Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 , September 03, 1991
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; “Practice of law” defined.—Practice of law
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR
23) Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law”, particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construc-tion intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both the rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Same; Same; Judicial review of judgments rendered by the Commission on Appointments.—The

Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

CUI V. CUI

Facts:

The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui
and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated
and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act
gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such
persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the
spouses deed of donation)” Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being
the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960,
the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a
“convenio” entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however
had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position. Upon the
death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the office be
turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor
of Jesus.

ISSUE Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD

Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and under equal
circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test
of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among
those otherwise qualified. Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the
Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar
and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the
position of administrator of the Hospicio. The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of
the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal
profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an
applicant to the examinations has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education. The founders of the Hospicio provided for a
lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge
of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset. Under this criterion, the
plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of administrator. Reference is made to
the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct).
However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his
admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

Cui v. Cui

G.R. No. L-18727. August 31,1964

Makalintal, J.

FACTS:

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma.

Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one
of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña
Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the incumbent
administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Brili, Dr.
Fernando Cui, resigned in favor of the defendant
pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them
and embodied in a notarial document. The next day,
defendant took his office. The plaintiff, however,
had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of
his brother’s assumption of the position.
ISSUES:

WON the defendant qualifies to the position of

administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barili.

RULING:

Yes. It is a fact that the defendant was disbarred

by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and
unprofessional conduct. However, it is also a fact
that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before
he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is a recognition of his moral
rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that
required for his admission to the Bar in the first
place. When the defendant was restored to the roll
of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities
resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped
out.

AGUIRRE V. RANA

FACTS

Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001,
one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar, charging respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a
member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 but ruled that he cannot sign the
Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Complainant charged respondent for
unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct, alleging that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for Vice Mayoralty candidate George Bunan in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Mandaon, Masbate, and filed with the MBEC a
pleading as counsel entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. Respondent also signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in her
petition to be declared the winning mayoralty candidate. On the charge of violation of law, respondent
is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body, respondent being
a municipal government employee (Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate). The
Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (“OBC”) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

OBC’s Report and Recommendation The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC
as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that
respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared
in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. Respondent’s
misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Such unauthorized
practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law.

HELD

Respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of law and was thus denied admission to the Philippine
bar. 1. SC agreed with the finding of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. - Respondent appeared as counsel for
Bunan and signed as “counsel” in the pleadings - was also retained as counsel of mayoralty candidate
Emily Estipona-Hao and of party REFORMA LM-PPC

*all these took place before Respondent took his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys 2. What
constitutes the “practice of law” - The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation
in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts - all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. - any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. - perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. - render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge
or skill. * respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before
the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. 3. The right to practice law is not a
natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. - limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. - A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations. - although respondent passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and
took the lawyer’s oath, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer.

Aguirre v Rana

FACTS:

Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. A day before the scheduled
mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna
Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Aguirre charged
Rana with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation. Aguirre alleges that Rana, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers of Mandaon,
Masbate. Aguirre further alleges that Rana filed with the MBEC a pleading entitled Formal Objection to
the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
Rana represented himself as ―counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan,‖
and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan. Aguirre claims that Rana is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
Rana is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

ISSUE/S:

WON Rana violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by practicing law without having
the authority to do so.

HELD:

Yes. Rana violated the code by practicing law without having been fully admitted to the Philippine Bar.
Ratio: Records show that Rana appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before he took the
lawyer‘s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor, Rana signed as ―counsel for George Bunan.‖ On 14 May
2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also ―retained‖ respondent as her counsel. On the same
date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that ―Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party.‖ All these
happened even before respondent took the lawyer‘s oath. Clearly, Rana engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

RIVERA V. CORRAL

Facts:

Rivera instituted a complaint for disbarment charging Atty. Corral with malpractice and conduct
unbecoming a member of the Philippine Bar. A decision for an ejectment case was received by Atty.
Corral’s secretary on February 23, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed by Atty. Corral on March 13, 1990.
Next day, he went to the clerk of court and changed the date February 23 to February 29 without the
court’s prior knowledge and permission. Atty. Corral later on filed a reply to plaintiff’s manifestation
claiming that he received the decision on February 28, not 29 (because there is no Feb 29).

Issue:

W/N Atty. Corral should be disbarred for changing the date when he received the decision of the court
without the court’s prior knowledge of decision

Held: No, Atty. Corral is suspended for 1 year. The correction of date by Atty. Corral was made not to
reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court in believing that the notice of appeal was filed within the
reglementary period. Because if the decision was received on Feb 22, the notice of appeal filed on
March 13 is filed out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament, Atty. Corral altered the date
he received the court’s decision. By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of
Appeal was timely filed, Atty. Corral committed an act of dishonesty. Dishonesty constitutes grave
misconduct

REYES V. CHIONG

FACTS

Two Chinese-Taiwanese businessmen (Xu and Pan) entered into a business venture to set up a factory
for seafood products. Xu invested P300,000. Eventually, Xu discovered that Pan had not established the
factory and asked for his money back. Pan became hostile and ignored Xu. Xu engaged the services of
Atty. Reyes, who filed a complaint for estafa against Pan (represented by Atty. Chiong). The complaint
was assigned to Asst. Manila City Prosecutor Pedro Salanga, who issued a subpoena for Pan to appear
for preliminary investigation. For failure to appear and submit a counter-affidavit, Salanga filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against Pan in the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against
Pan. In response, Atty. Chiong filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. He also filed with the RTC of
Zamboanga a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money, damages, and for the dissolution of
the business venture against Xu, Atty. Reyes and Salanga. Atty. Reyes then filed a disbarment case
against Atty. Chiong for filing a groundless suit, alleging that it was instituted to exact vengeance. Atty.
Chiong alleges that Atty. Reyes was impleaded for conniving with Xu in filing the estafa case. Salanga
was impleaded because of the supposed irregularities in conducting the investigation. The SC referred
the case to the IBP.

ISSUE W/N the civil complaint was groundless W/N is was proper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor
Salanga in the civil complaint

HELD Yes, civil complaint was groundless and it was improper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor
Salanga in said civil complaint. IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely to obtain leverage against the
estafa case. There was no need to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga since they were not
parties in the business venture. Their inclusion in the complaint was improper and highly questionable
and the suit was filed to harass both of them. In filing the civil suit, Atty. Chiong violated his oath of
office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP recommended 2 years suspension SC:
affirmed IBP’s recommendation. In addition, the Court mentioned some alternative remedies Atty.
Chiong could have taken if his allegations were indeed true. Chiong could have filed a motion for
reinvestigation or motion for reconsideration of Salanga’s decision to file the information for estafa.
Motion to Dismiss the estafa case was also available if it was indeed filed without basis. Relevant
Provisions: Canon 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Lawyer’s Oath – “not
to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same.”

