Cree pein Pu ere Ue eee) se.as.dcywains ana iad wlonos qin anil (a0. 37), AMIChemE Affiliation: > Dept. of Chem. Eng., School of Eng., KMITL, Bangkok 10520 > Member of the Ethical Committee, (COE) > Former Chairperson, Chemi I Engineering and Petrochemicals, The Engineer g Institute of Thailand under H.M. the King’s Patronage (EIT) > Former President, The Thai Institute of Chemical Engineering and Applied Chemistry (TIChE) Contact: trimag@gmail.comauaoamaznaiaeosnisyes 2 the 1 I » i » filsznounis ! gam ' . \ awe Qoatnsiiiisssinfina 12 qanrnveanainstaust (Product Quality) | (Good Corporate Governance) 12 sin (Price) nee ' my QO qammvesndnites (Product Quality) msu3ms OQ Productivity, Reliability and Viability 1 \ a » 1 OQ anniianelavesgnt (Customer Satisfagtion) | Oannittataudinuiinrern ! O Safety and Reliability Ope!Process Hazards from Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) or Loss of Containment (LOC) * Fire from flammables substances * Explosion after fire or from highly chemical reaction * Highly hazardous chemical release Fire & Explosion, MTP 5 May 2012 12 killed, 129 injured eit Amon 140 MUSS Losses PP Silo Fired Phetchabun we Rayong 7 Oct 2020 30 Nov 2020Fire & explosion in a German industrial park Date: July 27, 2021 Time: 9:40 a.m. (0740 GMT) Location: The waste management facility of the Chempark site in Leverkusen, Germany At least 2 killed and 31 injured. 5 workers are still missing. “© Leverkusen is home to Bayer, one of Germany’s biggest chemical companies. ~ The Washington Post, 20219?Heat/Ignition Source Flammable and Oxygen Explosive Substances (Fuel)Challenging Factors for Company Competitiveness & Sustainability: | Technology, Digitalization and Agility Innovation, R&D, New Products, High Productivity, High Quality,and Integrated Supply Chain & Value Chain Workforce Competency & Growth Mindset (Intelligence can be Developed.) Safety Integrity vs. Effective Emergency ResponseEffective = Do right things First Things First...Root causes of process safety incidents mainly come from lacking of design integrity, operational integrity, mechanical integrity.Barrier Management Program (Barrier Model) ZABS GroupClassification of Property Damage Loss i. o : = Ess _ ° In the first 10 years of a plant’s operation, most losses are caused by operations-related failures, such as not following operating or permit-to-work procedures. As plant operations experience both loss toll and there is a steep rise develops, the number of losses reduces, until.age takes i frequency and magnitude in plants more than 30-years-old, creating a skewed “bath-tub curve.” In older plants, mechanical-integrity-related failures account for 65% of losses. Failure of piping becomes increasingly more prevalent as plants age. (Overall, not accounting for age of plant, piping failure accounts far 60% of mechanical integrity losses.) Marsh JLT Specialty. 2020. 100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019. 26th ed. 10MIVINITIAMIUNUAMAU Mitigation : niavasit Munrsldundunaannansenuua: ThanwdoFia friwnlunrsunuTastuswfecifindy Preparedness ; nii\@suuWian Lunrsiaiuaar wien yarns iad lvarumwindalidinraialeluunnussmsle unm Response : nvaauavay unralvaniwiawimfelusasiia wh Umctfiamaninh Recovery : maituy unaguatnemaandvaeustfinasl oy thn: nsufsamignaninss gileanasgrinrseaniuy arsatas nrafads nrslianw msnszoqoue tngaFnnsaiuaraniid una (Storage tank) Uszinnars lala 2559 aTumadariunugaauiiierteasumsniiduasy oziiestsznouves WM UMaWuUAUQMAaMAaTa ly mauagiqianrsastunqaniaiu fuatuarantidunsie ostosiinae}maatumsiniiviaimamqluedre a Tnamafinw foyanrndoyanrudaonnum sini (Safety Data Sheet) yorensinisfiarty Gaazaeadamaaetumamsinlisa lia qunsaiqunsos arnaoasadauynna fim vauainsunssz Tung ansauinaa ii nangaalunasetumnqunaelisiansial asiniliiiaaud suas dhavu wiosiar ud udunnsionr iu domunildadavudilh finszidala arssetumqundeladornarsinssatiuldihlunrsaunda iusty flan: naulssenugnannnssn gileanasgnimsoenumy misa%v misfiada malta Maas zeWoUUALMs aiygaSnundurluaraindtunsa (Storage tank) Uszinnenalatal 2559 12aloSulalwiao4 (Styrene