NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. CA, GR NO.

148830, 2005-04-13
Facts:
Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc.
Proclamation No. 481 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos set aside a 120-
hectare portion of land in Quezon City owned by the NHA[4] as reserved property
for the site of the National Government Center ("NGC").
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1670, which removed a seven-hectare
portion from the coverage of the NGC.
MSBF
Manila Seedling Bank Foundation
Proclamation No. 1670 gave MSBF usufructuary rights over this segregated
portion
Over the years, MSBF's occupancy exceeded the seven-hectare area subject to its
usufructuary rights.
MSBF occupied approximately 16 hectares.
By then the land occupied by MSBF was bounded by Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue ("EDSA") to the west, Agham Road to the east, Quezon Avenue to the
south and a creek to the north.
MSBF leased a portion of the area it occupied to BGC and other stallholders.
President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127 ("MO 127") which
revoked the reserved status of "the 50 hectares, more or less, remaining out of
the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of the National
Government Center." MO 127 also... authorized the NHA to commercialize the
area and to sell it to the public.
the NHA gave BGC ten days to vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind
after the expiration of the ten-day period will be demolished by NHA.
BGC then filed a complaint for injunction... before the trial court.
BGC amended its complaint to include MSBF as its co-plaintiff.
The trial court agreed with BGC and MSBF that Proclamation No. 1670 gave MSBF
the right to conduct the survey, which would establish the seven-hectare area
covered by MSBF's usufructuary rights. However, the trial court held that MSBF
failed to act seasonably on... this right to conduct the survey.
The trial court concluded that to allow MSBF to determine the seven-hectare area
now would be... grossly unfair to the grantor of the usufruct.
the trial court dismissed BGC's complaint for injunction.
Not content with the trial court's ruling, BGC appealed the trial court's Decision to
the appellate court. Initially, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that
Proclamation No. 1670 granted MSBF the right to determine the location of the
seven-hectare... area covered by its usufructuary rights. However, the appellate
court ruled that MSBF did in fact assert this right by conducting two surveys and
erecting its main structures in the area of its choice.
the appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling.
Issues:
WHETHER THE PREMISES LEASED BY BGC FROM MSBF IS WITHIN THE SEVEN-
HECTARE AREA THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 1670 GRANTED TO MSBF BY WAY OF
USUFRUCT.
Ruling:
We remand this petition to the trial court for a joint survey to determine finally
the metes and bounds of the seven-hectare area subject to MSBF's usufructuary
rights.
The entire area... measures approximately 16 hectares.
Proclamation No. 1670 gave MSBF a usufruct over only a seven-hectare area. The
BGC's leased portion is located along
EDSA.
A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under such conditions as
the parties may deem convenient subject to the legal provisions on usufruct.
A usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct.
Thus, the NHA may... not evict BGC if the 4,590 square meter portion MSBF
leased to BGC is within the seven-hectare area held in usufruct by MSBF.
The owner of the property must respect the lease entered into by the
usufructuary so long as the usufruct exists.[11] However, the
NHA has the right to evict BGC if BGC occupied a portion outside of the seven-
hectare area covered by MSBF's usufructuary rights.
MSBF's survey shows that BGC's stall is within the seven-hectare area. On the
other hand, NHA's survey shows otherwise. The entire controversy revolves on
the question of whose land survey should prevail.
Article 565 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be those provided in
the title constituting the usufruct; in default of such title, or in case it is deficient,
the provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be observed.
In the present case, Proclamation No. 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct.
Proclamation No. 1670 categorically states that the seven-hectare area shall be
determined "by future survey under the administration of the Foundation subject
to private rights if there be any."
The appellate court and the trial court agree that MSBF has the latitude to
determine the location of its seven-hectare usufruct portion within the 16-
hectare area. The appellate court and the trial court disagree, however, whether
MSBF seasonably exercised this right.
Proclamation No. 1670 authorized MSBF to determine the location of the seven-
hectare area. This authority, coupled with the fact that Proclamation No. 1670 did
not state the location of the... seven-hectare area, leaves no room for doubt that
Proclamation No. 1670 left it to MSBF to choose the location of the seven-hectare
area under its usufruct.
More evidence supports MSBF's stand on the location of the seven-hectare area.
The main structures of MSBF are found in the area indicated by MSBF's survey.
These structures are the main office, the three green houses, the warehouse and
the composting area.
The first group covers buildings and facilities that MSBF needs for its operations.
MSBF built these... structures before the present controversy started.
The location of the gate is not a sufficient basis to determine the starting point.
MSBF's right as a usufructuary as granted by Proclamation
No. 1670 should rest on something more substantial than where MSBF chose to
place a gate.
To prefer the NHA's survey to MSBF's survey will strip MSBF of most of its main
facilities.
On the other hand, this Court cannot countenance MSBF's act of exceeding the
seven-hectare portion granted to it by Proclamation No. 1670.
A usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary has the duty to
protect the owner's interests. One such duty is found... in Article 601 of the Civil
Code which states:
ART. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a
third person, of which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the
rights of ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so, for damages, as if
they had been caused... through his own fault.
A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of
preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law
otherwise provides.
This controversy would not have arisen had MSBF respected the... limit of the
beneficial use given to it. MSBF's encroachment of its benefactor's property gave
birth to the confusion that attended this case. To put this matter entirely to rest,
it is not enough to remind the NHA to respect MSBF's choice of the location of its
seven-hectare... area. MSBF, for its part, must vacate the area that is not part of
its usufruct. MSBF's rights begin and end within the seven-hectare portion of its
usufruct.
The seven-hectare portion of MSBF is no longer easily determinable considering
the varied structures erected within and surrounding the area.
There is a need for a new survey, one conducted jointly by the NHA and MSBF, to
remove all doubts on the exact location of the seven-hectare area and thus avoid
future controversies. This new survey... should consider existing structures of
MSBF. It should as much as possible include all of the facilities of MSBF within the
seven-hectare portion without sacrificing contiguity.
ART. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or
association for more than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before the
expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation or
association is dissolved, the... usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof.
(Emphasis added)
The law clearly limits any usufruct constituted in favor of a corporation or
association to 50 years. A usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant. Unlike a
natural person, a corporation or association's lifetime may be extended
indefinitely. The usufruct would then be... perpetual.
Proclamation No. 1670 was issued 19 September 1977, or 28 years ago. Hence,
under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22 years left.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 March 2001 and its
Resolution dated 25 June 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48382 are SET ASIDE. This case is
REMANDED to Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
NHA vs. CA (456 SCRA 17 [2005])
Corp Law Topic: Corporate Term (Secs. 11; 19)

The trial court dismissed the complaint for injunction filed by Bulacan Garden
Corporation ("BGC") against the National Housing Authority ("NHA"). BGC wanted
to enjoin the NHA from demolishing BGC’s facilities on a lot leased from Manila
Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. ("MSBF"). MSBF allegedly has usufructuary rights
over the lot leased to BGC.

The appellate court reversed the Decision of the Trial Court.

On 24 October 1968, Proclamation No. 481 issued by then President Ferdinand

Marcos set aside a 120-hectare portion of land in Quezon City owned by the
NHA4 as reserved property for the site of the National Government Center
("NGC").

On 19 September 1977, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1670, which

removed a seven-hectare portion from the coverage of the NGC. Proclamation
No. 1670 gave MSBF usufructuary rights over this segregated portion.

MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation No. 1670. Over the years,
MSBF’s occupancy exceeded the seven-hectare area subject to its usufructuary
rights. By 1987, MSBF occupied approximately 16 hectares.
On 18 August 1987, MSBF leased a portion of the area it occupied to BGC and
other stallholders.

On 11 November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No.

127 ("MO 127") which revoked the reserved status of "the 50 hectares, more or
less, remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of
the National Government Center." MO 127 also authorized the NHA to
commercialize the area and to sell it to the public.

On 15 August 1988, acting on the power granted under MO 127, the NHA gave
BGC ten days to vacate its occupied area.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court that Proclamation No. 1670
granted MSBF the right to determine the location of the seven-hectare
area covered by its usufructuary rights. However, the appellate court ruled that
MSBF did in fact assert this right by conducting two surveys and erecting its main
structures in the area of its choice.

On 30 March 2001, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling: The
National Housing Authority is enjoined from demolishing the structures, facilities
and improvements of the plaintiff-appellant Bulacan Garden Corporation at its
leased premises located in Quezon City which premises were covered by
Proclamation No. 1670, during the existence of the contract of lease it (Bulacan
Garden) had entered with the plaintiff-appellant Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation, Inc.

Held:

This case is REMANDED to Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
which shall order a joint survey by the National Housing Authority and Manila
Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. to determine the metes and bounds of the seven-
hectare portion of Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. under Proclamation No.
1670. The seven-hectare portion shall be contiguous and shall include as much as
possible all existing major improvements of Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc.

Corporate Term
Article 605 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or
association for more than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before the
expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation or
association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof.

The law clearly limits any usufruct constituted in favor of a corporation or

association to 50 years. A usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant.

Unlike a natural person, a corporation or association’s lifetime may be extended

indefinitely. The usufruct would then be perpetual.

Proclamation No. 1670 was issued 19 September 1977, or 28 years ago. Hence,
under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22 years left.

Understanding Manila Seedling’s usufructuary rights

By: Atty. Sara Mae D. Mawis - @inquirerdotnet

Philippine Daily Inquirer / 05:11 AM July 14, 2018
“We don’t inherit the earth from our ancestors; we borrow it from our children,”
said Native American leader Chief Seattle.

In line with this proverb, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued

Proclamation No. 1670, series of 1977, granting to the Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation, Inc. (MSBFI) usufructuary rights over a 7-ha parcel of land owned by
the National Housing Authority (NHA).

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Thus, for the next three decades, MSBFI cultivated the said land for garden and
flower centers and pet shops, and provision of tree pruning and farming and
greenhouse construction services, in support of the government’s greening
program.

In 2012, however, Quezon City Mayor Herbert Bautista sent policemen, members
of his Department of Public Order and Safety, and private persons, to forcibly take
over the land occupied by MSBFI. Thereafter, the Quezon City government
successfully ejected the MSBF and its tenants from said land.

In his letter to former President Benigno Aquino III dated 8 December 2014,
Bautista prayed that Proclamation No. 1670 be amended so that the rights to the 7-
ha land be granted to the Quezon City government instead.

According to Bautista, the Quezon City government validly forfeited the land
purportedly because of MSBFI’s failure to pay real estate taxes since 1981.

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Surely, the Quezon City government’s actions violate the usufruct constituted in
favor of MSBFI over the land. No less than the Supreme Court recognized the
usufruct constituted in favor of MSBFI for a period of 50 years, or until 2027, in
accordance with Article 605 of the Civil Code, in National Housing Authority v.
Court of Appeals.

Usufruct gives MSBFI the right to enjoy the land owned by the NHA with the
obligation of preserving its form and substance, subject to the provisions of
Proclamation No. 1670.

Usufruct may be constituted: (a) by law, as in MSBFI’s case; (b) by agreement: (c) in
a last will and testament; and (d) by prescription. It may also be constituted on the
whole or a part of the fruits of the land, in favor of one or more persons,
simultaneously or successively, and in every case from or to a certain day, purely or
conditionally.

As a usufructuary, MSBFI is entitled to, among others:

all natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the land;

ADVERTISEMENT

enjoy any increase which the land may acquire through accession, the servitudes
established in its favor, and in general, all the benefits inherent therein;

enjoy the land, lease it to another, as it did in favor of Bulacan Garden Corp. and
other stall holders in 1987, and alienate its right of usufruct, among others;

use things included in the land which cannot be used without being consumed,
subject to its obligations in Article 574 of the Civil Code;
use the things included in the land, which, without being consumed, gradually
deteriorate through wear and tear, in accordance with the purpose for which they
are intended; and

make on the land useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as it may
deem proper, provided he does not alter its form and substance; but he shall have
no right to be indemnified therefore.

Before entering the land, MSBFI should have: (a) made, after notice to the NHA, an
inventory of all the land, which shall contain an appraisal of the movables, and a
description of the condition of the immovable, except when no one will be injured
thereby; and (b) given security, binding itself to fulfill the obligations imposed upon
him as usufructuary.

MSBFI should take care of the land as a good father of a family, and shall answer
for any damage caused by the alienation or lease of its right of usufruct through the
fault or negligence of the lessee or transferee. MSBFI is likewise obliged to make
ordinary repairs needed by the land, while extraordinary expenses shall be at the
NHA’s expense.

Moreover, MSBFI is liable for the payment of: (a) annual charges and taxes and of
those considered as a lien on the fruits, for the duration of the usufruct; and (b)
expenses, costs, and liabilities in suits brought with regard to the land.

A usufruct may be extinguished by: (a) the death of the usufructuary, unless a
contrary intention clearly appears; (b) the expiration of the period for which it was
constituted or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title
creating the usufruct; (c) merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(d) renunciation of the usufructuary; (e) total loss of the thing in usufruct; (f)
termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct; and (g)
prescription.

Read more: https://business.inquirer.net/253974/understanding-manila-
seedlings-usufructuary-rights#ixzz74svloCNj
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488 Phil. 140

PANGANIBAN, J.:
A sales patent applicant who has complied with all the legal requirements is
entitled to a grant of the disposable land of the public domain applied for. The
execution and formal delivery of the patent becomes merely ministerial. Under
these circumstances, the property applied for is, for all purposes, considered
segregated from the public domain. Hence, the subsequent issuance to a third
person of a free patent covering the same property is null and void. The
government can no longer convey the ownership of a parcel of land it no longer
owns.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45, seeking to nullify the
August 23, 2000 Decision[2] and the July 12, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in GR CV No. 61230. The decretal portion of the assailed Decision
reads:

"WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto."[4]

The challenged Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of agricultural land located in

Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon, particularly described as follows:

Poblacion, Sta. Magdalena,

"Location:
Sorsogon
"Area: 2.4969 hectares
"Boundaries: N-R. Frando & P. Frilles
E-I. Gallanosa & P. Frilles
 S-I. Gallanosa & P. Frilles
W. Marcela de Galag"[5]

Juliana Frando, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, was in possession of the

above-described property. Since 1925, she had planted several trees and other
plants thereon, including coconuts, pili, bananas and cacao. [6] Sometime in 1946,
the property was traversed by a national road that effectively divided it into two
portions, denominated as Lot Nos. 7 and 1855, respectively. [7] The latter, Lot No.
1855, is the subject of the present controversy.

Evident from certified copies of existing records of the Bureau of Lands

introduced in evidence is the fact that on February 14, 1952, Frando filed Insular
Government Property Sales (IGPS) Application No. 162 for the parcel in question.
Pursuant thereto, a representative of the Bureau of Lands inspected the area and
found it to be inside an agricultural zone, free from private claims and conflicts.

After the secretary of agriculture appraised the property at P240, a notice calling
for bids was published. At the auction sale conducted on April 22, 1955, the only
bidder was Frando. On even date she deposited P24, which represented 10
percent of the appraised value, as evidenced by Official Receipt (OR) No. 9654851
dated April 22, 1955.

Full payment of the purchase price was effected approximately a year later, on
April 6, 1956, when Frando paid the balance of P216 as evidenced by OR No. A-
2675530. On the same day, an Order/Award was made in her favor by Director of
Lands Zoilo Castrillo.[8] Apparent from a survey plan executed pursuant to an
Order of the Bureau was the fact that the property awarded to her covered both
Lots 7 and 1855 with an aggregate area of 4.000 hectares.

One of her two children, Salvacion Gallanosa who was married to Abdon Gimpes,
continued possession of the property. Sometime in 1940, the couple constructed
their house on the southwestern portion thereof.

The other child of Frando, Paciencia Gallanosa-Fuellas, chose to settle in Manila.

The Gimpes spouses helped her in the administration of the land. Their children --
particularly Respondents Rodolfo, Neri, Juan and Antonio -- were born on the
property, where they also grew up. After their parent's death, they continued
possession of the land; and harvested and received the fruits of the
improvements for themselves and on behalf of their grandmother, Juliana
Frando, even after her death in 1971. [9]

Purportedly unknown to private respondents, a cadastral survey of the

Municipality of Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon, was conducted in 1958. According to
the Bureau of Lands, during the said survey, Lot No. 1855 became the subject of
Case No. P1s-611-D, Sta. Magdalena Public Land Subdivision; as a result, Free
Patent No. 459501[10] dated July 24, 1969 was awarded to Defendant Cerila
Gamos on October 27, 1969. Allegedly, the free patent became the basis for the
issuance of OCT No. P-10548 in her name. Private respondents claimed to be
unaware of these developments, as neither she nor her heirs had taken
possession of the disputed portion until 1981. In that year, Ambrocio Guatno and
the other petitioners, who had joined him later, entered the property, gathered
its produce and built their houses thereon.

On August 3, 1988, the heirs of Juliana Frando filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a Complaint against Cerila Gamos and the director of the Bureau of Lands.
The complainants challenged the validity of Free Patent No. 459501 and OCT No.
P-10548. As the plaintiffs therein, they alleged that the Bureau of Lands had no
authority to award the patent covering an area it had earlier awarded to Frando.
They further alleged that fraud had attended the issuance of the subject OCT
when Miguel Fungo, an employee of the Office of the Provincial Assessor of
Sorsogon, purportedly forged the signature of Cerila Gamos in all the documents.
Those documents were used in the transfer of the Tax Declaration to her name, as
well as in the application for the issuance of Free Patent No. 459501 and OCT No.
P-10548.

In their Answer, Cerila Gamos and her co-defendants alleged that they had been
in actual and open possession of the land as early as 1952; and that the Bureau of
Lands' October 27, 1969 issuance in their favor of a free patent title, which
subsequently became the basis of OCT No. P-10548, was valid and lawful. They
pointed out that respondents' suit to contest a title nineteen years after its
issuance was already barred by prescription.

In its Answer, the Bureau of Lands, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), admitted that Juliana Frando had filed an IGPS application for a
parcel of land with an area of 2.4969 hectares located at Poblacion, Sta.
Magdalena, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Admittedly, she won the public bidding and
deposited the amount of P24 under OR No. 9654851 dated April 22, 1955, but
allegedly failed to pay the balance price of P216. Thus, concluded the Bureau,
while the land had previously been awarded to her, the Complaint was rendered
dismissible for lack of merit, as a consequence of her failure to pay the balance
price to assert her right to perfect her title thereto, and to controvert the
subsequent cadastral survey covering a portion thereof. In its Answer, however,
the Bureau made no mention of OCT No. P-10548.

On July 7, 1998, the Sorsogon RTC rendered the following judgment in favor of
respondents (the plaintiffs therein):

"WHEREFORE, the court renders judgment:

a. Finding the defendant Cerila Gamos of having fraudulently secured a free

patent title to that portion of the property in question described in
paragraph 3 of the complaint and indicated in Exhibit "X-1" as that portion
shaded by red lines;

b. Ordering the defendant Cerila Gamos or her successors-in-interest to

execute a deed of reconveyance of that portion of Lot No. 1855 under
Original Certificate of Title No. 10548 as delineated and described in Exhibit
"X-1", shaded by red lines;

c. Ordering the defendants to surrender the possession of the same to the

plaintiffs and to remove whatever improvements said defendants had
introduced on said property;

d. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P15,000.00 x x

x as damages representing attorneys' fees and necessary litigation
expenses, jointly and severally and;

e. To pay the costs."

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the RTC, the appellate court noted that the trial court's Decision was
fully supported by the evidence on record. The CA dismissed petitioners'
submission that, on the basis of the Report of the Bureau of Lands, the claim of
Juliana Frando had yet to be perfected, because she had paid only 10 percent of
the total value of the land covered by her application. The appellate court pointed
out that the foregoing argument was belied by the Bureau's Order/Award to her
in 1956.

Further, the CA upheld the lower court's award of attorney's fees, because the
appellees had been compelled "to litigate or incur expenses to protect their
interest by reason of the unjustified act of the [appellants]." [11]

Hence, this Petition.[12]

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our

consideration:

"Whether or not the order award given to Juliana Frando has been perfected

II

"Whether or not Cerila Gamos' free patent was secured through fraud

III

"Whether or not action of the heirs of Juliana Frando has already been barred by
laches/prescription"[13]
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit. However, the challenged judgment should be partly
modified.

First Issue:
Perfection of Sales Patent

The Philippine Constitution provides that "all lands of the public domain x x x are
owned by the State."[14] They "are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands and national parks. x x x. Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands."[15]

The origin of the foregoing provisions can be traced to the Roman law concept
of dominium, the power of the State to own or acquire property. Under this
concept, which became the basis for the regalian theory predominant during the
Spanish times, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown. [16] In our present
republican form of government, the concept remains, albeit stripped of its
colonial overtones. Now, ownership of all lands of the public domain is vested in
the State.[17]

As in ordinary ownership, dominium embraces the capacity to alienate the

property owned. The constitutional limitation on the State's power to alienate
agricultural lands of the public domain is intended to prevent monopoly and
foreign control of our natural resources, as well as to enable the government to
control the exploitation, development and utilization thereof for the benefit of all.

Private persons gain title to agricultural lands of the public domain by virtue of a
public grant,[18] adverse possession (or prescription), accretion and -- in certain
cases --reclamation. One who seeks to register one's title has the burden of
proving that it has been acquired through any of the foregoing modes, by virtue
of which the land has effectively been segregated from the public domain.

A perusal of the Complaint filed by private respondents before the trial court
shows that their asserted claim over the disputed portion ostensibly rested on the
Order/Award issued to their predecessor-in-interest, Juliana Frando, in 1956. The
issue is now narrowed down to whether this piece of evidence sufficiently vested
private respondents with an uncontroverted and indefeasible title over the
disputed property.
Acquisition of Public Land
Through a Sales Patent

Disposal of public agricultural land through a sales patent, as in the instant case, is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Public Land Act. Under this law, a
sales patent may be granted to a Filipino citizen who may or may not be of lawful
age, provided that one who is below the age of majority is the head of a family.
The law provides that after winning the bid and paying the purchase price, the
applicant must comply with the necessary requirements -- specifically the
cultivation, occupation and introduction of improvements over at least one fifth
of the land applied for.

After the applicant meets the legal requirements, the director of lands then
orders the survey of the land and the issuance of the sales patent in the
applicant's favor. Section 107 of Commonwealth Act 141 further requires the
registration of the patent under the Land Registration Act by furnishing the
registrar of deeds a certified copy thereof, after which the corresponding
certificate of title would accordingly be issued to the patentee.

In the present case, the Bureau of Lands did not issue the patent to Frando,
because she had allegedly failed to pay the P216 balance of the sale price. The
Bureau's assertion is, however, soundly disproved by evidence. Clearly appearing
on the Order/Award[19] issued to Frando in 1956 is the following proviso:

"That at the auction sale of the land held on April 22, 1955, the only bid received
was that of the applicant who offered P240.00 for the whole tract and deposited
the amount of P24.00 under O.R. No. 9654851 dated April 22, 1955 which is
equivalent to 10% of the bid. Subsequently, the applicant again paid the amount
of P216.00 under O.R. No. A-2675530 dated April 6, 1956 to complete the full
purchase price of the land." (Emphasis supplied)
Given the full payment of the purchase price as well as the compliance with all
the requirements for the grant of a sales patent, the Bureau had no reason to
deny the issuance of such patent to Frando. Her compliance with all the
requirements effectively vested in her and her successors-in-interest an equitable
title to the property applied for. Applicable to the instant case is our time-
honored pronouncement in Balboa v. Farrales, which we quote:

"A party who has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitle him to
a patent for a particular tract of public land, acquires a vested interest therein,
and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof.

"Where the right to a patent has once become vested in a purchaser of public
lands, it is equivalent, so far as the Government is concerned, to a patent
actually issued. The execution and delivery of the patent after the right to it has
become complete are the mere ministerial acts of the officers charged with that
duty. x x x. Even without a patent, a perfected homestead is a property right in
the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is
still in the Government. Such land may be conveyed or inherited." [20] (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, when the cadastral survey was subsequently conducted in Sta. Magdalena
in 1958, the disputed property -- already held in private ownership -- was no
longer part of the public domain. The director of lands had no more authority to
grant to a third person a patent covering the same tract that had already passed
to private ownership.[21] Thus, the issuance of the free patent to Cerila Gamos,
insofar as it encroached the portion already granted to Frando, had no legal basis
at all.

Open, Continuous, Exclusive and

Notorious Possession and Occupation
of Alienable and Disposable Lands

The denial of the sales patent notwithstanding, Juliana Frando is deemed to have
acquired equitable title to the property, because private respondents adequately
proved during trial her open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Introduced in evidence was a Declaration of Real Property covering the same tract
of land. The Declaration had been issued to Basilio Frando, father of Juliana
Frando, sometime in 1906.[22] Witness accounts[23] of long time residents of the
adjoining properties confirmed her possession for a period not later than 1925;
and her introduction thereon of various trees and other plants, including bananas,
cacao, pili and coconuts.
They also attested to the continued possession of the property by Frando's
daughter, Salvacion Gimpes; and subsequently by her children, herein private
respondents. Aside from showing the Order/Award, the children bolstered their
claim by introducing in evidence several Tax Declarations, sketch plans, survey
returns and the reports of the court-appointed commissioner.

While asserting possession of the property as early as 1952, petitioners have not
presented any document or witness to prove their bare claim. Moreover,
Ambrosio Guatno -- one of herein petitioners -- testified that he had entered the
property upon the permission of Ricardo Galag, an heir of Gamos; later, he
admitted that its true owner was Juliana Frando. [24]

In line with Susi v. Razon,[25] possession of a parcel of agricultural land of the

public domain for the prescribed period of 30 years ipso jure converts the lot into
private property.[26] In that case, the application of Valentin Susi for a free patent
was denied by the Bureau of Lands, despite the fact that he had been in
possession of the property for a far longer period than the grantee. Still true to
this day is this Court's ruling on the matter, which we quote:

"It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of
the land in question openly, continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and
through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. x
x x. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of the land,
Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty four years. x x x In favor of Valentin Susi, there is,
moreover, the presumption juris et de jure x x x that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been
in actual and physical possession personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and
publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under
the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for
a grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the government, for it is not necessary that
a certificate of title should be issued in order that a grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provision of Section
47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become the private property, at least by presumption of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a
land over which he no longer had title or control, and the sale thus made was
void and of no effect and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any
right." (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the mere application for a patent, coupled with the fact of exclusive,
open, continuous and notorious possession for the required period is sufficient to
vest in the applicant the grant applied for. In sum, the application by Juliana
Frando for a sales patent, coupled with her open, exclusive, uninterrupted and
notorious possession of the land applied for is, for all purposes, equivalent to a
patent already perfected and granted.

The subsequent entry of petitioners and their occupation of the property in

question was in bad faith,[27] given the prior possession thereof by private
respondents. Thus, when the former were ordered by the RTC to remove
whatever improvements they might have introduced thereon, the court
committed no error.[28]

Evidentiary Matters and the

Attempt to Deceive this Court

The Complaint before the Sorsogon RTC prayed mainly for the cancellation of OCT
No. P-10548, which had allegedly been issued to Cerila Gamos by the Register of
Deeds of Sorsogon on October 27, 1969. An examination of the records shows
that no copy of the said OCT was ever presented in evidence at any stage of the
proceedings. The complainants (herein respondents) failed to present the
document that was central to their action. That omission was in no way alleviated
by the ominous failure of the defendants themselves (herein petitioners) to
present the very evidence upon which they had based their claim of superior title.
In fact, the latter never presented any documentary evidence at all and merely
adopted that of the former.

Inasmuch as neither party had presented the subject OCT in evidence and, hence,
the Sorsogon RTC never had the opportunity to examine it, there was no basis for
trial court's Decision (as affirmed by the appellate court) -- more particularly, the
part ordering petitioners to "execute a deed of reconveyance of that portion of
Lot No. 1855 under Original Certificate of Title No. 10548."

As worded, the RTC's ruling may lead to mischievous consequences. For all we
know, OCT No. 10548 may be in the name of a third person who is not a party to
the present proceedings, or it may cover a property different from that in dispute.
On these grounds, the foregoing portion of the trial court's Decision should be
modified. The metes and bounds of the property in dispute -- the title to and
possession of which is confirmed to belong properly to private respondents --
should in no way be defined by any reference to OCT No. 10548. Rather, such
definition should be based on the documentary evidence at hand; more
particularly, the technical description in the survey plan made --pursuant to
Frando's application for a sales patent -- as confirmed by the survey later
conducted by the court-appointed commissioner.

By subsequently attaching Free Patent No. 459501 (which was in the name of
Gamos) as Annex "J" to their Petition, petitioners are resorting to a belated
remedy to a fatal omission. They should have offered the document before the
trial court, not -- as they have done -- in the last stretch of the proceedings, when
such document can no longer be considered. Time and time again, we have
pronounced that this Court is not a trier of facts.

Assuming arguendo that the patent is still admissible, it is nonetheless bereft of

any evidentiary value. While it refers to Lot No. 1855, it is -- unlike the
Order/Award issued to Frando -- accompanied neither by a survey sketch duly
approved by the Bureau of Lands, nor by a technical description that would
enable us to determine whether the patent refers to the property in dispute. We
also note that the said document was admittedly issued to Gamos on October 27,
1969, a mere seventeen years after she had allegedly entered into possession of
the property -- in 1952, according to herein petitioners. Clearly then, Free Patent
No. 459501 was issued despite the applicant's possession of the property for a
period shorter than the 30 years required by law. [29]

Further compounding the procedural lapse committed by petitioners is their

apparent attempt to mislead this Court. Likewise attached to the Petition is a copy
of an alleged Deed of Sale executed between one Felipa Bongais and Cerila
Gamos, as well as several copies of Tax Declarations apparently showing that the
Deed covers the contested property.
A perusal of the said documents shows that they involve a rice land situated in
Adgao, Poblacion, Sta. Magdalena, with an area of 11,300 square meters; not the
property subject of the present controversy, which covers 2.4969 to 4.0000
hectares. By introducing the alleged Deed of Sale, petitioners obviously want to
bolster their claim of ownership by impressing upon this Court that they have
purchased the property from Bongais. They are, however, thereby contradicting
their prior assertion of title on the basis of a free patent. These contradictory
assertions not only cast serious doubt on the veracity of their claim; they also
constitute an apparent attempt to mislead the Court.

Second Issue:
Fraud

Petitioners argue that the trial court erred in holding that the free patent issued
to Cerila Gamos had fraudulently been secured. Both parties failed, though, to
present a copy of Free Patent No. 459501. This lapse resulted in the trial court's
failure to examine the document and to appreciate the circumstances under
which it had allegedly been issued. Thus, any determination of whether fraud
indeed attended its issuance is not possible now.

Third Issue:
Prescription and Laches

In their last assignment of error, petitioners argue that private respondents'

action to annul the free patent issued to Cerila Gamos has already prescribed and
is barred by laches. We do not agree.

As testified to by the Gilda Bongais -- one of Juliana Frando's heirs -- when

petitioners first invaded the property in 1979 by constructing a house thereon,
her aunt (Paciencia Gallenosa) filed an action contesting such intrusion. The
action was later dropped due to the financial burdens of the litigation, definitely
not because of any concession of rights by private respondents. Thus, the legal
inaction on their part was due, not to their lack of vigilance, but merely to their
lack of resources to defend their property.
On the witness stand, Guatno himself recognized Juliana Frando and her heirs as
the true owners of the property, even as he admitted that it was Galag -- one of
herein petitioners -- who had given him permission to erect a house on the land in
1980. Petitioners' possession of the disputed property, based as it was on mere
tolerance, could neither ripen into ownership nor operate to bar any action by
private respondents to recover absolute possession thereof. [30]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. However, paragraph (b) of the RTC decision

is MODIFIED to read as follows:

b. Ordering the successors-in-interest of Cerila Gamos to execute a deed of

reconveyance of that portion of Lot No. 1855 with an area of 1,626 square meters
as delineated and described in Exhibit "X-1", shaded by red lines.
Counsels for petitioners -- Attys. Arceli A. Rubin, Amelia C. Garchitorena, Marvin
R. Osias and Beatriz Teves de Guzman -- are hereby ordered to SHOW CAUSE,
within ten days from receipt hereof, why they should not be subjected to
administrative sanction for their attempt to deceive this Court through the
introduction of misleading evidence.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Corona, J., on leave.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 9-28.

[2]
 Id., pp. 72-82. Sixth Division. Penned by Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and
concurred in by Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (Division chair, now a
member of this court) and Elvi John S. Asuncion.

[3]
 Id., pp. 99-100.
[4]
 Assailed Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 82.

[5]
 Assailed Decision, p. 3; rollo, p. 74.

[6]
 Ibid.

[7]
 Ibid.

[8]
 Id., pp. 4 & 75.

[9]
 Id., pp. 5 & 76.

[10]
 In some parts of the record stated as "45901."

[11]
 Assailed Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 82. Citations omitted.

[12]
 This case was deemed submitted for decision on August 1, 2003, upon receipt
by this Court of respondents' Memorandum, signed by Atty. Mariano B. Baranda
Jr. Petitioners' Memorandum -- signed by Attys. Amelia C. Garchitorena, Marvin R.
Osias and Beatriz Teves-de Guzman of the Public Attorneys' Office -- was received
by the Court on August 2, 2002.

[13]
 Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 134-135. Original in upper case.

[14]
 Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

[15]
 Section 3, id.

[16]
 Bernas, "The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary"
(1988) Vol. II, p. 419.

[17]
 Ibid.

[18]
 A public grant may be in the form of homestead settlement, sale, lease, and
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title and free title.

[19]
 Exhibit "A," records, p. 146.
[20]
 51 Phil. 498, February 14, 1928, per Johnson, J.

[21]
 De la Concha et al v. Magtira, 124 Phil. October 19, 1966; De los Reyes v.
Razon, 38 Phil. 480, August 20, 1918.

[22]
 Exhibit "E" for Complainants.

[23]
 See TSN, Vivencio Gaton, January 30, 1995, pp. 2-12; and Carina Daymon,
January 30, 1995, pp. 12-19.

[24]
 TSN, Ambrocio Galag, cross-examination, May 13, 1996, pp. 2-5.

[25]
 48 Phil. 424, December 9, 1925.

[26]
 Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602, March 23, 1990.

[27]
 Salacup v. Rambac, 17 Phil. 21, September 9, 1910.

[28]
 Article 549 of the Civil Code provides that "the possessor in bad faith shall
reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could
have received, and shall have a right only to the expenses mentioned in par. 1 of
Article 546 and in article 443. The expenses incurred in improvements for pure
luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in bad faith; but
he may remove the objects for which such expenses have been incurred, provided
that the thing suffers no injury thereby, and that the lawful possessor does not
prefer to retain them by paying the value they may have at the time he enters
into possession."

[29]
 See §44, CA 144.

[30]
 Article 357 of the Civil Code provides that "Acts merely tolerated, and those
executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or
by violence, do not affect possession."

MAGDALENA T. VILLASI vs. SPOUSES FILOMENO GARCIA AND ERMELINDA HALILI-

GARCIA G.R. No. 190106, SECOND DIVISION, January 15, 2014, Perez, J. In
Buduhan v. Pakurao,we underscored the significance of a tax declaration as proof
that a holder has claim of title, and, we gave weight to the demonstrable interest
of the claimant holding a tax receipt: Although tax declarations or realty tax
payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim
of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to
the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership. In this case, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona
fide title to the building in question. In contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily
establish the ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of evidence she appended to her
opposition. Worthy to note is the fact that the building in litigation was declared
for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the Spouses Garcias'.

FACTS:

Petitioner Magdalena T. Villasi (Villasi) engaged the services of respondent Fil-

Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium
building. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several
demands, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money before the RTC. The
RTC ruled in favor of FGCI. The CA, however, reversed the decision. FGCI filed a
petition for review on certiorari, but the same was denied. To enforce her right as
prevailing party, Villasi filed a Motion for Execution. A Writ of Execution was
issued commanding the Sheriff to execute and make effective the Decision of the
Court of Appeals. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building. While
the building was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in
which it was erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Filomeno
Garcia and ErmelindaHalili-Garcia (Spouses Garcia). After the mandatory posting
and publication of notice of sale on execution of real property were complied
with, a public auction was scheduled. To forestall the sale on execution, the
Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside
Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners of the
property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff. To persuade the court
a quo to grant their motion, the Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered
by the levy was mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI. The
motion was opposed by Villasi who insisted that its ownership belongs to FGCI
and not to the Spouses Garcia as shown by the tax declaration. The RTC issue an
order directing the Sheriff to hold in abeyance the conduct of the sale on
execution. Villasi moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the building and the lot in which it was erected should be treated
separate properties?

RULING:

In Buduhan v. Pakurao, we underscored the significance of a tax declaration as

proof that a holder has claim of title, and, we gave weight to the demonstrable
interest of the claimant holding a tax receipt: Although tax declarations or realty
tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim
of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to
the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership. Our perusal of the record shows that, as the party asserting their title,
the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building
in question. Aside from their postulation that as title holders of the land, the law
presumes them to be owners of the improvements built thereon, the Spouses
Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence to prove their ownership of the
property. In contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of
FGCI thru the pieces of evidence she appended to her opposition. Worthy to note
is the fact that the building in litigation was declared for taxation purposes in the
name of FGCI and not in the Spouses Garcias'. It likewise failed to escape our
attention that FGCI is in actual possession of the building and as the payment of
taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by tax declaration
strongly supports a claim of ownership. Quite significantly, all the court processes
in an earlier collection suit between FGCI and Villasi were served, thru the
former's representative Filomeno Garcia, at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon
City, where the subject property is located. This circumstance is consistent with
the tax declaration in the name of FGCI. While it is a hornbook doctrine that the
accessory follows the principal, that is, the ownership of the property gives the
right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially, such rule is not
without exception. In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to
prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same
person or entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership
shall be upheld. In a number of cases, we recognized the separate ownership of
the land from the building and brushed aside the rule that accessory follows the
principal. In Carbonilla v. Abiera, the court denied the claim of petitioner that, as
the owner of the land, he is likewise the owner of the building erected thereon,
for his failure to present evidence to buttress his position: To set the record
straight, while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as there can
be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens certificate
of title, he failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim of ownership
or right to the possession of the building. Like the CA, we cannot accept the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and
Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the Garcianos as proof that petitioner
acquired ownership of the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos were
the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right over it. Ranged
against respondents’ proof of possession of the building since 1977, petitioner’s
evidence pales in comparison and leaves us totally unconvinced. In Caltex (Phil.)
Inc. v. Felias, the court ruled that while the building is a conjugal property and
therefore liable for the debts of the conjugal partnership, the lot on which the
building was constructed is a paraphernal property and could not be the subject
of levy and sale: x xx. In other words, when the lot was donated to Felisa by her
parents, as owners of the land on which the building was constructed, the lot
became her paraphernal property. The donation transmitted to her the rights of a
landowner over a building constructed on it. Therefore, at the time of the levy
and sale of the sheriff, Lot No. 107 did not belong to the conjugal partnership, but
it was paraphernal property of Felisa. As such, it was not answerable for the
obligations of her husband which resulted in the judgment against him in favor of
Caltex. The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where this
Court was confronted with cases requiring judicial determination of the
ownership of the building separate from the lot, it never hesitated to disregard
such rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there are factual and
evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the lot on which it stands are
owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the building
or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of
its respective owner.

