CHAPTER VII

PROCESS SAFETY STUDIES

7.1 Introduction

The chemical industry has traditionally devoted considerable attention to

safety, beginning with the research and development on new processes through plant
design and construction, manufacture and the distribution and use of the products. It
recent years, however, due to the continued expansion of the industry, advantages in
the chemical knowledge and medicine, political, social and environmental trends, a
fundamental revision of the approach to safety has taken place.

Process safety study is an important factor in designing a chemical plant to

avoid major accidents in the designed plant. It has to be done to ensure safe process
and operation throughout the life of a plant. Furthermore, it ensures the safety of the
workers, public and environment. Safety study is most effective to carry out early in
a project for reducing the hazardous characteristics of a planned process. This can be
achieved by identifying all the potential hazards or incident scenarios while
minimizing all the possible risks. The main hazards in chemical plant are toxic and
corrosive chemicals, explosions, fires and accidents common to all industrial
activities. But it is most effective to carry out studies early in a project when there is
the greatest potential for reducing the hazardous characteristics of a planned process.
In this topic, various process safety techniques, general plant safety study, plant start-
up and shutdown and the concept of hazard and risk will be discussed. Finally,
hazard and operability study (HAZOP) on various unit operations will be done.

7.1.1 Hazards

A hazard has the potential to cause harm. This can take the form of death, ill
health, injury to people, damage to property/plant/products/the environment,
production losses, business harm and increased liabilities [13]. Ill health includes
acute and chronic ill health caused by physical, chemical or biological agents as well
as adverse effects on mental health.

Many of hazards, which give rise to such incidents, are readily identified. In
the process industries such hazard include those falling into one or more of the
following categories:
1. Chemical hazards (include acidity, alkalinity, corrosivity, explosiveness,
flammability, reactivity, toxicity and asphyxiation).
2. Thermodynamic hazards (include high pressure and vacuum, heat transfer, high
and low temperature and fluid jets).
3. Electric and electromagnetic hazards (include high voltage, radiation, static
electricity and electrical current).
4. Mechanical hazards (include mechanical energy, stresses, forces and impact blows
and contact laceration).
5. Health hazards (include noise, pollutants, chemicals, vibration, radioactivity and
temperature extremes).

External threats include accidental impact damage by missiles and vehicles,

act of God and natural causes, abnormal environment extremes, external interference
by a variety of causes including action by humans and chemicals, instability of
structures or foundations, force major and external releases of energy or toxins.

Any unplanned change might constitute threat to plant, personnel and

environment. For example, it might introduce a weakness into the system affecting
the defences of the system against loss of containment. This not only includes

143
internal changes to pipe work and vessels, such as increase in flow rate and pressure,
but also changes which arise in design, operation and maintenance which effect
performance of plant and equipment, personnel and procedures, communication and
information processing. Further more such changes may not be immediately
recognized as undesired events, but only appear at much later time to effect
behaviour.

So the position is more complicated than it first seems. The analyst cannot
simply aim at any particular time to study all hazards but must restrict the study to
the area of interest at that time. Paying particular attention to the way incidents
develop can do this.

7.1.2 Risk

A hazard is a physical situation with a potential for human injury, damage to

property, damage to the environment or some combination of these.

The risk of an event is the likelihood of a specified undesired event occurring

within given period or particular circumstances (Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment, 1996). Risk is usually considered to be a function of the frequency or
probability of an event occurring and the consequence of its occurrence, particularly
with respect to cause damage and injury. This is the normal definition used in the
process industries, although health hygienist might narrow this definition to consider
the hazard of a substance as the way it can harm the individual. The risk of a
substance can then be defined as how likely it is to harm you in practice. The
individual risk is the frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain
given level of harm from the realization of a specified hazard.

The social risk reflects the likelihood of accidents involving multiple

casualties. Standards for risk are set considering the views of all related groups.
There is of course, concern from public and employees that the risks to which they
will be exposed are tolerable. The publics are extremely unlikely to want a LPG
unloading station across the road from their home or a nuclear power station within

144
ten minutes’ walk. Apart from the risk most people consider these items to be ugly
installations anyway. Less clear cut are environmental objections to a main road
through fields at the bottom of the garden, as many people benefit from the detriment
to a few. So it has to be expected that there will be never be acceptable to which
everyone will agree. If the case seems fair then most social groups accept the
majority opinion. Even so there exist groups within community, which tend to be
vociferous and committed to a cause and will argue most about the tolerability of
risk. So confrontation will always arise.

Risk evaluation is the complex process of determining the significance or

value of the identified hazards and risks to those concerned with, or affected by, the
decision. It is an emotive topic. But in the first place it is necessary to the process
engineer to be able to carry out an initial screening of the risk involved in any
activity. This is best done on some numerical basis and hence there is a need for the
engineer to be aware of the order of magnitude of the risk which, with luck, will be
considered tolerable by the public, workforce, company directors, shareholders,
regulators, legislators and planning authorities.

7.1.3 The Chemical Hazards

The product itself, ammonia is a toxic and carcinogenic substances. The

safety guideline of ammonia are as mentioned below

TYPES OF
ACUTE HAZARDS/ FIRST AID/
HAZARD/ PREVENTION
SYMPTOMS FIRE FIGHTING
EXPOSURE
NO open flames, NO
FIRE In case of fire in the surroundings: all
Flammable. sparks, and NO
extinguishing agents allowed.
smoking.
Closed system,
ventilation,
EXPLOSION In case of fire: keep cylinder cool by
Gas/air mixtures are explosive. explosion-proof
spraying with water
electrical equipment
and lighting.
EXPOSURE Avoid all contact
Burning sensation. Cough.
Ventilation, local Fresh air, rest. Half-upright position.
INHALATION Laboured breathing. Shortness of
exhaust, or breathing Artificial respiration if indicated. Refer
breath. Sore throat. Symptoms
protection. for medical attention.
may be delayed (see Notes).
Redness. Skin burns. Pain. Cold-insulating ON FROSTBITE: rinse with plenty of
SKIN
Blisters. ON CONTACT WITH gloves. Protective water, do NOT remove clothes. Refer for
LIQUID: FROSTBITE. clothing. medical attention.