monomer) voariarla araNUUsIATIININIgAU NEPA gavalatulalwaossiAoil Shiu usnomiudunswénidainwseda 2 : Sunsw uqunan uns usionrrailalaiazets. lalaigs infos Uaovernilasaujiiunedy 2 : Upfizuadquuse aor uatoiagaviay : Lid Sunswiameziiona ll ‘ovosnsiinanivo im atuarsneninsziia Avioiianasounsodsemell ays wWioduiuorseialadioinnwsouga dint din msainiavusiiona ll Aamivounouonlaa (CO) Manrvowlaoonla (CO,) uazivhwadiwnrauoH (Carbon Black) 13SECTION 5. FIRE-FIGHTING MEASURES Suitable extinguishing media Unsuitable extinguishing media Specific hazards during firefighting Specific extinguishing methods Special protective equipment for firefighters Foam, water spray or fog. Dry chemical powder, carbon dioxide, sand or earth may be used for small fires only. Do not use water in a jet. Flammable vapours may be present even at temperatures below the flash point, Sustained fire attack on vessels may result in a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE). ‘The vapour is heavier than air, spreads along the ground and distant ignition is possible. Will float and can be reignited on surface water. Hazardous combustion products may include: Carton monoxide. Formaldehyde = Standard procedure for chemical fires. Clear fire area of all non-emergency personnel Allstorage areas should be provided with adequate fire fighting facilities, Keep adjacent containers cool by spraying with water, Proper protective equipment including chemical resistant gloves are to be worn; chemical resistant suit is indicated if large contact with spilled product is expected. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus must be worn when approaching a fire in a confined space. Select fire fighter's clothing approved to 44 relevant Standards (e.g. Europe: EN469).‘WuMT (Pentane) vaunarla ATaNTUUSEMTARIIASETU NFPA wosLnuLUsiiet Ardy uanserududuanes uqumwnsedul 1: Suaswe duns — uaiasarallaliseaty 4 : Lalwgsqa Aivéioa uansamullaioufiiersvu 0 : ousioufiien fun — uanatioyariay : ‘alii ansinitiiliatumnas th naindiunits thotiela Mam sueutaoon'lad wollufinustonoanaaed ansitiintvastosiallal Aamivounononlasd (COyMMuMMMANTseaUM nn IWTOUTUTaTseMaONS aalnsefifosii ailnsifoatuscuumulemlainasgiummiuananiaoa sanazomnsidlumaianunianadscma 1901/31 (The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health : NIOSH) Foyariioutin vidinidasTo nqunty dh sazmuonuesmsinil szSunsinitdauafia aaam uasiorh 15Section 5. ire-fighting measures Extinguishing media Suitable extinguishing media Unsuitable extinguishing media Specific hazards arising from the chemical Hazardous thermal decomposition products Special protective actions for fire-fighters Special protective equipment for fire-fighters + Use dry chemical, CO2, water spray (fog) or foam + Do not use water jet Highly flammable liquid.and vapor, Runoff to sewer may create fire or explosion hazard, Ina fire or if heated, a pressure increase will cour and the container may burst, with the risk of a subsequent explosion, The vaporigas is heavier than air and will spread along the ground. Vapors may accumulate in low or confined areas or travel a considerable distance to a source of ignition and flash back. This material is toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects. Fire water contaminated with this material must be contained and prevented from being discharged to any waterway, sewer or drain + Decomposition products may include the following materials: carbon dioxide carbon monoxide :/ Promptly isolate the scene by removing all persons from the vicinity of the incident if there is a fire. No action shall be taken involving any personal risk or without suitable training. Mave containers from fire area if this can be done without risk. Use water spray to Keep fire-exposed containers cool : Fire-fighters should wear appropriate protective equipment and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) with a full face-piece operated in positive pressure mode. 16Ss, MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET io PRODUCT CODE AND NAME : EXPANDABLE POLYSTYRENE (EPS) DATE ISSUED : Jan. 