Article 810

Labrador v. CA, 180 SCRA 120 ​BURGOS

G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO
LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and
CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, ​petitioners-appellants, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS LABRADOR, ​respondents-appellees.

Will: Holographic will of Melecio Labrador

Executed: March 17, 1968

Died: June 10, 1972

FACTS: ​On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died and left a holographic will. On July 28, 1975,
Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal
Labrador (heirs of Melecio), filed in the court ​a quo a petition for the probate of the alleged
holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.

On September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and
Gaudencio Labrador (heirs of Melecio) filed an opposition on the ground that the will has been
extinguished or revoked by implication of law since testator Melecio executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Jesus and Gaudencio. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold
said parcel of land to Navat. Sagrado filed against his brothers an annulment of deed of sale
over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father
Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968.

The trial court allowed the probate of the holographic will and declaring null and void the Deed
of Absolute sale. On appeal to the CA, it denied the probate of the will since it was undated.
Hence, this petition. The petitioners alleged that the will was dated, although the date as not in
its usual place.

ISSUE: ​W​hether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio Labrador is ​dated​, as
provided for in Article 810 of the New Civil Code.
HELD: YES. ​The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance
with Article 810.1âwphi1 It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of
the holographic will, ​viz​:

And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the
respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of ​March, 17th day, in
the year 1968,​ and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the
one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis
supplied) (p. 46, ​Rollo​)

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The
only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the
testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.

Respondents claimed that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his
beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the partitioning and
assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution
of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an "agreement" between the testator and the
beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was
thus a failure to comply with Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition
of his estate, to take effect after his death."

Respondents are in error. The intention to show ​17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of
the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by
petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly
knew that what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that
such partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio
Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the
character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.

Roxas v. de Jesus, Jr., January 28, 1985 ​CUBELO

G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE
OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS ANDBIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS,SIMEON R. ROXAS &
 PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR.,
respondent.

Facts:

After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, a special
proceeding entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de Jesus and
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. He

delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that he found a
notebook of the deceased Bibiana detailing a letter-win addressed to her children and
entirely written and signed in her handwriting.

The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my win which I want to be respected
although it is not written by a lawyer. ...The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was
corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus
who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61" is the holographic Will of
their deceased mother, Bibiana. Both recognized the handwriting of their mother
and positively identified her signature. They further testified that their deceased mother
understood English, the language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the
date "FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by their mother. On the
other hand, respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir, filed an
"opposition to probate". She submits that the purported holographic Will is void for
non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in that the date must contain the
year, month, and day of its execution.

The respondent contends that Article 810 of the Civil Code was patterned after Section
1277 of the California Code and Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code whose Supreme
Courts had consistently ruled that the required date includes the year, month, and day,
and that if any of these is wanting, the holographic Will is invalid. The respondent further
contends that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article 810 of the Civil
Code because statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of
holographic Wills are strictly construed.

The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688
of the Old Civil Code require the testator to state in his holographic Win the "year,
month, and day of its execution," the present Civil Code omitted the phrase “Año mes
ydia” and simply requires that the holographic Will should be dated. The petitioners
submit that the liberal construction of the holographic Will should prevail.

Issue: Whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code.

Ruling: Yes. This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal
application of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We
should not overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of
Wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy.

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and
year of its execution. However, if the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply
with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or
purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form
followed by the testator.

In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that

of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on
the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such
contingency in this case.

We have found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any
substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of
the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the
testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its
genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the
genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of said Will.

The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the

holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 "appearing on the
holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This
objection is too technical to be entertained.

Therefore, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance. ART. 810 of the Civil Code. A person may execute a
holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Article 811

​ RUM
Rivera v. CA, 182 SCRA 322 E
JOSE RIVERA vs. IAC and ADELAIDO RIVERA
G.R. No. 75005-06 FEBRUARY 15, 1990

FACTS: ​Venancio Rivera died on July 28, 1975. Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving
legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
Venancio’s estate. The petition was opposed by Adelaido Rivera who averred that Venancio
was his father and that the latter did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills.

Jose submitted the alleged certificate of Venancio and Maria Vital who were allegedly married in
1928; and his own baptisma certificate wherein the couple was indicated as his parents.
Domingo Santos, the witness, testified that he saw Venancio with Jose several times. Moreover,
Jose stressed that Adelaido considered him a half-brother and kissed his hand as a sign of
respect whenever they met. He insisted that Adelaido and his siblings were illegitimate children.

On the other hand, Adelaido maintained that he and his brothers and sisters were born to
Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson. He could not present his parents’ marriage certificate
because the records were burned during the war sometime in 1942. He also submitted his birth
certificate, and those of his two sisters. Moreover, Atty. Regalado MOrales affirmed that he
personally knew Adelaido’s parents.

The petition for probate of the two holographic wills was consolidated with Jose Rivera’s
petition. After the joint trial, Judge Eliodoro Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the
decedent but ofa different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio
Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven
children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent was
not his father. The holographic wills were also admitted to probate. This was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Venencio alleged by both Adelaido and Jose are one and the same
person.
2. Whether or not there was a need to present three witnesses as required by Article 811.

RULING:
1. NO. If it is true that Jose was the legitimate son of Venancio Rivera, he did not assert his right
as such when his father was still alive. By his own account, Jose supported himself and his
mother as a gasoline attendant and driver for many years. All the time, his father was residing in
the same town and available for support. His alleged father was openly living with another
woman and raising another family, but this was apparently accepted by Jose without protest,
taking no step whatsoever to invoke his status. If, as he insists, he and Venancio Rivera were
on cordial terms, there is no reason why the father did not help the son and instead left Jose to
fend for himself as a humble worker while his other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a
comfortable life. Such paternal discrimination is difficult to understand, especially if it is
considered, assuming the claims to be true, that Jose was the oldest and, by his own account,
the only legitimate child of Venancio Rivera.

And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible. As Venancio's
legitimate wife, if indeed she was, she should have objected when her husband abandoned her
and founded another family by another woman, and in the same town at that. Seeing that the
children of Maria Jocson were being raised well while her own son Jose was practically ignored
and neglected, she nevertheless did not demand for him at least support, if not better treatment,
from his legitimate father. It is unnatural for a lawful wife to say nothing if she is deserted in
favor of another woman and for a caring mother not to protect her son's interests from his
wayward father's neglect. The fact is that this forsaken wife never demanded support from her
wealthy if errant husband. She did not file a complaint for bigamy or concubinage against
Venancio.