G.R. No. 190106 Case Digest

G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014
Magdalena Villasi
vs Filomeno Garcia, substituted by his heirs
Ponente: Perez

Facts:
In 1990, Villasi engaged the services of Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc to construct a
7-storey condominium building in QC. For failure to fully pay, FGCI initiated a suit
for collection of sum of money. Villasi filed an answer n=denying the lateral
allegations of the complaint, averring that she delivered the total amount but
FGCI accomplished only 28% of the construction. RTC ruled in favor of FGCI.

Villasi appealed with CA, CA reversed the judgment of RTC. FGCI filed a petition
for review on Certiorari, but CA denied the appeal for being filed out of time. To
satisfy the CA judgment, the sheriff levied on a building registered under Garcia,
then later a public auction was scheduled.

To forestall the execution, Garcia filed an affidavit of 3rd party claim to set aside
the sale execution for they are the lawful owners of the building levied by the
sheriff. Garcia claimed that the city assessor made a mistake in the assessment of
the property levied. RTC suspend the execution.
Villasi filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by RTC. Thus this
instant petition.

Issue:
Whether CA erred in granting Villasi ownership of the property.

Held:
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against
the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the
property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for
another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy
through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. The duty of
the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third
person.

The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right
of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory
power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration
thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his
ownership or right of possession thereon.

Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in
question. Aside from their postulation that as title holders of the land, the law
presumes them to be owners of the improvements built thereon, the Spouses
Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence to prove their ownership of the
property. In contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of
FGCI thru the pieces of evidence she appended to her opposition.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

Finally, the issue regarding the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction is irrelevant
in this case. The Spouses Garcia are trying to protect FGCI from liability by
asserting that they, not FGCI, own the levied property. The Spouses Garcia are
asserting their separation from FGCI. FGCI, the judgment debtor, is the proven
owner of the building. Piercing FGCI’s corporate veil will not protect FGCI from its
judgment debt. Piercing will result in the identification of the Spouses Garcia as
FGCI itself and will make them liable for FGCI’s judgment debt.

Sheriff is directed to proceed with the sale on execution.

Facts: Villasi engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc.

(FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building located Cubao, Quezon
City. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several demands,
FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money. Villasi filed an answer
specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint. Contending that
FGCI has no cause of action against her, Villasi averred that she delivered the total
amount of P7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the latter accomplished only 28% of the
project.To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi filed a Motion for
Execution. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building located
Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City. While the building was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was erected were registered in
the names of the Spouses Garcia. The Spouses Garcia argued that the building
covered by the levy was mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name of
FGCI and that it could not be levied upon not being owned by the judgment
debtor.
Issue: Whether the general rule on accession can be applied in the case at bar
Ruling: While it is a horn-book doctrine that the accessory follows the principal,
that is, the ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything
which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either
naturally or artificially, such rule is not without exception. In cases where there is
a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory are
not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption shall not be
applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld.
When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and
the lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated
separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable
to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.

Villasi v. Garcia G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014 Terceria, Judgement, Execution,
Judicial Stability
APRIL 19, 2020
FACTS:

Petitioner Magdalena Villasi engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia

Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building
located in Cubao, QC. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite
several demands, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money before the
RTC. FGCI prayed, among others, for the payment of the amount of
₱2,865,000.00, representing the unpaid accomplishment billings.

Villasi filed an answer specifically denying the material allegations of the

complaint. Contending that FGCI has no cause of action against her, Villasi
averred that she delivered the total amount of ₱7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the
latter accomplished only 28% of the project.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of FGCI. It upheld the claim of FGCI to the
unpaid amount of the contract price.

On appeal, the CA ruled that an overpayment was made by Villasi and thereby
directed FGCI to return the amount that was paid in excess.

FGCI filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court which was however
denied the appeal for being filed out of time. The Court resolution denying the
appeal became final and executory on 27 November 2001, as evidenced by the
corresponding Entry of Judgment.

Villasi filed a Motion for Execution of the 20 November 2000 CA Decision, which
was favorably acted upon by the RTC, and a Writ of Execution was accordingly
issued.

To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building which was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, but the lots in which it was erected were
registered in the names of the Spouses Garcia.

Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside
Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners of the
property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff.

Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered by the levy was mistakenly
assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI. The motion was opposed by
Villasi who insisted that its ownership belongs to FGCI.

The RTC issued an Order directing the Sheriff to hold in abeyance the conduct of
the sale on execution.
Arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in ordering the suspension of
the sale on execution, Villasi timely filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.

The CA dismissed the petition.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the Decision of the trial court to
suspend and hold in abeyance the sale on execution of the buildings levied upon
on the basis of respondents’ Affidavit of Third-Party Claim

RULING:

We grant the petition.

It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against
the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the
property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for
another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy
through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Section 16,
Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies
of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken
hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an
independent “separate action” to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or
possession over the foreclosed property. However, the person other than the
judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not
precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim.

Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court.
The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a
third person. For, as the saying goes, one man’s goods shall not be sold for
another man’s debts.

The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right
of possession.

Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct
the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its
rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or
right of possession thereon.

In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya, we declared that for a third-party claim or a

terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently establish his right on the
property:

[A] third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the
obligation of the judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court
which authorized such execution. Upon due application by the third person and
after summary hearing, the court may command that the property be released
from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor.
The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property,
with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may be
necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the
sheriff to restore the property to the claimant’s possession if warranted by the
evidence. However, if the claimant’s proofs do not persuade the court of the
validity of his title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied.

Our perusal of the record shows that, as the party asserting their title, the
Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in
question.

Aside from their postulation that as title holders of the land, the law presumes
them to be owners of the improvements built thereon, the Spouses Garcia were
unable to adduce credible evidence to prove their ownership of the property. In
contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI thru the
pieces of evidence she appended to her opposition.

Worthy to note is the fact that the building in litigation was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the Spouses Garcias’. While it is true that
tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
they constitute credible proof of claim of title over the property.

G.R. No. 185020 6 October 2010 Filomena R. Benedicto vs. Antonio Villaflores
Resolution NACHURA, J.: Facts: Maria Villaflores owns a lot with an area
of 277 square meters. In 1980, she sold a portion to her nephew Antonio
Villaflores who then took possession of the portion sold to him and constructed
a house thereon. Twelve years later, Maria executed in favor of Antonio a
Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan covering the entire 277 square meters lot.
However, Antonio did not register the sale or pay the real property taxes
for the subject land. In 1994, Maria sold the same lot to Filomena,
evidenced by a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. Filomena registered the sale
with the Registry of Deeds who consequently issued a TCT in her name. Since
then she paid the real property taxes for the subject parcel of land. In 2000,
Filomena filed a case for Accion Publiciana with Cancellation of Notice of
Adverse Claim, Damages and Attorney’s Fees against Antonio when the latter
refused to vacate the property and instead, claimed absolute ownership of
the said lot which he himself promised to vacate after five years from the date
of sale and after an extension of 1 year where he paid 2,000 monthly rentals.
Antonio traversed the complaint, asserting absolute ownership and alleged
that he purchased the subject property, took possession of the same and
constructed his house thereon. He came to know of the sale in favor of Filomena
only in 2000 when the latter demanded that he vacate the property. He averred
that Filomena was aware of the sale; hence, the subsequent sale was rescissible,
fraudulent, fictitious, or simulated. The RTC rendered a decision sustaining
Filomena’s ownership and rejected Antonio’s allegation of bad faith because no
sufficient evidence was adduced to prove it. Likewise, the RTC found Antonio’s
evidence of ownership questionable. Nevertheless, he’s declared a builder in
good faith. Both moved for reconsideration of the decision, but were denied for
lack of merit. Filomena and Antonio filed their separate appeals with the CA
who rendered the now challenged Decision affirming with modification the RTC
decision upholding Filomena’s ownership and Antonio as a builder in good faith.
However, it remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings to determine
the respective rights of the parties under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code,
and the amount due Antonio. Issue: WON Antonio was a builder in good
faith and was entitled to reimbursement for the necessary and useful
expenses incurred, with right of retention until reimbursement of the said
expenses in full. Held: Antonio is a builder in good faith.

MORETO MIRALLOSA v. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, GR No. 194538, 2013-11-27

Facts:
Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a Caloocan
property known as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan
City.
As a consequence of Tuason, respondent made several oral demands on
petitioner to vacate the premises, but to no avail.[17] A written demand letter
which was sent sometime in April 2002 also went unheeded.[18]
On 14 January 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer[19]
before the MeTC. After due hearing on 9 November 2007, the trial court rendered
a Decision
Petitioner alleges that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because respondent had filed the Complaint beyond the one-year prescriptive
period for ejectment cases
In this case, petitioner could not be said to have been unduly burdened by
reliance on an invalid law.
Petitioner merely anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit allegedly
issued by Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHIA, authorizing petitioner to
occupy the... same.[63] However, this Affidavit was executed only sometime in
1995, or approximately seven years after the Tuason case was promulgated.[64]
At the time petitioner built the structures on the premises, he ought to have
been... aware of the binding effects of the Tuason case and the subsequent
unconstitutionality of P.D. 293. These circumstances necessarily remove him from
the ambit of the operative fact doctrine.
Issues:
Whether or not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case;
Whether or not Tuason may be applied here, despite petitioner not being a party
to the case; and
Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith.
Ruling:
The MeTC rightly exercised... jurisdiction, this case being... one of unlawful
detainer.
The MeTC rightly exercised jurisdiction, this case being one of unlawful detainer.
Petitioner argues that respondent has no cause of action against him, because
under the doctrine of operative fact and the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae
nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt, petitioner should not be prejudiced by Tuason;
the declaration of the... unconstitutionality of P.D. 293 should not affect the rights
of other persons not party to the case
While petitioner may not have been a party to Tuason, still, the judgment is
binding on him because the declaration of P.D. 293 as a nullity partakes of the
nature of an in rem... proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105190
are AFFIRMED.
Principles:
An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds
possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or
other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession
by virtue of any contract, express or... implied.[46] Here, possession by a party
was originally legal, as it was permitted by the other party on account of an
express or implied contract between them.[47] However, the possession became
illegal when the other party demanded... that the possessor vacate the subject
property because of the expiration or termination of the right to possess under
the contract, and the possessor refused to heed the demand.
in rem... proceeding.
- September 07, 2020

Clue: Mirralosa’s land in Carmel Dev’t; Tuason case in 1988 and Affidavit in 1995

MORETO MIRALLOSA and all persons claiming rights and interests under him,
Petitioner,

vs.

CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 194538               November 27, 2013

SERENO, CJ:
 The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared
unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and
it is deemed as if had never existed.

FACTS

1.    Mirralosa, et.al filed Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision and Order of the
Regional Trial Court RTC, Caloocan City. The RTC had reversed the Decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court MeTC), Branch 52, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. 03-
27114, ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property in this case for
ejectment.

2.    Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a Caloocan

property known as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan
City.

3.    The lot that petitioner presently occupies is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by
the titles above-mentioned.

4.    On September 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.

293 (P.D. 293), which invalidated the titles of respondent and declared them
open for disposition to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners
Association, Inc. (MHAI).

5.    Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHAI,

then occupied Lot No. 32 and subsequently built houses there.

6.    On January 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated Roman Tuason and Remedio

V. Tuason, Attorney-in-fact, Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of Deeds, Caloocan
City, Ministry of Justice and the National Treasurer14 (Tuason), which
declared P.D. 293 as unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts.

7.    Sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot No. 32 by virtue of an Affidavit

executed by Pelagio M. Juan.
8.    On 14 January 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before
the MeTC.

9.    METC ruled in favour of the respondent; RTC reversed the decision of MeTC, and
in CA, the decision was in favour of the respondent.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case;

2. Whether or not Tuason may be applied here, despite petitioner not being a
party to the case; and

3. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith.

RULING: YES

Petitioner argued that

1.    Respondent has no cause of action against him, because under the doctrine of

operative fact and the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis
praejudicium faciunt,

2.    And she should not be prejudiced by Tuason; the declaration of the

unconstitutionality of P.D. 293 should not affect the rights of other persons not
party to the case.

-      HOWEVER, in declaring a law null and void, the real issue is whether the nullity
should have prospective, not retroactive, application.

-      The Court held the ruling that Republic v. Court of Appeals is instructive on the
matter:

The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared

 unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity,
and it is deemed as if had never existed.

-      A law declared as unconstitutional produces no effect whatsoever and confers

no right on any person. It matters not whether the person is a party to the
original case, because "not only the parties but all persons are bound by the
declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter
invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in
other words, a total nullity.

-      Thus, petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae nullum

aliis praejudicium faciunt (meaning: Matters which are adjudged as between
certain persons effect no prejudice as to others) cannot be countenanced. We
have categorically stated that the doctrine does not apply when the party
concerned is a "successor in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action, or the action or proceeding is in rem, the judgment in which is
binding against him.

-      Neither may petitioner avail himself of the operative fact doctrine, which

recognizes the interim effects of a law prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality. The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must
be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law
produces no effects

-      COURT held that petitioner anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit
allegedly issued by Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHIA, authorizing
petitioner to occupy the same. However, this Affidavit was executed only
sometime in 1995, or approximately seven years after the Tuason case was
promulgated.

DECISION:

The Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

SPS. JUAN NUGUID AND ERLINDA T. NUGUID v. CA, GR NO. 151815, 2005-02-23
Facts:
Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot... on which he built a four-door two-
storey apartment building.
For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City
Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno... who in turn... sold it... to
the spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC
In its Decision,... the RTC upheld the spouses' title but declared that the four-door
two-storey apartment building was not... included in the auction sale.
This was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and thereafter by this Court
As a result, the Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of possession of the lot and
the apartment building.
the trial court... ruled that the Spouses Nuguid were to reimburse Pecson for his
construction cost... following which, the spouses Nuguid were... entitled to
immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the lot and improvements.
In the same order the RTC also directed Pecson to pay the same amount of
monthly rentals to the Nuguids as paid by the tenants occupying the apartment
units
Aggrieved, Pecson then filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition...
with the Court of Appeals.
the appellate court... affirmed the order of payment of construction costs but
rendered the issue of possession moot on appeal
Frustrated by this turn of events, Pecson filed a petition for review... the Court
handed down the decision... the decision of the Court of Appeals... and the
Order... of the Regional Trial Court,... are hereby SET ASIDE.
On the basis of this Court's decision
Pecson filed a Motion to Restore Possession and a Motion to Render Accounting,
praying respectively for restoration of his possession... and for the spouses
Nuguid to be... directed to render an accounting under oath, of the income
derived from the subject four-door apartment... until possession of the same was
restored to him.
the RTC denied the Motion to Restore Possession to the plaintiff averring that the
current market value of the building should first be determined.
Pending the said determination, the resolution of the Motion for
Accounting was likewise held in abeyance.
With the submission of the parties' assessment and the reports of the subject
realty... the trial court issued the following Order... the parties manifested that
they have arrived at a compromise agreement that the value of the said
improvement/building is P400,000.00 The Court notes that the plaintiff has
already received P300,000.00. However, when defendant was ready to pay... the
balance of P100,000.00, the plaintiff now insists that there should be a rental to
be paid by defendants.
defendants are directed to pay plaintiff the balance of P100,000.00.
after paying the said P100,000 balance to Pedro Pecson the spouses Nuguid
prayed for the closure and termination of the case, as well as the cancellation of
the notice of lis pendens on the title of the property on the ground that Pedro
Pecson's claim... for rentals was devoid of factual and legal bases.
After conducting a hearing, the lower court issued an Order... directing the
spouses to pay the sum of P1,344,000 as reimbursement of the unrealized income
of Pecson
The Nuguid couple then appealed the trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals
In the Court of Appeals, the order appealed from... was modified.
The CA reduced the rentals from P1,344,000 to P280,000 in favor of the appellee.
[19] The said amount represents accrued rentals from the determination of the
current... market value
Issues:
PETITIONERS LIABLE TO PAY RENT OVER AND ABOVE THE CURRENT MARKET
VALUE OF THE IMPROVEMENT
Ruling:
the construction of the four-door two-storey apartment, subject of this dispute,
was undertaken at the time when Pecson was still the owner of the lot.
When the Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the lot... by virtue of entry
of... judgment of the Court's decision... the apartment building was already in
existence and occupied by tenants.
the Court declared the rights and obligations of the litigants in accordance... with
Articles 448    and 546 of the Civil Code. These provisions of the Code are directly
applicable to the instant case.
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to
sell the land to the possessor in good faith.
Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is... entitled to full
reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives
him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.
The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for
the protection of builders in good faith.
Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual
possessor to remain in possession while he... has not been reimbursed... for those
necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing
possessed.
Accordingly, a builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay... rentals during
the period of retention[25] nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to
vacate.
In addition, as in this case, the owner of the land is prohibited from offsetting or
compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the fruits... received by the
builder-possessor in good faith.
since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves... they
could not benefit from the lot's... improvement, until they reimbursed the
improver in full, based on the current market value of the property.
Despite the Court's recognition of Pecson's right of ownership over the apartment
building, the petitioners still insisted on dispossessing Pecson by filing for a Writ
of Possession to cover both the lot and the building.
Clearly, this resulted in a violation of respondent's... right of retention.
Worse, petitioners took advantage of the situation to benefit from the highly
valued, income-yielding, four-unit apartment building by collecting rentals
thereon, before they paid for the cost of the apartment building.
The text of the decision in G.R. No. 115814 expressly exempted Pecson from
liability to pay rentals, for we found that the Court of Appeals erred not only in
upholding the trial court's determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering
him to account for the rentals of the... apartment building
The right of retention, which entitles the builder in good faith to the possession as
well as the income derived therefrom, is already provided for under Article 546 of
the Civil Code
Given the circumstances of the instant case where the builder in good faith has
been clearly denied his right of retention for almost half a decade, we find that
the increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable and equitable.
The petitioners had reaped all the benefits... from the improvement introduced
by the respondent during said period, without paying any amount to the latter as
reimbursement for his construction costs and expenses. They should account and
pay for such benefits.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Principles:
CASE BRIEF, CIVIL LAW, LEGAL MAXIMS, PRINCIPLES, DOCTRINES, PROPERTY,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Leviste Management System vs. Legaspi Towers 200 (2018)
Posted on 2021-01-18
LEVISTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC., petitioner, v. LEGASPI TOWERS 200, INC.,
and VIVIAN Y. LOCSIN and PITONG MARCORDE, respondents.
G.R. No. 199353 | April 4, 2018 | First Division | Justice Leonardo-De Castro
Civil Law | Property | Ownership | Rules on Accession
Statutory Construction | Latin Maxims | Legal Maxims, Principles and Doctrines
The Civil Code provisions on builders in good faith presuppose that the owner of
the land and the builder are two distinct persons who are not bound either by
specific legislation on the subject property or by contract. Properties recorded in
accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4726 (otherwise known as the
Condominium Act) are governed by said Act; while the Master Deed and the By
Laws of the condominium corporation establish the contractual relations between
said condominium corporation and the unit owners.

Generalia specialibus non derogant

Between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails.

FACTS:
Legaspi Towers is a condominium building located at Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
It consists of seven (7) floors, with a unit on the roof deck and two levels above
said unit called Concession 2 and Concession 3. The use and occupancy of the
condominium building is governed by the Master Deed with Declaration of
Restrictions of Legaspi Towers (hereafter “Master Deed”) annotated on the
transfer certificate of title of the developer, Legaspi Towers Development
Corporation.
Concession 3 was originally owned by Leon Antonio Mercado. On 9 March 1989,
Lemans, through Mr. Conrad Leviste, bought Concession 3 from Mercado.

Sometime in 1989, Lemans decided to build another unit (hereafter “Concession

4”) on the roof deck of Concession 3. Lemans was able to secure the building
permit for the construction of Concession 4 and commenced the construction
thereof on October 1990. Despite Legaspi Corporation’s notice that the
construction of Concession 4 was illegal, Lemans refused to stop its construction.
Lemans filed the Complaint with the RTC, praying among others that a writ of
mandatory injunction be issued to allow the completion of the construction of
Concession 4.

The RTC found the application of Article 448 of the Civil Code and the ruling in the
Depra vs. Dumlao to be proper. It ordered defendant Legaspi Towers 200, Inc. to
exercise its option to appropriate the additional structure constructed on top of
the penthouse owned by plaintiff Leviste Management Systems, Inc. within sixty
[60] days from the time the Decision becomes final and executory. Should
defendant Legaspi Towers 200, Inc. choose not to appropriate the additional
structure after proper indemnity, the parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the Court shall fix the terms thereof.

On May 26, 2011, the Court of Appeals, acting on the consolidated appeals of
LEMANS and Legaspi Towers, rendered its Decision affirming the decision of the
RTC of Makati City.

ISSUE:
Whether Article 448 and 546 of the Civil Code and are applicable to the parties’
situation.

RULING:
We are constrained to deny the Petition of LEMANS in view of our ruling that the
doctrine in Depra and Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code were improperly
applied in these cases.

Firstly, it is recognized in jurisprudence that, as a general rule, Article 448 on

builders in good faith does not apply where there is a contractual relation
between the parties.
Morever, in several cases, this Court has explained that the raison d’etre for
Article 448 of the Civil Code is to prevent the impracticability of creating a state of
forced co-ownership:

The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder,
planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements
without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability
of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by
giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for
the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either
option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option,
because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled
to the ownership of the accessory thing.

In the case at bar, however, the land belongs to a condominium corporation,

wherein the builder, as a unit owner, is considered a stockholder or member in
accordance with Section 10 of the Condominium Act, The builder is therefore
already in a co-ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders of
the condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is governed by a special
law, the Condominium Act.

It is a basic tenet in statutory construction that between a general law and a

special law, the special law prevails. Generalia specialibus non derogant. The
provisions of the Civil Code, a general law, should therefore give way to the
Condominium Act, a special law, with regard to properties recorded in accordance
with Section 4 of said Act. Special laws cover distinct situations, such as the
necessary co-ownership between unit owners in condominiums and the need to
preserve the structural integrity of condominium buildings; and these special
situations deserve, for practicality, a separate set of rules.
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are therefore
inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the
land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the subject
property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed and the By-
Laws of the condominium corporation). This Court has ruled that upon acquisition
of a condominium unit, the purchaser not only affixes his conformity to the sale;
he also binds himself to a contract with other unit owners.

In accordance therefore with the Master Deed, the By-Laws of Legaspi Towers,
and the Condominium Act, the relevant provisions of which were already set forth
above, Legaspi Towers is correct that it has the right to demolish Concession 4 at
the expense of LEMANS. Indeed, the application of Article 448 to the present
situation is highly iniquitous, in that an owner, also found to be in good faith, will
be forced to either appropriate the illegal structure (and impliedly be burdened
with the cost of its demolition) or to allow the continuance of such an illegal
structure that violates the law and the Master Deed, and threatens the structural
integrity of the condominium building upon the payment of rent. The Court
cannot countenance such an unjust result from an erroneous application of the
law and jurisprudence.
LEVISTAE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC., Petitioner vs. LEGASPI TOWERS 200, INC.,
and VIVAN Y. LOCSIN and PITONG MARCORDE, Respondents x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - x ENGR. NELSON Q. IRASGA, in his capacity as Municipal Building
Official of Makati, Metro Manila and HON. JOSE P. DE JESUS, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Dept. (G.R. No. 199353, FIRST DIVISION, APRIL 4, 2018,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) In the case at bar, however, the land belongs to a
condominium corporation, wherein the builder, as a unit owner, is already in a co-
ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the
condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is governed by a special law,
the Condominium Act. Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good
faith are therefore inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where
the owner of the land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on
the subject property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed
and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation).

FACTS:
Legaspi Towers is a condominium building located at Paseo de Roxas, Makati
City. Lemans bought Concession 3 and decided to build another unit ("Concession
4") on the roof deck of Concession 3. Despite Legaspi Corporation's notice that
the construction of Concession 4 was illegal, Lemans refused to stop its
construction. When Legaspi Corporation forbade the entry of Lemans'
construction materials to be used in Concession 4 in the condominium, Lemans
filed a Complaint with the RTC, praying that a writ of mandatory injunction be
issued to allow the completion of the construction of Concession 4. RTC issued
the writ prayed for by Lemans. RTC, in its Order, then found the application of
Article 448 of the Civil Code and the ruling in the Depra vs. Dumlao to be proper.
Afterwards, RTC rendered the Assailed Decision, ordering Legaspi Towers to
exercise its option to appropriate the additional structure constructed on top of
the penthouse within sixty [60] days from the time the Decision becomes final
and executory. Should defendant Legaspi Towers 200, Inc. choose not to
appropriate after proper indemnity, the parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the Court shall fix the terms thereof. When the
case was elevated, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC of Makati City. CA held
that while Concession 4 is indeed a nuisance, Lemans has been declared a builder
in good faith, and noted that Legaspi Towers failed to contest this declaration.
Since Concession 4 was built in good faith, it cannot be demolished. Hence,
LEMANS and Legaspi Towers filed separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari with
the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether Article 448 of the Civil Code and the Court’s ruling in Depra v. Dumlao
are applicable to the parties' situation?
(NO) RULING: Significantly, the parties are no longer questioning the past rulings
regarding Legaspi Towers' ownership of the air space above Concession 3 which is
the air space above the condominium building itself. The ruling of this Court in
Depra v. Dumlao extensively cited by both parties pertains to the application of
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. Art. 448. The owner of the land on which
anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the
building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. Art.
546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed
therefor. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith
with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of
paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason
thereof.
Firstly, it is recognized in jurisprudence that, as a general rule, Article 448 on
builders in good faith does not apply where there is a contractual relation
between the parties. Morever, in several cases, the Court has explained that the
raison d'etre for Article 448 of the Civil Code is to prevent the impracticability of
creating a state of forced co-ownership. In accord with the principle of accession,
the landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the
owner of the building to remove it from the land. In the case at bar, however, the
land belongs to a condominium corporation, wherein the builder, as a unit owner,
is already in a co-ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders
of the condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is governed by a
special law, the Condominium Act. Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on
builders in good faith are therefore inapplicable in cases covered by the
Condominium Act where the owner of the land and the builder are already bound
by specific legislation on the subject property (the Condominium Act), and by
contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation). In
accordance therefore with the Master Deed, the By-Laws of Legaspi Towers, and
the Condominium Act, Legaspi Towers is correct that it has the right to demolish
Concession 4 at the expense of Lemans. Indeed, the application of Article 448 to
the present situation is highly iniquitous, in that an owner, also found to be in
good faith, will be forced to either appropriate the illegal structure and impliedly
be burdened with the cost of its demolition) or to allow the continuance of such
an illegal structure that violates the law and the Master Deed, and threatens the
structural integrity of the condominium building upon the payment of rent. The
Court cannot countenance such an unjust result from an erroneous application of
the law and jurisprudence.

G.R. No. 187696, June 15, 2016 - FILOMENA CABLING, Petitioner, v. RODRIGO
DANGCALAN, Respondent.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 187696, June 15, 2016

FILOMENA CABLING, Petitioner, v. RODRIGO DANGCALAN, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 declaring void for lack jurisdiction the Decision2 issued by
the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Malitbog-Tomas Oppus, Southern
Leyte, as well as the Decision3 rendered by Branch 25, Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.

Antecedent Facts

This case stemmed from the Complaint for recovery of possession and damages
filed by Filomena Cabling (petitioner) against Rodrigo Dangcalan (respondent)
over respondent's alleged encroachment on petitioner's property.

In her Complaint,4 petitioner alleged that she owned a 125-square-meter parcel

of land located at San Vicente, Malitbog, Southern Leyte. It was denominated as
Lot No. 5056 and had an assessed value of P2,100. Adjoining her property was a
parcel of land that respondent had bought from her brother, Gerardo Montajes.
Despite knowing the boundaries of their respective properties, however,
respondent constructed a perimeter fence that encroached on petitioner's land.
After several unheeded demands for respondent to remove the encroachment
and a failed conference before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, petitioner filed the
Complaint before the MCTC in May 2001.5chanrobleslaw

Respondent denied any encroachment on petitioner's property and raised

prescription as an affirmative defense.6 He claimed that he had constructed the
perimeter fence together with his house way back in 1987, and that petitioner
knew about it. She had actually observed some phases of the construction to
ensure that it would not exceed their property boundaries. Yet, petitioner filed
her Complaint only in 2001, which was beyond the 10-year period for acquisitive
prescription under Article 1134 of the New Civil Code.7chanrobleslaw

Rulings of the MCTC and the RTC

After trial, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. Relying on the
sketch plan and the testimony of the court-appointed commissioner, it ruled that
respondent's perimeter fence had indeed encroached on some 13 square meters
of petitioner's property. The court further ruled that respondent was a builder in
bad faith, because he did not verify the actual boundaries of the lot that he had
purchased from petitioner's brother. Respondent had the lot titled under his
name in 1988, but it was surveyed only in August 2001.8chanrobleslaw

The dispositive portion of the MCTC Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant of the following to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Surrendering the defendant's possession of the portion of land in question to
plaintiff, the true owner of the portion of land, and as defendant is a builder in
bad faith loses what was built on said portion without right to indemnity. (Art.
448, Civil Code of the Philippines);

To pay the plaintiff of the monthly rental at P50.00 per month for the possession
of said portion in question starting from the time the defendant demanded by the
plaintiff to vacate up to the time the former actually vacate; and cralawlawlibrary

To pay the plaintiff for moral damages in the amount of P20,000, exemplary
damages in the amount of P10,000 and actual damages in the amount of
P2,000.00 and

To pay the costs of suit.9

Upon appeal by respondent, however, the RTC ruled differently. Unlike the MCTC,
it did not give credence to the commissioner's sketch plan. The RTC noted that
the sketch plan had no accompanying Commissioner's Report, and that the basis
of the survey was not clear. It also ruled that the MCTC should have first ruled on
the issue of prescription because respondent had raised it in a timely manner,
albeit via an Amended Answer.10chanrobleslaw

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the decision of the lower
court declaring:
That the action has already prescribed and/or that plaintiff was already in laches
when this action was filed in 1990, and defendant has already acquired the
portion in litigation by prescription;

That when defendant built the concrete perimeter fence on the lot in litigation in
August 1987, he was a builder in good faith;

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.11

CA Ruling

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 before the CA,12 raising
the following issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE

PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND EXTINCTIVE
PRESCRIPTION.

II
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINT OF THE
PETITIONER IS BARRED BY LACHES.

III

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS A

BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 24 January 2008, the CA denied the Petition and annulled both the RTC and
MCTC Decisions for lack of jurisdiction.14 Instead of ruling on the issues
presented by petitioner, the appellate court held that the threshold question was
whether the MCTC had jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. After examining
the averments therein, the CA ruled that the MCTC had no jurisdiction because
the Complaint was clearly an accion publiciana. As such, it was a plenary action
for the recovery of the real right of possession, which properly fell under the
RTC's jurisdiction. Accordingly, all proceedings in petitioner's Complaint, including
her appeal before the RTC, were invalid and the decisions rendered thereon could
be struck down at any time.15chanrobleslaw

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Malitbog-Tomas Oppus, Southern Leyte dated June 2, 2004
and the January 17. 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region,
Branch 25, Maasin City reversing the Decision of the MCTC are BOTH declared
NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction, and the instant Complaint for recovery of
possession with damages is DISMISSED without
prejudice.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 1 April 2009, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.17 Hence,
this Petition.
Issue

The only legal issue We shall resolve is whether the CA erred in f nullifying the
RTC and the MCTC Decisions on the ground that the MCTC had no jurisdiction
over petitioner's Complaint for accion publiciana.

Court Ruling

We GRANT the petition.

It is no longer good law that all cases for recovery of possession or accion
publiciana lie with the RTC, regardless of the value of the
property.18chanrobleslaw

As early as 2001, this Court had already declared that all cases involving title to or
possession of real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000, if outside
Metro Manila, fall under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.19
This pronouncement was based on Republic Act No. 7691,20 which was approved
by Congress on 25 March 1994.

Jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or

interest therein, as set forth in Sections 19 (2) and 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129,21 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, is as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
(2)
In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
[t]wenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(3)
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed [t]wenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
In Laresma v. Abellana,22 We clarified that the actions envisaged in the
aforequoted provisions are accion publiciana and reivindicatoria. To determine
which court has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint. The Court explained
further in Penta Pacific Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development
Corporation23 that its jurisdiction would now be determined by the assessed
value of the disputed land, or of the adjacent lots if it is not declared for taxation
purposes. If the assessed value is not alleged in the complaint, the action should
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The reason behind this rule is that the trial
court is not afforded the means of determining from the allegations of the basic
pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pertains to it
or to another court. After all, courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or
market value of lands.24chanrobleslaw

Clearly, the CA erred in nullifying both the RTC and the MCTC decisions.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined
by the allegations in the complaint, as well as by the character of the reliefs
sought. Once it is vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction remains
vested in the trial court irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.25cralawred As the CA
has correctly held, the allegations in the Complaint filed by petitioner sufficiently
made out a case for recovery of possession or accion publiciana. The same cannot
be said, however, of the ultimate outcome of her appeal from the RTC Decision.
The MCTC correctly exercised its exclusive and original jurisdiction in finding for
petitioner as the plaintiff. On the other hand, the appeal of respondent, as the
defendant, properly fell under the appellate jurisdiction of the RTC, under Section
22 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended. Hence, neither decision can be struck down for
being a total nullity.

Petitioner now argues that the CA's dismissal of her Complaint without prejudice
to the filing of another case before the RTC, would only force her to re-litigate the
same issues that the MCTC has already thoroughly considered. Additionally, she
contends that the RTC Decision was not in accord with the applicable provisions
of the New Civil Code. She claims that respondent cannot be deemed a builder in
good faith, because he failed to verify the actual boundaries of his property prior
to the construction of his perimeter fence. Further, neither prescription nor
laches applies, because petitioner filed her Complaint in 2001, which was well
within the 30-year prescriptive period set forth in Article 1141 of the New Civil
Code for real actions over immovables.26 For these reasons, she urges us to
reinstate the MCTC Decision.27chanrobleslaw

Respondent, on the other hand, has not filed any comment despite Our repeated
directives to his counsel on record.28chanrobleslaw

Suffice it to say that the errors ascribed by petitioner to the RTC Decision are
factual issues that properly belong to the jurisdiction of the CA. The test of
whether a question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. If so, it
is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.29chanrobleslaw

Good faith is a question of fact that must be proved.30 Similarly, the question of
prescription of an action involves the ascertainment of factual matters, such as
the date when the period to bring the action commenced to run.31chanrobleslaw

We resolve only questions of law; We do not try facts or examine testimonial or

documentary evidence on record.32 We may have at times opted for the
relaxation of the application of procedural rules, but We have resorted to this
option only under exceptional circumstances, such as when: (a) the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) in making its findings, the CA went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (g) the CA's findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (h) the findings are conclusions without a citation of the specific evidence
on which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; (j) the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; or (k) the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.33chanrobleslaw

None of the above circumstances, however, are extant in this case. The simple
reason is that the CA opted to gloss over the factual issues raised by petitioner on
the wrong premise that the decisions of the trial courts were void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is

GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 24 January 2008 and Resolution
dated 1 April 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88408 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for the prompt resolution of the case on
the merits.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 19-30; dated 24 January 2008, penned by Associate Justice Francisco
P. Acosta with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
concurring.

2 Id. at 79-85; dated 2 June 2004, penned by Judge Sulpicio D. Cunanan.

3 Id. at 109-120; dated 17 January 2005, penned by Judge Romeo M. Gomez.

4 Id. at 52-60.
5 Id.

6 Id. at 75.

7 Id. at 74-76.

8 Supra note 2.

9 Id. at 84-85.

10 Supra note 3.

11 Id. at 119-120.

12 Id. at 37-56.

13 Id. at 42.

14 Supra note 1.

15 Id. at 29.

16 Id. at 30.
17 Id. at 167-170.

18Penta Pacific Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development

Corporation, G.R. No. 161589, 24 November 2014, 741 SCRA 426, 438; Spouses
Cruz v. Spouses Cruz, 616 Phil. 519, 526 (2009), citing Quinagoran v. Court of
Appeals, 557 Phil. 650, 657 (2007).

19Aliabo v. Carampatan, 407 Phil. 31, 36 (2001).

20 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal

Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas
Pambuma Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980."

21 Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

22 424 Phil. 766, 782 (2004).

23 Supra note 18, at 439.

24Hilario v. Salvador, 497 Phil. 327, 336 (2005), citing Ouano v. PGTT International
Investment Corporation, 434 Phil. 28-37 (2002).

25cralawred De Vera v. Spouses Santiago, G.R. No. 179457, 22 June 2015; Hilario
v. Salvador, supra.
26 Supra note 1, at 9-13.

27 Id. at 14.

28 Id. at 177. In a Resolution dated 5 September 2011, we deemed as waived the

filing of respondent's Comment on the Petition.

29Crisostomo v. Garcia Jr., 516 Phil. 743, 749 (2006).

30Civil Service Commission v. Mania, 504 Phil. 646, 653 (2005); Cabrera v. Tiano,
118 Phil. 558, 562 (1960).

31Cabrera v. Tiano, id.

32 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Section 1.

33 De Vera v. Spouses Santiago, supra note 25.

PABLO M. PADILLA v. LEOPOLDO MALICSI, GR No. 201354, 2016-09-21

Facts:

Spouses Padilla bought a parcel of land in Magsaysay Norte, Cabanatuan City in

1984.
Spouses Padilla bought a parcel of land in Magsaysay Norte, Cabanatuan City in
1984

Sometime in 1998, Spouses Padilla discovered that Leopoldo Malicsi, Lito Casino,
and Agrifino Guanes (Malicsi, et al.) constructed houses on their lot.

Spouses Padilla made repeated verbal and written demands for Malicsi, et al. to
vacate the premises and pay a monthly rental of P2,000.00, but Malicsi, et al.
refused to heed Spouses Padilla's demands.

On August 6, 2007, Spouses Padilla filed a complaint for recovery of possession

against Malicsi, et al., along with three (3) others: Larry Marcelo, Diosdado dela
Cruz, and Rolando Pascua.

Malicsi, et al. alleged that they believed in all honesty and good faith that the lot
belonged to Toribia Vda. De Mossessgeld (De Mossessgeld).[11] They claimed
that they possessed the land and built their houses on the lot only after receiving
De Mossessgeld's permission.

Malicsi, et al. also claimed that they and De Mossessgeld agreed that she would
sell them the areas occupied by their houses, provided that pending full payment,
they would pay her P40.00 per month as rent.

