cities are nested (vertical diffusion).
Our study investigates the relationship of each of these factors on city-level climate actions
individually and in concert.

Horizontal influences: Transmunicipal networks

The actions of other cities are key horizontal sources of influence across cities which are
made more visible via transmunicipal networks. Much of the literature on urban climate
action policy concerns efforts related to determining city-level efforts to sign transmunicipal
climate change agreements—e.g. the US Conference of MCPA or ICLEI’s World Mayor
Agreement (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004; Lee, 2013). A related branch of this literature
focuses on specific decisions to adopt policies that address climate change as a function of
the international agreements to which mayors and the cities their represent are signatories
(Bulkeley, 2010; Engel, 2006; Krause, 2011a; Wheeler, 2008). Policies that cities have
undertaken to address climate change (in addition to providing other key co-benefits) include
green building ordinances (Koski, 2010), CAPs (Bassett and Shandas, 2010; Krause, 2011b;
VijayaVenkataRaman et al., 2012; Wheeler, 2008; Zahran et al., 2008a, 2008b), or congestion
taxes (Hårsman and Quigley, 2010; Schaller, 2010).
These climate commitments beg significant two significant empirical questions. Do
climate agreements matter (Krause, 2011b, 2011c)? And, if so, what is the mechanism?
Certainly, the rationale for signing such agreements can be largely symbolic—to be sure,
signing the US MCPA is a nonbinding commitment to the environment in the strict sense of
this term. Some economists have referred to signing such nonbinding climate agreements
somewhat dismissively as fostering a “warm glow” (Andreoni, 1990; Engel and Orbach,
2008), rather than real change (see also Millard-Ball, 2012, 2013). However, the act of signing
a national or international climate agreement is a real commitment on the part of a local
government; a commitment for which local governments can be held accountable. Signing
an agreement will push cities to engage in actions related to climate change, when they
otherwise might not, to demonstrate their ability to meet their climate change commitments.
1504 T Lee, C Koski

Signing a climate protection agreement places the mayor and the city she represents in
a particular network of like-minded actors that offers opportunities to connect in informal
and formal ways for the purpose of developing solutions to climate change. The literature
on municipal climate action suggests that, even in cases where cities are interested in
addressing climate change, local governments have a hard time simply identifying what
to do (Krause, 2011b; Tang et al., 2010). Transmunicipal networks provide a common
forum to share solutions about climate change; signing onto such networks provides local
officials access to vetted policy ideas. Climate networks specifically provide case studies
of innovations to reduce greenhouse gasses and plans of action that can be modified
to fit other members goals, thereby reducing sunk costs of planning for climate action
from scratch. Additionally, climate change networks offer members opportunities for
signatories to compete with other cities for rank—a kind of “high score chart” (Koski,
2010). Thus, the act of signing a transmunicipal climate agreement not only enhances the
political impetus to act but also provides information to signatories regarding the form
those actions can take.
““H1: Transmunicpal agreements lead to stronger actions to address climate change.
The concept of “action strength” is inherently relative and peculiar to, in this case, climate
policy. We conceive of stronger actions toward climate change to be those that represent
deeper commitments on the parts of cities either in terms of bureaucratic resources related to
engaging in processes intended to reduce greenhouse gasses further than other cities. While
it is certain that city residents are likely to hold their leaders to account for the promises they
make—transmunicipal agreements included—it is entirely possible that signing a voluntary
climate change agreement with no enforcement apparatus may very well only provide the
“warm glow” with no real “heat.” Signing an agreement costs a leader and a city nothing
financially; actually taking steps to assess greenhouse gas inventories, invest in clean energy
technologies, and change citizen behaviors (classic implementation issues) are much more
financially and politically taxing.