Atty. Ramon P. Reyes vs. Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong, A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003

FACTS:

Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime his services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu, a Chinese-Taiwanese, in
a business venture that went awry. Xu, through Atty. Reyes, filed a complaint for estafa against Pan, who
was represented by respondent Atty. Chiong. The latter neither appeared on the two scheduled hearings
nor submitted his counter-affidavit. Atty. Chiong argued that he had shown no disrespect in impleading
Atty. Reyes as co-defendant in the civil case. He alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an
additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had committed in conducting the criminal
investigation. Atty. Reyes was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in filing the
estafa case, which Xu knew fully well was baseless. According to Atty. Chiong, the irregularities
committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainant‘s connivance therein
were discovered only after the institution of the collection suit. Commissioner of the IBP held that Atty.
Chiong had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office
and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE/S:

WON Atty. Chiong violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

Yes.Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that ―a lawyer shall conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.‖ Respondent‘s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The Civil case was for
the "collection of a sum of money, damages and dissolution of an unregistered business venture." It had
originally been filed against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor
Salanga. The amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper remedies strengthen
complainant‘s allegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage against the estafa case. If
respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salanga‘s resolution, they should have used the
proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to the justice secretary
and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salanga‘s decision
to file an information for estafa. Moreover, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings against
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to act illegally. As a
lawyer, respondent should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of
the civil case had no justification. It appears that respondent took the estafa case as a personal affront
and used the civil case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions
demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the
parties according to law, not to harass them.

In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao v. Severino G. Martinez, A.C. No. 244,
March 29, 1963

FACTS:

Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with
having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite
academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the
charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased
from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this
Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars: (a) Diao did
not complete his high school training; and (b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never
obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of
his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required
pre-legal education". Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although
he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and
upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent
of 3rd and 4th year high school.

ISSUE/S: WON Diao be admitted to the Bar despite his misrepresentation.

HELD: No.Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations.

Florido v. Florido

FACTS:

Natasha Florido and Atty. James Florido are married and have children. However, they are estranged
and living separately from each other. Their children are in the custody of Natasha. One day, James went
to Natasha‘s residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their children
be given to him pursuant to a Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which granted his motion for
temporary child custody. Natasha called up her lawyer but was informed that he had not received any
Resolution. Natasha asked James for the original copy of the alleged Resolution but James only provided
a photocopy of it. Doubting this to be true, she refused to give the custody of their children to James. A
month after, while Natasha and her children were at the ABC Learning Center, James, accompanied by
armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of the children. He
threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions whom he claimed to be agents
of NBI. She was alarmed so she sought the assistance of Tanjay City Police. Natasha then agreed to allow
the kids to sleep with James for one night on the condition that he would not take them away from
Tanjay City. In the early morning of the following day, she rushed to the hotel where James and the kids
stayed before she learned that he has plans of taking the kids to Bacolod. She took the children. James
filed with RTC a petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children pursuant
to the alleged Resolution issued by the CA. During the hearing, James did not appear and petition for
habeas corpus was dismissed. Natasha filed a complaint alleging that James violated his oath by
manufacturing, flaunting, and using a spurious CA Resolution. This was referred to the IBP-CBD and they
recommended that James be suspended from the practice of law for 3 years. The IBP governors
modified it and recommended a 6-year suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE/S:

W/N James can be held liable administratively for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious
Resolution of CA

HELD:

Yes. Although he claimed that he acted in good faith, this is belied by the fact that he used and
presented the spurious Resolution several times. First, in his petition for issuance of writ of habeas
corpus. Second, when he sought the help of PNP of Tanjay to recover the custody of the children from
Natasha. The SC held that he is presumed to have participated in the fabrication of the Resolution. Atty.
James Florido violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He was suspended for 2 years.

Lozano vs. Martinez

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22

(Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the
ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one
case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case.
The parties adversely affected thus appealed.

ISSUES: 

1. Does BP 22 is violate the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt?

2. Does it impair freedom of contract?
3. Does it contravene the equal protection clause?

HELD:

1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant

to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of
an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a
debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions,
the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of

money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the
drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure
payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or
assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks
have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce.
Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes
for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such
perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as
currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice
therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of
worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest.

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into

“lawful” contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we
must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is
a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free
from the regulatory power of the state.

3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection
of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the
payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer
of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his
acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to
saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the
swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause
“equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals,
who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification
is not unreasonable or arbitrary. (Lozano vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18,
1986)

LOZANO v MARTINEZ            G.R. NO. L-63419Dec. 18, 1986

YAP, J.

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing
Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for
decision.

Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict between
the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the
statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated
only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute
is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the
check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce
payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.

ISSUE: 

WON enactment of BP 22 repugnant of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt and
therefore is an invalid exercise of police power.

RULING:

NO. police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times.
There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For
example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of
contracts must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge
has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it.

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The SC finds that the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

People v. Tuanda

A.C. No. 3360. January 30, 1990.

Per Curiam

FACTS:
Instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry,
received by respondent from one Herminia A. Marquez
for sale on a commission basis, respondent Atty. Fe
Tuanda ssued three checks amounting to P26,500.00.
Upon presentment for payment, all checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of
dishonor, respondent made no arrangement with the
bank and made no effort to settle her obligations to
Ms. Marquez.

ISSUE:

WON respondent should be suspended from the practice

of law.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court stated that the Court of

Appeals correctly ruled that “the offense of which
respondent is found guilty involved moral
turpitude.” The Court added that violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which
deteriously affects public interest and public
order.

PEOPLE VS. TUANDA (A.M. NO. 3360

01/30/1990)
FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court
to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the
Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez
several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis.
In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she
issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal
Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein
she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-
Bouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court
and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the
ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the
Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a
penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the
aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-
appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is
found guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

 Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what

grounds.  A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
 Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last
preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a
serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interest of
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the
community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure
the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and
violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under
both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders
from this Court.
VILLANUEVA v STA. ANA CBD Case No. 251 – July 11, 1995 Per Curiam Complainant:
Adelina T. Villanueva Respondent: Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana
Facts:

 In April 1992, Villanueva went to Sta. Ana to have documents notarized.