In the Decision[22] dated July 15, 2009, the Regional Trial Court ruled that Malicsi,
et al. cannot be considered as builders in good faith.[23] The dispositive of the
Regional Trial Court Decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the [Spouses Padilla] and against [Malicsi, et al.]
ordering the latter:To vacate the property covered by TCT-T-45565 of the Registry
of Deeds of Cabanatuan City and surrender possession of the same to [Spouses
Padilla];To pay [Spouses Padilla] jointly and severally attorney's fees in the
amount of P20,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00.SO
ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis in the original)... they point out that respondents
Leopoldo Malicsi, Lito Casino, and Agrifino Guanes failed to substantiate their
claim of being builders in good faith:

A builder in good faith is a builder who was not aware of a defect or flaw in his or
her title when he or she introduced improvements on a lot that turns out to be
owned by another

Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only
the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed
therefor.

Respondents claim to be builders in good faith because they believed that the lot
was owned by De Mossessgeld.[52] Operating under this belief, they entered into
an agreement with her where she would sell them the areas occupied by their
respective houses, and pending full payment, they would each pay her P40.00
monthly as rent.

Regional Trial Court was not swayed by respondents' assertion of being builders in
good faith since it found that the property was titled, as early as 1963, to
petitioner Pablo M. Padilla, Jr.'s mother, while respondents only entered the lot
sometime between 1980 and 1983, thus:

Issues:

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether respondents are builders in
good faith.
n built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or
that the planting or sowing be removed, in order t

Ruling:

recoup - reimburse or compensate (someone) for money spent or lost.

Under Article 452[67] of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup
the necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of the land. However,
respondents neither alleged nor presented evidence to show that they introduced
improvements for the preservation of the land.
Rules on property rights when a person builds a house on land owned by
someone else.
What does the law provide about ownership of a parcel of land and of the
improvements thereon?

Under the Civil Code, the owner of a property has the right by accession to
everything which is incorporated or attached thereto either naturally or
artificially.[1]

However, there may be instances when the landowner is different from the one
who built an improvement, say a building, on the land. Hence, the Civil Code[2]
provides that whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the
improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject
to the provisions of the succeeding articles.

What are the rights of the landowner and the builder?

In determining the rights of a landowner and a builder, we must determine first

whether they are in good faith or bad faith.

What constitutes good faith and bad faith?

The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.[3]

On the other hand, the Supreme Court (SC) said in Spouses Espinoza v. Spouses
Mayandoc[4] that bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.
It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong. It means breach of a known duty through some motive, interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud.

What then are the different scenarios and the respective rights of the landowner
and the builder?

A. Both in good faith

Art. 448 of the Civil Code applies when both the landowner and the builder are in
good faith.

With respect to the landowner in good faith, he has the right to:

1. Appropriate as his own the building after payment of the indemnity required by
law[5]; or

2. Oblige the builder to pay the price of the land.

The SC emphasized that the choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that
accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot
refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to
remove it from the land.[6]

The SC further said in Spouses Espinoza v. Spouses Mayandoc[7] that, “the raison
d'etre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or
sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and
it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing
injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a
state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the
owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the
proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the
sower the proper rent."

On the other hand, a builder in good faith is entitled to retain the possession of
the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 546.[8] The term
"builder in good faith" as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers
to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land, believing
himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of
acquisition.[9]

B. Both in bad faith

Under Art. 453, if both the landowner and the builder are in bad faith, the rights
of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith,
therefore, the above scenario will be applied.

There is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with
his knowledge and without opposition on his part.[10]

C. Landowner in good faith; builder in bad faith

Padilla v. Malicsi[11] summarized the rights of the landowner, to wit:

Based on these provisions [referring to Arts. 449-451 of the Civil Code], the owner
of the land has three alternative rights:

(1) to appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity
therefor, or
(2) to demand that the builder remove what he had built, or

(3) to compel the-builder to pay the value of the land. In any case, the landowner
is entitled to damages under Article 451.

On the other hand, the builder in bad faith may recover necessary expenses for
the preservation of the land but without any right of retention.[12]

D. Landowner in bad faith; builder in good faith

Under the Civil Code[13], the landowner in bad faith shall pay the value of what
was built and he shall be obliged to the reparation of damages.

On the other hand, the builder in good faith may remove what he built in any
event with a right to be indemnified for damages.
[1] Article 440.
[2] Art. 445.

[3] Delos Santos v. Abejon, G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017.
[4] G.R. No. 211170, July 3, 2017.
[5] See Arts. 546 and 548, Civil Code.
[6] Padilla v. Malicsi, G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016.
[7] Supra, note 4.
[8] Supra, note 6.
[9] Spouses Aquino v. Spouses Aguilar, G.R. No. 182754, June 29, 2015.
[10] Art. 453, paragraph 2, Civil Code.
[11] Supra, note 6.

[12] Art. 452 in relation to Art. 546, Civil Code.

[13] Art. 454, in relation to Art. 447, Civil Code.
G.R. No. 201354

September 21, 2016

PABLO M. PADILLA, JR. AND MARIA LUISA P. PADILLA, Petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO
MALICSI, LITO CASINO, AND AGRIFINO GUANES, Respondents. FACTS: Spouses
Padilla, the petitioners, bought a parcel of land with an area of 150 square meters
and had an assessed value of more than Php20, 000.00 in Magsaysay Norte,
Cabanatuan City in 1984. Sometime in 1998, Spouses Padilla discovered that
Leopoldo Malicsi, Lito Casino, and Agrifino Guanes (Malicsi, et al.), the
respondents, constructed houses on their lot. Spouses Padilla made repeated
verbal and written demands for Malicsi, et al. to vacate the premises and pay a
monthly rental of P2,000.00, but Malicsi, et al. refused to comply with the
former’s demands. So, the matter was referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay.
However, no settlement among the parties happened. On August 6, 2007,
Spouses Padilla filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Malicsi, et al.,
along with three (3) others: Larry Marcelo, Diosdado dela Cruz, and Rolando
Pascua. In the Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim of Malicsi, et al., they
alleged that they believed in all honesty and good faith that the lot belonged to
Toribia Vda. De Mossessgeld for she agreed that she would sell them the areas
occupied by their houses, provided that pending full payment, they would pay her
P40.00 per month as rent. Between 1980 and 1983, the respondents constructed
their respective houses on the lot in the belief that they would eventually own the
areas they were occupying. Malicsi and Casino even introduced improvements to
the houses they had built. Spouses Padilla, exercising their option to sell the land
to Malicsi, et al. under Article 448 of the Civil Code in the amount of P5,000.00
per square meter, filed a Motion and Manifestation with Offer to Sell which was
declined by the respondents. The Regional Trial Court ruled that Malicsi, et al.
cannot be considered as builders in good faith. They ordered the latter to vacate
the premises, surrender the possession of the land to the petitioners and pay
jointly and severally the attorney’s fees. Malicsi, et al. appealed to the Court of
Appeals which reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision. Then Spouses
Padilla elevated the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Malicsi et
al. are builders in good faith. RULING: No, Malicsi et al. are not builders in good
faith. A builder in good faith is a builder who was not aware of a defect or flaw in
his or her title when he or she introduced improvements on a lot that turns out to
be owned by another. In this case, the respondents assert that they believed De
Mossessgeld when she told them that the lot belonged to her. Yet, the records
show that De Mossessgeld was a complete stranger to them. The lack of blood
relation should have been enough to put respondents on guard and convince
them not to rely on her claim of ownership. If they had looked into the ownership
of the lot, they would have easily discovered that it was titled to petitioner Pablo
M. Padilla, Jr.'s mother as early as 1963. Moreover, the burden of proving the
status of a purchaser in good faith lies on Malicsi et al. since they are the ones
who are asserting that status. It is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption
of good faith because everyone is presumed to act in good faith. The
respondents, as the party asserting the status of builder in good faith, must
substantiate their claim through preponderance of evidence. However, aside
from this naked and self-serving testimony, they failed to present any evidence to
bolster their claim and to adduce evidence that they entered into an agreement
to sell with De Mossessgeld, or that they paid her

P40.00 per month as rent, pending full payment of the areas they were
occupying. Aside from that, respondents neither presented De Mossessgeld
herself nor submitted proof on which she might have based her purported
ownership of the lot. If De Mossessgeld proved elusive, respondents could then
have presented statements from disinterested third parties who could testify that
it was so well-known in the community that De Mossessgeld owned the lot that
they had to believe her claim of ownership. Respondents also failed to prove that
they exercised the necessary diligence required by their situation. They did not
examine the tax declarations or the title to the property before they built on it.
Failing to substantiate their claim, respondents cannot be considered as builders
in good faith. Therefore, the benefits and rights provided under Article 448 of the
Civil Code, which gives a builder in good faith the right to compel the landowner
to choose either to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by
law; or to sell the land to the builder, do not apply. As builders in bad faith,
respondents have no right to recover their expenses over the improvements they
have introduced to petitioners' lot under Article 449 of the Civil Code and are also
not entitled to recoup the necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of the
land sine they neither alleged nor presented evidence to show that they
introduced improvements for the preservation of the land. Therefore, petitioners
as landowners became the owners of the improvements on the lot, including the
residential buildings constructed by respondents, if they chose to appropriate the
accessions. However, they could instead choose the demolition of the
improvements at respondents' expense or compel respondents to pay the price of
the land under Article 450 of the Civil Code. Considering that petitioners pray for
the reinstatement of the Regional Trial Court Decision ordering respondents to
vacate the lot and surrender its possession to them, petitioners are deemed to
have chosen to appropriate the improvements built on their lot without any
obligation to pay indemnity to respondents.
Tan Queto v. CA [G.R. No. L-35648. February 27, 1987.]; Resolution
Posted by LADY ESQUIRE on JULY 5, 2012

En Banc, Paras (J): 10 concur, 1 votes to deny reconsideration, 1 dissents, 2 took

no part

Facts: Restituta Tagalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot (Lot
304-B of the Cadastre Survey of the Municipality of Centro, Misamis Occidental)
either as a purported donation or by way of purchase on 11 February 1927 for
P50.00 as the alleged consideration thereof. The transaction took place during her
mother’s lifetime (her father having predeceased the mother) and consummated
while Restituta was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena. On 22
January 1935, Juan filed an application of Torrens title over the land for himself
and his supposed co-owner Restituta. On 22 November 1938, a decision was
promulgated (GLRC 1638, Cadastral Case 12) pronouncing Juan (married to
Restituto) as the owner of the land. On 22 September 1949 a contract of lease
over the lot was entered into between Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta (with
the consent of her husband) for a period of 10 years.

Meanwhile, On 27 December 1960 Restituta sued Tan Queto for unlawful

detainer (the lease contract having expired) before the Municipal Court of Ozamis
City.

On 22 April 1962, as a consequence of the cadastral case, an OCT was issued in

Juan’s name. On 10 October 1962, Tan Queto and Juan entered into a barter
agreement whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the disputed lot, and the
spouses in turn became the owners of a parcel of land with the house constructed
thereon previously owned (that is, before the barter) by Tan Queto. Thereafter,
Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a concrete building, without any
objection on the part of Restituta.

The Municipal court ruled in favor of the spouses in the unlawful detainer case;
but on appeal in the CFI, the entire case was dismissed because of an
understanding (barter) entered into by Juan and Tan Queto.

Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the
registered but disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the
land with damages. The CFI and the Court of Appeals found the disputed lot as
paraphernal and that Tan Queto was a builder in bad faith. These findings were
regarded by the Supreme Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive
upon the Court. Tan Queto filed for a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme
Court decision dated 16 May 1983.

The Supreme Court set aside its decision promulgated on 16 May 1983, and
rendered a new one declaring the questioned lot together with the building
thereon, as Tan Queto’s exclusive property; without costs.

1. Findings of the lower courts ordinary conclusive upon the Court; exception, if
erroneous

The findings of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals were regarded
by the Supreme Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive upon the
Court. Assuming they are factual findings, still if they are erroneous inferences
from certain facts, they cannot bind the Court.

2. Land not transferred to Restituta by donation, for it to be paraphernal

The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation inter-vivos because it was
not executed in a public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation
mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with. The allegation
that the transfer was a conveyance to Restituta of her hereditary share in the
estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual
transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited.

3. Land is conjugal, not paraphernal; Ownership by tradition

The land is conjugal, not paraphernal. Ownership was acquired by the spouses by
tradition (delivery) as a consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil
Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of
the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the
spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal, there
being no proof that Restituta had paraphernal funds of her own).

4. Sale not fictitious nor simulated; Allegation of simulation cannot prejudice a

stranger

The sale cannot be said to be fictitious or simulated (and therefore void) as there
was a valid consideration therefor. Assuming that there had indeed been a
simulation, the parties thereto cannot use said simulation to prejudice a stranger
to said strategem (like petitioner herein).

5. Tan Queto recognized Restituta as an owner, not the owner

Tan Queto admitted Restituta was “an owner” (not the owner) of the lot in his
Answer, and this is true, for she was a co-owner (with Juan, and therefore “an
owner.”) There is no admission of Restituta’s exclusive ownership.

6. Assuming Tan Queto recognized Restituta as the owner; bad faith of one
neutralizes the bad faith of the other

Even assuming that despite registration of the lot as conjugal, Tan Queto nursed
the belief that the lot was actually Restituta’s (making him in bad faith), still
Restituta’s failure to prohibit him from building despite her knowledge that
construction was actually being done, makes her also in bad faith. The net
resultant of mutual bad faith would entitle Tan Qyeto to the rights of a builder in
good faith (Art. 448, Civil Code), ergo, reimbursement should be given him if
Restituta decides to appropriate the building for herself (Art. 448, Civil Code).

7. Tan Queto an owner-possessor

Tan Queto having bartered his own lot and small house with the questioned lot
with Juan (who has been adverted to by a court decision and by the OCT a
conjugal owner) may be said to be the owner-possessor of the lot. Certainly he is
not merely a possessor or builder in good faith (this phrase presupposes
ownership in another); much less is he a builder in bad faith. He is a builder-
possessor (jus possidendi) because he is the owner himself.

8. Jus possessionis, jus possidendi; good faith and bad faith

The Chapter on Possession (jus possessionis, not jus possidendi) in the Civil Code
refers to a possessor other than the owner. The difference between a builder (or
possessor) in good faith and one in bad faith is that the former is not aware of the
defect or flaw in his title or mode of acquisition while the latter is aware of such
defect or flaw (Art. 526, Civil Code). But in either case there is a flaw or defect. In
the present case, there is no such flaw or defect because it is Tan Queto himself
(not somebody else) who is the owner of the property.

(taken from other source)

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by its Regional Director, vs. DELFINA
C. CASIBANG, ANGELINA C. CANAPI, ERLINDA C. BAJAN, LORNA G. GUMABAY,
DIONISIA C. ALONZO, MARIA C. BANGA YAN and DIGNA C. BINAYUG, G.R. No.
192268 TOPIC: Rules Regarding Builder in Good Faith FACTS: Respondents are the
heirs of late Juan Cepeda, the registered owner of the property in controversy. It
is alleged that sometime in 1965, upon the request of the then Mayor Justo Cesar
Caronan, Cepeda allowed the construction and operation of a school on the
western portion of his property. The school is now known as Solana North Central
School, operating under the control and supervision of the petitioner Department
of Education (DepEd). Sometime between October 31, 2000 and November 2,
2000, the respondents entered and occupied a portion of the property. Upon
discovery of the said occupation, the teachers of the school brought the matter to
the attention of the barangay captain. The school officials demanded the
respondents to vacate the property. However, the respondents refused to vacate
the property, and asserted Cepeda's ownership of the lot. DepEd filed a complaint
for Forcible Entry and Damages against respondents and the court ruled in favor
of the petitioner and directed the respondents to vacate the premises.
Respondents filed an action for Recovery of Possession and/or Sum of Money
against the DepEd. Respondents averred that since their late father did not have
any immediate need of the land in 1965, he consented to the building of the
temporary structure and allowed the conduct of classes in the premises. They
claimed that they have been deprived of the use and the enjoyment of the
portion of the land occupied by the school, thus, they are entitled to just
compensation and reasonable rent for the use of property. In its Answer, the
DepEd alleged that it owned the subject property because it was purchased by
civic-minded residents of Solana, Cagayan from Cepeda. It further alleged that
contrary to respondents' claim that the occupation is by mere tolerance, the
property has always been occupied and used adversely, peacefully, continuously
and in the concept of owner for almost forty (40) years. It insisted that the
respondents had lost whatever right they had over the property through laches.
During the trial, respondents presented, inter alia, the OCT No. O-627 registered
in the name of Juan Cepeda; Tax Declarations also in his name and the tax
receipts showing that they had been paying real property taxes on the property
since 1965. They also presented the Technical Description of the lot by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Land Management Services
showing that the subject property was surveyed in the name of Cepeda and a
certification from the Municipal Trial Court of Solana, Cagayan declaring that Lot
115 was the subject of Cad Case No. N-13 in LRC Cad. Record No. N-200 which
was adjudicated to Cepeda.

On the other hand, despite notice and reset of hearing, the DepEd failed to
present its evidence or witness to substantiate its defense. Consequently, the RTC
considered the case submitted for decision and rendered a Decision dated
January 10, 2008, finding that the respondents are the owners of the subject
property. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUES: 1.
Whether or not the respondents are barred to recover possession because of
Prescription and/or laches. 2. Whether or not DepEd is a builder in good faith?
RULINGS: 1. No, respondent is not barred by prescription and or/laches. The court
ruled that Laches, in a general sense, is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. There is no absolute
rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since laches is an equitable
doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot work
to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. In order to constitute laches,
the following elements must be present: 1)conduct on the part of the defendant,
or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not
held to be barred. In the present case, as registered owners of the lots in
question, the respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying
their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioner's occupation of the property, and regardless of the length
of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as

long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is
never barred by laches. Further, case law teaches that those who occupy the land
of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate
the property upon demand. 2. YES, DepEd is a builder in good faith. To be deemed
a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on
which he builds, i.e., that he be a possessor in the concept of owner, and that he
be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it. However, there are cases where Article 448 of the Civil Code was
applied beyond the recognized and limited definition of good faith, e.g., cases
wherein the builder has constructed improvements on the land of another with
the consent of the owner. The Court ruled therein that the structures were built
in good faith in those cases that the owners knew and approved of the
construction of improvements on the property. In the present case, despite being
a possessor by mere tolerance, the DepEd is considered a builder in good faith,
since Cepeda permitted the construction of building and improvements to
conduct classes on his property. Hence, Article 448 may be applied in the case at
bar.
Laches v. Tolerance

Considering that the occupation of the subject lot is by mere

tolerance or permission of the respondents, the DepEd, without
any contract between them, is bound by an implied promise that
it will vacate the same upon demand. Hence, until such demand
to vacate was communicated by the respondents to the DepEd,
respondents are not required to do any act to recover the subject
land, precisely because they knew of the nature of the DepEd’s
possession which is by mere tolerance.

Therefore, respondents are not guilty of failure or neglect to

assert a right within a reasonable time. The nature of that
possession by the DepEd has never changed from 1965 until the
filing of the complaint for forcible entry against the respondents
on June 21, 2001. It was only then that the respondents had
knowledge of the adverse claim of the DepEd over the property.
The respondents filed the action for recovery of possession on
March 16, 2004 after they lost their appeal in the forcible entry
case and upon the continued refusal of the DepEd to pay rent,
purchase the lot or vacate the premises. [45]

G.R. No. 192268, January 27, 2016 ]

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS REGIONAL

DIRECTOR, PETITIONER, VS. DELFINA C. CASIBANG, ANGELINA
C. CANAPI, ERLINDA C. BAJAN, LORNA G. GUMABAY, DION1SIA
C. ALONZO, MARIA C. BANGAYAN AND DIGNA C. BINAYUG,
RESPONDENTS.

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CASE DIGEST: ESMAQUEL VS. COPRADA

G.R. No. 152423 : December 15, 2010

SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA SORDEVILLA, Petitioners, v.
MARIA COPRADA, Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

On February 24, 1997, spouses Esmaquel filed an ejectment case against Coprada
before the 2nd MCTC Laguna. Petitioners claimed that they are the registered
owners of a parcel of land situated in San Miguel, Majayja. In 1945, Coprada was
able to persuade the petitioners to allow her and her family to use and occupy the
land for their residence, under the condition that they will vacate the premises
should petitioners need to use the same. Coprada and her family were allowed to
construct their residential house. Since then, the petitioners never made an
attempt to drive them away out of pity, knowing that respondent and her eight
children have no other place to live in. the a few years later the financial condition
of Copradas family, having acquired her own residential house. This prompted
petitioners to institute an ejectment case against Coprada. Respondent avers that
she had already acquired ownership over the contested lot when she orally
purchased it. And further avers that the claim has already prescribed and thus
barred by laches.

MCTC ruled in favor of Coprada, thus the case was dismissed. On appeal to the
RTC, the ruling of the MCTC was reversed. The CA reversed the RTCs decision and
reinstated the MCTCs ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent from
the subject property.

HELD:

LAND TITLES

As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally

occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by
laches.

In the present case, Coprada failed to present evidence to substantiate her

allegation that a portion of the land was sold to her in 1962. Coprada's submission
that there was an oral sale is a mere afterthought.

On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered by a title,
registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the respondent's unproven
claim that she acquired a portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of
an oral sale, the Torrens title of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners' title over the
subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental
principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who
has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
Further, Coprada's argument that petitioners are no longer the owners of a
portion of the subject land because of the sale in her favor is a collateral attack on
the title of the petitioners, which is not allowed. The validity of petitioners'
certificate of title cannot be attacked by respondent in this case for ejectment.
Under Section 48 of PD No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or canceled, except in a direct
proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of
the title of the petitioners can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for
that purpose. Whether or not the respondent has the right to claim ownership
over the property is beyond the power of the trial court to determine in an action
for unlawful detainer.
DIGEST: REPUBLIC VS. HOLY TRINITY DEVELOPMENT INC
AdministratorMay 25, 2020

DIGEST: REPUBLIC VS. HOLY TRINITY DEVELOPMENT INC

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB),
filed with the RTC a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners
whose properties would be affected by the construction, rehabilitation, and
expansion of the North Luzon Expressway.
The Holy Trinity Reality and Development Corporation was one of the affected
landowners. TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession, manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the
payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties (in the total
amount of 28,406,700 pesos) with the Land Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor
Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized government depository. TRB
maintained that since it had already complied with the provisions of Sec. 4 of RA
8974 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of the writ
of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the RTC. RTC issued an Order for
the Issuance of the Writ of

Possession as well as the Writ of Possession itself. Holy Trinity moved for
reconsideration.

The Sheriff filed with the RTC a Report on Writ of

Possession stating that since none of the landowners voluntarily vacated the
properties subject of the expropriation proceedings, the assistance of the PNP
would be necessary in implementing the Writ of Possession. Accordingly, TRB,
through OSG, filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion praying for an Order
directing the PNP to assist the Sheriff in the

Implementation of the Writ of Possession.

The Holy Trinity filed with the RTC a Motion to

Withdraw Deposit, praying that it be allowed to withdraw 22,968,000 out of
28,406,700, including the interest which accrued thereon. RTC granted the
motion (except as to the interest) since Holy Trinity already proved its absolute
ownership over the properties and paid the taxes due to the government. RTC
conducted a hearing on the accrued interest, after which it directed the issuance
of an Order of Expropriation, and granted TRB a period of 30 days to inquire from
LBP-South Harbor whether the deposit made by DPWH with the bank relative to
the expropriation proceedings is earning interest or not. TRB submitted a
Manifestation to which was attached the letter by Atty. Osoteo stating that the
DPWH Expropriation Account was an interest bearing current account. RTC
resolved the issue by ruling that the interest earnings from the deposit of
22,968,000 (under the principle of accession) are considered as fruits and should
properly pertain

to the property owner (in this case, Holy Trinity). Upon motion of TRB, it issued an
Order of Expropriation. But later on, it reversed itself stating that the issue as to
who is entitled to the

Payment of interest should be ventilated before the Board of Commissioners. The

CA reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Holy Trinity is only entitled to the amount equivalent to the zonal
value of the expropriated property and not to the accrued interest?

RULING
RULING: TRB failed to distinguish between the expropriations procedures under
RA 8974 and Rule 67. The former specifically governs expropriation proceedings
for national government infrastructure projects. In the case of Republic vs.
Gingoyon, the SC ruled that under RA 8974, the government is required to make
immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be
entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the government is authorized
only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. In the
case at bar, the proceedings deal with the expropriation of properties intended
for a national government infrastructure project. Thus, the RTC was correct in
applying the procedure laid out in RA 8974, by requiring the deposit of the
amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be
expropriated.

The controversy though arises not from the amount of the deposit but as to the
ownership of the interest that had since accrued on the deposited amount. The
SC agrees with the ruling of the CA. The critical factor in the different modes of
effecting delivery which gives legal effect to the act is the actual intention to
deliver on the part of the party making such delivery. The intention of the TRB in
depositing such amount through DPWH was clearly to comply with the
requirement of immediate payment in RA 8974, so that it could already secure a
writ of possession over the properties subject of the expropriation and commence
implementation of the project. In fact, TRB did not object to Holy Trinity‘s Motion
to Withdraw Deposit with the RTC, for as long as it shows (1) that the property is
free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner thereof. A
close scrutiny of TRB's arguments would further reveal that it does not directly
challenge the CA‘s determinative pronouncement that the interest earned by the
amount deposited in the expropriation account accrues to Holy Trinity by virtue
of accession. TRB only asserts that Holy Trinity is entitled only to an amount
equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property, nothing more and
nothing less. The SC agrees in TRB's statement since it is exactly how the amount
of the immediate payment shall be determined in accordance with Sec4 of RA
8974, i.e., an amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the expropriated
properties. However, TRB already complied therewith by depositing the required
amount in the expropriation account of DPWH with LBP-South Harbor. By
depositing the said amount, TRB is already considered to have paid the same to
Holy Trinity, and Holy Trinity became the owner thereof. The amount earned
interest after the deposit; hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of the
principal who is already determined as the Holy Trinity. The interest is paid by
LBPSouth Harbor on the deposit, and TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount
more than what it is required to do so by law. Nonetheless, the SC finds it
necessary to emphasize that Holy Trinity is determined to be the owner of only a
part of the amount deposited in the expropriation account, in the sum of
P22,968,000.00. Hence, it is entitled by right of accession to the interest that had
accrued to the said amount only.

Sanchez vs. Divinagracia (2018)

Petitioners
: SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND DELMA SANCHEZ
Respondents
: ESTHER DIVINAGRACIA VDA. DE AGUILAR
Ponente
: Peralta (Third Division)
Topic
: Remedial Law
SUMMARY
: Spouses Sanchez filed a petition for annulment of judgment of the MCTC
decision against thembefore the RTC, long after the MCTC decision had become
final and a writ of execution issued. The Court ruledthat such petition was a
wrong remedy, raising questions as to error in the exercise of jurisdiction, and
that itwas untimely filed.
DOCTRINE
: The Court has consistently ruled that
jurisdiction
is not the same as the
exercise of jurisdiction.
Asdistinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to
decide a cause, and not the decisionrendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction
over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all otherquestions arising
in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court
may commit inthe exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.The Court must emphasize that an action for
annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction must be broughtbefore the
same is barred by laches or estoppel.
FACTS
:On July 11, 2000, Juanito Aguilar sold to petitioner spouses Francisco and Delma
Sanchez (SpousesSanchez) a 600-square-meter portion of his 33,600-square
meter lot identified as Lot No. 71, Pls 870, located inthe Municipality of Lake
Sebu, South Cotabato.On October 23, 2004, the heirs of Juanito Aguilar, namely,
respondents Esther Divinagracia Vda. de Aguilar, Juanito's spouse, and their
children, fenced the boundary line between the 600-square-meter lot of
thespouses and the alleged alluvium on the northwest portion of the land by the
lake Sebu.The Spouses Sanchez protested the act of fencing by Esther before the
barangay, but since nosettlement was reached, they filed a Complaint for Forcible
Entry against the heirs of Aguilar before the MunicipalCircuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Surallah-Lake Sebu, Province of South Cotabato. They claimed that under the
law,they are the owners of the alluvium which enlarged their 600-square-meter
lot. It cannot, therefore, be fenced bythe heirs of Aguilar.For their part, the heirs
refute the existence of the alluvium. They assert that the "alluvium" referred to
isthe 800-square-meter area beyond the 600-square-meter lot of the spouses
which has been in their actualpossession but was used, with their tolerance, by
the spouses in connection with their operation of fish cages inthat portion of Lake
Sebu abutting their lot.On June 7, 2006, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing
the complaint of the Spouses Sanchez.Since the spouses purchased the 600-meter
land adjacent to the land in question only on July 11, 2000, theycould not have
been in possession thereof ahead of the heirs of Aguilar. Thus, the heirs are the
ones in actualpossession of the subject property and cannot be held liable for
forcible entry by stealth as alleged by theSpouses Sanchez.

The MCTC was also unconvinced with the spouses' contention that the subject
land is an alluvium. Analluvium is an area formed by running water like a river or a
creek. But in a lake like the subject Lake Sebu, thewater is stagnant. Thus, the
land in question is a natural surrounding of the lake which existed at the same
timewith the lake itself. Moreover, the MCTC pointed out that the subject land is
800 square meters in size which isgreater than the area purchased by the spouses
so if there could be a legal claimant, it is the government ofLake Sebu as
foreshore or salvage zone for public use.On May 27, 2008, the MCTC issued a Writ
of Execution ordering the Sheriff to execute its June 7, 2006Decision by setting,
defining, and/or fixing the boundaries of the respective properties of the
parties.On May 22, 2010, the spouses filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Judgment with Prayer for the Issuanceof a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction and Damages before the RTC seeking to annul theJune 7,
2006 Decision of the MCTC for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for
rendering judgment overa non- existent parcel of land since there is no excess of
the 600-square-meter portion to speak of.On July 8, 2013, the RTC granted the
spouses' complaint and annulled the June 7, 2006 MCTC Decision.However, the
CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision
ISSUES
:

 WoN the ruling of the RTC must be upheld in view of the findings of the Sheriff
that since the width of thenational highway is almost 60 meters wide, the lot of
the spouses must have gone downwards towardsthe lake, and thus any portion of
land beside said lake must be considered as part of the land purchasedby the
spouses from Aguilar

o
NO. The Spouses Sanchez anchored their Complaint for Annulment of Judgment
on the allegedlack of jurisdiction of the MCTC.
o
Here, the Court agrees with the appellate court that the MCTC had both
jurisdictions over theperson of the defendant or respondent and over the subject
matter of the claim. On the former, itis undisputed that the MCTC duly acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the spouses Sanchezas they are the ones who
filed the Forcible Entry suit before it. On the latter, Republic Act No.7691 (R.A. No.
7691) clearly provides that the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), MTC,
orMunicipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over
ejectment cases,which includes unlawful detainer and forcible entry.
o
Despite this, the Spouses Sanchez insist that the MCTC could not have had
jurisdiction over thedisputed land area in excess of their 600-square-meter lot.
This is because since the DistrictEngineer's Office found that the width of the
national highway is almost 60 meters wide, the edgeof their 600-square-meter lot
must have gone downwards and necessarily reached the edge ofthe 20-meter
wide public easement abutting the Lake Sebu. Thus, the heirs of Aguilar could
nothave been in "actual physical possession" of a non-existent lot for the disputed
area belongs tothem.
o
The Court, however, is not convinced. As duly noted by the CA, the area beyond
the 600- square-meter lot abutting Lake Sebu, whether it is a lot claimed to be in
"actual physical possession" ofthe heirs of Aguilar or a public easement, refers to
the "alluvium" lot area claimed by the SpousesSanchez as their own in their
forcible entry complaint. It is clear, therefore, that the MCTC had jurisdiction over
the subject matter, which, in this case, is the 600-square-meter lot and its
allegedalluvium.

o
It bears stressing, moreover, that the Spouses Sanchez explicitly brought the
subject matter tothe jurisdiction of the MCTC. They cannot now deny such
jurisdiction simply because said courtdid not rule in their favor.
o
Thus, the issue of whether the MCTC erred in dismissing the forcible entry
complaint, ruling thatthe heirs of Aguilar were in actual physical possession over
the subject property should have beenraised by the Spouses Sanchez in an appeal
before the RTC. But as the records reveal, thespouses did not do anything to
question the decision of the MCTC, merely allowing the same toattain finality. In
fact, the sheriff had already started its execution. Moreover, without
evenproviding any explanation for their delay, it was only on May 22, 2010, or
four (4) years after theissuance of the MCTC ruling on June 7, 2006, that the
spouses filed the instant Complaint for Annulment of Judgment.
NOTES
: Petition
DENIED
.
G.R. No. 228680 | September 17, 2018 | Third Division | Justice Peralta
Remedial Law | Jurisdiction | Aspects of Jurisdiction | Jurisdiction over the
Subject Matter
In the instant case, the Spouses Sanchez anchored their Complaint for Annulment
of Judgment on the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC. Jurisdiction is the
power and authority of the tribunal to hear, try and decide a case and the lack
thereof refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party
or over the subject matter of the action. Lack of jurisdiction or absence of
jurisdiction presupposes that the court should not have taken cognizance of the
complaint because the law or the Constitution does not vest it with jurisdiction
over the subject matter. On the one hand, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance or submission by
the defendant/respondent to the court, or by coercive process issued by the court
to such party through service of summons. On the other hand, jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations of the complaint and the relief prayed for. Thus, whether the plaintiff
is entitled to recovery upon all or some of the claims prayed therein is not
essential. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or
by law and not by agreement or consent of the parties. Neither does it depend
upon the defenses of the defendant in his/her answer or in a motion to dismiss.
Here, the Court agrees with the appellate court that the MCTC had both
jurisdictions over the person of the defendant or respondent and over the subject
matter of the claim. On the former, it is undisputed that the MCTC duly acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who
filed the Forcible Entry suit before it. On the latter, Republic Act No. 7691 (R.A.
No. 7691) clearly provides that the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), MTC,
or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over
ejectment cases, which includes unlawful detainer and forcible entry.

FACTS:
On July 11, 2000, Juanito Aguilar sold to petitioner spouses Francisco and Delma
Sanchez (Spouses Sanchez) a 600-square-meter portion of his 33,600-square
meter lot identified as Lot No. 71, Pls 870, located in the Municipality of Lake
Sebu, South Cotabato. On October 23, 2004, the heirs of Juanito Aguilar, namely,
respondents Esther Divinagracia V da. de Aguilar, Juanito’s spouse, and their
children, fenced the boundary line between the 600-square-meter lot of the
spouses and the alleged alluvium on the northwest portion of the land by the lake
Sebu. The Spouses Sanchez protested the act of fencing by Esther before the
barangay, but since no settlement was reached, they filed a Complaint for
Forcible Entry against the heirs of Aguilar before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Surallah-Lake Sebu, Province of South Cotabato. They claimed that
under the law, they are the owners of the alluvium which enlarged their 600-
square-meter lot. It cannot, therefore, be fenced by the heirs of Aguilar. For their
part, the heirs refute the existence of the alluvium. They assert that the
“alluvium” referred to is the 800-square-meter area beyond the 600-squaremeter
lot of the spouses which has been in their actual possession but was used, with
their tolerance, by the spouses in connection with their operation of fish cages in
that portion of Lake Sebu abutting their lot.
On June 7, 2006, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint of the
Spouses Sanchez. It ruled that since the spouses purchased the 600-meter land
adjacent to the land in question only on July 11, 2000, they could not have been
in possession thereof ahead of the heirs of Aguilar. Thus, the heirs are the ones in
actual possession of the subject property and cannot be held liable for forcible
entry by stealth as alleged by the Spouses Sanchez.

On May 22, 2010, the spouses filed a Complaint for Annulment of Judgment with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction and Damages before the RTC seeking to annul the June 7, 2006
Decision of the MCTC for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for
rendering judgment over a non-existent parcel of land since there is no excess of
the 600- square-meter portion to speak of.

On July 8, 2013, the RTC granted the spouses’ complaint and annulled the June 7,
2006 MCTC Decision.

On July 28, 2016, however, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. The
appellate court ruled that the MCTC Decision cannot be annulled on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. It is clear that the MCTC
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Sanchez as they are the
ones who filed the forcible entry complaint before said court. As to the nature of
the action, the MCTC likewise had jurisdiction since under the law, it exercises
exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment suits.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling of the CA erred in reversing the RTC Decision and in
ruling that MCTC Decision cannot be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case.

RULING:
No. Time and again, the Court has ruled that a petition for annulment of
judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of
only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or
final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction
or through extrinsic fraud. Its objective is to undo or set aside the judgment or
final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his
cause or to ventilate his defense. Being exceptional in character, it is not allowed
to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments,
orders or resolutions. Thus, the Court has instituted safeguards by limiting the
grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by
prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should
show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. In
this regard, if the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings
are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper
court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of
extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a
timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.

In the instant case, the Spouses Sanchez anchored their Complaint for Annulment
of Judgment on the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC. Jurisdiction is the
power and authority of the tribunal to hear, try and decide a case and the lack
thereof refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party
or over the subject matter of the action. Lack of jurisdiction or absence of
jurisdiction presupposes that the court should not have taken cognizance of the
complaint because the law or the Constitution does not vest it with jurisdiction
over the subject matter. On the one hand, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance or submission by
the defendant/respondent to the court, or by coercive process issued by the court
to such party through service of summons. On the other hand, jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations of the complaint and the relief prayed for. Thus, whether the plaintiff
is entitled to recovery upon all or some of the claims prayed therein is not
essential. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or
by law and not by agreement or consent of the parties. Neither does it depend
upon the defenses of the defendant in his/her answer or in a motion to dismiss.

Here, the Court agrees with the appellate court that the MCTC had both
jurisdictions over the person of the defendant or respondent and over the subject
matter of the claim. On the former, it is undisputed that the MCTC duly acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who
filed the Forcible Entry suit before it. On the latter, Republic Act No. 7691 (R.A.
No. 7691) clearly provides that the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), MTC,
or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over
ejectment cases, which includes unlawful detainer and forcible entry.

It bears stressing that the Spouses Sanchez explicitly brought the subject matter
to the jurisdiction of the MCTC. They cannot now deny such jurisdiction simply
because said court did not rule in their favor. The Court has consistently ruled
that jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished
from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause,
and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person
and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is
but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in
the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper
subject of an appeal.

Thus, the issue of whether the MCTC erred in dismissing the forcible entry
complaint, ruling that the heirs of Aguilar were in actual physical possession over
the subject property should have been raised by the Spouses Sanchez in an
appeal before the RTC. But as the records reveal, the spouses did not do anything
to question the decision of the MCTC, merely allowing the same to attain finality.
In fact, the sheriff had already started its execution. Moreover, without even
providing any explanation for their delay, it was only on May 22, 2010, or four (4)
years after the issuance of the MCTC ruling on June 7, 2006, that the spouses filed
the instant Complaint for Annulment of Judgment. On this matter, the Court must
emphasize that an action for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction
must be brought before the same is barred by laches or estoppel. On the one
hand, laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. On the other hand, estoppel precludes a
person who has admitted or made a representation about something as true from
denying or disproving it against anyone else relying on his admission or
representation. To the Court, the failure on the part of the Spouses Sanchez to file
either an appeal of the MCTC Decision or the instant complaint for annulment of
judgment for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, four (4) years to
be exact, despite receiving notice and knowledge of the said decision, constitutes
laches that necessarily barred their cause.