We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in holding that the
Venancio Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same person who married
Maria Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to a humbler family which had no
relation whatsoever with the family of Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more
prosperous and prominent. Except for the curious Identity of names of the head of each, there is
no evidence linking the two families or showing that the deceased Venancio Rivera was the
head of both.

2. NO. The respondent court considered them valid because it found them to have been
written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code. It also held there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under
Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.

The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by
Jose Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died
intestate; and in SP No. 1091, he denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by
Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills
submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were spurious. Consequently, it may be
argued, the respondent court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as
follows:
In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows
the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are
in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be
required.

The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of
the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he
had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of
requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who
authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

​ UENTES
Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 472 F

G.R. No. L-18979, June 30, 1964

FACTS:

A petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the original, Exhibit "A" as the
alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso
Icasiano as executor thereof was filed. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and
son of the testatrix, filed their opposition thereto.

On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his
evidence; but on June 1, 1959, he filed a motion for the admission of an amended and
supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all
the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed duplicate
(Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959.

The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously
with the filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while
signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the
attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate
copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is
signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

ISSUE:

Did the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will render the will void?
HELD:

NO. Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original,
admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but
affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence.

We hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not
per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is
assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective
page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before
whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not
be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the
purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages
is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence
on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.

That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure
oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will,
which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one
was aware of the defect at the time.

​ LACO
Codoy v. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333, 1999 O
CODOY vs CALUGAY
G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999

FACTS: ​On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia
Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño
Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the
genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978. Eugenio Ramonal Codoy
and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that
the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the
will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the
handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.

The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified
the records of the case bearing the signature of the deceased. The second witness was
election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed
to as the same was already destroyed and no longer available. The third, the
deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceased’s
signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her
various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The
niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and
signed by said deceased. The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in
the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the signature on the will
was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure. The fifth was an
employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the
deceased which appeared in the latter’s application for pasture permit.

The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased
since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one
appearing on the will was genuine. Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence​,
claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the
probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal. was
granted by the lower court. ​It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which
granted the probate.

ISSUE: ​Is Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly
declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is
mandatory or directory?

RULING: Mandatory. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative

obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that
the word“shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.

In the instant case, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of
the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous
individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the
deceased.

​ IVERA
Azaola v. Singson, 109 Phil 102 R
FACTS:

Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein submitted the holographic will executed by Fortunata S. Vda. de
Yance for probate. He testified that he saw the holographic will one month, more or less, before the death
of the testatrix, as the same was handed to him and his wife. He testified also that he recognized all the
signatures appearing in the holographic will as the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said
statement, witness presented the mortgage, the special power of the attorney, and the general power of
attorney and other documents to show the signatures of the testatrix.

The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by undue
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did
not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually written either on the
5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must
present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix,
the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent "did not prove
sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."

The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness because
the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the
production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its
authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.

ISSUE:

Should the will be admitted for probate?

RULING:

Case is ​remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to hold a new trial​.

Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was not required to produce more than one
witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that
Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by
law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and
producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the
testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness of the testator's
hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance
with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason
why the second paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that —
 in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court
deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely directory and
is not mandatory.

Gan v. Yap, G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958 ​VILLARIN

​FACTS:

On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of
Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.

On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings in the Manila court of first
instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not
left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.

After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge,
refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator.

RULING:

NO, the court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will
may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.

The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof. Even if oral
testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the
evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies
that it fails to measure up to that “clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.
 Rodelas v. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16 ​YAP
G.R. No. L-58509
December 7, 1982

FACTS:
Marcella Rodelas filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate
of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The petition, was opposed by Amparo Aranza
Bonilla et. al. and one of its grounds was that the alleged hollographic will itself, and not an
alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v.
Yap, 104 Phil. 509​The court dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla and is of opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy
thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court
of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to
law and well-settled jurisprudence. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of
a photostatic copy

DECISION:
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance
of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested
or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available,
experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required.

However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of
the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will.

But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it
shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity."
But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or
photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before
the probate court,"
 Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by
the probate court.

Article 814

Kalaw v. Relova, 132 SCRA 237 ​ALILIAN

FACTS: ​Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of sister Natividad, filed a
petition for probate of the latter's holographic will in 1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's
name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it and such
was not initialed; b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's name was written
above it. This alteration was initialed by the testator.

Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that she would be the sole heir. The
lower court denied the probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and additions.

ISSUE: Is the will valid?

RULING:NO. The will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will which could remain valid as
there was only one disposition in it.

Such was altered by the substitution of the original heir with another. To rule that the first will should be
given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of mind. However, this change of mind cannot be given
effect either as she failed to authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing her full signature.

Ajero v. CA, 236 SCRA 488 (1994) ​BURGOS

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, ​petitioners,

vs. ​THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, ​respondents.

WILL: Holographic will of Annie Sand

Executed: ​during her birthday celebration in 1981

Died: November 25, 1982

FACTS: ​Annie Sand died on Nov. 25, 1982 and left a holographic will. ​In the will, decedent
named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent
Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and
Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.

On January 20, 1983, petitioners filed for the allowance of decedent's holographic will. Private
respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which
were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence.

The trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It found no reason for the
disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for
lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix. No evidence was presented to show that the will
in question is different from the will actually executed by the testatrix. The petitioners
presented 3 witnesses who had knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix identified that
the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine
handwriting and signature of the testatrix.

On appeal, the CA dismissed the probate of will since it failed to meet the requirements for its
validity under Art. 813 and 814. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either
unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: ​WON the holographic will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.

HELD: YES.

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be
totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the
New Civil Code.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of
the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign
and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions ​cannot be effectuated.
Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

A holographic will can still be admitted to probate, despite non-compliance with Article 814.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in
a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined. (Kalaw v. Relova)

Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date
of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

The requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in
provisions (Articles 813 and 814) are separate from that which provides for the necessary
conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to
Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering
holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:

Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the
requisites required in Article 688.

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of
its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a
statement of the year, month and day of its execution.

If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them
over his signature.

Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of
Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same
Code — are essential to the probate of a holographic will.

Guevarra v. Guevarra, 74 Phil 479 ​CUBELO

Rosario Guevara vs. Ernesto Guevara

74 Phil. 479

FACTS:
This is an action commenced by Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she
claims to be her strict legitimate as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased
Victoriano Guevara. Ernesto is a legitimate son of the decease. It appears that the deceased
had left a will disposing of his properties in favor of the defendant and the rest of his relatives,
the plaintiff among them. This will have not been probated. Rosario who has her father’s will,
died and nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made there in her favor. But
four years after her father’s death, she commenced this action. Wherein she presented the will,
to prove that she has been acknowledged as a natural daughter by the deceased.Because the
will has not been probated both Trial Court and Court of Appeals sustained the theory.