145
 Face shield, or eye
First rinse with plenty of water for
EYES Redness. Pain. Severe deep protection in
several minutes (remove contact lenses if
burns. combination with
easily possible), then take to a doctor.
breathing protection.
INGESTION

SPILLAGE DISPOSAL STORAGE PACKAGING & LABELLING

T symbol
Evacuate danger area! Consult an expert!
N symbol
Ventilation. NEVER direct water jet on liquid. Fireproof. Separated from
R: 10-23-34-50
Remove gas with fine water spray (extra personal oxidants, acids, halogens. Cool.
S: (1/2-)9-16-26-36/37/39-45-61
protection: gas-tight chemical protection suit Keep in a well-ventilated room.
UN Hazard Class: 2.3
including self-contained breathing apparatus).
UN Subsidiary Risks: 8

7.1.3.1 Identification

CAS: 7664-41-7 (anhydrous); 1336-21-6 (25% solution in

water)
ERG ID: UN 1005 (anhydrous; more than 50% ammonia
solution)
UN 2672 (10-35% ammonia solution)
UN 2073 (more than 35% but not more than 50%
ammonia solution)
ERG Guide: 125 (anhydrous; more than 50% ammonia solution);
154 (10-35% ammonia solution); 125 (more than 35%
but not more than 50% ammonia solution)
ERG Guide Category: Anhydrous; more than 50% ammonia: GASES-
CORROSIVE
10-35% ammonia: TOXIC AND/OR CORROSIVE
(NONCOMBUSTIBLE); More than 35% but not more
than 50% ammonia: GASES CORROSIVE
Molecular Formula: H3N
RTECS No.: BO0875000
Properties: Anhydrous ammonia is a colourless, highly irritating
gas at room temperature with a pungent, suffocating
odour. It is lighter than air and flammable at high
concentration and temperatures. Easily compressed, it
forms a clear, colourless liquid under pressure. Readily
dissolved in water, forming ammonium hydroxide, an

146
 alkaline, corrosive solution. Floats and "boil" on water.
Poisonous, visible vapour cloud is produced. Gas is
lighter than air, hugs the ground when cool.

7.1.3.2 Health and Safety Information

Contact with liquid may cause frostbite. Corrosive to skin, eye, nose, throat
and lungs. There is no antidote for ammonia poisoning. Chemical-protective clothing
is recommended because ammonia can cause skin irritation and burns. Repeated
exposure may cause chronic irritation of the respiratory tract. Chronic inflammation
of the bronchi and airway hyperactivity has been reported. Chronic irritation of the
eye membranes has also been reported.
IDLH: 300 ppm
Odour Threshold: 5.75 ppm
OSHA Table Z-1-A Air Contaminant
OSHA Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals: (29 CFR
Part 1910.119, Appendix A) TQ = anhydrous 10,000 lb; solutions (>44% ammonia
by weight) 15,000 lb
NIOSH Criteria Document: NIOSH 74-136

Exposure Limits: TWA STEL

ACGIH: 25 ppm; 17 mg/m3 35 ppm; 24 mg/m3
NIOSH: 25 ppm; 18 mg/m3 35 ppm; 27 mg/m3
OSHA: 50 ppm; 35 mg/m3

7.1.3.3 Recommendations for Respiratory Selection: Niosh

250 ppm: CCRS (any chemical cartridge respirator with cartridge(s) providing
protection against the compound of concern); or SA (any supplied-air respirator)
300 ppm: SA: CF (any supplied-air respirator operated in a continuous-flow mode);
or PAPRS (any powered, air-purifying respirator with cartridge(s) providing
protection against the compound of concern); or CCRFS (any chemical cartridge

147
respirator with a full face piece and cartridge(s) providing protection against the
compound of concern); or GMFS [any air-purifying, full-face piece respirator (gas
mask) with a chin-style, front-or back-mounted canister providing protection against
the compound of concern]; or SCBAF (any self-contained breathing apparatus with a
full face piece); or SAF (any supplied-air respirator with a full face piece)

Emergency or Planned Entry Into Unknown Concentration or Idlh Conditions:

SCBAF: PD, PP (Any self-contained breathing apparatus with a full face piece and is
operated in a pressure-demand or other positive-pressure mode); or SAF: PD, PP;
ASCBA (any supplied-air respirator that has a full face piece and is operated in a
pressure-demand or other positive-pressure mode in combination with an auxiliary
self-contained breathing apparatus operated in a pressure-demand or other positive
pressure mode.

Escape: GMFS [any air-purifying, full-face pieces respirator (gas mask) with a chin-
style, front-or back-mounted acid gas canister providing protection against the
compound of concern]; or SCBAE (any or SCBAE (any appropriate escape-type,
self-contained breathing apparatus)
Note: Substance reported to cause eye irritation or damage, may require eye protection

7.1.3.4 Chemical Reactivity

Violent reaction with strong oxidizers and acids. Shock-sensitive compounds

may be formed with gold, halogens, mercury, mercury oxide, and silver oxide. Fire
and explosions may be caused by trimethylammonium amide, 1-chloro-2,4-
dinitrobenzene, o-chloronitrobenzene, platinum, trioxygen difluoride, selenium
difluoride dioxide, boron halides, mercury, chlorine, iodine, bromine, hypochlorites,
chlorine bleach, amides, organic anhydrides, isocyanates, vinyl acetate, alkaline
oxides, epichlorohydrin, and aldehydes. Attack some coatings, plastics and rubber.
Attacks copper, brass, bronze, aluminium, steel, tin, zinc, and their alloys.

148
7.1.3.5 Fire Information

Firefighting gear (including SCBA) does not provide adequate protection. If

exposure occurs, removed and isolate gear immediately and thoroughly
decontaminate personnel. Vapours are heavier than air and will collect in low area.
Vapour in confined area may explode when exposed to fire. Vapours may travel long
distances to ignition sources and flash back. Storage containers and parts of container
may rocket great distances, in many direction. If material or contaminated runoff
enters waterway, notify downstream users of potentially contaminated waters. Notify
local health and fire officials and pollution control agencies. DO NOT PUT WATER
ON LIQUID AMMONIA; WILL INCREASE EVAPORATION. Use dry chemicals,
carbon dioxide. From a secure explosion-proof location, use water spray to cool
exposed containers. If cooling streams are ineffective (venting sound increases in
volume and pitch, tank discolour or shows any signs of deforming), withdraw
immediately to a secure position.