Indeed, the attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment,

final order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the
time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a
solid cornerstone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and, thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at
the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first,
a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is
no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is
made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land.
As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of
time.
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO v. IAC, GR No. 68166, 1997-02-12

Facts:

The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be
registered.

is registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by
the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay.

The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's
land. Applicant's registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.

Sinforoso Pascual... filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of

foreshore land

This application was denied

Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano
Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty
five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan.

the Director of Fisheries... gave due course to his application but only to the
extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be... certified by the Bureau of
Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.

The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's

application.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary

of Natural Resources who, however, affirmed the grant.

The then Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the

President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant.

On the other hand

Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel
of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan,... Pascual... claimed that this land is
an accretion to his property,... and covered by Original Certificate of Title

It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the
Bulacan River, and on the northern... side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as
well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby
depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon.
Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.

the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an

opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest
possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the
public domain... and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines.

The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's
application for the same reason as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later
on, however, the Director of Lands withdrew his... opposition. The Director of
Forestry become the sole oppositor.

the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the Director of Lands
and the Director of Forestry.

Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was
lifted and,... Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application.

Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been part of the
public domain, it being... a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a
lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond
permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the
President; and that he had already converted the area covered by... the lease into
a fishpond.

The case was decided adversely against Pascual.

the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore
land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land
registration proceedings.

On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and
granted the petition for registration of the subject property but excluding
therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty meters (50)
meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the

Psu-175181.

Issues:

May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it
naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered
as foreshore land?... whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion
or foreshore land,... whether or not said land was formed by the action of the two
rivers of

Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay.

Ruling:

We find merit in the petition.

The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of
Manila Bay and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action
of the sea which brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat
and bakawan trees planted thereon by... petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of
the waters of the river; and (3) that... the land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of the river.[

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil
deposited on the estate fronting the river bank;[12] the owner of... such estate is
called the riparian owner

Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter
being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters.

The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of... the Civil Code, is automatically
owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen[14]
but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.

Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the
principle of accretion, is misplaced.

First, the title of private respondents' own tract of land reveals its northeastern
boundary to be Manila Bay.
Private respondents' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila
Bay and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action, private respondents
insist,... is to account for the accretion on their land.

Private respondents' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in
front of their land... on the northern side lies now the disputed land where before
1948, there lay the Manila Bay.

If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay
and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of
the eastern and... western boundaries of private respondents' own tract of land,
not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay.

Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium
is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is... adjacent to the river
bank.

Second

Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what
kind of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we held...
that:

"Appellant next contends that x x x Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea.

We find said contention untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a mere
indentation of the same:
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or
on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private
respindents' own tract of land on the northern side.

As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and bakawan trees,
the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up
of its former foreshore, and the regular torrential action of the waters of Manila
Bay, is the... formation of the disputed land on the northern boundary of private
respondents' own tract of land.

The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or
an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain.

At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de
Bay.

In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San Jose,... we categorically

ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake... the accretion on which, by the mandate of
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the land
contiguous thereto.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

 "Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the... establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard
service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the... establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard
service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."... unequivocal is the
public nature of the disputed land in this controversy, the same being an
accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay
is.

As part of the public domain, the... herein disputed land is intended for public
uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is
reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private
person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a...
competent authority."

Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the
power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no
longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause... of establishment
of special industries or for coast guard services.
Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative department
has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, to be the... property of private respondents as owners of
the estates adjacent thereto.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.

Binalay v. Manalo, G.R. No. 92161, March 18, 1991

Facts:
Respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from
Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. He then purchased
another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired the
same from Judge Juan Taccad. The two (2) parcels of land belonging to
respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot,
designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489
hectares includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from
Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares
purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy
month, a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water
was left unsurveyed and was not included in Lot 307. The Sketch Plan
submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by
respondent Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from south to
north, forks at a certain point to form two (2) branches—the western and
the eastern branches—and then unites at the other end, further north, to
form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through the
land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the
rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the
unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For about
eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at the point where the
Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into
the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and
is susceptible to cultivation. 
There is this Lot 821 which is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is
separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River
during the rainy season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry
river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad.
Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of
accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent. 
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist
that they own Lot 821. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the
river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other
agricultural products.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints before the then
Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession
and damages against petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2)
parcels of land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio
Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered ordering
petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion.
Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be entered declaring
him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey.
CFI Ruling;
CFI renders judgment against the defendants(petitioners) and in favor of
the plaintiff(respondent).
CA Ruling:
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
WON Manolo own Lot 821 by way of accretion to the submerged portion of
the property to which it is adjacent? 
Ruling:
No, Manolo does not own Lot 821 by way of accretion to the submerged
portion of the property to which it is adjacent
Article 420 of the Civil Code states:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the
sea coast).
Pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not
acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even
if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio
Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have
validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. The Court
considers that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment
to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the river. As it is, the
claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot
307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.
Hence, Manolo does not own Lot 821 by way of accretion to the
submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.
Overall SC Ruling:
1. Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307.
2. The regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan
River is hereby DECLARED to be property of public dominion.
3. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate
action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se. If
respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited
physically to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or the eastern river bed.
The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad
did not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. The tax
declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent
Manalo. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory
and the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership
and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent
Manalo as owner(s) thereof.

BINALAY V. MANALO 195 SCRA 374  

FACTS: Judge  Taccad  owned  a  parcel  of  land—on  the  west, 

bordering  on  the Cagayan River, on the east, the national road.  The
western portion would occasionally  go  under  the  waters  and  reappear 
during  the  dry  season.  Manalo purchased the land.  A relocation survey
was conducted during the rainy season, so the survey didn't cover the
submerged land.  The sketch would show that the river branches through
the west and east, leaving a strip of land.  The land was then surveyed into
two 2 lots.  One of these is being claimed by Manalo through accretion.  

HELD: According to the Law of Waters, the natural bed or channel of a

creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods.
This  being  the  case,  the  subject  land  couldn't  have  been sold  to 
Manalo, being part of the public domain.

Binalay v. Manalo G.R No. 92161 Petitioners: Binalay et al Respondent:

Guillermo Manalo and the CA DOCTRINE: For accretion to take place as a
mode of acquiring ownership over the land, the land formed should be
directly adjacent to the land owned. FACTS: Guillermo Manalo bought
parcels of land in Tumauini, Isabela; 8.65 hectares was acquired from
Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares was bought from Gregorio Taguba.
The parcels of land were described as having the Cagayan River on their
west. During a cadastral survey conducted, the two parcels of land were
consolidated into one lot and designated as Lot No. 307. But since the
survey was conducted on a rainy day, a portion of the land bought from
Taccad was covered with water and was not included in Lot No. 307.
Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form
two branches (western and eastern) and then unites at the other end,
further north, to form a narrower strip of land. The eastern branch of the
river cuts through Lot 307, and is flooded during the rainy season. The
unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the bed of the eastern branch.
***NOTE: that the fork exists only during the rainy season while the
“island”/elongated strip of land formed in the middle of the forks becomes
dry and perfect for cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its ordinary
depth. The strip of land in the middle of the fork totaled 22.7 hectares and
was labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is directly opposite Lot 307 and is
separated by the eastern branch of the river’s fork. The Sketch Plan shows
that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point
to form two branches (eastern and western branches) and then unites at
the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. It appears that
eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of Manalo and is flooded
with water during rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is the
unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to Manalo, and is, for most part of
the year (about 8 months), dry and susceptible to cultivation. Lot 821 is
located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from it during the rainy
season. However, Petitioner (Binalay et al) claim ownership over the land
as they have possessed it, occupied it and have cultivated it. Manalo filed
two cases for forcible entry which were both dismissed. Later on, he filed a
complaint for quieting of title, possession, and damages against petitioner.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Being a portion of the land bought from

Taccad, respondent claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of
accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.
The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot 821 and
Lot 307 cannot be considered separate and distinct from each other. They
reasoned that when the land dries up for the most part of the year, the two
are connected. [Note: The CA applied the ruling in Gov’t of the Phil Islands
vs. Colegio de San Jose, which was actually inappropriate because the
subject matter in this case was a lake so that the definition of a “bed” was
different. ISSUE: Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821? HELD: The Court
held in the negative saying that 1.) it is part of public dominion and 2.) it
fails to meet all the requisites needed for accretion to take place. First, it
must be noted that Art. 70 of the Law of Waters defines the natural bed or
channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its waters during the
highest floods. The periodic swelling of the water was taken into
consideration and it was concluded that the submerged portion of the land
during rainy days forms part of the natural bed of the river. In connection
with this conclusion, Art. 420 of the Civil Code provides that rivers form part
of public dominion. Second, accretion as a mode of acquiring property
under Art. 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three
requisites: 1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river
(or sea); and 3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers (or the sea coast). In this case at bar, the requisites were
not satisfied. The claimed accretion lies on the bank of the river not
adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river. Lastly,
SC held that it is difficult to suppose that a land with an area of 22.72
hectares resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. If
Manalo’s contention is accepted, then his land would have doubled in a
span of 10 years. All these considered, the Court held that the land in
question is part of public dominion and neither Manalo nor the petitioners
were held owners of the land.
The Director of Lands Vs. Court of Appeals
November 30, 2017
The Director of Lands, Petitioner Vs. Court of Appeals and Teodoro
Abistado, substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann,
all surnamed Abistado, Respondents.
G.R. No. 102858, July 28, 1997

Facts: Teodoro Abistado, private respondent, Filed a petition for original

registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under P.D. No. 1529
or the Property Registration Decree. The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. During the pendency of the
case, Teodoro Abistado died and was substituted by his children -
Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold, and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado,
who were all represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, ad litem ( act in
which a lawsuit has a representative in behalf of children not capable of
representation.)

Land Registration Court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction in

compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of initial
public hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. Records show that
applicants failed to comply with P.D. No. 1529 Section 23 (1) requiring
publication of notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
Initial public hearing was only published in the Official Gazette.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals which granted the
application and ordered the registration of title to Teodoro Abistado, since
publication in a newspaper of general Circulation is merely procedural,
hence dispensable. The Director of Land, represented by the Solicitor
General, elevated this case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or Not the Director of Land is correct that the publication of
Notice of Initial hearing in a Land Registration Case is mandatory.

Held: Yes. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 shall be followed requiring a

publication once both in the Official Gazette and newspaper of general
circulation. The Land Registration Case is an in Rem proceeding, meaning
the applicant must prove his title over the land against all persons
concerned, who might have interest to right in the property and should
effectively be invited in the court to prove why the title should not be
granted.

Such provision used the term "shall" which indicated that it is mandatory.
When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room
for interpretation, vacillation, or equivocation, there is room only for
application.

Thus. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Lower Court dismissing
the petition for registration of Land Title to the respondents.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 83804 July 18, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. REYNALDO M. ALON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Silay City, Branch 40, EDUARDO L. CLAPAROLS,1 CELIA JALANDONI,
CARMITA L. CLAPAROLS, ALBERTO BALCELLS, SAGRARIO MEDINA
VDA. DE CLAPAROLS, EULALIA L. CLAPAROLS and FRANCISCO
ROSELLO, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The refusal of the respondent Trial Judge to grant the petitioner Republic's
motion for issuance of a writ of possession in Civil Case No. 838 is what
has given rise to the special civil action of certiorari at bar.

Civil Case No. 838 was instituted by the Republic in the Court of First
Instance at Silay City for the purpose of nullifying and cancelling
resurvey/subdivision-consolidation plans, and certificates of title issued on
the basis thereof to the private respondents,2 on the theory that they
embraced increases in or expansions of the original areas obtained by said
respondents in violation of law, and said expanded areas form part of the
unclassified public forest, not subject to private appropriation.3

As established by the evidence, and as summarized by the Trial Court,4

the antecedents of the case are as follows:
1. The private respondents were indisputably the registered co-owners of
two big tracts of land:

(a) Lot No. 10-B of the subdivision plan Psd-50714, being a portion of Lot
No. 10 of the Cadastral Survey of Talisay, Negros Occidental (LRC Record
No. 97, measuring 650,124 square meters, more or less, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 38525 issued in their names on September
8, 1964; and

(b) Lot No. 2 of the Cadastral Survey of Negros Occidental, with an area of
667,634 square meters, more or less, their ownership being evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 38516, also issued on September 8, 1964.

2. Both these lots were resurveyed, and the resurvey plans were approved
by the Land Registration Commissioner. The resurvey resulted in the
expansion of the original areas of the lots.

(a) The area of Lot No. 10-B-increased by 100,367 square meters; i.e.,
from 650,124 square meters to 750,491 square meters; and

(b) That of Lot No. 2 increased by 182,656 square meters; i.e., from
667,634 square meters to 850,290 square meters.

3. Thereafter, the owners caused the subdivision of these two (2) expanded
lots into smaller lots, and then the consolidation-subdivision of the latter
(and one other property of the same respondents [Lot 9 of the Talisay
Cadastre with an area of 12,537 sq.m. covered by TCT No. 88517]), all
with the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner, and
corresponding transfer certificates of title were issued for the subdivided
areas. All this activity resulted in the original property (Lots 10-B and 2)
being ultimately subdivided into ten (10) lots, covered by individual titles, as
follows:

(a) Derived from Lot 10-B

(1) Lot No. 1 10,000 sq. m. TCT No. 47459

(2) Lot No. 2 10,000 sq. m. TCT No. 51832

(3) Lot No. 3 10,000 sq. m. TCT No. 51833

(4) Lot No. 4 10,000 sq. m. TCT No. 51834

(5) Lot No. 5 386,670 sq. m. TCT No. 51835

(6) Lot No. 6 161,805 sq. m. TCT No. 51836

(b) Derived from Lot 2

(1) Lot No. 2-A 52,774 sq. m. TCT No. 42843

(2) Lot No. 2-B 36,105 sq. m. TCT No. 42843

(3) Lot No. 2-C 88,879 sq. m. TCT No. 42842

(4) Lot No. 2-D 672,532 sq. m TCT No. 42850

4. The private respondents' claim of title to the expanded areas was
founded on the proposition that the same were alluvial in character and
therefore accrued to them as riparian owners in accordance with Article
457 of the Civil Code.5

The Trial Court rendered judgment on February 6, 1987. It made reference

to the evidence presented by private respondents consisting of "the
testimonies of Dr. Virendra Pal Singh, Mr. Bart Ali Choudray, Dr. Pedro
Sangatanan, Dr. Wilfredo Espada and Miss Eufemia Sionosa, all expert
witnesses on soil except the last who is a chemist," who "all testified that
based on their examinations and laboratory tests of the soil taken from the
expanded area, . . . the same is alluvial in character and therefore the
defendants owned it as riparian owner under Art. 457 of the Civil Code."
The Court also adverted in its judgment to the "similar case of Republic vs.
Heirs of Abrille, 71 SCRA 576 (in which) the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court cancelling the transfer certificates of title
covering the lands with the increased areas and directing the Register of
Deeds of Davao to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the
increased portions shall have been segregated;" and hewing to Abrille, and
observing that the increases in area were to be found in only two (2) of the
subdivided lots, the judgment disposed of the case as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer

Certificate of Title Nos. 51835 and 42850 and directing the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof
after the portions consisting of 100,367 square meters and 182,656 square
meters, respectively, shall have been segregated therefrom in accordance
with law.

The private respondents initially sought to appeal. They filed a notice of

appeal. However, they later filed a motion to withdraw their appeal,
"electing (instead) to file a petition for original registration of the expanded
area questioned by the plaintiff . . . (since) a favorable action on said
petition will . . . make (the case) moot and academic . . ."7 In the same
motion, the respondent also prayed for cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens "on their properties not included in the questioned expanded
area." By Order dated May 19, 1987, the Trial Court granted the motion,
considering the appeal withdrawn, and directing cancellation of the notice
of lis pendens "on the titles subject of this case . . . ." The judgment of
February 6, 1987 consequently became final.

The respondents did not file applications in May and June, 1987 with the
Regional Trial Court at Silay City for registration of their titles over the
expanded areas thru Eduardo L. Claparols8 and Javier M. Claparols,9
uniformly docketed as Cad. Case No. 10, GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 97, but
covering different lots.10 The applications stated that the applicants were
claiming the areas "as riparian owner . . . by virtue of Art. 457 of the Civil
Code in relation to Art. 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters and/or Section 48,
CA 141 as amended by RA 42 and 6246 and by virtue of the open, public,
uninterrupted possession of applicant and his predecessors-in-interest for
more than 30 years under claim of ownership."11

Five months or so after the initiation of the registration proceedings

involving the so-called "expanded areas," the Republic filed in Civil Case
No. 838 a "Motion for Writ of Possession,"12 claiming that, as "the
prevailing party," it was "entitled to possession of . . . (said) portions," and
their segregation from the respondents' titles, as decreed by the judgment
of February 6, 1987, "would be meaningless unless the same are placed in
the (Republic's) possession and control . . ." It theorized that although the
judgment did not decree restoration of the segregated portions to the
Republic, that judgment nevertheless "necessarily carries with it the
delivery of possession of said portions to the State, as successful party,
and as owner of all lands of the public domain," a judgment not being
"confined to what appears upon the face of the decision but also those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto," citing Section 45, Rule
39, Rules of Court, and Unson v. Lacson, 2 SCRA 861, referring to Perez
v. Evite, L-16003, March 29, 1961 as "controlling precedent." The motion
closed with the prayer, later amended,13 reading as follows:14
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of possession be issued
placing plaintiff in possession of the segregated portion covering an
aggregate area of 283,023 square meters, and removing defendants and
all those claiming in their behalf from the premises.

After submission of extensive argument by the parties on the issue,15 the

Trial Court rendered an Order on May 12, 1988 denying the Republic's
motion for a writ of possession, for lack of merit. In justification of its
resolution, the Court made the following observations:

The decision of this Court was founded only in the propriety of the remedy
resorted to by private defendants in securing title to the expanded areas. It
was found that the titling of the expanded areas was not in accordance with
Act 496 and following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Republic vs. Abrille, 71 SCRA 57, the titles were ordered cancelled
because the law requires that to make the alluvial deposits of land come
under the Torrens System, there must be a judicial application for
registration.

The purpose of registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts
is merely to confirm the title of the registrant and thereafter protect the title
already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
third parties. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing and registration
under the Torrens System of that ownership is another. Ownership is
governed by the Civil Code and registration under the Torrens System is
not one of the modes of acquiring ownership (Grande vs. Court of Appeals,
115 Phil. 521).

During the trial of this case, private defendants presented expert witnesses
who testified and concluded that the expanded areas are alluvial in
character. And as registered owners of the land to which the alluvial
deposits adjoined, they are therefore the lawful owners of the said alluvial
areas.

Art. 475 of the Civil Code provides:

To the owners of the land adjoining the bank of the river belong the
accretion which they gradually received from the effect of the current of the
waters.

Accretion therefore which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from
the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the bank,
such accretions being natural incidents to land bordering on running
streams. The provisions of the, Civil Code in that respect are not affected
by the Land Registration Act. (C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133).

Since the alluvial deposits of land adjoin the registered land of the private
defendants and the expanded areas have become part of their estate as a
result of accretion, it follows therefore that the said expanded areas belong
to them.1âwphi1

On June 28, 1988 the Republic instituted in this Court the special civil
action of certiorari at bar praying that the Order of May 12, 1988 be
declared null and void, and pending adjudgment of the action, that a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issue to place it in possession of the
expanded areas. Here, the Republic insists on the correctness of the theory
it advocated before the Trial Court and contends that the latter, in not
upholding that theory, acted beyond its jurisdiction and gravely abused its
discretion. It assails the Trial Court's findings respecting the private
respondents' rights over the expanded areas as "being totally without
factual or legal mooring, apart from being wholly extraneous to the lis mota
of petitioner's main action which was for cancellation and reversion;"16
invokes the presumption that all unregistered lands . . ., unless the contrary
is shown, are . . . "public lands;"17 and refers to 14 evidences" in its
possession (a) "that the areas aver which private respondents lay claim as
alluvial deposits are nothing but portions of a FORESHORE,"18 (b) are
"within the unclassified public forest of Talisay . . . released to the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources for its administration, management and
disposition, pursuant to Section 13, PD No. 705, as implemented by
Department Order No. 3, dated July 22, 1975, as shown in the
Memorandum of the Secretary of Natural Resources, dated January 23,
1976,"19 and (c) are now in fact subject of a subsisting fishpond lease
agreement in favor of a third person.20

The signification and import of the Trial Court's challenged Order of May
12, 1988, as well as of its decision of February 6, 1987, seem to the Court
to be sufficiently clear. Both the decision and the order declared21 that at
the very least the evidence of the private respondents established prima
facie that they are owners of the expanded areas in question –– pursuant
to Article 475 of the Civil Code and in virtue of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land for more than 50 years in concept of
owners –– but that the procedure under Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496) by which they succeeded in obtaining title
over said areas was incorrect, and that title should issue in their favor only
in virtue of regular, original registration proceedings in accordance with the
same law in the course of which, as pointed out in Republic v. Heirs of
Abrille, supra, "the following requisites should all be satisfied:

1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private

surveyor;

2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;

3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with
all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court
to the Land Registration Commission;

5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place
of the hearing in the Official Gazette;

6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known

to have interests in the property by the sheriff;

7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the

notice or not;

8. Hearing of the case by the Court;

9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;

10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and
instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree Entry of the
decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;

12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding

Register of Deeds; and

13. Transcription of the decree of registration book and the issuance of the
owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register
of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.
This is indeed what the respondents have done. They have commenced
original registration proceedings for the registration of their title over the
expanded areas. Their institution of said proceedings pursuant to the
decision and order of the Trial Court did not, of course, foreclose the right
and option of the Republic to oppose their claim of ownership over those
expanded areas, and show the areas to be in truth unclassified forest. But
these issues –– whether or not the land is alluvial or not, or of public or
private domain, and whether or not the private respondents are riparian
owners thereof within the contemplation of the Civil Code and have
occupied the land as owners for fifty years, are issues proper for ventilation
in the registration case now pending before the Regional Trial Court at
Silay City. As things stand now, the private respondents have in their favor
a judicial pronouncement that they have shown, prima facie at least, that
the expanded areas are not of public domain and they have acquired rights
of ownership over them; in a word, they have acquired rights of ownership
over them, in a word, they have overcome the presumption that the land is
within an unclassified public forest; on the other hand, there is no
categorical declaration in the judgment in Civil Case No. 838 that the
expanded areas belong to the State, surely a condition for its entitlement to
a writ of possession thereof.22 In any event, the issues are obviously not
triable before this Court, which must therefore reject the Republic's efforts
to have said issues ventilated and resolved on the merits in the action at
bar. And since, as the record of Civil Case No. 838 of the Regional Trial
Court now stands, no clear right to the possession of the expanded areas is
shown to exist in favor of the Republic, the Court must also reject the
Republic's submittal that the respondent Trial Court, in refusing to grant its
motion for writ of possession, had acted beyond its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED, without

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Eduardo L. Claparols died on June 14, 1988 at the Makati Medical

Center, Makati, MM. His estate is being judicially settled in the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Occidental (Sp. Proc. No. 5017). His surviving
spouse, Celia J. Claparols, was appointed special administratrix of his
estate. Rollo, pp. 166-169.

2 Aside from the private respondents named in the caption of this case, to
wit: EDUARDO L. CLAPAROLS, CELIA JALANDONI, CARMITA L.
CLAPAROLS, ALBERTO BALCELLS, SAGRARIO MEDINA VDA. DE
CLAPAROLS (Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Jaime Claparols),
EULALIA L. CLAPAROLS and FRANCISCO ROSELLO, those impleaded
as defendants, as nominal parties, were the Land Registration
Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

3 Rollo, pp. 39, 57-60, 196-197.

4 Rollo, pp. 37-42 (Decision dated February 6, 1987).

5 "ART 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters. (366)"

6 That case, as the one at bar, involved proceedings under Section 12 of

the Land Registration Act.
7 Rollo, pp. 124-125.

8 SEE footnote 1, supra.

9 Id., pp. 121,127-128, 129-130.

10 Id., pp. 131-134.

11 Id., pp. 127-128 and 129-130.

12 Id., pp. 43-46.

13 Id., pp. 47-48.

14 Italics, in original.

15 Rollo. pp. 66-84.

16 Id., p. 21 0.

17 Id., pp. 211-212.

18 Id., pp. 217-219.

19 Id., pp. 220-221.

20 Id., pp. 222-224.

21 Id., pp. 41-42; 85-86.

22 Gawaran v. IAC, 162 SCRA 154.

Agustin vs IAC [G.R. Nos. L-66075-76] Case Digest

Agustin vs IAC

G.R. Nos. L-66075-76

Facts:

In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre.
Among these occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were
plaintiffs-private respondents, namely, Pablo Binayug, and Maria Melad,
who owns Lot 3351.

Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao
Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was defendant-petitioner
Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457, depositing the alluvium as accretion on the
land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western bank.
However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course,
returned to its 1919 bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria
Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima
Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of
the river.

The private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots
located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners,
accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed
the same lands as their own and drove away the private respondents from
the premises.

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad
filed a complaint to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its
6.6-hectare accretion. Private respondent Pablo Binayug filed a separate
complaintto recover his lots and their accretions.

Trial court rendered a decision, restoring the ownership in favor of Maria

Melad and Timoteo Melad who are the only interested heirs of Macario
Melad; [and Pablo Binayug in another case]. IAC affirmed the judgment of
trial court in toto.

Issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the land in question had
become part of private respondents' estate as a result of accretion

Held:

No.

Ratio:

The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the
lots of the private respondents who did not lose the ownership of such
accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by the
sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive
on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code
which provides:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.

In Agustin, et. al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court et. al. (G.R. nos. L-66075-
76 July 5, 1990), the Cagayan River changed its course after 49 years and
returned to its former bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of
private respondents situated on the western side of the river (such were
gradual accretions coming from the eastern side of the river for 49 years)
which were transferred on the eastern side of the river. The petitioners
claimed the same lands that were displaced because of the occurrence.
The issue was whether the land in question had become part of private
respondents' estate as a result of accretion; that the accretion to private
respondents' estate which used to pertain to petitioners' estate cannot
preclude the private respondents from being the owners thereof; and that
the ownership of private respondents over the accretion was not affected
by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the river when it reverted
to its old bed. The Supreme Court held that accretion was evident in this
case. It was proven that Cagayan River did move year by year for a period
of 49 years. The addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could
not discern it but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. The
testimonial evidence in these cases that said Cagayan River moved
eastward year by year is overwhelming as against the denial of petitioner
alone. The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands
was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the river,
for articles 459 and 463 of the Civil Code applied to this situation.
REPUBLIC VS SANTOS (G.R. NO. 160453 NOVEMBER 12, 2012)
Republic of the Philippines vs Santos
G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

Facts: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years,
respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7,
1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045
square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to
respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the
Paraque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the
Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998,
Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include
Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the
property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion
and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years.
Issue: Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the
process of accretion.

Held: No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the
banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a)
gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of
the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an
accretion that became respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the
Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying
up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from
the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which
was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks
through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not
recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the
riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the
Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the
provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is,
indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is
no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its
right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that
rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that
the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State
as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that
provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual
deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and
that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the
law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from
the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes
manifest has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was
not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to
the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to
possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in
relation to Lot 4998-B.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents

possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the character they
claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other
means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as
alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the
land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No
public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express
or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is
a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the concept
of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which
declares river beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land
occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining
lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto
belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of
course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain
property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable
and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already
declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed
to have acquired the property through prescription.

REPUBLIC v. ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, GR No. 160453, 2012-11-12

Facts:

By law, accretion the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the
effects of the current of the water belongs to the owner of the land adjacent
to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not
accretion. Hence, the dried-up... river bed belongs to the State as property
of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the
ownership in some other person.

respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7,

1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Parañaque City.

The property, which had... an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less,
was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded
in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos,
Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the
Southwest by an... abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A
also owned by Arcadio Ivan.

He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had
been in their joint open,... notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years.
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land
registration

On May 10, 2000,[4] the RTC granted the application for land registration...
the CA affirmed the RTC.

Issues:

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS

"PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME
AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE
ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL
CODE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY
OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO
THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS

HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY
OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30)
YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE
EVIDENCE.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was
applicable herein; and whether or not respondents could claim the property
by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).

Ruling:

The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457... of the Civil Code to

respondents' benefit

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of
rivers.

The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and
imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and

(c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.[13] Accordingly,

respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion
to warrant the grant of their application for land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof.

Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up... river
bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to
themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of
the Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."

In other words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of
land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the
effects of the current.
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an
accretion that became respondents' property pursuant to Article 457 of the
Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying
up of a river to form dry land involved the... recession of the water level
from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion,
which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river
banks through the effects of the current.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its
right of ownership.

Acquisitive prescription was... not applicable in favor of respondents

Both lower courts erred.

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title

must prove the following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the
disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b)
that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and... notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

The decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had
caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough
to justify the... foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty
taxes did not conclusively prove the payor's ownership of the land the taxes
were paid for,[25] the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of
a claim of... ownership;[26] and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the
property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse
possession
This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion.
Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to... the river bank by
respondents' predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot
4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and
adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or
preponderantly established.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents

possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the character they
claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other
means without any competent proof that the land was already declared...
as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration,
the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of
Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev't" did not
prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as... alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of
Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the
application for registration

Principles:
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.

1529 (Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
[Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,... or earlier.

xxxx

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public
dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the
properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those
intended for public use, such as roads,... canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development
of the... national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code
declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the
confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or... disposable
portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared
the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of
entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for
purposes of an imperfect title.

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

all river beds remain property of public dominion... and cannot be acquired
by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to
be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to
be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not
be deemed to have acquired the... property through prescription

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,

an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of
the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, investigation reports of the

Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the

rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case)
must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms
part of the public domain.
Republic vs. Santos
August 8, 2017Light
G.R. no. 160453
“The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed
belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person”

Facts:

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan Santos III filed for an application for land
registration on the ground of prescription. He alleged that the property had
been formed through accretion as the land is limited in the southeast by the
Paranaque river.
The City opposed such registration on the ground that it was only an
orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.
RTC Affirmed
CA Affirmed

Issue: Whether or not the dried up orchard belongs to the respondent by

virtue of Art. 457, NCC

Held: No. Art. 457 states that “To the owners of the lands adjoining the
bank of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.”

Accretion is to be construed as:

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of
rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be:

(a) gradual and imperceptible;

(b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and

(c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers

Drying up of the bed is not a process of deposition, given that area of 1,045
square meters could not have accumulated by a gradual and imperceptible
process in the span of about 20 to 30 years.

Petition granted.
BAGAIPO V. CAGR. No. 116290, December 8, 2000QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot which is
located southeast of Davao river. Whilerespondent Leonor Lozano is the
owner of a registered parcel of land located across and opposite
thesoutheast portion of petitioner’s lot facing the Davao River. On May 26,
1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Mandatory Writ of PreliminaryInjunction and Damages against Lozano for:
(1) the surrender of possession by Lozano of a certain portionof land
measuring 29,162 square meters which is supposedly included in the area
belonging to Bagaipounder TCT No. T-15757; and (2) the recovery of a
land area measuring 37,901 square meters whichBagaipo allegedly lost
when the Davao River traversed her property. Bagaipo contended that as a
result of achange in course of the said river, her property became divided
into three lots, namely: Lots 415-A, 415-Band 415-C. In January 1988,
Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot 415 and presented before the
trialcourt a survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A.
Magno which concluded that the landpresently located across the river
and parallel to Bagaipo’s property still belonged to the latter and not
toLozano who planted some 350 fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-C and the
old abandoned river bed.For his part, Lozano insisted that the land
claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titledproperty. He
asserted that the Davao River did not change its course and that the
reduction in Bagaipo’sdomain was caused by gradual erosion due to the
current of the Davao River. Lozano added that it is alsobecause of the
river’s natural action that silt slowly deposited and added to his land over a
long period oftime. He further averred that this accretion continues up to
the present and that registration proceedingsinstituted by him over the
alluvial formation could not be concluded precisely because it continued
toincrease in size. The Trial Court, upon inspection, found that the
decrease in land area was brought aboutby erosion and not a change in
the river’s course. CA affirmed the TC ruling.
ISSUE:W/N there was a change in the river’s course which resulted to
avulsion.
HELD:NO. The trial court and the appellate court both found that the
decrease in land area was brought about byerosion and not a change in
the river’s course. This conclusion was reached after the trial judge
observedduring ocular inspection that the banks located on petitioner’s land
are sharp, craggy and very much higherthan the land on the other side of
the river. Additionally, the riverbank on respondent’s side is lower andgently
sloping. The lower land therefore naturally received the alluvial soil carried
by the river current. These findings are factual, thus conclusive on this
Court, unless there are strong and exceptional reasons,or they are
unsupported by the evidence on record, or the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension offacts. The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the
corresponding expansion of respondent’s property were thecombined effect
of erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is
inapplicable. Petitionercannot claim ownership over the old abandoned
riverbed because the same is inexistent. The riverbed’sformer location
cannot even be pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the
Davao River tookplace gradually over an unspecified period of time, up to
the present. The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner
when the following requisites are present:1) That the deposit be gradual
and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of
thewater; and 3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to
the bank of the river. Theserequisites were sufficiently proven in favor of
respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change inthe course of
the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption
is that the changewas gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated June 30, 1994, of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G. R. CV No.37615, sustaining the judgment of the court a
quo, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

SANTULAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR No. L-28021, 1977-12-15

Facts:
This case is about the lease of a parcel of foreshore land of the public
domain with an area of about four and one-half hectares located at Barrio
Kaiñgin, Kawit, Cavite abutting on Bacoor Bay and the Ankaw
Creek.
Santulan claimed that that foreshore land is an extension of his land, Lot
986 of the Kawit cadastre, with an area of 17,301 square meters, registered
in his name in 1937 under Original Certificate of Title No. 6 which was
issued by virtue of a free... patent.
The said foreshore land was allegedly formed by soil deposits accumulated
by the alluvial action of the sea.
Santulan caused the said land to be surveyed.
Seven years later, or on December 22, 1949, Santulan filed with the
Bureau of Fisheries an application for an ordinary fishpond permit or lease,
of the said foreshore land (Special Use Permit, Fp. A. No. 5114, Exh. H).
At the instance of the Director of Fisheries, the Director of Forestry
investigated the condition of the said foreshore land.
The latter in his first indorsement dated June 19, 1950 found that it was
swampy "and not an improved... fishpond as alleged by Antonio Lusin" and
that it is within the disposable areas for agricultural purposes under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands (Exh. L-1).
On January 12, 1951 an attorney, acting for the Director of Lands wrote the
following letter to Lusin advising him to vacate the disputed land and
maintain the status quo:
Santulan declared the said foreshore land in his name for tax purposes.
On the other hand, Antonio Lusin in 1942 and 1945 (he died in 1962) filed
with the Bureau of Lands applications for a revocable permit and lease of a
foreshore land, respectively, for the purpose of producing salt on the said
land.
He allegedly converted two hectares of the said land into a fishpond.
The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Santulan and Lusin gave rise to
Bureau of Lands Conflict No. 8 (N).
The Director ruled that the disputed foreshore land was subject "to riparian
rights which may be invoked by Santulan as owner of the upland in
accordance with section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1" (Exh.
K).
Lusin... filed a motion for reconsideration.
The Director in his order of October 19, 1951 denied that motion.
Lusin appealed to the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources who in his decision of October 13, 1952 dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the Director's 1951 decision (Exh. M made a part hereof for
reference as Annex
C).
Lusin asked for a reinvestigation of the case.  His request was granted. 
The Department ordered a reinvestigation on May 12, 1953.
After receipt of the report of reinvestigation, the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, by authority of the Secretary, in his
order of December 14, 1954, reaffirmed the rejection of Lusin's revocable
permit and foreshore lease applications but... ordered Santulan to
reimburse to Lusin the appraised value of his improvements (Exh. O made
a part hereof for reference as Annex E).
Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo, by authority of the President, held in his
decision of April 10, 1958 that section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No.
7-1 (promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on
April 30, 1936 pursuant to Acts
Nos. 2874 and 3038) was "rendered obsolete" by section 67 of the Public
Land Law which took effect on December 1, 1936 (Exh. P made a part
hereof for reference as Annex G).
On the basis of the foregoing ruling and since the record is silent as to
whether or not the land in question has been declared by the President as
not necessary for the public service and as open to disposition (Sec. 61,
Public Land Law), the Executive Secretary sustained
Lusin's appeal and reversed the orders of the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in favor of Santulan.
Santulan's motion for reconsideration was denied in the letter of the Acting
Executive Secretary dated August 20, 1959 (Exh. W).
Santulan filed in the Court of First Instance of Cavite a petition for certiorari
wherein he alleged that the Executive Secretary committed a grave abuse
of discretion in misinterpreting certain provisions of Act No. 2874,... Com-
monwealth Act No. 141, and Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1.
It... should... further be underscored that the regulations give him a
preferential right to lease the land as a riparian owner.
Issues:
Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the
preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on his land?
Ruling:
The Executive Secretary concluded that, because the preferential right of
the applicant to lease foreshore land was immaterial under section 67 of
the present Public Land Law, paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1, which gives such preference, had become "idle... and useless".
That conclusion is wrong because it is based on the erroneous hypothesis
that section 64 of the 1919 Public Land Act is different from section 67 of
the 1936 Public Land Law.
They are not different.  The truth is that section 64 was... amended by Act
No. 3517 which took effect on February 4, 1929 (24 Public Laws 416).
In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner
(riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by
accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea
In view of the foregoing considerations, the trial court's decision and the
decision of the Executive Secretary dated April 10, 1958 are reversed and
set aside
Principles:
32
Preference of Riparian Owner.- The owner of the property adjoining
foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to
apply for such... lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the
public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this
nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the
date he receives a communication from the Director... of Lands advising
him of his preferential right.
Home
Civil Law
Doctrine of Reparian Rights: JULIAN SANTULAN VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY G.R. No. L-28021 December 15, 1977
by
Dagitab
-
March 22, 2014
0
JULIAN SANTULAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. L-28021
December 15, 1977

Lease of a parcel land in Public domain- Doctrine of Reparian Rights

Facts:
Petitioner Julian Santulan and Antonio Lusin who have been succeeded by
their heirs were rival claimants with respect to the lease of a parcel of
foreshore land of public domain with an area of about 4 ½ hectares located
at Barrio Kaingin, Kawit Cavite. The Petitioner Santulan surveyed the land
on December 5, 1942 and filed an application on Dec. 29, 1942 to lease for
five (5) years for agricultural purposes an area of 36, 120 sq. meters and
including the application for revocable permit to occupy the said land for
planting of Bakawan which later develop to fishpond seven years later after
acquiring ordinary fishpond permit from BFAR. On the other hand, private
respondent Lusin was reported and was being summoned that he was
illegally entered the area covered by the petitioners fishpond permit and
was refrain from introducing improvements.
However, private respondent Lusin filed applications 1n 1942 and 1945 for
a revocable-permit and a lease of a foreshore for the purpose of producing
salt in the said land. He also contends that he had been in the continues
and exclusive possession of the land since 1920 when it was still under
water, and that he had used it as a site of his fish corrals, and allegedly
converted two (2) hectares into fishpond enclosed with mud dikes and
provided with a concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made of wood.
On the northern part of the land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes
placed at close intervals to serve as water breakers to protect the mud
dikes from being washed away by the action of the sea. The private
respondent said that he introduced the alleged improvements from 1951 to
1953. The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Petitioner Santulan and
private respondent Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands Conflict.