Vertical influences on local climate change: States

The first major works on subnational climate change in the United States focused on a variety
of state efforts to control greenhouse gasses via the classic range of policy tools, though most
of these focused on incentives for action (Backus et al., 2012; Carley, 2012; Maggioni et al.,
2012; Rabe, 2004, 2009; Rabe and Borick, 2012). In addition, states have been the epicenter
of much of the major environmental policy efforts in the United States for the past 30 years
(Konisky and Woods, 2012). Congressional delay has created little federal legislation, leaving
environmental policy to seek a portfolio of alternative venues of action of which states are an
important component (Klyza and Sousa, 2013).
Constitutionally, states have formal powers guaranteed by the federal government whereas
cities do not. The relationship between states and the national government in the US is a
decidedly federal one—shared and unique powers as in other federal systems—however, the
relationship between states and cities is variably a unitary one (Miller and Lee, 2011). Most
cities have control over land use planning, some enjoy significant home rule, but all have some
form of independence in the form of bureaucratic structure and revenue. The extent to which
cities have powers to manage their own affairs is a function of state constitutional and statutory
law. Thus states have a greater potential for enacting climate change policy which is a critical
component of pushing city-level climate change policy (Carley, 2011; Engel, 2006; Lutsey
and Sperling, 2008; Warren and Tomashefsky, 2009). This logic drives our secondary research
question: how does state policy affect local climate actions?
Multilevel governance and urban climate change mitigation 1505

““H2: Stronger state policies related to climate change will produce stronger city-level
actions to address climate change.
Our concept of “state policy strength” is derived from the commitment states have made to
reducing greenhouse gasses for the purpose of mitigating climate change. In many cases,
simply the presence of a particular kind of policy (e.g. a CAP or green building policy) is an
indication that one state’s overall policy toward addressing climate change is stronger than
another which may not address climate policy. Policies between state and local governments
can work synergistically insofar as they are not intended to displace one another. Fisher’s
(2013) account of “boomerang” federalism suggests that vertical influences on local
governance can at once help by way of resources but can also displace in terms of supremacy
(see also Derthick’s (2009) concept of “compensatory federalism”). Indeed, several scholars
(Engel, 2009; Rabe, 2011) have noted that, for policy making, vertical influences can be
counterproductive for particularly innovative subnational units. Still, in the case of policy
actions, governments in which subgovernments are nested (e.g. national governments) could
provide support and pressure to reach extant climate change goals—with or without city-
specific policies—through resources and agenda setting.
Vertical influences fall into two general categories of “information-seeking” and
“adjustment-seeking” behaviors (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). Specific to environmental
policy, vertical influences can come in the form of policy leadership (information), policy
requirements (adjustment), and capacity (information). Generally, states or other higher order
governments are able to motivate cities through common policy initiatives. Diffusion literature
suggests that states can either influence or be influenced by city adoption of policy (Shipan
and Volden, 2006). In the case of climate change, there are several voluntary agreements in
which states engage—e.g. energy efficiency standards or green building standards—that are
intended model behavioral or policy change for cities (Koski and Lee, 2014).
In addition to these nudges, states can mandate compliance with a variety of
environmental goals—such as planning for climate change. The majority of literature
regarding coercive vertical power—particularly in the United States—concerns federal and
state interactions (Nolette, 2014). By and large, policies at the state level are not intended
to require action on the parts of subgovernments—but this may be changing with more
comprehensive climate action planning (Gerrard and Welton, 2014; Wheeler, 2008). In
addition, states can provide a source of vertical influence over cities by providing capacity
to identify and address problems related to environmental harm. Vertical governments (in
our study, states) typically have greater access to resources and bureaucratic expertise than
do city governments (Jänicke, 1997); this access places states in a privileged position given
that cities may address climate issues with more limited funds or with bureaucracies that are
focused on different types of problems.

