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Culture Documents
By John Drury
Within the context of his critique of religion as unbelief, Barth picks up the
“line of thought in Romans” (306). He acknowledges that Romans 1
emphasizes the heathen “knowledge of God the Creator” (306). This
knowledge of God is declared by the apostle “in and with the preaching of
Christ” (306). These words of Romans 1 are often used to justify all kinds
of natural theology. Yet Barth avers that they “are in reality a constituent
part of the apostolic kerygma” (306). Thus Romans 1 is not an
independent discussion of the natural knowledge of God. Rather, it forms
a part of the apostolic testimony to Christ.
In light of the context in which the passage should be read, Barth goes on
to indicate how the statements of Romans 1 function. Paul is certainly not
appealing the Gentiles’ prior possession of knowledge. He is not trying to
“link up pedagogically with this knowledge” (307). He does not regard it as
a “primal revelation” (307). There is no “remnant” of the natural knowledge
of God (307). What Gentiles do acknowledge is not God at all but a
negation of God. Thus there is no netural, “undisputed” heathendom to
which Paul could appeal (307).
What does Barth accomplish in this section? Barth here (1) blocks the
appeal to Romans 1 as a proof-text for natural theology, (2) locates the
knowledge of God the creator in its proper literary and theological context,
and (3) exhibits a procedure for how one might deal with other well-worn
natural theology texts (Acts 17, Ps 19, Amos 9, John 10:16). Note that in
contrast to Calvin, Barth places knowledge of God the Creator in a more
Christocentric context. However, the use of this knowledge parallels
Calvin’s treatment of the idolatrous use of our knowledge of God. So
although their theoretical assumptions might be different, the pragmatic
payoff is the same.
What does this section (II/1) add to the previous (I/2)? (1) Barth begins
with an exegesis of the creation story to show that his exegesis of
Romans 1 can be extended back into the Old Testament. The same
covenant that forms the context of Romans 1 is the covenant promised in
Genesis 1-2. There is no abstract human, even in the beginning. (2) He
expands his exegesis of Romans to include the insightful parallels
between Jewish law and Gentile knowledge of the Creator. (3) Barth
clarifies in what sense unbelieving humanity receives revelation: as
unwilling witnesses. Thus Barth can continue to block the idea of an
independent revelation in creation while at the same time acknowledging
that creatures bear witness to God (certainly a biblical affirmation). (4) He
emphases even more the eschatological and even apocalyptic nature of
revelation, especially as it bears on the interpretation of Romans 1 and
Acts 17. It may be that it is precisely Barth’s thoroughgoing eschatology
that separates him from Brunner on these points.
At the end of his life, Barth once again picked up the problem of the
knowledge of God and hence also the exegesis of Romans 1 and Acts 17.
In a short small print section, Barth reiterates, clarifies and (possibly)
develops his earlier treatments.
Concluding Questions:
(2) Does the utter newness of the revelation of God in Christ (II/1, 120)
render ambiguous the relationship between this revelation and the
objective revelation of God in creation (II/1, 119)? Is it new only
noetically? In other words, is it new to us, but not new to God?
(3) Since Barth makes use of a grace-based form of the term “point of
contact,” could it be that his quarrel with Brunner was focused more
on the problem of nature and grace than on this rather innocuous
phrase?
(6) Does Barth ultimately come closer to Calvin over the course of the
dogmatics, as Berkhof suggests?