Issue:
Whether or not the continues and exclusive possession of the private
respondent could nullify the petitioner’s preferential right to lease the land
by reason of his riparian rights?

Ruling:
The Director of Land ruled that the disputed land was subject to “reparian
rights” which may he invoked by petitioner Julian Santulan as owner of the
upland in accordance with section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-
1. It was found out that the disputed land is foreshore land covered and
uncovered by the flow and ebb of the ordinary tides that is an extension of
Santulan’s Lot No. 986 of the Kawit cadastre, with an area of 17, 301
square meters, registered in his name in 1937 under Original Certificate of
Title No. 6 which was issued by virtue of a free patent, and the said
foreshore land was allegedly formed by soil deposits accumulated by the
alluvial action of the sea, and the petitioner was the first to enter the land
and to make dikes thereon.
Private Respondent Antonio Lusin was found out to be possessor in bad
faith, and latter’s allegation with respect to the possession and
improvements could not nullify the petitioner’s preferential right to lease the
land by reason of his riparian rights. Therefore, the rejection of the private
respondent’s revocable permit and foreshore lease is proper.
____________________________________________________________
____
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30. 1936
32. Preference of the Reparian Owner � The owner of the property
adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water
bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given
preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be
needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing
lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefore within sixty (60)
days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands
advising him of his preferential right.
Strictly speaking, "riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person
who owns land situated on the bank of a river.
“Riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of lands on the banks of
rivers but also the littoral owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering
the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal
region including both the land along the coast and the water near the coast
or the shore zone between the high and low watermarks.

Preferential right

A LAW EACH DAY (KEEPS TROUBLE AWAY) - Jose C. Sison -

April 27, 2010 | 12:00am
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This case is about the rights of a riparian or littoral owner, or the owner of
the land adjacent to the banks of rivers or shores of the sea to the
accretions or alluvial deposits due to the actions of the sea or river.

The case concerned a foreshore area near the sea which was the subject
of a Foreshore Lease Application on November 16, 1989 by Berto who had
already been using it as “dock board” of his fishing business. In his
application Berto declared that he was the owner of the land adjoining the
said foreshore area. On November 23, 1990, Berto was awarded the
Foreshore Lease Agreement (FLA) over the area by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

On March 4, 1994 however Lito filed his protest questioning the grant of the
FLA to Bert. He claimed that he was the owner of the land adjoining the
said foreshore area. To prove his claim Lito presented his TCT issued on
January 20, 1975 showing that his Lot 2-B immediately adjoins the
foreshore area applied for by Berto. So Lito asked for the cancellation of
the FLA due to fraud and misrepresentation committed by Bert.

Pursuant to the order of the City Environment and Natural Resources

Officer (CENRO), a Geodetic Engineer surveyed the area and submitted a
sketch on December 10, 1995 clearly showing that Lito’s property is in
between the foreshore land and Bert’s property. But on February 1, 1996,
the DENR Regional Director issued an order dismissing Lito’s protest on
the ground that “in view of all the circumstances and facts gathered, the
foreshore area is separate and distinct from the parcel of land, Lot 2-B
registered in Lito’s name. So Lito has no legal personality to question the
veracity of possession and occupation of Berto over the said foreshore
area as the same was by virtue of a valid award granted by the DENR.
Was the Regional Director correct?
No. It is undisputed that Lito is the registered owner of the land adjacent to
the foreshore area leased to Berto which is covered by TCT 8423 issued
on January 20, 1975. Thus prior to Berto’s application on November 16,
1989 and the grant of the FLA on November 23, 1990, Lito already owned
the land adjacent to the foreshore land. This was confirmed by the sketch
submitted by the Geodetic Engineer on December 12, 1995.

Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, Lito is the riparian
or littoral owner who has a preferential right to lease the foreshore area as
provided in paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No 7-1 dated
April 30, 1936. The rule in this paragraph is in consonance with Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that while these lands
form part of the public domain, they shall be declared by the Government to
be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
increment thereof when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea
and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment
of special industries or for coast guard services. The reason for the
preferential right is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the
diminutions which his land suffers by reason of destructive force of the
waters. So he who loses by encroachments of the sea should gain by its
recession.

In this case, Bert committed fraud when he misrepresented himself as the

riparian owner in his application for the foreshore lease. Under stipulation
no. 15 of the FLA, any fraud or misrepresentation committed by the
applicant is a ground for cancellation of rescission of the FLA (Cantoja vs.
Lim, G.R. 168386, March 29, 2010).
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA v. IMBORNAL, GR No. 182908,
2014-08-06

Facts:
Basilia owned a parcel of land

Sabangan property)... which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters

Balbina, Alejandra, and

Catalina (Imbornal sisters)

Catalina's husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a
homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land (Motherland) adjacent
to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan

Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the
Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion.

the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area,adjoined the

southern portion of the Motherland.

OCT No. P-318 was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano, married
to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First

Accretion.

the Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less,
abutted the First Accretion on its southern portion.[19] On November 10,
1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents
covering... the Second Accretion.
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children
of Alejandra and Balbina,... an Amended Complaint[20] for reconveyance,
partition, and/or damages against respondents

They anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his
wife Catalina,urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property,
and that Ciriaco used the proceeds therefrom to fund histhen-pending
homestead patent application over the

Motherland.

In return, Ciriaco agreed that once his homestead patent is approved, he

will be deemed to be holding the Motherland which now included both
accretions in trust for the Imbornal sisters

Likewise, Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood,

and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First
Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second
Accretion, had illegally registered the said... accretions in their names,
notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners

Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their inheritance... claims
over the Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they respected
respondents' rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have
repudiated their (Francisco, et al.'s) shares thereon... but also to the
subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance of
said properties, or, in the alternative, the payment of their value, as well as
the award of moral damages in the... amount of P100,000.00, actual
damages in the amount of P150,000.00, including attorney's fees and other
costs... the RTC rendered a Decision
(a) reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland
and in the accretions thereon, or their... pecuniary equivalent

The RTC found that the factual circumstances surrounding the present
case showed that an implied trust existed between Ciriaco and the
Imbornal sisters with respect to the Motherland

It gave probative weight to Francisco, et al.'s allegation... that the

Sabangan property, inherited by the Imbornal sisters from their mother,
Basilia, was sold in order to help Ciriaco raise funds for his then-pending
homestead patent application.

In exchange therefor, Ciriaco agreed that he shall hold the Motherland in

trust for them... once his homestead patent application had been
approved.As Ciriaco was only able to a... cquire the Motherland subject of
the homestead patent through the proceeds realized from the sale of the
Sabangan property, the Imbornal sisters and, consequently, Francisco, et
al.

With respect to the accretions that formed adjacent to the Motherland, the
RTC ruled that the owner of the Motherland is likewise the owner of the
said accretions. Considering that the Imbornal sisters have become
proportionate owners of the Motherland by virtue of the implied... trust
created between them and Ciriaco, they (Imbornal sisters) and their heirs
are also entitled to the ownership of said accretions despite the fact that
respondents were able to register them in their names.

With respect to the Motherland, the CA found that Ciriaco alone was
awarded a homestead patent, which later became the basis for the
issuance of a Torrens certificate of title in his name; as such, said
certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally through an action for...
reconveyance filed by his wife's (Catalina's) relatives (i.e., Francisco, et al.
being the children of Alejandra and Balbina, who, in turn, are the sisters of
Catalina).

On the other hand, with regard to the disputed accretions, the CA ruled that
respondents i.e., respondent Victoriano with respect to the First Accretion,
and all the respondents with respect to the Second Accretion need not be
the owners of the Motherland in order to acquire... them by acquisitive
prescription.

In this case, the CA found... that respondents have acquired title to the
subject accretions by prescription,[33] considering that they have been in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the First Accretion in the concept
of an owner since 1949 (when the First Accretion was formed),... which
resulted in the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of respondent
Victoriano covering the same.

Issues:

the descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive

owners of the Second Accretion on the basis of the following grounds: (a)
prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as an
affirmative defense in the Amended Answer, and

(b) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and
Ciriaco.

Ruling:

At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the
Motherland and the First Accretion are barred by prescription.
To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-ownership over the Motherland,...
alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trust for their predecessors-
in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name.
Likewise, they alleged that respondents acquired the First and Second
Accretions by means of fraud and... deceit.

When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive

trust is created by law in favor of the true owner.[38]Article 1456 of the Civil
Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by
operation of law, a trustee... of an implied trust for the benefit of the real
owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust prescribes in ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of registration of
the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the...
property,[39] if the plaintiff is not in possession.However, if the plaintiff is in
possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible

When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive

trust is created by law in favor of the true owner.[38]Article 1456 of the Civil
Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by
operation of law, a trustee... of an implied trust for the benefit of the real
owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust prescribes in ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of registration of
the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the...
property,[39] if the plaintiff is not in possession.However, if the plaintiff is in
possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10

years. The reference point of the 10-year prescriptive period is the date of
registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period
applies only if there is an actual... need to reconvey the property as when
the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10)
years from the registration of the respective titles covering the disputed
properties within which to file their action for reconveyance, taking into
account the fact that they were never in... possession of the said
properties.

Hence, with respect to the Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued on
December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action for reconveyance
therefor should have been filed until December 5,1943; with respect to the
First Accretion... covered by OCT No. P-318 issued on August 15, 1952 in
the name of respondent Victoriano, an action of the same nature should
have been filed until August 15, 1962; and, finally, with respect to the
Second Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481issued on November 10,...
1978in the name of the respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor
should have been filed until November 10, 1988.

A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended
Complaint[42]covering all three (3) disputed properties was filed only on
February 27, 1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year
reglementary period within which to seek... the reconveyance of two (2) of
theseproperties, namely, the Motherland and the First Accretion, with only
the reconveyance action with respect to the Second Accretion having been
seasonably filed.

Thus, considering that respondents raised prescription as a defense in their

Amended Answer,[43] the Amended Complaint with respect to the

Motherland and the First Accretion ought to have been dismissed based on
the said ground, with only the cause of action pertaining to the Second
Accretion surviving. As will be, however,... discussed below, the entirety of
the Amended Complaint, including the aforesaid surviving cause of action,
would falter on its substantive merits since the existence of the implied trust
asserted in this case had not been established. In effect, the said complaint
is completely... dismissible.

The main thrust of Francisco, et al.'s Amended Complaint is that an implied

trust had arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one hand, and
Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland. This implied trust is
anchored on their allegation that the proceeds from... the sale of the
Sabangan property an inheritance of their predecessors, the Imbornal
sisters were used for the then-pending homestead application filed by
Ciriaco over the Motherland. As such, Francisco, et al. claim that they are,
effectively, co-owners of the Motherland... together with Ciriaco's heirs.

The burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its
existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the
existence of the trust and its elements.[45] While implied trusts may be
proven by oral evidence, the evidence... must be trustworthy and received
by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on
loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required
because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.[46]

In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral evidence
offered by Francisco, et al., that the Motherland had been either mistakenly
or fraudulently registered in favor of Ciriaco. Accordingly, it cannot be said
either that he was merely a trustee of an... implied trust holding the
Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal sisters or their heirs.

As the CA had aptly pointed out,[47]a homestead patent award requires

proof that the applicant meets the stringent conditions[48] set forth under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which includes actual
possession, cultivation, and... improvement of the homestead. It must be
presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly
satisfied the strict conditions necessary for the grant of his homestead
patent application.
As such, it is highly implausible that the Motherland had been acquired...
and registered by mistake or through fraud as would create an implied trust
between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco, especially considering the dearth
of evidence showing that the Imbornal sisters entered into the possession
of the Motherland, or a portion... thereof, or asserted any right over the
same at any point during their lifetime

Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his
name pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 24991 on December 15, 1933,
Ciriaco's title to the Motherland had become indefeasible. It... bears to
stress that the proceedings for land registration that led to the issuance of
Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in Ciriaco's
name are presumptively regular and proper,[49] which presumption has not
been overcome by the... evidence presented by Francisco, et al.

In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners,
are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First Accretion
had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over the First
Accretion. Consequently, as the Second

Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no
right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they
acquired these properties through prescription as it was not established
that they were in possession of any of them. Therefore,... whether through
accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible conclusion
is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over the First and
Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said
properties cannot be... reconveyed in their favor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

RACHEL C. CELESTIAL VS JESSE CACHOPERO Gr. No. 142595.
October 15, 2003
Posted by LADY ESQUIRE  on JUNE 28, 2012
 
Facts:
 Respondent, brother of petitioner, filed an MSA (Miscellaneous Sales
Application)with the Bureau of Lands. Petitioner filed a protest, claiming
preferential right over the land. However, on an ocular inspection, the Bureau
found that the subject land was outside the commerce of man and thus, denied the
petitioner’s protest. Petitioner thereafter filed an ejectment case against the
respondent. Subsequently, respondent filed another MSA which the petitioner once
again protested against. The DENR Regional Executive Director declared that the
land is suitable for residential purposes and in the light of the conflicting interest of
the parties, ordered that the land be sold at public auction. Respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the said order but was denied by the OIC Regional
Executive Director of Region XII. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary
restraining order. Petitioner then moved for the dismissal for lack of  jurisdiction
and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The RTC denied respondent’s
petition. The CA on the other hand, reversed and set aside the decision of the CA
and ordered the DENR to process the MSA of the respondent. Petitioner contends
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the respondent’s petition for certiorari.
Issue: 
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari.
Ruling: 
 Yes. Petition for review of a decision of a quasi-judicial agency under rule 43
andpetition for review under rule 65 is separate and distinct. The petition filed
beforethe RTC clearly shows that it alleged the DENR acted with grave abuse of
discretionand without or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Ordersthrough a special civil action for certiorari was within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
MALLILIN JR. V CASTILLO
Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM
G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000 [Article 148-Property Regime of
Bigamous Marriage]
FACTS:
Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still
subsisted. During their union, they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage
Corporation. The business flourished and the couple acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable
differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a complaint for partition and/or
payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages against Castillo.
Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between them
because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-ownership shall
govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband
and wife but not married, they are not capacitated to marry each other because of
their valid subsisting marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real
and personal properties involved in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that
they were acquired entirely  out of her own money and registered solely in her
name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING:
Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are
incapacitated to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover
parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under
Article 148 of the Family Code where co-ownership is limited, properties acquired
by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
Categories: Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code, Property Regime
of Unions Without Marriage
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN v. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, GR No. 136803, 2000-
06-16
Facts:
petitioner and respondent, both married and with children, but separated
from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in
1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted.
During their union, they... set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage
Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of
directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer.
The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and
personal properties which were... registered solely in respondent's name.
the couple separated.
Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties,
but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered
solely in her name.
She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the
fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses.
She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties
involved in petitioner's... action for partition on the ground that they were
acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name.
Issues:
Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or payment of co-ownership
share, accounting and damages, considering that plaintiff and defendant
are admittedly both married to their respective spouses under still valid and
subsisting marriages, even... assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that they
lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage?
Ruling:
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
provided they are not incapacitated or are without impediment to marry
each other,[15] or in which the... marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not
bigamous. Art. 144, therefore, does not cover parties living in an adulterous
relationship. However, Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a
limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are incapacitated
to... marry each other.
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to... their respective contributions.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by
them through their joint contribution of money,... property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus
co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry each
other.
We do not think this is correct. The legal relation of the parties is already
specifically covered by Art. 148 of the Family Code under which all the
properties acquired by the... parties out of their actual joint contributions of
money, property or industry shall constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership
is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other.
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May
7, 1998, is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Makati City for further proceedings on the merits.
G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000 EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR. vs. MA. ELVIRA
CASTILLO
August 18, 2019

G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR. vs. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO

FACTS:
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for
"Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages"
against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
93-656 at the Regional Trial Court in Makati City, alleged that petitioner and
respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their respective
spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective
marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs
Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of
directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished
and petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were
registered solely in respondent's name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences,
the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject
properties, but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered
solely in her name.
She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the fact was
that they were still legally married to their respective spouses. She claimed to be
the exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action
for partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money
and registered solely in her name.
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, in
accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. She contended that summary
judgment was proper, because the issues raised in the pleadings were sham and not
genuine.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the couple are capacitated to marry each other at the time they are
living together could own common properties?

HELD:
Yes.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage provided
they are not incapacitated or are without impediment to marry each other, or in
which the marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous. Art. 144,
therefore, does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art.
148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where
the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other. It states:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credits.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not
capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been
living together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family
Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a
woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions
which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is
thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties herein.
Consequently, whether petitioner and respondent cohabited and whether the
properties involved in the case are part of the alleged co-ownership are genuine
and material. All but one of the properties involved were alleged to have been
acquired after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the
property acquired before the Family Code took effect if it is shown that it was
really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code, then it should be excluded.
Mallilin vs Castillo
Mallilin vs. Castillo
GR No. 136803, June 16, 2000

FACTS:

Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and
with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979
while respective marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs
Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was the President
and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise
acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent’s
name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then
demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused
alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore,
respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they
were still legally married at the time of cohabitation.

Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent

filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and
granted the latter.

ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties
registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting
relationship when they started living together.

HELD:
The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry
each other and were living together could not have owned properties in common.
Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties
acquired by them through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-
ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each
other.

Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for partition on grounds of

due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties
was denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply
excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of
Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case.

The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings.

Mallilin vs Castillo G.R. No. 136803 | Article 147 Property Regime of Unions
without Marriage FACTS: Sometime in 1979, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. and
respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo, both were married and with children, cohabitated
even during the existence of their respective marriages. The Superfreight Customs
Brokerage Corporation was put up by them during their union. The petitioner being
the president and chairman of the board of directors while the respondent as vice-
president and treasurer. Because of their brokerage business, they were able to buy
personal properties, which they registered solely in respondent’s name. When the
couple separated in 1992 due to irreconcilable differences, petitioner demanded
from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging
that said properties had been registered solely in her name. That she exclusively
owns the properties since she acquired them out of her own money. Respondent
also denied that she lived with the petitioner as husband and wife because they in
fact were legally married with their respective spouses. Petitioner filed a complaint
for partition of co-ownership shares of their alleged properties. PETITIONER’S
CONTENTION: [1] That the properties were acquired by him and respondent
during their union from profits derived from their brokerage business. [2] That said
properties were solely registered in respondent’s name only because they agreed
that arrangement, there was an implied trust in accordance with Art. 1452 and Art.
1453 of the Civil Code. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: [1] That even if she
and petitioner actually cohabitated, petitioner could not validly claim part of the
properties because of Art. 144 of the Civil Code. [2] That petitioner can’t be
considered an unregistered co-owner of the properties, since titles to the land are
solely in her name, to grant petitioner’s prayer would be to allow a collateral attack
on the validity of titles. ISSUE: Whether or not the parties can be considered as co-
owners of the properties, under the law, considering that they were both married
and incapable of marrying each other, even assuming they lived together as
husband and wife. HELD: Yes. They can be considered as co-owners of the
properties and the court ruled that the trial court erred that if parties were
incapacitated to marry each other, they could not own common properties. RATIO:


Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which provides that the rules on co-ownership shall
govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband
and wife but not married, or under a marriage which is void ab initio, applies only
if the parties are not in any way incapacitated to contract marriage, was actually
repealed by the Family Code under Article 148. And it provides that when a man
and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.

There was not a collateral attack on the validity of titles according to the court of
appeal since petitioner sought to compel respondent to execute documents
necessary to effect transfer of what he claimed was his share, petitioner in fact
recognized their validity.


Art. 1452 of the Civil Code which provides that "If two or more persons agree to
purchase property and by common consent the legal title is taken in the name of
one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the
others in proportion to the interest of each”

Art. 1453. When the property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared
intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another grantor, there is an implied trust in
favor of the person whose benefit is contemplated.

Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other

Ocampo v. Ocampo
G.R. No. 150707. April 14, 2004
Facts:

The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and
Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten (10) children. Two of them, Fidela, and
Felicidad are respondents herein.

During the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo, they
acquired 3 parcels of land. Upon their death, they left the properties. Only one of
them, Lot A is the subject of this case, a parcel of residential/ commercial land
situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur. These lands are actually owned
in common by the children of the late spouses although the land denominated as
parcel A of the complaint, it is ostensibly registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo
alone but acknowledged by her as a property owned in common by all of them,
brothers and sisters. Plaintiffs’ desire to partition said properties but defendants
Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably refuse to do so; that the
same defendants have been receiving the fruits of the properties to the exclusion of
their co-heirs.

In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the partition
of the properties; ordering defendants Fidela and Felicidad to release or otherwise
cancel any and all encumbrances which they had caused to be annotated on the
TCT; to refrain from further encumbering said properties; and to indemnify
plaintiffs.

The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito and

Vicente Barrito are spouses; that in 1987, the TCT in the name of defendant Fidela
and covering the lot described as parcel A was cancelled and, in lieu thereof a TCT
was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, on the strength of an allege[d]
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela in their
favor.
At the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos was presented for registration and
when a TCT was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, both the donor and
donees were notoriously aware that said properties were owned by the Ocampo
brothers and sisters, and that the donor Fidela was not the exclusive owner thereof.

The RTC holds and declares that defendant spouses are the true and lawful
exclusive owners of the following properties. The CA affirmed with modifications
(for damages) the said ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC erred for holding and declaring defendant spouses as true and
lawful exclusive owners of the disputed property?

Ruling:

Petitioners’ chief evidence of co-ownership of the property in question is simply

the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier,
both the trial and the appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of
documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial and
documentary evidence that were adduced by respondents, such as:

First, Belen presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land, referring to the
subject property, executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix Ocampo as
buyer. The document dated in 1948, was acknowledged before a notary public.
Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo declared his “exclusive
ownership” of the property, “having been acquired by purchase[;] and [having]
been in [his] continuous, public, peaceful, adverse and material possession for
more than 50 years together with [his] predecessors in rights and interest, in [the]
concept of owner without any claim of other persons.”

Second, Respondent Belen proved that on February 1953, this property had been
sold to Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable consideration; and that Fidela had
entered the property, actually occupied it, and exercised all powers of dominion
over it to the exclusion of petitioners.

To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property, Belen also
presented a Real Estate Mortgage executed by the former as absolute owner. Fidela
had executed it in favor of her sister Apolonia Ocampo, one of the original
petitioners in this case, who is now represented by her heirs. Belen correctly argues
that in agreeing to be a mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and recognized Fidela as the
true owner of the land in question.

third, Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed in 1984,
between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate source
of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the property

Finally, Finally, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1365431 as proof
of her ownership of the property. To be sure, the best proof of ownership of the
land is the Certificate of Title (TCT). Hence, more than a bare allegation is
required to defeat the face value of respondent’s TCT, which enjoys a legal
presumption of regularity of issuance.
In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax Declaration
indicating that she, as owner, had been paying real estate taxes on the property, all
to the exclusion of petitioners.

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title

to the property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the
Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her
siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of the
Acknowledgement — assuming that its authenticity and due execution were
proven — the property had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation,
which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the document
(Acknowledgement of Co-ownership) relied upon by petitioners.

On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or document to
prove their ownership. Having filed an action involving property, they should have
relied on the strength of their own title and not on the alleged weakness of
respondents’ claim.

Neither can we accept petitioners’ contention that co-ownership is shown by the

fact that some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put up
businesses on the property. The appellate court correctly found that since the
litigants in this case were blood relatives, fraternal affection could have been a
good motive that impelled either Belen or Fidela to allow petitioners to use the
property. Without any proof, however, co-ownership among the parties cannot be
presumed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

OCAMPO et al vs. OCAMPO et al

NOVEMBER 11, 2010 ~ VBDIAZ
OCAMPO et al vs. OCAMPO et al

G.R. No. 150707

April 14, 2004

FACTS: The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose
Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten (10) children. 2 of
them, Fidela, and Felicidad are respondents herein.

‘The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose
Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo, they acquired 3parcels of land and,
upon their death, left the following properties. Only one of them, lot a is the
subject of this case, a parcel of residential/ commercial land situated in the
poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur

‘that the 3 parcels of land are actually owned in common by the children of
the late spouses although the land denominated as parcel (a) of the
complaint is ostensibly registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo alone but
acknowledged by her as a property owned in common by all of them,
brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to partition said properties but
defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably
refuse to do so; that the same defendants have been receiving the fruits of
the properties to the exclusion of their co-heirs ;and, that because of their
relationship, they undertook earnest efforts to amicably settle this
controversy but because of defendants’ utterly unreasonable and
unjustified actuations, the same failed.

‘In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the
partition of the properties; ordering defendants Fidela and Felicidad to
release or otherwise cancel any and all encumbrances which they had
caused to be annotated on the TCT; requiring Fidela and Felicidad to
refrain from further encumbering said properties; further ordering Fidela
and Felicidad to indemnify plaintiffs .

‘The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-

Barrito and Vicente Barrito are spouses; that in 1987, the TCT in the name
of defendant Fidela and covering the lot described as parcel (a) was
cancelled and, in lieu thereof aTCT was issued to defendant Belen
Ocampo-Barrito, on the strength of an allege[d] Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela in their favor.

That at the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos was presented for
registration and when a TCT was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-
Barrito, both the donor and donees were notoriously aware that said
properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and sisters, and that the
donor Fidela was not the exclusive owner thereof.

The RTC holds and declares that defendant spouses are the true and
lawful exclusive owners of the following properties. The CA affirmed with
modifications (for damages) the said ruling. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: At bottom, the question to be resolved in this case is who owns the
disputed property?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed

Decision AFFIRMED

Petitioners’ chief evidence of co-ownership of the property in question is

simply the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela. As
mentioned earlier, both the trial and the appellate courts were correct in
finding that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the
array of testimonial and documentary evidence that were adduced by
respondents, such as:

1. On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole
ownership of the property and presented preponderant proof of her claim.
she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land, referring to the
subject property, executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix
Ocampo as buyer. The document dated in 1948, was acknowledged before
a notary public. Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo
declared his “exclusive ownership” of the property, “having been acquired
by purchase[;] and [having] been in [his] continuous, public, peaceful,
adverse and material possession for more than 50 years together with [his]
predecessors in rights and interest, in [the] concept of owner without any
claim of other persons.”20

2. Respondent Belen proved that in 1953, this property had been sold to
Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable consideration; and that Fidela had
entered the property, actually occupied it, and exercised all powers of
dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners.

3. To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property,
Belen also presented a Real Estate Mortgage executed by the former as
absolute owner. Fidela had executed it in favor of her sister Apolonia
Ocampo, one of the original petitioners in this case, who is now
represented by her heirs. Belen correctly argues that in agreeing to be a
mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and recognized Fidela as the true owner of
the land in question.

4. Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed in 1984,

between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the
immediate source of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the property
5. In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax
Declaration indicating that she, as owner, had been paying real estate
taxes on the property, all to the exclusion of petitioners.

The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a contract of

mortgage is that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing
mortgaged. Co-ownership cannot be presumed even if only a portion of the
property was mortgaged to Apolonia, because a co-owner may dispose
only of one’s interest in the ideal or abstract part of the undivided thing co-
owned with others. The effect of a mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited
to the portion that may be allotted to that person upon the termination of the
co-ownership. In this case, Fidela mortgaged a definite portion of the
property and thus negated any acknowledgement of co-ownership.

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer

of title to the property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly
rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by
Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time
of the execution of the Acknowledgement — assuming that its authenticity
and due execution were proven — the property had already been donated
to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly
inconsistent with the document (Acknowledgement of Co-ownership) relied
upon by petitioners.

On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or
document to prove their ownership. Having filed an action involving
property, they should have relied on the strength of their own title and not
on the alleged weakness of respondents’ claim.

Neither can we accept petitioners’ contention that co-ownership is shown

by the fact that some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and
even put up businesses on the property. The appellate court correctly
found that since the litigants in this case were blood relatives, fraternal
affection could have been a good motive that impelled either Belen or
Fidela to allow petitioners to use the property. Without any proof, however,
co-ownership among the parties cannot be presumed.

It is quite surprising that despite the process of transfers and titling of the
subject property — commencing in 1948 and eventually leading to the sole
ownership of Belen in 1984 — it was only after 1984 that petitioners started
asserting their claim of co-ownership thereof

NOTES:

1. Petitioners argue that the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership may be

considered as a declaration against interest. A statement may be
admissible as such a declaration if it complies with the following requisites:

1) the declarant is dead or unable to testify;

2) it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;

3) at the time of the declaration, the declarant was aware that it was
contrary to his or her interest; and

4) the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed the declaration to be

true

The Acknowledgement of Co-ownership could not be a fact against the

interest of the declarant Fidela, since her right over the property had
already been extinguished by the prior act of donation. Thus, at the time of
the declaration, Fidela could not have acknowledged co-ownership, as she
had no more property against which she had an interest to declare.
2. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person gratuitously disposes of
a thing or a right in favor of another who accepts it. Once perfected, a
donation is final; its revocation or rescission cannot be effected, absent any
legal ground therefor. A donation may in fact comprehend the entire
property of the donor. At any rate, the law provides that donors should
reserve, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for their own
support and that of all their relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of
the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by them.

3. To be sure, petitioners’ arguments all pertain to circumstances

extraneous to the Deed of Donation itself. The law is clear that when its
terms have been reduced to writing, an agreement must be presumed to
contain all the terms agreed upon; and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement
Apolonia Ocampo vs. Fidela Ocampo (G.R. No. 150707, April 14, 2004,
427 SCRA 547)

FACTS:
Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo have ten children, including the
petitioners and respondents to this case. In the celebration of their
marriage, they acquired several properties, all of which are owned in
common by their children. However, the residential/commercial lot in
Nabua, Camarines Sur is ostensibly owned by Fidela Ocampo, although
the latter acknowledges that the same is co-owned by her and her siblings.

Aside from the first complaint that they have filed before the trial court,
petitioners also filed a supplemental complaint where they allege that
Fidela Ocampo cancelled the first TCT of the lot in Nabua and issued a
new one in the form of Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of Belen
Ocampo-Barrito and her spouse Vicente Barrito. Both the donor of the
donee are notoriously aware that the lot is still under dispute in the
petitioners' first complaint, nevertheless, the two still pursued the donation.
Petitioners also allege that the transfer of ownership from Fidela to Belen,
daughter of another defendant Felicidad, is tainted with fraud, actual and
deliberate, to deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share therein, knowing as
they do that the same are a co-ownership of the original parties plaintiffs
and defendants herein.

Defendants, on the other hand, allege that Fidela has been the absolute
owner of the property since 1949, and that its title is free from all
encumbrances and adverse claims. In 1984, Fidela conveyed the property
to Belen via a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos and since September 13, 1987,
Belen has been the absolute owner of the same property.

In its decision, the Appellate Court said that other than the
Acknowledgment of Co-ownership executed by Respondent Fidela
Ocampo, no documentary evidence was offered to establish petitioners’
claim of co-ownership. It also said that respondents were able to give clear
proof of their ownership of the property: the Transfer Certificate of Title and
the corresponding Tax Declaration in the name of Fidela, and later of Belen
Ocampo-Barrito.

ISSUE:
Where a deed of donation inter vivos entered in bad faith deprives the heirs
of their hereditary shares, is said deed valid?

HELD:
The Petition has no merit.

Belen presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed on January 13,

1984, between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the
immediate source of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the property.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer
of title to the property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly
rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by
Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time
of the execution of the Acknowledgement -- assuming that its authenticity
and due execution were proven -- the property had already been donated
to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly
inconsistent with the document relied upon by petitioners. We agree with
the RTC’s ratiocination:

"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself made a
written acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the properties
disputed with plaintiffs in this case, the same cannot be considered as a
declaration against Fidela’s interest since the alleged acknowledgement
was written and executed on 24 December 1985 when she was no longer
the owner of the property as the year previous, on 13 January 1984, she
had already donated all her properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito,
so that, in effect, she had no more properties with which she can have an
interest to declare against."

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CASE DIGEST: LACBAYAN VS. SAMOY, JR.

G.R. No. 165427 : March 21, 2011.

BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner, v. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.,

Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend

sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being already married, their
relationship developed. During their illicit relationship, petitioner and
respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish
a manpower services company.Five parcels of land were also acquired
during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondents
names, ostensibly as husband and wife.

Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decidedto part
ways sometime in 1991.In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter,
while the ownership over the three other properties will go to
respondent.However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be
included in the partition agreement, respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved,
petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties before
the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.

On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the
CA asserting that she is thepro indivisoowner of one-half of the properties
in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts decision subjected the
certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to
law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper to
thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition. Her appeal was
denied.

ISSUES:

1. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on ownership;

2. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally
attacked in the action for partition
3. Whether respondent is estopped from contesting the Partition
Agreement

HELD:

The petition is bereft of merit.

CIVIL LAW: Existence of co-ownership in an action for partition.

First issue: In Municipality of Bin v. Garcia, the Court explained that the
determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the
resolution of an action for partition. While it is true that the complaint
involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or
non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is
a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties.
Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless
this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly,
the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does
not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.

Second issue: There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot

be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What
cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership
which is, more often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of
ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used

REMEDIAL LAW: Admissions.

Third issue: An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against
his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is
inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. To be admissible, an admission
must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and
definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the
admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement

indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior
settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to
whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the
subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to
allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his
legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over
the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever
share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties.

DENIED.
BETTY B. LACBAYAN v. BAYANI S. SAMOY, GR No. 165427, 2011-03-21

Facts:

During their illicit relationship,... petitioner and respondent, together with

three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services
company.[4] Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period
and were registered in... petitioner and respondent's names, ostensibly as
husband and wife.

In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate
their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.[11]
Initially,... respondent agreed to petitioner's proposal that the properties in
Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the
ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent.[12]
However, when petitioner wanted additional demands... to be included in
the partition agreement, respondent refused.[13] Feeling aggrieved,
petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition[14] of the said properties
before the RTC... the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit.[23] In resolving the issue on ownership, the
RTC decided to give considerable weight to petitioner's own admission that
the properties were acquired not... from her own personal funds but from
the income of the manpower services company over which she owns a
measly 3.33% share.

petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro
indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute.
the appellate court denied the appeal

Issues:

Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of

ownership;

Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally
attacked in the action for partition; and

Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the

subject realties.

Ruling:

the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the

resolution of an action for partition. Thus:

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made
by voluntary agreement of... all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a... co-
ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,]
partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may... well also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt
after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and
an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just
share in the rents and profits of... the real estate in question

While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the
same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the
five real estate properties based on the transfer... certificates of title (TCTs)
covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise.
Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is
definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of
the disputed... properties.[30] More importantly, the complaint will not even
lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful
interest over the subject properties.
BETTY B. LACBAYAN VS. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.G.R. No. 165427.
March 21, 2011THIRD DIVISION. VILLARAMA Jr, J.:FACTS:During Betty
Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy’s illicit relationship, they, together with
threemore incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services
company, by which theyacquired 5 parcels of land, registered in their
names, ostensibly as husband and wife.Having parted ways eventually,
both of them agreed to divide the said properties andterminate their
business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, Samoy
agreedto Lacbayan's proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don
Enrique Heights be assigned tothe latter, while the ownership over the
three other properties will go to Samoy. However, whenLacbayan wanted
additional demands, Samoy refused. Thus, Lacbayan filed a complaint for
judicial partition of the said properties before theQuezon City RTC. In his
Answer, however, Samoy denied Lacbayan's claim of cohabitation andsaid
that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any
contributionfrom her.ISSUES:Does an action for partition preclude a
settlement on the issue of ownership? HELD:No. While it is true that the
complaint involved here is one for partition, the same ispremised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Petitionerinsists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate
properties based on the TCTscovering the subject properties. Respondent
maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, untiland unless this issue of co-
ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature toeffect a
partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not
even lie ifthe claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any
rightful interest over the subjectproperties.A careful perusal of the contents
of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that thedocument involves
matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of
whichis a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely
divide among themselves thesubject properties. Moreover, to follow
petitioner's argument would be to allow respondent notonly to admit against
his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be

lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not

allowed by law towaive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the
disputed properties. Petitioner herselfadmitted that she did not assent to
the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend thesame to include
other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of
anagreement she intentionally refused to sign

ANTIPOLO INING v. LEONARDO R. VEGA, GR No. 174727, 2013-08-12

Facts:

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of

a... parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-630[5] (OCT RO-630).
Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria
Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.

Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson,

herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased).
Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I.
Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the...
substituted respondents.

Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners
Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo,
and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea,
Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo

Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus

Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo
is survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco
(Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo),... Lucimo
Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and
Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa
Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is
not clear from the records if he was made... party to the proceedings, or if
he is alive at all.

In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and

Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria's grandchildren or spouses
thereof (Gregoria's heirs).

acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as

Romana's surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Kalibo, Aklan... recovery of ownership and possession, with... damages,
against Gregoria's heirs.
Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he demanded the partition of
the property but Gregoria's heirs refused to heed his demands... that
portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which
portions must be collated and included as part of the... portion to be
awarded to Gregoria's heirs

Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject
property;... that the same be partitioned after collation and determination of
the portion to which he is entitled; that Gregoria's heirs be ordered to
execute the necessary documents or agreements

Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that

Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the
sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the
same in... good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn
acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that
they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive
possession of the property with a just title; that they have been paying the...
taxes on the property; that Leonardo's claim is barred by estoppel and
laches

As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer

Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the property.

the trial court rendered a Decision

Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' right of action has
long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;
Declaring Lot 1786... to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria
Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered
cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to
issue a transfer certificate... of title to the heirs of Natividad Ining, one-
fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of
Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth
(1/4) share.

trial court found... deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon

never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the
property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon's
estate at the... time of his death in 1962. Leon's siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and
the respondents are entitled to Romana's share as the latter's successors.

the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon's death in
1962 or up to 1992 within which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo
instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already barred by
prescription

In addition, the trial court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo was...
guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to Gregoria's
heirs exclusively.

Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA... the appeal

questioned the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of Civil Case No.
5275, its application of Article 1141, and the award of the property to
Gregoria's heirs exclusively.

this appeal is GRANTED

CA held that the trial court's declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and
November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr.,
respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners' failure to appeal
the same. Proceeding from the premise that no... valid prior disposition of
the property was made by its owner Leon and that the property which
remained part of his estate at the time of his death passed on by
succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which thus makes
the parties herein who are Romana's and

Gregoria's heirs co-owners of the property in equal shares, the appellate

court held that only the issues of prescription and laches were needed to
be resolved.

CA declared that prescription began to run not from Leon's death in 1962,
but from Lucimo Sr.'s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in
1979,... which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the
property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the
Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-
owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he...
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that it
was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in
1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414)
solely in his name that a repudiation of his co-ownership with

Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running

of the 30-year prescriptive period under Article 1141.

The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.'s sole possession of the property for
more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the respondents as a
valid repudiation of the co-ownership either, stating that his exclusive
possession of the property and appropriation of its fruits... even his
continuous payment of the taxes thereon while adverse as against
strangers, may not be deemed so as against Leonardo in the absence of
clear and conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted or
deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention of... assuming
exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a showing that this was
effectively made known to Leonardo.

CA granted respondents' prayer for partition, directing that the manner of

partitioning the property shall be governed by the Commissioner's Report
and Sketch and the Supplementary Commissioner's Report which the
parties did not... contest.

Issues:

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-
OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION

OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES

Ruling:

The Court denies the Petition.

The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been
settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the
property remained part of Leon's estate.
The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of
Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then concluded that
no such sale from

Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not
appeal. Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should be
considered settled. Thus, petitioners' insistence on Lucimo Sr.'s 1943
purchase of the property to reinforce their claim over the... property must
be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the
subject property clearly remained part of Leon's estate upon his passing in
1962.

Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.

Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares.

Gregoria's and Romana's heirs are co-owners of the subject property.

Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana,

petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners,
they may use the property owned in common, provided they do so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as...
not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners
from using it according to their rights.

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation
of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-
owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the... co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing.

it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within
which Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon in 1962. Article
1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall begin
to run in... favor of a co-owner and against the other co-owners only from
the time he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his
repudiation to the other co-owners.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts' notice, however, is that while it
may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized
as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the
property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria;... he is merely Antipolo's
son-in-law, being married to Antipolo's daughter Teodora.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property;

Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-
ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not
run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek... a partition of the
property has not been lost.

Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this...
very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of
Leon. More significantly, the property, which is registered under the
Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon's name. Leon's
ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the property
passed... on to his heirs by operation of law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

Principles:

One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from
the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent's property.
Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the
estate that was formed among the... decedent's heirs.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation
of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-
owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the... co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing.

Ining v Vega (Succession)

Ining v Vega
GR No. 174727, August 12, 2013

ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL VILLANUEVA,

TEODORA VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO, CAMILO
FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR.,
MILAGROS FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO
FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES, ROBERTO TAJONERA,
NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA,
JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA-
FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ;
DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON,
CESARIA RIMON GONZALES AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND
PEDRO INING (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING (WIFE)
AND PEDRO INING, JR., Petitioners, v. LEONARDO R. VEGA,
SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO
M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA,
Respondents.

FACTS:

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a

3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon
and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana
Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both
deceased.
Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and
grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both
deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children
Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard
Vega, the substituted respondents.
Sibling # 2: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and
Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses
thereof (Gregoria’s heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the
said property.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to
him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery of
ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo)
claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have
become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who
acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez),
who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this
fact.

ISSUES BEFORE LOWER COURTS:

1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;

2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
3. Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by
estoppel or laches.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC –
1. No. Declared lot to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria
Roldan Ining
2. Concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn,
Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property
remained part of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962.
3. Dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription (30 years
adverse possession).
(2) CA:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as
successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan; Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786
as the share of the defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria
Roldan Ining;
2. Trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25,
1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively,
became final and was settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same.
3. There was no prescription. Prescription began to run not from Leon’s
death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership
of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of
the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of
the Civil Code, which provides that “[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a
co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,”

ISSUES:
I
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-
OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.

RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct based on the following reasons:
1. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long
been settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus,
the property remained part of Leon’s estate.
2. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
3. Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no
prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
4. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.
The CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 –
or even in 1980 – when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that
Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole
ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil
Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is
clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.
Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of
Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s
daughter Teodora.
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from
the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property.
Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the
estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.

OTHER NOTES:
1. Possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the
other co- owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-
heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co- heirs if he administers or takes care
of the rest thereof with the obligation to deliver the same to his co- owners
or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
2. Principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the
respondents. It held that laches is controlled by equitable considerations
and it cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be
utilized to deprive the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
3. “A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co- ownership. In order that the
title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting
to an ouster of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other
co-owners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.”
4. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for
succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
(2) Between parents and children;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing
co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.
Useless and ineffective

A LAW EACH DAY (KEEPS TROUBLE AWAY) - Jose C. Sison - The

Philippine Star
April 30, 2014 | 12:00am
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Family relations under the Family Code (Article 150) which is the primary
basis for succession include only relationship by blood, not by affinity. This
is the ruling in this case involving a valuable piece of land.

The parcel of land here had an area of 3,120 square meters covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-360 owned by Mang Dencio who was
married to Aling Rita. The couple however died without any children. So
when Mang Dencio died in 1962 the property was transferred by
succession to her surviving sisters, Mona and Doria who became its co-
owners by operation of law.

Mona and Doria however did not partition the property until both of them
died. Mona had a daughter while Doria had six surviving children. The
surviving children also did not partition the property yet until they all died
and were survived by their grandchildren. Mona only had a grandson, Leo,
while Doria had 12 grandchildren.
The property still remained undivided among the grandchildren although
Doria’s grandchildren took sole possession of the property while Leo
acquired custody of OCT RO-360. But in 1979, Max, who was married to
Cita one of Doria’s grand children, executed an Affidavit of Ownership
of Land and obtained a tax declaration over the property solely in his name
to the exclusion of Leo and all the other grandchildren of Doria. Later on in
1988, Max even deprived Leo of the fruits of the property.

Leo did not take any action until 1997 when he learned that the property
was already partitioned among the heirs of Doria to his exclusion. He filed
an action with the Regional Trial Court for partition, recovery of possession
with damages against the grandchildren and heirs of Doria praying, among
others, that he be declared owner of one-half of the property and that
Doria’s heirs be ordered to execute the necessary document for this
purpose.

After hearing however, the RTC dismissed Leo’s complaint and

declared the land to be the common property of the heirs of Doria only. The
RTC ruled that under Article 1141 of the Civil Code, the action for partition
and recovery of possession of a real property prescribes in 30 years. In this
case, the RTC said that Leo had only 30 years from the death of Mang
Dencio in 1962 or until 1992, within which to file the case. Since he filed the
case only in 1997, his action was already barred by prescription. Besides
he was also guilty of laches for his long inaction. Was the RTC correct?

No. The RTC erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leo
may seek partition from the death of Mang Dencio in 1962. Under Article
494 of the Civil Code (par.5), prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-
owner and against the other co-owners only from the time he positively
renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other
co-owners.
Actually in this case, even Max’s claim of exclusive ownership of the
entire property as contained in his Affidavit of Ownership cannot be
considered as a repudiation of the co-ownership that would start the
running of the prescriptive period. In point of law, Max is not a co-owner of
the property. It is his wife Cita who is the co-owner because under the
Family Code, family relations as the basis of succession exclude relations
by affinity. In this case, the successors- in-interest of Mang Dencio who
became co-owners of the property and can validly repudiate such co-
ownership for purposes of prescription are the grand children of his sisters
Mona and and Doria. Max is only the grandson-in-law married to Cita the
grand-daughter of Doria.

Since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation, Leo can still file the
action at any time. The RTC should not therefore have dismissed the case
but should have ordered the partition of the property, one-half to Leo as
successor in interest of Mona and one half to the children of Doria as her
successor-in interest (Ining vs. Vega, G.R. 174727, August 12, 2013 703
SCRA, 406)
Remedy in case of non-compliance with the judgment
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Persida Acosta
By Persida Acosta
December 15, 2018

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Persida Acosta
Dear PAO,

I sued my sister so that the house and lot of our deceased parents, which
she is occupying, will be divided between us. The court referred us to a
mediation proceeding and we both agreed that the property will be sold and
the proceeds will be divided equally. One year has elapsed after the court
approved the compromise agreement, but my sister refuses to abide by the
judgment. She has discouraged potential buyers of the property and is
even claiming that she will appeal the decision of the court. Can I file a
case for the physical division of the property because my sister refuses to
abide by the judgment?

Shawn
powered by AdSparc
Dear Shawn,

The compromise agreement which was approved by the court has the
effect of a final judgment. This finds support in the case of Spouses Aromin
vs. Floresca, et al. (GR 160994, July 27, 2006), where the Supreme Court,
through Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, stated:

“Xxx. It is well settled that a judicial compromise has the effect of res
judicata and is immediately executory and not appealable unless set aside
on grounds of nullity under Article 2038 of the Civil Code. Further, a
judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits,
wherein the parties have validly entered into stipulations and the evidence
was duly considered by the trial court that approved the agreement.”

There is already a judgment involving the matter; thus, the same should be
respected and should not be disturbed. This is in accordance with Letters
(b) and (c), Section 47, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, which
states:

“b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity.
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.”

Please be guided by the decision of the court in the case of Gadrinab vs.
Salamanca, et al. (GR 194560, June 11, 2014), where the Supreme Court,
through Associate Justice Mario Victor F. Leonen, stated:

“Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a

decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made
by the court that rendered it or by the

Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must
immediately be struck down.”

The physical division of the property, which is already the subject of the
judgment, is not allowed because this was already barred by res judicata.
The judgment is immediately executory, hence, your sister cannot file an
appeal involving the decision.

Your legal remedy because of the refusal of your sister to comply or abide
by the judgment is to file a motion for execution of the judgment pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

Remember also that disobedience of, or resistance to, a judgment of the

court is considered an indirect contemptuous act under Letter (b), Section
3, Rule 71 (id).
We hope that we were able to answer your queries. Please be reminded
that this advice is based solely on the facts you have narrated and our
appreciation of the same. Our opinion may vary when other facts are
changed or elaborated.
CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION v. EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA,
GR No. 151334, 2013-02-13

Facts:

The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died
intestate in May 1958. Petitioner Carolina is the surviving spouse. The
other petitioners Elena Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria A. Figuracion (Hilaria),
Felipa Figuracion-Manuel (Felipa), Quintin Figuracion, and Mary

Figuracion-Ginez and respondent Emilia were Carolina and Leandro's

children.[4]

Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, which were acquired by Leandro during his lifetime.

These properties were: (1) Lot No. 2299... and (2) Lot No. 705

Both lands were registered in the name of "Leandro Figuracion married to

Carolina Adviento". Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the above
real properties in... favor of his six (6) children on August 23, 1955. Their
shares, however, were not delineated with particularity because spouses
Leandro and Carolina reserved the lots and its fruits for their expenses.
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan... owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 15867 issued in his name on August
21, 1917.

Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife Marcela
Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio had
another daughter, herein petitioner Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina
Escabesa (Faustina).[6]

On November 28, 1961, Agripina[7] executed a Deed of Quitclaim[8] over

the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of her niece, herein respondent
Emilia.

on December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-

Adjudication[9] adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole
and exclusive heir of her deceased parents, Eulalio and Faustina.[10] On
the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[11] over
Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa... who in turn
immediately caused the cancellation of OCT No. 15867 and the issuance of
TCT No. 42244 in... their names.[12]

In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the
Philippines only in 1981. Upon her return and relying on the Deed of
Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707.[13]

The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her
agents threatened to demolish the house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was
prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and
705.
On May 23, 1994, respondent Emilia instituted the herein Complaint[15] for
the partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the

Affidavit of Self- Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244,
reconveyance of eastern half portion of Lot No. 707, quieting of title and
damages.

In opposition, the petitioners averred the following special and affirmative

defenses: (1) the respondent's cause of action had long prescribed and that
she is guilty of laches hence, now estopped from bringing the suit; (2) TCT
No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria have... already attained
indefeasibility and conclusiveness as to the true owners of Lot No. 707; and
(3) an action for partition is no longer tenable because Felipa and Hilaria
have already acquired rights adverse to that claimed by respondent Emilia
and the same amount to a... repudiation of the alleged co-ownership.[16]...
the RTC rendered its Decision dated June 26, 1997 disposing as follows:...
the complaint for partition, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages is
hereby ordered dismissed whereas the affidavit of self-adjudication[,] deed
of sale and the transfer certificate of title involving Lot 707 are hereby
declared... null and void.

The RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature
since their ownership is yet to be transmitted from Leandro to his heirs
whose respective shares thereto must still be determined in estate
settlement proceedings. Anent Lot No. 707, the RTC held that... petitioner
Carolina transferred only her one-half (½) share to Felipa and Hilaria and
any conveyance of the other half pertaining to Agripina was void. While the
RTC nullified the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and
TCT No. 42244, it refused to... adjudicate the ownership of the lot's eastern
half portion in favor of respondent Emilia since a settlement of the estate of
Eulalio is yet to be undertaken.[19]
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its Decision dated
December 11, 2001, ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot
No. 707. The CA explained that there is no necessity for placing Lot No.
707 under judicial administration since Carolina had long sold her

½ pro indiviso share to Felipa and Hilaria. Thus, when Carolina sold the
entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 as her own, the sale affected
only her share and not that belonging to her co-owner, Agripina. The proper
action in such case is not the nullification of the... sale, or for the recovery
of possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but
for a division or partition of the entire lot. Such partition should result in
segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.

The CA, however, agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299
and 705 is indeed premature considering that there is a pending legal
controversy with respect to Lot No. 705 and the accounting of the income
from Lot No. 2299 and of the expenses for the last illness and... burial of
Leandro and Carolina, for which the lots appear to have been intended.

Respondent Emilia appealed the CA's decision to the Court, docketed as

G.R. No. 154322. In a Decision promulgated on August 22, 2006, the Court
denied the appeal, concurring with the CA's ruling that a partition of Lot
Nos. 2299 and 705 would be inappropriate considering that:

(1) the ownership of Lot No. 705 is still in dispute; and (2) there are still
unresolved issues as to the expenses chargeable to the estate of Leandro.

Issues:

The respondent can compel the partition of Lot No. 707

The petitioners posit that the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in the name of
Hilaria and Felipa over Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 was an express
repudiation of the co-ownership with respondent Emilia. Considering the
period of time that has already lapsed since then, acquisitive... prescription
has already set in and the respondent is now barred

Ruling:

The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of
ownership. Such an action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest
in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by
the Rules of Court to set forth in their... complaint the nature and the extent
of their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition until
and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved.[35]

Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No.
707 from the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Agripina, who in turn, was the
co-owner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of Eulalio. It is well to
recall that the petitioners failed to... categorically dispute the existence of
the Deed of Quitclaim. Instead, they averred that it has been rendered
ineffective by TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria this
contention is, of course, flawed.

Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co- ownership
with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be
a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired... interest over the
property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.[36] Stated
differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system
does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The
certificate cannot... always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.[37] In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely
what respondent Emilia was able to successfully establish, as correctly
found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.

The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an

undisputed fact. As such heirs, they became co-owners of Lot No. 707
upon the death of Eulalio on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina was
predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became a co-owner of the lot upon

Eulalio's death. Faustina's share, however, passed on to her daughter

Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949. The Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice the share of Agripina
because it is not legally possible for one to... adjudicate unto himself an
entire property he was not the sole owner of. A co-owner cannot alienate
the shares of her other co-owners nemo dat qui non habet.[38]

Hence, Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of Agripina and Carolina.

when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 to Hilaria
and Felipa without the consent of her co-owner Agripina, the disposition
affected only Carolina's pro indiviso share, and the vendees, Hilaria and
Felipa, acquired only what corresponds to

Carolina's share. A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; hence,

a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-
owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a... co-owner of the
property.[40]

In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by

virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner,
and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner.[41]
Hilaria and Felipa did not acquire the... undivided portion pertaining to
Agripina, which has already been effectively bequeathed to respondent
Emilia as early as November 28, 1961 thru the Deed of Quitclaim. In turn,
being the successor-in-interest of Agripina's share in Lot No. 707,
respondent Emilia took the... former's place in the co-ownership and as
such co-owner, has the right to compel partition at any time.[42]

Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share

of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co
ownership.[43] The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-
ownership, is subject to certain... conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner
repudiates the co- ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious... possession of the property for the period
required by law.[44]

The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions. The act of Hilaria
and Felipa in effecting the registration of the entire Lot No. 707 in their
names thru TCT No. 42244 did not serve to effectively repudiate the co-
ownership. The respondent built her house on the eastern... portion of the
lot in 1981 without any opposition from the petitioners. Hilaria also paid
realty taxes on the lot, in behalf of the respondent, for the years 1983-1987.
[45]

These events indubitably show that Hilaria and Felipa failed to assert
exclusive title in themselves adversely to Emilia. Their acts clearly manifest
that they recognized the subsistence of their co-ownership with respondent
Emilia despite the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in 1962.

Their acts constitute an implied recognition of the co-ownership which in

turn negates the presence of a clear notice of repudiation to the
respondent.
In addition, when Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to the
exclusion of Emilia, an implied trust was created by force of law and the
two of them were considered a trustee of the respondent's undivided share.
[47] As trustees, they cannot... be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying
on the registration.

records do not reflect conclusive evidence showing the manner of

occupation and possession exercised by Hilaria and Felipa over the lot
from the time it was registered in their names. The only evidence of
possession extant in the records dates back only to 1985 when

Hilaria and Felipa declared the lot in their names for taxation purposes.[50]
Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of ownership, or in
this case, possession, do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights
of the other co-owners.

Hence, prescription among co-owners cannot take place when acts of

ownership exercised are vague or uncertain.[51]

The express disavowal of the co-ownership did not happen on December

11, 1962 when TCT No. 42244 was issued but in 1994 when Hilaria
attempted to demolish Emilia's house thus explicitly excluding her from the
co-ownership. It was the only time that Hilaria and Felipa made known...
their denial of the co-ownership. On the same year, the respondent
instituted the present complaint for partition; hence, the period required by
law for acquisitive period to set in was not met.

Anent laches, the Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the
proximity of the period when the co-ownership was expressly repudiated
and when the herein complaint was filed.
CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, ET. AL. v. EMILIA
FIGURACION-GERILLA, G.R. No. 151334, February 13, 2013
Remedial law; Defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for
the first time on appeal. Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly
emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for
the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory
and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be
permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so
would be unfair to the adverse party. The Court had likewise, innumerous
times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will
not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the
first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie
this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no
opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it
could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before
the trial court.

However, the Supreme Court also ruled that a party may change his theory
on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of
any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly
meet the issue raised in the new theory.
CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, ET. AL. v. EMILIA
FIGURACION-GERILLA, G.R. No. 151334, February 13, 2013
Remedial law; Defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for
the first time on appeal. Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly
emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for
the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory
and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be
permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so
would be unfair to the adverse party. The Court had likewise, innumerous
times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will
not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the
first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie
this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no
opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it
could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before
the trial court.

However, the Supreme Court also ruled that a party may change his theory
on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of
any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly
meet the issue raised in the new theory.
G.R. No. 151334 February 13, 2013 CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION
vs. EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA REYES, J.: Facts: The parties are the
heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May 1958. Lot
No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan was originally
owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered by an OCT issued in his
name. Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife Marcela
Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio had
another daughter, petitioner Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina
Escabesa (Faustina). Agripina executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the
eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of her niece, Emilia. Soon thereafter,
petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication adjudicating
unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her
deceased parents and also executed a Deed of Absolute Salein favor of
petitioners Hilaria and Felipa. Upon Emilia and her family’s return from the
U.S., and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the
eastern half of Lot No. 707. Years thereafter, Hilaria and her agents
threatened to demolish the house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was
prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and
705. The matter was initially brought before the Katarungang
Pambarangay, but no amicable settlement was reached by the parties.
Emilia instituted a Complaint for the partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705 and
707, annulment of the Affidavit of Self- Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale
and TCT No. 42244, reconveyance of eastern half portion of Lot No. 707,
quieting of title and damages. The RTC rendered its decision dismissing
the complaint for partition, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages is
hereby ordered dismissed whereas the affidavit of selfadjudication, deed of
sale and the transfer certificate of title involving Lot 707 were declared null
and void. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to
partition Lot No. 707 and declared Lot No. 707 to be owned by Emilia, ½
pro indiviso share; Felipa, ¼ pro indiviso share; and Hilaria, ¼ pro indiviso
share. Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondent can compel the partition
of Lot No. 707 (2) Whether or not the respondent’s right to demand for
partition is barred by acquisitive prescription or laches (3) Whether or not
respondent is entitled to the eastern half of Lot No. 707 Held: (1) Yes. The
first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of
ownership. Such an action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest
in the subject property.

In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to set
forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property.
It would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of
ownership is first definitely resolved. Placing a parcel of land under the
mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no
longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership. Agripina and Carolina, as legitimate
heirs of Eulalio, became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the death of
Eulalio. Since Faustina was predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became
a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalio’s death. Faustina’s share, however,
passed on to her daughter Carolina when the former died. The Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice the share of
Agripina because it is not legally possible for one to adjudicate unto himself
an entire property he was not the sole owner of. A co-owner cannot
alienate the shares of her other co-owners – nemo dat qui non habet. As
co-owners, each of them had full ownership of her part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto. A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share; hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of
the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner
of the property. In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee
obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as
co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-
owner. (2) No. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive
prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. The act of repudiation, as a mode of
terminating co-ownership, is subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-
owner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required
by law. To sustain a plea of prescription, it must always clearly appear that
one who was originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-
owners, and that his co-owners were apprised or should have been
apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership before the
alleged prescriptive period began to run. When Hilaria and Felipa
registered the lot in their names to the exclusion of Emilia, an implied trust
was created by force of law and the two of them were considered a trustee
of the respondent’s undivided share. As trustees, they cannot be permitted
to repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. (3) Yes. Under the Old
Civil Code which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and Marcela’s
marriage, Lot No. 707 was their conjugal property. When Marcela died,
one-half of the lot was automatically reserved to Eulalio, the surviving
spouse, as his share in the conjugal

partnership. Marcela’s rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted to

her legitimate child, Agripina and surviving spouse Eulalio. Under Article
834 of the Old Civil Code, Eulalio was entitled only to the usufruct of the lot
while the naked ownership belonged to Agripina. When he remarried,
Eulalio’s one half portion of the lot representing his share in the conjugal
partnership and his usufructuary right over the other half were brought into
his second marriage with Faustina. When Eulalio, ¼ portion of the lot was
reserved for Faustina as her share in the conjugal partnership. The
remaining ¼ were transmitted equally to the widow Faustina and Eulalio’s
children, Carolina and Agripina. However, Faustina is only entitled to the
usufruct of the third available for betterment. The usufructuary of Eulalio
over the ½ portion inherited by Agripina earlier was merged with her naked
ownership. Upon the death of Faustina, the shares in Lot No. 707 which
represents her share in the conjugal partnership and her inheritance from
Eulalio were in turn inherited by Carolina including Faustina’s usufructuary
rights which were merged with Carolina’s naked ownership. Therefore,
Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while the remaining 3/8
pertains to Carolina. Thus, when Carolina sold Lot No. 707 to Hilaria and
Felipa, the sale affected only 3/8 portion of the subject lot. Since the Deed
of Quitclaim, bequeathed only the ½ eastern portion of Lot No. 707 in favor
of Emilia instead of Agripina’s entire 5/8 share thereof, the remaining 1/8
portion shall be inherited by Agripina’s nearest collateral relative, who,
records show, is her sister Carolina.

Balus v. Balus

G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010

Petitioner Celestino and respondents Saturnino and Leonarda are the

children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on 6
September 1978. In 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land as security for
a loan obtained from a bank. When Rufo failed to pay the loan, the property
was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder
at a public auction held for that purpose. The same was not redeemed
within the period allowed by law. Hence, a new title was issued in the name
of the Bank. Rufo died on 6 July 1984. On 10 October, 1989, petitioner and
respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to
each of the a specific one-third portion of the subject property. Three years
thereafter, respondents bought the subject property from the Bank and a
new title was issued in their name. Meanwhile, petitioner continued
possession of the subject lot. The respondents thus filed a complaint for
recovery of possession. However, petitioner alleged that respondents’ act
of buying back the property without notifying him inures to his benefit as co-
owner and that he is entitled to a one-third share of the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property forms part of the estate of
petitioner and respondents’ father

No. The court ruled that the subject property does not form part of the
estate of Rufo considering that ownership over the same was transferred to
the bank prior to the death of Rufo. Inheritance consists of existing
property, as well as accrued property, and transmissible rights and
obligations at the time of death of the decedent. Thus, since Rufo lost
ownership over the subject property during his lifetime, the same no longer
forms part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim at the time of his
death. Consequently, his children never inherited the property. The Court
further ruled that petitioner and respondents are not co-owners of the
subject property and there is no property to partition, as the disputed lot
never formed part of the estate of their deceased father.
GR No. 168970 Balus vs Balus
FACTS: On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land as security
for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo
failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed
and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public
auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale
was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not
redeemed within the period allowed by law. On January 25, 1984, the
sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank’s favor. Thereafter, a
new title was issued in the name of the Bank. Subsequently Rufo died on
July 6, 1984. On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them
a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246
square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions
wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father
mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to
redeem the same at the soonest possible time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned land is part of the Estate of Rufo.
HELD: No the subject lang is not part of the estate of Rufo. ART 777
provides that the rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death.The inheritance of a person consists of the property
and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as
well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession. Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime,
it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no
longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated
differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from
their father.
BALUS v BALUS GR 168970
December 10, 2016Uncategorized
FACTS: Petitioner and Respondents are children of Sps. Rufo and
Sebastiana Balus. In 1978, Sebastiana died while Rufo died in 1984. In
1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land which he owns as a security for a
loan he obtained from Rural Bank. He failed to pay his loan; mortgaged
property was foreclosed and was sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at
public auction. In 1981, Certificate of Sale was executed by the Sheriff in
favor of the Bank. Property was not redeemed within the period allowed by
law. More than 2 years after the auction (1984), Sheriff executed a Definite
Deed of Sale in the Bank’s favor. Thereafter, new title was issued in the
name of the Bank. Petitioner and Respondents executed an extra judicial
settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them specific 1/3 portion of the
subject property. Contained therein knowledge of mortgaged property and
agreed to redeem them the soonest possible time. Three (3) years after its
execution, one of the Respondents bought back property from the Bank.
Respondents filed action for Recovery of Possession and Damages against
the Petitioner who was in the possession thereof claiming that they were
the new owners of the disputed property. But Petitioner refused to
surrender possession of the same to them on the force of said extrajudicial
settlement. All amicable settlements were exhausted by the Respondents
but to no avail.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial settlement of the Estate’s properties
entered into by Petitioner and Respondents was valid even after the
transfer of title to the Bank?

HELD: Yes, insofar only as to that portion of Estate’s property not covered
by mortgage where title thereof was already transferred in the name of the
Bank after the period of redemption. Hence, there is no question that the
Bank had acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the
lifetime of Rufo.

Moreover, the rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the

moment of his death.

In this case, Rufo lost ownership of subject property during his lifetime; it
only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no
longer formed part of his estate to which the heirs may claim. Hence, the
Petitioner and the Respondents were wrong in assuming that they became
co-owners of the subject lot as it did not pass into their hands as
compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point of time.
CELESTINO BALUS v. SATURNINO BALUS, GR No. 168970, 2010-01-15

Facts:

Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and
Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died
on July 6, 1984.

On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as

security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del
Norte (Bank). The said property was originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-439(788)
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a
public auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate
of Sale[3] was executed by the sheriff in... favor of the Bank. The property
was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years
after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite
Deed of Sale[4] in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in
the... name of the Bank.

On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an

Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate[5] adjudicating to each of them a specific
one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square
meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also... contained provisions wherein
the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the
subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at
the soonest possible time.

Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein

respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12,
1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land[6] was executed by the Bank in
favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-39,484(a.f.)[7] was issued in the name of

respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.

On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint[8] for Recovery of

Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had
already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the
disputed property, but the petitioner still... refused to surrender possession
of the same to them.
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents
his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before
the respondents bought the subject lot from the

Bank.

the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing and setting

aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to immediately
surrender possession of the subject property to the respondents. The CA
ruled that when petitioner and respondents did... not redeem the subject
property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of
ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-
ownership was extinguished.

Issues:

whether co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property

persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto
transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the
respondents from the

Bank.

Ruling:

The Court is not persuaded.

Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the
time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property
formed part of the estate of their deceased father to which they may lay
claim as his heirs.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to

the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and
respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This
was stipulated by the parties during the hearing... conducted by the trial
court on October 28, 1996.[12] Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of
Sale[13] was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the
period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new... title
was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence,
there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the
contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death.[14] In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property
and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as
well as those which have... accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.[15] In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the
subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his
death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his... estate to
which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents
never inherited the subject lot from their father.

Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they

became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the
supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is
negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the... disputed lot did not
pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of
Rufo at any given point in time.
there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any
express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue with their
supposed co-ownership of the contested lot.

On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial

Settlement would not, in any way, support petitioner's contention that it was
his and his sibling's intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and
continue what they believed to be co-ownership... thereof.

For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement

between him and his siblings to continue what they thought was their
ownership of the subject property, even after the same had been bought by
the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said

Extrajudicial Settlement too far.

In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk

about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of
the estate of their deceased father.

Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of

continuing with their supposed co-ownership is negated by no less than his
assertions in the present petition that on several occasions he had the
chance to purchase the subject property back, but he... refused to do so. In
fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-
sell the same to him but he ignored such offer.

In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that,

at the time of the execution thereof, the parties were not yet aware that the
subject property was already exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless,
the lack of knowledge on the part of petitioner... and respondents that the
mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the property was already
transferred to the Bank does not give them the right or the authority to
unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of the disputed property

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to

continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts
the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly
manifested their intention of having the subject property... divided or
partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific
1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance
of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a
severance of the individual interests of each... co-owner, vesting in each of
them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to
enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other.[20] In
other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to... co-ownership,[21]
an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
Monday, April 5, 2010
CELESTINO BALUS vs. SATURNINO BALUS G.R.No. 168970 January
15, 2010 Peralta, J.:
Facts: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses
Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel
of land, which he owns, as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural
Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the
mortgaged property was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sloe
bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. The property was not
redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the
auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of
Sale in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of
the Bank.

On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an

Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific
one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square
meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the
parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the
subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at
the soonest possible time.

Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein

respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12,
1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the Bank in
favor of respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of
respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.

On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of

Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had
already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the
disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of
the same to them.

The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents
his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before
the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal

with the CA. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not
redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the
consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of
the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issue: Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the

subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank
and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually
bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
Held: The court is not persuaded.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to

the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and
respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This
was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court
on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was
issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of
redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued
in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no
question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot
during the lifetime of Rufo.

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well
as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.
In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property
during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed
parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay
claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the
subject lot from their father.

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to

continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts
the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly
manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or
partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific
1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance
of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a
severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of
them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to
enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. In other
words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an
objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
Occupation of Definite Portion as Partial Partition
In Vda. de Cabrera v. CA,[45] the Court held that where the transferees of
an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to
occupy a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a
period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or right
than said transferees. (Potior est conditio possidentis)[46] Such
undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial partition of the co-owned
property which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which he
occupies.[47] Conformably, the respondents are entitled to the subject
property, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for more than 35
years.

G.R. No. 188145

SPOUSES PRIMO INALVEZ AND JULIANA INALVEZ, PETITIONERS,
VS. BAYANG NOOL, ALLAN NOOL AND CELESTINO NOOL,
RESPONDENTS.
April 18, 2016
Sps. Primo Inalvez and Juliana Inalvez vs. Bayang Nool, et al.
G.R. No. 188145 April 18, 2016

Topic: Trust

Facts: The records showed that the subject property was originally covered
by TCT No. 583986
originally registered in the names of Spouses Nicolas and Francisca Nool
and Spouses Cornelio
and Bayang, with an area of 15.1441 ha. On May 3, 1965, Spouses
Cornelio and Bayang sold a large portion of their one-half share of the
landholding to the petitioners and Maria Zamora (Zamora). Then, on April
16, 1980, the new set of owners, namely, Spouses Macayanan, Zamora,
Spouses Cornelio and Bayang, and the petitioners executed a Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) over the whole property in favor of Tarlac Development
Bank (TDB) to secure a loan of Pl0,000.00. Unfortunately, the mortgage
was foreclosed, and the title to the subject property was consolidated with
TDB, together with the corresponding issuance of TCT No. 188251.13 On
April 17, 1985, TDB sold the parcel of land to the petitioners and Spouses
Jim and Liberty Baluyot (Spouses Baluyot). Hence, TCT No. 188251 was
cancelled and TCT No. 1882521 was issued in the names of the petitioners
and Spouses Baluyot. Meanwhile, the respondents continued possession
of the subject lot. On June 16, 2000, the petitioners instituted a complaint
for ejectment, collection of shares and damages, against the respondents
alleging that since Bayang is Juliana's sister, they allowed the respondents
to cultivate 2-ha portion of the subject property with the obligation to share
the landowners 25% of the harvest proceeds thereof. The respondents'
cultivation thereof was purportedly conditioned upon the payment to the
petitioners of a rightful share in the produce. Thus, when the respondents
failed to fulfil their undertaking, the petitioners instituted an ejectment
complaint against them. For her part, Bayang averred that she and her late
husband were the actual and registered co-owners of the subject property,
which they inherited from her father, together with the petitioners. Bayang
denied having sold portions of their property to the petitioners and Zamora.

Issue: Whether or not the Bayang is a co-owner since she inherited the
land from her father and thus made the petitioners a trustee of the land as
co-owners?

Held: YES. Records show that the subject property was originally owned by
Juliana and Bayang's father, Cleto Macayanan under Original Certificate of
Title No. 1665. "Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land
passes by succession to any person and he causes the
legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by
implication of law for the
 benefit of the true owner." Bayang, being an heir and a co-owner, is thus
entitled to the possession of the subject property. This was confirmed by
the issuance of TCT No. 58439 in the names of Spouses Nicolas and
Francisca for one-half share, Spouses Cornelio and Bayang for one-eighth
share, Zamora for one-fourth share, and the petitioners for one-eighth
share. Evidently, a co-ownership existed between the parties prior to the
foreclosure and consolidation of title in favor of TDB and the
subsequent re-acquisition thereof by the petitioners. Co-
ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
others.Before the partition of
a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to
any definite portion
thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota
proportionate share in the entire
land or thing. Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned
property itself, the

alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the
portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. In
case of foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission only of
whatever rights the seller had over of the thing sold. Indeed, a co-owner
does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is
mortgaged by another co-owner without the farmer's knowledge and
consent as in the case at bar. The mortgage of the inherited property is not
binding against co-heirs who never benefited. As correctly emphasized by
the CA, the petitioners' right in the subject property is limited only to their
share in the co-owned property. When the subject property was sold to and
consolidated in the name of TDB, the latter merely held the subject
property in trust for the respondents. the rights of the respondents as co-
owners of the subject property were never alienated despite TDB's
consolidation of ownership over the subject property.
G.R. No. 183546 Case Digest
G.R. No. 183546, September 18, 2009
Wilson Go
vs Harry GO
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

Wilson instituted an action for partition with accounting against Harry Go in

RTC Valenzuela City. Wilson alleged that they are among the five children
of Spouse Sio Tong Go and they are the registered owner of a parcel of
land in Valenzuela City. On the said land, there are 7 warehouses being
rented by various businesses without proper authority from Wilson. He also
alleges that Harry collected the rental payments for the warehouse without
giving Wilson his share to the rental.

Harry countered that there was no co-ownership because he acquired the

ownership of the land through extra-judicial settlement between their father
and certain Wendell Simsim. That before a partition may be decided, it
must be ascertain first whether there is co-ownership.

RTC: ruled in favor of Wilson and ordered Harry to deposit in court the
receipt of all the amounts collected by him from the leases. Harry, moved
for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. Harry filed then a petition
for certiorari with CA.

CA: ruled in favor of Harry.

It was premature for the respondent court to act favorable on private
respondent's motion to deposit in court all rentals collected from the date of
death of the said decedent, which according to petitioner is the true owner
of the property under co-ownership.
 Held:
The Court emphasizes that these are preliminary findings for the sole
purpose of resolving the propriety of the subject order requiring the deposit
of the monthly rentals with the trial court. The precise extent of the interest
of the parties in the subject land will have to await the final determination by
the trial court of the main action for partition after a trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The April 21, 2008

Decision and July 4, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 100100 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 4 and July 4,
2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172 in
Civil Case No. 179-V-06 are SET ASIDE and a new Order is entered
directing private respondent to deposit 1/12 of the monthly rentals collected
by him from the buildings on TCT No. V-44555 with the trial court from the
finality of this Decision and every month thereafter until it is finally adjudged
who is lawfully entitled thereto.
Ecarma vs CA
G.R. No. 193374 | June 08, 2016 Topic: Partition and distribution of estate under Art.
1078 and 1081 of NCC;
Facts: 

Spouses Natalio and Arminda owned 4 properties

designated as Kitanlad, Cuyapo and Lala consisting of 2
lots. They have 7 children among them were Gerry
Ecarma and private respondent Renato Ecarma. Natalio
predeceased Arminda, and therefater their children
executed Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate. No
physical division of properties was effected and they
remained in co-ownership even after the death of
Arminda. Renato Ecarma as the Special Administrator in
the intestate proceedings filed a Project of Partition
because of the conflict between Gerry and the other heirs
over actual division of their inherited properties. The legal
heirs except Gerry expressed their desire to have the
property partitioned. 

Gerry objected because the proposed partition is not

feasible, impractical and detrimental. The planned partition
is not accordance with the wishes of decedents, but
however, it was denied by the lower court. He brought up
the case to the CA but before the controversy has been
settled, he died. Therefore, the heirs of Gerry Ecarma filed
their Appellant’s Brief in substitution of the deceased.

Issue:

1. WON the Order of Partition is proper where one of the

co - owners refuse to accede to such proposed partition
on the ground that it is not feasible, impractical and
detrimental. - YES

Held:

1. Upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the

succession (covering Arminda's share in the subject
properties) vested and their co-ownership over the subject
properties has consolidated by operation of law.
Effectively, without a valid will of Arminda, and as
Arminda's compulsory heirs, herein parties (specifically
Gerry Ecarma prior to his death and substitution by herein
petitioners) all ipso facto co-owned the subject properties
in equal proportion being compulsory heirs of the
deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda. 