Setting and case

Measuring climate policy is relatively straightforward in comparison to measuring climate
actions. Thinking about climate actions as “performance” yields two primary ways of
conceptualizing what cities do when attempting to manage climate change: goal-oriented
and process-oriented performance measurements (Poister and Streib, 1999). Goal-oriented
performance consists of measures related to an organization’s ability to quantitatively
accomplish planned aims. In the context of climate change policy, goal-oriented performance
assesses whether a local government fulfills its municipal climate change action plan. For
example, a goal-oriented performance measure could be for a city to reduce its CO2e (CO2
equivalent) to 15% of its 1997 baseline by 2012. Process-oriented performance evaluates
whether an organization carries out specified procedures ostensibly to reach a predetermined
1506 T Lee, C Koski

goal. Given the difficulty in characterizing CO2e variation across several hundred cities, we
focus on mitigation processes (rather than outcomes) as a measure of climate actions.
In the field of climate change mitigation policy, we operationalize climate policy
performance by looking at the extent to which a city government has achieved predetermined
steps of a specific mitigation policy. The aim of any climate change mitigation policy is to
reduce the greenhouse gas emissions to stabilize CO2e concentration in the atmosphere. In
order to set the CO2e reduction target, a city government should take an inventory of its
greenhouse gas emissions. An emission inventory reports the major sources and total amount
of GHG emissions for the city. Based on the inventory, a city government should be able to set
a relative reduction target which identifies the total reduction to be achieved, the baseline year,
and the target year. To meet the target, a city government can then develop a comprehensive
CAP. CAPs often contain detailed strategies including a variety of sector-specific policies.
The next logical step is to turn climate policy plan into action by implementing planned
strategies. Finally, the process of implementation and actual reduction of GHG emissions can
be monitored and disclosed to the public (Lee and Koski, 2014).
Chicago’s climate change mitigation policy engages these five steps and provides a good,
well-studied example of climate change mitigation efforts at the municipal level (Lambright et
al., 1996; Young, 2010). The city government plan identifies that Chicago emits 36.2 million
metric tons (MMT) of GHGs in 2005. Chicago’s climate policy set an 80% GHG emission
reduction target by 2050 using 1990 emissions levels as a baseline—a goal of 6.5 MMT
CO2e. To accomplish this goal, Chicago developed the “Chicago Climate Action Plan” which
establishes four mitigation-related strategies and one adaptation strategy. The four mitigation
strategies encompass a broad range of actions from energy efficiency in building to improved
transportation options. After implementing these planned policies, the city issued a progress
report to disclose the achievement of first two years of the CAP through a website (www.
chicagoclimateaction.org).

Measures
Dependent variable
Our dependent variable of climate actions is conceptualized as climate policy performance
at the municipal level. We operationalize climate policy performance as an ordinal variable,
using the five ICLEI municipal mitigation milestones: (1) conducting GHG emission
inventory; (2) setting a GHG emission reduction target; (3) establishing a formally approved
CAP; (4) implementing planned strategies; and (5) monitoring, disclosing, and reevaluating
progress. Our dependent variable is an ordinal measure, ranging from 0 to 5. Through survey
and internet searching software, ICLEI USA measures the level of achievement based on
these five criteria among member cities. Two-hundred cities have completed a baseline
emission inventory; 155 of which have established a formal GHG emission reduction target.
We use data from ICLEI USA to measure the policy performance of cities as of 2010 (ICLEI,
2010). The drawback associated with using ICLEI data is that these milestones are a course
measurement of an array of potential city actions (see Krause (2011a) for an excellent
investigation of measures beyond the ICLEI framework). We acknowledge this limitation,
but hope to offset the lack of specificity regarding mechanisms with a broad range of included
cities and state-level policy actions.
A research design only analyzing ICLEI member cities would contain two flaws (Krause,
2011b): (1) ICLEI cities may not be representative of other cities and (2) ICLEI cities are
likely to be more inclined toward climate change mitigation activities (thus biasing selection
on the dependent variable). Thus, we include all US cities with a population greater than
50,000 in our analysis, resulting in a sample of 591 (out of roughly 18,000 municipalities
in the US). For cities that are not members of ICLEI or ICLEI member cities that do not
Multilevel governance and urban climate change mitigation 1507