NFPA Hazard Classifications:

Health Hazards (Blue)……………. 3
Flammability (Red)……………….. 1
Reactivity (Yellow)……………….… 0

Flash Point: Gas. Indefinite below 32oF (0oC); sometimes difficult to ignite
Flammable Limits in Air: LEL 15%; UEL 28%
Autoignition Temperature: 1204oF (651oC)

7.1.3.6 First Aid

Move victim to fresh air. Call emergency medical care. Apply artificial
respiration if victim is not breathing. Do not use mouth-to-mouth method if victim
ingested or inhaled the substance; induce artificial respiration with the aid of a pocket
mask equipped with a one-way valve or other proper respiratory medical device.
Administer oxygen if breathing is difficult. Remove and isolate contaminated
clothing and shoes. In case of contact with substance, immediately flush skin or eyes

149
with running water for at least 20 minutes. For minor skin contact, avoid spreading
material on unaffected skin. In case of contact with liquefied gas, thaw frosted parts
with lukewarm water. Keep victim warm and quiet. Keep victim under observation.
Effect of contact or inhalation may be delayed. Ensure that medical personnel are
aware of the material(s) involved and take precaution to protect themselves.

7.1.3.7 Environmental Information

Clean Air Act: Section 112 (r), Accidental Release Prevention/Flammable

Substances (Section 68.130); (anhydrous) TQ = 10,000 lb (4.540 kg); (concentration
equal to or greater than 20%) TQ = 20,000 lb (9,150 kg)
Clean Water Act: Section 311Hazardous Substances/RQ (same as CERCLA);
Section 313 Priority Chemicals
EPCRA Section 302, Extremely Hazardous Substances: TPQ = 500 lb (228 kg)
EPCRA Section 304 Reportable Quantity (RQ): CERCLA, 100 lb (45.5 kg)
EPCRA Section 313: Form R de minims concentration reporting level: 1.0%;
includes anhydrous ammonia and aqueous ammonia from water dissociable
ammonium salt and other sources; 10% of total aqueous ammonia, and 100% of
anhydrous forms of ammonia is reportable under this listing. If a facility
manufactures, processes, or otherwise uses anhydrous ammonia or aqueous
ammonia, they must report under the ammonia listing. Solutions containing aqueous
ammonia at a concentration in excess of 1%of the 10% reportable under this listing
should be factored into threshold and release determination.

7.2 General Process Safety Procedures

The Health and Safety Act. 1974 provided a new legal and administrative
framework to promote, stimulate and encourage even higher standards of health and
safety at work. Its aim is to promote safety awareness and effective safety
organization and performance in companies. Besides, a contractor must ensure that
all work activities carried out, must fully comply with Unichema Malaysia Safety
Rules as well as the Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA) 1994. A contractor

150
also should apply for Permit-To-Work from Unichema Contact. If there is HOT
WORK required, the contractor needs to apply for ‘HOT WORK PERMIT’.
Contractors are supposed to ensure that all tools and equipment are in good condition
and suitable for the job. Employers are required to carry out certain specific duties
and employees must co-operate with the employer to comply with the law and not
misuse safety equipment. Every employer must prepare a statement of policy on
health and safety, together with the arrangements for the policy. It is essential that
the new chemical operator acquaint themselves with the details of this policy at the
commencement of their training. Suggestion for safety improvements should be
made to the member of the Company Health and Safety Committee representing the
Chemical Operator’s own department.
(Chemical Process Safety, Fundamentals with Application by Daniel A. Crowl and
Joseph F. Louvar).

7.2.1 General Safety

 Each employee is expected to know and observe all plant safety.

 All injuries, no matter how slight, must be reported at once to your immediate
Supervisor. This is for your protection to insure that proper records are made
of the accident.
 All employees are responsible for their fellow employee’s as well as their
own. It is part of their job safety and correctly.
 Detective equipment, unsafe conditions and unsafe practices must be reported
to your Supervisor as soon as discovered.
 If you are not sure of the correct and safe way to do your job, ask the
Supervisor. The right way will be safe way. You are not expected to do any
job that you do not understand thoroughly.
 There are shall be no smoking at any time except in specific areas designated
for smoking by Plant Management.
 Matches or lighters shall not be carried into the plant. It ‘s must be left in
lockers rooms or other specific areas.

151
  Its is mandatory that all persons working in the plant wear hard hats and
safety glasses 100% of the time while in the plant. In some plant area, other
protection may be required (i.e. hearing protection). If anyone of employee,
management or visitor enters without this proper safety equipment, it is the
responsibility of the operator in that department to kindly asks him or her to
leave and check back in at the main office. He or she should notify his/her
supervisor of this action.
 Horseplay can only lead to accidents and will not be tolerated in the plant.
Horseplay is cause for immediate disciplinary action including discharge.
 Each employee is expected to help maintain the cleanliness of the plant.
Failure to do this helps to create an atmosphere conductive to the accident.
 Possession or use of liquor illegal drugs is not permitted on the plant premises
anyone under the influence of either will not be permitted on the plant
premises.
 Visitor must apply to the main office, sign a release, and be instructed of
plant safety rules before they are allowed to enter the plant. Visitor will not
be taken into the plant areas that are experiencing production problems. It is
the duty of all employees to challenge anyone not having temporary or
permanent pass.

7.2.2 Plant Safety

There are so many factors influencing the safety of a plant, especially one that
is associated to the chemical sector. Among the factors are:

i) Chemical Storage
The chemical storage is important because it has a huge amount of
raw material or complicated product along with chemicals used for other
processes such as water treatment, cleaning, waste treatment etc. To avoid
any form of unnecessary risk, the storage tang farm should not be situated
adjacent to urban development to eliminate any possibility of Vapor Cloud
Explosion (VPE), fireball or toxic cloud drift over population. A buffer zone

152
 is suggested around the plant. Thus, storage area for ethylene, oxygen and
any other chemical should be situated in a safe position. The distance of
minimum chemical storage is 100m from the nearest process equipment. The
storage area should also be equipped with facilities to contain any spillage
from the vessel.

ii) Transportation
This factor related to work in handling the chemicals inside a plant . A
safe handling program must be installed and practiced by every personnel
because unforeseen events can create a big disaster due to human error.
Personal involvement with handling and transportation of such chemicals by
the tanker lorry and forklift drivers makes it compulsory for them to follow
all the handling procedures because they are the ones who are closely
associated with these materials and thus indirectly the safety of other workers
depend on them.

iii) Plant Location

For every chemical plant, there is nee to locate the plant far from any
housing areas in order to minimize the probability or harming the public in
any possible way. Accidents that normally occur can be related to fire,
explosion or vapor cloud and each of these factors can result in a big
catastrophic.

iv) Flammable Environments

Nobody in his or her right mind would look for a gas leak while
carrying a lit cigar. But by not thinking clearly, it’s easy to do equally
ridiculous things. Every year, many thousands of workers make these
mistakes and end up as statistic. If the material we work with whether it’s
paper, paints, solvents or fluids in tanks or pipelines is combustible, then
there is a risk of fire or explosion. In acetaldehyde production, ethylene is
also flammable. If working in an area where leaks or a buildup of
combustible vapors is possible, hazards present.