 Upon learning of Villanueva’s plans to procure a loan from a bank or lending institution, Sta.
Ana offered her services as attorney on the condition that Villanueva would put up land
collateral and provide a “guaranty deposit” of Php 150,000.

 Villanueva accepted and subsequently entrusted Php 144,000 and various documents
(special power of attorney, deed of sale, tax declaration, land title, etc.) to Sta. Ana.

 Sta. Ana later requested an additional amount of money for procedural matters. With that,
Villanueva decided to forego the loan and requested that Sta. Ana return all money given.

 Sta. Ana not only failed to comply with the request but also began to avoid Villanueva.

 Villanueva sought assistance from the Office of the Vice President, which referred the matter
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

 The NBI subpoenaed Sta. Ana twice but she failed to appear both times. It then recommended
that Sta. Ana be criminally charged with estafa and that disbarment proceedings be taken
against her. It transmitted the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) of the
IBP.

 Through the course of the proceedings, the Commission discovered criminal charges filed
against Sta. Ana: estafa, falsification of public documents and violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). After Sta. Ana’s failure to appear, the Commission recommended
that she be disbarred for being totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession.
Issue
1. W/N Sta. Ana should be disbarred – YES
o Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the legal
profession. It must remain extant to maintain one’s good standing in such an exclusive and
honored profession.
o The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates the following:

 Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

 Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
  Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client. o Sta. Ana was given all opportunity to defend and even just explain herself.
However, she failed to refute the charges filed against her. The Court has no choice but to
accept the findings and recommendations of the Commission.
Ruling:
Sta. Ana is DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out her name from the Roll of
Attorneys.

DECEIT/SQUATTING, RESPONDENT CANNOT IN GOOD FAITH ALLEGE TO BE A LAWFUL TENANT ONE

MOMENT AND BE AN OWNER THE NEXT

Raymundo T. Magdaluyo vs. Atty. Enrique L. Nace

Adm. Case No. 3808 (February 2, 2000)

Facts:

 Complainant accused respondent of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct. Respondent was
one of the squatters living in one of the complainant's parcels of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Allegedly, when complainant offered to relocate the squatters, the latter refused and instead filed a
complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) claiming to be tenants
therein.

 Three months later, the squatters again including respondent also filed a case before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo for the annulment or cancellation of complainant's land titles. This time, claiming to be
owners and not mere tenants of the land. They traced their alleged ownership to an old Spanish title.

 Because of the conflicting causes of action, both cases were dismissed. Complainant filed a case
against respondent accusing him of having deliberately committed a falsehood and of forums hopping
praying that proper disciplinary sanctions be imposed against the latter.

Held:

 After referral of the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the findings of the former are
as follows: ". . . while it may be true that different causes of action are indeed involved, it is their total
inconsistency, nay, total opposition with each other which raises doubts about the respondent's
sincerity. It escapes this Commission [on Bar Discipline] how Respondent can, in good faith, allege to be
a lawful tenant one moment, and be an owner the next. Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in
his duty to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of this case. He failed to allege in his
complaint the fact that a prior dispute had been existing between the parties before the PARAB, thus
deceiving the court and giving it an inaccurate appreciation of facts. Lastly, respondent was delinquent
in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as appears to him to be just and such defenses only as
he believes to be honestly debatable. It has long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as
evidence of land ownership. Yet respondent dares raise the same in his complaint to defeat
Complainant's duly registered certificate of title. Any lawyer should know that a Spanish title would have
no legal leg to stand on in the face of Transfer Certificate of Title over the same parcel of land."
 The Court concurs with the IBP's findings and recommendations being fully supported by evidence on
record.

 Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility against engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. He was indeed, less than sincere in asserting two
conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all probability, he knew not to be his.

 As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oath not to do falsehood or consent to its commission and to
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. The lawyers’ oath is a
source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action. Said acts are clearly in violation of his lawyer's oath that the court will not tolerate.
LEGAL ETHICS (3) the professional
standing of the lawyer order of the trial court is hereby Ramos vs. Manalac FACTS: The facts
involved in this case are: On August 31, 1933, Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina,
Gregoria,Ceferina, Jose and Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor
of their brother Eladio Ramos giving the latter authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer in favor
of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan. On August 9, 1934, by virtue of
the power of attorney abovementioned, Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera a
mortgage on therefore saidproperty. Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the payment
of loanof 300, withinterestthereonat the rate of 12% perannum.WhenEladioRamosfailed topay the
obligation on its date of maturity, Romualdo Rivera, the mortgage, filed an action to foreclosure the
mortgage, making as parties-defendants the herein petitioners, brothers and sisters of Eladio Ramos
(civil case No.7668). The summonswasservedonlyuponEladioRamos,whoacknowledgethe servicein

CEFERINA RAMOS v. ANATOLIO C. MANALAC, GR No. L-2610, 1951-06-16

Facts:
on August 31, 1933, Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose and
Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor of their brother
Eladio Ramos giving the latter authority to encumber, mortgage and... transfer in favor of
any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan.
Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera a mortgage on the aforesaid
property, together with another parcel of... land, to guarantee the payment of a loan of
P300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum.
When Eladio Ramos failed to pay the obligation on its date of maturity, Romualdo Rivera,
the mortgagee, filed an action to foreclose the mortgage, making as... parties-defendants
the herein petitioners, brothers and sisters of Eladio Ramos (civil case No. 7668).
Eladio Ramos engaged the services of Attorney
Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance for all the defendants, and submitted an
answer in their behalf. After trial, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court
rendered decision ordering Eladio Ramos to pay to the plaintiff his obligation of P300, with...
interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August 9, 1934, until its full
payment, plus the sum of P100 as attorney's fees, and ordering the foreclosure of the
mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay the judgment within ninety (90) days from the
date the... decision becomes final.
Issues:

The issues posed by the petitioners relate (1) to the validity of the decision rendered by the
lower court on August 24, 1939, in civil case No. 7668, ordering the foreclosure of the
mortgage executed by Eladio Ramos on the properties in question; and (2) to the validity of
the... order of the court dated September 22, 1947, directing the issuance of a writ of
possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in possession of the properties purchased by
her from the mortgagee.
Ruling:
As regards the first issue, we are of the opinion that the claim of the petitioners can not be
sustained for the reason that it is in the nature of a collateral attack to a judgment which on
its face is valid and regular and has become final long ago. It is a well-known rule... that a
judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in a separate action
brought principally for the purpose
Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners were not properly served with summons
in civil case No. 7668, as they claim, the defect in the service was cured when the
petitioners voluntarily appeared and answered the complaint thru their attorney of record,
Lauro C.
Maiquez, who appeared in their behalf in all the stages of the case. Since an attorney is
presumed to be authorized by his client in a case in which he appears (section 20, Rule
127), Attorney Maiquez who appeared for the petitioners must be presumed to have been
authorized by... them when he appeared in their behalf in all the stages of the case.