report their actions specific to climate change, we search city government websites and
local newspapers, if applicable, for the relevant information as of 2010. We also verified the
climate policy performance of ICLEI member cities, using the same method (checking each
city’s website).
Horizontal influences
We conceptualize horizontal influences as city-level commitments to other municipal
climate change organizations. Cities in transmunicipal networks have made commitments
to their own citizens to act and are also open to influence from other in-network cities.
We measure city-level leadership in climate change as mayors or top leadership officials
who have agreed to sign the US Conference of MCPA (coded 1 for signatory or 0 for
nonsignatory). In our dataset, 145 out of 298 MCPA signed cities (49%) set a GHG emission
inventory. Furthermore, 128 cities (42%) established a reduction target for GHG emissions.
Despite one of the primary actions under the MCPA to “urge their state governments, and
the federal government to enact policies and programs to meet or beat the GHG reduction
targets suggested for the United States in the Kyoto Protocol—7% reduction from 1990
levels by 2012 (USMCPA, 2008),” less than half of MCPA cities set their reduction target.
Still, MCPA signatories set reduction targets at a much higher rate (42%) than nonsignatory
cities (15%).
An additional variable that measures horizontal influence is a city’s membership in the
ICLEI’s CCP program (coded 1 for CCP members or 0 for nonmembers). Sixty-six of 591
sample cities (about 11%) signed both the MCPA and CCP memberships.
We also test a series of city-level factors known in the literature on urban politics to
influence the adoption of climate policy (Krause, 2012; Lee and Koski, 2012). We measure
partisanship as the percentage of citizens voting for Barack Obama in 2008 presidential
election (Atlas of the US Presidential Election). We also test the influence of city government
type by coding mayor-council governments as 1 and other forms of city government (e.g.
council-manager, commission, town meeting, and representatives from town meeting) as 0
(International City/County Management Association, 2002).
The presence and power of environmental NGOs has been found to influence state and
city level environmental policies (Rootes, 2007; Zahran et al., 2008a, 2008b). For instance, the
Sierra Club has created the climate change initiative “Cool Cities: Solving Global Warming
One City at a Time” (http://coolcities.us/). To measure the influence of environmental NGOs
on mitigation actions, we use total revenue of environmental NGOs reported on IRS form
990 in a given city. In addition, we also consider an alternative measure of environmental
NGOs influence by counting the number of registered environmental NGOs. We also control
for demographic factors which may affect the degree of climate change policy actions:
population, college education, and per capita income.
Vertical influences
In the federal system, state-level characteristics may influence cities’ climate change
actions. Our primary independent variable characterizing vertical influence on climate
policy performance is the presence of state-level climate initiatives. We additionally
control for a slate of state-specific factors including institutions, partisanship, and interest
groups.
State-initiated policies are likely to directly or indirectly influence the advancement
of city climate change actions. First, a state CAP can have an (intended) impact on cities’
emission reduction target and implementation. In some cases, state-initiated regulations,
for example of California’s AB 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, specifically
encourage local governments to reduce GHG emissions (Pew Charitable Trust, 2009). Thus,
the presence of a state-level CAP is likely to promote city level climate mitigation actions.
1508 T Lee, C Koski