20, 2016 Polystyrene | > 92.6 Expandable Polystyrene (EPS) ysty' Pentane <7.0 “National Fire Protection Flammability Association NFPA (United States) Health Reactivity Speaife danger] Sunway iioaalil am ae a a ay aw , od og y Hlofialloziiama a Wiwuazorfinszidala Hants wMuiuuazmaindunsala dat an asiiiadutiiona ll Aanriuvounouonlyd (CO) Manrivorlaoonlaa (CO,) aladu uazuosurlin Yalasaisuou (Aliphatic Hydrocarbon) 7Section 5. Fire-fighting measures 4] Recommended Fire Water may be ineffective on flames bul should be uSed to cool fire-exposed Extinguishing Agents And containers and provide protection for persons ‘Special Procedures: attempting to stop the leak. Use water spray, dry chemical, foam or carbon dioxide to extinguish fames. Unsuitable extinguish media | Do not use water jt. 52 | Unusual or Explosive Hazards: | Danger! Extremely flammable materials mayrelease vapors that travel long distances, ignite, and flash back. Containers may explode in a fre. Do not expose to heat, sparks, fame, static, or other sources of ignition. When handling, use non-sparking fool, round and bond all containers. Explosive ait-vapor mixtures may form. Fire gives off dense black smoke and acid gasses. Electrostatic discharge can be a source of ignition due to accumulated pentane vapors exceeding the L.E.L. (ower explosive limit) of 1.5% (15,000 ppm). Pentane vapors may be emitted from newly opened Containers or when the product is heated. Ifignted, there could be a very high rate of flame propagation ‘Combustion decomposition ‘Can produce carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, styrene, aliphatic hydrocarbons products 53 | Advice for firefighters Fire fighters should wear complete protective clothing including self-contained breathing apparatus. Chemical protection suit, Keep containers cool by spraying with water if exposed to fire. Flammable concentrations of pentane may accumulate on storage in closed containers Personal protective equipment Wear full protective clothing (chemical splash sult) and positive pressure self- contained breathing apparatus. 18as manhaszianveshl (CLASSIFICATION OF FIRE) - UL, NFPA 10, Hon. - BSEN@lal) A UKISO 7165 SL @ nes Ey oo sem sens 1S Nan Grn $035 S$.ay ication of Fi B vai Classification of Fire ihandafigntrsiann hi, &h aszanw , vanafin ana (Ordinary) undaiignlraianveaniaaialytyiiagna 9 arainailahl Wilt. viviTU (Oil & Gas) vain dea sunathuliinoingdasalbh wont Fhhhngadl nszualifiaeg, Electric) (C=E inUK) wren sicwens 8S Nano graeme Foe 20Tai 4 umadhiiniannlanzhldemsivjmeiun g wazqniallal iu usintivdun , lation , lnsiiien , Jandun , arian, sunenden 05 lave (have hititiinnmivtuilidsznovenns iu H@avouihlaoinitwuasiiad , viii , dairy Oils, Lard, Fats 2 (K=Fin UK) S owes FI low wre, siewens BS Nano B rmeroe 2, 2Types of Fire Accidents Fire accidents are relatively frequent among major accidents, being in fact the most frequent one. There are several types of fire accidents, depending on the circumstances and on the substances involved Loss of containment ‘of 2 ommedie substance £ on f 1 Feb Running i fee Poa re | + Fach ew ] | Jet re | a ae “Tank tee ] fre onground | | Freon water Ref, Eualia Planas and Joaquim C: UNCERTAINTIES. AND RESEARCH NEEDS" (2008) “FIRE ACCIDENTS IN PROCESS PLANTS: MATHEMATICAL MODELLING, Suggested reading: Passive Fire Protection Lifecycle 2Fireballs Fireballs is usually associated to the sudden loss of containment of a pressurized li juefied fuel, typically LPG. The two-phase cloud can burn only on its outer surface as inside there is no oxygen. This phenomenon has a short duration, but the thermal radiation intensity can be very strong. Fireballs, usually associated to the explosion of a vessel (often a BLEVE), release large amounts of therm: energy in a short time, originating very strong thermal radiation intensities with severe potential effeets Ref. uli Planas and Souq Casal “FIRE ACCIDENTS IN PROCESS PLANTS: MATHEMATICAL MODELLING, UNCERTAINTIES AND RESEARCH NEEDS" (2008) csPool Fires A pool fire occurs on ignition of an, accumulation of liquid as