Their objection to the actual partition notwithstanding,

herein petitioners and even Rodolfo Ecarma cannot
compel the other co-heirs to remain in perpetual co-
ownership over the subject properties. Article 494, in
relation to Article 1083, of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-

ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned. 
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided
for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall
be valid. This term may be extended by a new
agreement. 
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period
which shall not exceed twenty years. 
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by
law. 
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. 
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division
of the estate unless the testator should have expressly
forbidden its partition, in which case the period of
indivision shall not exceed twenty years as provided in
Article 494. This power of the testator to prohibit division
applies to the legitime. 
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership
terminates when any of the causes for which partnership
is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for
compelling reasons that division should be ordered, upon
petition of one of the co-heirs.
Ineluctably, therefore, herein petitioners' absolute
opposition to the partition of the subject properties which
are co-owned has no basis in law. As mere co-owners,
herein petitioners, representing the share of the deceased
Gerry Ecarma, cannot preclude the other owners likewise
compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and
Arminda, from exercising all incidences of their full
ownership. 

50 Ignacio v. Reyes G.R. No. 213192 | July 12, 2017 Peralta, J. Topic:
Partition Petitioner: Teresa Ignacio Respondent: Ramon Reyes, Florencio
Reyes Jr., Rosario Du, and Carmelita Pastor DOCTRINE: There must be
first a determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a
partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.
FACTS:  Angel Reyes and Oliva R. Arevalo filed before the then CFI of
Rizal (now RTC of Pasig City, intestate court) a Petition for Letters of
Administration of the Estate of their father Florencio Sr.  Thereafter,
Teresa became the administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate. Teresa
executed several lease contracts over properties in Baguio City.  Herein
respondents filed before the RTC three complaints for partition, annulment
of lease contract, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction against Teresa and the lessees of the
subject Baguio properties. They alleged in their Complaints that, with the
exception of the lessees, the parties and the Florencio Sr. estate own one-
tenth (1/10) of each of the Session Road, Loakan and Military Cut-off, and
Magsaysay properties. They claimed that Teresa misrepresented that the
Florencio Sr. estate is the sole owner of the properties and leased the
same to the other parties without their conformity. They also asserted in
one of their complaints that the Florencio Sr. estate is different from the
Heirs of Florencio Sr. and Heirs of Salud.  They averred that, as co-
owners, they have not received their share in the monthly rentals of the
properties aforementioned.  RTC – manifested that it shall await a
Request Order from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution of
the subject properties.  Intestate Court – denied respondent’s motion 
CA – annulled order of intestate court. Granted respondent’s petition for
partition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in its decision? NO. HELD:
Petition denied. CA affirmed with modification to resume trial to determine
the question of ownership and if partition is proper. 

Respondents presented certificates of title of the properties registered

under their names and the Florencio Sr. estate, and their respective
shares. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties until
their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. The co-
ownership of the said properties by virtue of the certificates of title is a
common issue in the complaints for partition led before the Baguio RTC.
Thus, the intestate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
asserted jurisdiction over the

subject properties since its jurisdiction relates only to matters having to do

with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. 
An action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is typically
brought by a person claiming to be the owner of a specified property
against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be his
co-owners, and is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-
ownership between the parties.

In this regard, the RTC shirked from its duty when it deferred the trial to
await a request order from the intestate court regarding the possible
distribution. In fact, it has not yet made a definite ruling on the existence of
co-ownership. There was no declaration of entitlement to the desired
partition either because a co-ownership exists or a partition is not legally
prohibited. As this Court is not a trier of facts, it is for the trial court to
proceed and determine once and for all if there is co-ownership and to
partition the subject properties if there is no legal prohibition. It is also best
for the Baguio RTC to settle whether the respondents are claiming
ownership over the properties by virtue of their title adverse to that of their
late father and his estate and not by any right of inheritance.

FILIPINAS ESLON MANUFACTURING CORP. v. HEIRS OF BASILIO

LLANES, GR No. 194114, 2019-03-27

Facts:

Issues:

In essence, the CA believes that an action for quieting of title which

involves a challenge to the validity of a certificate of title is a collateral
attack which is prohibited by law.
Ruling:

The CA is mistaken.

Principles:

Complaint for Quieting of Title

Jurisprudence explains that an action or proceeding is deemed an attack

on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the
judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when
the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in
an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof.[19]

MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT DUE TO PLAINTIFF’S FAULT

under Rule 17, Sec. 3.
Sec. 3, Rule 17 enumerates the instances where the complaint may be
dismissed due to plaintiff’s fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the
presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action
for an
unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the rules or any
order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this
has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be
with prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided
in the order of dismissal. In other words, unless there be a qualification in
the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the dismissal should be
regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice. (Cruz vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164797, February 13, 2006)

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 164797 February 13, 2006

JOSEFINA M. CRUZ and ERNESTINA M. CONCEPCION, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION, MARIANO "BOY"
BUNAG and ROLANDO BUNAG, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

which seeks to reverse and set aside the decision1 of public respondent
Court of Appeals dated 19 March 2004 which dismissed the petition for
certiorari asking for the nullity of the 13 May 2003 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 2583-02,
and its Resolution2 dated 29 June 2004 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedents are substantially stated by the Court of Appeals as
follows:

There are four (4) cases involved in this controversy. The first case that
was filed between the parties is Civil Case No. 4365 for Unlawful Detainer
litigated before the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija entitled
"Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M. Concepcion, plaintiffs, vs. Mariano
`Boy' Bunag, Rolando Bunag, Remedios Bunag, et al., Defendants." This
case was decided on 6 November 1998 by the Municipal Trial Court in
favor of herein petitioner Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M. Concepcion.

The second case is Civil Case No. 1600 for Quieting of Title, filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 with "Carlos L.
Bunag, Elias Bunag Natividad, Mariano Bunag, Salud Bunag Clanaoc and
Juliana Bunag Arevalo, as Plaintiffs and Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M.
Concepcion as Heirs of Sps. Carlos Maniquis and Marina Bunag, as
Defendants." This case was dismissed for failure to prosecute as
evidenced by the Regional Trial Court Order dated 10 March 2000.

The third case is Civil Case No. 2573-02 for Injunction, with "Mariano `Boy'
Bunag and Rolando Bunag as Petitioners against Carlos Bunag, Elias
Bunag Natividad, Mariano Bunag, Salud Bunag Clanaoc and Juliana
Bunag Arevalo as Defendants." This case, which was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Branch 35, was dismissed on ground of
res judicata. The 6 November 2002 Order, in effect, ruled that there is a
substantial identity of parties in this case and in Civil Case No. 1600, a
Petition for Quieting of Title.

The fourth case is the instant controversy for Annulment of Title With
Damages. Docketed as Civil Case No. 2583-02, it was lodged by herein
private respondents Mariano "Bo[y]" Bunag and Rolando Bunag against
herein petitioners Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M. Concepcion before
the sala of Branch 35, Regional Trial Court of Gapan City.

It appears that herein petitioners interposed a Motion for Outright Dismissal

of Civil Case No. 2583 which was granted by the Court a quo as evidenced
by an Order dated 18 February 2003, ratiocinating:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful study of the arguments of both parties, the Court has found
that herein case (2583) involve the same parties, subject matter and issue
as that in Civil Case No. 1600 which has become final and executory and
Civil Case No. 2573-02 which was already dismissed by this Court on the
ground of res judicata. In all three cases, Mariano Bunag was included as
party-plaintiff and Ernestina Concepcion as party-defendant. The subject
matter involves a parcel of land located in San Nicolas, Gapan City with an
area of 1,160 square meters, more or less, and the issue is who between
the two parties has the lawful title over the same. Clearly, not only res
judicata but also accion pendente lite is present in herein case which the
plaintiffs and their counsel should have revealed in the
Certificate/Verification of their complaint. The allegation that it is only now
that they have learned of the existence of Civil Case No. 1600 is without
merit considering that in the Motion for the Outright Dismissal of Civil Case
No. 2573, dated September 19, 2002, its existence was already disclosed
and even became the ground for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2573 on
the ground of res judicata.

Moreover, the Certification against forum shopping does not only refer to
final and executory actions but also to pending controversies. Considering
that plaintiffs have been represented by the same counsel in Civil Case No.
2573 and herein case (Civil Case No. 2583-02), it is very clear that plaintiffs
counsel is appraised (sic) of the existence of Civil Case No. 1600 and Civil
Case No. 2573.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Outright Dismissal is
granted by reason of res judicata and accion pendente lite and the plaintiffs
and their counsel are declared guilty of indirect Contempt of Court by
reason of non-disclosure of Civil Case No. 1600 and Civil Case No. 2573
as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court and ordered
them to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 36)

xxx xxx xxx

However, when herein private respondents interposed their Motion for

Reconsideration, the court a quo reversed itself and reinstated the present
case, the fallo of the herein assailed Order reads:

xxx xxx xxx

In the light of the foregoing, the Order dated February 18, 2003 of this
Court, granting defendants' Motion for the Outright Dismissal of this case
and citing plaintiffs and counsel for contempt of court is hereby
reconsidered and set aside. Accordingly, the instant case is reinstated and
the defendants are directed to file their answer/responsive pleading within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this order.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 11-13)3

Via petition for review, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals. The latter
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that one of the elements of
res judicata, i.e., that there must be, between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action, is
lacking. It explained:

First. The issue in the Injunction case is the propriety of the demolition
order; while in the present action (Petition for Annulment of Title With
Damages), the pivot of inquiry is the ownership of the controversial estate.

Second. Private respondent Mariano Bunag denied that he authorized

Carlos Bunag to sign the Verified Complaint in his behalf. Because of this,
Mariano Bunag cannot be considered as a party litigant in the Injunction
case. Concomitantly, there is no identity of parties between the present
case and in Civil Case No. 2573-02 (Injunction). As correctly ruled by the
trial court, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

While it is true that this Court has earlier made a declaration in Civil Case
No. 2573 that Carlos Bunag was authorized by his co-plaintiffs to file Civil
Case No. 1600 including herein plaintiff Mariano Bunag, against herein
defendants, such declaration was based on the verified complain[t] signed
by Carlos Bunag. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court
has to assume that indeed Carlos Bunag was authorized by his co-plaintiff
Mariano Bunag to file Civil Case No. 1600. However, with the submission
of the affidavit of Mariano Bunag on April 14, 2003, wherein he claimed that
Civil Case No. 1600 for quieting of title was filed without his knowledge by
Carlos Bunag for and in behalf of the other plaintiffs including himself, the
verified complaint of Carlos Bunag is now disputed.

The categorical denial of Mariano Bunag that he was not aware that Carlos
included him as one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1600 for quieting of
title has disputed the verified complaint of Carlos Bunag. What is more,
Rolando Bunag, one of the herein plaintiffs was never made a party in the
said Civil Case No. 1600 for quieting of title. Since Mariano Bunag did not
authorize nor give his consent to Carlos Bunag to include him as one of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1600 and that herein plaintiffs Rolando Bunag is
not a party to the said case, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1600 will not
bind them. Hence, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1600 will not bar the
filing of the instant complaint as one of the requisites of res judicata is
absent. There is no identity of parties between Civil Case No. 1600 and the
instant case for the simple reason that herein plaintiffs were not parties in
Civil Case No. 1600 as discussed above. Consequently, plaintiffs and their
counsel can not be said to have violated the rule against forum shopping.
Plaintiffs and their counsel did not file Civil Case No. 1600 and therefore
they are not obligated to inform this Court that they have filed a similar
action involving the same issue with other court.

x x x"

Third. As the court of justice abhors the disposition of the case based on
technicalities, this Court further concurs with the trial court's disquisition, to
quote:

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, substantial justice demands that technicalities should not be

allowed to prevail over the substantive rights of a party-litigant. If the
subject property is really owned by the plaintiffs, then it would be the height
of injustice if they are not allowed to prove their cause of action because of
mere technicality. It would amount to deprivation of their property without
due process.4

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration5 which was denied in a

resolution dated 29 June 2004.6
Dissatisfied, petitioners are now before us charging that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed decision and resolution.7

Petitioners contend that all the elements of res judicata are present in the
instant case. They argue that the shuffling of parties should not prevent the
application of res judicata considering that three prior cases (Civil Case No.
4365 for Unlawful Detainer, Civil Case No. 1600 for Quieting of Title and
Civil Case No. 2573 for Injunction) against substantially the same parties
over the same subject matter and cause of action have all been decided in
their favor. They point out that private respondent Mariano "Boy" Bunag
was one of the parties in the Ejectment and Quieting of Title cases (and
Injunction), and that his allegation in his affidavit that he neither authorized
Carlos Bunag to include him in the Quieting of Title case nor was he
(Mariano) informed thereof, leaves too much to be desired and that same
was merely intended for delay. As regards the non-inclusion of private
respondent Rolando Bunag in the case for Quieting of Title but who was a
party in the Ejectment case (as well as in the Injunction case), they claim
that same was in preparation for this stage of the proceedings. They added
that insofar as identity of causes of action is concerned, it cannot be denied
that the ownership and its concomitant right of possession are the issues in
the cases for Quieting of Title, Injunction and Annulment of Title.

In their comment,8 private respondents Rolando Bunag and Monina

Luzong Vda. de Bunag9 maintain that the public respondent did not err
when it held that there was no res judicata in the instant case and that the
disposition of the case should not be based on technicalities.

The question to be resolved is: Does res judicata apply in the case at bar?

Under the rule of res judicata, also known as "bar by prior judgment," a final
judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a Court having jurisdiction of
the subject matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case
between the same parties and their successor-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity. The requisites essential for the application of the principle are: (1)
there must be a final judgment or order; (2) said judgment or order must be
on the merits; (3) the Court rendering the same must have jurisdiction on
the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be between the two
cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of
action.10

Petitioners claim res judicata applies in this case because all the elements
thereof are present. On the other hand, private respondents argue the
contrary alleging that the second and fourth elements are lacking.

There being no dispute as to the presence of the first and third elements,
we now determine if the second and fourth elements are attendant in the
case.

On the second element, private respondents argue that the dismissal of

Civil Case No. 1600 (for Quieting of Title) was not a dismissal on the
merits. The dismissal of this case, they claim, will not bar the filing of the
instant case (Civil Case No. 2583-02 for Annulment of Title) because there
was neither litigious consideration of the evidence nor any stipulations
submitted by the parties at the trial. In fact, there was no pre-trial
conference and that after four years of court inactivity, the case was
dismissed for failure to prosecute.11

Their argument does not hold water. Section 3 of Rule 17 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. - If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in
chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court.12

The rule enumerates the instances where the complaint may be dismissed
due to plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the
presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the rules
or any order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute,
this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be
with prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in
the order of dismissal. In other words, unless there be a qualification in the
order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the dismissal should be
regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice.13 The
order dismissing Civil Case No. 1600 reads:

For failure of the plaintiffs as well as counsel to appear on several settings

despite due notices, precisely for the reception of plaintiffs' evidence, upon
motion of the defendant through Atty. Mark Arcilla, this case is dismissed
for failure to prosecute.14

It is clear from the afore-mentioned order that said case was dismissed,
upon petitioners' motion, for failure of private respondents and their counsel
to attend several scheduled hearings for the presentation of their evidence.
Since the order did not contain a qualification whether same is with or
without prejudice, following Section 3, it is deemed to be with prejudice and
shall have the effect of an adjudication on the merits. A ruling based on a
motion to dismiss, without any trial on the merits or formal presentation of
evidence, can still be a judgment on the merits.15
We now go to the fourth element - identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action.

Petitioners, citing jurisprudence, argue that res judicata is not defeated by a

minor difference of parties, as it does not require absolute but only
substantial identity of parties16 in light of the fact that three prior cases
before the instant case have been decided in their favor against
substantially the same parties over the same subject matter and cause of
action.lavvphil.ñe+

Public respondent ruled there was no identity of parties for two reasons: (1)
Private respondent Mariano Bunag was not a party litigant in the Quieting
of Title17 case because he denied in an affidavit that he authorized Carlos
Bunag to sign the Verified Complaint and to make him a party thereof; (2)
Private respondent Rolando Bunag was not made a party in the Quieting of
Title case.

Private respondent Mariano "Boy" Bunag's claim that the Quieting of Title
case was filed without his knowledge does not inspire belief. In the decision
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 4365 (for Unlawful Detainer), it is very
clear that the defendants in said case that included both private
respondents, have knowledge of the pendency of the Quieting of Title case.
A portion of the decision18 reads:

Defendants claim of ownership of the property involved in this case which

is now pending with the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija
(paragraph 3, Pre-Trial brief of defendants) where the issue of ownership is
the subject of the proceedings x x x.

It was the defendants, through their trial brief, that informed the court
hearing the ejectment case that a case (Civil Case No. 1600 for Quieting of
Title) is pending where the issue of ownership is the subject of the
proceedings. Thus, as early as the pendency of the Ejectment case, private
respondents had known of the case for Quieting of Title. If he really did not
authorize Carlos Bunag to include him as one of the plaintiffs in the
Quieting of Title case, he could have easily questioned his inclusion therein
at an earlier time. This, he did not do. He executed his affidavit only on 14
April 2003 or more that three years after the case for Quieting of Title has
been dismissed, and after the Injunction case which he and private
respondent Rolando Bunag filed, was dismissed. It is evident that his
affidavit is a mere afterthought executed after his Motion for
Reconsideration in the injunction case was denied because the court gave
no weight on his counsel's allegation that he (Mariano Bunag) was unaware
of the complaint signed and filed by Carlos Bunag. It is too late in the day
for him to claim lack of knowledge. It is very clear that the execution of the
affidavit is to make it appear that there is no identity of parties in the instant
case and in the case for Quieting of Title.

Private respondents add that since Rolando Bunag was not a party in the
Quieting of Title case, the dismissal of said case will not bind him and thus
not bar the filing of the instant case.

We do not agree. The principle of res judicata may not be evaded by the
mere expedient of including an additional party to the first and second
action. Only substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application of
res judicata. The addition or elimination of some parties does not alter the
situation. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community
of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case
albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case.19

In the case at bar, it is apparent that from the face of the complaint for
Quieting of Title, private respondent Rolando Bunag was not a party therein
as his name does not appear in the title. This, notwithstanding, his claim
and that of the plaintiffs therein, which included private respondent Mariano
Bunag, are the same - to be declared the true owners of the parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22262 and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67161 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija. Private respondent Rolando Bunag and the plaintiffs are all heirs of
the alleged owners of the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 22262.
Private respondent Rolando Bunag, though not a party therein, shared an
identity of interest from which flowed an identity of relief sought, namely, to
declare them the true owners of the parcel of land covered by OCT No.
22262 and TCT No. 67161. Such identity of interest is sufficient to make
them privy-in-law, thereby satisfying the requisite of substantial identity of
parties.

As regards the identity of subject matter, we find that there is. In both Civil
Case No. 1600 (for Quieting of Title) and Civil Case No. 2583 (for
Annulment of Title), what is involved is one and the same parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 67161.

We likewise rule that there is identity of causes of action. Hornbook is the

rule that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity.
Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by
changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to determine
whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the
facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or
evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and
a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.20 In
Stilianopulos v. The City of Legaspi,21 this Court had this to say:

The underlying objectives or reliefs sought in both the quieting-of-title and

the annulment-of-title cases are essentially the same -- adjudication of the
ownership of the disputed lot and nullification of one of the two certificates
of title. Thus, it becomes readily apparent that the same evidence or set of
facts as those considered in the quieting-of-title case would also be used in
this Petition.
The difference in form and nature of the two actions is immaterial and is not
a reason to exempt petitioner from the effects of res judicata. The
philosophy behind this rule prohibits the parties from litigating the same
issue more than once. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such
trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them. Verily, there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and
their privies over a subject, once it is fully and fairly adjudicated.

Civil Case No. 1600 was for Quieting of Title, while Civil Case No. 2583 is
for Annulment of Title with Damages. The two cases are different only in
the form of action but an examination of the allegations in the second case
would reveal that the issue raised - ownership of the land -- and the relief
sought - be declared as owner and TCTs be issued in their names -- are
substantially the same. The evidence required to substantiate their claims
are likewise the same. The proceedings in the instant case, if permitted to
continue, would entail the presentation of evidence which should have
been adduced in the case for Quieting of Title. The case for Annulment of
Title is simply a second cycle of review involving a subject matter that has
already been decided with finality in the Quieting of Title case.

Finally, private respondents ask that the instant case be not decided based
on technicalities, for substantial justice demands that technicalities should
not be allowed to prevail over the substantive right of a party
litigant.lavvphil.ñe+

We find no reason not to adhere to the doctrine of res judicata. A case for
Quieting of Title had been filed for the purpose of determining the
ownership of the subject land, but same was dismissed because the
plaintiffs therein failed to attend the scheduled hearings for the presentation
of their evidence. As above discussed, the dismissal was an adjudication
on the merits. They had all the opportunity to present all the evidence for
their cause but they failed to do so. It is undeniable that there was no denial
of due process in this case.lavvphil.ñe+

The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated

system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in
various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be
an end to litigation - republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the hardship on the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause - nemo debet
bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public
peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the
gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the
preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.22 lavvphil.ñe+

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 March 2004 and its resolution
dated 29 June 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
2583-02 for Annulment of Title with Damages, pending before Branch 35 of
the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, is herby ordered
DISMISSED. With costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Asscociate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 CA rollo, pp. 71-78; Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.

with Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Regalado E.
Maambong, concurring.

2 Rollo, p. 22.
3 Id., pp. 14-17.

4 Id., pp. 18-20.

5 CA rollo, pp. 79-82.

6 Rollo, p. 22.

7 Id., p. 5.

8 Id., pp. 50-52.

9 Substituting her husband private respondent Mariano "Boy" Bunag per

Resolution dated 22 June 2005.

10 Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 401, 404 (1999).

11 Rollo, p. 93.

12 Prior to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Sec. 3 of Rule 17 of the

Revised Rules of Court reads:

Section 3. Failure to Prosecute - If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the

trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.
This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise provided by court.
13 De Knecht v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 833, 850 (1998).

14 Rollo, p. 38.

15 Luzon Development Bank v. Conquilla, G.R. No. 163338, 21 September

2005.

16 Manila Electric Company v. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., 425

Phil. 65, 80 (2002).

17 Not in the Injunction Case as erroneously stated by the public

respondent in page 6 of its decision. Rollo, p. 18.

18 MTC decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 27.

19 Heirs of the Late Faustina Adalid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122202,
26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 27, 39.

20 Luzon Development Bank v. Conquilla, supra note 15.

21 374 Phil. 879, 897 (1999).

22 Heirs of the Late Faustina Adalid v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19.

HEIRS OF UY VS. HEIRS OF DEL CASTILLO

G.R. No. 223610, 24 July 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J:
Facts: There was an action for quieting of title in the RTC
involving land, where the original petitioner was eventually substituted by
his siblings, the Heirs of Uy, and the original respondents were eventually
substituted by their children, the Heirs of Del Castillo.
The RTC eventually ruled in favor of the respondents and
issued a writ of execution with a notice of garnishment, seeking a levy for
attorney’s fees, moral damages, and litigation costs.
The Heirs of Uy then filed both an omnibus motion to quash the
WOE, claiming that it was invalid because it altered the terms of the RTC’s
decision which did not state that the zonal value mentioned therein referred
to the zonal value of the property at the time of execution, and a motion to
quash the case itself on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the Heirs of Uy in the Quieting of Title Case as they
were never served with summons.
The RTC granted the omnibus motion, nullifying and voiding the
NOG, but denying the motion to quash as its grounds had never been
raised before in the trial itself. The Heirs of Uy then filed a consolidated
motion for reconsideration, but this was denied. The Heirs of Uy then filed a
motion for review on certiorari with the CA, raising the additional issue that
that they cannot be held personally liable with their separate property for
their deceased sibling Jaime's liability and that respondents should have
filed a claim against Jaime's estate in accordance with Section 20, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, affirmed the RTC. The Heirs of Uy
then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC.
Issue: Was the CA correct in affirming the RTC?
Ruling: Yes, it was. Anent the Heirs of Uy’s claim that they were
never served with summons, the CA correctly pointed out that in the
November 1997 Manifestation/Motion, they, through their counsel, explicitly
stated, among others, that they "received the Summons with a copy of the
Second Amended Complaint" and that "the Answer earlier filed serves as
the Answer to the Second Amended Complaint." Having admitted the
foregoing, petitioners cannot now assert otherwise. Assuming arguendo
that petitioners did not receive summons for the amended complaint, they
were nonetheless deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's
jurisdiction by filing an Answer to the amended complaint and actively
participating in the case. In fact, one of the siblings was presented as a
witness for the defense. Moreover, they appealed the adverse RTC ruling
in the Quieting of Title Case all the way to the SC. It is settled that the
active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, is
tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case, and such will bar said party from later
on impugning the court's jurisdiction. After all, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant in civil cases is obtained either by a valid service of
summons upon him or by his voluntary submission to the court's authority.
In this regard, petitioners cannot also deny their counsel’s
authority to represent them. Indeed, if he was not authorized to represent
them, the natural reaction for petitioners was to exhibit concern. Based on
the records, however, there is no indication that any of them made even the
slightest objections to the representation. This only confirms the CA's
finding that such denial was a mere afterthought and a desperate attempt
to undo a final and executory judgment against them.
As to their contention that the Heirs of Del Castillo should have proceeded
against their brother’s estate pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, it is well to point out that based on the records, they were not merely
substituted in their brother’s place as Defendant; rather, they were
impleaded in their personal capacities. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, substitution of parties takes place when the party to the
action dies pending the resolution of the case and the claim is not
extinguished. As per Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it applies in
cases where the defendant dies while the case is pending and not before
the case was even filed in court, as in this case. If they truly believed the
estate is the proper party to the Quieting of Title Case, they could and
should have raised the lack of cause of action against them at the earliest
opportunity. Obviously, they did not do so; instead, they actively
participated in the case, adopted the answer earlier filed, and even litigated
the case all the way to the SC. They cannot now question the final and
executory judgment in the Quieting of Title Case because it happened to be
adverse to them.
GUILLERMO SALVADOR v. PATRICIA, GR No. 195834, 2016-11-09
Facts:

This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns
the property occupied by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares.

Additionally, to prevent the defendant Patricia Inc., from evicting the

plaintiffs from their respective improvements along Juan Luna Street,
plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction in their Complaint pending the
quieting of title on the merits.

The complaint was amended to include different branches of the

Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila. A Complaint-in-Intervention was filed
by the City of Manila as owner of the land occupied by the plaintiffs.
Another Complaint-in-Intervention by Ciriano Mijares was also filed alleging
that he was similarly situated as the other plaintiffs.

A preliminary injunction was granted and served on all the defendants.

To resolve the question about the boundaries of the properties of the City
of Manila and respondent Patricia, Inc., the RTC appointed, with the
concurrence of the parties, three geodetic engineers as commissioners,...
the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against Patricia,
Inc., permanently enjoining the latter from doing any act that would evict
the former from their respective premises, and from collecting any rentals
from them. The RTC deemed it more sound to side with two of the
commissioners who had found that the land belonged to the City of Manila

On appeal, the CA,... reversed the RTC's judgment... and dismissed the
complaint. The CA declared that the petitioners were without the necessary
interest, either legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit for quieting of title;
castigated the RTC for acting like a mere rubber stamp of the majority of
the commissioners; opined that the RTC should have conducted hearings
on the reports of the commissioners; ruled as highly improper the
adjudication of the boundary dispute in an action for quieting of title

The CA denied the motions for reconsideration

Hence, this appeal by the petitioners.

Issues:

The petitioners did not show that they were real parties in interest to
demand either injunction or quieting of title

The petitioners did not have a cause of action for injunction

Ruling:

Even assuming that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for
quieting of title, the petitioners failed to allege and prove their interest to
maintain the suit. Hence, the dismissal of this cause of action was
warranted.

An action to quiet title or remove the clouds over the title is a special civil
action governed by the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. Specifically, an action for quieting of title is essentially a
common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not
only to put things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights
to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit
of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he
deems best. But "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

To determine whether the petitioners as plaintiffs had the requisite interest

to bring the suit, a resort to the allegations of the complaint is necessary.

The petitioners did not claim ownership of the land itself, and did not show
their authority or other legal basis on which they had anchored their alleged
lawful occupation and superior possession of the property. On the contrary,
they only contended that their continued possession of the property had
been for more than 30 years; that they had built their houses in good faith;
and that the area had been declared an Area for Priority Development
(APD) under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended. Yet, none of such
reasons validly clothed them with the necessary interest to maintain the
action for quieting of title. For one, the authenticity of the title of the City of
Manila and Patricia, Inc. was not disputed but was even admitted by them
during trial. As such, they could not expect to have any right in the property
other than that of occupants whose possession was only tolerated by the
owners and rightful possessors. This was because land covered by a
Torrens title cannot b e acquired by prescription or by adverse possession.

Moreover, they would not be builders entitled to the protection of the Civil
Code as builders in good faith. Worse for them, as alleged in the
respondent's comments,... which they did not deny, they had been lessees
of Patricia, Inc. Such circumstances indicated that they had no claim to
possession in good faith, their occupation not being in the concept of
owners.
the Court observes that the fact that the area was declared an area for
priority development (APD) under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as
amended, did not provide sufficient interest to the petitioners. When an
area is declared as an APD, the occupants would enjoy the benefits
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1517 (Proclaiming Urban land
Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the Implementing Machinery
Thereof). In Frilles v. Yambao,... Presidential Decree No. 1517 only granted
to the occupants of APDs the right of first refusal, but such grant was true
only if and when the owner of the property decided to sell the property.
Only then would the right of first refusal accrue. Consequently, the right of
first refusal remained contingent, and was for that reason insufficient to
vest any title, legal or equitable, in the petitioners. Moreover, the CA's
adverse judgment dismissing their complaint as far as the action to quiet
title was concerned was correct. The main requirement for the action to be
brought is that there is a deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding casting
cloud on the plaintiffs' title that is alleged and shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy,
the eliminates the existence of the requirement. Their admission of the
genuineness and authenticity of Patricia, Inc.'s title negated the existence
of such deed, instrument, encumbrance or proceeding that was invalid, and
thus the action must necessarily fail.

Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is

directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory
injunction or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called
a prohibitory injunction. As a main action, injunction seeks to permanently
enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued by the court and
contained in the judgment.

Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a
right to be protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be
directed are violative of said right. Particularly, in actions involving realty,
preliminary injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his
title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose.
Accordingly, the petitioners must prove the existence of a right to be
protected. The records show, however, that they did not have any right to
be protected because they had established only the existence of the
boundary dispute between Patricia, Inc. and the City of Manila. Any
violation of the boundary by Patricia, Inc., if any, would give rise to the right
of action in favor of the City of Manila only. The dispute did not concern the
petitioners at all.

Principles:

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 25,

2010 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
What is the legal basis for an action of quieting of title?

The remedy of quieting of title is governed by Article 476 and 477 of the
Civil Code, which state:

“Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to
said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the
title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title
to real property or any interest therein.

Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the
real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in
possession of said property.”
What are the requisites of an action to quiet title?

An action to quiet title has two indispensable requisites, namely: “(1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.” (Spouses Caldito v. Obado, G.R. No. 181596, January 30,
2017)

What is the the meaning of “title”?

The first requisite is based on Article 477 of the Civil Code which requires
that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. “Legal title denotes
registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership,
meaning a title derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on
recognized equitable principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to
have the legal title transferred to him.” (Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No.
195834, November 9, 2016)

What is the subject of an action for quieting of title?

The concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to
quieting of title. In declaratory relief, the subject-matter is a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation,
or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of these documents.
The relief sought is the declaration of the petitioner’s rights and duties
thereunder. Being in the nature of declaratory relief, this special civil action
presupposes that there has yet been no breach or violation of the
instruments involved.
In an action for quieting of title, the subject matter is the title sought to have
quieted. “Title” is not limited to the certificate of registration under the
Torrens System (i.e., OCT or TCT). Pursuant to Article 477 of the Civil
Code, the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the
real property subject of the action for quieting of title. The plaintiff need not
even be in possession of the property. (Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. Nos.
170375, 170505, 173355-56, 173401, 17356-64, 178779 & 178894, July 7,
2010)

When is there a “cloud on a title”?

“A cloud on a title exists when: (a) there is an instrument (deed, or contract)

or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (b) which is apparently
valid or effective; (c) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive
prescription; and (d) and may be prejudicial to the title.” (Heirs of Tappa v.
Heirs of Bacud, G.R. No. 187633, April 4, 2016)

Who may file an action for quieting of title?

“Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring

an action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may also
be availed of by a person other than the registered owner because, in
[Article 476 of the Civil Code], ‘title’ does not necessarily refer to the
original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of
title to a property does not necessarily bar an action to quiet title.” (Spouses
Portic v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 156171, April 22, 2005)

What is the prescriptive period for an action to quiet title?

“There is no prescription when in an action for reconveyance, the claimant
is in actual possession of the property because this in effect is an action for
quieting of title:

‘[S]ince if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession

of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a
piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on
his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.'”
(Philippine National Bank v. Jumamoy, G.R. No. 169901, August 3, 2011,
670 PHIL 472-484)

Under what rule is an action for quieting of title filed?

An action for quieting of title is a special proceeding, specifically governed

by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court on declaratory relief and similar remedies.
Actions for declaratory relief and other similar remedies are distinguished
from ordinary civil actions because in declaratory relief, the subject-matter
is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order
or regulation, or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of these
documents. The relief sought is the declaration of the petitioner’s rights and
duties thereunder. (Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. Nos. 170375, 170505,
173355-56, 173401, 17356-64, 178779 & 178894, July 7, 2010)

“An action to quiet title or remove the clouds over the title is a special civil
action governed by the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. Specifically, an action for quieting of title is essentially a
common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not
only to put things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights
to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit
of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he
deems best.” (Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 195834, November 9,
2016)

How is an action to quiet title different from an action for reconveyance?

An action for reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496,

otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, as amended, which states
“[t]hat in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue
all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud,
without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of
a certificate of title.” (Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. Nos. 170375, 170505,
173355-56, 173401, 17356-64, 178779 & 178894, July 7, 2010)

The concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to
declaratory relief as this special civil action presupposes that there has
been no breach or violation of the instruments involved. Consequently,
unlike other judgments, the judgment in an action for declaratory relief does
not essentially entail any executional process as the only relief to be
properly granted therein is a declaration of the rights and duties of the
parties under the instrument, although some exceptions have been
recognized under certain situations. (Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. Nos.
170375, 170505, 173355-56, 173401, 17356-64, 178779 & 178894, July 7,
2010)
The Remedy of Quieting of Title
What is the remedy of quieting of title?
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded
on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights
of the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their
proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect
and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who
has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated,
and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may
desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best[1].

What law and rule govern quieting of title?

Quieting of title is governed by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code, and
this remedy is a special civil action under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

Which court has jurisdiction over an action for quieting of title?

The case of Salvador v. Patricia[2], Inc. is informative with respect to the

subject of jurisdiction, to wit:

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said
provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not
categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It
repeatedly uses the word "may"- that an action for quieting of title "may be
brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person
desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a
statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a
mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of

1980, as amended, uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve
title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00, thus:

What requisites must concur in order for an action to quiet title to prosper?

The following 2 requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has
a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy[3].

With regard to the first requisite, what does legal and equitable title mean?

Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means

beneficial ownership, meaning a title derived through a valid contract or
relation, and based on recognized equitable principles; the right in the
party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred to him[4].

As regards the second requisite, what does a cloud on a title mean?

A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract)

or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently
valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive
prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title[5].

[1] Mananquil v. Moico, G.R. No. 180076, November 21, 2012.

[2] G.R. No. 195834, November 09, 2016.
[3] Heirs of Tappa v. Heirs of Bacud, G.R. No. 187633, April 4, 2016.
[4] Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., supra.
[5] Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 227894, July 05, 2017.
SPOUSES ROLANDO AND SUSIE GOLEZ, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF
DOMINGO BERTULDO,
NAMELY: ERINITA BERTULDO-BERNALES, FLORENCIO BERTULDO,
DOMINADOR BERTULDO,
RODEL BERTULDO AND ROGER BERTULDO, HEREIN REPRESENTED
BY THEIR CO-HEIR AND
DULY APPOINTED ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ERINITA BERNALES,
Respondents.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 201289, May 30, 2016
Ponente: BRION, J.
FACTS:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners-spouses
Rolando and
Susie Golez (Sps. Golez) assailing the March 18, 2011 resolution1 and
March 8, 2012 resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 05741 on the ground
that respondents Heirs of
Domingo Bertuldo (collectively referred to in this case as respondents)
have no cause of action for
unlawful detainer.
The dispute involves two neighboring unregistered parcels of land located
at Roxas, Capiz,
In 1976, Benito Bertuldo (Benito) sold Lot 1024 to Asuncion Segovia acting
for her daughter, Susie
Golez. They executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 10, 1976,
clearly indicating the lot's
metes and bounds. After the sale, the Sps. Golez started the construction
of their house on Lot
10258, instead of on Lot 1024. Domingo Bertuldo (Domingo), Benito's first
cousin, claimed
ownership over Lot 1025 and protested against the Sps. Golez's house
construction. In response,
the Sps. Golez assured Domingo that the construction was being done on
Lot 1024.
Sometime in 1993 and after Domingo's death, the respondents conducted
a relocation
survey on Lot 1025.12 The relocation survey revealed that the Sps. Golez's
house stood on Lot
1025.13 The respondents confronted the Sps. Golez with this result. On
February 17, 2009, the
respondents filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer25 against the Sps.
Golez with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of President Roxas, Capiz, in Civil Case No.
507,26
Second, the ejectment complaint must be dismissed since there was no
tolerance from the
start of the Sps. Golez' possession of Lot 1025. To stress, the late Domingo
Bertuldo objected and
protested against the construction of the house.
Upon motion by the Sps. Golez, the MCTC ordered the conduct of a
relocation survey. The
survey result showed that 99.99% of the house of Sps. Golez occupied Lot
1025.
The MCTC, in its decision dated September 20, 2010,31 decided in favor of
the respondents
.The MCTC recognized that what the Sps. Golez actually bought from
Benito was Lot 1024 which
issue has already been decided with finality by no less than the Supreme
Court.32 Since the survey
result showed that the Sps. Golez's entire house occupies Lot 1025, the
Sps. Golez are in unlawful
possession of Lot 1025 under an erroneous claim of ownership. The MCTC
also held that the Sps.
Golez's possession of Lot 1025 was originally lawful because they believed
that they bought Lot
1025 from Benito Bertuldo, as evidenced by the execution of the Amended
Deed of Absolute Sale
and the filing of the quieting of title case against the respondents.34 Their
possession became illegal
when the RTC dismissed the quieting of title case and ruled that the Sps.
Golez bought Lot 1024, not
Lot 1025
On appeal to the RTC, the Sps. Golez reiterated their argument that there
is no cause of
action for unlawful detainer because Domingo's protest over the Sps.
Golez's house construction on
Lot 1025 negates the presence of tolerance which is an essential element
of an action for unlawful
detainer.
In its decision dated January 4, 2011, the RTC38 dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the
MCTC decision in toto.
In its Resolution48 dated March 18, 2011, the CA dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the
MCTC and RTC decisions.49 The CA held that it does not need to wait for
the DENR Secretary
Page | 36
resolution on the respondents' free patent application over Lot 1025
because the Supreme Court
has already ruled that the respondents are the lawful and rightful owners of
Lot 1025.50
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FILED
BY THE RESPONDENTS
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS WAS PROPER. Whether or not there was
tolerance on the part of
plaintiffs to warrant a case for unlawful detainer against respondents.
RULING:
We grant the petition. No cause of action for an unlawful detainer.
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of
real property. This
action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. A complaint for
unlawful detainer must
allege that: (a) the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his
possession was permitted
by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them;
(b) the defendant's
possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant
vacate the subject
property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under
the contract; (c) the
defendant refused to heed such demand; and (d) the case for unlawful
detainer is instituted within
one year from the date of last demand.
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action
and the jurisdiction
of the court. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting
unlawful detainer. In the
absence of these factual allegations , an action for unlawful detainer is not
the proper remedy and
the municipal trial court does not have jurisdiction over the case.
The respondents' allegations in the Complaint are contrary to the
requirements for an
unlawful detainer case. In an unlawful detainer, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal
and his possession was permitted by the owner through an express or
implied contract.
In the present case, paragraph 6 of the complaint clearly characterized the
Sps. Golez's
possession of Lot 1025 as unlawful from the start and bereft of contractual
or legal basis. Domingo
did not tolerate the possession of Sps. Golez since he had immediately
objected and protested over
the construction of Sps. Golez's house on Lot 1025. Notably, the RTC
expressly found that there was
no tolerance or permission on the part of Domingo on the construction of
the Sps. Golez house on
Lot 1025.
Since tolerance has not been effectively alleged in the complaint, the
complaint fails to state
a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Therefore, the MCTC had no
jurisdiction over the
respondents' complaint.
Even assuming arguendo that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
action, the
respondents still failed to prove that they or Domingo tolerated the Sps.
Golez's possession on
account of an express or implied contract between them.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs
supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be
recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an
action for unlawful detainer
would be an improper remedy.