States with completed CAPs are coded 2, states that are currently engaged in constructing a
CAP are coded 1, and states with no CAP are coded 0.
In addition to state CAPs, we also consider the effect that other policies, such as regulation
and financial incentives, have on city level climate actions. One of the primary policies by
which states attempt to mitigate GHG production is to create a renewable portfolio standard
(RPS). An RPS can aim to reduce fossil fuel use by requiring a certain percentage of the
electricity sold by a utility to come from renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, and
biomass (Carley and Miller, 2012). We code the presence of the RPS using a dichotomized
variable. Another way states can facilitate climate change mitigation is to provide financial
incentives to firms or individuals to engage in behaviors that reduce carbon emissions. Public
benefit funds are a common mechanism by which states incentivize action through subsidies
and information in the use and installation of renewable energy (Carley, 2011). For example,
Illinois’ Energy Efficiency Public Benefits Funds can be used for energy-efficiency upgrades
for low-income households, green building construction, and building retrofits. We use a
dummy variable for the existence and nonexistence of a public benefit fund at the state level
(DSIRE, 2009).
We account for institutional characteristics of states by coding for the presence of an
independent energy agency which have been theorized to offer increased capacity to
facilitate climate mitigation policies (May and Koski, 2007). We use a dichotomous variable:
1 for states that have an independent energy agency and 0 for no agency (Department of
Energy). In a similar vein, the presence of a state advisory board for climate policy may
help to formulate policy recommendations related to state climate mitigation policies.
This advisory body provides additional capacity to cities in developing and implementing
key components of climate mitigation strategies such as development of a GHG emission
inventory, analysis of the efficacy of mitigation and adaptation policies, and suggestions for
policy recommendations (Pew Charitable Trust, 2009).
Regional climate initiatives are another institutional factor which can enhance collaboration
among member states, ultimately to address climate change in their jurisdiction. With
neighboring states, state governments can collaborate to reduce GHG emissions and develop
clean energy technology and sources through multistate climate initiatives. Membership in
these initiatives such as North America 2050, the Western Climate Initiative, and the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative demonstrates a state’s willingness to tackle climate change in a
collective way. We use a dummy variable to code the membership in a regional climate
initiative (Pew Charitable Trust, 2009).1
Political partisanship is also potential factor that might be associated with variation in
climate policy performance (Carley, 2011). We control for partisanship at the state level,
using the percent of a statehouse that is Democrat in 2005 (data source: National Conference
of State Legislatures). In addition, we consider the effects of environmental groups at the state
level and include Sierra Club and other environmental NGO membership per 1000 (logged
to correct for skewed results). Table 1 presents a variable, brief definition, data source, and
descriptive statistics.

Analysis and findings

Our major research goal concerns the influence of multilevel governance on city-level
climate actions. Specifically, we are interested in the city-level effects, horizontal effects

These level climate policy variables are not highly correlated with each other, except
(1) 

for CAP presence and state climate advisory board presence (correlation coefficient 0.67);
public benefit fund and regional climate initiative (correlation coefficient 0.62). Correlation
coefficients for all variables can be offered upon request.
Multilevel governance and urban climate change mitigation 1509

Table 1. Variable description and data source.

Variable Description and operationalization Data source Mean (SD)

City level
US Mayor Whether a mayor signs US Mayor Climate US conference of .50 (.50)
Agreement Protection Agreement (1, agreement; 0, no Mayors (2009)
agreement)
Partisanship Percentage voting for Obama in 2008a The Atlas of US 50.7 (12.7)
(Democrat) Election
Government type City government types (1, mayor-council Int’l City .32 (.46)
government; 0, other forms of city Management
government) Association (2007)
Cities for Climate Membership in Cities for Climate Protection ICLEI (2006) .12 (.33)
Protection (1, membership; 0, no membership)
Environmental Total revenue reported on Form 990 of National Center for 16.7 (1.8)
NGO revenue environmental NGOSa (in $millions) Charitable Statistics
(logged) (2007)
Population (logged) Number of residents in cities’ jurisdictions US Census (2005) 16.1 (.98)
College education Percentage of bachelor’s degree or higher US Census (2005) .26 (.12)
over the whole population
Income (logged) Income per capita in cities’ jurisdictions US Census (2005) 10.6 (.28)
State level
Climate Action The presence of state-level climate action Pew Center (2008) 1.58 (.78)
Plan plan (2, completed; 1, in progress; 0; no
policy in place)
Public Benefit State-level Public Benefit Funds for DSIRE (2007) .53 (.55)
Funds renewables and energy efficiency
(1, existence; 0, no existence)
Renewable State-level Renewable Energy Standard (1, DSIRE (2007) .72 (.49)
Energy Standard existence; 0, no existence)

Independent The existence of independent energy Department of .47 (.49)