ISSUE:

Whether the procedure adopted by the plaintiff in accordance with law, invoicing the provisions
of the different sections of Rule 76 (now Rule 75) of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

It cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario in violation of procedural
law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent left a
will and no debts and heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate,
they must first present that will to the Court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with
the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless thoseprovisions are contrary to
law.

​ RUM
Ventura v. Ventura, 106 Phil 1159 E

​MIGUEL VENTURA vs. GREGORIA VENTURA

G.R. No. L-26306 APRIL 27, 1988

FACTS: ​Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura. Her
mother is Juana Cardona and her brother is Miguel Ventura. On the other hand, the
respondents Mercedes and Geregoria Ventura are the deceased’s legitimate children with his
former wife Paula Simpliciano. However, the paternity of the respondents was denied by the
deceased in his will.

On December 14,1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not
include the appellees. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child,
was named and appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of
his estate. The will was admitted to probate on January 14, 1954.
Gregorio Ventura died on September 26, 1955. On October 10, 1955, the appellant Maria
Ventura filed a motion for her appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favor.

Maria was able to file her accounts of administration from 1955 to 1960. The accounts were
opposed by respondents on the ground that the report did not reflect the true income of the
estate and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses.

In 1961, Maria filed a motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration
or to have their approval without the opposition of the spouses respondents on the ground that
the question of the paternity of respondents is still pending final determination before the
Supreme Court and that should they be adjudged the adulterous children of testator, as
claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to oppose the approval of the counts of
administration. This was denied.

On May 17, 1965, the executrix Maria Ventura finally submitted her accounts of administration
covering the period 1961 to 1965 which were again opposed by the respondents. On October 5,
1965, the court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds of the
estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the
matter of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate
taxes of the estate.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.

RULING: ​YES. In related cases, respondents are declared to be the legitimate children of the
deceased from his former wife who died in 1943. Thus, the surviving spouse of the deceased is
Juana Cardona (mother of Maria) while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura
(respondents) and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those
persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property. It is
generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is
preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for
preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of
kin is to be preferred."

Under Article 854, "the pretention or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous
appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic. This would now necessitate the
appointment of another administrator, under the following provision:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, a petition shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference
over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence,
under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be
appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the
discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.

Article 817

​ UENTES
Testate Estate of Suntay, G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088, July 31, 1954 F

FACTS:

In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died in
Amoy, China. He left real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in
Amoy. During his lifetime, he married twice, the first wife was Manuela Cruz, with whom
he had several children. The second marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian,
with whom he had a son, Silvino Suntay.

Intestate proceedings were instituted by the heirs from the first marriage. While the
second wife, the surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a petition for the
probate of the last will and testament of the deceased which was claimed to have been
executed and signed in the Philippines on November, 1929. The petition was denied
due to the loss of the will before the hearing thereof. After the war, Silvino filed a petition
in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the
Philippines in November 1929 or of the will executed in Amoy, China in January 1931.
He claimed that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father,
a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased in
January 1931, and that the same was filed, recorded, and probated in the Amoy District
Court in China. The CFI disallowed the alleged last will and testament executed in
November 1929 and the alleged last will and testament executed in Amoy, China.

ISSUE:

May the will executed in Amoy, China still be validly probated in the Philippines?

HELD:

No. it should not be allowed because certain facts as to the due execution of the China
Will were not established. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Rule 78 provide that wills proved and
allowed in a foreign country according to the laws of such country maybe allowed, filed,
and recorded by the proper CFI in the Philippines provided that a copy of such will and
the allowance thereof be duly authenticated and filed with a petition for allowance in the
Philippines in the court having jurisdiction. Such court shall fix a time and place for the
hearing and cause notice thereof to be given. If it appears at the hearing that the will
should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its
allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court, to which shall be
attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk. Thus, the will shall
have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.

In the case at bar, the fact that the court in Amoy, China is a probate court must be
proved. The law in China on the procedure for the allowance of wills must also be
proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 must
also be established by competent evidence. The case does not present proof on these
points. Hence, the last will and testament executed in Amoy, China should not be
allowed in Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy
were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and
that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to probate or
allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the
alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the
accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and
allowance of wills. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a
probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be
presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the
Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it
were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is
a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties must be made.

The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence
shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the
Philippines. The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be
likened to or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of
notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such
interested parties.

In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been
done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles
followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated
transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be
deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and,
therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a
competent court of this country.

Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil 867 ​OLACO

MICIANO VS. BRIMO
50 PHIL 867, NOVEMBER 1, 1927

FACTS: ​Juan Miciano was the judicial administrator of the estate of Joseph Brimo, a
Turkish citizen. Miciano filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of
the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance and
that said scheme of partition was not in accordance in the Turkish laws. However, in the
second part of the will of Joseph Brimo, he specifically indicated that the distribution of
his properties shall be in accordance with the Philippine laws and not his national law,
which is Turkish.

ISSUE:​Is the Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s
estates and not the Turkish law?
RULING: NO. ​Under ​Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject
of another country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which
he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own
country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the
Philippines.

In the present case, though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said
that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine
Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as
those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in
his testamentary dispositions. Further, Andre Brimo failed to prove that the scheme of
partition being filed violated the Turkish law. Hence, the court approved the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre
Brimo, as one of the legatees.

Article 818

Dela Cerna v. Potot, 12 SCRA 576 ​RIVERA

FACTS:

Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament in the local dialect
whereby they willed that "our two parcels of land acquired during our marriage together with all
improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece, whom we have nurtured since
childhood, because God did not give us any child in our union, Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas
Potot", and that "while each of the testators is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the
two lands aforementioned"​. Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was
submitted to probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which,
after due publication as required by law and there being no opposition, heard the evidence. Upon the
death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar
as Gervasia was concerned was filed.

The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for being
executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art.
818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed,
on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and
conclusive on the due execution of the testament.

ISSUE:
Are joint wills valid?

RULING:

No. ​Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939
decree admitting his will to probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks
that the ultimate decision on whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here they have
spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939.

But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the
probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It
could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and
over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely
because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will
could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.

It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on
her death, reexamined and adjudicated ​de novo,​ since a joint will is considered a separate will of each
testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one
prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in
question.

Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate,
and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or
unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage could not make
them valid when our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by other
subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may prevail against their observance.

Article 821

Gonzales v. CA, G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979 ​VILLARIN

FACTS:

Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Isabel Gabriel and designating
Lutgarda as the principal beneficiary and executrix.

The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have
been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the
death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of the
deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all
the pages.

The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales. The Trial Court disallowed the probate
of the will. The Court of Appeals allowed the probate of the will. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: ​Was the will executed and attested as required by law?

RULING: Yes

As to the credibility of the witnesses​:

Rizalina argues that the requirement in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be
credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will and
testament may be admitted to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence
on record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is honest and
upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.

In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely
attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution.

In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses,
namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is
satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals.

Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much
less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or
dumb, or cannot read or write.

In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be
shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief
and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the
witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed
to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is
established otherwise.

As to the capacity of the testator​:

We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the testatrix
dictated her will without any note or memorandum appears to be fully supported by the following
facts or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly
active in her business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of the movie business
ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death.
She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as
coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the
win was in Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the light of all the
circumstances, We agree with the respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will without
any note or memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnesses and
the notary public himself.

In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that Matilde
was present on April 15, 1961 and that she signed the attestation clause to the will and on the
left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will, the documentary evidence which is the will
itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly and convincingly
prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she
witnessed the will by signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary
public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best
evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the
material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation
clause which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form a record of the facts
attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing
witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved.

Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the

witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and
contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who constitute the best
evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the lawyer
who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice thereof, who thereafter
notarized it. All of them are disinterested witnesses who stand to receive no benefit from the
testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been identified on the will and
there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, that they were not
genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein conflict is factual and we go back to the rule
that the Supreme Court cannot review and revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of
Appeals.

Tanchanco vs. Garcia Santos (G.R. No. 204793, June 8, 2020) ​YAP
GR No. 204793
June 8, 2020

Article 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:

(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;

(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.
(n)

FACTS:
 Consuelo Garcia died leaving estate in this case. Catalino Tanchanco, grandchild of
Consuelo filed a petition to settle the intestate estate of Consuelo. Natividad Garcia Santos, one
of the daughters of Consuelo, aunt of Catalino, file a Motion to Dismiss stating that she already
filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Consuelo.

The Tanchancos filed an opposition to Natividad’s petition for probate and alleged
among others that, the attestation clause did not state the number of pages and the will was
written in Tagalog, and not in the English language usually used by Consuelo in most of her
legal documents. Natividad invoked substantial compliance and that the Tanchanco’s allegations
were not supported by proof.

The witnesses in this case were Attorneys Tantuico, Paras, and Lallana. Atty. Marapao
had assisted Atty. Lallana in drafting the will and he was also the one to notarize the will. Also,
said attorneys testified as to the soundness of mind of Consuelo upon drafting the will.

Ruling of the RTC:

The RTC gave credence to that Consuelo left no will and that her properties would be
equally divided between her two children.

Ruling of the CA:

The CA declared that the will should be allowed probate. Natividad complied with
proving the due execution and authenticity of the will by presenting the witnesses who admitted
the singing of the will in the presence of each other and Consuelo in a conference room of
Quasha Law Office in Makati City and that at the time of the execution of the will, Consuelo was
very alert and sane and was not suffering from any physical ailment.

ISSUE:
Whether the will should be allowed probate

DECISION:
Yes, the will should he allowed probate as Lawyers are not disqualified from being
witnesses to a will; the subscribing witnesses testified to the due execution of the will.

Article 820 of the New Civil Code provides that, any person of sound mind and of the
age of eighteen years of more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a
witness to the execution of a will mention in Article 805 of this code.

Here, the attesting witnesses to the will in question are all lawyers equipped with the
aforementioned qualifications. In addition, they are not disqualified from being witnesses under
Article 821 of the New Civil Code, even if they all worked at the same law firm at the time.

As pointed out by Natividad, these lawyers would not risk their professional licenses by
knowingly signing a document which they knew was forged or executed under duress; moreover,
they did not have anything to gain from the estate when the signed as witnesses. All the same,
petitioners did not present controverting proof to discredit them of to show that they were
disqualified from being witnesses to Consuelo’ will at the time of its execution.

The lawyer-witnesses unanimously confirmed that the will was duly executed by
Consuelo who was of sound mind and body at the time of signing. The Tanchancos failed to
dispute the competency and credibility of these witnesses; thus, the Court is disposed to give
credence to their testimonies that Consuelo executed the will in accordance with the formalities
of the law and with fill mental faculties and willingness to do so.

Cruz v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 31 ​ALILIAN

​FACTS: The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz.
However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed
without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in
accordance with law. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was
acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there
is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary
public was one of them.

ISSUE: Can the acknowledging officer serve as witness at the same time?

RUILING: No. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the
third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To
acknowledge before means to avow; to own as genuine, to assent, to admit, and “before” means in front
or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he
would have to avow, assent or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge
his participation in the making of the will.

Article 824

Caluya v. Domingo, 27 Phil 330 ​BURGOS

G.R. No. L-7647 March 27, 1914

DOMINGO CALUYA,​ petitioner-appellant, vs. ​LUCINA DOMINGO,​ respondent-appellee.

FACTS: ​The CFI denied the probate of a will on 3 grounds: ​The first one was that, although the
testator had signed by mark, it nowhere appeared in the will who had written the signature or
that it had been written at his request. The second, that the witness Antonino Pandaraoan
could not really have signed the attestation clause because, at the time it was executed, he was
attending a session of the municipal council of Piddig as a member thereof. Third: That as to the
other witness, Segundino Asis, the will mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to him by the
testator, and he being thereby an interested party his testimony could not be believed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: ​WON the will was valid

HELD: YES. ​It is nowhere required that, where the testator is unable to write, the fact that his
signature was written by some other person, at his request and express direction, should
appear in the body of the will itself.

As to the third ground that the will having mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to
Segundino Asis, one of the witnesses to the will, while not rendering the will entirely invalid,
throws great doubt upon the legality of its execution and especially the testimony of said
witness relating thereto.

Section 622 provides:

If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to whose wife or husband, or parent, or
child, a beneficial devise, legacy, or interest, of or affecting real or personal estate, is given by
such will, such devise, legacy, or interest shall, so far only as concerns such person, or the wife
or husband, or parent or child of such person, or anyone claiming under such person or such
wife or husband, or parent or child, be void, unless there are three other competent witnesses
to such will, and such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise,
legacy, or interest had not been made or given. ​But a mere charge on the real or personal
estate of the testator, for the payment of debts, shall not prevent his creditors from being
competent witnesses to his will.