153
v) Chemically Hazardous Environments
In addition to flammable or explosive conditions, chemical hazards
are also common. As you consider the possible sources of chemical hazards
in your environment. You’ll want to know the characteristics of all material,
you’ll be in contact with drums of open fluids, open tanks and vessels,
process ingredients, all fluids that run through pipelines even cleaning agents
and others incidental chemicals. The plant should have standards for
personal protection for each type of chemical hazard present. The plant
obligation is to have these standards and observe the pertinent information on
the MSDS sheet.

7.2.3 Worker Safety

There are few basic safety rules, which must be observed when working in all
chemical-manufacturing areas:
i. No smoking or eating.
ii. No drinking of alcoholic liquor.
iii. Safety instruction and danger sings must be observed.
iv. Wear all personal protective equipment provided and replace
damaged items immediately.
v. Do not tamper with faulty equipment or electrical fitting-report
such faults to your supervisors.
vi. Get immediate medical attention for injuries, however minor
they appear to be.
vii. Report all accidents to your supervisors.
viii. Know the location of fire alarms, extinguishers and escape
routes.
ix. When in doubt-ask you supervisors.

154
7.2.4 Detection of Possible Hazards

The skilled chemical operator uses all their sense to detect and recognize the
symptoms of a potential safety hazard. They will get themselves-and others-clear of
the source of danger and report their observation to supervisor immediately. Most
danger can be avoided if readily recognized and the right corrective action taken
promptly. Some of the ways in which the sings of possible hazards may be
recognized as follows:

i. Seeing
Look for warning signs, tags and safety instruction. Smoke, fumes or
sparks, particularly from electrical equipment, is symptom of overheating and
constituents a fire hazard. A blue flash may indicate a discharge of static
electricity. Observe gauges for sudden increase in temperature, rapid pressure
changes, rise or fall in liquid levels in tanks and gauge glasses. Look for
cracks or other visible damage to equipment, particularly glassware and glass
linings and leaks at valves, gaskets or seals. Keep watch for physical changes
of chemicals, such as a change in color, lumpiness, change in crystal form,
bubbling or frothing. Do no poke your head into any vessel to see it is clean.
Look out for reddening of the skin or rashes: they may indicate contact with
an irritating, corrosive or dermatitis chemical.

ii. Hearing
Whistling or hissing noises may be a warning of the escape of gas or
steam under pressure. Banging, rattling, grinding or whining sounds usually
indicate faults in moving parts of machinery. In the line, dripping or
splashing noise may lead to the detection of leaking vessels; pump seals,
valves or gaskets. The sound of shattering or cracking of glass is associated
with fracturing of glass pipeline, glass vessels or fittings caused by excessive
pressure, being struck or being subjected to a sudden change in temperature
(thermal shock). A cracking noise may indicate the discharge of static
electricity, which constitutes a fire hazards.

155
iii. Feeling
Unusual vibrations indicate pressure change or uneven running, for
example misalign moving parts of a basket of a centrifuge loaded unevenly.
Excessive heat radiating from reaction vessels may be a warning of an
exothermic reaction; in the case of electrical equipment or machinery it may
indicate an unusual overload due, perhaps, to less of lubricant. Burning,
irritation or itching of the skin indicates contact with corrosive, irritants or
dermatitis chemicals. Dryness of the lips or skin may indicate contact with
organic solvents. Smarting, irritating, watering or itching of the eyes may be
caused by contact with certain dusts or lachrymatory vapors. Difficulty in
breathing, choking, giddiness or feeling of weakness at the knees may be the
effects of harmful gases, dusts or vapor.

iv. Smelling
The chemical operator learns to identify certain chemicals by their
distinctive smell and be they may be forewarned of possible danger. It is
often difficult to describe a particularly smell and the sense varies
considerably from person experience is the only reliable guide. Some
chemicals may irritate the mucous membranes: some are sweet and sickly
(such as nitrous oxide). Purging and suffocating and may cause gasping (such
as ammonia). A pungent, irritating smell is characteristic of chlorine or
bromine: a sweet, scented smell may indicate the organic chemicals called
esters (such as amyl acetate). Organic compounds of benzene give a
characteristic aromatic smell, which is easily recognizable. There are also
many chemicals, which give smells identifiable with common day to day
smells. For example: hydrogen sulfide (rotten eggs) or carbon disulfide
(decaying vegetables).

v. Tasting
Chemicals must never be tested, as this very dangerous practice.
However in the event of accidental contact with the lips or mouth, an acute
sense of taste may the person effected to take the appropriate action quickly
by washing the mouth with copious quantities of cool water for at least 15
minutes. For example, the sour taste of acids, the sweet, sickly taste of nitrous

156
 oxide or even the loss of taste caused, for example, by phenol may be
recognized readily.

7.2.5 Personal Protective Clothing and Equipment

A wide range of clothing and equipment for personal protection in a variety

of material is generally available and the chemical operative should seek the advice
of their supervisor as to the correct type to use for each task they may be required to
perform. It is important to remember that a chemical operator is entitled to refuse to
do job if the appropriate protective clothing or equipment is not available; on the
other hand, it is the responsibility of their supervisor to ensure that it is available and
worn where necessary.

i. Safety Hats
Soft caps of plastic or leather give protection against chemical
splashes, especially when working with overhead pipes, tanks, heat
exchangers and other equipment, which may leak. Reinforced hats of metal,
laminated plastic or other materials resistant to impact from falling objects
should be worn when overhead work is performed (a properly fitting hat
gives maximum protection).

ii. Basic Eye Protection

Flying objects that result from equipment failures, procedure
performed by fellow workers, dust, grit and particulate in the air and
chemical splashes are just a few of the common causes of eye injury.
Selection of appropriate safety glasses is very important. Standard glasses
give only limited protection because objects can strike the eye from above,
below and to the side of the glasses. This is why frames with good top fit and
side shields are generally recommended. A hazard become more extreme,
more eye protection is required. Goggles that seal tightly to the face may be
required when working near chemicals, or face shields may be used in
conjunction with the goggles.