Energy Agency agency in the state department organizations Energy (2009)
(1, existence; 0, no existence)
State Climate The existence of a state climate change- Pew .69 (.46)
Advisory Board related advisory board (2009)
(1, existence; 0, no existence)
Regional initiative Membership in a regional climate change Pew (2009) .66 (.47)
initiative (1, state has signed regional
agreement; 0, state has not signed regional
agreement)
Democrats in State Percentage of state house that is Democrat in Conference of State .51 (.13)
House 2005 Legislatures

NGO The number of NGOs in states (logged) NCCS (2007) 7.31 (.89)

ICLEI: International Council for Local Environmental Initiative; DSIRE (Database of State
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency); NCCS (National Center for Charitable Statistics)
a
We recoded the county level data into city level data by considering the location of cities located in
counties.
1510 T Lee, C Koski

in the form of transmunicipal networks, and vertical effects in the form of state institutions
and policies. For this task, multilevel ordered logit models are an appropriate statistical
tool given that cities’ mitigation actions may not be independent of state actions and the
structure of the dependent variable (ordinal). We specify models with a random intercept
with city and state-level variables. Table 2 presents the model parameter estimated for
climate mitigation policy action. Model 1 is a varying intercept model with horizontal
and city level covariates only. Model 2 introduces state-level policies and institutions as
vertical covariates.
Model 1 reveals our key independent variable related to horizontal governance, US MCPA
signatory status, is positive and statistically significantly associated with city-level climate
action. A MCPA signatory city is more likely to carry out stronger actions (i.e. more ICLEI
milestone steps) to mitigate climate change than a nonsignatory city. This finding supports
our hypothesis related to horizontal influences within multilevel governance: mayor’s
transmunicipal commitment is likely to lead to stronger climate mitigation policy action.
Similarly, membership in the CCP program is also associated with greater climate actions.
In terms of city-level factors, consistent with theory we find that more Democratic and
more educated cities take stronger actions to mitigate climate change. Curiously, neither
interest group variable at the city level presents a significant result. This is a somewhat
counterintuitive finding which may be due to diversified NGO expertise and focuses other
than issues related to climate mitigation at the local level.
Model 2 presents results that are generally inline with expectations generated from the
literature on multilevel governance. As expected, a state’s comprehensive CAP provides
vertical influence to motivate mitigation actions at the city level. Similarly, the presence of a
state RPS also contributes to stronger climate actions at the city level. These results comport
with public policy empirical research that finds regulations or standards to be more effective
at pushing cities to address climate change more aggressively (see Carley and Miller, 2012).
Our examination of the influence of institutional structures at the state level and local
climate actions produces mixed results. Cities in states with climate advisory boards are no
more likely to engage in climate mitigation actions than cities in states without. However,
we find that cities in states with independent energy agencies in are more likely to carry
out actions related to climate change. Similar to the story at the city level, environmental
groups at the state level are not found to be significant drivers of climate change mitigation
actions in cities. This finding may be a function of the fact that we use a variable specific
to one group (the Sierra Club) to measure environmental group presence. Though much of
the literature on climate change in the US relies on the Sierra Club counts as a proxy for
environmental sentiment, it could very well be that climate change goes beyond traditional
conceptualizations of the environment.
Table 3 presents predicted probabilities for a key vertical influence (state-level independent
energy agency) and a key horizontal influence (MCPA signatory status) derived from results
in Model 2. The first finding that emerges from Table 3 is that many cities simply do not
engage in processes to mitigate climate change. However, horizontal and vertical pressures
are very important in increasing the likelihood that cities take steps to mitigate climate
change. For example, a non-MCPA signatory city in a state without an independent energy
agency is highly unlikely to reach any of the ICLEI milestones (83% probability). However,
cities that are MCPA signatories in states that have an independent state energy agency are
considerably more likely to at least reach one milestone (54%). Non-MCPA signatories in
states without independent energy agencies are less likely to complete all five mitigation steps
(0.1% predicted probability), compared to MCPA signatory cities with state energy agencies
Multilevel governance and urban climate change mitigation 1511

Table 2. Multilevel ordered logit model of mitigation policy procedure.