As will readily be seen on reading this section, nothing in the will before us relative to the sale
of land to Segundino Asis creates such an interest therein as falls within the provisions thereof.
Indeed, no interest of any kind was created by the will in favor of Segundino Asis, nor did it
convey or transfer of any interest to him. It simply mentioned a fact already consummated, a
sale already made. Even if, however, the will had conveyed an interest to Segundino Asis, it
would not have been for that reason void. Only that clause of the will conveying an interest to
him would have been void; the remainder could have stood and would have stood as a valid
testament.

The SC held the validity of the will and ordered for its probate.
Article 828

​ UBELLO
Testate Estate of Maloto v. CA, 158 SCRA 451, 1988 C

Article 832

Molo v. Molo, G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951 ​ERUM

JUANA JUAN VDE DE MOLO vs. LUZ GLICERIA AND CORNELIO MOLO
G.R. No. L-2538 SEPTEMBER 21, 1951

FACTS: ​Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941 in Pasay, Rizal without leaving any forced heir.
He was survived by his wife Juana and by his nieces and nephew, the respondents, who are the
legitimate children of the deceased’s brother Candido Molo. He left two wills, one executed on
August 17, 1918 and another on June 20, 1939.

On February 7, 1941, Juana filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition seeking for the probate of the
will executed by the deceased in 1939. The will was initially admitted to probate, however upon
a petition filed by the oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to probate was set
aside and the case was reopened. The CFI of Rizal ruled that petitioner failed to prove that the
subject will was executed in accordance with law.

In view of the disallowance of the 1939 will, the widow on February 24, 1944, filed another
petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased in 1918. Again, the same
oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now
estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in
the manner required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked.

Before the second petition could be heard, the battle for liberation came and the records of the
case were destroyed. Consequently, a petition for reconstitution was filed, but the same was
found to be impossible because neither petitioner nor oppositors could produce the copies
required for its reconstitution. As a result, petitioner filed a new petition on September 14, 1946,
similar to the one destroyed, to which the oppositors filed an opposition based on the same
grounds as those contained in their former opposition. On May 28, 1948, the will was admitted
to probate.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that Molo’s will of 1918 was
subsequently revoked by the decedent’s 1939 will.
RULING: ​NO. There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately
destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause
contained in the will he executed in 1939. The only evidence we have is that when the first will
was executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the
testator himself and apparently they remained in his possession until he executed his second
will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner
was asked by her attorney to look for another will, she found the duplicate copy among the
papers or files of the testator. She did not find the original.

If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will because of his
knowledge of the revocatory clause of the 1939 will, and it is true that he gave a duplicate copy
thereof to his wife, the herein petitioner, the most logical step for the testator to take is to recall
said duplicate copy in order that it may likewise be destroyed. But this was not done as shown
by the fact that said duplicate copy remained in the possession of petitioner. It is possible that
because of the long lapse of twenty-one (21) years since the first will was executed, the original
of the will had been misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was a copy, the testator deemed
it wise to execute another will containing exactly the same testamentary dispositions. ​Whatever
may be the conclusion we may draw from this chain of circumstances, the stubborn fact
is that there is no direct evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by
the testator. This matter cannot be inference or conjectur.

It is the Court’s opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of
"dependent relative revocation".

This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually applied where the
testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a
present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the
new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for same reason. The doctrine is limited to
the existence of some other document, however, and has been applied where a will was
destroyed as a consequence of a mistake of law.

The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another
will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend
upon the efficacy of a new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the
new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original
will remains in full force.

This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a new testamentary
disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a
suspensive conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent
to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction
conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new
will.

We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the
testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such
destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is
founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be
given due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not
intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two
different occasion and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no
mistake as to his intention of dying testate.

Naval v. Naval, G.R. No. L-11823, February 11, 1918 ​FUENTES

Article 830

​ LACO
Testate Estate of Maloto v. CA, 158 SCRA 451, 1988 O
TESTATE ESTATE OF MALOTO v. CA
158 SCRA 451

FACTS: ​Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners
Aldina Maloto- Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo
Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will
and testament, these four heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement
of their aunt’s estate. While the case was still in progress, they executed an extrajudicial
settlement of Adriana’s estate dividing it into four equal parts among themselves. They
presented the same and successfully gained court approval.

Three years later, a document was discovered entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA

PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),” purporting to be the last will and testament of
Adriana. Malotos oppposed the probate of the Will stating among others that the said
will was revoked. Two witnesses were presented to prove that the will was burned by
Adriana herself.

ISSUE: ​Was the will validly revoked?

RULING: ​No. The will was not validly revoked. Under Article 830. No will shall be
revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or

(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or

(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it,
by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the
express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate
distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its
unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the
Rules of Court.

A valid revocation must be done with animus revocandi or the intention to revoke
coupled with an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will
carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express
direction.

In the instant case, the document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe, was
not satisfactorily established–that such was the will of Adriana Maloto. And that the
burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. Also
the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses stated that they were the only ones
present at the place where papers were burned. The act done by the witnesses could
not have constituted a valid revocation of Adriana’s Will.

​ IVERA
Gago v. Mamuyac, 49 Phil. 902 (1927) R

FACTS:

The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac,
who died on the 2d day of January, 1922​. It appears from the record that on or about the 27th day of July,
1918, the said Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament (Exhibit A). The said Francisco Gago
presented a petition for the probation of that will. The probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio
Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac . The petition for the probation of
said will was denied upon the ground that the deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919, executed a
new will and testament.

On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was commenced. Its purpose was to secure the
probation of the said will of the 16th day of April, 1919 (Exhibit 1).To said petition the same oppositors
presented their oppositions, alleging (​a)​ that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament
executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (​b)​ that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the
lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and (​c​) that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased
Miguel Mamuyac.

The judge, after hearing the respective parties, denied the probation of said will of April 16, 1919, upon
the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920. The opponents have
successfully established the fact that father Miguel Mamuyac had executed in 1920 another will. Narcisa
Gago, the sister of the deceased, who was living in the house with him, when cross-examined by attorney
for the opponents, testified that the original Exhibit A could not be found. For the foregoing consideration
and for the reason that the original of Exhibit A has been cancelled by the deceased father Miguel
Mamuyac, the court disallows the probate of Exhibit A for the applicant.

ISSUE:

Whether ​the will presented for probate had been cancelled by the testator in 1920

RULING:

Yes. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when
last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled
or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the
will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by
any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of
cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the
circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the
testator with intent to revoke it.