 ABOUT

 ASK

 SUBMIT

(Legal Ethics)

Brion, Jr. vs. Brillantes, Jr.

A.C. No. 5305            March 17, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Marciano P. Brion, Jr., in this petition for disbarment, avers that respondent violated the
court’s decree of perpetual disqualification imposed upon respondent Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. (in
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr.) from
assuming any post in government service, including any posts in government-owned and controlled
corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member
of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal
consultancy agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a Special Consultancy Agreement.

Respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy Contract as well as the Special
Consultancy Contract. However, he raises the affirmative defense that under Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993, services rendered pursuant to a
consultancy contract shall not be considered government services, and therefore, are not covered by
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent has transgressed the letter and spirit of the court’s decree in
the Atienza case.

Held:

By performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual employee, albeit in the
guise of an advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both letter and spirit of the Court’s
decree in Atienza.

The Court finds that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and functions of a non-
advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee of LWUA. As stated by petitioner in his
reply, there is a difference between a consultant hired on a contractual basis (which is governed by
CSC M.C. No. 27, s. 1993) and a contractual employee (whose appointment is governed, among
others, by the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointment and other Personnel Actions). The lawyer’s
primary duty as enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath is to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. That duty in its irreducible minimum entails
obedience to the legal orders of the courts. Respondent’s disobedience to this Court’s order
prohibiting his reappointment to any branch, instrumentality, or agency of government, including
government owned and controlled corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a
special consultancy contract.

Hence, Atty. Brillantes was suspended and ordered to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(Php10,000.00).

Evangeline Leda vs. Atty. Trebonian Tabang, A.C. No. 2505, February 21 1992
FACTS:
Tabang and Leda contracted marriage at Iloilo and was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code as
marriage of exceptional character. Both of them kept their marriage a secret until Tabang finishes his
law studies, they had not yet lived as husband and wife.
Tabang, having finished his law studies, declared in his application to take the bar that he was ―single‖.
After Tabang passed the bar, Leda blocked him of taking his oath by instituting a complaint, Bar Matter
No. 78, that he acted fraudulently in filling out his application. Thus, Tabang should be considered as
unworthy to take the lawyer ‘s oath for lack of good moral character. Tabang admitted that he ‗legally
married‖ Leda but that the marriage ―was not yet made and declared public‖ so that he could properly
take the Bar exams and ensure their future. Bar Matter No. 78 was dismissed because Tabang said that
it just arose out of misunderstanding between him and Leda.
Leda, in response to this, instituted the present Administrative Case praying Tabang‘s disbarment on
grounds of using his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with Leda, misrepresented himself
as single, and for lack of good moral character.
It was found out that the marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of
Article 76 of the Civil Code, or the five-year minimum cohabitation before celebration of marriage and
that they were both twenty years old when they got married, below the required minimum age of
twenty-one years old.
He contended that he and Leda agreed not to disclose that their marriage was void from the beginning
because he wanted to finish his studies and take the bar first. He also believed that when he applied for
the Bar, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
ISSUE/S:
WON Tabang committed gross misrepresentation of his status
HELD:
Yes. Tabang committed gross misrepresentation of his status.
RATIO: Tabang‘s declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was
"single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fafct made in utter bad faith, for which he should be
made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly
provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had
been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably
exhibits lack of good moral character.

Tabang‘s protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only
because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage
to Leda was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Tabang
cannot assume that his marriage to Leda is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and
conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met
and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed. Tabang is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
[CANON 10] LEDA v TABANG
Facts: Complainant Evangeline
Leda and Respondent Atty.
Trebonian
Tabang contracted marriage
performed under Article 76 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to
keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had
finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations,
allegedly to ensure a stable future
for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a
Petition for Disbarment against
respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented
himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his
application to take the bar exam
and for being not of good
moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court. Respondent
averred that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said
marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code thus he could not have
abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that
when he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
Issue: Whether or not
Respondent lacks of good
moral character and violated
the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes, Respondents lack of
good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics
with Complainant in order to serve
his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and
good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has
been
lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. Hence, respondent is
subjected to suspension from the
practice of law until further
Orders.
LEDA v. ATTY. TABANG
(A.C. No. 2505, February 21, 1992)

FACTS:
Evangeline Leda (complainant) challenges
Atty. TrebonianTabang’s (respondent) good moral
character in two complaints she filed against him,
one docketed as
Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on
January 6, 1982 and the case at hand. It appears
that complainant and respondent contracted a
marriage in Tigbauan, Iloilo on October 3, 1976
under as one of the exceptional character under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. The
parties agreed to
keep their marriage a secret until respondent had
finished his law studies and had taken the Bar
examinations. Complainant admits that they have
not lived together as husband and wife. After
respondent’s law studies and bar examinations,
complainant blocked his oath
-
taking (by instituting
Bar Matter No. 78) claiming that respondent had
acted fraudulently when he filled out his application
declaring he was “single” and is thus unworthy to
take the lawyer’s Oath for lack of good moral
chara
cter. Respondent filed his explanation
claiming that he was “legally married” to
complainant but the marriage was not yet made
and declared public so that he may finish his
studies as well as take the bar exams and he
therefore believed that he was still s
ingle.
Respondent also alleged that he and the
complainant has reconciled and prayed that the
case be dismissed (on the ground that complainant
confirmed with his explanation as evidence by the
affidavit of desistance made by complainant) which
was granted
by the Court on August 20, 1982.
However, on February 14, 1983, complainant filed
an Administrative case and prayed for respondent’s
disbarment on the grounds that: Respondent used
his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage;
he mirepresented hims
elf in his application to take
the bar exam; lack of good moral character; and
that complainant was deceived into signing the
affidavit of desistance and that the only reason why
he reconciled with her is so that she would
withdraw the complaint against hi
m. Complainant
also claimed that respondent sent her a letter which
proves all of her allegations where the respondent
states that their marriage was actually void form the
beginning. Respondent denied that he had sent
such letter. On March 26, 1984, the
Bar
Confidant’s report recommended indefinite
suspension of respondent until the status of his
marriage is settled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. TrebonianTabang
violated Rule 7.01 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
The court he
ld that Atty. TrebonianTabangis
guilty of violating Rule 7.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is thus suspended
from the practice of law until further notice.The
Court held that respondent’s “declaration in his
application for Admission to t
he 1981 Bar
Examinations that he was "single" was a gross
misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter
bad faith, for which he should be made answerable.
Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of
Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "
A
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a
false statement or suppression of a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the
bar." That false statement, if it had been known,
would have disqualified him outright from taking
the
Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of
good moral character.”