Model 1 Model 2
City level City and state
City level
MCPA .73 (.23)** .80 (.23)**
CCP 1.77 (.27)** 1.78 (.28)**
Partisanship (Democrat) .02 (.001)** .03 (.009)**
Government type –.42 (.38) –.02 (.41)
Environmental NGOs .05 (.06) .06 (.06)
Population (logged) .01 (.11) –.04 (.26)
College education 4.49 (.86)** 4.98 (.91)**
Income (logged) –1.26 (.41)** –1.52 (.44)**

State level
Climate action plan .43 (.20)*
Public Benefit Fund –.45 (.29)
Renewable Energy Standard .56 (.27)*
Independent Energy Agency .71 (.26)**
Climate Advisory Board –.56 (.31)
Regional initiative .43 (.25)
Democrats in State House –3.0 (1.1)
Environmental NGO –.003 (.31)
N 591 (level 1) 591 (level 1); 48 (Level 2)
Log likelihood –613.31 –601.10
CCP: Cities for Climate Protection; MCPA: Mayor Climate Protection Agreement.
Note:
1. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
2. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: *p<.05, **p<.01 (two-tail test).

Table 3. Predicted probabilities of mitigation steps by the presence of a key vertical influence
(independent state energy agency) and a key horizontal influence (MCPA signatory status).

State City Predicted probability for mitigation steps

Energy MCPA
No Inventory Target Plan Implementation Monitoring
Agency
policy
No No .83 .04 .04 .05 .01 .00
Yes .65 .07 .09 .11 .04 .01
Yes No .69 .07 .08 .09 .03 .01
Yes .46 .08 .12 .19 .09 .04
MCPA: Mayor Climate Protection Agreement.
1512 T Lee, C Koski

(4% predicted probability). In short, the comparison of predicted probabilities shows the
power of both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of multilevel governance motivating
steps toward climate mitigation—but, in this analysis, horizontal influences are stronger.
Conclusion
Climate change is the quintessential multilevel governance problem—the effects of climate
change are individual to localities, but the causes are globally generated by a plethora of
localities. States often get most of the credit for addressing climate change in the literature
on federalism, but it is important to remember that cities have been key players in climate
policy. Subnational units are given wide latitude to address climate change because of the
conspicuous absence of federal standards that might otherwise bound the range of policy
solutions. Adding to this amalgam of factors that influence local mitigation actions are the
international organizations that devise local climate solutions, provide networks to share
ideas, and opportunity structures for mayoral leadership. The investigation we present in this
article examines the actions cities take related to climate change mitigation. The resultant data
analysis supports three general conclusions: (1) subnational multilevel climate governance
in the US is a story of complementarity, (2) city-level political and economic conditions
are more influential in pushing climate actions, and (3) mayors can be climate leaders in
multilevel governance given strong influence transmunicipal protection agreements have
over city actions.
First, it might seem as though states and cities working together toward the same goal
would produce a better result than one or the other going it alone. However, the current
literature on federalism is greatly concerned with the reality of local climate action policy
if and when the federal government does get involved (Rabe, 2011). Federal action might
preempt many years’ worth of policy innovation and action at the state and local level (Engel,
2009); or, federal action might maintain current practices, but stamp out innovation. The same
scenarios could very well be the case for state and local interactions in the US. Our results
do not specifically speak to the influence of the federal government as a vertical influence
on states and localities; however, we can say that, in the context of vertical influences from
state governments, horizontal influences are the primary motivators of climate actions at the
local level. In the debate on whether local and state climate initiates might “wither” (Engel,
2009), we offer some evidence that horizontal influences may maintain the local character of
climate action. As we report in the analysis, MCPA signatory cities in states with CAPs are
six times more likely to develop plans (the third ICLEI milestone) to implement reductions
in GHGs. Our large N analysis precludes the kinds of thick description of actual interactions
between cities and states, but in broad strokes we can say that one level of government
does not attenuate the effects of the other. We can go farther and say that, while multilevel
influences are the best-case scenario for climate actions, the individual effects of state and
local government policies on climate actions are important in and of themselves.
Second, the findings of the paper generally support the reality that city political and
economic factors are largely are driving climate change policy decision-making at the local
level. This observation conforms to many scholarly and popular case studies that outline the
innovative and stronger strategies cities have for confronting climate change. Our analysis
simply does not find a relationship between state political factors and city actions; though
the extent to which state institutions or policies exist related to climate change is important.
While limited, this state intervention can be seen as playing a particular role in motivating
some cities’ actions or in providing technical support. The broader implication of our analysis
is that, in the open policy space for climate change, cities can be thought of as largely
independent actors in acting toward mitigation goals. States are important in facilitating
action, but cities’ economies, citizens, and politicians are more influential. This relationship
Multilevel governance and urban climate change mitigation 1513