157
iii. Dust Mask
Many types are now available, all giving protection against the
inhalation of harmful dust. Special absorbent pads are covered by a
perforated metal disc or fitted to a molded rubber face piece: the pads should
be changed regularly and the face piece cleaned after use. It is most important
to remember that dust masks offer no protection against gases.

iv. Air Masks

The most common air masks are the “army gas mask” type: a molded
rubber front with two eye ports is held to face by adjustable elastic straps
fitting around the head. Air is drawn through a flexible hose and a non-return
valve, in front of the mouth, from a canister strapped to the body and is
expelled between the cheeks and the rubber sides of the mask. The canister
contains a suitable, absorbent material and it is therefore of a vital importance
to distinguish the correct canister for the conditions to be entered. Check with
a supervisor, there is a limited life before the absorbent material is spent and
it is susceptible to deterioration, so immediately area. To obtain protection
over longer periods, there are similar masks, which are supplied by air from a
compressed air line or cylinder or from a hand or electricity driven blower
(positioned in the “flesh air”). The canister-type mask gives the wearer the
most freedom of movement and those connected to the blower the least.
There is a danger of the trailing airlines becoming jammed or cut or of
tripping up the wearer.

v. Safety Footwear
Industrial safety shoes and boots, with steel touchups, which are of
good appearance and comfortable are supplied free or at reduced cost.
Ordinary shoes are most unsuitable as they offer little resistance to corrosive
chemicals or at falling objects. Sparks from nailed boots are a source of
danger. Rubber boots are water weight and resistant to most corrosive
chemicals, but may be attack by much organic solvent.

158
 vi. Basic Hand Protection
Accident records continue to shows that hand and finger injuries are
one of the more common types of personal injury in many plants. Many
different kinds of gloves are available. Some are made of material that
provide protection against toxic and caustic chemicals. Some are suitable for
use in high temperature applications. Others types will ‘break away’, or come
apart, if caught in rotating or moving machinery. Other will cushion against
vibration when working with power tools. Selecting and always wearing the
right glove for the job is the first step in preventing hand injuries. Beyond
that, one must also consider what types of hazards they may be working with,
and be on constant guard to keep one’s hand safe.

vii. Hearing Conservation

In some plants, excessive levels of noise can be a problem. The
OSHA was established guidelines that relate the maximum permissible daily
exposure to varying noise levels. The guidelines suggest noise level of 85 to
90 dab for an 8-hour per day. For daily life example, this level of noise is
about the same as a busy city street corner. As the noise level increase, the
maximum permissible exposure time is reduced. No worker should expose to
noise levels above 115 d.b.a., which it is roughly equal to the sound of a jet
plane taking off, as heard about 300 feet away. Personal protection in the
form of earplugs or muffs should be planned whenever exposure to noisy
equipment and processing is anticipated.(Industrial Hygiene Aspects of Plant
Operation, Vol 2 by Lewis J. Crally and Lester V. Cralley, 1984, pg-13).

7.2.6 First Aid (Poison Information)

i. Eye Contact
Immediately flush with large amounts of water for at least 15 minutes,
occasionally lifting upper and lower lids. Seek medical attention.

159
 ii. Skin Contact
Quickly remove contaminated clothing. Immediately wash
contaminated skin with large amounts of soap and water.

iii. Breathing
Remove the person from exposure. Begin rescue breathing if
breathing has stopped and CPR if heart action has stopped. Transfer promptly
to a medical facilities.

7.3 Process Safety Study (Hazop Study)

7.3.1 General

The hazard and operability studies or HAZOP study, is a systematic and

critical examination for identifying all plant or equipment hazards and operability
problems. It is a technique for systematically considering deviations from the design
intent by the application of a series of guide words to the process parameters, in
order to identify undesirable process deviations. The HAZOP methodology is the
best suited to a group session with multi-disciplinary participants.

HAZOP originated from criticality analysis of chemical processes. It focuses

of the effects of normal and exceptional parameter variation on the systems. Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA) starts with an identified hazard as the works backwards to
determine its possible causes. A causes can be defined as an AND or OR
combination of events, thereby prevailing the combinations of component failures
that may cause the hazard. A fault tree analysis follows the system structure, such
that the upper levels in a fault tree correspond to the system, and the lower levels
correspond to system components.

A preliminary study can be made from a description of the process and the
process flow sheets. For a detailed, final, study of the design, the flow sheets, piping
and instruments diagrams, equipment specifications and layout drawings would be
needed. For a batch process information on the sequence of operation will also be

160
required, such as that given in operating instructions, logic diagrams and flow charts.
A written record is not normally made of each step in the study; only those
deviations that lead to a potential hazard are recorded. If possible, the action needed
to remove the hazard is decided by the team and recorded. If more information or
time is needed to decide the best action, the matter is referred to the design group for
action, or taken up at another meeting of the study team.

When using operability study technique to vet a process design, the action to
be taken to deal with a potential hazard will often be modifications to the control
systems and instrumentation; the inclusion of additional alarms, trips or interlocks. If
major hazards are identified, major design changes may be necessary; alternative
processes, materials or equipment.

Necessary changes to a system for eliminating or reducing the probability of

operating deviations are suggested by the analytical procedures. The method
provides a necessary management tool that it demonstrates to insurers and inspectors
evidence of comprehensive thoroughness. HAZOP study technique is now used by
most major companies handling and processing hazardous material, especially those
where engineering practice involves elevated operating parameters, e.g. oil and gas
production, flammable and toxic chemicals, pharmaceuticals etc. progressive
legislation in encouraging smaller and specialty manufacturing sites to adopt the
method also as standard practice.

7.3.2 Objective of HAZOP

 To identify hazards or deficiency and potential operability problems, which may

lead to hazards such as fire, explosion, toxic release or reduces productivity.
 To critically examine the inadequacies in systems by considering is as a fully
integrated dynamic unit, rather than the ‘ad hoc’ design approach.
 To coordinate the various discipline involved in the project and provides a means
for systematic analysis of the system.

161
 To reduce cost due to operability problems in increasingly larger and complexity
plants so that profitability is increased.
 To meet the legislative requirements for example, DOSH.
 To identify and prevent hazards in process plants that are growing in complexity
with standards are no longer adequate.