a pool on the ground or on water or other liquid. A steadily burning fire is rapidly achieved as the flame vapor to sustain the fire is provided by evaporation of liquid by heat from the flames. The maximum burning rate is function of the net heat of combustion and heat required for its vaporization. Gener; heat radiation dominates the burning rate for flame greater than I m diameter. Reef. Disaster Management Insitute, Bhopal. Types of major chemical/industial bazards Fite 24 nt: wow kr nte5783/e173274627015/027713) (2018)Flash Fires A flash fire occurs when a cloud of flammable gas and air ignited. The speed of burning is function of the concentration of the flammable component in the cloud and also the wind speed. Within a few seconds of ignition, the flame spreads both upwind and downwind of the ignition source. Initially, the flame is contained with in the loud due to premixed burning of the regions within the flammable limits. Subsequently, the flame extends in the form of a fire plume above the cloud. The downwind edge of the flame starts to moye towards the spill point after consuming the flammable vapor downwind of the i ion source. The duration of this fire is very short and the damage is caused by thermal radiation and oxygen depletion. Reef. Disaster Management Insitute, Bhopal. Types of major chemical/industial bazards Fite 25 nt: wow kr nte5783/e173274627015/027713) (2018)Jet Fires A jet fire occurs when a flammable liquid or gas is ignited after its release from a pressurized, punctured vessel or pipe. The pressure of release generates a long flame, which is stable under most con ions. A flash flame may take the form of jet flame on reaching the spill point. ‘The duration of the jet fire is determined by the release rate and the capacity of the source. Flame length increases directly with flow rate. Typically a pressurized release of 8 kg/s would have a length of 35 m. The cross winds also affects the flame length. 4 Reef. Disaster Management Insitute, Bhopal. Types of major chemical/industial bazards Fite 26 nt: wow kr nte5783/e173274627015/027713) (2018)Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion: BLEVE 1. A vessel partly filled with liquid with vapor above filling the remainder of the container is ruptured. The vapor portion may rapidly leak, lowering the pressure inside the container. 2, Sudden drop in pressure inside the container causes violent boiling of ‘the liquid, which rapidly liberates large amounts of vapor. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bleve_explosion. svg . The pressure of this vapor can be extremely high, causing a significant wave of overpressure (an explosion) which may completely destroy the storage vessel and project fragments over the surrounding area 28The mechanism of BLEVE formation due to external fire. The metal wall exposed to vapor will eventually fail at a pressure below the ned Vessel wall temperature does not vessel'S rated yom pipe spain tne olan eo pressure ‘Vessellyvall temperature increases due to poor heat transfer with vapor 29MaALoFNANIAIWIaNNAENIAAUlANTIZANIAM (EPR) Employee Alarm Systems EPR mraoulaly mmonun e anaqniin Emergency Action Plans Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response 30i 6.1 iy (Hazard) marietta sovunrsaiviodstielinindunse Sudsnanseuio mraviecty Guin windau ateumagrouseduindon dinanevaelcsnen’ fesifinvn | mansevioanyudunediownineluleteraunn 6.2 qifinvaal (Incident) varia somoralieclinwiniornesciin ' 63 emgenacinlna (Abrormad) vanes aban cidiintusrnmatidutensn | {voile teehee moa inp rrruoradjinpslseeninades ques | 4 ar wodfunmdinwitotos vogue iu vignduy Boats ut wacaine meow | thiteyeruediamnmetmaniae ongornalitdwanseiituncoimoaciilsangtainuin | ' umqrsciocls wddawense muuch vndiawsingon Chua i 6.4 nazqnid (Emergency) maneila ada manifiiunnentoamnetiisunsne | {sigs Aintuaaieuanemutiodin windy dwrndatl wiowuennetinedudsbianna | rraupltoguan nent ce uti iy RI en avant ha i uw ane — pres! eee ‘pr aegniaa TimnQaernnTaIsER 1 RE ge TR ernvaemarerne aoraatmeTTy unnvioduibndied Shru/oonnse