may change as the federal government adopts rules that require state implementation or rules
that attempt to homogenize climate efforts across all subnational governments (Gerrard and
Welton, 2014).
Third, the data support a general finding that city officials can have direct and indirect
influences over climate policy. Directly, mayors can influence a city’s agenda by signing
transnational climate agreements. To be sure, mayoral strength is critical to the capacity
of a mayor to exert influence in any area of public policy—however, the US Conference
of MCPA offers a particular opportunity to mayors to influence future policy decisions of
cities beyond their term. The “list of participating mayors” found at the climate protection
center (usmayors.org) includes the mayor that originally signed the agreement rather than the
current mayor charged with implementing that agreement. Specifically signing the MCPA
shows that when mayors can influence the signatory process regarding climate change, they
connect a city with a broader network of like-minded cities which ultimately influences
city level actions. The comparison in effect between the MCPA and the CCP program is
particularly useful to show the overall importance of mayoral actions in influencing climate
actions. The CCP program is explicitly tied to the ICLEI milestones, whereas the MCPA is
not. The MCPA is often derided as a symbolic agreement—this may indeed be the case, but
it would seem that this symbolism manifests itself in a substantive outcome.
Mayoral agreements also indirectly influence climate action by placing a city in a network
that allows for a city to influence other cities, but also linked to other cities for the purpose of
generating horizontal influence on their own actions. This is particularly the case for climate
change policy in the United States where a considerable long-term policy vacuum from
the federal government has created the opportunity for subnational leadership in solutions.
Consider New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg’s very public response to Hurricane
Sandy, the strength of which he associated with climate change. Mayor Bloomberg exercised
political leadership in a late endorsement of President Obama in the 2012 presidential election
because of the issue of climate change. As climate change becomes a more mainstream part
of the conversation, the early investors in shaping policy on a local and international scale via
policy networks are likely to continue to lead.
Certainly our study is one that reduces myriad actions that cities across the United States
take to address climate change to a few indicators. We are encouraged by the results—
particularly as they relate to determining the relative strength of cities to states in motivating
city level climate change actions. It should be noted that we are engaging in a specific form of
understanding mitigation efforts by examining actions cities have taken specific to the ICLEI
Milestones. There is certainly a considerable debate among practitioners and academics that
these Milestones are a useful unitary measure of climate actions. Future research in the area
of subnational climate change mitigation and adaptation measures will hopefully construct a
more holistic measure that can be used in a large quantitative comparative context. In addition,
our cross-section statistical analysis cannot consider temporal changes or mechanisms of
policy development. Future research could benefit from a panel data analysis to examine time
series and cross-section changes of mitigation policy.
Recent public opinion data from the United States suggest that Americans generally
agree that climate change is happening, that this change would have negative outcomes, and
are willing to adjust some of their actions regarding carbon-producing activities because of
it (Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2013; Krosnick and MacInnis, 2013). Cities are in a prime
position to be innovators in policy development (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Kates and
Torrie, 1998; Kousky and Schneider, 2003). However, our research indicates that cities need
not venture into the void of climate governance alone nor fear the potential for national action
(Newig and Fritsch, 2009). Future climate policy would do well to plan for multilevel climate
governance to remain nimble and responsive to the most pressing issue of our time.
1514 T Lee, C Koski

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication
of this article.
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