7.3.3 HAZOP Technique

The HAZOP techniques applies to a combination of a ‘Property Word’ and

‘Guide Word’ to generate a ‘Deviation’ from design intent. This techniques is
systematically applied to parts of a system such that hazard and operability problems
on the complete system are eventually identified. The following step outline the way
in which HAZOP is applied; (Chemical Engineering, Volume 6 by J.M Coulson and
J.F Richardson, 1983, pg 295)
i. Select a ‘Sub-System’
ii. Applied a ‘Property Word’ (also referred to as a parameter)
iii. Apply a ‘Guide Word’ to a property word to give a ‘Deviation’
iv. Identify the ‘Causes’
v. Identify the ‘Consequences’
vi. Identify the existing ‘Safeguards’
vii. Decide on any ‘Action’ to eliminate or mitigate the identified
problem.
viii. Repeat for others Property Words, Guide Words as a relevant
ix. Repeat for all Sub-System

The HAZOP study is carried out in a group session involving a chairman,

equipment and a number of experts with knowledge and experience of the process
equipment and operations. The HAZOP chairman direct the team in determining the
possible causes of deviations from the normal design intention. To accomplish this,
the chairman will guide the team in brainstorming each process or operation by
applying a number of basic Property Words and Guide Words. Property Words
include; (flow, temperature, pressure, level, reaction amount, heat transfer and time).
Guide Words are as listed in table below:

162
GUIDE WORDS MEANINGS COMMENTS
NO or NOT The complete negation of No part of the intention is
these intentions. achieved but nothing
happens.
MORE or LESS Quantitative increase or These refers to quantities
decrease. and properties such as
flow rates and
temperature, as we ll as
activities like ‘HEAT’
and ‘REACT’.
AS WELL AS A quantitative increase. All the design and
operating intentions are
achieved together with
some additional activity.
PART OF A quantitative decrease Only some of the
intentions are achieved;
some are not.
REVERSE The logical opposite of This is mostly applicable
the intention. to activities, for example
reverse flow or chemical
reactions.
OTHER THAN Complete substitution. No part of the original
intention is achieved.
Something quite different
happens.

The ‘Causes’ and ‘Consequences’ identified by the HAZOP team will be

dependent on the type of system under study. Typically the types of causes involved
in process system are:
i. Equipment failure
ii. Human error
iii. Influence from other system
iv. External event such as fire or explosion
v. Extreme environmental events

The consequences of the identified deviations typically fall into the following areas:

163
 i. Effect on other sub-system or system
ii. Effect on local operators
iii. Effect on surrounding public
iv. Environmental impact
v. Damage to property

Typical situation are considered during the study:

 Normal operation
 Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. up-rating, reduced output, plant start-up
and shut-down
 Suitability of plant materials, equipment and instrumentation
 Provision for failure of plant services, e.g. steam. Electricity, cooling water.
 Provision far maintenance.
The application of each guides word to a process line to generate all conceivable
deviations must be thorough and exhaustive. For each deviation generated the cause
and consequences must be determined.

7.3.4 HAZOP Study In The Plant

7.3.4.1 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger

The main objective of the Hazop study on heat exchanger is maintaining the
inlet and outlet temperature of heat exchanger equipment as best as possible to a
desired temperature. For safe and satisfactory operation of the heat exchanger,
certain constraints must be observed when doing Hazop. For example, shell and tube
pressure drop should be high enough to maintain effective operation.

Hazop analysis for the heat exchanger in the Phthalic Anhydride plant is as
follow. The analysis is through study of streams: inlet and outlet streams of coolant,
hot oil, and process streams.

164
Hazop for Inlet and Outlet of Coolant Streams

Key Word Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Action Required

NO or Coolant flow Plugged Possible Install cooling
NOT cooling line. thermal waters flow indicator.
runaway.
Cooling water Install backup
supply / service Not achieve a cooling water
failure. desire sources.
temperature.
Valve fail to Install backup flow
open. Temperature / controller.
pressure might
increase and Install high
explosion can be pressure/temperature
occurs alarm to alert
operator.

Install high
pressure/
temperature
emergency
shutdown.

MORE OF Cooling Control valve Effected to the Install low

Flow fails respond. shell side temperature alarm.
temperature (not
High flowrate achieved a Install the flow
in cooling water. desired
indicator for cooling
temperature).
water.
Explosion if
wall cannot
Change new valve
withstand high
pressure
Install high
pressure/temperature
alarm to alert operator
LESS OF Less Cooling Same as Same as Same as NO/NOT
Flow NO/NOT NO/NOT

REVERSE Reverse Coolant pump Cooling not Install valves at the

cooling flow not functioning. effective. coolant flow before
inlet the tube side.
OTHER Another Water Possible loss Isolation of water-
material contaminated. cooling with cooling sources.
Beside possible run-
Cooling away.

165
 Water. Back flow. Install check valve
to prevent the others
material

Hazop for Inlet and Outlet of Hot Streams

Possible
Key Word Deviation Consequences Action Required
Causes
NO or Flow Valve fail to Possible Install hot oil flow
NOT open. thermal indicator.
runaway.
Blocked valve Install backup hot
from the Not achieve a oil sources.
previous part. desire
temperature. Install temperature
indicator for process
Further process stream
cannot be
operated or
stopped.
MORE OF Flow Valve failure Possible Install high
to be function in thermal temperature indicator.
good condition. runaway.
Install stop valve.
Control system Not achieve a
failure desire Install high
temperature. pressure/temperature
alarm to alert
operator.

Install high
pressure/
temperature
emergency
shutdown.

Temperature Temperature Same as Same as MORE.

controller not MORE.
functioning.

Valve failure

166
 Pressure The pressure Temperature Same as MORE.
inlet is not will increase
stable
(disturbance)

LESS OF Flow Same as NO. Same as NO. Same as NO.

Temperature Control system Temperature Install low
not functioning. will decrease Temperature
with that Transmission
condition.
Less of High Pressure The flow of Install the LOW PT
Pressure drop. fluid stream is and PC.
disturbed.

Hazop for Inlet and Outlet of Process Streams (main stream)

Possible
Key Word Deviation Consequences Action Required
Causes
NO or Flow Valve fail to Thermal run- Install flow
NOT open. aways. indicator.