SELWYN F. LAO VS. ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL A.C. NO. 5961, July 1, 2003, EN BANC,
(Panganiban, J.)
FACTS: Selwyn Lao lent money to Atty. Medel which he paid using bad checks. Medel
persistently refused to make good on the 4 checks that he issued and kept on delaying its
payment. Needless to say, the intention of this present complaint proves that contrary to
Medel’s written promises, he never made good on his dishonoured checks. Neither has he paid
his indebtedness. In Medel’s Answer, the Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for
disciplinary action because: (a) it does not constitute malpractice only a violation of BP 22; (b)
violation of BP 22 is not one of the grounds for disciplinary action; and (c) it does not constitute
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP recommended suspending respondent from
practice of law for 2 years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Robert Medel is liable for gross misconduct for failure to pay debts
and for issuing worthless checks?

HELD: Yes. The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records
that he made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his obligation
despite sufficient time afforded to him. Worse, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing and
transferred the blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning that the latter had refused to
accept the formers plan of payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had no obligation to
accept it, considering respondents previous failure to comply with earlier payment plans for the
same debt. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar,
to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial
obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may
disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court. WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross
misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt
with more severely.

HEINZ R. HECK v. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS

401 SCRA 46 (2003)

Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation of a decision and

parroting it verbatim reflect blatant judicial sloth.
Heinz R. Heck is one of the defendants in a Civil Case before the Regional Trial presided
by Judge Anthony E. Santos. Heck and his co-defendant did not receive a copy of the
order to schedule the

trial on June 10 and 11, 1996. Consequently, they and their counsel failed to appear
therein. Since only the plaintiff’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Singson, appeared in that
hearing, Judge Santos considered the non-attendance of Heck and his co-defendant as
waiver of their right to present evidence. Judge Santos thereafter ordered that the case
to be submitted for decision. He therefore authorized Atty. Singson to prepare the draft
of the decision.

The decision issued by Judge Santos was copied verbatim from the draft which Atty.
Singson prepared. Hence, Heck filed an administrative complaint charging Judge
Santos with violation of Section 1, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge Santos guilty for adopting Singson’s work
as his own.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Santos is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

HELD:

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. Santos’ order for the counsel of one of
the parties to draft the decision and his adoption verbatim of the draft clearly violate the
Code of Judicial Conduct. The pertinent canons of which read: Canon 2, a Judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Canon 3, a Judge
should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence
adjudicative responsibilities.

By such order, Judge Santos abdicated a function exclusively granted to him by no less
than the fundamental law of the land. It is axiomatic that decision-making, among other
duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench. He must
use his own perceptiveness in understanding and analyzing the evidence presented
before him and his own discernment when determining the proper action, resolution or
decision. Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation of a decision and
parroting it verbatim reflect blatant judicial sloth.

Lack of malice or bad faith is not an excuse. It bears emphasis that a judge must not only
render a just, correct and impartial decision. He should do so in such a manner as to be
free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.
ROSARIO DELOS REYES vs. ATTY.
JOSE B. AZNAR (A.M. No. 1334
November 28, 1989)
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2013 Labels: Disbarment, Lawyers, Legal Ethics

FACTS:

           

            Complainant is a second year medical student of the Southwestern University in which

respondent Atty. Aznar is the then Chairman of the College of Medicine. Complainant was compelled to

go to Manila with respondent for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the

threat of respondent that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would flunk in all her subjects

and she would never become a medical intern. After due investigation, the Solicitor General found the

respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that since the complainant is partly to

blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married

man ,with children, a rich man and is not practicing his profession before the court, he should merely be

suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not the imposition of the penalty is proper.

HELD: NO.
             The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not

render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes

admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon

admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to

continue in the practice of law.

           

            Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for disbarment

or suspension from his office as attorney, among others, by grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct

has been defined as that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to

the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

            In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent to have taken advantage of his

position in asking complainant to go with him under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in

case she refused.

Respondent Jose B. Aznar is DISBARRED.

ROSARIO DELOS REYES v. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, Adm. Case No. 1334, 1989-11-28
Facts:
omplainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged
in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said
university, had carnal knowledge of her for several times... under threat that she would fail
in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. 
Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain
Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo... forced abortion.
July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant
as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special defense,
averred that complainant is a... woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.
As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge leveled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's... vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of
the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant
from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. 
It is likewise contended... that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the
investigation conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the
hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar
has been substantiated by sufficient evidence, both testimonial and documentary; while
finding insufficent and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional... abortion.  The Solicitor
General then recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a
period of not less than three (3) years.
Issues:
is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore... be removed or suspended by the
Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar
Ruling:
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason... of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice.
it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage
of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he... had carnal knowledge of her under the
threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

PATRICIA FIGUEROA vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR.

SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

G.R. No. 519

Facts:

Patricia and Simeon were both from the same town, and they became sweethearts when they were in
their teens. Because of their intimacy, together they had a child. According to Patricia, after the child
was born, Simeon first promised to marry her after he passes the Bar Examinations. The two continued
their relationship and it was alleged that he had given her 20 or 30 promises of marriage throughout
their relationship. But, her trust in him and their relationship ended when she found out that he had
married another woman.
In 1970, after a few years and four attempts at passing the Bar Examinations Simeon finally nailed it.
However before Simeon could ever take his oath as a lawyer, Patricia filed a case against him in 1971
preventing him from his admission to the legal profession. Three years later, on February 18 th 1974,
Simeon submitted a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case saying that Patricia failed to respond
on the motion. To which Patricia then replied that she was still interested in the resolution of the
present case. So on June 18, 1974, the Court denied Simeon’s motion to dismiss the case.

A few years have passed and Simeon became a politician. In 1988, he again requested to dismiss the
case citing that his public service, active participation in civic organizations, and good standing in the
community, as well as the length of time this case has been pending are reasons enough to allow him to
take his oath as a lawyer.

On September 29, 1988, the Court decided to dismiss the case for Patricia’s failure to prosecute the case
for an unreasonable period of time, and to allow Simeon to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the
required fees. Simeon’s hopes were once again crushed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to Patricia's opposition, decided to cancel his scheduled oath-taking.