MANANQUIL VS MOICO (GR NO. 180076 NOVEMBER 21, 2012)

Mananquil vs Moico
GR No. 180076 November 21, 2012

Facts: Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form  part  of the land previously expropriated by the National
Housing Authority (NHA) and  placed under its Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project – where
occupants, applicants or beneficiaries may purchase  lots on installment basis.  In October 1984, Lot 18 was awarded
to  spouses Iluminardo and  Prescilla Mananquil under a Conditional Contract to Sell.  Lot 19, on the other hand,
was sold to Prescilla in February 1980 by its occupant. When the spouses died, the heirs of Illuminardo filed for
extrajudicial settlement of estates of the spouses over lots 18 and 19. They appropriated to themselves the properties
by leasing it. However, herein respondent Moico  bought the properties from one Eulogio who is the alleged child of
Prescilla from her first marriage who in turn evicted the tenants of the herein petitioners. Upon finding out the of the
same, the Mananquils filed for an action to quiet the title against herein Moico claiming title over the said properties.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have legal title over the subject lots entitling for the relief of quieting of title.

Held: No. An action  for quieting of title is  essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. 

The competent court  is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to
place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said  immovable respect and not disturb the
other, but also for the benefit of both, so that  he who has the right would see every cloud of  doubt over the property
dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to 
abuse the property as  he  deems best.  But “for an  action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable  requisites must
concur, namely: 

(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title  to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and 
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title  must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its  prima  facie  appearance of validity or legal efficacy.”

Contrary to  petitioners’ stand,  the issue  relating to the grant of rights, title or award by the NHA determines
whether the case for quieting of title may be maintained.  If the petitioners are legitimate successors to or
beneficiaries of Iluminardo upon his death – under the certificate of title, award, or grant, or under the special law or
specific terms of  the  NHA program/project – then they possess the requisite interest to  maintain suit; if not, then 
Civil Case No. 2741-MN must necessarily be dismissed.

From  the evidence adduced below,  it appears that the petitioners have  failed to show their qualifications  or right
to succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the NHA program/project.  They  failed to present any  title, award, grant,
document or certification from the NHA  or proper government agency which would show that Iluminardo  and
Prescilla have  become the registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are
qualified successors or beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project,  taking over Iluminardo’s rights after
his death.  They  did not call to the witness  stand competent witnesses from  the NHA who can attest  to their rights
as successors to or beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19.  They  failed to present proof, at the very least, of the specific
law, provisions, or terms that govern  the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project which would
indicate  a modicum of interest on their part.   For this reason, their rights  or interest in  the property  could not be
established. 

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CASE DIGEST: MANANQUIL VS MOICO

G.R. No. 180076 : November 20, 2012

DIONISIO MANANQUIL, LAUDENCIA MANANQUIL-VILLAMOR,

ESTANISLAO MANANQUIL, and DIANITA MANANQUIL-RABINO,
represented by OTILLO RABINO, Petitioners, v. ROBERTO MOICO,
Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the land previously

expropriated by the National Housing Authority (NHA). Lots 18 and 19 were
awarded to spouses Iluminardo and Prescilla Mananquil under a
Conditional Contract to Sell.

After the death of the spouses in 1991, it turned out that Prescilla had a
child by a previous marriagenamely Eulogio Francisco Maypa (Eulogio).
Iluminardos supposed heirs (Mananquil heirs) his brothers and sisters and
herein petitioners Dionisio and Estanislao Mananquil (Estanislao),
Laudencia Mananquil-Villamor (Laudencia), and Dianita Mananquil-Rabino
(Dianita) executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and
adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. They took
possession of Lots 18 and 19 and leased them out to third parties.

Sometime later, the Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997, Eulogio and
two others, on the claim that they are surviving heirs of Iluminardo and
Prescilla, had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of
Rights and Sale, and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Roberto Moico
(Moico). Moico began evicting the Mananquils tenants. Thus, the
Mananquils filed a case for quieting of title.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Mananquils. On appeal, the CA reversed the
RTC.

The Mananquils argue that since they are the legal heirs of Iluminardo
Mananquil, then they possess the requisite legal or equitable title or interest
in Lots 18 and 19, which thus permits them to file an action to quiet title;
and whatever rights Iluminardo had over the lots were transmitted to them
from the moment of his death, per Article 777 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to quiet title should prosper?

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CIVIL LAW: quieting of title

An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded

on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights
of the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their
proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect
and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who
has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated,
and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may
desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But for
an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the petitioners have
failed to show their qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights
under the NHA program/project. They failed to present any title, award,
grant, document or certification from the NHA or proper government
agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have become the
registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that
petitioners are qualified successors or beneficiaries under the Dagat-
Dagatan program/project, taking over Iluminardos rights after his death.

Petitioners should have shown, to the satisfaction of the courts that under
the NHA program project governing the grant of Lots 18 and 19, they are
entitled and qualified to succeed or substitute for Iluminardo in his rights
upon his death.

DENIED.
G.R. No. 210607, March 25, 2019

DOCTRINE:

It is an elementary rule that since the only issue for resolution in

an ejectment case is physical or material possession, where the parties to
an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon
that issue only for the purposes of determining who between the parties
has the better right to possess the property.

FACTS:

Lopez filed a petition for quieting of title and damages against

petitioners Sps. Pozon, Tradex, the Register of Deeds of Makati,
Raymundo, Cuasay, Diomampo, and Evangelista. The petition sought to
declare void the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1515226 issued to
Tradex, covering a parcel of land with improvement located at 2149
Paraiso St., Dasmarinas Village, Makati City. In a Supplemental Complaint,
Lopez also sought the declaration of nullity of TCT No. 212133
subsequently issued in the name of Sps. Pozon.

Lopez bought the property from Zobel. After the sale of the
subject property, Lopez immediately took possession and occupied the
same. Then Beltran Cuasay Law Office assisted in the documentation of
the sale and the transfer of the title from Mr. Zobel to Lopez. Consequently,
the law office made it appear that the property was acquired by Raymundo.

Later, Lopez discovered that the title of the subject property was
in the name of Tradex and was never transferred in her name. She also
learned that Raymundo was brokering the sale of the subject property to
Sps. Pozon on behalf of Tradex. Lopez claimed that she told Raymundo
and Sps. Pozon that she owned the subject property and it was not for
sale. Lopez also refused them entry into the subject property for inspection.
Despite Lopez’s warning, Tradex, thru Diomampo, sold the subject property
to Sps. Pozon. Nonetheless, Tradex could not deliver possession of the
subject property Lopez was still in possession of the subject property.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court may pass upon the issue of ownership in
action for ejectment.

RULING:

YES. It is an elementary rule that since the only issue for

resolution in an ejectment case is physical or material possession, where
the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts
may pass upon that issue only for the purposes of determining who
between the parties has the better right to possess the property. Where the
issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication
of ownership is not final and binding, but merely for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession.

In fact, ironically, in the same Decision by the Court in the Ejectment Case
heavily invoked by petitioners Sps. Pozon, and contrary to their assertion,
the Court held that despite the resolution of the Ejectment Case,
respondent Lopez may thresh out the issue of ownership in the appropriate
proceeding, i.e., the Quieting of Title Case filed before the RTC, Branch
142: [If respondent] Lopez believes that she is entitled to relief, it may be
secured from the action for quieting of title pending before another branch
of the RTC. x x x It is also not difficult to see that [respondent] Lopez wants
this Court to take cognizance of circumstances which she believes would
support her alleged ownership of the [subject] property and cast doubt on
the [petitioners Sps. Pozon’s] manner of acquisition, and then rule on these
competing claims, especially since she refuses to accept the determination
of the courts below in the ejectment case that, based on the TCT in their
name, the [petitioners Sps.] Pozon have a better right to possess the
[subject] property. This Court is not a trier of facts nor can it take
cognizance of facts alleged by [respondent] Lopez that have yet to be
proven in an appropriate proceeding, such as Civil Case No. 96-692
pending in the RTC[, Branch 142].

Held: Yes. An action for specific performance praying for the execution
ofan instrument in connection with an undertaking in a contract to sell,
whichis precisely similar to the Specific Performance Case invoked by
petitionersSps. Pozon in the instant case, is an action in personam. And
being ajudgment in personam, the judgment is binding ONLY upon the
partiesproperly impleaded therein. Since it is beyond dispute that
respondentLopez was NOT impleaded in the Specific
Performance Case, then,contrary to the assertion of petitioners Sps.
Pozon, it cannot bind and affectrespondent Lopez and her claim of
ownership over the subject property. Itis an elementary rule that since the
only issue for resolution in an ejectmentcase is physical or material
possession, where the parties to an ejectmentcase raise the issue of
ownership, the courts may pass upon that issueonly for the purposes of
determining who between the parties has thebetter right to
possess the property. Where the issue of ownership
isinseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of ownership is
notfinal and binding, but merely for the purpose of resolving the
issue ofpossession.
HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ,
GR No. 170604, 2013-09-02

Facts:

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document
are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the
inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast
a cloud on the title... of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does
not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence
other than the original document.
This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on
August 18, 2005,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
judgment rendered on November 5, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 35, in Manila... in Civil Case No. 96-78481 entitled Heirs of
Maximo S Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo S.
Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v.
Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila
dismissing the... respondents' action for quieting of title.[2]

In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita

Prodon,[3] the respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the
late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the
registered owners of... that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 84797 of the Register of Deeds of Manila; that their parents
had been in possession of the property during their lifetime; that upon their
parents' deaths, they had continued the possession of the property as...
heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon; that they could not locate
the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of TCT
No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the
original copy contained an entry stating that the... property had been sold to
defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had
been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to
repurchase covering the property did not exist. Consequently, they prayed
that the entry be cancelled, and... that Prodon be adjudged liable for
damages.

Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on
September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed
had been registered with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on
the... title; that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been granted six months
from September 9, 1975 within which to repurchase the property; and that
she had then become the absolute owner of the property due to its non-
repurchase within the given 6-month period.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the
copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the
files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

On November 5, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment,[6] finding untenable

the plaintiffs' contention that the deed of sale with right to repurchase did
not exist. It opined that although the deed itself could not be presented as
evidence in... court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by
secondary evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of its
unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the defendant had...
established the execution and existence of the deed,... t... he execution and
existence of the disputed deed of sale with right to repurchase
accomplished by the late Maximo Alvarez in favor of defendant Margarita
Prodon has been adequately established by reliable and trustworthy
evidences

(sic).

efendant Prodon swore that... s... he purchased the land covered by TCT
No. 84747 (Exhibit 1) from its registered owners Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr.
and Valentina Clave... hat the deed of sale with right to repurchase was
drawn and... prepared by Notary Public Eliseo Razon... testimony of
Margarita Prodon has been confirmed by the Notarial Register of Notary
Public Eliseo Razon

Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase; Name of Persons: Maximo S.

Alvarez and Valentina Alvarez

The RTC rejected the plaintiffs' submission that the late Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. could not have executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase
because of illness and poor eyesight from cataract. It held that there was
no proof that the illness had rendered him bedridden and... immobile; and
that his poor eyesight could be corrected by wearing lenses.

The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts had been exerted to
produce it before the court.

It believed Jose Camilon's testimony that he had handed the original to one
Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao,... but that he could not anymore retrieve such
original from Atty. Lacanilao because the latter had meanwhile suffered
from a heart ailment and had been recuperating.

n appeal, the respondents assigned the following errors,... HE TRIAL

COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DUE EXECUTION
AND EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT
TO REPURCHASE HAS BEEN DULY PROVED BY THE DEFENDANT.

TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PIECES OF

EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANTS AS PROOFS OF THE
DUE EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF
SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE.

RIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE HAS
BEEN LOST OR OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE PRODUCED IN COURT
WITHOUT THE FAULT OF THE DEFENDANT.

TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE PLAINTIFFS'

CLAIM THAT THEIR FATHER COULD NOT HAVE EXECUTED THE
QUESTIONED DOCUMENT AT THE TIME OF ITS ALLEGED
EXECUTION.
In the present case, the trial court found all three (3) prerequisites ha[ve]
been established by Margarita Prodon. This Court, however, after going
through the records of the case, believes otherwise. The Court finds that
the following circumstances put doubt on the very... existence of the
alleged deed of sale.

Evidence on record showed that Maximo Alvarez was hospitalized between

August 23, 1975 to September 3, 1975

M... aximo Alvarez, was not physically able to personally execute the deed
of sale and puts to serious doubt [on] Jose Camilion's testimony that
Maximo Alvarez, with his wife, went to his residence on September 5, 1975
to sell the property and that again... they met on September 9, 1975 to sign
the alleged deed of sale (Exhibits "A" and "1").

The foregoing testimony does not convince this Court that Jose Camilion
had exerted sufficient effort to obtain the copy which he said was with Atty.
Lacanilao. It should be noted that he never claimed that Atty. Lacanilao
was already too sick to even try looking for the copy he... had.

the Court finds that the secondary evidence should not have been admitted
because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the existence of the original deed
of sale and to establish its loss.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Manila, Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 96-78481 is hereby
REVERSED... he heirs of Margarita Prodon (who meanwhile died on March
3, 2002) filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of Defendant and for
Reconsideration of the Decision,... hey alleged that the CA erred: (a) in
finding... that the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence
had not been complied with; (b) in concluding that the late Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. had been physically incapable of personally executing the deed of sale
with right to repurchase; and (c) in blaming them... for not recovering the
property, for not paying the realty taxes thereon, and for not transferring the
title in their names.

On November 22, 2005, the CA issued itsresolution,[11] allowing the

substitution of the heirs of Margarita Prodon, and denying their motion for
reconsideration for its lack of merit.

the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have appealed to the Court

through petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:

In this appeal, the petitioners submit the following as issues, namely: (a)
whether the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had
been complied with; (b) whether the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been
physically incapable of personally executing the... deed of sale with right to
repurchase;and (c) whether Prodon's claim of ownership was already
barred by laches.[12]

Ruling:

An analysis leads us to conclude... that the CA and the RTC both

misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case, and their misapplication
diverted the attention from the decisive issue in this action for quieting of
title. We shall endeavor to correct the error in order to turn the case to the
right track.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written
document the original of the document must be produced in court. The rule
excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the contents
thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the... existence or due execution of
the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its
non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the
offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be... attributed.[13]

The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact
contents of a writing are brought before the court,[14] considering that (a)
the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of...
more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or
dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a
slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a
substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process... of making a copy
by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting
to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error,
greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally.

But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading

inferences arise only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing.
Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are
in issue.

It is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or contents of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised by the
respondents as the plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on, was
whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase,... duly executed by
the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.

Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution of
the deed of sale with right to repurchase
The medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr.

This high improbability was fully confirmed by his son, Maximo, Jr., who
attested that his father had been seriously ill, and had been in and out of
the hospital in 1975.

Truly, Prodon's allegation that the deed of sale with right to repurchase...
had been executed on September 9, 1975 could not command belief.

The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the deed of sale
with right to repurchase and the entry in the primary entry book of the
Register of Deeds did not themselves establish the existence of the deed.
They proved at best that a document purporting to be a deed of... sale with
right to repurchase had been registered with the Register of Deeds. Verily,
the registration alone of the deed was not conclusive proof of its
authenticity or its due execution by the registered owner of the property,
which was precisely the issue in this case.

we concur with the CA that the respondents preponderantly, proved that

the deed of sale with right to repurchase executed by the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August

18, 2005 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624 entitled Heirs
of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo
Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of

Deeds of the City Manila; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of
suit.
RESIDENTS OF LOWER ATAB TEACHER’S VILLAGE v. STA. MONICA G.R. No. 198878 | 15 October 2014
Torrens System (General Principles) DOCTRINE: : For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must be present, namely: (1) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and Civil Law Justice Del Castillo
Digests 71 (2) The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. FACTS: • In May 2001, residents of Lower Atab & Teachers’ Village, Sto. Tomas Proper
Barangay, filed a civil case for quieting of title with damages against respondent Sta. Monica Industrial
and Development Corporation. • They alleged that they are successors and transferees-in-interest of
Torres, the supposed owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Baguio City (the subject property,
consisting of 177,778 square meters) which Torres possessed and declared for tax purposes in 1918;
that they are in possession of the subject property in the concept of owner, declared their respective
lots and homes for tax purposes, and paid the real estate taxes thereon; that in May 2000, respondent
began to erect a fence on the subject property, claiming that it is the owner of the property. •
Petitioners thus prayed that respondent’s TCT No. T-63184 be surrendered and cancelled. • On the
other hand, respondent claimed that petitioners have no cause of action; that TCT No. T63184 is a valid
and subsisting title; that the case for quieting of title constitutes a collateral attack upon TCT No. T-
63184; and that petitioners have no title to the subject property and are mere illegal occupants thereof.
Thus, it prayed for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 4946-R and an award of exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs in its favor. ISSUE: Whether or not the quieting of title case should be
granted HELD: No, in order to maintain such action, it is primarily required that the plaintiff must have
legal or equitable title to the subject property — a condition which they could not satisfy. • Legal title
denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. • Petitioners do not
have legal or equitable title to the subject property. Evidently, there are no certificates of title in their
respective names. And by their own admission in their pleadings, specifically in their pre-trial brief and
memorandum before the trial court, they acknowledged that they applied for the purchase of the
property from the government, through townsite sales applications coursed through the DENR. In their
Petition before this Court, they particularly prayed that TCT No. T-63184 be nullified in order that the
said title would not hinder the approval of their townsite sales applications pending with the DENR. •
Thus, petitioners admitted that they are not the owners of the subject property; the same constitutes
state or government land which they would like to acquire by purchase. It would have been different if
they were directly claiming the property as their own as a result of acquisitive prescription, which would
then give them the requisite equitable title. By stating that they were in the process of applying to
purchase the subject property from the government, they admitted that they had no such equitable
title, at the very least, which should allow them to prosecute a case for quieting of title. In short,
petitioners recognize that legal and equitable title to the subject property lies in the State. Thus, as to
them, quieting of title is not an available remedy.

GUNTALILIB v. DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 200042 | 7 July 2016 Dealings With Unregistered Lands DOCTRINE:
The reliefs sought in an action for quieting of title and annulment of title are the same. FACTS: •
Respondents filed a Complaint for Quieting of Titles; Annulment and Cancellation of Unnumbered OCT/
Damages against petitioner. o They claim the subject property by inheriting the same from their father
(who inherited the property from his father/respondents’ grandfather) • Respondents likewise alleged
that petitioner filed a petition for reconstitution or issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu of an
allegedly lost unnumbered OCT. o This was issued in the name of petitioner’s predecessor, Bernardo
Tumaliuan, covering the very same property which the respondents owned. o Said unnumbered OCT
constituted a cloud upon their titles that must necessarily be removed. • Petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss arguing that the Complaint stated no cause of action; that the case constituted a collateral
attack on their unnumbered OCT. Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests 78 ISSUE: Whether or not the
quieting of title case filed by respondents constitutes as a prohibited (collateral) attack on the
unnumbered OCT HELD: No, it is settled that a certificate of title is not subject to collateral attack.
However, while respondents’ action is denominated as one for quieting of title, it is in reality an action
to annul and cancel Bernardo Tumaliuan’s unnumbered OCT. . • The allegations and prayer in their
Amended Complaint make out a case for annulment and cancellation of title, and not merely quieting of
title: they claim that their predecessor’s OCT 213, which was issued on August 7, 1916, should prevail
over Bernardo Tumaliuan’s unnumbered OCT which was issued only on August 29, 1916; that petitioner
and his codefendants have knowledge of OCT 213 and their existing titles; that through fraud, false
misrepresentations, and irregularities in the proceedings for reconstitution, petitioner was able to
secure a copy of his predecessor’s supposed unnumbered OCT; and for these reasons, Bernardo
Tumaliuan’s unnumbered OCT should be cancelled. • Besides, the case was denominated as one for
“Quieting of Titles x x x; Cancellation of Unnumbered OCT/Damages.” It has been held that the
underlying objectives or reliefs sought in both the quieting-of-title and the annulment-of-title cases are
essentially the same: adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lot and nullification of one of the
two certificates of title. Nonetheless, petitioner should not have been so simplistic as to think that the
respondents’ complaint is merely a quieting of title case. It is more appropriate to suppose that one of
the effects of cancelling Bernardo Tumaliuan’s unnumbered OCT would be to quiet title over the subject
property; in this sense, quieting of title is subsumed in the annulment of title case.

ntrary to those of the trial court;(9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts
that, if properlyconsidered, would justify a different conclusion;(10) the findings of the CA are beyond
the issues of the case; and(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.---In

Young v. Spouses Sy

, the Court held that there is forum shopping where there exist:(a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in bothactions;(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the samefacts; and(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered inthe pending case, regardless of which party is successful would
amount to

res judicata

.---In

Villarica Pawnshop v. Spouses Gernale

, the issue before the Court was whether

litis pendentia

was present when there were two pending cases between the same parties: one for quieting
of title, and another for annulment and cancellation of title. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court heldthat:

Civil Case No. 438-M-2002 is for quieting of title and damages, while Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 is for
annulment and cancellation of titles and damages.

The two cases are different onlyin the form of action, but an examination of the allegations in both cases
reveals that themain issue raised, which is ownership of the land, and the principal relief sought, which
iscancellation of the opposing parties' transfer certificates of title, are substantially the same.

The test is not the name of the action, but the ultimate objective of the same and the relief
soughttherein.

The pronouncement above does not mean that in all instances, cases for quieting of title andfor
annulment of title are essentially the same.---It is well established in jurisprudence that where there are
two certificates of title covering thesame land, the earlier in date must prevail as between the parties
claiming ownership over it.---Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court states:

SECTION 1.

Judicial notice, when mandatory

A court shall take judicial notice, without theintroduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history, forms ofgovernment and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of theworld and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts ofthe legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure oftime, and the geographical divisions.

---To emphasize, points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attentionof the trial
court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the firsttime on
appeal.--- As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of
casespending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
beentried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may havebeen
heard or are actually pending before the same judge.It is true that the said rule admits of exceptions,
namely:(a) In the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a courtmay
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as readinto the record of
a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,reference is made to it for
that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner bywhich it is sufficiently designated; or(b)
when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawnfrom the archives by
the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, andadmitted as a part of the
record of the case then pending.---
 Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidenceof ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no onein his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructivepossession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Thevoluntary declaration
of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one'ssincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim againstthe State and all other interested parties,
but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to theGovernment. Such an act strengthens one's
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

BERNAS V. FELIPE

Emir Mendoza2 years ago

Avg. Rating:

Summary:
The SC ruled that Yu Han Yat is the rightful owner of the subject property in light of the SC’s
ruling above that there is an overlap between the properties covered by the two TCTs in
question, and that the evidence showing Yu Han Yat's title to be earlier means that Yu Han Yat
holds better title.

Doctrine:
It is true that, as a general rule, the Court is not a trier of facts, and that petitions under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court should only raise questions of law. This rule, however, is subject to the
following exceptions:

(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

(2)  the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3)  there is grave abuse of discretion;

(4)  the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5)  the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6)  there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
(7)  the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record;

(8)  the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;

(9)  the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and

(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.

---

            In Young v. Spouses Sy, the Court held that there is forum shopping where there exist:

            (a) identity of parties,  or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions;

            (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and

            (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata.

---

            In Villarica Pawnshop v. Spouses Gernale,  the issue before the Court was whether litis
pendentia  was present when there were two pending cases between the same parties: one for
quieting of title, and another for annulment and cancellation of title. Ruling in the affirmative,
the Court held that:

            Civil Case No. 438-M-2002 is for quieting of title and damages, while Civil Case  No. 
502-M-2002  is  for  annulment  and  cancellation  of  titles  and damages.  The two cases are
different only in the form of action, but an  examination  of  the  allegations  in  both 
cases  reveals  that  the main issue raised, which is ownership of the land, and the
principal relief sought, which is cancellation of the opposing parties' transfer certificates
of title, are substantially the same.
            The test is not the name of the action, but the ultimate objective of the same and the
relief sought therein.

            The pronouncement  above does not mean that in all instances, cases for quieting of
title and for annulment of title are essentially the same.

---

            It is well established  in jurisprudence  that where there are two certificates  of title
covering the same land, the earlier in date must prevail as between the parties claiming
ownership  over it.

---

            Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court states:

            SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality,  the law of nations,  the
admiralty  and maritime  courts of the world  and  their  seals,   the  political  constitution  and 
history  of  the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.

---

            To  emphasize,  points  of  law,  theories,  issues  and  arguments  not  brought  to  the
attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.

---

            As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of
cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding  the  fact  that  both 
cases  may  have  been  heard  or  are actually pending before the same judge.

            It is true that the said rule admits of exceptions, namely:

            (a) In the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court
may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read
into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or

            (b) when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.

---

            Although  tax  declarations  or  realty  tax  payment  of  property  are  not conclusive 
evidence  of ownership,  nevertheless,  they are good  indicia  of possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual
or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over  the  property.  The  voluntary  declaration  of  a  piece  of  property  for taxation 
purposes  manifests  not only one's  sincere  and honest  desire  to obtain title to the property 
and announces  his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

---

            In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that in the absence
of malice or bad faith in the prosecution of the case, the award of damages is unavailing.

Facts:
The present case involves a parcel of land known as Lot 824-A-4 (subject property), covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-28758 (30627) PR-9639 (TCT No. 30627),
located at Brgy. Matandang Balara, Quezon City, consisting of 30,000 square meters, more or
less, which is part of Lot 824 of the Piedad Estate containing an area of 147,072 square meters
registered in the name of respondent Felipe Yu Han Yat (Yu Han Yat).

            Yu Han Yat subdivided the subject property into 60 lots under Subdivision Plan Psd-
13-018013, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands on August 13, 1991, as part of his plan to
develop and convert the subject property.[4] As a consequence, TCT No. 30627 was cancelled
and derivative titles, namely TCT Nos. 47294 to 47353 (Yu Han Yat TCTs), were issued in his
name.
            To finance his plan of developing the subject property, Yu Han Yat applied for loans
with several banks using some of the Yu Han Yat TCTs as security. However, when the
mortgage  instruments  were  presented  for  registration,  the  Register  of  Deeds  of Quezon 
City refused  to record  the same on the ground  that the Yu Han Yat TCTs overlapped with the
boundaries covered by another title: TCT No. 336663 registered in the name of Esperanza
Nava (Nava).  However, in Consulta  No. 2038[9]  issued on October 15, 1992, the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the action taken by the Register of Deeds, and ordered
the registration of the mortgage instruments on Yu Han Yat's TCTs.

            Meanwhile, petitioners Jose A. Bernas (Bernas) and Felomena S. Mejia (Mejia)
claimed ownership over the subject property. They claim that Nava was the registered owner
of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 336663 until she sold parts of the said lot to Mejia and
Gregorio Galarosa (Galarosa).  On September 15, 1986, Mejia executed with Nava a Deed of
Sale with Right of Redemption by virtue of which Mejia acquired the real property covered by
TCT No. 336663, subject to Nava's right to redeem the same.  When  Nava  failed  to  redeem 
the  property,  Mejia  then  filed  a  petition  for consolidation of title under her name. The
petition was granted in a Decision dated June 28, 1990 in Civil Case No. Q-90-5211 rendered
by Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.

            Since TCT No. 336663 bore the annotation  "subject to verification,"  the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City referred the matter to the LRA for consultation. In a Resolution dated
March 15, 1991, in LRA Consulta  No. 1890, the LRA upheld the registrability of TCT No.
336663 in the name of Mejia. In LRA Consulta  No. 1890, the LRA reasoned that a court
decision is needed to categorically determine that the titles from which TCT No. 336663 were
derived were spurious before it could order that the encumbrance was not registrable. Hence,
the Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption was annotated on the title of the subject property.

            On February 21, 1992, Bernas, for and on behalf of Wharton Resources Group
(Philippines), Inc. (Wharton), entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Mejia whereby
the latter agreed to sell to Wharton the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 336663.
Subsequently, a Deed of Sale was entered into between Mejia and Wharton conveying to the
latter the subject property.

            In April 1992, Bernas  discovered  that there was another  title covering  about three
hectares which overlapped a portion of the property registered under TCT No. 336663. This
other title, TCT No. 30627, indicated  Yu Han Yat as the registered  owner pursuant to
subdivision plan Psd-2498 of a parcel of land located in Bayanbayanan, Marikina.

            On June 24, 1992, Bernas filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on Yu Han Yat's TCTs,
claiming  that a Deed of Sale was executed  between  himself,  for and on behalf  of Wharton,
and Mejia over the realty covered by TCT No. 336663 which overlaps portions covered by Yu
Han Yat's TCTs.
            On the basis of this adverse claim filed by Bernas, the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City refused to record the subject mortgages affecting the Yu Han Yat TCTs. This prompted
Yu Han Yat to file another consulta  with the LRA which, in a Resolution dated October 15,
1992, ordered the registration of the mortgage to the properties.

            Afterwards, on September 18, 1992, Yu Han Yat filed a Petition for Quieting of Title
before the RTC of Quezon City docketed  as Civil Case No. Q-92-13609  against the Estate of
Nava (represented by Antonio N. Crismundo), Galarosa, Mejia, Bernas, and the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City (Estate of Nava, et al.).

            Trial ensued, and on March 15, 2004, the RTC issued a Decision ruling in favor of the
Estate of Nava, et al., and Wharton.

            Aggrieved, Yu Han Yat appealed the above Decision of the RTC to the CA.

            In its Decision, the CA granted Yu Han Yat's appeal and held that: (a) the petition for
quieting of title, and the petition for annulment of title are essentially the same; and (b) Bernas
and Mejia's title was void as they source their ownership from Dominga Sumulong's title to the
property which had been declared as null and void by the CA in previous cases. The CA also
awarded actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees in favor of
Yu Han Yat.

            After the denial of their MR, petitioners appealed to the SC.

Issues Ratio:
 WoN petitioners complied with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when
they filed the Petitions dated April 15, 2011 and April 20, 2011, since the petition raises
questions of fact
o YES, but the petition falls within the exceptions. Some of the exceptions are
present in this case. The rulings alone of the RTC and the CA were
contradictory,  to the point that they differ on their rulings on each of the issues
presented in this case. Further, and as will be discussed in detail later on, the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at certain factual findings and
legal conclusions. The Court must perforce conduct a judicious examination of
the records to arrive at a just conclusion for this case.
 WoN the filing of the Petitions constituted forum shopping; whether Petitions are
barred by res judicata
o NO to both. Respondent's assertions fail to convince. Petitioners did not commit
forum shopping by filing separate appeals.
o While there was identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, there was no
identity of parties in the case at bar. Granted that both Mejia and Bernas trace
 their title from Nava,  this  does  not,  by  itself,  make  their  interests 
identical.  Bernas'  and  Mejia's interests remain separate, and a judgment on one
will not amount to res judicata on the other as, for instance, Bernas could, and
did, raise the defense that he was an innocent purchaser for value of the subject
property and thus should not be bound by any adverse  judgment  should 
Mejia's  title be found defective.
o The same reasoning applies to respondent's assertion that Mejia's and Bernas'
claims were now barred by res judicata because the Heirs of Nava did not
appeal. The heirs of Nava hold an interest separate from Mejia's and Bernas',
and the latter could not be adversely affected by the fact that the Heirs of Nava
no longer filed an appeal.
 WoN Yu Han Yat's Amended Petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of
the title of petitioners (and their predecessors-in-interest) over the property subject of
TCT No. 336663
o NO. The CA was correct in holding that the petition for quieting of title filed by
Yu Han Yat was not a collateral attack on TCT No. 336663, and was, in fact, a
direct attack on the same.
o The test is not the name of the action, but the ultimate objective of the same and
the relief sought therein. Applying the said test in this case, the petition for
quieting of title filed  by  Yu  Han  Yat  was  a  direct  attack  on  the 
petitioners'  title  as  the  petition specifically sought to annul TCT No. 336663
in the name of Nava. Thus, even as petitioners correctly claim that in assailing
the validity of a Torrens title, there must be a direct proceeding expressly
instituted for the purpose, the fact of the matter is that the petition for quieting
of title was exactly that proceeding as it was filed precisely to question the
validity of TCT No. 336663.
 WoN the CA ruling that the property covered by respondent's title is the same as the
property subject of TCT No. 336663 is supported by the evidence on record
o YES. First, petitioners' argument that Yu Han Yat's title, TCT No. 30627, does
not cover the same property as their title, TCT No. 336663, is because TCT No.
30627 came from TCT No. 8047 which, in turn, bears an annotation that it is "a
transfer from TCT No. 3633/T- R," a title that covers a property situated in
Murphy, Quezon City. They point out that, in contrast, TCT No. 336663 covers
a parcel of land located in Piedad Estate in Quezon City.
o The SC ruled that both TCT No. 30627 and TCT No. 336663 cover the same 
property  as shown  by their respective  technical  descriptions  stating  that the
parcel of land covered is Lot 824 of the Piedad Estate. The fact that TCT No.
8047, from which TCT No. 30627 was derived, bears an annotation that it was a
transfer from TCT No. 3633/T-R which covers a property in Murphy, Quezon
City casts little doubt on the title of Yu Han Yat.


 o The Court is more inclined to uphold the view that the error lies in the
annotation in TCT No.  8047  that it was  "a transfer  from  TCT No.  3633/T-
R,"  as compared  with petitioners' theory that the error was in
the entire technical descriptions contained in TCT Nos. 8047 and TCT No.
336663. It is notable that TCT No. 8047 was, in truth, a transfer from TCT No.
336663, as shown by the meticulous narration of Yu Han Yat quoted above. To
repeat, records show that TCT No. 336663, in the name of Spouses Ruiz, was
cancelled when the lot was subdivided into four lots: Lot 824-A-1, Lot 824-A-
2, Lot 824-A-3, and Lot 824-A-4.  TCT No. 336663 was cancelled,  and TCT
Nos. 8044, 8045, 8046, and 8047 were issued in lieu of the same. TCT No.
8047 was then cancelled  when the lot was sold to Yu Han Yat in 1956. In other
words, the error occurred  in encoding  that  TCT  No.  8047  was  "a transfer 
from  TCT  No.  3633/T-R" instead of "from TCT No. 36633."
o It is well established  in jurisprudence  that where there are two certificates  of
title covering the same land, the earlier in date must prevail as between the
parties claiming ownership  over it.
o The contention  that Bernas (on behalf of Wharton)  and Mejia were "innocent
purchasers" is thus immaterial, for even if it is assumed that they are indeed
such, they still could not acquire a better right than their transferor — Nava —
whose title was issued much later than Yu Han Yat's transferor.
o Another evidentiary contention by Bernas purportedly establishing his better
right to the  subject  property  was  that  TCT  No.  T-10849,  issued  before 
1930  to  Juan Porciuncula, which was the origin of Yu Han Yat's title, was
based on subdivision plan Psd-2498. In turn, Psd-2498 indicates that it is a
subdivision plan of a lot located in "Bayanbayanan, Mariquina."  Supposedly,
this establishes that the land covered by Yu Han Yat's title is different from the
one covered by his title. With regard to this issue, the CA ruled that: “While it is
true that, under PS 2498 (sic), it was stated that the property is located in
Bayanbayanan, Mariquina, however, it must be noted that at the time the survey
was conducted on June 11-13, 1927, the property was still under the Province of
Rizal and that Quezon City was only created pursuant to  Commonwealth  Act 
No.  502,  and  approved  on  October  12,  1939.”
o The CA was justified in taking judicial notice when Quezon City was
established.
 WoN the case of Manotok, et al. v. Barque (Manotok) applies
o NO. One, the Court in Manotok  needed to check the parties' compliance with
the Friar Lands Act because each of the parties questioned the petition for 
administrative  reconstitution  filed  by  the  other.  This circumstance was not
present here. The issue of whether there was a valid transfer from the
government to either of the parties was never raised in the proceedings  in the
trial court or upon initial appeal. Mejia only raised  the issue  of compliance 
with  the Friar  Lands  Act only  upon  her  motion  for reconsideration  with 
the  CA,  and  eventually  upon  appeal  to  this  Court.  Mejia  is precluded from
doing this, as it is well settled in jurisprudence that an issue which was neither
averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be
 raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice and due process.
 WoN the CA erred when it took judicial notice of proceedings in other cases before it
o YES. Neither  of  the  exceptions exists  in  this  case.  The  parties  were  not
informed, much less their consent taken, of the fact that the CA would take
judicial notice of these cases.
 WoN Yu Han Yat's alleged payment of real property tax constitutes proof of ownership
or superior title over the property covered by TCT No. 336663
o No need to resolve.
 WoN petitioners are liable to the estate of Yu Han Yat for damages and attorney's fees
o NO. The Court believes that petitioners were honestly convinced of the validity 
of their claim  to the subject  property.  As subsequent  holders  of the same
through a sale, both Mejia and Bernas (and consequently, Wharton) were
expected to insist on their supposed ownership over the property in question.

Dispositive:
NOTES: Petition DENIED.