In view of the fat that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel
Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the
conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a
proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its
execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the
contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed
for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all
evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts
with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate
and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may
be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled
or destroyed by the testator.

After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will presented for probate
had been cancelled by the testator in 1920.

Article 832
 Molo v. Molo, G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951 ​VILLARIN

FACTS:

Mariano Molo y Legaspi executed two (2) wills, one executed on June 20, 1939 (1939 Will) and
another in 1918 (1918 Will). He died. He was survived by his wife and his nieces and nephew,
Luz and Cornelio Molo. Mariano’s wife filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 Will. In view of
the disallowance of the 1939will, the widow filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will.
The oppositors filed an oppositionalleging that the said will had already been revoked under the
1939 will contending that, notwithstanding the disallowance of said will, the revocatory clause is
valid and still has the effect of nullifying the prior of 1918. The oppositors contend that the
testator, after executing the 1939 will, and with full knowledge of the recovatory clause
contained said will, himself deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and for that
reason the will submitted by petitioner for probate in these proceedings is only a duplicate of
said original.

ISSUE:​Can the 1918 Will still be valid despite the revocatory clause in the 1939 will which was
disallowed for probate?

RULING: YES

A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the
reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous
will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.

There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately destroyed the
original of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will
he executed in 1939. The only evidence we have is that when the first will was executed in
1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the testator himself and
apparently they remained in his possession until he executed his second will in 1939. And when
the 1939 will was denied probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her
attorney to look for another will, she found the duplicate copy (Exhibit A) among the papers or
files of the testator. She did not find the original.

This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a new testamentary
disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a
suspensive conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent
to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction
conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new
will. (1 Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p. 253.)

We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the
testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such
destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is
founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be
given due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not
intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two
different occasion and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no
mistake as to his intention of dying testate.

​ AP
Diaz v. De Leon, 43 Phil 413, 1922 Y
G.R. No. 17714
May 31, 1922

Article 832. A revocation made in a subsequent will shall take effect, even if the new will should
become inoperative by reason of the incapacity of the heirs, devisees or legatees designated
therein, or by their renunciation.

FACTS:
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by alleging
that the testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another will expressly
revoking the former.

From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the testator, shortly after the
execution of the first will in question, asked that the same be returned to him. The instrument
was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the document. This was done in his
presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After some time, the testator, being asked
by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been destroyed.
 We find that the second will executed by the deceased is not cloth with all the
necessary requisites to constitute a sufficient revocation.

ISSUE:
Whether or to the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now, was revoked by him

DECISION:
Yes, the will executed by Jesus de Leon was already revoked by him.

According to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction
of a will animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation.

The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the
testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will.
This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statements to the witnesses Canto and the
Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined.

The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo
revocandi, cannot now be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.

Article 838

​ LILIAN
Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil 479 1943 A

​ URGOS
Dela Cerna v. Potot, 12 SCRA 576, 1964 B

G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964

PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., ​petitioners, vs. ​MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ​respondents.

FACTS: O​n May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a
joint last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed: that their two parcels of
land with all improvements acquired during marriage shall be given to Manuela Rebaca (niece),
since they had no child; and that Spouses Manuela Rebaca and Nicolas Potot will continue to
enjoy the fruits of the two lands.

Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the will was submitted to probate by said
Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance. The CFI admitted to probate the will.
Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate of
the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952, but for failure
of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and her attorney, Manuel Potot to appear, for the hearing
of said petition, the case was dismissed on March 30, 1954.

The Court of First Instance declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary to
the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil
Code of the Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed,
on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction
and conclusive on the due execution of the testament. It ruled that while making a joint will is
prohibited by law, however, a joint last will and testament has been admitted to probate by
final order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no alternative except to give
effect to the provisions thereof that are not contrary to law. The CA also dismissed the action
for partition.

Whence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.

ISSUE: ​WON the will was valid.

HELD: YES. ​Tha CA correctly held ​that the final decree of probate in 1939 by the CFI has
conclusive effect as to his last will despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already
decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in
favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error committed by the probate court was
an error of law. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon
the whole world and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional
errors judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. ​Interest rei
publicae ut finis set litium.

Petitioners, as heirs of Bernabe were concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his will to
probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks that the
ultimate decision on Whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here they have
spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this court, the dismissal of their
action for partition was correct.

But the probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of Bernabe and not include the
disposition of the share of Gervasia, who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the
conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate
could not then be in issue. Note that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated
during the testator's lifetime.

It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned,
must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated ​de novo​, since a joint will is considered a
separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the CFI that the joint will is one
prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the
properties in question. Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon
her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir.

​ UBELO
Gallanosa v. Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676 (1978) C

Gallanosa v. Arcangel

83 SCRA 676

FACTS:

Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother Lito. In his will,
Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla, and, should
Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his ½ share would be assigned to spouses Gallanosa.
Pedro Gallanosa was Tecla’s son by her first marriage who grew up under the care of
Florentino. His other properties were bequeathed to his protégé Adolfo Fortajada.

Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition was registered by
Florentino’s brother, nephews and nieces. After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present
any evidence, the Judge admitted the will to probate. The testator’s legal heirs did not appeal
from the decree of probate and from the order of partition and distribution.

Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against Pedro alleging that
they had been in continuous possession of those lands and praying that they be declared
owners thereof.

Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge on the ground of res
judicata.

The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal. 15 years after the dismissal of the first
civil case and 28 years after the probate of the will, the legal heirs filed a case for “annulment of
the will” alleging fraud and deceit.

The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal after the heirs filed
a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the “annulment” of the will of Florentino and
for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.

HELD:

NO. The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting aside its
order of dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case and the first civil case which is the same
as the instant case. It is evident that second civil case is barred by res judicata and by
prescription.

The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will. That
means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time he executed the will and
was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him
in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine.

Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a
criminal action for the forgery of the will.

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution
cannot be raised anymore.

The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding in rem, is
binding upon the whole world. Moreover, the dismissal of the first civil case, which is a judgment
in personam, was an adjudication on the merits. Thus. It constitutes a bar by former judgment
under the Rules of Court.

The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the recovery of the lands
had not been prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art. 1410 of NCC (the action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe) cannot apply to last wills and
testaments.

The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for “annulment” of a will. A final decree of
probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will.

A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole world.After the period
for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of court has expired,
a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack
of due process of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral
fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is four (4) years from the
discovery of fraud.

The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not prescribe
cannot be applied to last wills and testaments.