On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended the dismissal of the
charge of gross immorality made by Patricia and that Simeon be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court agreed and took the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, citing
that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of Simeon from
the legal profession.

His engaging in premarital sexual relations with Patricia and promises to marry suggests a doubtful
moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.

The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral.

A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community

The Supreme Court find the ruling in Arciga vs.  Maniwang quite relevant because mere intimacy
between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on
and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child
was born out of wedlock.

The Supreme Court cited that Patricia and Simeon’s relationship was voluntary. Patricia was not forced
to have sexual relations with Simeon since she even continued to be his girlfriend even after she gave
birth to their son. She was an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and there
was no deception given by Simeon. The Supreme Court added that it was neither corrupt nor
unprincipled of Simeon to be given disciplinary sanction against him, even if their relationship resulted
with a child out of wedlock.

It was just unfortunate that Simeon chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. The
Supreme Court emphasized; “We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any
other reason.”

The Supreme Court therefor concluded that Patricia was simply acting as a scorned woman seeking
revenge to make Simeon’s personal and professional life suffer, bitter and unforgiving to the end. And
that, the 26 years that Simeon has been prevented from being a lawyer was already punishment enough
for whatever wrong he had made. And so, the Court Dismissed the case filed against him, and the 62
year old was finally allowed to take his lawyers oath.

sanction against him, even if as a

result of such relationship a child was
born out of
wedlock.
 Court said that we cannot castigate a
man for seeking out the partner of his
dreams,
for marriage is a sacred and perpetual
bond which should be entered into
because of
love, not for any other reason. We
cannot help viewing the instant
complaint as an
act of revenge of a woman scorned,
bitter and unforgiving to the end.
 Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are dishonorable, the
twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from
being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment
therefor. Respondent, who is now
sixty-two years of age, should thus be
allowed,
albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's
oath.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, petition
is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr.
is ALLOWED to take his oath as a
lawyer.
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FOR FAILING TO MARRY GF, MAN NOT

ALLOWED TO BECOME ATTY
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that
respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession.
[Simeon] had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after
unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath,
however, [Patricia] filed the instant petition averring that [Simeon] and she had
been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that [Simeon]
did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.

[Simeon] and [Patricia] were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. [The Supreme Court does] not find [Patricia's] assertions that she
had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be
[Simeon'] girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971.
All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she
was forced to have sexual congress with him. [Patricia] was then an adult who
voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent
young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, [Simeon] chose to marry
and settle permanently with another woman. [The Supreme Court] cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred
and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any
other reason.
sanction against him, even if as a
result of such relationship a child was
born out of
wedlock.
 Court said that we cannot castigate a
man for seeking out the partner of his
dreams,
for marriage is a sacred and perpetual
bond which should be entered into
because of
love, not for any other reason. We
cannot help viewing the instant
complaint as an
act of revenge of a woman scorned,
bitter and unforgiving to the end.
 Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are dishonorable, the
twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from
being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment
therefor. Respondent, who is now
sixty-two years of age, should thus be
allowed,
albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's
oath.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, petition
is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr.
is ALLOWED to take his oath as a
lawyer.
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FOR FAILING TO MARRY GF, MAN NOT
ALLOWED TO BECOME ATTY

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that

respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession.
[Simeon] had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after
unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath,
however, [Patricia] filed the instant petition averring that [Simeon] and she had
been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that [Simeon]
did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.

[Simeon] and [Patricia] were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. [The Supreme Court does] not find [Patricia's] assertions that she
had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be
[Simeon'] girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971.
All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she
was forced to have sexual congress with him. [Patricia] was then an adult who
voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent
young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, [Simeon] chose to marry
and settle permanently with another woman. [The Supreme Court] cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred
and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any
other reason.
[The Supreme Court] cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of
revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended
to make [Simeon] suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the
profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that [Simeon] has been prevented
from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time
there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him. [Simeon], who is now
sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the
lawyers oath. (SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997)

In short, Simeon was not allowed to practice law for 26 years simply
because he failed to fulfill his promise to marry a woman with whom
he had a child. He was only allowed to take the lawyer's oath at the
age of 62. Wow! (PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON
BARRANCO, JR., respondent.)

Fortun v. Quinsayas, GR No. 194578, February 13, 2013 PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN, petitioner, vs. PRIMA
JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, MA. GEMMA OQUENDO, DENNIS AYON, NENITA OQUENDO, ESMAEL
MANGUDADATU, JOSE PAVIA, MELINDA QUINTOS DE JESUS, REYNALDO HULOG, REDMOND BATARIO,
MALOU MANGAHAS, DANILO GOZO, GMA NETWORK, INC. through its news editors Raffy Jimenez and
Victor Sollorano, SOPHIA DEDACE, ABS-CBN CORPORATION through the Head of its News Group, Maria
Ressa, CECILIA VICTORIA OREÑA-DRILON, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC. represented by its Editor-in-
Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, TETCH TORRES, PHILIPPINE STAR represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac
Belmonte, and EDU PUNAY, respondents. G. R. No. 194578, SECOND DIVISION, February 13, 2013,
CARPIO, J

As a general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and the
final decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing of a disbarment complaint against petitioner
is itself a matter of public concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. Since
the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a right to publish such fact
under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that respondent media groups and personalities
merely acted on a news lead they received when they reported the filing of the disbarment complaint.

However, Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a
complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the
Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. His act of
distributing copies of the disbarment complaint render him guilty of indirect contempt.

FACTS
 Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr., the principal accused for the Maguindanao
Massacre. In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner
before this Court, docketed as Bar Matter No. A.C. 8827, which case is still pending. Petitioner alleged
that several media outlets, such as GMA News TV internet website, Inquirer.net, and PhilStar, among
others, all published articles giving detailes to the disbarment allegations. In November 2010, Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner before this Court, docketed as Bar
Matter No. A.C. 8827. The disbarment case is still pending.

Petitioner alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the disbarment
complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that respondent media groups and personalities
conspired with Atty. Quinsayas, et al. by publishing the confidential materials on their respective media
platforms. Petitioner pointed out that Drilon discussed the disbarment complaint with Atty. Quinsayas in
a television program viewed nationwide.

ISSUE
(1) Whether or not media respondents violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings,
warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court (NO)
(2) Whether or not Atty Quinsayas violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings,
warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court (YES)

RULING
As a general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and the
final decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing of a disbarment complaint against petitioner
is itself a matter of public concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The
interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as
defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment
complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao Massacre case. The
Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile case. Of the 57 victims of the massacre, 30 were
journalists. It is understandable that any matter related to the Maguindanao Massacre is considered a
matter of public interest and that the personalities involved, including petitioner, are considered as
public figure.

Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a right to publish
such fact under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that respondent media groups and
personalities merely acted on a news lead they received when they reported the filing of the disbarment
complaint. The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by itself, is not
sufficient to absolve the media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality rule. However, since
petitioner is a public figure or has become a public figure because he is representing a matter of public
concern, and because the event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a
matter of public concern, the media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case as
legitimate news. It would have been different if the disbarment case against petitioner was about a
private matter as the media would then be bound to respect the confidentiality provision of disbarment
proceedings under Section 18, Rule 139- B of the Rules of Court.

However, Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a
complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the
Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. Hence, only he
was found guilty for indirect contempt for distributing a copy of the disbarment complaint against the
petitioner.

sanction against him, even if as a

result of such relationship a child was
born out of
wedlock.
 Court said that we cannot castigate a
man for seeking out the partner of his
dreams,
for marriage is a sacred and perpetual
bond which should be entered into
because of
love, not for any other reason. We
cannot help viewing the instant
complaint as an
act of revenge of a woman scorned,
bitter and unforgiving to the end.
 Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are dishonorable, the
twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from
being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment
therefor. Respondent, who is now
sixty-two years of age, should thus be
allowed,
albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's
oath.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, petition
is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr.
is ALLOWED to take his oath as a
lawyer.
Dacanay v. Baker & Mckengie, A.M. No. 2131, May 10, 1985.

Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules
of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the
world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of
Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the
highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment.”. This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here.

FACTS

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine
other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87
shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H. E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He
requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is
your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the
instant complaint.

ISSUE

Whether or not the the respondents are enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie. (YES)

RULING

Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules
of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the
world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of
Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.”. This is unethical because Baker &
McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here. Wherefore, the respondents are enjoined from
practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie
Director of Religious
Affairs v. Bayot (AC L-1117,
20 March 1994) – Legal
Profession/Ethics
 MissIdea  Uncategorized  September 4, 2017 1 Minute

Facts:

The case involves Respondent Estanislao Bayot, an attorney-at-law,

who is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement
in the Sunday Tribune, regarding marriage arrangements; to wit:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay
or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of
parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything
confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Respondent asks for “the indulgence and mercy”of the Court, promising
not to repeat it and that he published it only once.

Issue and Ruling:

Whether Respondent’s act is in violation of the legal profession?

Yes. It is undeniable that the advertisement was a flagrant violation by

the Respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from public.
That pursuant to section 25 of Rule 127, “the practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain constitutes malpractice”. It is settled that it
is highly unethical for lawyers to advertise his talent and skills. LAW
PROFESSION IS NOT A TRADE.

*Respondent was only reprimanded.

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acts:
Estanislao Bayot caused the publication of an advertisement of his services in the
Sunday Tribune, in direct violation of the provision of Section 25, Rule 127 which
imposes a prohibition on soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice
Held:
Yes. His act of causing the publication of an advertisement constitutes malpractice.
Law is a profession and not a trade. A member of the bar degrades himself or
herself in adopting the practices of mercantilism through advertising his or her
services like a merchant advertising wares.
However, considering the fact that Bayot is a young lawyer and that he promises to
refrain from repeating the same misconduct, the Court exercised leniency. He was
merely reprimanded for his violation and he was reminded that the most effective
advertisement possible is the establishment of a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity as well as fidelity to trust.
Lawyer and Society

Director of Religious Affairs VS Bayot 74 Phil 579 – Legal Ethics – Malpractice In June 1943,
Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses; that he
does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal
consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious
Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice. Bayot initially denied having
published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and asked for the court’s mercy as
he promised to never repeat the act again. ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.” The advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of
business from the public..” It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as
a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best
advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency and his promise and the
fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded
him.
Santos, Jr. v. Llamas

FACTS:

On Feb. 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr. a member of the bar, filed a complaint against Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues. Santos claimed
that Llamas, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data in
his pleadings, as the latter only indicates ―IBP Rizal 259060‖ for at least three years already, as shown
by the pleadings filed by Llamas in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997.

On April 18, 1997, Santos filed a certification by the then IBP president of the IBP that respondent‘s last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his
membership fees up to the present. On July 7, 1997, Llamas was required to comment on the complaint
and in his comment, Llamas alleged that he was exempt from payment of IBP dues under R.A. 7432, Sec.
4, for being a senior citizen since 1992 and that he was engaged only in ―limited‖ practice of law.
Llamas, also added, that if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to
show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such
dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges
and penalties. On Dec. 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.

ISSUE/S:

WON Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:

Yes, Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RATIO:

Llamas violated Canon 7 which states that ―A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.‖
Although Llamas‘ failure to pay his IBP dues may be in good faith, his act of indicating ―IBPRIZAL
259060‖ in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts the he had paid his
IBP dues is contrary with the duty of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Llamas‘
failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the
most severe penalty. However, in view of his advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and
plea for a more temperate application of the law, the Court ruled to impose the penalty of one year
suspension upon Llamas from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

Atty. Ramon P. Reyes vs. Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong, A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003

FACTS:

Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime his services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu, a Chinese-Taiwanese, in
a business venture that went awry. Xu, through Atty. Reyes, filed a complaint for estafa against Pan, who
was represented by respondent Atty. Chiong. The latter neither appeared on the two scheduled hearings
nor submitted his counter-affidavit. Atty. Chiong argued that he had shown no disrespect in impleading
Atty. Reyes as co-defendant in the civil case. He alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an
additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had committed in conducting the criminal
investigation. Atty. Reyes was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in filing the
estafa case, which Xu knew fully well was baseless. According to Atty. Chiong, the irregularities
committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainant‘s connivance therein
were discovered only after the institution of the collection suit. Commissioner of the IBP held that Atty.
Chiong had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office
and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE/S:

WON Atty. Chiong violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

Yes.Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that ―a lawyer shall conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel. ‖ Respondent ‘s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The Civil case was
for the "collection of a sum of money, damages and dissolution of an unregistered business venture." It
had originally been filed against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga. The amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper remedies
strengthen complainant ‘s allegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage against the
estafa case. If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salanga‘s resolution, they should
have used the proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to the
justice secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation of Prosecutor
Salanga‘s decision to file an information for estafa. Moreover, he could have instituted disbarment
proceedings against complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to
act illegally. As a lawyer, respondent should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies.
Thus, the filing of the civil case had no justification. It appears that respondent took the estafa case as a
personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client. His
actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice
to the parties according to law, not to harass them.