Piping failure Unstable Install pressure

condition. Might /temperature indicator
increase for process stream
pressure/
temperature. Install high
pressure/temperature
Further process alarm to alert
cannot be operator.
operated or
stopped.

167
MORE OF Flow Valve failure Possible Install flow
to be thermal indicator.
functioning in runaway.
good condition. Install pressure
Not achieve a /temperature indicator
Control system desire for process stream
failure temperature.
Install high
Temperature / pressure/temperature
pressure might alarm to alert
increase and operator.
explosion can be
occurs

Effects on
further process
Temperature Temperature Same as Same as MORE.
controller MORE.
failure

Valve is
failure function.

Pressure Previous Temperature Same as MORE.

equipment will increase
failure
LESS OF Flow Same as NO. Same as NO. Same as NO.
Temperature Control system Effects on Install low
not functioning. further process Temperature
Transmission

7.3.4.2 HAZOP on Compressor

Hazop study on compressor is important in order to control the product

quality. To achieve that, the compressor must maintain either the pressure or
temperature to the desired pressure and temperature. Hazop analysis for the
compressors in the Ammonia plant is as follow.

Outlet flowrate from compressor.

Key Word Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Action Required

NO or Flow Compressor Reaction ceases Regular

168
NOT failure Process stop maintenance

Pipe broken Install high flow

pressure alarm
Pipe plugging interlocked to reduce
flow rate

MORE OF Flow SAME AS High rate of Install high

ABOVE. reaction, change temperature alarm
in outlet
temperature Install high flow
pressure alarm
interlocked to reduce
flow rate

Pressure SAME AS Over pressure Regular

ABOVE. for heat maintenance
exchanger.
Product ruined. Install high pressure
alarm

Install high flow

pressure alarm
interlocked to reduce
flow rate

LESS OF Flow SAME AS Heat supply Regular

ABOVE. reduce maintenance

Install high pressure

alarm

Install high flow

pressure alarm
interlocked to reduce
flow rate

REVERSE Flow SAME AS Reaction ceases Install non-return

ABOVE. valve

7.3.4.3 HAZOP on Reactor

Ammonia reactor for this plant need external heating which perform
by a heat exchanger (X-3 ) and operate at rather high temperature that is at 450 C

169
with pressure drop = 0.03 atm. Since the process involves reactions at rather high
temperature, the Hazop study is important to ensure plant safety.

HAZOP for inlet stream of reactor.

Possible
Key Word Deviation Consequences Action Required
Causes
NO or Flow Heat Fire and health Consider installing
NOT exchanger hazards. Possibly flow indicator.
failure explosion hazard.
Process stops and Install flow control
Line blockage column runs dry. valve.
failure.
Plant shutdowns.
Line leakage
MORE OF Flow Incorrect Reactants build Consider installing
instrument up. Deviation in flow indicator.
reading or flow temperature and
control valve pressure. Install flow control
failure. valve.

Pressure Make by-pass.

difference too
high.
Temperature Over heating High Install high
by heat temperature to temperature alarm
exchangers (X- reactor. Possibly
3) upstream. runaway reaction. Install flow control
Possibly valve.
explosion hazard.
Plant shutdowns.

Pressure Incorrect High pressure to Install high

instrumen reactor. Possibly temperature alarm
reading. runaway reaction.
Possibly Install flow control
Pressure explosion hazard. valve.
difference too
high. Plant shutdowns.

LESS OF Flow As NO As NO Install LOW FLOW

ALARM.

Regular
maintenance.

170
 Temperature Heat Low Install LOW
exchanger TEMPERATURE
temperature to
failure. ALARM.
reactor. Reaction
Consider
rate drops.
alternative heat
Product failure. exchanger.
Loss of reactants.
Regular
Downtime to maintenance.
overall process.
REVERSE Flow Reverse Back mixing, Install check valve
pressure no reaction. on line.
differential. Reduced
reaction rate.
PART OF Composition Failure of Product failure. Install reactant ratio
maintaining controller.
reactant ratio.

HAZOP for outlet stream from reactor

Possible
Key Word Deviation Consequences Action Required
Causes
NO or Flow Line blockage Product loss. Install flow
NOT and catastrophic Downtime to indicator.
fracture. overall process.
Fire, explosion Install LOW
and health FLOW ALARM.
hazards.
Vent to flare or
atmosphere. Apply
passive intumescent
to pipe work.

Plant shutdown.
MORE OF Temperature Poor heat Higher Install backup
transfer in the temperature to the control valve or
water jacket, next equipment. manual bypass in
increased duty, cooling water
or cooling water stream or install
failure. control valve that
fails open.
Pressure Pipeline Back mixing in Install flow
blockage. reactor. indicator or HIGH
Reaction stops. Flow Alarm.
LESS OF Flow Valve leaking, Discharge of Install LOW
line fracture or chemicals into FLOW ALARM.
control valve the
failure. surroundings.

171
 Loss of feed to Regular
reactor. maintenance.
Reduction in
product.
Temperature Higher Lower Ensure regular
throughput of temperature to the maintenance.
cooling water. next equipment.
Valve for
coolant stream
fails open.
Temperature
controller
failure.
Pressure Changes in Temperature Ensure regular
flow. drops. maintenance.
Reactor
leakage.
Line leakage.

7.3.4.4 HAZOP for Flash

HAZOP for outlet stream from Liquid vapor separator

Possible
Key Word Deviation Consequences Action Required
Causes
NO or Flow Line blockage. Product loss. Install flow
NOT Downtime to indicator.
overall process.
Fire, explosion Install LOW
and health FLOW ALARM.
hazards.
Vent to flare or
No separation atmosphere. Apply
occured. passive intumescent
to pipe work.

Plant shutdown.
MORE OF Temperature Heat Higher Install backup
exchanger temperature to the control valve or
failure next equipment. manual bypass in
cooling water
stream or install
control valve that
fails open.
Pressure Pipeline Back mixing in Install flow
blockage. flash unit. indicator or HIGH
Flow Alarm.

172
 Product loss.
Downtime to
overall process.
Fire, explosion
and health
hazards.
LESS OF Flow Valve leaking, Discharge of Install LOW
line fracture or chemicals into FLOW ALARM.
control valve the
failure. surroundings. Regular
Loss of feed to maintenance.
distillation tower.
Reduction in
product.
Temperature Flash unit Lower Ensure regular
leakage temperature to the maintenance.
next equipment.
Heat
exchanger
failure
Pressure Changes in Temperature Ensure regular
flow. drops. maintenance.
Flash leakage.
Line leakage.