ques saast losefvodlasny wScluituil Taslidatedunsroodin windau dturadon vormuaay olseutiuies uae/Tominine ‘mr aegnid Rengaamnnredy 2 TAROTY AERTS TW aOTIATTETOUIT TORR TTTTAT| uuttiodanéntonl élsseu/annualsenouns Bina; van ini ‘i fie gunsalgpalsssvustldan unweit yunrsls uaemqnrsalsluvaliniterdmalivindunsronotin) TWihidau ANAagen vorpmuuas/wiolsiutates unc/omorser dylariowowFolAtn nla Sno apstunrsn auquina nr safe niaodillis LY wfosnnd tna uitos pawrunbuitil wind ntnnnin toons ameqniinn hmngaarnnsseds 3 Tar Aaa TT ATTTSTTOUNTS ToT TTI VOirvodwAnAad ddsemw/aonwienouNs hisrwsnazuRunAN zolldiugaeuuss| efosfonsinaclensTasrulArnaueuntounall unvinqrraiiunaliadiaed walihindunrrong ont Rawrndon vorpmuune/violssmrutrakes uae/vomovine ansntiengyn fans un se uaa rn9 ns von so sx nhostvusisitud (mmnadionnun ns] 31 innuvredruatiuans mmurediumnuty Wownnaadih nsdonmhuiudalueneniaSn.n. 2564 mrssziuMaari la hia ysod Muna nny waeMevEauiuazelnsal a 5 yw ww oy a a Tnhnlanqudondshilionna sinzifanshienansangamssatiavosmomaaFunctional Safety in the Safety concept for a plant Disaster protection - protection Collection basin cay Overpressure valve, rupture disc ens Safety system (automatic) Plant personnel intervenes OR Cu Cee eee Normal activity © Siemens 2021 | Ir. Johnson Tan MinstMC CEng 33auuun uuomumsUavAu fon audigvavanainssuiad 00 Webex byeisco + fnmoluotnaquoomssdorenyaanctugaannnssuiAd sr.0s De yos doModug + PSM uacmsthourTuansindduastesieusy adwouaaamudavugudadwls Sf.05.diyuws nSnadat wdonao aynssumsnazaunoiugmowduniys awiSeonssuiAD + msthvfuvaonsulsougaaninssuiWadanA gute, uongaannnssuind ee SomakuSsulsimce wns s 3PDU Feaens sweaxva/aonsiGou Ll “muamanistosiuaiia ia ‘voagamnnssainii” Junsin 11 Ganian 2564 1901 13.00 - 16.30 W. shudtodiinnso fin (Cisco Webex) (3 PDU) https://www.coe.or.th/http_p ublic/main/choice_1/news/de tail. php?aType=2&aYear=2 021&aNo=257 34matloaiiuaiA AutrausouazannnapusavesqiAsuwusanoramiatwin dead seundanrsaraonadlunseuumanaamaunnstauanil (Risk-Based) Process Safety) vadfamiaitugnys wu + SosoonuuunszuaunrsHRauavgUnseindrmymiainasgyumeiaanssa saantafiarsanndnnrnnlavaiarnag fiitertos + imuariuriniavos Facility Siting od aNzen aun qUaselunssuauMsAaA aimrsAIUQUMsUAiMMsNA (Central Control Building) wowiqywnrsAeU Tamazantiuazednsamoulanazaniau IavUnfioimsnauqumsdgians AM uaZ MUTT YM NI IMOUIANIZANAUAZMoOMiszeZMWDINNIZUIUMIAAA Nsvavflaonduornthsinazusasaiin @iilaauaeasuiy) . msFUasuanrguaenralseiiunrvuduatudosdhAyAdoarmseazia Jauiamnesitodin snlasuuvaslunszusumsnan (Management of Change) itil wanazhusennaonsunszuaunisnaa Buudnsdinrsiaswudasnla sifiunatmmeaiuton munauyndssms4 Integrity Principles Associated with Process Safety Integrity £ a 2 = c iy a o a Operational Integrity Leadership Integrity Technical or Mechanical Standards / Codes / RAGAGEPs and training are important (A.W. Lothongkum) 36| RAGAGEPs through Every Asset Life Cycle Phase Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) Modified byRAE Engineering and Inspection Ltd. “Total Asset Integrity Management’, 37S “se oof Inherent Safety - Minimize (Intensification) - Substitute (Substitution) - Moderate (Attenuation and Limitation of Effects) - Simplify (Simplification and Error Tolerance) fia: Daniel A. Crowhand Joseph F. Louvar. 2019. Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals with Applications. 4th ed., Prentice Hall. 38Aostanrztduaneuazdse unawares How do we identify hazards? 1. Identify hazards and potential loss of the containment situations. 2. Identify potential causes that can result in loss of the containment. 3. Identify potential consequences of loss of the containment. 