Nepomuceno v. CA, 139 SCRA 206, 1985 ​ERUM

Baltazar v. Laxa, 2012 ​FUENTES

In Re: Pilapil, 72 Phil 546 ​OLACO

Maninang v. CA, 114 SCRA 478 ​RIVERA

FACTS:

Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the age 81. She left a holographic will​, the pertinent portions of which
are quoted hereunder:

xxx xxx xxx

It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi
City and all my personal properties shagllbe inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L.
Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra.
Maninang and her husband Pamping have been kind to me. ... I have found peace and happiness
with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am
now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy
would like me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not consider
Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent​. On the other hand,
herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent
Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings. He then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case
on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was
preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.

The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case and appointed Bernardo as the administrator
of the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said
deceased while oppositor Soledad Maninang is not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has
not been shown to be unfit to perform the duties of the trust. "

ISSUE:

Whether the Testate Case should be dismissed?

RULING:

No. We find that the Court ​a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate
Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.

No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated
and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be
rendered nugatory.

Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. ​Opposition to the intrinsic validity or
legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose
is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.

Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronouncement in ​Nuguid vs. Nuguid ​, reading:

In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after
the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. ​However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue.​ (Emphasis supplied)

The ​Nuguid ​case provides the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those
cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover,
for the parties in the ​Nuguid c​ ase, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in
fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed
probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and
a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.
 Spouses Pascual v. CA, G.R. No. 115925, August 15, 2003 ​VILLARIN

FACTS:

Consolacion andRemediosare the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the late

Canuto. CANUTO and 11 other individuals, were co-owners of a parcel of land.

CANUTO had the lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into and were placed under CANUTO's
name.CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng BilihangTuluyan​. ​Under the
KASULATAN, CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of CONSOLACION for P2,250.00.
The KASULATAN, notarized. CONSOLACION immediately took possession. She later declared
the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real estate taxes.On 1968, the
surviving children of CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a joint affidavit affirming
the said sale. On 1988, REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her spouse
Ricardo Pascualfor "Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages."
REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because CATALINA devised
these lots to her in CATALINA's last will and testament.

ISSUE:

Whether Consolacion’s claim of ownership is valid?

HELD:

No. REMEDIOS anchored her claim over the lots on the devise of these lots to her under
CATALINA's LAST WILL. However, the court found that the probate court did not issue any
order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS does not contest this finding. Indeed,
during the trial, REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still
pending.Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." This Court has
interpreted this provision to mean, "until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and
no right can be claimed thereunder."REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit on her being
a devisee of Catalina’s last will. However, since the probate court has not admitted CATALINA's
LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any right under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus
without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce
an implied trust over these lots.
 ​ AP
Mercado v. Santos, 66 Phil 216 Y
G.R. No. 45629
September 22, 1938

SUBSECTION 8. Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:
Antilano Mercado filed a petition for probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa.
Sixteen months after the probate of the will, intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed a complaint
against Antilano, for falsification or forgery of the will probated.

T​he petitioner herein has been arrested four times, has put up a bond in the sum of P4,000
and has engaged the services of counsel to undertake his defense an equal number of times. The
first arrest was made upon a complaint filed by one of the intervenors herein for alleged
falsification of a will which, sixteen months before, had been probated in court. This complaint,
after investigation, was dismissed at the complainant's own request. The second arrest was made
upon a complaint charging the same offense and this complaint, too, was dismissed at the behest
of the complainant herself who alleged the quite startling ground that the petitioner was in poor
health. The third arrest was made following the filing of an information by the provincial fiscal
of Pampanga, which information was dismissed, after due investigation, because of insufficiency
of the evidence. The fourth arrest was made when the provincial fiscal secured a reinvestigation
of the case against the petitioner on the pretext that he had additional evidence to present,
although such evidence does not appear to have ever been presented.

ISSUE:
Whether the probate of Ines Basa’s will is a bar to Mercado’s criminal prosecution for the
alleged forgery of said will

DECISION:
Section 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides as to the effect of judgments:

"Sec. 306. Effect of judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or
special proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of
any State or Territory of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce... the judgment or
order, may be as follows:

"1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a
will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person, the... judgment or order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of
the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death... of the testator or intestate:
 Sec. 306. Effect of judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or
special proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of
any State or Territory of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce... the judgment or
order, may be as follows:

"1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a
will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person, the... judgment or order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of
the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death... of the testator or intestate:

Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due execution
of a probated will. It says:

"Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No will shall pass
either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First instance, or
by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of... real and personal
estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution." (Underscoring ours.)

Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due
execution of a probated will. It says:

"Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No will shall pass
either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First instance, or
by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of... real and personal
estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution."

Manahan vs. Manahan

The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it
cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separate or independent action or... proceeding.

28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378

"The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction mereof is usually
considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was... not
acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a
forgery.

As our law on wills, particularly section 625 of our Code of Civil Procedure aforequoted,
was taken almost bodily from the Statutes of Vermont, the decisions of the Supreme Court of
that State relative to the effect of the probate of a will are ox persuasive authority in this...
jurisdiction.

Vermont statute as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will reads as
follows:

"Sec. 2356. No will shall pass either real or personal estate, unless it is proved and
allowed in the probate court, or by appeal in the county or supreme court; and the probate of a
will of real or personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution."

Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of Missionary Society vs. Eells

The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof, upon the due
notice, is conclusive as to its due execution against the whole world.
The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice
by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon... everybody, even
against the State. This court held in the case of Manalo vs. Paredes and Philippine Food Co.

Everrett vs. Wing (103 Vt., 488, 492), the Supreme Court of Vermont

"In this State the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, being in form and substance
upon the will itself to determine its validity. The judgment determines the status of the
instrument, whether it is or is not the will of the testator. When the proper steps... required by
law have been taken the judgment is binding upon everybody, and makes the instrument as to all
the world just what the judgment declares it to be. (Woodruti vs. Taylor, 20 Vt., 65, 73; Burbeck
vs. Little, 50 Vt., 713, 715; Missionary Society vs.