7.3.5 Plant Start-Up and Shut Down

7.3.5.1 Introduction

Normally, start-up and shut-down of plant must proceed safely and easily, yet
flexible enough to be carried out in several ways. The operating limits of the plant
must not be exceeded and dangerous mixtures must not be formed. Where necessary
introduce additional equipment, sampling point, instrumentation and lines and
identify their use on the engineering line diagram. There are several important things
that we must take into consideration during the start-up and shut-down of the plant.

173
7.3.5.2 Plant Start-Up

Below are the prestart-up procedures that should be followed:

1. Before the manways covers are installed on the towers or vessels, a final
inspections should be made of the interiors of each tower and vessels for
cleanliness and conformance to the design specification.
2. Check all the items in the “turnaround Worklist” whether they have been
completed and all the equipment and the associated lines have correctly
reassembled
3. If any heat exchangers were opened during the turnaround for inspection,
cleaning and mechanical work, they must be hydrostatically tested after they
have been assembled.
4. Check all the instruments control loops that the alarm circuits are functioning
correctly.
5. Check all the level gauge glasses for cleanliness
6. Make sure that all the control valves operable
7. Check all the orifice plates have been installed properly.
8. Check the pumps for operability
9. check all the utilities, power steam and cooling water. Check all the steam
traps are functioning.
10. Make sure that all the safety valves is tested, installed and the block valve are
sealed in their respective operating position.
11. Check all onsite fire protection equipment such as extinguishers, water hoses,
nozzles and steam hoses are in place and ready for immediate use.
12. Check all the drains are unplugged and all the water drained from equipment.
13. Make sure all the flanges and manheads have good gasket and are made up
tight.
14. The safety valve header, the blowdown line and the flare system are
successfully commissioned.
15. All the blinds are required for tightness testing and air freeing equipment are
available, removed or installed.
16. Make all the steam tracing is operable.
17. The supply of chemicals are adequate and at band.
18. Air freeing and tightness testing

174
 19. Gas blanketing.
20. Catalyst should be activated and sufficiently warm reaction to commence
when flow of reactants is started.

7.3.5.3 Summary of Plant Start-up Procedure

The start-up procedures should be inclusive of the five procedures listed below:

Preliminary Elimination of Tightness

Preparation air Testing

Bringing Unit Disposal of

On Stream purge material

7.3.5.4 Plant Shut-Down

Preparation for the shut-down include the following checks to the advanced
planning:
1. The “ Turnaround Worklist “ are to be prepared to include all items for
repair, cleaning, inspection and modification.
2. The detailed plan of the shut-down and turnaround for the day to day and
probably hour by hour schedule of the sequence of the events are to be
prepared. This is called the Critical Path Monitoring Chart.
3. Before shutting down the unit , check the following:
 The fire fighting equipment are to be correctly located
 The personal protective equipment are to be available for immediate
use,
4. All items that are required during the shut-down of the unit are available.
These items include blinds, hoses for steaming out circuits and
equipment, hoses for draining circuits equipment of liquid, connections
for connecting those hoses.

175
7.3.5.5 Summary of Plant Shut-down Procedure

The shut-down procedure should be inclusive of the five phases as shown below:

Cooling and Pumping out Removal of

depressurizing the unit residue
the unit hydrocarbon

Blinding and Disposal of

opening the water
unit

7.3.5.6 Plant Emergency Shutdown

The emergency shutdown of the plant mostly is due to:

 Losses of utility supply such as cooling water, electricity, steam and etc.
 Mechanical failure of equipment prevents normal operation or result in a
serious fire or leak.
 An emergency response plan should be prepared for the safety of the
employees and public. The two steps should be taken during the event of an
emergency. Firstly, determine the extent of the emergency condition.
Secondly, decide on how to cope with emergency.

7.3.5.7 Emergency Control and Operator Response

Alarms, Detection and Warning System

Alarms can be classified as internal process. Alarms indicating an imminent
problem or that something have gone wrong necessitating emergency action.
External detectors and alarms indicate that a release has occurred. Operators and

176
other personnel clearly can act in this manner as well as wide range of other
instrumentation. It should be noted that warnings by people are only effective if that
person has the authority. A major problem with alarms is that several may go off at
similar times and computers can print out a whole range of information. If people are
overload with information they either fail to analyze it or simply do nothing. Some of
the different warning and detection systems in common use are indicated below:
 Fire or smoke detectors
 Photoelectric cells
 Ionization, ultraviolet and infrared detectors
 Gas analyzers and alarms
 Low pressure and low flow detectors
 Breakage movement detectors
 Visual and plant surveillance system
 Environmental pollution control

The actual alarms used must be clear in meaning, as different responses are required
to toxic and flammable events. The use of audible messages by loudspeaker, radio,
etc. should augment sirens or bells.

Emergency Relief and Relief Treatment

Process pressure and vacuum relief use relief valves, bursting disc, bursting
hatches etc. Relief can be to relief header, flare, back into the process, atmosphere,
etc. There have been many cases where the relief header cannot take all the flows
and the normal design for back pressure developed is exceeded. Many means exist to
process discharge such as incineration, chemical absorption, particulate removal, etc.
Serious incidents have occurred when such systems have been out of action when the
emergency demand arises, the worst being Bhopal

Emergency Depressurizing and transfer of material

Depressurization of a vessel by removing part of its content to a relief header
or to dump tanks not only relieves the pressure but may for example avoid feeding a
fire. On the other hand, it can lower liquid levels and thereby remove cooling fluid
from the inner surface of a vessel exposed to external fire, probably leading to over-

177
temperature and possible rupture. Depressurization can take a long time which its
effectiveness. Transfer to material can conveniently be done back into the process. It
is particularly useful to transfer liquid into a dump full of quench liquid or inhibitor
to stop an undesired reaction. Depressurizing is of course vital prior to maintenance
as is effective isolation, which is continued for as long as plant is not pressure tight.

Emergency Input of Material and Inerting

Emergency input of material can be helpful in suppressing explosion and
exothermic reactions. Possibly a better term than inerting might be diluting. This
then includes the recycle of product as one way of reducing certain reactions. Some
of the system s associated with emergency response are similar to this in
methodology. Inerting is extensively used prior to loosening of equipment for
maintenance and prior to adding process material after maintenance.

178