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTALTENORIO, Respondent. A.C.
No. 6290, FIRST DIVISION, July 14, 2016, DAVIDE JR,J.

Holding oneself out as a lawyer for the purpose of identifying oneself as an attorney,appearing in court
in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of
law constitute unauthorized practice of law. In this case, Felicisimo is not a lawyer but holds himself out
as one while his wife, respondent, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal
profession.

The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client,
and the bar from incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court.

FACTS:

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Ana Marie Cambaliza (Complainant), a former employee of Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-
Tenorio (Respondent), charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office.

On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to be
married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. (Felicisimo) who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another
woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo, were able to obtain a false
marriage contract. No record of the marriage exists in the Civil Registry of Manila and National Statistics
Office.

As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the dissemination
to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome.

On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent: (1)
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2)
converted her client’s money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against
her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family with the statement “Isang bala ka lang” to deter
them from divulging respondent’s illegal activities and transactions.

In her report and recommendation, the IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline found that the complainant
failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However, she found tghe
respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo, in violation of
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1)
the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo, as a senior partner; (2) an
identification card signed by the respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as an
attorney; and (3) Felicisimo entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for the provision
dismissal of a case for failure of the private complainant to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute
the said cases. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendations but increased
the penalty to be imposed to six months.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (YES)

RULING:

A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is
guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:

Canon 9 - A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by lawyers.
Holding oneself out as a lawyer for the purpose of identifying oneself as an attorney,appearing in court
in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of
law constitute unauthorized practice of law. In this case, Felicisimo is not a lawyer but holds himself out
as one while his wife, respondent, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal
profession.

The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client,
and the bar from incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court.

TAN TEK BENG VS. TIMOTEO A. DAVID

A.C. NO. 1261. December 29, 1983

This case was instituted by Tan Tek Beng against David for allegedly not living up to their agreement that
lawyer David will give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he he
also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.

The business relation between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. David clarified that the partnership
was composed of himself as manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as
president and financier.  When Jacinto became ill and the cost of office maintenance mounted, David
suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a part of the business
expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused.

Issue:
WON the agreement was valid?

Held:
The SC hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.  Malpractice ordinarily refers to any ,malfeasance or
dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.  Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term
"malpractice".  That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business.

Tan Tek Beng v. David

FACTS:

In 1970, Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer, entered into an agreement whereby Tan Tek Beng
will supply clients to Atty. David and in exchange thereof, Atty. David shall give Tan Tek Beng 50% of the
attorney‘s fees collected as the latter‘s commission. Atty. David also agreed not to deal with clients
supplied by Tan Tek Beng directly without the latter‘s consent. The agreement went sour due to
allegations of double-cross from both sides. Tan Tek Beng denounced Atty. David before the Supreme
Court but did not seek the enforcement of their agreement.
 ISSUE/S:

WON Atty. David is guilty of malpractice

HELD:

Yes. RATIO: The agreement between Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng is void because it was tantamount to
malpractice which is ―the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers‖ Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court. Malpractice ordinarily refers to any
malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical
meaning to the term ―malpractice‖. That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the
practice of law is a profession, not a business. ―The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by him
or through others for to do so would be unprofessional‖. On the agreement to divide the attorney‘s
fees, the Supreme Court noted: No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another
lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility. On the agreement that Atty. David shall not
deal with clients supplied by Beng directly: The professional services of a lawyer should not be
controlled or exploited by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. A lawyer‘s responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which
direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer‘s relation to his
client should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . .‖

IGOY vs. ATTY SORIANO

Facts:
Igoy was a petitioner in a certain case pending in the CA. He later sought help from a friend to
win his case in the event it would lose in CA. The said friend introduced IGOY from one of the
alleged “JUSTICE” of the SC which later turned out to be Atty Soriano. The “Justice” offered
IGOY to help him when his case reaches SC for a consideration of 20k. When then they loss
the case in CA, the “Justice” prepared a petition for review for a consideration of another 20k.
When IGOY found out that the “Justice” is not really a Justice, and when the petition for review
was denied, IGOY now filed this administrative case against ATTY SORIANO.
Held:
ATTY SORIANO is disbarred. Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties.

The foregoing command acquires particular significance given the prevailing facts of this case
considering that respondent is a senior lawyer of this Court. It bears stressing that government
lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service, for public service is a
public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional
obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.
IGOY v SORIANO

FACTS:
   Igoy is one of the petitioners in the case of Heirs of Gavino Igoy, et al. vs. Mactan Shangrila Hotel.
   Eng. William Redoblado introduced Atty. Soriano  to Igoy as a Justice of the CA.
   According to Igoy’s friend, Atty. Soriano will be able to help him in his case which is pending in the CA
   Atty. Soriano demanded from Igoy P20,000 but the former reminded the latter the he will only be able to help in the case as soon as the
case was lifted to the SC
   Igoy’s case received an unfavorable decision in the CA and Atty. Soriano offered to prepare the Petition for Review to be filed in the
SC.
   Atty. Soriano asked for an additional P20,000
   Igoy send the amount by courier to the address of Atty. Soriano which was received by his son.
   SC denied the petition for review of Igoy with finality
   Igoy later found out that Atty. Soriano is not a CA Justice and filed this complaint against Igoy in the SC
   Arguments of Atty. Soriano:
o    It is unnatural for a person to give money to someone whom he does not know well and whom he met only for the first time
o    The money was offered gratuitously by Igoy
o    it is impossible the Igoy handed the money to him on the SC parking lot for many employees were passing in that place
o    it is not Eng. Redoblado who introduced him to Igoy but Mr. Taneo
o     if the SC finds that he is guilty, he will retire from the service
   Atty. Soriano filed his letter of resignation/retirement under RA 1616
ISSUE:
   W/N Atty. Soriano violated Canon 6, Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
   Yes! Atty. Soriano was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and is suspended from the practice of law.
   Atty. Soriano’s offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever penalty may be imposed on him.  However, resignation
will not extricate him form the consequences of his acts
   Resignation should not be used either as an escape or an easy way out to evade administrative liability by court personnel facing
administrative sanctions
   To accept the claim of Soriano that the money was offered gratuitously will open the floodgates to fraud or graft and corruption.
   Government lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service for public service is a public trust.  Government
lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their reputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the
public eye.
   The nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the Constitution are not mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly as
idealistic sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals that should e matched with actual deeds.