Eells, 68 Vt., 497, 504; 35 Atl., 453.) The proceedings before the probate court are
statutory and are not governed by common-law rules as to parties or causes of action. (Holdrige
vs. Holdrige's Estate, 53 Vt., 546, 550; Purdy vs. Estate of Purdy, 67 Vt. 50, 55;

30 Atl., 695.) No process is issued against anyone in such proceedings, but all persons
interested in determining the state or conditions of the instrument are constructively notified by
the publication of notice as required by G. L. 3219. (Woodruff vs. Taylor,... supra; In re Warner's
Estate 98 Vt., 254; 271; 127 Atl., 362.)"... ndido su quebrantada salud." The foregoing allegation
was inserted on page 6 of the... amended petition for certiorari presented to the Court of Appeals.
The constitutional issue also appears to have been actually raised and considered in the Court of
Appeals. In the majority opinion of that court, it is stated:

"Upon the foregoing facts, counsel for the petitioner submits for the consideration of this
court the following questions of law: First, that the respondent court acted arbitrarily and with
abuse of its authority, with serious damage and prejudice to the rights and interests... of the
petitioner, in allowing that the latter be prosecuted and arrested for the fourth time, and that he be
subjected, also for the fourth time, to a preliminary investigation for the same offense, thereby
converting the court into an instrument of oppression and vengeance on... the part of the alleged
offended parties, Rosario Basa et al.; * * *."

And in the dissenting opinion, we find the following opening paragraph:

"We cannot join in a decision declining to stop a prosecution that has dragged for about
five years and caused the arrest on four different occasions of a law abiding citizen for the
alleged offense of falsifying a will that years before, had been declared genuine and valid... by a
court of competent jurisdiction."

From the view we take of the instant case, the petitioner is entitled to have the criminal
proceedings against him quashed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed,
without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

From the view we take of the instant case, the petitioner is entitled to have the criminal
proceedings against him quashed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed,
without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

​ LILIAN
Lim v. CA, 323 SCRA 102 A

Alsua-Betts v. CA, July 30, 1979 ​BURGOS

G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979

FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, ​petitioners, vs. ​COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO
ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian,
CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, ​respondents.

FACTS: ​On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña Florentina Rella, both of
Ligao, Albay, together with all their living children, entered into a duly notarized agreement
over the properties of the spouses. On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doña Florentina (Dona
Tinay), separately executed their separate holographic wills the provisions of which were in
conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949.

On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Tinay filed before the CFI for the probate of
their wills. On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Tinay executed their mutual
and reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wills. On
February 19, 1957, their respective holographic wills and the codicils thereto were duly
admitted to probate. Upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named
executor

In November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio imperial
Sr. was then instructed to draft a new will (notarial will) which was duly signed by Don Jesus
and his attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959.

On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died. On May 20, 1964, petitioner Francisca Alsua Betts, as the
executrix named in the will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new
will of Don Jesus Alsua before the CFI. Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and
Fernando and argued that the will was not executed according to the formal requirements of
the law.

The CFI approved the notarial will. On appeal to the CA, it reversed the decision of CFI. On the
ground that Don Jesus had sought the probate of his will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of
August 14, 1956 during his lifetime but insofar as the will of November 14, 1959 is concerned,
he had no intention of seeking the probate thereof during his lifetime. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: ​whether the respondent court erred in not allowing the probate of the last will and
testament of Don Jesus Alsua.

HELD: YES.

Petitioners claim that the disallowance was based on speculations, surmises or conjectures,
disregarding the facts as found by the trial court. The Civil Court is very clear and explicit in
providing the cases where a will may be disallowed under Article 839; the findings of the lower
court declaring the contested will as having been executed with all the formal requirements of
a valid will, are supported by the evidence. This finding is conclusive upon this Tribunal and We
cannot alter, review or revise the same.

We agree with the petitioner that these details which respondent court found difficult to
reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of life are mere conjectures, surmises or
speculations which, however, do not warrant or justify disallowance of the probate of the win
of Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did not cause his will to be probated during his lifetime
while his previous holographic win and codicil were duly probated when he was still alive is a
mere speculation which depends entirely on the discretion of Don Jesus as the testator. The law
does not require that a will be probated during the lifetime of the testator and for not doing so
there cannot arise any favorable or unfavorable consequence therefrom. The parties cannot
correctly guess or surmise the motives of the testator and neither can the courts. Such surmise,
speculation or conjecture is no valid and legal ground to reject allowance or disallowance of the
wig. The same thing can be said as to whatever reason Don Jesus had for selling the properties
to his daughter Francisca when he had already assigned the same properties to her in his will.
While We can speculate that Don Jesus desired to have possession of the properties transferred
to Francisca after the sale instead of waiting for his death may be a reasonable explanation or
speculation for the act of the testator and yet there is no certainty that such was actually the
reason. This is as good a conjecture as the respondents may offer or as difficult to accept which
respondent court believes. A conjecture is always a conjecture; it can never be admitted as
evidence.

​ UBELO
In Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil 159 C

In Re: Estate of Johnson G.R. No. 12767. November 16, 1918

Facts: On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of
the United States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated
amount of P231,800.

The will was written in the testator’s own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law
generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have
been proved under section 618.

On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of his death,
a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the will was duly executed in
accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to
section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleged that the law is inapplicable to his
father’s will

Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petition

Held: No.

Ratio: Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-week
publication of the notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in view
of the statute concerned which reads as “A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or
subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or
country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of
his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands” the “state”,
being not capitalized, does not mean that United States is excluded from the phrase (because
during this time, Philippines was still a territory of the US).
 ​ RUM
Leviste v. CA, 169 SCRA 580 E

Dorotheo v. CA, 320 SCRA 12 ​FUENTES

​ LACO
Maloles v. Phillips, G.R. No. 129505/133359, January 31, 2000 O

Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449, 1966 ​RIVERA

​ ILLARIN
Pastor Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983 V

Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984 ​YAP

G.R. No. L-54919
May 30, 1984

SUBSECTION 8. Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he
executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the
entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.

Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion
Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States. In her petition, Nenita alleged that
the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and
testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix
death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the
Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.

An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by Hermogenes. However, the latter
filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has
been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the
probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the
reprobate of the questioned will was made.

On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order
allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was
secured through fraudulent means.

The petition for relief was set for hearing but Hermogenes failed to appear. He made
several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.

The respondent judge, Tomas Leonidas, issued an order dismissing the petition for relief
for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Hermogenes filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which,
incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face,
patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last
will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the
instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the
withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will

DECISION:
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was
adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through
fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show
that after the firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation
wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed.
Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa
had long withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn
filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of
record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the
respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ​ex-parte, there being no
other opposition to the same.

As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records
wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19,
1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10,
1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court
even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was
repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the
future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to
vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such
request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.

Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly
devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:

SECTION 1. ​Where estate of deceased persons settled.​ — If the

decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed
with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged
and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite"
as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent
and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See
Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.

​ LILIAN
Coronado v. CA, G.R. No. 78778, December 3, 1990 A