4. Identify control measures and safeguards to: * Prevent loss of the containment + Mitigate or reduce the consequences (such as fire, explosion, highly hazardous chemical release) Aoalvinaincneiey “Engineering and Administrative Controls” are considered as active safegards. uuzth: Nigel Hyatt.2003. Guidelines for Process Hazards Analysis, Hazards Ident CRC Press LLC. ication & Risk Analysis, 39Occupational Health and Safety “Personal safety” ™ Workplace rules ™ Worker training ™ Supervision " Individual behaviors ™ Safety equipment ™ Focus on ind jual well being " High frequency ™ Low severity Process Safety “Safety in the process industries” * Collective commitment ™ Addresses events over which the individual worker has little or no control ™ Focus on systems * Low frequency * Broader impact — events that could affect, groups of workers or general public (High severity) Rot: https:ichemeblog.org/2014/11/09Hen-differences-between-process-safety-and-occupational-safety-day- 165! /ttp:/rmuemse lolenvironmental-health-and-safety-che-consultancy-services!process-safety!MEaTAnend uaa sein uAIaAwAE Aaa Incidents in 2019 Saudi Arabia, Abqaiq oil processing facility and Khurais oil field September 14, 2019 Saudi Arabian Oil Co. Saudi Arabia failed to protect itself from drones and missiles attacked. 17 targets of 14 storage tanks and 3 processing production units were N/A fatality and injured a1Summary of Hazard Identification/Evaluation and Risk Analysis Methods Non-scenario-based methods Checklist analysis Safety review Inherent safety review Preliminary hazard analysis Relative ranking Scenario-based methods What-if analysis What-if/Checklist analysis Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) Fault tree analysis (FTA) Event tree analysis (ET) Cause-consequence analysis (CCA) Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) Bow-tie analysisFourth Edition Safety and Security Review for the Process Industries Application of HAZOP, PHA, ‘What-lF and SVA Reviews Tn PHA and What-If/Checklist Questions Part 1 Piping Part 2 Valves Part 3 Vessels Part4 Tanks Part 5 Pumps Part 6 Compressors Part 7 Heat Exchanger Part 8 Reactors Part 9 Columns and Towers Part 10 Flares Part 11 Electrical Equipment Part 12 Cooling Tower Part 13 U lity Systems Part 14 Human Factors Part 15 Global Events iafommunity Emergency Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) or Onion Model against Possible Accident Passive Containment; Dikes, Double-walls Relief Devices; Rupture Disks, Flare/Destruct Systems Response to Critical Alarms by Operators and Supervisors Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1, 2,3, 4 ant qaniouns Sanag7 a oysenHierarchy of Process Safety Strategies Strategy Emphasis Examples Inherent | See Inherently Safer Design Minimize (intensification) Strategies * Substitute (substitution) * Moderate (attenuation and limitation of effects) ‘Simplify (simplification and error tolerance) Passive | Minimizes the hazard through —_| ® Using equipment with a higher pressure rating process and equipment design than the maximum possible pressure features that reduce either the | * Blast walls around process equipment to reduce frequency or the consequence blast overpressures without the active functioning of | * Dikes around storage vessels to contain any device. Spills. Separation of equipment from occupied buildings and other locations where personnel may be present fisn: Daniel A. Crowhand Joseph F. Louvar. 2019. Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals with Applications, 4th ed., Prentice Hall. oeHierarchy of Process Safety Strategies (Cont.) Strategy Emphasis Examples Active Requires an active Alarms, with operator response response. These systems are Process control system) including basie process commonly referred to as control systems, safety instrumented systems, and engineering controls, although | safety instrumented functions human intervention is also Sprinklers and water deluge systems included. Pressure relief devices Inerting and purging systems. Water curtains to knock down gas releases Flares: Procedural | Based on an established or Policies official way of doing Something, These are commonly referred to as administrative controls. Operating procedures Safe work pract es such as lock-out / tag-out, vessel entry, and hot work Emergency response procedures Training 46Improvements in Safety Performance Time ys 47Behavior Based Safety Underlies and Benefits Traditional Safety Traditional Safety ogc LicaThank you -—